Strategic security and defence agreement between Afghanistan and US

On 21 November the national council of elders of Afghanistan (Loya Jirga) agreed to the terms of a ‘strategic security and defence agreement’ with the United States.

The Security and Defence Agreement was concluded about 1,5 years after a first Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) was endorsed by the Loya Jirga. Whereas this BSA (aka Strategic Partnership Agreement) dealt with the overall political, economic and development support the US would provide to Afghanistan after 2014, the latest agreement details the presence of US forces and American military assistance after 2014 – a contentious matter for both parties.

Litmus test

The commitment of Afghanistan and the US to substantiate the agreements could prove to be the litmus test for the Kabul Government’s ability to remain ‘in control’ post 2014. It is still in the mind of many Afghan leaders, that it was drying up of funds from Moscow following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991-92 that brought the Afghan government to collapse and a prey for the warring factions.

The intention by the US to continue its military and financial support could also play a role in the peace negotiations, altering the calculations of some Taleban parties. For the moment at least, it serves as a signal to the Afghan population that they are not yet left in the lurch again. The same counts for dozens of government officials who have dared to stand up and take their responsibility in the past 13 years.

In their relationship, Presidents Karzai and Obama seem to be walking a tight rope, both balancing international and domestic constituencies. On the one hand, Kabul wants to regain full sovereignty, an apology for American wrong-doings in the past decade and an end to drone strikes and entering of Afghan houses.

On the other hand, Kabul simply needs US military and financial support to survive. In order to bridge this dilemma, Karzai has been calling for the Loya Jirga to provide him with a mandate; an indication that Karzai does not have sufficient domestic support to make such decisions as well as a signal towards the Americans not to try to force things upon Afghanistan.

Kabul Airport Diplomacy

Nonetheless, the “Kabul Airport Diplomacy” executed by the US Secretaries of State and Defence (Clinton & Gates and now Kerry & Hagel) as well as the National Security Advisers (Gen. James, Donilon and lately Rice) did not hesitate to put pressure on Karzai and his Government.

The Obama team is keen to keep a presence in the country – at least to continue the counter-terrorism fight which remains a dominant logic in Washington. Quite recently Obama has been taking a rather blunt ‘take-it-or-leave-it’ approach, likely for domestic consumption where people are simply tired of Afghanistan.

Despite the degree of weariness by both out-going Presidents of each other, a first attempt at formulating a long-term framework for Afghan-American cooperation was undertaken in 2011 with the Bilateral Security Agreement. Meant as a security alliance, the final agreement watered down into an open-ended document of good intentions of economic, political and security support (initially called Bilateral Security Agreement , later called Strategic Partnership Agreement).

For the US, the BSA/SPA proved to be insufficient to build a longer-term military presence on, protected from legal charges and secured of Afghan political support. So, what does the latest Strategic Security and Defence Agreement add and in whose favour?

Strategic Security and Defence Agreement

1. The US and Afghanistan declare that they will cooperate  “to strengthen security and stability in Afghanistan, contribute to regional and international peace and stability, combat terrorism, achieve a region which is no longer a safe haven for al-Qaida and its affiliates, and enhance the ability of Afghanistan to deter threats against its sovereignty, security, and territorial integrity.” In other words, a continuation of a policy objective that has guided US, Afghan and NATO activities over the last decade. The question is whether the resources and the will – on both sides - are there to eventually achieve this goal.
    
2. The US declares that it will not use Afghanistan to launch attacks on other countries (read: Pakistan and Iran). Many inside and outside of Afghanistan have been suspecting that the US presence and interest relates more to an ability to strike in Pakistan and Iran rather than helping Afghanistan. This seems as an attempt by Kabul to pacify relations with its neighbours. After all, President Karzai has been signing several security, defence and economic accords with Pakistan, Iran, India and several Central-Asian states.
    
3. Even though the US military presence will not have a permanent character, the US Military is allowed to operate quite a number of exclusive military bases throughout the country. In relation to this, the “United States shall have the exclusive right to exercise jurisdiction over such persons in respect of any criminal or civil offenses committed in the territory of Afghanistan”. Of no surprise will be the addition that no one may be surrendered or transferred to an international tribunal (read: the International Criminal Court). The impunity of US soldiers has become a source of extreme frustration for Karzai personally after too many incidents whereby Afghan civilians were killed by strikes that missed their target or uncontrolled behaviour of US (and NATO) military.
    
4. The US will not conduct combat operations, but will be “advising, training, equipping, supporting, and sustaining” the Afghan Army and Police. At the same time, the US is still allowed to conduct counter-terrorism activities, which are “intended [hence: not required] to complement and support” the Afghan security forces’ activities. The document quite explicitly adds some big ‘unlesses’, hinting at US discriminatory authority to continue to conduct operations as they deem necessary.
    
5. The US takes responsibility (literally, it says “obligation”) for ensuring adequate funding for the Afghan Army and Police. At the last NATO Summit in Chicago, the Alliance estimated it would costs about 4 Billion USD yearly to field the Army and the Police. At the time, Obama explicitly demanded other allies and partners to take their share of the costs, but without great success.
    
6. The US supports Afghanistan against any outside aggression. For the Afghans, who are strongly believing their misery is caused by and from Pakistan, its ability to rely on America’s support is undoubtedly highly appreciated. It remains to be seen whether the US is able and willing to back Afghanistan’s sometimes bellicose defence policy in regard to Pakistan. The agreement, after all, only obliges the US to “regard with grave concern any external aggression”.

Right after the Loya Jirga’s consent, President Karzai has been saying he will not sign the Agreement as it is now, causing him loads of criticism from the Jirga members and from the US Government. At the same time, it should come as no great surprise: with the upcoming Presidential elections, Karzai has nothing to lose and does not want to be remembered as the President who ‘sold’ his country to the United States.

After all, by the letters of this agreement, the US have their demands conceded while Afghanistan mainly attained intentions of political-military support which do not come with any guarantees. A new Afghan President in 2014 and Obama’s willingness to continue America’s engagement will determine the true value of another ‘strategic security agreement’.