The Polish 2011 presidency of the EU was notable for its initiative to break the deadlock on the lack of effectiveness of the EU's Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). To date, the results have been limited, but the Polish drive to have a more robust EU capacity in defence is an intriguing case of a shift in strategic thinking on European strategic autonomy. Among others, it provokes asking basic questions with regards to the future of the EU as a strategic actor.
The (in)ability to act
Since the launch of CSDP the EU has organized almost 30 peace support operations, deploying a total of more than 60 000 civilian experts and soldiers. Those missions have been building the capacity of local rule of law institutions (e.g., in Kosovo), implementing security sector reform (Guinea Bissau, Congo), training local security forces (Iraq, Afghanistan, Somalia), protecting refugees from violence (Chad), deterring pirates from attacking commercial and WFP ships (Somali waters) or monitoring cease fires and peace deals (Georgia, Macedonia, Indonesia, Bosnia&Herzegovina). It might seem that those simple facts are enough to prove that the EU is effectively addressing security problems in its closer and further neighborhood. However, this not the case.
Undeniably, the EU has launched multiple operations, developed an institutional framework of the CSDP and declared an ambitious role on the global security arena. However, the CSDP has had to cope with numerous shortcomings: member states' reluctance to provide national capabilities for operations and to participate in EU-led capability initiatives, as well as difficulties in reaching consensus on the modalities of agreed operations. For the latter reason, the EU has never used Battle Groups, meant to be its flagship military capability. The crisis has deepened these problems by diverting the member states' attention away from the CSDP and forcing governments to cut national military assets. The vision of the Union swiftly deploying integrated forces under its flag to address a security crisis has moved further away.
A matter of strategic choice
Launching CSDP back in 1999 required a deal between the states, which wanted to keep the Atlantic Alliance as the exclusive pillar of European security (and the Union as a predominately economic organization) and those, which pursued European autonomy in defense. As a result the EU was given both tools to launch operations and a task to address security crises, but made dependent of NATO's planning, command and control infrastructure, member states' capabilities and was denied the right to defend itself. In this awkward strategic framework the CSDP grew mostly as a civilian tool, employing experts and policemen, rather than soldiers.
Nowadays, the vision of the EU employing military assets to secure its vital interests, such as stability of its neighborhood, is, arguably, not popular among EU members. It seems that the majority of member states either do not care about the strategic future of the EU in this regard or openly pursues the vision of the Union as merely a "manager" of the single market. The ones that see a global role for the Union, a role of a strategic actor able to formulate defence policy vis-à-vis the rising powers and implement it to solve security challenges, are a clear minority.
A model evolution?
It is needless to remind, that Poland did not hide its anxiety towards the CSDP, fearing that too much investment in CSDP will result in a weaker NATO, seen as primary pillar of European security. Nevertheless, this strategic assumption was complemented with the sense of a shared responsibility for the EU's global role and a desire to play a visible role within the Union. And this is precisely why Poland contributed to numerous operations of the Union and invested considerable effort in EU capability initiatives (among others by leading three Battle Groups). A strong and secure EU, effective on the global stage, and Poland having influence on the Union's policies was acknowledged as a prerequisite for Polish security and prosperity.
The Polish drive to boost CSDP was further reinforced by a re-interpretation of recent strategic developments. With the U.S. pivot shifting to the Pacific, fiscal austerity making defence budgets shrink, and, further, a new wave of instability in both Europe's Eastern and Western neighborhood, the need to have a more robust EU's capacity in security and defence has been reappraised in Polish strategic thinking. Although NATO is still seen by Polish leaders as the best hard security guarantee, the Union is valued as much as the Art 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty.
Choosing a strategic future
The Polish call to have a more effective CSDP by establishing a central headquarters for the Union's military operations, by revising the Battle Groups system to make it more usable, or by having a new strategy for the Union's external relations, is not lip-servicing. It is neither a challenge to NATO's guarantees - the CSDP will long be far from the Alliance's unprecedented capacity to actually assist its members in the case of politico-military crises. Finally, Warsaw does not foresee creating a European "foreign legion"; a robust EU military capacity is not more, but perhaps as much as making national military assets more interlinked, more available for EU operations, more suitable for today's security challenges and more common, in this precise sense.
The re-oriented Polish policy towards CSDP can be seen as a vote for the EU assuming a role of a genuine strategic actor. One, which not only formulates an autonomous security policy, but is actually able to implement it with concrete capabilities, both civilian and military. The latter being a condition of efficiency in the volatile world, where future crises may be far different from the ones we already coped with.
Marcin Terlikowski is an international security analyst at the Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM). His area of research is the Common Security and Defence Policy of the European Union, the European defence industry and defence equipment market, cybersecurity and privatization of security. He is the author of various papers and articles on CSDP operations, EU military capabilities, and the evolution of the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base.