Chapter 3
The political economy of food security in fragile settings
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3.1 Introduction

The previous chapter has explored the international segment of wheat value chains and the impact that international market dynamics have on food security in fragile settings. Although dependency on international markets is high for many fragile settings, in many cases domestic production and distribution mechanisms play a major role in meeting (or failing to meet) the population’s demand for food.[54] As a result, any engagement on food security should be grounded in a thorough understanding not only of international markets but also of these domestic dynamics.

Relying on a review of relevant literature and examples from over a dozen countries,[55] this chapter explores the main challenges faced by fragile states in achieving food security through domestic production and distribution mechanisms. First, it looks at how fragility and conflict disrupt activities along all stages of agricultural value chains (including, but not limited to, wheats), thus making it difficult to ensure the availability and affordability of food for the population. In addition to these disruptions, the chapter explores the political constraints that negatively affect food security in fragile settings. In particular, it shows how powerful elites instrumentalise food security and business activities in the agri-food sector to serve their own interests, often at the expense of food security for the population more at large. Finally, the chapter looks at how the development efforts in agricultural value chains risks inadvertently stirring up tensions and conflict if it does not take into account the underlying (and often informal) power dynamics that characterise the agri-food sector in fragile settings.

By exploring these challenges, this chapter highlights how food security debates and interventions need to take into account political economy dynamics, rather than focusing primarily on technical issues. Too often, efforts to improve food security are largely technical in nature, focusing for instance on how to boost production or minimise post-harvest losses. Although these efforts do have the potential to improve food security, they risk failing to do so if broader political economy dynamics are not considered. For instance, in contexts where powerful elites manipulate food for their own political and economic gains, boosting production may enrich only a few powerful actors, rather than increasing the availability and affordability of food for the population at large. Similarly, in contexts where activities along an agricultural value chain are tied to conflict dynamics, stimulating these activities risks exacerbating tensions and conflict. Awareness of political economy dynamics is therefore critical to ensure successful food security programming in fragile settings.

3.2 Disruptions along the value chain

In fragile settings, and even more so in situations of active conflict, the development of functioning agricultural (and wheat) value chains faces significant challenges. This section first outlines the structural challenges that have an impact across the whole chain, such as widespread insecurity, a complex governance environment and infrastructural and policy deficiencies, as well as challenges in accessing finance. Then, it delves more specifically into how these challenges affect different stages of the value chain (from input sourcing and production to transport, processing and sales), providing concrete examples from a wide range of fragile settings. Overall, these examples show how fragility and conflict make it difficult to develop domestic systems of production and distribution that are able to meet the population’s demand for food.

When looking at the impact across the whole value chain, widespread insecurity is arguably the most significant challenge for actors at all stages.[56] In times of active hostilities, workers can become victims of armed attacks, be forced to abandon their businesses in search of safety or be recruited by armed factions. Moreover, conflict often destroys key assets (e.g., farmers’ land, stocks of agricultural inputs and produce, processors’ factories, traders’ trucks, etc.), as well as the infrastructure on which various actors depend (e.g., irrigation systems as well as transportation, electricity and telecommunication networks). Even when the active conflict subsides, the destruction and displacement brought about by conflict often lingers for some time, as it takes time for displaced people to go back to their activities, as well as for assets and infrastructure to be rebuilt or repaired. Even in the absence of active conflict, fragile settings are characterised by pervasive insecurity, for instance in the form of sporadic attacks and robberies, which threaten activities along the whole value chain. Overall, this threat to the physical security of workers and assets often leads to a focus on short-term, survival-oriented solutions. In turn, this results in limited incentives to engage in longer term investments, thus hampering the sector’s productivity in the medium- to long-term.

Besides insecurity, activities across the entire span of agricultural value chains are complicated by various challenges typical of fragile settings. Frequent disputes, most notably over the ownership of land, can complicate business activity. Moreover, governance often relies on a mix of formal and informal structures which are not always aligned with each other, thus potentially creating confusion and tensions. For instance, a business may secure access to land or to a certain market through formal structures, but face resistance by local actors for whom informal, customary rules are more important than the formal state laws. Crucially, in fragile settings the state often enjoys limited authority, legitimacy and/or capacity.[57] As a result, it often struggles to mediate disputes, as well as more broadly to enforce contracts and uphold the rule of law. Moreover, limited state capacity also results in struggles to develop and maintain the physical infrastructure needed across the value chain (e.g., roads, electricity, telecommunications), as well as in the lack of policy frameworks (e.g., quality standards, etc.) that are conducive to value chain development.[58] Last, but not least, in fragile settings businesses across the value chain tend to suffer from challenges in accessing finance. This often results in constraints on working capital and a limited ability to expand their activities to achieve economies of scale.

