


Conflict Policy Research Unit (CPRP)

The Netherlands and Guatemala

Dutch policies and Interventions in the
Guatemalan Conflict and Peace

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List of Abbreviations

ASC	<i>Asamblea de la Sociedad Civil</i> (Civil Society Assembly)
AVANSCO	<i>Asociación para el Avance de las Ciencias Sociales en Guatemala</i> (Association for the Advancement of Social Sciences in Guatemala)
BCIE	<i>Banco Centroamericano de Integración Económico</i> (Central American Bank for Economic Integration)
BEMO	<i>Beoordelingsmemorandum</i> (Assessment Memorandum)
CACIF	<i>Comité Coordinadora de Asociaciones Agrícolas, Comerciales, Industriales, y Financieras</i> (Coordinating Committee of the Agricultural, Commercial, Industrial and Financial Associations)
CCPP	<i>Comisión Permanente de Refugiados</i> (Permanent Commission of Refugees)
CDHG	<i>Comisión de Derechos Humanos de Guatemala</i> (Guatemalan Human Rights Commission)
CEAR	<i>Comisión Especial para la Atención de Refugiados, Repatriados y Desplazados</i> (Special Commission for Attention to Refugees, Repatriates and Displaced Persons)
CEG	<i>Conferencia Episcopal Guatemalteca</i> (Guatemalan Bishops' Conference)
CEH	<i>Comisión para el Esclarecimiento Histórico</i> (Commission for Historic Clarification)
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CNR	<i>Comisión Nacional de Reconciliación</i> (National Reconciliation Commission)
CODW	<i>Conflict Oorzaken in Derde Wereld</i> (Causes of Conflict in the Third World)
CPR	<i>Comunidades de Población en Resistencia</i> (Communities of Peoples in Resistance)
CPRP	<i>Conflict Policy Research Project</i>
CTEAR	<i>Comisión Técnica para la Ejecución del Acuerdo sobre Reasentamiento</i> (Technical Commission for the Execution of the Resettlement Accord)
DCG	<i>Democracia Cristiana Guatemalteca</i> (Guatemalan Christian Democratic Party)
EC	<i>European Community</i>
EGP	<i>Ejército Guerrillero de los Pobres</i> (Guerrilla Army of the Poor)
EU	European Union
FAR	<i>Fuerzas Armadas Rebeldes</i> (Rebel Armed Forces)
FDNG	<i>Frente Democrático Nueva Guatemala</i> (Democratic Front New Guatemala)
FLACSO	<i>Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales</i> (Latin American Faculty for Social Sciences)

FONAPAZ	<i>Fondo Nacional para la Paz</i> (National Fund for Peace)
FONATIERRA	<i>Fondo Nacional para la Tierra</i> (Land Trust Fund)
FRG	<i>Frente Republicano Guatemalteco</i> (Guatemalan Republican Front)
FU	<i>Frente de Unidad</i> (Unitary Front)
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GSP	General System of Preferences
GT	MIDAS code for Guatemala
IDB	Inter-American Development Bank
IFAD	International Fund for Agricultural Development
IFI	International Financial Institutions
IGO	International Organization
ILO	International Labour Organization
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INIAP	<i>Instituto de Investigación y Autoformación Política</i> (Institute for Political Research and Self-formation)
KAP	<i>Kleine Ambassade Projecten</i> (Small Embassy Projects)
LWF	Lutheran World Foundation
MAGA	<i>Ministerio de Agricultura, Ganado y Alimentación</i> (Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Alimentation)
MCCA	<i>Mercado Común de Centro America</i> (Central American Common Market)
MFO	<i>Mede-financieringsorganisatie</i> (Co-financing Organization)
MIDAS	<i>Management Inhoudelijk Documentair Activiteiten Systeem</i> (Management Contents Documentary Activities System)
MINUGUA	<i>Misión de las Naciones Unidas para la Verificación de los Derechos Humanos en Guatemala</i> (UN Human Rights Verification Mission in Guatemala)
MR-13N	<i>Movimiento Revolucionario 13 de Noviembre</i> (Revolutionary Movement 13 November)
MSF	<i>Médicos Sin Fronteras</i> (<i>Médecins sans frontières</i>)
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NLG	Netherlands Guilder
NUFFIC	Netherlands Organization for International Cooperation in Higher Education
OAS	Organization of American States
ODA	Official Development Assistance
ODHA	<i>Oficina de Derechos Humanos del Arzobispado</i> (Archbishop's Human Rights Office)
OECD/DAC	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development/ Development Assistance Committee
ORPA	<i>Organización Revolucionaria del Pueblo en Armas</i> (Revolutionary Organization of the People in Arms)
OS	<i>Ontwikkelingssamenwerking</i> (Development Cooperation)
PAC	<i>Patrullas de Autodefensa Civil</i> (Civil Defence Patrols)
PAN	<i>Partido de Avanzada Nacional</i> (National Advancement Party)
PDHG	<i>Procurador Derechos Humanos de Guatemala</i> (Guatemala Human Rights Ombudsman)

PDHSL	<i>Programa de Desarrollo Humano Sostenible a Nivel Local</i> (Programme for Sustainable Human Development at the Local Level)
PGT	<i>Partido Guatemalteco de Trabajadores</i> (Guatemalan Workers Party)
PRODERE	Development Programme for Displaced, Refugees and Repatriated in Central America
REMHI	<i>Recuperación de la Memoria Histórica</i> (Recuperation of Historic Memory)
SEGEPLAN	<i>Secretaría General de Planificación Económica</i> (General Secretariat of Economic Planning)
SEPAZ	<i>Secretaria de la Paz</i> (Secretariat for Peace)
UN	United Nations
UNAGRO	<i>Unión Nacional Agripecuario</i> (National Agricultural Union)
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNOPS	United Nations Office for Project Services
URNG	<i>Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional de Guatemala</i> (National Revolutionary Union of Guatemala)
US (USA)	United States of America
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USD	United States Dollar

Executive Summary

This study focuses on Dutch foreign policies towards the conflict in Guatemala and the specific role of Dutch interventions in this regard. Attention is paid to Dutch policy formulation and the specific interventions and instruments identified. Finally, an attempt has been made to determine the results of these interventions and the lessons learned from experiences so far. Chapter 1 gives an overview of the objectives and rationale of this research, as well as the methodology and concepts that are applied.

