The current borders between Benin and Nigeria were demarcated during colonial times. The demarcation of these borders separated people sharing similar cultural backgrounds. Today, there remain strong cross-border links despite the national boundaries, including shared socio-political institutions and economic activities.[133]

The border between Benin and Nigeria can be divided into three ethnic zones (see Figure 8). First, there are the Hausa and Fulbe in the northern parts of both countries – the area between Kebbi State in Nigeria and Alibori in Benin. This area overlaps with parts of the 19th century Sokoto caliphate. Second, in the centre are the Bariba and Boo – the area between the northern parts of Benin’s Borgou Department and mainly Nigeria’s Niger State. This area overlaps with the pre-colonial Borgu Empire. A third area is from the Yoruba, Gun and Ajo-speaking groups in the southern part of Benin’s Borgou Department and most of Nigeria’s Kwara State. This pre-colonial Oyo empire falls outside the scope of this study.

3.1 The northern link: the Hausa and Fulbe

In the areas between North East Alibori and Kebbi State, key groups are the Hausa and Fulbe (with smaller numbers of Zerma and Kanuri) and all have close cross-border links.

The Hausa are overwhelmingly concentrated in the northern parts of Nigeria and in the Niger Republic. The Hausa are also present in northern Benin. Their arrival in Benin dates back as far as 1897, when Hausa settlers arrived with the Europeans.[134] Others migrated to Benin from Nigeria, particularly Hausa fishermen from Kebbi State who settled in Monsey, Alibori Department.[135] The Hausa in Nigeria, Benin and Niger share a common identity.

Cross-border connections are facilitated by the Hausa practices of having open relations with other ethnic groups with frequent intermarriages, making the Hausa politically and socially active.[136] But the real facilitator of these cross-border connections are the Hausa language and the Hausa’s role in commerce. Hausa are traditionally involved in long-distance trade, which has helped to make Hausa a lingua franca for commerce and communications. In northern Benin, Hausa is used for wider communication – notably in large towns and market villages.[137] Hence, a trader from northern Benin noted that in order to sell at the market in Nigeria, it is necessary to speak at least Hausa and Fufulde.[138] Moreover, the Hausa’s role in cross-border trade also places them in an important position. For example, a fuel vendor from northern Benin stated, ‘If you want to excel at transporting fuel, you have to be friends with the Hausa.’[139] Based on profitable business practices and common trade, the Hausa enjoy good relations with their Nigerian neighbours, particularly the Kanuri.[140]

The countries of Benin and Nigeria are further connected through the cross-border presence of the ethnic Fulbe. The Fulbe in Benin have different subgroups divided both in terms of castes and in terms of their Fulbe origin. The Fulbe who are common along Alibori’s border with Nigeria are not the Barugabe Fulbe who are indigenous/autochthonous to Benin – such as the Korakube (the Borgou Fulbe who have been settled there for centuries).[141] Instead, the Fulbe along the border with Kebbi State and Alibori are often labelled as Zamfara Fulbe – that is, Fulbe who originate from Nigeria.[142] Zamfara Fulbe are present in Benin for two key reasons. One is that droughts in the 1970s led to Fulbe migration from northern Nigeria to northern Benin. Another reason is that one transhumance route runs from Kandi via Segbana into Nigeria.[143] Cross-border relations between the Fulbe in Nigeria and Benin involve, among other things, a barter system of exchanging zebu and taurine breeds of cattle. This barter system takes place between nomadic Fulbe pastoralists (often from Niger and Nigeria) and local Fulbe herders.[144]

3.2 The centre: the cross-border Borgu Empire of the Bariba

There has been evidence of violent extremism in the area between Borgou and southern Alibori, Benin, and Niger State, Nigeria, since early 2023. The main ethnic groups in this area are the Bariba and the Boo as well as the Fulbe and the related Gando (a Fulbe subgroup with links to the Bariba).[145] The area used to be the Borgu Empire – an empire extending from Nikki, Illo and New Bussa (see Figure 8).