The structural impacts of fragility and conflict described above have repercussions for actors throughout the whole value chain, as becomes evident from a number of examples coming from many different fragile and conflict-affected settings.[59] At the production level, farmers in conflict areas are often unable to prepare and plant their land. In Sudan, for instance, 40 percent of farmers have reported being unable to prepare their land due to the ongoing war.[60] In the Central African Republic, conflict-affected areas have reported a 10 percent reduction in the amount of land prepared for agriculture.[61] Moreover, conflict makes it extremely difficult for farmers to source necessary inputs (e.g., quality seeds, chemical fertilisers, fuel, machines, etc.), at times due to logistical challenges, at times due to lack of finance to buy them. For instance, during the conflict in northern Mali in 2011-2012, farmers were unable to travel to other cities to get fertilisers, and their water pumps were stolen by rebels, who also took control of gas supplies, while the government reduced the supply of fertilisers to the area for fear that it would be used to manufacture explosives.[62] In Sudan’s current conflict, over 60 percent of surveyed smallholders reported the lack of finance to buy seeds, fertilisers and labour as a major challenge.[63]

The result of these challenges is usually lower productivity at best and inability to produce at worst. In Myanmar, for instance, the escalation of conflict after the 2021 military coup led to a four percent decrease in rice productivity, with an comparatively stronger effect for poorer farmers.[64] During the conflict in northern Mali in 2011-2012, rice production reportedly decreased by almost half in a single year.[65] The conflict in northern Nigeria had an even stronger impact, with farmers reporting extremely large drops in the average production of rice (50 percent), millet (80 percent), maize (80 to 85 percent) and sorghum (70 to 100 percent).[66]

Besides hampering production, fragility and conflict also disrupt access to markets, severing some of the crucial links that allow food products to reach consumers. In Sudan’s current conflict, for instance, around 30 percent of the smallholders surveyed reported market disruptions due to the conflict, with the rate being particularly high in areas where violence is occurring (e.g., 56 percent in Khartoum).[67] These disruptions can make it hard for farmers to access markets, forcing them to rely on spot sales at the individual level with traders.[68] At the same time, traders themselves are victims of frequent disruptions. Attacks and looting by armed actors (or the threat of such attacks), unreliable supply and demand dynamics, deficient and/or damaged infrastructure and the sprawling presence of checkpoints make it extremely challenging to move products across regions. As a result of these challenges, traders face considerably higher risks, long delays and higher costs, leading many of them to either pass on the increased cost to consumers, or to be driven out of business. In Somalia, for instance, checkpoint taxes constitute the largest share of transport costs, including for agricultural goods, resulting in higher prices for consumers.[69] In Nigeria, the conflict in the country’s north reportedly resulted in a 20 percent rise of transportation cost, leading many traders to quit their business.[70] Similarly, during the conflict in northern Mali, many traders had to scale down their operations, if not abandon them altogether, due to the severity of the challenges they faced.[71]

Overall, these disruptions tend to result in highly fragmented food markets. While models often assume that products can be moved from areas where there is a surplus production to those where there is higher demand, in reality this is not the case in many fragile settings. In Sudan, for instance, even before the outbreak of the current war, markets for staple cereal crops in the western region of Darfur were only loosely connected to those in other areas of the country.[72] The ongoing war has further reinforced the fragmentation, with the peaks of food insecurity concentrated in hard-to-reach areas in Darfur and Khartoum, while other areas (e.g., Gedaref) are still expected to run a food surplus.[73] This means that food security interventions in fragile settings should be highly area specific and not assume that any increase in supply will be allocated based on demand thanks to market forces.

In addition to production and transport, fragility also has a significant impact on downstream activities such as the processing of agricultural products. Widespread insecurity, challenges in accessing finance (including extremely high interest rates on loans, when such loans are available) and deficient infrastructure (e.g., in terms of access to electricity) raise significantly the cost of doing business and make it much less appealing to make long-term investments on productive machinery. Moreover, the drop in agricultural production induced by conflict often results in shortages of inputs for processors, who are forced to operate below capacity and thus incur higher production costs. Examples of shortages of agricultural inputs in times of conflict have occurred in northern Nigeria[74] and Ethiopia,[75] as well as in Sudan.[76] In Sudan’s case, for instance, a majority of agri-processors surveyed in 2023 reported being closed, either permanently (13 percent) or temporarily (50 percent), with a number of them operating at reduced volumes.[77] Decreased availability and increased price of inputs was reported as a main challenge for these businesses – together with the lack of financial services and the damage suffered by physical assets.[78]

Finally, conflict tends to lead to a rise in the price of agricultural and food products for consumers. In northern Nigeria, for instance, the conflict reportedly led to a steep increase (45 to 130 percent year-on-year) in the price of wheat, and a reduced tendency of farmers to provide wheat for charitable purposes.[79] Sudan’s current conflict also led to major price hikes for wheats, such as wheat (74 percent year-on-year), sorghum (120 percent) and millet (120 percent).[80] This rise in prices is all the more troublesome because conflict also tends to cause a drop in the purchasing power of large segments of the population. The combination of these two factors makes it extremely difficult for many households, particularly poorer ones, to meet their food needs – leading to a major negative impact on food security.

