Recommendations | Dangerous Liaisons

This report concludes with three recommendations, most notably for the governments of Benin and the federal governments of Nigeria.

Cease the Talon-Tinubu entente: coordinate the military response

The relationship between Nigeria and Benin has been complex since 2015. Then president Muhammadu Buhari was accused of supporting former president and opposition leader Boni Yayi in the contentious elections of 2016 against sitting president Patrice Talon. Relations deteriorated in August 2019 when Nigeria closed the border with Benin, officially because of the large-scale smuggling of rice from Benin into Nigeria and fuel from Nigeria to Benin.[234] Sources suggest that the move was read by Benin as an attempt at destabilising the Talon regime.[235]

However, the election of Bola Tinubu has led to a major entente in relationships between the two countries. Soon after Tinubu’s election, Talon appointed Shegun Bakari as Benin’s foreign minister – a Yoruba just like Tinubu (6 June 2023), which widely seen as an attempt to reset relationships with Nigeria. Tinubu and Talon met in Paris (June 2023) where Talon reportedly voiced his strong support for Tinubu to become chairman of ECOWAS.[236] The presidents met again in July (in the run-up and aftermath to Niger’s coup), at Benin’s independence celebrations (August 2023, where Tinubu called the two countries ‘conjoined twins’) and in December 2023 when both discussed in detail plans to improve trade relations.[237]

This political/economic entente should be followed with improved security collaboration in three ways:

Explore revamping regional security cooperation within ECOWAS. Regional military cooperation in West Africa around violent extremism is (supposed) to take place within the Accra Initiative and the Conseil d’Entente. There are a myriad of reasons for such ad hoc cobble- together coalitions instead of the permanent multilateral organisation ECOWAS (see also the G5-Sahel, the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF)-Lake Chad, and the plan for the MNJTF/AI).[238] But one reason for ad hoc coalitions over ECOWAS has been the rather inward-looking role and weakening hegemony of Nigeria in the region over the last decade.[239] Under Tinubu this role might be changing (e.g. see the more outspoken and forceful position vis-à-vis Niger’s coup) and a direct link between Nigeria’s domestic problems of violent extremism and the problems in the Sahel could generate an opportunity for more vigour and determination in Nigeria’s foreign security policies, including within ECOWAS which Tinubu presently chairs. Despite other problems that could make a more active ECOWAS role complex (most notably the emergence of the AES – Alliance of Sahel States) it is an opportunity that should be explored, despite the lack of confidence in ECOWAS. The fact that the Benin-Nigeria border is a purely littoral affair might prove helpful.

Quickly develop bilateral security cooperation particularly around hot-pursuit, intelligence sharing and coordination. The general trend in littoral West Africa has been a bilateral rather than multi-lateral reflex when countries actually experience incidents of violent extremism on their soil (see, Côte d’Ivoire with Burkina Faso in 2020, Togo with Burkina Faso in 2022, and Benin with Niger in 2021 and Burkina Faso in 2023). While multilateralism is ultimately needed, a bilateral reflex between Nigeria and Benin would also be very welcome. This report makes clear that a security response on one side of the border (e.g. targeting the families of bandits in North West Nigeria) has effects on the other side. Quick wins would be to: ensure the ability of both Benin and Nigeria to engage in hot-pursuit operations (whereby security organisations can operate on the soil of the neighbour when pursuing extremists); share intelligence on movements and presence of extremists and bandit groups (particularly as information from Nigeria suggests a blind spot on developments in Benin); and generally share information on military and security operations, as there appears to be strong waterbed effects, where bandits and violent extremists resettle in response to military operations (presently mainly from Nigeria to Benin). Such initiatives could be implemented at relatively short notice.

Develop a shared Beninois-Nigerian approach to hunting groups. A looming problem is the different treatment of the same hunting groups (particularly the Dambanga) by Nigeria and Benin. In Nigeria, security actors have worked with these hunters vis-à-vis violent extremists whereas in Benin hunting groups are de facto banned (which to quite some extent relates to a perception of hunter loyalty to former president Boni Yayi, the opposition). Moreover, hunters in Nigeria have occasionally worked alongside suspected extremists. The present set-up is untenable, as Benin’s policy to ban hunters is not effective in the Borgou because hunting groups can take on a significant role elsewhere (which might become a factor in upcoming elections). While the first response should be from state security forces, there is a need to consider a role for the hunting groups who perceive themselves as protectors of the community – and exclusion is already generating grievances in areas outside of the Borgou. The key challenge for Nigeria and Benin is to consider how to engage constructively with the Dambanga (and other hunters) without creating a civil defence force and the excesses that accompany such forces.[240]