In 1898, the British and the French partitioned the Borgu Empire between Nigeria and the Benin Republic. They established the administrative Borgou Department in Benin (comprising the Nikki Kingdom – Nikki, Parakou, Djougou, Kouande, Kandi and Bembereke). In Nigeria this empire was split between Niger State and Kebbi State and was called the Borgu Emirate (comprised of the Bussa Kingdom and Illo Kingdom in northern Bussa, specifically Illo, Kaoje, Koenji, Agwara, Rofia Aliyara, Wawa, Kaima, Kenu, Okuta, Ilesha, Gwanara and Yashkikera).[146]

Cross-border connections

The former Borgu Empire used to be a confederation of various kingdoms, with the Nikki (Benin), Bussa and Illo (Nigeria) as primary power centres. The leaders of the primary kingdoms in the former Borgu Empire – Illo, Nikki and Bussa – governed their territories autonomously.[147] Although each kingdom had its own political identity, they were connected by shared elements such as a similar caste system, a governing dynasty rooted in the cultural legend of Kisra, gift exchanges, participation in each other’s traditional festivals, and using the same ritual and ceremonial instruments.[148]

Today, the Bariba continue these interactions. At leadership level consider, for example, the communities of Babanna (Nigeria) and Basso (Benin) where the royal house of the two towns is the same.[149] Similarly, who becomes the king of Illo (Kebbi State) and Nikki (Borgou Department, Benin) is subject to the consent of the emir of Borgu (in New Bussa, Niger State).

Relations are particularly strong between the ethnic and linguistic groups and subgroups that form the Bariba. One example is the Gani Festival, which is organised by communities from both countries. This annual festival brings people together from Nikki, Benin and New Bussa, Nigeria. The festival is a uniting force and cultural marker. Another is the turbaning ceremony in which people from either side of the borderlands participate.[150] Communities are also linked by agricultural work in fields that straddle the border. A community member from Bessassi noted, ‘My farm crosses the border, so when I go to work, I sometimes see my Nigerian brothers working on the other side of the border. If you’re in the field, you don’t think of the border, so you can cross the border without knowing.’[151] Nigerians also cross the border to attend schools or to work in Benin.[152]

Finally, there are cross-border hunting connections. The Boo – not formally Bariba as such, but they are tied to the Bariba in plainsanterie relations – are key hunting groups and they engage in cross-border activities. ‘The Boo share their activities [across borders, KdB], including […] hunting.’[153] Another person pointed out that ‘no country is going to separate us from our Boo identity’.[154] And a final comment: ‘Hunters are part of our cultural heritage, no matter what anyone says, where there are Boo and Bariba, there will always be hunters.’[155]

The Nigerian Borgu Emirate

Nigeria’s Borgu emir does not have the same influence as his counterpart in Benin. There are three reasons for this. One is that the ethnic composition of the area crucially changed after the building of the Kainji Dam. A resettlement scheme between 1964 and 1968 saw many communities along the River Niger resettling in the Borgu Emirate.[156] Moreover, the British conquest of northern Nigeria and the colonial administration produced waves of migration into the Kainji Lake area (Hausa, Sorko, Zabarma, Nupe, Yoruba, Igbo, Esan and Igala) settling in places such as Wawa, Gungun Bussa, Shagunu and Agwara.[157]

The effect was that the emir had to adapt. For that reason, parts of the Hausa Emirate system are now integrated into the Borgu Emirate. Furthermore, non-Bariba ethnic groups, such as Nupes, Yorubas, Igbos, and Isokos can hold traditional titles in the Emirate. They also play an important role in consultations regarding development issues. For now, this has led to collaboration with one interviewee calling the New Bussa ‘a mini-Nigeria’.[158] A traditional ruler noted, ‘Our main language of communication is Bissan, spoken by a majority of the indigenous people, but every Borguien can understand and speak the Hausa language.’[159] Intermarriages, interfaith relations, interethnic consultations and coexistence are common.

3.3 Cross-border religious movements

A final cross-border social dynamic is religious movements that operate cross-border. Generally North West Nigeria and northern Benin share a Muslim identity. The customary institutions are mainly Suffi stemming from 19^th century jihads and most people adhere to a strand of Maliki Suni and some Sunni reformist movements. Here we explore two reformist movements with some Wahabi orientation: the Yan Izala movement and the Tabligh movement with a cross-border presence.

