For years, politicians, researchers, policy makers and security officials have speculated about links between extremists in the Sahel and the Lake Chad Basin.
Ten years ago a study pointed to Benin as a potential link between Nigeria and the Sahel. Nigerian president Goodluck Jonathan similarly warned about the training of Boko Haram fighters in Mali and Niger.[1] In 2015, emerging Islamic State affiliates in the Sahel and Lake Chad spurred new speculation. In 2019, the UN Security Council warned of the emergence of a joint Islamic State logistical base in Nigeria’s Sokoto.[2] And in 2020, the International Crisis Group warned that Nigeria’s North West region could soon become a corridor for Sahelian extremists.[3]
It is clear what motivates these warnings: a link between Lake Chad and the Sahel is a major opportunity for Al Qaeda and the Islamic State to boast about their profiles as leaders of global jihad.
Yet, for just as many years, these ideas have been dismissed as lacking sufficient empirical basis. This report warns that evidence of a link between the Sahel and Lake Chad is now mounting.
Mounting evidence
In March 2023, a report from the Hudson Institute led to the realisation that Nigerian extremists had expanded further into North West and Central Nigeria than was publicly known. This came on the back of incidents where extremists from Burkina Faso had crossed into Nigeria in 2020 as well as attempts to create an extremists bridgehead in Benin towards Nigeria (March-June 2022).[4]
This report presents evidence from the border area between Nigeria and Benin that points to a worrying reality. While still at the early stages, there are indications of a sustained presence of violent extremists along the Nigerian-Beninese border. Data from the Clingendael Institute shows a peak in the movement of unidentified armed groups in 2023 along Benin’s border with Nigeria. Of concern is that more than one group seems to be involved. For the first time, there is substantial evidence that some of these include extremists from both the Sahel and the Lake Chad Basin.
A game-changer?
It is important to understand the emergence of nascent links between extremists from the Sahel and the Lake Chad Basin, as this could be a game-changer for West Africa.
One reason is that it might change regional responses to violent extremism. Current responses include semi-ad hoc ‘coalitions of the willing’ such as the G5-Sahel, Multinational Task Force (Sahel) the Accra Initiative and Conseil d’Entente (West Africa). For these ad hoc coalitions a key problem has been that Nigeria – still West Africa’s largest military and economic power – has remained at a distance. A Nigerian entry into the fight with West Africa’s most successful insurgency movement since the jihadist movement in the 19th century could set in motion new dynamics.
Another reason is that the newest expansions of violent extremism should be a wake-up call for West African and Western governments alike. It is clear that the response in the Sahel has been ineffective. The response has been largely one of playing catch up; violent extremist organisations (VEOs) continue to outperform West African armies as well as Western and Russian support to these armies. While hardly a novel insight at this point in time, the presence of VEOs in the Benin-Nigeria border zone shows once again that extremists are more resilient militarily than the state is. VEOs also have social agendas that speak to people’s needs in ways that West African states and donor programming have not been able to do. The response can no longer be business as usual.
Research design
This report adopts the following research design.
It starts by exploring the nascent indications of violent extremists along the border between Northern Benin and North West Nigeria. Subsequently, it explores specific links between Nigeria and Benin, ranging from social and ethnic links to religious ties and cross-border trade connections. It seeks to identify the existing risk factors that could facilitate further immersion and expansion of violent extremists in the area.
Two specific areas are researched. The border between Northern Benin and North West Nigeria comprises several distinct zones. In the North, the border area between North East Alibori (Benin) and Kebbi State (Nigeria) is mainly populated by the Hausa and Fulbe and formed part of the Sokoto caliphate in the 19th century. Below this area is the border between the Borgou/South East Alibori in Benin and Niger State in Nigeria. This area is inhabited by the Bariba and Boo (and the Fulbe) and largely overlaps with the pre-colonial Borgu kingdom.
Methodology
This report relies on a mixed method design used on both sides of the border.
First, four quantitative sources. First, ACLED data on Nigeria, Benin, Niger and Burkina Faso. Second, a database on Northern Benin (since March 2020) from a consortium led by the Clingendael Institute on all forms of political violence and disorder. Third, data collected in North West Nigeria (Zamfara, Sokoto, Kebbi and Niger State) since May 2023 on all forms of political violence and disorder. These sources allowed us to trace in detail the activities of armed groups and the changes in modalities and locations. Fourth, a database seeking to track the movement of violent extremist actors in Benin (since early 2021), Niger and Burkina Faso (since July 2022). Figure 1 shows all data.
Second, qualitative data was collected in both Nigeria and Benin. About 20 interviews based on a semi-structured set of questions (Annex 1) were conducted in North West Nigeria with informed experts and insiders on the presence and nature of violent extremist groups in Kebbi and Niger State (reflecting the two cross-border zones of interest). The data was collected from November-December 2023 by Dr Murtala Ahmed Rufa'i and James Barnett. In addition, about ten targeted interviews were conducted in Kebbi and Niger state by a Nigerian security specialist.
In Benin in November 2023, 50 key informant interviews were carried out based on a standard list of questions (see Annex 1). The sampling involved 25 interviews in each of the two zones of interests: the North-Eastern Alibori-Kebbi state border and the Borgou-Niger state border. Interviews were conducted in 14 villages (see Figure 2). Although this data was ethnically diverse it was unbalanced in its gender representation, with only five out of the 50 interviewees being female.
Report structure
The report starts with a primer on violent extremist groups in Nigeria (Chapter 1). It then moves on to examine indicators that point to violent extremism along the border between Nigeria and Benin (Chapter 2).
The subsequent chapters explore the social and economic risks in more detail. Chapter 3 considers cross-border ethnic relations and social tensions and also explores cross-border religious movements.
Chapter 4 considers cross-border trade and identifies specific challenges to people’s livelihoods – with cereals and fuel being risk factors.
Finally, this report ends with a summary and recommendations for the government of Benin, the federal governments of Nigeria and the state governments of Kebbi and Niger.