Prioritise people’s livelihood: cushion the effect of economic policies

A second line of action should take place in the economic sphere. Action could be taken by the federal governments of Nigeria and the government of Benin separately. Yet, there is scope for specific coordination and policy making in the border zones through the Nigerian National Boundary Commission (NBC) and Benin’s Agence Béninoise de Gestion Intégrée des Espaces Frontaliers (ABeGIEF), which have benefited from the general entente between the two countries.[241] Moreover, the recent resuscitation of the Nigeria Benin Joint Commission, which included reference to the interconnection between insurgency and the standards of living in border areas.[242]

Cushion the effects of the ban on cereals (and cutting of fuel subsidies). Since 2021 Benin has seen a variety of export restrictions.[243] The most significant export restrictions were introduced in February 2022 with export taxes on rice, soya, cotton, processed and unprocessed cassava, shea butter and yams, in an effort to keep domestic prices low.[244] This was followed by a full ban on soybeans in October 2022.[245] These export bans are not unique for West Africa, as global developments have led many countries to adopt bans: Covid-19 led to shortages and inflation; and the war in Ukraine has restricted grain and maize export to Africa and led to a strong rise in prices.[246] As a result, not only Benin but other governments (Ghana,[247] Togo,[248] Côte d’Ivoire[249] and Burkina Faso[250]) have pursued export restrictions of cereals – e.g. rice, wheat, rye, oats, barley, millet, maize, grain and others.
As this reports shows, these economic regulations have had an impact on the livelihoods of border communities. While there are very defendable rationales for the policy (ensuring sufficient food in country, promoting domestic processing, raising money for subsidies on other goods, lowering government expenditure) there are also countervailing arguments that need to start playing a stronger role now. In a context where violent extremists operate it is very dangerous to implement policies with strong livelihood consequences.
What needs to happen in addition to a military response, is a set of actions that help to cushion the effects of these policies for border communities. For cereals this can, for example, involve collective buying of cereals at Nigerian market prices by the state, or outright supplementation of people’s income. For fuel (although see below) this might involve sponsoring alternative trade and livelihoods, although the IMF recently suggested that Nigeria should work on a quiet reintroduction of the subsidies.[251]
While such advice might be economically not sound and involves technical challenges (e.g. ensuring complementarity on both sides of the border, preventing smuggling of goods from other areas), it will ultimately be cheaper than a military response.

Develop more flexibility in the responses

A final recommendation is a call for more flexibility and agility to respond directly to a changing context of violent extremism.

Closely monitor the border market for cereal and fuel along Nigeria’s border. Fieldwork for this research in Benin was done in November 2023 and showed strong livelihood effects. Yet, a massive drop in the naira exchange rate vis-à-vis the CFA has created new incentives, as Nigerian exporters obtain CFA for their exports which can be exchanged at higher naira rates.[252] For the fuel market, the effect has been that fuel smuggling from Nigeria to Benin started to pick up again in early 2024 (mostly due to ‘kpayo’ – smuggled fuel).[253] For the cereal market this has meant that rather than a concern about cereal moving out of Benin, there has been an influx in cereals.[254] Aside from the substantial effects, the real issue is that border markets with Nigeria experience unrivalled trade dynamics and that – as a consequence – vulnerabilities to violent extremism are also very dynamic. In the context of violent extremist presence in these areas, there is urgent and constant need for up-to-date and near real-time information on which societal groups lose out. The Beninese and Nigerian governments should, in light of these vulnerabilities, have a flexible response and request that their donors give them the necessary space.

The need for more flexible donor programming. The final recommendation concerns donors who seek to support the response to violent extremism by West African states. Violent extremists do not think in terms of national states and their activities transcend state boundaries. Yet, many donor response mechanisms are bound by these national boundaries and priorities set back home. An additional problem for Benin’s border with Nigeria is that most international programmes do not consider that Nigeria is part of the violent extremism spill-over problem from the Sahel. Yet, as this report shows, there are connections. There should be a push for more flexibility in programming mandates such that programming can respond to developments and speak to the spirit rather than the letter of mandates.