Saudi efforts to roll back Iranian influence in the region, alongside the reconstitution of Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula in Yemen in 2009, set the direction of Riyadh's response to the Arab uprisings. Saudi Arabia's most important Arab ally President Mubarak of Egypt, was toppled without the US stepping in to save their common partner.[40] Meanwhile, large-scale popular protests erupted in Bahrain on 14 February[41] and in Oman on 25 February 2011. The Al Saud family responded by showing their unfaltering support for the other Gulf monarchies, fearing that the toppling of one monarchy might lead to a domino effect that could spill over to Saudi Arabia. The demonstrations in Bahrain were particularly threatening due to their intensity, the threat they posed to the survival of the Bahraini monarchy and the country’s large Shi’a population, as is the case in the eastern province of Saudi Arabia.[42] These concerns were compounded by Saudi Shi’a showing their solidarity with the people of Bahrain three days into protests in Manama.[43]
The Saudi regime was more than willing to come to the rescue of Bahrain’s ruling al-Khalifa family when the latter requested help from the other Gulf monarchies. On 14 March 2011, Saudi troops entered Bahrain as part of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Peninsula Shield force, which was deployed to protect government buildings so that the Bahraini security forces could crackdown on the protestors. The Saudi troops were followed by UAE police. These deployments were legitimised in the Saudi and Bahraini media by framing the protests as an Iranian plot carried out with the assistance of the local Shi’a population, despite there being only limited evidence for this.[44] The support of Saudi and Emirati security forces helped the Al Khalifa ruling dynasty to crack down on the protestors and stay in power. Meanwhile, the Saudi regime sought to pre-empt the effects of the Arab uprisings at home by mixing a robust law-and-order response with massive government handouts to boost its status as provider of wealth to the Saudi population.[45] New public spending programmes worth US$130 billion were announced to increase public sector salaries, hire new recruits into the security apparatus and launch a housing programme to build 500,000 new affordable units. Saudi Arabia’s religious establishment also benefited from state largesse as it received an additional $200 million to ensure its co-optation. [46] Religious officials played an important role in discouraging protests in the Kingdom. The Grand Mufti, the highest religious official in Saudi Arabia, even issued a fatwa forbidding protests, which was disseminated by clerics in their Friday sermons.
But Saudi Arabia did not completely distance itself from the revolutionary spirit that swept the Arab world at the beginning of 2011. Driven by historical antagonisms with the Khaddafi regime – which had plotted to assassinate then-crown prince Abdullah[47] – it put its diplomatic weight behind the NATO-led intervention in Libya. Furthermore, Saudi Arabia played a crucial role in suspending Syrian membership of the Arab League in November 2011 because of the repressive policies adopted by the Assad regime in response to the uprising. This was the result of Saudi public opinion being supportive of Syrian protestors and of the Al-Saud’s power struggle with Iran.[48]
In brief, while Saudi Arabia’s rulers acted against the Arab uprisings where they came too close to home with a mix of soft and hard power, they did support some revolutionary forces – but for reasons more linked with historical animosities and regional power competition than with sympathy for the demands of the street.
Consolidation of the Saudi-Emirati axis
The intervention of Saudi Arabia and the UAE in Bahrain turned out to be the steppingstone towards more intensive cooperation between both countries. They shared a determination to prevent Iran from exploiting regional upheaval to gain a further foothold in Arab countries, as well as wishing to mitigate the domestic ideological threat posed by the likes of the Muslim Brotherhood and Islamic State. In an interview, Mohammad bin Salman, who became the Saudi Crown Prince in 2017 after replacing his cousin Mohammed bin Nayef, dubbed these threats a ‘triangle of evil’[49] – Iran, the Muslim Brotherhood and violent extremist organisations such as Al-Qaeda and Islamic State. President Obama’s pivot towards Asia further boosted the countries’ cooperation as it became clear to Saudi Arabia and the UAE that the US would not guarantee the regional pre-uprisings status quo[50] as it shifted its military focus away from the region.[51]
However, there are divergences between the Saudi and Emirati in these threat perceptions and associated policy responses. Mehran Kamrava, an expert on the Gulf region, notes that ‘for Riyadh, the competition with Iran has become an existentially-motivated crusade, an effort to undermine and undercut Iran whenever and wherever possible,’[52] which has been exemplified by its engagement in Bahrain, Yemen and Syria. Meanwhile, the UAE prioritised the campaign against the Muslim Brotherhood.[53] It gathered steam after the Muslim Brotherhood and other Sunni Islamist organisations gained significant power via legislative elections in Tunisia, Egypt and Morocco, and even seized the presidency in Egypt with the election of Mohamed Morsi.[54] As the Muslim Brotherhood has been supported by Qatar and Turkey, the Saudi-Emirati axis has also increasingly pitted itself against the Qatari-Turkish alliance.[55]