The first movement is the ‘Yan Izala’, which originated in 1978 under the leadership of Sheikh Isamail Idris in Jos, Plateau State. The Wahabi movement emerged in opposition to the prominent Sufi brotherhoods of the Tijaniyya and Qadiriyya.[160] The Yan Izala movement considers these orders to be ‘un-Islamic,’ calling for a stricter interpretation of Islam.[161] Izala primarily leveraged its support from the youth and less privileged segments of the local communities, preying on dissatisfaction with politics and the perceived elitism of the northern Sufi movements (co-opted by the British colonial authorities).[162] In Nigeria, offsprings of this movement formed the basis of Boko Haram.

Yan Izala expanded into adjacent northern Benin through Salafi scholars such as Abubakar Gumi and al-Banna, while Nigerian preachers and theorists spread their views into Benin via the media. In the early 2000s, Yan Izala vied for influence over a mosque in Malanville and sponsored Koranic schools in Malanville, Madecali and Monkassa.[163]

Our interviews highlighted the fact that the Izala movement is well established along the border, with both travelling preachers and those who have settled permanently. In the border zones from north Alibori to deep into Borgou Department, the movement is seen as a Nigerian movement, but there is a strong presence in Guene Laaga, Kalale, Segbana, Lougou, Madecali and Malanville.[164] People first reported a presence in early 2010 in Segbana and most observations were from 2016 onwards.

The second movement is the Sunni pacifist Jama'at Tabligh movement. This movement has its roots in India, where it began as a missionary movement to counter conversion attempts by Hindu revivalists at the beginning of the 20^th century. The Tabligh propagates an egalitarian position that repudiates ethnic distinctions or caste hierarchies.[165] The Tabligh expanded to more than 150 countries, including Benin and Nigeria.[166] Their presence in Nigeria can be traced back to 1956 when Pakistani preachers visited the city of Lagos, with ten more arriving in 1960. In the 1980s, the Nigerian branch of the Tabligh split and over 300 Tablighi centres were established in Nigeria.[167] Tabligh members were among those who joined MUJAO early on in Mali and Hamadoun Kouffa and Iyad ag Ghaly held important roles within the Tabligh.[168] For this reason, the movement is sometimes viewed with suspicion but is in reality a pacifist movement that rejects the use of violence and does not seek to intervene in politics, with Tabligh leaders openly condemning jihadist violence.[169]

In Benin, the movement only arrived in 1986 (first in the south), but it is viewed as being more of a Beninese movement than the Yan Izala.[170] This might be due to its base in Parakou from where it branched out.[171]

The Tabligh movement has also grown in the border area between Nigeria and Benin. Many interviewees were familiar with the movement; one stated that, ‘The Tabligh [...] go from village to village to pray, […] coming to Baninzi every week for years’, while someone else said that, ‘The Tabligh go from town to town to preach, like the prophet.’[172] Other villages that are regularly visited are Madecali, where the Tabligh maintain a seasonal presence, and Monkassa.[173] A well-known Tabligh area is Tsamiya (indeed, the village where Sadiku’s son held his marriage).

3.4 Social, ethnic and religious connections

How do these social, ethnic and religious connections connect with the risk of violent extremism in Benin and Nigeria? A key point is that dependencies between ethnic groups foster resilience against violent extremism and should be supported. But there are real vulnerabilities.

In the Northern area (the Hausa-Fulbe area that belonged to the former Sokoto caliphate) there are familiar tensions with – and stereotypes of – the Fulbe community. For example, a trader from Malanville expressed the opinion that the Fulbe ruin the market as they raise their prices during negotiations.[174] Another trader from Malanville noted, ‘There are also the Fulbe. They are often violent.’[175] A third said, ‘The Fulbe in Nigeria are the same as here – they're not serious.’[176] A businessman from Monkassa stated, ‘Often it’s the Fulbe who cause complications, a Fulbe will never tell you the truth and will always try to deceive you.’ [177] The origins of these tensions are in part related to farmer-herder tensions, land use and ownership, but there is also a clear connection to the strong tensions in North West Nigeria between Fulbe and Hausa.[178]

