It is tempting to start an analysis of how power is organized and exercised in Ethiopia by going back to 1991, when the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) overthrew the military junta (‘Derg’) under Mengistu Haile Mariam and brought 17 years of rebellion-cum-liberation struggle to an end. It was a watershed moment that ended a prolonged period of harsh oppression in which tens of thousands of Ethiopians disappeared, perished, fled or were imprisoned.‍[11] It was also the start of the period 1991–95 in which Ethiopia’s current political settlement was forged between the different political parties that make up the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF).

However, taking 1991 as a starting point risks putting too much emphasis on contemporary factors that influence Ethiopia’s political settlement, and too little on historical ones, producing an unbalanced understanding of its evolution. Indeed, a more appropriate historical marker is the reign of Menelik II (1889–1913) as it was under his rule that the Ethiopian empire was consolidated administratively and became a lasting political fixture of modern East Africa after the defeat of Italian colonial forces at the battle of Adowa (1896). It acquired more or less its present form through a series of campaigns resulting in the conquest of both the highland periphery of the Ethiopean plateau and the lowlands surrounding it.‍[12] Ethiopia’s ability to avoid all but a very short period of direct colonial rule has enabled its rulers to chart an autonomous path of national development, which has involved dealing with friction between its diverse social forces, and experimenting with various modes of governance and the organization of security.

An examination of Ethiopia’s history since 1889 suggests a number of historical (between 1889 and 1991) and contemporary (between 1991 and 2015) factors that have influenced the evolution of the country’s political settlement. Table 1 provides a brief summary of these factors, which are then analysed to generate the basic political parameters of the organization of security in Ethiopia.

Historical factors (1889–1991)

The Tigrayan/Amharan polities situated on the northern side of the Ethiopean plateau form the historical core of present-day Ethiopia. Traditionally, these polities were run in authoritarian fashion, their rulers infused by religious legitimacy through the Christian Orthodox church and their wealth derived from the extraction of surplus from agricultural produce. Their societies were stratified and hierarchical, featuring both social inequality and opportunities for social mobility through successful military performance.‍[13] Since land was the most valuable resource in these densely populated societies, its acquisition became the key driver of the process of imperial expansion from c. 1889 to 1913.‍[14]

Centralization, control and coercion

A first historical factor that influences the evolution of Ethiopia’s political settlement is the centralization, control and coercion that characterized both the process of imperial expansion and the governance of the country afterwards. Historically, the Amhara-dominated core of the empire gradually annexed the highland periphery of the Ethiopian plateau and then its surrounding lowlands, in a classic pattern of empire-building that imposed different modes of governance on annexed territorities.‍[15] The generally fertile and productive areas of the Ethiopian plateau were largely integrated into the empire and administered through a centralized bureaucracy that sought to maintain control and extract rents via a feudal system of land management, military mobilization and political loyalty. The local peasantry was subjected to serfdom and tied to its land by an elaborate mechanism of taxes and services, while local elites were either suppressed or co-opted into the existing feudal Amharan hierarchy, depending on the level of resistance they had offered in the process of their subjugation. In contrast, the lowland areas, which generated much less revenue, were typically administered through local elites that served as proxies for their Amharan overlords.‍[16] Both modalities were underpinned by the cultural sense of superiority felt by the core Amharan/Tigrayan highland population – its leadership in particular – vis-à-vis other inhabitants of the empire.‍[17]

Unsurprisingly, coercion has been used extensively to establish and maintain centralized administration and political control. In the process of imperial expansion and consolidation, entire sultanates, principalities and even population groups were eliminated as need dictated. The groups that were forcibly incorporated into the Ethiopian empire are now citizens of today’s Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia.‍[18] The collective memory of violence‍[19] that certain groups suffered in this process has remained fresh in a number of cases, owing to the continued perception or experience of central political control and targeted use of coercion.‍[20]

Indirect and direct control and centralization have continued as modes of governance since Imperial Ethiopia ceased to exist in 1974. Significant aspects of this approach were reproduced in varying forms by the military junta between 1974 and 1991 and some aspects by the EPRDF between 1991 and 2015, in particular the continuation of top-down decision-making and implementation, especially in the realms of ‘high politics’ and security, with little scope for dissent or adaptation to local circumstances.‍[21] Even today, decision-making takes a ‘committee-style’ form, usually involving small groups of well-connected individuals who, by and large, are not representative of the population at large.‍[22] That said, it should be noted that this centralized approach to governance seems to have served Ethiopia’s ruling elites well in terms of resisting colonization, facilitating significant surplus extraction from vast areas with diverse populations and enabling a focused mobilization of resources for economic growth today.‍[23]

Exclusionary rule with ethnic undertones

A second historical factor that infuences the evolution of Ethiopia’s political settlement is a legacy of exclusionary rule with ethnic undertones. More specifically, Ethiopia’s ruling elites have largely come from two ethnic groups – Amharan and Tigrayan – which represent respectively a sizeable and a small fraction of the total population (see Box 1). While the Ethiopian empire of the past was dominated by Amharans, the contemporary Ethiopian federal state has been dominated by Tigrayans for most of the time.‍[24] The origins of rule by the Amharan-Tigrayan imperial core can be understood through the power dynamics of the growth of the empire. In short, rapid expansion meant that a growing diversity of populations needed to be administered and governed. Because land ownership was vital to political control and wealth, land acquired through conquest was typically allocated to elites from the core if it was sufficiently valuable, so that it could be used as a resource to perpetuate their rule. This helped create a legacy of not only central but also elite-cum-ethnic dominance over key resources, which in certain respects still prevails today.‍[25]

Rule by Amharan or Tigrayan groups nevertheless cannot be equated with ethnic dominance, for two reasons. First, with the exception of the period during its rebellion-cum-liberation struggle in which the TPLF was closely connected to the Tigrayan rural population, the Amharic and Tigrayan leadership in control of the Ethiopian state marginalized the rural population of their own ethnic groups just as much as lower classes of other ethnic groups. Moreover, as already noted, leaders beyond the political core typically have been incorporated to some extent into the ruling elite.‍[26] This has endowed central rule with greater legitimacy while at the same time creating functional channels for implementing decisions made at the political centre. The EPRDF is a good contemporary example of this dynamic (discussed below). In short, while there is an ethnic dimension to rule in Ethiopia, it is partial and somewhat diluted through measures that give a larger number of groups a stake in governance. It is nevertheless not surprising that this situation has continued to generate criticism as well as resistance from those who feel politically and economically excluded. Given the country’s diversity, it is remarkable that the Ethiopian state has not just survived such centrifugal dynamics, it has also enjoyed relative stability since 2000, as well as making substantial economic progress. Nevertheless, two recent developments are making ethnicity more prominent as a future source of strife.

To start with, ethnicity was more or less inadvertedly politicized by the military junta as a by-product of its large-scale repression of national movements, such as student associations and trade unions, that were considered political risks. This effectively meant that other groups that were more territorially and ethnically based became key channels of resistance. The ‘profile of ethnicity’ was further reinforced by the 1995 Constitution which explicitly turned Ethiopia into a federation of nine ethnic nations but, as some have argued, without a corresponding devolution of authority and resources in real terms.‍[27] A consequence of this situation of partial federalization is that a number of states are not yet equipped with the capacities or funds they need to deliver more than limited social services (such as housing, water and electricity) of variable quality.‍[28] The resulting discontent serves as a driver for identity-based mobilization, despite a generally shared sense of ‘Ethiopian-ness’.

