Dozens of armed groups came into being in 2014 to defend Iraq against the rapid advance of the Islamic State (IS) on Baghdad after the partial collapse of the Iraqi Army.[1] Together, they became known as ‘Al-Hashd al-Sha’abi’ (or Popular Mobilisation Forces, PMF). The Hashd is essentially a structured network of about 30 to 50 paramilitary groups of different sizes, capabilities, affiliations and sectarian composition. Most Hashd groups and fighters are nevertheless Shi’a.[2] When the IS-threat diminished after years of fighting, a number of individual Hashd armed groups increased both their economic and political activity, such as competing in the 2018 Iraqi elections.

Today, the Hashd as a coercive institution is a standard feature of both the security architecture and daily life in large parts of Arab Iraq, including the disputed territories.[3] During recent interviews in the Kirkuk area, senior Hashd commanders (mostly of the Badr Corps, one of the constituent groups of the Hashd) made statements such as ‘nothing can stand against us any more’, or, ‘the power of the Hashd is undisputed and we will use it in the right way to govern’ – from a viewpoint that considers the Hashd a true representation of citizen mobilisation.[4] Administered by the state-sanctioned Hashd Commission, most Hashd groups have formally become part of the Iraqi security apparatus. However, some continue to operate on a relatively autonomous basis in spite of their formal incorporation.[5]

This paper is the third – and last – in a series that purposes to generate new insights into how Iraq’s existing plurality of coercive organisations can be harnessed to provide greater human security, and how the potentially negative impact of this plurality on state development can be mitigated.[6] Using a broad set of indicators to monitor Hashd-related events and incidents as reported in open, online sources in Arabic and English,[7] the series compares the development of the powerbase of seven Hashd groups, their mutual relations, and their attitudes towards the Iraqi government across three monitoring periods: January–September 2017; February–May 2018 (until the 12 May elections) and August–December 2018.[8] The current paper covers the last period.

As pointed out in our previous paper (November 2018), the original version of the Hashd – the organisational umbrella created to fight IS – was disintegrating due to the disappearance of the external threat that kept it together. It noted that, while some groups were ‘going local’ (e.g. the Sinjar Resistance Units – YBS), others were integrating more fully into the security forces (e.g. the Abbas Combat Division – ACD), and yet others were focusing on their political activities and dissociating themselves somewhat from the Hashd (e.g. Saraya al-Salam).[9]

Based on evidence gathered, this paper argues that the original Hashd no longer exists. While the label lives on, it now refers to a restructured entity in which Iran-affiliated groups increasingly dominate – Kataib Hezbollah, Asaib ahl al-Haq and the Badr Corps, especially. This entity operates at least in part on the basis of a transnational concept of Shi’a militancy[10] aims to gradually increase its socioeconomic influence throughout Iraqi society, leveraging the legitimacy it derived from the fight against IS and increasing its popularity by filling a gap created by the absence of public services and disappointing government performance.

The short-term strategy of these Iran-affiliated groups combines marginalisation of some (larger) Hashd groups via their control over the PMF Commission with co-optation of other (smaller) Hashd groups as local auxiliaries. Being part of the Iraqi state simultaneously legitimises, empowers and constrains these Iran-affiliated Hashd groups. This paper traces the developments underpinning these shifts.