3.3 Elite interests vs. food security

While the disruption of agricultural value chains is the most evident way in which fragility makes it harder to achieve food security, it is not the only one. Even in absence of active conflict, fragile settings tend to be characterised by exclusionary governance frameworks, with power often concentrated in the hands of a few people. In this context, powerful elites and political actors often instrumentalise food (security) and economic activities in the agricultural sector in order to further their own interests, rather than to ensure the availability and affordability of food for the population. In particular, this section shows how political elites shape food systems in a way that advances their own agenda, while large and well-connected businesses exploit their privileged position to engage in lucrative activities in the agricultural sector. This results in food systems that are often geared towards serving the interests of a few powerful actors, rather than the population at large. In such a context, efforts to boost production and develop value chains risk further empowering existing powerbrokers, rather than improving food security outcomes.

Given food’s nature as a basic need for the population, food security is intimately tied to political stability. Over the past decades, a growing body of evidence has emerged regarding the relation between food insecurity on the one hand and instability, unrest and conflict on the other. For instance, it has been shown that a rise in the price of (non-substitutable) food staples, particularly in urban areas, can trigger conflict, especially when taking place in combination with other exacerbating factors (e.g., preexisting political tensions).[81] There are several examples of this trend, including for instance the uprisings across the Middle East during the 2011 Arab Spring,[82] successive revolutions in Sudan in 1985 and 2019[83] and protests in Pakistan in the late 2000s.[84] In some cases, food shortages have also been shown as boosting the recruitment of armed groups.[85] For instance, violent extremist organisations such as the Islamic State and Boko Haram have reportedly offered not only money, but also food to lure prospective recruits.[86]

Aware of food’s importance for political stability, ruling political elites are often eager to actively intervene in the food and agricultural sector. This is particularly common in the case of crops that are important for national subsistence and food security (often wheats, like wheat, rice and maize), which are therefore crucial for electoral politics and regime stability.[87] Food subsidies of different kinds – ranging from direct support to consumers to more indirect mechanisms such as price controls – can be seen in countries as diverse as India,[88] Egypt[89] and Venezuela.[90] The case of Sudan provides an extremely illustrative example of the political use of food by ruling elites. Over the past few decades, successive Sudanese rulers relied on large wheat subsidy schemes to guarantee low bread prices for the urban middle class. Dissatisfaction amongst the urban middle class was considered as the main threat to the country’s stability by the ruling elites.[91] On the other hand, the population from the country’s vast peripheries traditionally suffered from acute food insecurity, as the government’s subsidies scheme heavily relied on the exploitation of labour and natural resources from these areas to finance the subsidy scheme.[92] In addition, successive Sudanese regimes also directed foreign investments in the agri-food sector in a way that rewarded their political allies and punished their opponents,[93] and strategically used food aid towards neighbouring countries (e.g., South Sudan) as a resource to gain political leverage and influence abroad.[94]

While ruling elites have the power to shape food policies, non-state actors (e.g., insurgents, armed groups) can also turn food into a political tool in their own ways. At times, non-state armed groups may extort money from firms engaged in the trading of agricultural products. In Somalia, for instance, both Al Shabaab and a wide array of local militias use checkpoints to collect revenues from traders, with agricultural products accounting for a significant share of the taxed goods.[95] Insurgents can also instrumentalise food insecurity by diverting or misappropriating food aid – a practice that governments also often adopt. Accusation of aid diversion by both the government and rebel groups has been a feature of several humanitarian crises, including for instance during the famine in Ethiopia in the mid-1980s.[96]

In extreme cases, the politicisation of food can even give way to its weaponisation. History has witnessed several examples in which hunger has been used as a weapon of war, from the Biafran famine in the 1960s to more recent examples in the conflicts in South Sudan, Sudan and Ethiopia.[97] More in generally, as extensively argued over the past decades, starvation is a policy outcome, rather than a natural disaster.[98] This means that the inability of people to feed themselves is not the result of an inevitable outcome, but rather the product of political choices, such as for instance the extreme political and economic marginalisation of certain segments of the population.[99]

Besides being a key commodity for political purposes, food is also extremely relevant from an economic perspective.[100] In fragile settings, food systems are often the largest segment of the private sector, as well as the most important provider of jobs (in most countries classified as fragile, over half of the labour force is employed in agriculture alone, with peaks of over 90 percent in some countries).[101] Moreover, in cases when agricultural products are exported, they can become a precious source of foreign currency earnings, making them attractive from both a business and a macroeconomic perspective.[102]

Given this economic relevance, it is perhaps unsurprising that elites and their networks of cronies tend to be heavily engaged in business opportunities in the agri-food sector. Political elites are often among the most active and powerful players – at times through an official engagement on behalf of the state (e.g., through their role in public companies and state-owned enterprises, SOEs), other times in their private capacity (e.g., through private business empires and/or networks of private companies managed by family, friends and allies of various sorts). Alongside these political elites, a number of private businesspeople – both domestic and foreign – are often engaged in the sector, leveraging their connections to political elites to engage in lucrative business activities.

These well-connected actors tend to enjoy a number of privileges. To begin with, they are usually in a better position than the average company to address some of the challenges typical of fragility and conflict (see section 3.2). For instance, they may be able to negotiate directly with the warring parties to avoid being targeted or have enough money to pay for security for their assets.[103] At times, these actors can even manage to profit from instability, for instance by buying land or agricultural outputs when prices are low, at times re-selling them at a profit after prices rise.[104] Through their connections and their lobbying power, these well-connected businesses can shape policies and regulation in their favour and benefit from breaks on taxes and custom duties, as well as get preferential access to key inputs such as land, finance (including forex), utilities (e.g., water, electricity), labour or agricultural inputs (seeds, fertilisers). Overall, these advantages allow these companies to significantly improve their performance, for instance by achieving economies of scale, integrating vertically along the value chain whenever profitable, or implementing technological upgrades to increase their profits (e.g., by using irrigation systems for production, machinery for farming and processing, modern storage systems, etc.).

Examples of these power imbalances can be found across a wide range of countries and (grain) value chains. In Pakistan’s wheat sector, for instance, power has traditionally been concentrated in the hands of a few well-connected businesspeople, who own large amounts of land and at times benefit from illegal assistance from irrigation officials.[105] In Sudan’s wheat market, military-linked businesses and large family-owned conglomerates have enjoyed a strong oligopoly, including for instance on wheat and sorghum. For example, under al-Bashir, a single company belonging to a large agro-industrial conglomerate was estimated to supply over 70 percent of the country’s consumption wheat flour.[106] In 2015, the company managed to get subsidised currency exchange rates by effectively strong-arming the government, threatening to shut down production. Similar dynamics took place in Kenya’s sorghum sector, where a large brewery successfully leveraged its prominent position within the value chain to negotiate a major (albeit temporary) tax exemption with the government.[107]

In this context, interventions aimed at strengthening agricultural value chains and food security outcomes risk being blocked or hijacked by these powerful actors, who are often more concerned with maintaining their own dominant position than with developing an efficient value chain. At times, these actors may want to prevent domestic value chains from developing in order to protect their vested interests. In Tanzania, for instance, strong political and business interests opposed the increase of domestic rice production because it would have curtailed the import of cheap rice, from which they used to profit.[108] Eventually, these powerful interests managed to hamper the implementation of some of the policies that were put in place to scale up domestic production. In other cases, powerful actors managed to unduly benefit from policies that had been originally implemented to strengthen domestic value chains. In Nigeria, for instance, the government had limited the import of foreign maize to support domestic production. However, the opportunities generated by these policies (e.g., input subsidies) were largely captured by a few well-connected private sector actors.[109] Moreover, due to the huge profits made through illicit trade of maize, political actors connived with their cronies in the private sector to allow for selective opportunities for illicit trade.[110]

Besides powerful elites and well-connected businesses, at times other actors enjoy significant power thanks to the specific position or role that they play within a given value chain. In agricultural systems dominated by smallholder farmers, for instance, traders and middlemen often enjoy a powerful position. Leveraging their ability to bridge the gap between smallholder producers selling small quantities of produce and large-scale processors eager to buy in bulk, these actors are often able to play a key role in price setting, ensuring that their own profit margins are preserved – even if this squeezes out other actors along the chain.[111] Middlemen are in a particularly strong position when they enjoy access to liquidity and storage capacity, allowing them to buy products when prices are lower and keep them in store until prices rise. This game was played, for instance, by middlemen in Sudan’s grain markets during the al-Bashir era.[112] Information advantages can further strengthen the middlemen’s position. This was the case in Sudan’s gum Arabic value chain, where local traders used their knowledge of prices in central markets to increase their bargaining power vis-à-vis their suppliers, who generally did not have such information. Besides the middlemen, exporters of agricultural commodities can also wield significant power thanks to their ability to generate foreign currency, which is often much needed in fragile settings. This has been the case, for instance, for some of the large agricultural conglomerates in Sudan, who have replenished the government’s treasury with hard currency in exchange for subsidies for their purchases and facilities to export their products.

Overall, these observations show that agricultural value chains in fragile settings feature significant power imbalances, as a limited amount of powerbrokers are able to wield a disproportionate amount of power vis-à-vis their competitors. In this context, interventions aimed at supporting agricultural value chains and food security risk inadvertently reinforcing the position of these powerbrokers, rather than achieving their original aims. A thorough understanding of the political economy of these value chains is necessary to devise measures to mitigate this risk.

