What is wrong with the world? Just twenty years ago, it was unthinkable that Russia would be asserting itself through sabre-rattling on Europe’s eastern border, that China would be one of the world’s largest economies, that jihadi terrorism would be one of the main security challenges facing the West and that the immediate ring of countries around Europe, rather than being the hoped-for ring of stability, would seem to have degenerated into a ring of fire. As the Ministry of Foreign Affairs puts it, ‘a quarter of a century after the fall of the Wall, the hopes of that time have turned into the uncertainty of today’.‍[1]

But as EU High Representative Federica Mogherini notes, uncertainty cannot be used as the basis for policy:

The questions for the Clingendael Strategic Monitor, therefore, are: What is the strategic environment? What threats can be expected? And to what extent is the ‘world order’ changing? The updated Clingendael Strategic Monitor 2017 identifies the major trends on the basis of a solid evidence-based and transparent method. In this way, despite all the uncertainty, the Monitor offers some firm ground to stand on.

On the basis of an expert analysis of ten themes, this Monitor draws two key conclusions. First, a ten-year trend analysis (2006-2016) suggests a substantial increase in threats to European security in the next five years. In addition to the existing threats (jihadi terrorism, fragile states/crises), Clingendael expects that a number of threats (cyberattacks, crumbling EU unity and threats to territorial integrity) will grow more acute. Clingendael also expects new threats in the area of free trade. In short, traditional geopolitical security threats and (as yet) non-geopolitical threats – or in the words of the Brookings Institution, ‘functional threats’ – will together continue to set the European agenda. Non-state actors are generating the main threats, but the share of state actors is expected to increase.

In addition, the Monitor concludes that the world order is moving into uncharted waters. Clingendael uses the term ‘Multi-Order’: a highly diverse system in which international cooperation takes place (or fails to do so) in totally different ways in separate areas. The state of international cooperation thus depends on the specific theme. Within the multi-order, Clingendael expects an ongoing rules-based system in which the level of cooperation varies, depending on the theme. The multi-order bears no resemblance to the 19th-century multipolar order, nor to the bipolar order of the Cold War, nor to the unipolar order of the 90s. There is no historical precedent. In short, the idea that the world and the EU in particular are mainly suffering the effects of a multipolar malaise that is leading to greater insecurity, more frequent conflict and a crumbling international order, is one that requires nuancing.

Methodological enhancement

These two findings have been arrived at – by contrast with previous years – on the basis of the Structured Expert Approach, a Clingendael method developed in spring 2016 for the purposes of reliable and transparent expert forecasting (see Appendix 2). Clingendael regards experts as crucial, because a purely quantitative analysis has its limitations and Clingendael has very well-established experts both on its staff and in its network.‍[2] However, it is clear that even the best experts are prone to prejudice and bias. The method is therefore designed to limit forecast bias.

The structured expert approach uses a number of principles that have been shown to improve experts’ assessments, such as reasoning from a base rate, and wisdom-of-the-crowd techniques (see Appendix 2). These principles are systematically incorporated into four mutually reinforcing and complementary methods. For the threat assessment, use is made of the Clingendael Trend Database, a validated set of quantitative and, where necessary, qualitative indicators (as not everything can be expressed in figures). This dataset ensures that the assessment is reproducible. The main indicators are shown schematically in a table for each of the ten threat assessments (see the underlying theme studies). The second method involves the Clingendael Expert Survey, a questionnaire sent out to some 2,500 scientists worldwide. The Expert Survey is a wisdom-of-the-crowd technique that above all identifies possible ‘shocks’ and then assigns probability and impact scores to them. In addition, the survey is a horizon-scanning tool for identifying new security challenges. The qualitative Structured Focused Comparison method provides the basis for the international order analysis, in which five qualitative indicators are used. Finally, the Clingendael Assessment Tool has been designed, consisting of two controllable scoring mechanisms to support accurate assessments of the threat situation and the international order. Together, this set of methods ensures transparent, evidence-based assessments and an opportunity to evaluate and elaborate further on the Structured Expert Approach. Appendix 2 gives a comprehensive summary of the methods. The full version is not publicly available (but is provided to the client and is thus open to peer review).

This evidence-based Monitor is structured around the following question:

In answering this question we focus on two sub-questions. These sub-questions were originally also central to the Future Policy Survey of the Dutch Ministry of Defence:‍[3]

In order to answer these questions, the Monitor starts with a theoretical and empirical critique of the often-heard diagnosis of the current state of the world: the existing order is crumbling and European security is in danger due to emerging great powers (the multipolar order). Part Two then outlines the complex threat assessment up to 2021 for ten policy areas, on the basis of ten evidence-based trend studies. Part Three analyses these ten areas in more detail and describes the trends that are foreseen for the international system. Finally, Part Four indicates where the largest policy gaps are, with reference to a number of policy issues. Perhaps the most important policy implication is the acute need for an integrated approach.

Both this syntheses report as well as the underlying thematic studies have been written in the fall of 2016. An important development since then is the election of Donald Trump as the 45st President of the United States. The possible effects of his presidency are outlined in an epilogue: “Donald Trump and the Multi-Order”.

1. A ‘return to geopolitics’?

The problems facing the EU and the Netherlands are regularly summed up in terms of ‘power shifts’, ‘multipolarity’ and ‘the return of geopolitics’. It is certainly true that, broadly speaking, a transition appears to be occurring from a multilateral to a multipolar order (see also previous versions of the Clingendael Strategic Monitor).‍[4] This characterisation is one of the most important strategic lenses through which international developments can be understood.

Are these assumptions correct? (Also: whose agenda is actually served by this characterisation? A number of publications point to a Chinese and Russian agenda).‍[8] One is immediately struck by the fact that the supposed negative consequences of power shifts represent a relatively new interpretation. Until the publication of a book by Kenneth Waltz (1979), most scientists (including well-known thinkers such as Hans J. Morgenthau) thought that a system in which multiple great powers vied with each other for influence was much more stable than one with only two great powers.‍[9] In 1964, for example, Deutsch and Singer wrote: ‘For the most part it has seemed intuitively reasonable that […] as the system moves away from bipolarity towards multipolarity, the frequency and intensity of war should be expected to diminish.’‍[10] It was thus assumed that there would be less conflict in a multipolar order. Of course, the presumed stability of ‘the return of geopolitics’ had its origins in history, and in particular in the stable 19th-century system known as the Concert of Europe. The idea was that by means of flexible alliances and changing systems of collaboration, great powers could achieve goals far more easily without the need for force.

A second reason for doubt is that it is far from clear that uncertainty leads to conflict. Some thinkers believe that there is little uncertainty even when there is a large number of great powers. For example, large power differences leave little room for inaccurate assessments.‍[11] Another analytical model (the Balance of Power Model) goes even further, arguing that in uncertain conditions, states will above all exercise caution.‍[12] Moreover, a third group believes that international institutions exist partly in order to eliminate uncertainty so that states are better able to pursue their own interests.‍[13] Would the new group of international players really wish to put an end to an international order that ensures more predictability and also reduces the chance of conflict? The Chinese agenda, for example, despite obvious revisionist traits, is emphatically one of ongoing international and multilateral cooperation.‍[14]

The idea is thus open to serious question that power shifts and the return of geopolitics constitute the main or even the sole causes of the perceived security challenges and should therefore be the definitive lens through which to interpret the strategic environment of the European Union and the Netherlands. The Clingendael Institute is not alone in this view. For example, the Brookings Institution states: ‘Multipolarity has been sometimes compared to an incurable disease that will eventually kill the liberal order. But there is insufficient evidence to take this as a foregone conclusion.’‍[15] The Egmont Institute argues that ‘the problem with multipolarity is that it does not help us to explain military, diplomatic and economic developments’, and reaches the following strongly worded conclusion: ‘History as usual is back. Some call that multipolarity, others unipolarity. It does not matter. Reality is stronger than this kind of simplistic classification.’‍[16] In short, there is a need for careful thought about the forthcoming world order and the significance of the observed trends, without falling back on facile characterisations and solutions.

2. The European threat assessment

Findings

The ten threat assessments are presented in detail in the thematic contributions (Table 2 provides a brief summary). On the basis of the composite assessment, two main conclusions can be drawn.

Figure 1

Actors behind the threats (2016-2021)

First, the current (2016) overarching threat assessment is – self-evidently – very diverse and hence complex. For that reason, this report refers to Complex Security. There are genuine threats to all five vital interests.‍[18] Threats to European territorial security result from terrorism, territorial tensions, organised crime, the proliferation of CBRN weapons and a number of crises on Europe’s margins (Libya, Syria, Mali, Ukraine). The economic security of some EU member states is currently under threat as a result of the asymmetrical energy relationship with Russia. Society’s security is threatened by the very difficult relations within the EU, combined with the internal terrorist threat and the social tensions to which this has given rise. Ecological security is under pressure from climate change. Finally, technological security is threatened by cyberattacks (including by terrorists). Equally unsurprising is the fact that non-state actors (e.g. armed groups, terrorist organisations, criminals and hacker collectives: see Figure 1) play a very significant role in the array of threats. In other words – and this is why these self-evident points are nonetheless important – the threat assessment in terms of both content and actors ranges far more widely than the effects of classic geopolitical tensions. Although geopolitical tensions are evident in connection with territoriality, the proliferation of CBRN weapons, energy supply and free trade (partially), and cyberattacks, reference is usually made to (as yet) non-geopolitical or ‘functional’ threats in the areas of climate change, fragile states, the EU and terrorism.

Second, Clingendael expects the security assessment to deteriorate further over the next five years. Tables 1 and 2 summarise the main conclusions. Table 1 describes the expected adverse effects on European interests in general terms. The impact and probability scores for each of the ten thematic contributions are pulled together and produce a worsening picture for all five vital interests. It should be noted that the threat levels are not comparable to each other: Level 3 for territorial integrity is not equivalent to Level 3 for economic security. The last column of Table 1 indicates the top three expected threats to each security interest. Naturally, a more qualitative interpretation is of interest, and Table 2 gives a brief explanation of the expected developments in the next five years.

3. The multi-order

Jochem Wiers, special professor of Dutch foreign policy at the University of Groningen and former head of the Strategy Advisory Unit of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, lists four themes for the coming years for a strategic agenda for Dutch foreign policy. One of these themes is the rules-based system: the organisation of a safe, sustainable and fair world, with validity not just in ‘the West’ but also extending to developing countries and non-state actors.‍[20]

The interest in the rules-based order is partly accounted for by the supposed return of geopolitics. The emergence of new players, it is expected, will put fundamental pressure on the rules-based order.‍[21] The Clingendael Institute analyses reveal a different picture. It is certainly true that there are situations in which international relations are growing less harmonious and the world order (including the rules-based order) is coming under pressure. It is also fair to say that in these cases problems are often encountered as a result of more assertive action by the great powers. Yet it is simply not true that the world order is merely crumbling away. Clingendael’s analyses show continuing cooperation in many areas. Moreover, in many areas the rules-based order turns out to be fairly stable, although there are worrying trends.

The current order: where do we stand?

Figure 2

The international system 2016 -2021

Forecast: where will we be in 2021?

On the basis of our trend analyses, some shifts can be expected in the multi-order by 2021. Figure 2 presents these shifts visually and paints a very varied picture, in which more cooperation can be expected in some regimes and less in others. The overall picture is of a world order that is somewhat less cooperative but that will also provide more space for non-state actors. Three trends stand out:

Coherence in the multi-order?