Moreover, feedback across all categories of respondents indicated a degree of disillusionment among the other political parties-cum-powerful groups incorporated in the EPRDF (the ANDM, OPDO and SEPDF) because of their limited role in the country’s government compared with that enjoyed by the TPLF.‍[29] At the same time, elements of the population in Ethiopia’s periphery are dissatisfied with the dominance of the country’s core. These issues suggest that political incentives for mobilizing ethnicity as a resource in struggles for power already exist.‍[30]

A volatile and insecure region

A third and final historical factor influencing the evolution of Ethiopia’s political settlement is the volatile and insecure nature of the region in which the country is situated. This both requires and perpetuates securitized approaches to (political) conflict. The origins of this volatility are too complex to discuss here in detail, but they include decades of cross-border violent activity, competing cross-border claims on resources, territory, loyalty and legitimacy, the quest for greater autonomy by some ethnic groups, the seasonal migration of the region’s sizeable nomadic populations, and the illicit movement of people and goods across porous borders.‍[31] Given its size, location and interests, Ethiopia is at the heart of a ‘regional conflict complex’.‍[32] It could be argued that many of the drivers of this complex have been situated outside of the country since the start of EPRDF rule in 1991. Although Ethiopia is no mere spectator or passive victim of regional insecurity, recognizing this state of affairs helps to understand the need to keep political power and state security organizations centralized and under control. Any departure from this model could unintentionally jeopardize national security.‍[33] In such circumstances, the number of political dialogues Ethiopia is engaged in actually represents a positive sign of its willingness to search for peaceful resolutions to the region’s troubles. It is worth noting, for example, the country’s role in the Nile Basin Initiative dialogue and in the Sudanese national dialogue, and its mediation efforts in the South Sudan power struggle.

However, it can also be argued that the combination of Ethiopia’s political culture of militarism, history of violence and its control-oriented approach to power tends to prioritize the use of force in response to regional insecurity over softer conflict resolution methods, such as negotiation and dialogue.‍[34] Here, one could point to Ethiopia’s bilateral interventions in Somalia and its training of Somali militia along its border, which is separate from its engagement with the Somali National Army through AMISOM.‍[35]

The ‘global war on terror’ has added another layer to this conflict complex over the past 15 years, arguably with three major effects. The first is that additional, mostly US, resources have become available to countries in the region in the form of diplomatic support and funding. This has generally resulted in the regression of civil liberties and prioritized security concerns over quality-of-governance concerns.‍[36] The second effect is that that countries in the region, Ethiopia included, have been enabled to brand as ‘terrorists’ groups that have domestic grievances but do use violent methods. This branding has happened mainly through associating such groups with the transnationalism, radicalism and extreme violence of Al-Qaeda’s jihad, which was the central theme of the war on terror. This makes it difficult to engage in more open and introspective reflection on the source of these groups’ domestic grievances, their objectives and the nature of their underlying conflict with the state. Examples in the case of Ethiopia include the suppression of the Oromo Liberation Front, the Ogaden National Liberation Front‍[37] and the Islamic Front for the Liberation of Oromia, which has played a role in cutting off alternative conflict-resolution channels such as peace talks.‍[38] The third effect, noted by a number of interviewees, is that the ‘war on terror’ has increased the feeling of marginalization among some groups within Ethiopia’s Muslim community. They observed that the country’s security forces had recently made a number of mistakes in their dealings with this community, including interference in the elections of the Ethiopian Islamic Affairs Supreme Council, and a disproportionate response to the resulting demonstrations.‍[39] It is often overlooked that over 30% of Ethiopians are Muslim who, to date, have mostly lived in peaceful coexistence with Ethiopia’s other nations, nationalities and peoples.

