Assessing the broad evolution of EU foreign policy related to conflict

Today, the strategic foreign policy thinking in Brussels is in full swing. But it is of recent date and far from complete. Significant focus has been brought to bear on putting different bits of EU foreign policy architecture in place, reconceptualising the EU’s understanding of conflict (cyclical, context-specific) and creating conceptual drivers to ensure a higher degree of bureaucratic coherence (comprehensive approach, global strategy). Key issues that require future attention include creating a shared strategic outlook and threat perception, modalities for more effective EU institutional action under different configurations of Member State interests and creating greater bureaucratic coherence.

From modest beginnings and a limited level of ambition throughout most of the 2000s, the foreign policy of the European Union as a whole has developed significantly over the last decade, particularly regarding the conflict cycle that is the focus of this Section.[6] By way of a visual analogy, current EU foreign policy resembles a communal residence held in joint ownership by 27 inhabitants, the top floor of which is under construction while the roof leaks. In other words, EU foreign policy requires a significant degree of consensus – inevitably reducing speed and effectiveness – and its functionality remains limited. The two critical constraints on the effectiveness of EU foreign policy are the willingness of Member States to move the needle of their ambition and their ability to put corresponding institutional innovations and routines in place.

The year 2009 was an important marker as the Treaty of Lisbon re-tooled parts of the EU foreign policy architecture by enabling the creation of the Service for Foreign Policy Instruments (FPI) in 2010 and the European External Action Service (EEAS) in 2011.[7] It also put in place the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP).[8] In good EU fashion, the reform was sufficiently incremental to generate a hybrid. Despite the creation of the EEAS, several other bureaucratic centres for making and implementing EU foreign policy also remained in existence, while the CSDP was initially created without much of the infrastructure needed to ensure it could be operationalised. Such steps – including the EU force generation concept, Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), European Defence Fund (EDF), Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC), Civilian CSDP Compact and the European Peace Facility (EPF) – followed only in 2015–2020.[9]

In the wake of the Lisbon Treaty, the EU also re-conceptualised its policy understanding of conflict: away from a linear view that depicts a logical sequence of prevention-war-recovery and towards a more protracted and iterative view of the conflict cycle that is typical of contemporary intra-state conflicts.[10] This opened the door to the idea that a more integrated approach and mix of instruments should be mobilised to address conflict effectively, since these different phases tended to repeat, overlap or even occur in parallel.

Such re-conceptualisation became more operational with the publication of the 2013 Joint Communication of the European Commission on the comprehensive approach to external conflict and crisis. It intended to pave the way for better practical coordination of EU instruments and resources, as well as to anchor the principle of shared responsibility between EU institutions and Members States in the EU’s foreign policy.[11] Crisis and conflict could now officially be approached through the full suite of existing EU policy options and instruments, including political (e.g. declarations), diplomatic (e.g. mediation), economic (e.g. sanctions), security (e.g. CSDP missions) and development (e.g. humanitarian or stabilisation programmes) options – if the right strategic culture, decision-making structures and operational modalities could be created. This development also pointed to the next inevitable policy ‘insight’, namely that each conflict is violent in its own way and EU interventions in conflict situations ought to be context-driven and context-specific.

In 2016, a revamped European Global Strategy gathered together the architecture elements of the Lisbon Treaty with the Joint Communication’s objective of generating more comprehensive interventions to increase the level of ambition of EU foreign policy.[12] Between 2016 and 2020, the EU institutions began to operationalise the EU Global Strategy by creating new frameworks and processes (i.e. PESCO), institutions (i.e. MPCC) and developing/streamlining resources (i.e. the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument, EDF and EPF). But it was not until 2020 that the EU Strategic Compass was launched, which is an initiative to define EU strategic objectives in the area of security and defence more clearly. The Compass effort seeks to: a) generate a shared EU threat assessment and b) estimate the capabilities and resources to counter these threats. Both are essential to creating a policy culture of strategic deliberation in cases of crises and conflict.[13] However, until the end of 2021/beginning of 2022 when the Compass is due to be finalised, the EU will muddle through based on its present array of policies, actors and tools. At the end of 2020, the Council moreover adapted a global human rights sanctions regime and gave a boost to the EU’s institutional ability to mobilise civilian experts for CSDP missions.[14]

Dimensions of the EU foreign policy toolkit

To understand what strengths and weaknesses the developments outlined above generate in relation to the conflict cycle in particular, we must briefly survey the toolbox of EU foreign policy, its internal organisation and the role of Member States. In terms of the EU foreign policy toolbox in relation to conflict in its neighbourhood, several dimensions can be identified underneath the European Global Strategy that serves as a capstone:

To begin with, there are thematic and geographical policies, such as the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP, thematic) or the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP, regional in name, mostly bilateral in practice) that make the Global Strategy relevant to a particular subset of issues, or group of countries in its broader Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) context. They are more specific, still quite general, but also dynamic. For example, originally designed in 2004 and reviewed in both 2011 and 2016, the ENP[15] has remained focused on its core objectives of assisting transitions to democracy via elections and support for inclusive economic development while also innovating itself (2011: introduction of the ‘more for more’ principle in response to the Arab Uprisings; 2016: greater focus on security in response to growing migration concerns and tailoring its approach to specific country conditions).[16]

Next come a number of strategic forums for engaging foreign policy partners, such as the Union for the Mediterranean (since 2008), political dialogue with the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (since 2014/15) and the Strategic Dialogue between the EU and the League of Arab States (since 2015). These are places where broad EU foreign policies can be discussed in relation to regional developments and the collective priorities of the EU’s partners. While these forums typically produce fairly bland summit statements, they are also useful places for structural dialogue with key stakeholders.[17]

A third – and vital – dimension of EU foreign policy related to the conflict cycle are country-specific arrangements that are always based on an association agreement (the EU’s legal basis for engagement with third countries) and typically rest on a cascade of action plans, country (progress) reports and conflict assessments. Such documents operationalise more generic thematic or geographic policies for a particular country and funnel resources into the achievement of the objectives it identifies (critical resources include funds, human capital, political capital and time). It is not clear at present how well this crucial link in the process ensures that realities on the ground are leading in setting policy feasibility parameters and guiding operational modalities. The fact that there is currently no monitoring mechanism to ensure that short-term interventions (e.g. CSDP missions) and long-term ones (e.g. programmatic initiatives) reinforce one another, based on shared conflict assessments, is a telltale sign that further improvement is needed.

The final dimension of the EU’s foreign policy is the instruments and mechanisms that exist in addition to the EU’s bureaucracy (EEAS, Special Representatives, relevant Commission Directorate Generals and Delegations) that can initiate, operationalise and finance foreign policy interventions in specific countries, themes or other contexts. Instruments and mechanisms include the likes of CSPD missions, sanctions (restrictive measures), the Instrument Contributing to Stability and Peace, the new European Peace Facility[18] and the new Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI).[19] It is worth noting that significant variety exists in the range of financial instruments, operational mechanisms and decision-making procedures that the EU has available, which depend on the Treaty basis of particular elements of EU foreign policy. For example, while the European Commission’s Directorate-General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (ECHO) has significant leeway in the distribution of humanitarian aid,[20] the initiation and extension of CSDP missions require unanimous European Council approval.

This brings the analysis to a key observation, namely that the creation of the EEAS has not dissolved other centres of foreign policy making and implementation in the EU bureaucracy. The ensemble of existing internal actors relevant to intervention in conflicts elsewhere, such as the European Commission Directorate-Generals for development cooperation (DG DECVO), neighbourhood policy (DG NEAR), humanitarian aid (DG ECHO), the Service for Foreign Policy Instruments (FPI) as well as the General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union itself, do not operate on the basis of similar timelines, mechanisms or procedures. On paper, foreign policy is made in the European Council, supported by the EEAS, which in turn coordinates all other internal EU actors. In practice, a framework for strategising and monitoring the execution of agreed actions in different parts of the bureaucracy is absent while the High Representative has a limited ability to bring about greater alignment.[21] One consequence is that integrated strategic action remains difficult and that ensuring continuous coherence of EU foreign policy interventions takes considerable bureaucratic effort.

In addition to the remaining multi-polarity of the conduct of foreign policy within the European Union institutions, it should be noted that the national interests of the Member States related to conflict in Europe’s near abroad can be substantial and diverge profoundly. They tend to vary in function of geographic proximity (consider e.g. the role of France in the Sahel and the role of Germany in respect of Ukraine). This means that either EU foreign policy needs to be aligned with key Member State(s) to be effective – providing additional ‘services’ or supplying greater collective engagement – or risks being rendered ineffectual. When larger EU Member States cannot agree on foreign policy priorities, paralysis tends to ensue. This has for example happened regarding Libya, with France supporting Haftar’s Libyan National Army and Italy supporting Serraj’s Government of National Accord – the opposing sides of the civil war. EU foreign policy towards the Syrian civil war has arguably also suffered from divergent Member State preferences and views. In other words, the extent to which the political positions of key Member States can be aligned on a given conflict is a key variable for EU institutional foreign policy effectiveness.

Headline strengths and weaknesses of EU foreign policy regarding the conflict cycle

Based on the preceding analysis, Table 1 outlines a number of strengths and weaknesses of EU foreign policy regarding the conflict cycle. These will be tested against the specific cases of Syria (Sections 2 and 3) and Iraq (Sections 4 and 5) later in the paper.

Table 1

Headline strengths and weaknesses of EU foreign policy re conflict (2020)

	Strength	Weakness
Strategic	(1) EU foreign policy has been constantly evolving and improving since the Lisbon Treaty (2009) in both its policy implementation frameworks and supporting institutions. Member States appear keen to make it better and more effective by trial and error. (2) Since 2017, the EU has taken significant steps to improve its defence and security toolkit, including PESCO, the European Defence Fund and the European Peace Facility, as well as creating an EU strategic military HQ.	(3) The EU’s general strategic culture remains weak and the foreign policy interests/divergence of its Member States profound. Moreover, the Strategic Compass work is limited to the area of security and defence and has only just started. Without broader positive change in strategic culture and perceptions, new capabilities and institutional innovations risk being hamstrung. (4) The EU remains unable to project meaningful armed force beyond its own borders and, while this capacity is evolving, at least in the indirect sense, it is not yet usable.[22]
Operational	(1) The EU has said goodbye to its boilerplate template of approaching conflicts as a generic phenomenon and introduced much more conflict contextuality in its approaches, at least on paper.[23] (2) The EU has a strong record and is well capacitated to perform on softer aspects of conflict such as humanitarian aid and peacebuilding.	(3) The diversity of foreign policy funding instruments and foreign policy implementation centres makes developing a coherent approach a Herculean task without greater strategic consolidation and streamlining of methods/authorities. Crisis management, especially, is disconnected from interventions in the conflict prevention and recovery spheres. (4) CSDP missions have largely become political symbols of EU engagement. Their effectiveness and integration with other interventions has taken a backseat.

Strength

Weakness

Strategic

(1) EU foreign policy has been constantly evolving and improving since the Lisbon Treaty (2009) in both its policy implementation frameworks and supporting institutions. Member States appear keen to make it better and more effective by trial and error.

(2) Since 2017, the EU has taken significant steps to improve its defence and security toolkit, including PESCO, the European Defence Fund and the European Peace Facility, as well as creating an EU strategic military HQ.

(3) The EU’s general strategic culture remains weak and the foreign policy interests/divergence of its Member States profound. Moreover, the Strategic Compass work is limited to the area of security and defence and has only just started. Without broader positive change in strategic culture and perceptions, new capabilities and institutional innovations risk being hamstrung.

(4) The EU remains unable to project meaningful armed force beyond its own borders and, while this capacity is evolving, at least in the indirect sense, it is not yet usable.[22]

Operational

(1) The EU has said goodbye to its boilerplate template of approaching conflicts as a generic phenomenon and introduced much more conflict contextuality in its approaches, at least on paper.[23]

(2) The EU has a strong record and is well capacitated to perform on softer aspects of conflict such as humanitarian aid and peacebuilding.

(3) The diversity of foreign policy funding instruments and foreign policy implementation centres makes developing a coherent approach a Herculean task without greater strategic consolidation and streamlining of methods/authorities. Crisis management, especially, is disconnected from interventions in the conflict prevention and recovery spheres.

(4) CSDP missions have largely become political symbols of EU engagement. Their effectiveness and integration with other interventions has taken a backseat.

Sources: Debuysere, L. and S. Blockmans, Europe’s Coherence Gap in External Crisis and Conflict Management, Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2019, online; Musiol, L, Better Early than Sorry: How the EU Can Use its Early Warning Capacities to their Full Potential, Brussels: ICG, 2019; ECDPM (2018), op.cit.; ECDPM (2019), op.cit.; Particip et al., External Evaluation of EU’s Support to Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding (2013–2018), European Commission, online, 2019; Key informant interviews at European Commission, Parliament and External Action Service (November 2020); Mölling and Schütz (2020), op.cit.

The next Sections on the Syrian and Iraqi civil wars start by tracing the evolution of these conflicts. This helps develop an ‘external’ benchmark for assessing the relevance of EU foreign policy, i.e. how well does it relate to particular conflict episodes and dynamics? Subsequently, the report discusses how the strengths and weaknesses outlined above apply.