In the former Borgu Empire there are three separate social, ethnic and religious risks that open up opportunities for Violent Extremist Originations. First the role of Fulbe in the former Borgu empire. Fulbe in the former Borgu Empire attained a relatively elevated social status. In part this was a result of the Bariba practice of sending Fulbe to school, as Western education was negatively perceived.[179] Another was that the French colonial regime slowly elevated Fulbe leaders into elite positions in Borgou Department.[180] A final reason is the role of the Gando – originally a Fulbe/Bariba slave caste. The Gando status is obtained hereditarily (enslaved by the Bariba) or when Bariba parents reject newborns (accused of sorcery) who are then brought up by the Fulbe. But during colonial times, it was particularly the Gando who received education (as Fulbe elite were themselves also suspicious of colonial powers and hence send in those with the lowest social status) allowing them to climb the social ladder and to hold political and administrative positions.[181] Particularly in the Borgou Department, Gando play important political roles (e.g. Kalale).

Yet despite this different social states there are clear tensions. Fulbe are predominantly involved in livestock activities and previous research shows persistent farmer-herder tensions and violence.[182] Interviews with community members in Borgou Department underscore this. In Sokotindji, Kalale and Basso respondents openly dismissed the Fulbe (habitually considering every Fulbe to be a herder, despite many exceptions). For instance, one resident from Basso stated that, ‘Relations with other communities are sometimes tense, especially when the Fulbe come to destroy our fields. Sometimes there are fights and the police have to be called.’[183] Another commented that, ‘If you ask any farmer, he'll tell you there are two problems in his life: problems with the authorities and problems with the Fulbe. We can't do anything about the authorities because they're the ones in power, but the Fulbe and the way they destroy our fields are likely to lead to conflict one day.’[184] A respondent in Kalale said, ‘Here the Fulbe are the real problem because their oxen destroy all the fields.’[185]

Moreover, some Fulbe are viewed with more disdain than others; Zamfara Fulbe (those who originate from Nigeria). In various cases, people linked the whole group to kidnapping incidents and an increase in general criminal incidents. One person stated, ‘The ones I avoid the most are the Zamfara Fulbe, they're real savages. If you meet them at night, you're in trouble. They can kidnap you or steal your goods. They're mean, even towards their own Fulbe brothers in Benin,’[186] and ‘It's often the Zamfara Fulbe who are dangerous. If you come back from the market at night, they can hurt you.’[187] Given the observed spreading of banditry (often with a Fulbe link) towards Kebbi and the presence of Darul Salam (with also Fulbe among them) in the area, such prejudices can become recruitment grounds.

A second risk emerges around the hunting groups in the former Borgu Empire. While there is a history of tension between hunting groups and Fulbe groups, there is a different concern. Hunting groups such as the Dambanga operate across borders and have allegiance to the cross-border customary authorities (the Nikki king and the Borgu emir). In Nigeria, Dambanga hunting groups are more openly pitched against whatever armed/extremist group operates from Kainji Lake National Park. This is because extremists targeted the customary system in 2021 (a system which hunting groups defend). Moreover, that the hunting groups are part of communal armed groups that have fought against whatever armed groups holds out in Kainji Lake (2022), and because the Nigerian government has linked up with communal hunting groups on two occasions (2022).[188]

The problem is that in Benin, the hunters are de facto banned by the government, which creates a discrepancy between the Nigerian and Beninese response.[189] Over the course of this research, almost no one in Benin was willing to answer questions about the hunters. But those who did speak out were very clear on the role the Dambanga presently play: ‘The Dambanga have always been there […] It's not the politicians who are going to chase them away. They are Boo, so they are in contact with the Dambanga Boo of Nigeria.’[190] When the violent extremism problem in the area increases, the different treatment of the hunters in Nigeria and Benin is poised to become a source of friction.

Finally, the increasing role of the Tabligh and Yan Izala is partly a concern (although it should not be overstated). It is important to realise that these movements are not violent or inherently linked to violent extremism. But the bigger point is that there is an overlap between the ideology of these reformist movements and the jihadist/extremist doctrine – such as strict interpretation of Islamic law, a firm rejection of Western ideas, complicit African elites, and a strong concept of a cohesive global Muslim community point of view.[191] As evidence from the Sahel shows, those who are attracted to these stricter forms of reformist movement ideologies are more susceptible and more at risk at some point in their lives to join a violent group.

3.5 Summary

There are deep connections between North West Nigeria and North East Benin due to longstanding social, ethnic and religious connections, particularly in the former ‘cross-border’ Borgu Empire: