Conclusions and options for the Netherlands | Specialising in European defence

Conclusions

Specialisation in defence is still considered as controversial due to past experiences: unilateral, uncoordinated abolishment of capabilities, mainly due to budget cuts. The issue of becoming fully dependent on each other’s capabilities also continues to block an open and frank discussion on the topic. On the other hand, many examples of (partial) dependencies of ‘have not’ countries on ‘have nations’ already exist, such as with regard to nuclear weapons, missile defence, long-range strike systems or military space-based capabilities. More importantly, if arranged ‘by design’ instead of ‘by default’, specialisation can strengthen the collective capabilities of European countries by strengthening capabilities across the whole spectrum, contribute to better interoperability, and enhance mutual trust and confidence.

The negative legacy of the past and the confusion about terminology have to be overcome in order to explore the scope for defence specialisation. One suggestion is to use another term, for example the more positively sounding excelling capabilities or mutually agreed specialisation. Another issue is to point to the potential benefits more explicitly. Certainly, specialisation entails risks of which dependency on other nations for providing the capability and the loss of sovereignty remain the most challenging ones. However, specialisation also offers benefits, such as optimising capabilities by the countries that specialise, increasing multinational cooperation and producing cost savings. A categorisation or a framework defining the various forms of specialisation may assist in overcoming doubts which still exist. Three distinct forms of specialisation are:

Structured European capability groups: countries with specific capabilities (e.g. missile defence) can specialise within the group (e.g. with land- or sea-based missile defence capabilities);

Specialisation in support functions: in particular when countries operate the same equipment, they can specialise – by mutual agreement – in offering training and maintenance facilities to each other;

Traditional specialisation: the most far-reaching form in which countries are mutually dependent on the provision of a capability.

In practice, Structured European capability groups are relatively easy to realise. Many already exist, for example the initial-entry Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF), led by the United Kingdom, or the NATO Framework Nation Concept (FNC) of grouping heavy land forces, led by Germany. The return of regionalisation in the Alliance’s conventional deterrence and defence posture offers additional scope for establishing new structured capability groups of countries for Northern, Central, Eastern and South-Eastern Europe. Enhanced Forward Presence Battlegroups need to become more standardised with a fixed war-fighting capability, also in order to build standardised brigade-size forces for a reinforced Allied military presence on the Eastern flank, as decided at the NATO Madrid Summit. Structured European capability groups could also be formed thematically, for example a European intervention group for initial entry in crisis management operations – which is envisaged in the EU Rapid Deployment Capacity – and a stabilisation group for longer-term post-conflict missions, both with specialised contributions by European countries. Such groups could also be formed for missile defence, space-based capabilities, military support for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief activities, and many others. While so far often constituted in a bottom-up manner – by the participating countries – it is important to involve the EU and NATO in further establishing such groups in order to structure European defence cooperation and the European contribution to NATO in a consistent and effective manner. Both organisations should further adapt their defence planning tools in order to incorporate specialisation in a multinational format in defining capability goals and targets.

The category of specialisation in support functions offers tremendous scope for specialisation in areas such as training and maintenance, reducing exploitation costs and increasing defence integration. Unfortunately, the potential is far from being systematically explored due to a lack of standardised equipment but also as a result of cultural, economic or industrial reasons, namely ‘do it all myself’. The Belgian-Dutch Benesam model of each country specialising in having the training and maintenance facilities for minehunters and frigates respectively is a successful format that can be applied to other capabilities. The more European countries manage to move from fragmentation to standardisation in military equipment, the larger the scope for specialisation in support functions will become. New projects such as the Future Air Combat Systems (FCAS), Main Ground Combat Systems (MGCS) and the Next Generation Rotorcraft Capability (NGRC) as well as others should take the issue of specialisation in support functions on board from the design phase onwards in order to prevent nations from opting for purely national solutions later on.

Finally, the most challenging category is traditional specialisation: radical forms such as the specialisation of countries in either collective defence or crisis management as well as trading armies for navies are unrealistic in political and military terms, both nationally and internationally. In other words, task specialisation is not the way to go also in view of the multitude of threats that all European countries are facing. Scope lies primarily in the area of specialising weapon systems within capability areas. Examples could be: long-range missile artillery vs short-range systems; land-based vs. sea-based special forces; blue water ocean-going naval capabilities vs. brown water naval assets; and so forth. Such far-reaching weapons specialisation will require time and patience as this form of specialisation by design requires agreement between two or more countries. Trust and confidence are key factors and, thus, traditional specialisation has the best chance for success between neighbouring states with a long tradition of close defence cooperation.

Options for the Netherlands

In the Defence White Paper 2022, the Dutch Ministry of Defence already identified ‘specialisms’ to which a significant number of investments will be directed. These include: intelligence capacity, the cyber domain, special operations forces, integrated air and missile defence (on land, at sea and in the air), long-range artillery, expanding and arming unmanned aerial systems, and reinforcing measures for countering enemy drones.[76] A further integration of the Dutch and German land forces is also mentioned and, together with its international partners and allies, The Hague will discuss stepping up efforts in moving towards specialisation in the long term. However, no concrete options for specialisation are mentioned in the White Paper.

Connecting these ambitions to the concrete options for specialisation that are proposed in this report, the Netherlands could consider the following ten options. Some of them could be introduced in the EU and NATO in the relatively short term as work on adapting the requirements for crisis management operations (implementation of the EU Strategic Compass) and for the Alliance’s deterrence and defence posture is already ongoing. All of them will contribute to increased interoperability and standardisation, in particular in cases of collaborative armaments procurement which offers optimal conditions for specialisation in areas such as training and maintenance as well as the integration of the armed forces of various countries. However, large collaborative acquisition programmes only deliver in the longer term – which nevertheless requires that opportunities for specialisation should be on their agendas from the start in particular with regard to identifying the potential for specialisation in support functions early on.

As a Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF) participant, the Netherlands should engage in talks with the other contributors, starting with the lead nation (UK), to explore the scope for strengthening the JEF and making it even more effectively structured, equipped, trained and adapted to the Northern European theatre as a structured European capability group for operations in the context of collective defence, taking into account the future NATO membership of Finland and Sweden. The Dutch Marine Corps contribution has to be strengthened, based on the reinforcement measures as announced in the Defence White Paper 2022. Adding the heavy-lift helicopter capacities of the Netherlands (CH-47 Chinooks) should be considered.

The Netherlands intends to contribute to the EU Rapid Deployment Capacity (RDC), the first core of which will be provided by Germany in 2025 when the RDC reaches its operational status. The close cooperation between the Dutch 11 ^th Air Assault Brigade and the German Rapid Forces Division offers scope for a bilateral contribution to a structured European intervention group. France should also contribute to this group and appropriate arrangements for participation by the UK should be explored.

Next to the integration of the Dutch 43^rd Mechanized Brigade into the parent 1^st German Armoured Division, also the Dutch 13 ^th Light Brigade could be integrated into a parent German division. As the Boxer wheeled armoured vehicle is used by both countries, there is scope for specialisation in support functions. The same might be possible in the context of the existing integration of air mobile forces, after Germany starts to replace its current CH-53 heavy-lift helicopters with the CH-47 Chinooks already used by the Netherlands.

Within the NATO Framework Nation Concept (FNC) for heavy land forces, the Netherlands could explore, together with the lead nation Germany, the potential for specialisation in long-range missile artillery. This could be a follow-up specialisation action – including the Dutch-German specialisation in support functions – now that the Netherlands has announced (in the White Paper 2022) that it will procure long-range missile artillery. Together, the two countries could provide the core of this specialised capability to which other FNC participants could contribute.

Based on the existing Dutch-German cooperation in land-based missile defence, The Hague should investigate, preferably together with Berlin, how a structured European integrated air and missile defence group could be constituted as more European nations (including Poland and Sweden) are procuring the same Patriot system. Specialisation in support functions could be discussed in such a European missile defence group. For the longer term, based on coordination with all European countries operating missile defence systems, the Dutch might opt for specialisation in sea-based capacities as the number of European nations with land-based missile defence assets is expanding more than those with sea-based capabilities.

Maritime surveillance in the North Sea/Norwegian Sea area could be a capability area for constituting closer cooperation and specialisation within a regional and structured European capability group. The Netherlands could promote such a group and, together with Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Norway and the UK, explore options for specialisation in maritime surveillance assets (maritime patrol aircraft, drones, patrol vessels, etc.) for use outside territorial waters.

In view of the growing effects of climate change and in line with the strengthening of military support for national civil authorities, the Netherlands could also promote the grouping of military capabilities for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief at the European level. In this context, The Hague could argue for specialisation, e.g. with a Dutch contribution focusing on helicopter capabilities.

The Netherlands should consider joining the Future Air Combat Systems (FCAS) programme, next to its stated request to participate in the Franco-German Main Ground Combat Systems (MGCS) project. These two programmes, both of which are in the design phase, offer wide scope for specialisation in support functions. The Netherlands could bring this important aspect into the programmes in order to prevent the multiplication of support facilities once these programmes reach maturity.

As more European countries are acquiring the American MQ9-Reaper drone, it is worth exploring a European user group as it exists for the F16 and F35 fighter aircraft. Woensdrecht Air Base could be offered as the maintenance facility to other European countries operating the system. As the larger European countries intend to replace the US-built Reapers with the Eurodrone towards the end of the 2020s, the Netherlands should consider joining the Eurodrone programme and explore the scope for specialisation in support functions.

10.

The Hague could explore the scope for coordinated specialisation with Belgium for host nation support. If Belgium were to consider the acquisition of land-based missile defence – which is becoming more important, in particular for the protection of the Port of Antwerp against long-range strike systems – then the Dutch Patriot capability could be shared (first) and handed over (later) to Belgium as a specialisation for protecting the harbours of both countries. In return the Dutch sea-based missile defence capability could be offered to protect Belgian interests further away.