3.4 Agricultural value chains and conflict

Given the close link between food security and agriculture on the one hand and power and politics on the other, it may not be surprising that the development of agricultural value chains is frequently intertwined with conflict dynamics. This section explores how increased economic activity in the agri-food sector can exacerbate conflict – be it by directly funding armed factions or by exacerbating tensions among societal groups due to a (perceived) unequal distribution of benefits. Awareness of these dynamics is critical to ensure that interventions aimed at developing agricultural value chains do not end up stirring tensions and conflict, thus undermining their original goal of improving food security.

The most direct way in which activities along agricultural value chains can fuel conflict is when the businesses active along these chains are (more or less directly) linked to conflict actors, and thus an increase in their activity actively funds the fighting. In Sudan, for instance, the warring parties to the current conflict have for a long time enjoyed control over vast economic empires, with a very strong presence in the agri-food sector.[113] In this case, not only have the proceeds from these economic activities been used to fund the war effort, but competition among the warring parties’ business empires has also contributed to fuelling the conflict.[114] In other cases, such as that of the Philippines, an increase in agricultural production has been shown to lead to more conflict, as insurgents sought to get control of large banana plantations to fund their operations.[115] This phenomenon is more likely to take place when the increase in agricultural production happens in areas affected by an active insurgency and when it concerns the large-scale cultivation of cash crops geared to export.[116]

In addition to this direct connection to conflict, it is crucial to consider how the development of agricultural value chains can affect conflict by creating winners and losers and hence impacting existing power balances. For instance, if the benefits of this development are concentrated in the hands of a restricted elite, rather than benefiting the population more at large, this could generate resentment and unrest. Similarly, if the increase in economic activity is perceived as benefiting only certain segments of the population while excluding others, this is likely to create discontent among the latter group. The risk of this discontent leading to conflict is particularly high if the division between beneficiaries and excluded communities is framed along identity lines, and if it plays on preexisting tensions regarding unequal opportunities, marginalisation and exclusion.[117]

The past decades have witnessed several cases in which the scaling up of agricultural activities has fuelled conflict through these mechanisms. In late 1980s’ Sudan, for instance, the implementation of mechanised farming schemes in the Nuba Mountains came at the expense of the livelihoods of local pastoralists and farmers, who were often displaced from their ancestral land.[118] This prompted many people to join armed movements in the region fighting against the central government, thus exacerbating existing conflicts. More recently, in Sierra Leone, the implementation of palm oil cultivations led to an increase in the value of land, and it pushed local communities to set fixed boundaries, something that had not been part of their customary land management system.[119] These developments led to a rise in conflicts over land among different communities. In addition, local youth felt largely excluded from the palm oil deals. They saw them as an obstacle preventing them from accessing land, while they were not gaining any of the benefits, as profits from the deals were pocketed by local elders. These dynamics exacerbated the youth’s feeling of exclusion, which had been one of the factors contributing to the decade-long civil war in Sierra Leone.[120]

Although preventing the risk of conflict requires ensuring a broad distribution of benefits, it is also important to carefully handle the way in which existing power brokers are affected by any change to the status quo. If the powerful actors dominating a value chain feel threatened by this change, they are likely to resist it. As noted earlier, for instance, Tanzanian business elites in the rice sector successfully blocked a shift towards increased domestic production in order to protect their vested interest in the rice import business.[121] To mitigate the risk that these frictions lead to tensions and conflicts, changes to the status quo should be handled in a sensitive way, ensuring a degree of buy-in from existing power brokers to prevent them from turning into spoilers.

3.5 Conclusion

This chapter has explored the complex interplay between fragility and conflict on the one hand and food security and agricultural value chains on the other. On the one hand, in fragile settings it is often difficult to achieve food security outcomes through domestic production and distribution mechanisms, as fragility and conflict disrupt economic activities along the whole value chain. Other times, the development of domestic value chains is hampered by political constraints, as powerful elites block changes to the status quo in order to preserve their position of power, with little to no regard for the well-being of the population more at large. On the other hand, developing stronger agricultural value chains does not automatically lead to improved food security incomes for the population. Leveraging their connections to powerful elites or their privileged positions within the value chain, existing powerbrokers often stand ready to reap most of the profits arising from the increased economic activity, leaving little benefits for their competitors or for end consumers of food products. Moreover, increased economic activity along agricultural value chains risks inadvertently fuelling conflict – not only when profits are directly used to fund armed actors, but also if an unequal distribution of benefits exacerbates existing tensions among communities.

Overall, this analysis showed the importance of moving beyond technical approaches when devising interventions aimed at improving food security by developing agricultural value chains. Rather, these interventions should be grounded in a thorough understanding of the political economy of the context in which they are implemented. Most crucially, this entails taking into account existing power structures in order to understand who stands to benefit or lose from the proposed interventions and how they may react to them. Such understanding can inform the design and implementation of interventions that deliver inclusive economic development and improved food security outcomes, rather than empowering existing powerbrokers or exacerbating local conflicts.