In short, while regional insecurity has historically required strong centralization and control over power and security, the resulting use of force also perpetuates regional insecurity.‍[40] Both centralization and use of force simultaneoulsy also strengthen perceptions that historical patterns of central dominance continue, which generates both grievances and demands for change.‍[41]

Historical political parameters for the organization of security

The historical factors that influence Ethiopia’s political settlement point to the following broad parameters for the organization of security:

Contemporary factors (1991–2015)

Contemporary Ethiopia emerged from the rebellion-cum-liberation struggle that toppled the military junta in 1991. This event heralded a period of 25 years of unbroken EPRDF rule. It will be argued that three aspects of the nature and style of EPRDF governance have shaped the evolution of Ethiopia’s political settlement over this period in particular. These contemporary factors provide a more recent understanding of the country’s present political situation and its implications for how security in Ethiopia is organized. Given the TPLF’s historical role in shaping the EPRDF, and the number of respondents who commented on the continued influence of the TPLF within the EPRDF, the section that follows focuses primarily on the TPLF.‍[42]

The transition of the TPLF to political party

The first contemporary factor influencing Ethiopia´s political settlement is the partial and ongoing transition of the TPLF from ‘liberation movement’ to political party. A brief excursion into history shows that the TPLF emerged in 1975 as a military-movement-cum-party that sought to liberate Ethiopia from its military junta. The overthrow of the junta has been described as an “intellectually-led and ideology-driven revolution”, and in this light the TPLF can be classified as an “integrated insurgent organization”, characterized by strong central leadership, unity/cohesion and high levels of local support/compliance among the Tigrayan people.‍[43] These characteristics made the TPLF a formidable adversary for the military junta which, lacking the sophisticated means necessary for a comprehensive counter-insurgency campaign,‍[44] actually boosted the TPLF’s initial strengths by resorting to indiscriminate counter-population warfare.‍[45] The TPLF’s organizational characteristics also made it a movement/party with strong internal discipline and the ability to retain popular support.‍[46] Existing research offers a four-point general framework for understanding the transition of the TPLF from liberation movement to political party post-1991:‍[47]

The extent to which a political party structure has been developed: After 1991 the TPLF/EPDRF expanded its already formidable (though all-Tigray) party organization to achieve national scale. It has successfully developed into a national party whose structure today extends far into many Ethiopian communities. This greatly facilitates party outreach, campaigning and understanding of local needs. At the same time, however, such outreach also appears to serve the purpose of maintaining control and political alignment.‍[48]

The degree to which military structures have been dissolved: According to some observers, the TPLF’s military structures were not really disbanded after 1991, but rather they replaced the army of the junta to be reincarnated as the Ethiopian National Defence Force (ENDF).‍[49] A complex process of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration followed, a feat that had to be repeated once more after the 1999 war with Eritrea. In short, the TPLF’s military structures and forces were in in a constant state of transition for at least the first decade after the overthrow of the junta. An army in the modern sense started to emerge in the early 2000s and is still in the process of professionalization and transformation in terms of the representativeness of its composition.‍[50]

The extent to which decision-making has been internally democratized: Despite the adoption of a federal governance model and a new constitution (1995), efforts to increase internal democratization of EPRDF decision-making since 1991 have been limited. Some reports and a number of interviews actually suggest increased centralization of power and a growing dominance of Prime Minister Meles Zenawi within the party after its restructuring in 2001, following the resolution of the divergence within the TPLF that had appeared on the conclusion of the Ethiopian–Eritrean war.‍[51] According to a number of interviewees, Prime Minister Meles Zenawi's dominance appears to have persisted until his death in 2012, after which the TPLF’s internal cohesion weakened, with several factions emerging.

The level to which a political/civilian strategy has been developed: The TPLF has been partially successful in replacing its military philosophy and securitized approach to governance as liberation movement with more civilian, pro-development strategies. The forward-looking policies that Prime Minister Meles Zenawi and his inner circles crafted in areas like agriculture, education and foreign and security affairs stand out, in a positive way. Such policies explain much of the party’s enduring support from (parts of) the Ethiopian population. However, their implementation has not been uncontested.

On the basis of this ‘transition framework’ it can be observed that the TPLF espoused a clear vision for governance and development in Ethiopia after 1991 while retaining a closed hierarchical culture, firm internal control, and control over key security levers. This vision has been driven forward with determination and varying degrees of success, but without much transparency or public accountability.‍[52]

The above notwithstanding, the new ‘People’s Forum’ that Prime Minister Hailemariam’s (who succeeded Meles Zenawi in 2012) has convened, arguably represents a positive step towards enhanced transparency. This Forum has gathered together leaders of sectors such as health, transport and construction throughout 2015 and 2016 with the aim of getting senior policy-makers to listen and hear from sectoral leaders about the impact of government policies on the functioning of their particular sector. Although feedback obtained through interviews suggests that the government has shown commitment to follow-up meetings and policy amendments in some areas, the programme is still new and will need to be monitored. A Forum dedicated to discussing more sensitive issues such as security, justice and human rights has yet to be formed.‍[53]

TPLF/EPRDF dominance of the Ethiopian state

A second contemporary factor influencing Ethiopia’s current political settlement can be captured succinctly: the continuous dominance of the Ethiopian state by the TPLF/EPRDF since 1991. This has by and large created a monopoly of power that has excluded political competition and makes the government difficult to distinguish from the party, with the consequence that the state becomes partly an instrument of the party. A political opposition exists, but remains powerless. Opposition leaders have been subjected to abuse and their parties prevented from operating as such through an array of restricting laws and regulations.‍[54]

Some analysts portray a model of concentric circles, with the TLPF at the core of power and dominating the EPRDF coalition, followed by a second ring, composed of the ANMD, OPDO and SEPDF, which act as more junior partners of the EPDRF,‍[55] and a third ring made up of EPRDF satellite parties, such as the Afar People’s Democratic Organization and Beni Shangul-Gumuz People’s Democratic Party. The second and third rings are said to enhance ethnic representation and government authority, but to enjoy a decreasing measure of status, representation and influence in how Ethiopia is ruled.‍[56]

Reality is more complex than a model of conveniently ‘layered’ influence, as some of these layers overlap and some connections will be more prominent than others, but it does suggest that a number of historical patterns of co-optation continue to operate. Some interviewees suggested that the dynamics of co-operation and dominance have become less TPLF-directed and more competitive (within the EPRDF, that is) since the death of Prime Minister Meles Zenawi in 2012, with the result that TPLF’s historically mentored satellite parties are developing a more assertive stance of their own.

A statist approach to economic governance with mixed methods

A final contemporary factor that influences Ethiopia’s political settlement is the fusion of political power and economic interests in a governance model in which both state and economy are led by the party ‘for the people’ through the state. The Ethiopian approach to its economy is not unique, and is modelled on that of countries such as China, South Korea (under its dictatorship) and Singapore, which mixes statist, planning and quasi-liberal features that are welded together in a long-term, state-led effort to stimulate economic growth and development out of poverty.‍[57] A number of analysts argue that a significant feature of this model is that resources and rents are centralized in the hands of either business leaders with political connections, or senior party officials themselves.‍[58]

On the positive side, such continuity of rule and effort has created regulatory stability, enabled long-term investment and generated a productive version of patrimonialism in which rents appear to be used largely for developmental purposes.‍[59] This approach has been instrumental in stabilizing poverty, increasing education and maintaining high overall growth rates.‍[60] On the negative side, the fusion of political power and economic interests gives the country’s leading figures privileged access to resources that can also be used to further the interests of selected constituencies‍[61] and/or their own.‍[62] This exacerbates existing tension between those included in and those excluded from present governance arrangements. As the former seek to maintain the status quo, the latter push for change.‍[63]

The point here is not to discuss whether this approach to economic governance is efficient or sustainable, but to underline the fact that Ethiopia’s leading groups use economic resources and rents to create output legitimacy. The approach is akin to that taken by China and some of the Gulf states, and the EPRDF/TPLF’s popular political support is in part dependent on its ability to raise standards of living and to provide a growing range of economic opportunities to its citizens. At the same time, the party also uses the ability to withhold such opportunities as a tool of control, in part to limit and discourage its citizens from political engagement.

Contemporary political parameters for the organization of security

These contemporary factors that influence Ethiopia’s political settlement point to the following broad parameters for the organization of security: