Presently, c. 23 per cent of the total population of Dohuk governorate consists of Iraqi IDPs and Syrian refugees (see Box 1).‍[31] The vast majority of both groups is Kurdish, hailing from Kurdish populations in Nineveh (Tel Afar, Mosul, Sinjar and the disputed areas) or from the Kurdish areas of Syria.‍[32] Although for Iraq as a whole the rate of return started to outstrip the rate of displacement in late December 2017, since 2003 Iraq has been among the 10 countries worldwide with the highest numbers of IDPs.‍[33] In addition, the rate of return appears to be less pronounced for the Dohuk region so far (see Figure 2).

Care should be taken with the interpretation of such numbers, however, because the fight against the IS only terminated in late 2017, especially in the border areas with Syria. Meanwhile, new turmoil arose in the form of the Kurdish referendum, following which the ISF as well as the Hashd moved into parts of the disputed areas in force. In short, there has been sufficient political tension to prevent prospective returnees from going back to where they came from.

Nevertheless, taking into account Iraq’s history of ‘having an IDP problem’, no prospect of a viable resolution for the disputed areas, ongoing tensions between Erbil and Baghdad, and the unresolved nature of the Syrian civil war, one might assume that many IDPs/refugees will stay where they are for a while longer.‍[34] The slow pace of the reconstruction of Mosul and its hinterlands is also likely to delay returns as Dohuk and Mosul lie only about 75km apart.‍[35]

Source: IOM, online: link (accessed 4 June 2018). A comparable breakdown of UN OCHA data did not seem to be available online.

It is obvious that the protracted presence of the current IDP/refugee population in a governorate already struggling to make ends meet will strain the Kurdish administration politically as well as financially. It is also likely to create tensions, and perhaps insecurity. In contrast to the preceding three factors, this one is more forward looking because a significant track record of popular protest or violent incidents between IDPs and the local population does not yet exist. However, the KRG’s lack of strategic planning in relation to IDPs, the political use of citizenship and residence in the battle for territory and identity in both Iraqi Kurdistan and the disputed territories, the recent economic downturn of the KRI and the financial crunch facing the KRG are all elements that are conducive to instability in the medium term.‍[36] Two dimensions seem of particular relevance:

First, a deteriorating economic and financial situation in the KRG without a strategy for dealing with its IDP population makes it likely that demand for housing, services, jobs and resources will continue to outstrip supply for the next few years. This is especially the case given that international humanitarian aid may gradually decrease and because uncertainty surrounding the status of the disputed territories continues. Practically, this will lead to living conditions that are more impoverished, education of a lower quality, downward pressure on already meagre wages, and greater dependency on humanitarian aid. IDPs, refugees and host communities will all be affected, but the IDPs/refugees are likely to be hardest hit. Increasing competition for resources can easily create greater tensions between host communities and displaced persons given the vulnerable position of the latter, the local politicisation of their presence,‍[37] and the current low levels of communication and exchange between IDPs and locals.

In addition, there is the significant risk that both Baghdad and the KRG will seek to use IDPs in their political fight to establish control over the disputed areas. Many IDPs are from those areas and were already under significant pressure from Baghdad and/or the KRG to clarify their political allegiance, which tended to be starkly framed in either/or terms with little scope for political expression of minority identities. For example, Arab tribes from Zummar accused the KDP (President Barzani’s family in particular) of trying to Kurdify their town in October 2017. They stated that more than 150,000 individuals had been forcibly displaced from their homes and transferred to IDP camps by KRG officials. As a counter to Kurdish pressure, the tribes asked the Iraqi government to install a new – representative – local council and incorporate their armed youth into the Hashd or ISF.‍[38] In short, it is entirely possible to envisage population transfers (including returns) being used as a political tool to achieve territorial advantages. The problem of population allegiance, control and identity in a context of IDPs has, however, several levels that increase its complexity.

In the likely absence of a politically negotiated solution to the problem of the disputed areas (see factor 2), the issues outlined above could increasingly start to intersect as the result of political pressure, identity-based mobilisation and (in)security in a context awash with small arms, trained fighters and armed groups of different sizes and qualities. Such a scenario would not necessarily result in large-scale violence, but it could create a steady trickle of incidents – violent clashes, growing crime rates and forced dispossession – that might overtime become a vicious circle of violence that hinders reconstruction, blocks reconciliation and causes further displacement.

In brief, there is modest potential for intra- and intercommunity strife, especially in the urban areas of Dohuk governorate, which currently accommodate most IDPs/refugees. This potential is limited due to the cultural, linguistic and social homogeneity of the displaced, refugees and host communities – although there are also notable educational and class differences between IDPs and the local population.