How do the elements fit together in this multi-order? Are some regimes more important than others? How should the multi-order be assessed? The easy answer is that the traditional security regimes (territorial integrity in combination with CBRN) are decisive, and that other regimes will follow developments in the traditional security regime, doubtless in fits and starts, and probably with a considerable time lag. If this were the case, analyses would need to focus mainly on the role of the great powers and the conflict about rules in which they have become involved.

However, such an answer would be misleading. There is simply too little scientific evidence to back it up. In empirical terms, no convincing demonstration has been provided that the international order is determined by the traditional security regime alone. On the contrary, this question has been a subject of debate for decades, without any clear consensus having emerged. Even if it had, the weighting (one in which the traditional security regimes of territorial integrity, CBRN and – to a lesser extent – free trade are weighted by a factor of 10 and are thus very decisive) results in a score in the cooperative sector of the chart. Another reason for not only considering traditional security threats is that the current state of international relations bears little resemblance to the 19th-century multipolar order, the bipolar order of the Cold War or the unipolar order of the 90s (for example, the unofficial agenda of a major player such as China is one of selective multilateralism). There is no historical precedent.

In short, the way in which the various chessboards of this multi-order interact with each other is not (yet) clear. There are two possible directions that developments could take. On the one hand, it is conceivable that there will be negative spill-over, with the less cooperative systems pulling the other systems in the direction of a less cooperative order. There are recent examples that point to such negative spill-overs. For example, former ‘islands of cooperation’ on one chessboard have been turned into pawns on another chessboard (such as Russia’s unilateral suspension of some nuclear cooperation programmes in response to ‘America’s hostile actions’).‍[30] On the other hand, the opposite is also imaginable. There is a long tradition, of which the European project is the best-known example, which suggests that there will be positive spill-overs in which cooperative relationships on one chessboard serve to cushion against shocks on other chessboards.‍[31] In short, exactly how the multi-order hangs together, and above all which type of spill-over will dominate, are open questions for which there is an explicit and urgent need for further study.

4. Policy issues and lines of enquiry

What do the threat assessment and the multi-order signify for policy-making? This Monitor does not offer any concrete policy recommendations, but sets out some lines of enquiry and dilemmas with reference to which future policy could be shaped.

The first line of enquiry concerns the strategic orientation of the EU and the Netherlands. This orientation still seems to be heavily affected by the notion of the negative consequences of changing power relations. In 2013, for example, the Dutch Ministry of Defence stated: ‘The world is on the move as a result of shifting geopolitical and economic power relations’, and noted increasing uncertainty, with a greater risk of crises and consequent pressure on the security institutions’.‍[32] In the same year, the Dutch government wrote in the International Security Strategy: ‘The world has become more opaque and unpredictable with the emergence of major new geopolitical and economic powers and shifting international power relations.’‍[33] Similar ideas can be found in the Dutch policy agendas for 2016 and 2017.‍[34] Without detracting from the importance of great powers in the international system, this Monitor makes some points which qualify this strategic orientation. First, the current and expected threat assessment reveals a highly complex range of threats that often have little to do with changing power relations. Often these are non-state and sometimes even internal in nature (see the epilogue on Trump and the multi-order). Second, the emergence of new great powers does not seem to be leading to a complete breakdown of the order. There is a multi-order with ongoing cooperation – including between the great powers – in many areas. In addition, these great powers often share power with a large group of actors. An excessive policy focus and fixation on shifts in the balance of power can lead to tunnel vision and may even prove counterproductive. The same actors are responsible for both worsening and improving cooperation, which is why a more varied orientation is desirable. One question for the next few years, for example, is how to deal with Russia (and, to a lesser extent, China), given that on the one hand it is clearly putting the rules-based order with regard to territorial integrity under pressure, but on the other hand is complying with the existing order in other areas.

A second line of enquiry concerns the consequences of a complex and worsening threat assessment. The worsening threat assessment means that in the next few years greater tensions can be expected to arise on the eastern borders, that the threat of CBRN proliferation is increasing, that free trade is under pressure, that cyberattacks on essential information will increase and that the EU will come under further pressure. In addition, there will remain a substantial threat from terrorism and ongoing crises on the EU’s southern borders. This complex threat assessment leads to three crucial policy dilemmas:

A third line of enquiry concerns how to deal with the multi-order. The Netherlands is committed to promoting the international legal order. The multi-order presents some opportunities in this respect, as a legal order persists in certain areas. At the same time, it is also clear that working to bring about improvements in all areas is not very realistic. For this reason, a more pragmatic multilateral attitude could be considered. In support of this pragmatic approach, Table 4 presents a simple gap analysis featuring both the expected threat assessment and the development of the international order in the ten policy areas that have been examined.‍[35] Roughly speaking, two possible orders of priority emerge from this:

Which of these priorities to choose mainly depends on exactly how the multi-order is structured. At present, there still seems to be too much uncertainty about potential spill-over effects within this multi-order. In a positive spill-over situation, in which a reasonable degree of cooperation in one regime facilitates cooperation in other areas, it will be necessary to concentrate primarily on the first option (quick wins). However, if there is mainly negative spill-over, in which deterioration in one area exacerbates the problems in others, the second policy option seems the more sensible. Further research into these spill-over effects is therefore of great importance.

A fourth line of enquiry, finally, concerns the consequences of the Monitor’s conclusions for the institutional structure of the different government departments. It is clear that there is significant cooperation within and between the ministries, extending far beyond individual themes. Within departments there are cross-thematic directorates, and between departments initiatives such as the interdepartmental strategic monitor ensure convergence and overlap between separate threat assessments. At the same time, it is noticeable that each department has to deal with a different threat assessment and structure (based on a conventional interpretation of roles). The level of threat for the Ministry of Security and Justice/the National Coordinator for Counter-Terrorism and Security remains the same, but the international order is presented as improving. The Ministry of Defence assessment is predominantly of deterioration in terms of both threats and the international order. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is confronted with the prospect of both increasing and decreasing cooperation. This raises two points:

First, there is the dilemma of information exchange and the associated strategic coordination. In international relations, the Netherlands deals with actors with which there is simultaneous cooperation and conflict. Although there is considerable coordination and information-sharing, in some cases it is also clear that the current structures are somewhat fragmented (as the approach to the MH17 disaster shows).‍[36] Better information-sharing could help with the identification of similarities between policy areas and the possibility of issue linkage. At the same time it needs to be borne in mind that greater information-sharing may also have unintended negative effects: linking policy areas can lead to the spill-over of conflict from one policy area to another. In short, here too a better understanding is needed of the relationship between policy areas in the international order.

The second point is that the complex threat assessment could call for an authoritative cross-departmental platform in order to achieve a truly integrated whole-of-government approach. At present, there is a somewhat fragmented range of coordinating forums. A cross-departmental platform would help firstly to set priorities, but above all to further unify the various departmental threat and order assessments – not only in an integrated assessment, but above all in an integrated strategy and corresponding strategic coordination. Without enhanced strategic coordination, there is a significant risk that policy initiatives by one department will have (unintended) consequences for other departments. Protecting the eastern borders of Europe may increase territorial security, for example, but drive away parties to cooperation against terrorism. It is also conceivable that a cooperative relationship with a player in one regime, such as free trade, might lead to the same player becoming too prominent in a different policy area. One promising initiative, for example, is the integrated approach within the EU context in the area of internal and external security. In line with this initiative, and to overcome the compartmentalisation of policies, resources and actions, various options are conceivable. For some time there has been a debate in progress about a national security council in which the relevant government departments outline an approach under the direction of the Ministry of General Affairs.‍[37] One important question in this regard is how, given the constitutionally guaranteed autonomy of the ministers and the lesser decision-making powers – compared with counterparts in the United Kingdom or the United States – of the Prime Minister (who remains primus inter pares), an authoritative and controlling body could nonetheless be created.