This, however, does not apply to all countries – in some cases, the geographic conditions make it impossible for countries to satisfy their food demand domestically. This is the case, for instance, for several Middle Eastern countries, such as Iraq or Egypt.
The examples used in this chapter come from different fragile settings, as diverse as Sudan, the Central African Republic, Mali, Myanmar, Nigeria, Somalia, South Sudan, Ethiopia, Pakistan, Kenya, Ghana, Sierra Leone, Tanzania and the Philippines. While most examples are related to grain value chains, a few of them are related to other value chains that are also relevant.
Delgado, C., and Tshunkert, K., 2022. ‘Food Security in Conflict and Peacebuilding Settings: Beyond a Humanitarian Concern,’ Puti k Miru i Bezopasnosti, 2(63), link (accessed 2 February 2024); Hiller, S., et al. 2014. Value Chain Development in Fragile Settings, Occasional Paper 14, Wageningen, Wageningen University.
Schultze-Kraft, M., et al. 2014. What Works for Rural Development in Fragile States? Evidence from Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Yemen, Nepal and Bolivia, Brighton, International Development Studies; Swisspeace. 2015. Agribusiness: Risks and Impacts in Conflict-Affected Areas, International Alert, London, Swisspeace; Hiller, S., et al. 2014. Value Chain Development in Fragile Settings, Occasional Paper 14, Wageningen, Wageningen University.
For instance, quality monitoring mechanisms are essential for the export of agricultural products. They are also key for third-party managed storage systems which reduce post-harvest losses, while stabilising prices for consumers and for incomes for producers. However, such systems do not work without clear quality standards, social trust and impartial governance.
See, for instance, Hiller, S., et al. 2014. Value Chain Development in Fragile Settings, Occasional Paper 14, Wageningen, Wageningen University.
Kirui, O., et al. 2023. Impact of the Ongoing Conflict on Smallholder Farmers in Sudan, Working Paper 7, Khartoum, International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI).
Blankenspoor, B., et al. 2020. Estimating the Effect of Conflict on Agricultural Activity in the Central African Republic with Remotely Sensed Data, Washington, DC, American Geophysical Union.
Kimenyi, M. 2014. The Impact of Conflict and Political Instability on Agricultural Investments in Mali and Nigeria, Working Paper 17, Washington, DC, Africa Growth Initiative at Brookings.
Kirui, O., et al. 2023. Impact of the Ongoing Conflict on Smallholder Farmers in Sudan, Working Paper 7, Khartoum, IFPRI. Around half of the smallholders surveyed reported increases in the cost of both labour and fertilizers.
IFPRI. 2023. Conflict and Agricultural Productivity: Evidence from Myanmar, Working Paper 30, Washington, DC, IFPRI.
Kimenyi, M. 2014. The Impact of Conflict and Political Instability on Agricultural Investments in Mali and Nigeria, Working Paper 17, Washington, DC, Africa Growth Initiative at Brookings.
Ibid.
Kirui, O., et al. 2023. Impact of the Ongoing Conflict on Smallholder Farmers in Sudan, Working Paper 7, Khartoum, IFPRI.
Hiller, S., et al. 2014. Value Chain Development in Fragile Settings, Occasional Paper 14, Wageningen, Wageningen University, 33-34.
Schouten, P. 2023. Paying the Price: The Political Economy of Checkpoints in Somalia, Report, Nairobi, Rift Valley Institute. While the specific characteristics of the checkpoints vary both within and across countries, checkpoints tend to play a major role in many different fragile settings. See, for instance, Schouten, P. 2022. ‘Roadblock Politics,’ in: Roadblock Politics: The Origins of Violence in Central Africa, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
Ibid.
Kimenyi, M. 2014. The Impact of Conflict and Political Instability on Agricultural Investments in Mali and Nigeria, Working Paper 17, Washington, DC, Africa Growth Initiative at Brookings.
Abay, K.A., et al. 2023. ‘Evaluating Cereal Market (Dis)integration in Less Developed and Fragile Markets: The Case of Sudan,’ Food Policy, 114 (2023), link.
Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWS NET). 2024. Sudan’s Worsening Food Security Emergency Leads to a Risk of Famine in Some Areas, February.
Kimenyi, M. 2014. The Impact of Conflict and Political Instability on Agricultural Investments in Mali and Nigeria, Working Paper 17, Washington, DC, Africa Growth Initiative at Brookings.
See chapter 4.
Kirui, O., et al. 2023. Armed Conflict and Business Operations in Sudan, Working Paper 11, Khartoum, IFPRI.
The situation is worse in areas most affected by conflict, such as Khartoum, where 75 percent of agri-processors reported being closed.
Kirui, O., et al. 2023. Armed Conflict and Business Operations in Sudan, Working Paper 11, Khartoum, IFPRI.
Kimenyi, M. 2014. The Impact of Conflict and Political Instability on Agricultural Investments in Mali and Nigeria, Working Paper 17, Washington, DC, Africa Growth Initiative at Brookings.
IFPRI, 2023. Bulletin on Food Price Dynamics, Inflation, and the Food Security Situation in Sudan: January 2023, Policy Note 5, Khartoum, IFPRI. These price hikes stand in stark contrast with the relative stability of the international market price of cereals, which grew only by five percent over the same period (January 2022 – January 2023).
Delgado, C., and Tshunkert, K. 2022. ‘Food Security in Conflict and Peacebuilding Settings: Beyond a Humanitarian Concern,’ Puti k Miru i Bezopasnosti, 2(63), link (accessed 2 February 2024); Bruck, T., and d'Errico, M. 2019. ‘Food Security and Violent Conflict: Introduction to the Special Issue,’ World Development, 117(1), 167-171, link (accessed 2 February 2024); Sova, C., et al. 2023. Dangerously Hungry: The Link Between Food Insecurity and Conflict, Report, Washington, DC, World Food Program USA, 26-27.
Soffiantini, G., 2020. ‘Food Insecurity and Political Instability During the Arab Spring,’ Global Food Security, 26(1), link (accessed 2 February 2024).
Resnick, D. 2021. Political Economy of Wheat Value Chains in Post-Revolution Sudan, Working Paper 01, Khartoum, IFPRI.
Khan, A. 2014. ‘Pakistan’s Food Security from Wheat Value Chain Perspective,’ PhD diss., University of Auckland, 241.
Negassa, A. 2021. Final Report: USAID-Ethiopia Bellmon Crop Availability and Market Analysis for 2021/22, Arlington, VA, USAID Food Security Service Center II; Sova, C., et al. 2023. Dangerously Hungry: The Link Between Food Insecurity and Conflict, Report, Washington, DC, World Food Program USA, 20-21.
Yaron, S. 2017, ‘ISIS tries to recruit child refugees by offering them food, cash,’ New York Post, 6 February, link (accessed 2 February 2024); Meagher, K. 2014. Beyond Terror: Addressing the Boko Haram Challenge in Nigeria, Policy Brief, Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre.
Chinsinga, B., and Naess, L.O. 2022. The Political Economy of Agricultural Commercialisation: Insights from Crop Value Chain Studies in Sub-Saharan Africa, Working Paper 87, Accra, Agricultural Policy Research in Africa, 7.
Ansari, H.T. 2019. ‘Role of food subsidy in poverty alleviation in India,’ in Environment and Social Development, Glasgow, Keystone Publishing, 215-224.
Moustafa, A., and Al-Shawarby, S. 2017. ‘The Tamween Food Subsidy System in Egypt: Evolution and Recent Implementation Reforms,’ in: The 1.5 Billion People Question, eds. Alderman, H., Gentilinni, U. and Yemtsov, R., Washington, DC, World Bank Group.
Pinerua, I. 2024. ‘Price controls and food access: Lessons from Venezuela,’ Agriculture, Nutrition and Healthy Academy, 1 May, link (accessed 1 May 2024).
Gallopin, J., et al. 2021. Sudan’s Political Marketplace in 2021, London, London School of Economics Conflict Research Programme. This assumption turned out to be well founded: in late 2018, a rise in the price of bread triggered widespread unrest across the country’s urban centres, eventually bringing al-Bashir down in 2019.
The government exploited natural resources (land, oil, gold) and labour in the peripheries to export commodities in the international markets in exchange for foreign currency. This foreign currency was then used to pay for the subsidies scheme.
See, for instance, the actions of the Nimeiri regime during the inflow of Gulf investment in Sudan’s agricultural sector in the 1980s. Meester, J., et al. 2018. Riyal Politik: The Political Economy of Gulf Investments in the Horn of Africa, The Hague, Clingendael, 20-23.
In the late 2010s, both the government and some prominent businesspeople offered food aid to South Sudan to gain political leverage and influence abroad.
Schouten, P. 2023. Paying the Price: The Political Economy of Checkpoints in Somalia, Report, Nairobi, Rift Valley Institute.
Plaut, M. 2010. ‘Ethiopia famine aid “spent on weapons,”’ BBC, 3 March, link; Bradley, M. 2023. ‘Drought and Famine in Ethiopia, 1983–1985,’ in The Politics and Everyday Practice of International Humanitarianism, Oxford Academic, 45-58.
Roth, K. 2022. ‘Confronting Ethiopia’s abusive siege,’ Human Rights Watch, 31 August, link; link (accessed 2 February 2024); Hoffmann, A. 2024. From Catastrophe to Famine: Immediate Action Needed in Sudan to Contain Mass Starvation, The Hague, Clingendael.
Conley, B., and De Waal, A. 2019. ‘The Purposes of Starvation: Historical and Contemporary Uses,’ Journal of International Criminal Justice, 17(4), 699-722, link.
For instance, food shortages are less likely to turn into starvation if the population is not already poor and excluded from the provision of basic services and from governance structures.
McKechnie, A., et al. 2018. Economic Development in Fragile Contexts: Learning from Success and Failure, London, Supporting Economic Transformation.
This figure includes only the labour employed in agriculture, thus excluding people working in other sectors of the value chain (e.g. transport of agricultural commodities). The World Bank. 2021. Future of Food: Building Stronger Food Systems in Fragility, Conflict, and Violence Settings, Washington, DC, World Bank Publications, 5; Holden, J., and Pagel, M. 2012. Fragile States’ Economies: What Does Fragility Mean for Economic Performance?, London, Department for International Development, 4.
See, for instance, the relevance of coffee for the foreign exchange situation of countries like Ethiopia, Ivory Coast or Ghana, e.g. Africa Intelligence. 2023. ‘Ethiopia Coffee Sector Hobbled by Drive for Foreign Currency,’ Africa Intelligence, 16 November.
For instance, a source with knowledge of Sudan’s private sector reported that military-linked businesses in the livestock sector would transport livestock across the country in military vehicles, thus reducing security risks while also cutting costs.
This trend, for instance, has been a very prominent feature of successive conflicts and crises in Somalia. Jaspars, S., et al. 2020. Food and Power in Somalia: Business as Usual? London, London School of Economics Conflict Research Programme, 25-26.
Khan, A., 2014. ‘Pakistan’s Food Security from Wheat Value Chain Perspective,’ PhD diss., University of Auckland, 252-273.
Resnick, D. 2021. Political Economy of Wheat Value Chains in Post-Revolution Sudan, Working Paper 01, Khartoum, IFPRI.
Resnick, D., et al. 2022. The Political Economy of Kenya’s Agricultural Transformation: A Comparative Value Chains Approach, Michigan State University Department of Agricultural, Food and Resource Economics Food Security Group, 20 December.
Chinsinga, B. and Naess, L.O. 2022. The Political Economy of Agricultural Commercialisation: Insights from Crop Value Chain Studies in Sub-Saharan Africa, Working Paper 87, Accra, Agricultural Policy Research in Africa, 14; Mdoe, N., and Mlay, G. 2021. Agricultural Commercialisation and the Political Economy of Value Chains: Tanzania Rice Case Study, Accra, Agricultural Policy Research in Africa.
Chinsinga, B., and Naess, L.O. 2022. The Political Economy of Agricultural Commercialisation: Insights from Crop Value Chain Studies in Sub-Saharan Africa, Working Paper 87, Accra, Agricultural Policy Research in Africa, 14; Amaza, P., et al. 2021. The Political Economy of the Maize Value Chain in Nigeria, Accra, Agricultural Policy Research in Africa.
Ibid.
In these contexts, farmers seldom have information about the markets for their products, while processors are often unable or unwilling to deal with a multitude of small-scale suppliers.
In this case, middlemen exploited inefficiencies in the government-run wheat purchasing system to their own advantage, buying wheat directly from farmers and then re-selling it at a higher price to the government later on. Resnick, D. 2021. Political Economy of Wheat Value Chains in Post-Revolution Sudan, Working Paper 01, Khartoum, IFPRI.
Hoffmann, A., and Lanfranchi, G. 2023. Kleptocracy versus Democracy: How Security-Business Networks Hold Hostage Sudan’s Private Sector and the Democratic Transition, The Hague, The Clingendael Institute.
Abushama, H., et al. 2023. Political and Economic Drivers of Sudan's Armed Conflict: Implications for the Agri-Food System, Khartoum, IFPRI.
Crost, B., and Felter, J. 2020. ‘Export Crops and Civil Conflict,’ Journal of the European Economic Association, 18(3), 1484-1520, link.
Ibid.
According to existing research, high levels of horizontal inequality, that is, inequalities between groups that have different cultural identities (e.g., ethnicity, religion, etc.), increase the risk of violent conflict. Hillesund, S., et al. 2018. ‘Horizontal Inequality and Armed Conflict: A Comprehensive Literature Review,’ Canadian Journal of Development Studies, 39(4), 463-480, link.
Swisspeace, 2015. Agribusiness: Risks and Impacts in Conflict-Affected Areas, International Alert, London, Swisspeace, 7-8; Pantuliano, S. 2009. Uncharted Territory: Land, Conflict and Humanitarian Action, Warwickshire, Practical Action Publishing, 154-157. Similar land issues were also at the heart of the conflict in Darfur and eastern Sudan.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Chinsinga, B., and Naess, L.O. 2022. The Political Economy of Agricultural Commercialisation: Insights from Crop Value Chain Studies in Sub-Saharan Africa, Working Paper 87, Accra, Agricultural Policy Research in Africa, 14; Mdoe, N., and Mlay, G. 2021. Agricultural Commercialisation and the Political Economy of Value Chains: Tanzania Rice Case Study, Accra, Agricultural Policy Research in Africa.
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Fragile states in international wheat markets
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Case study: Ethiopia’s wheat value chain