As a background to this study, the nature and course of the conflict and domestic responses are described in chapter 2. For a long time the Guatemalan conflict has - domestically as well as internationally - been interpreted in the light of the prevailing ideological context of the Cold War. Escalation into violence and the more than thirty-year prolongation of war was either assessed as a fight against communist takeover or, alternatively, a fight against severe inequality, military rule and human rights violations. Whereas this polarized, mainly political-military vision ‘coloured’ many analyses and sources of information of the time, today it is acknowledged that the background and causes of the conflict in Guatemala are of a more structural nature. Widespread impunity and persistent violations of human rights, weak governmental institutions, pervasive militarization and widespread economic, social and cultural inequities have instigated a cycle of violence that has marked Guatemalan politics for over 500 years. Guatemalan state-society relations could therefore be characterized as a combination of struggles and accommodation between elites and the poor, largely indigenous and rural (but also increasingly mixed-race and urban) majority.

Changes in the international context came to play an important role in creating an internal enabling environment for a move towards democracy. The global economic recession as well as international isolation of Guatemala began to affect the economic elite, and several sectors pressured government to gain greater credibility on the international stage. Moreover, the end of the Cold War seemed to have influenced a change of position on the part of the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (URNG), particularly after the Sandinista electoral defeat in 1990 and the conclusion of the El Salvador peace process in 1992.

Guatemalan conflict analysis includes issues as diverse as human rights violations, Cold War ideologies, economic development and decline, ethnic and class division, socio-economic inequality, exclusive and ‘criminalized’ governance, and international dependence. Whereas most of these issues do not inevitably lead to violent conflict, in Guatemala they have been acknowledged as part and parcel of the causes and dynamics of conflict. Moreover, they have been acknowledged as part and parcel of the *solution* to the conflict. The Guatemalan peace agenda thus overlapped with the overall development agenda. The course of the conflict was also linked to the transition from a militaristic-authoritarian system to a democratic one. Conflict resolution, development, and democratization, then, are intricately linked.

International initiatives towards Guatemala changed with the phases of the conflict, which is the subject of chapter 3. During the first phase of transition and peace negotiations (1983-1987), regional initiatives played a central role. These were mainly directed towards reducing cross-border destabilization, as the Nicaraguan conflict and US involvement were main concerns. In an effort to regain international standing after years of international isolation, Guatemala adopted a foreign policy of neutrality in the Central American regional crisis, relative distance from US foreign policy towards Central America, and support for the Contadora group's initiatives. The conclusions from these regional peace talks directly affected the Guatemalan transition process. In particular the establishment of a National Reconciliation Commission in 1987 opened a slim chance for civic participation. As indirect talks converted into direct talks between government, army and guerrillas, the peace process and democratization process mutually reinforced each other. In the early 1990s the international community became directly involved in the peace negotiations. The UN participated as an observer, and later moderator, and took on the role of international verification through MINUGUA. The Organization of American States (OAS) and the Group of Friends exerted diplomatic pressure, and bilateral government manoeuvres facilitated talks between the various parties. These talks were further considered to be a guarantee of international support for the process, which could contribute to neutralizing certain actors' reticence. On a different level, throughout the years local human rights organizations had received considerable financial and moral support from international NGOs and from some Western governments. Humanitarian and emergency aid had also continued over extensive periods. Moreover, with the signing of the Firm and Lasting Peace in December 1996 large financial commitments were made.

Chapter 4 focuses on Dutch interventions during the Guatemalan conflict, the Netherlands' support to the peace negotiations, and post-conflict commitments. During the 1980s in particular the idea of 'neutral' aid was upheld. The highly polarized nature of Cold War ideology in combination with the absence of historic relations and economic and political interests resulted in Dutch reluctance to become involved in the Guatemalan conflict. Yet the humanitarian crisis as a result of human rights abuses, refugees, and internally displaced peoples led to a call by the Dutch public to intervene. Dutch government interventions focused on international diplomatic pressure through multilateral forums, but foremost on discrete aid through the MFO (*Mede-financierings Organisatie*, or co-financing organization) channel. This project aid, however, was carefully scrutinized to make sure that it would not support the guerrilla groups, nor that it supported the Guatemalan government's position. The Guatemalan government, on the other hand, considered assistance to the victims of violence as subversive, as these were identified as (potential) supporters of the guerrillas. Hence, the character of the Guatemalan conflict as well as the international Cold War context made 'politics' an inherent part of any type of intervention. Yet development cooperation support took on a 'politicized' character in another way, as the 1986 return to civil governance placed the objective of democratization high on the international and Dutch policy agenda. This further opened possibilities for more overt support and the strengthening of popular organizations. Although a clear bilateral stance was shunned, the Netherlands remained critical towards internal developments through multilateral forums. At the project level, the policy focus partly shifted from emergency and humanitarian projects to popular participation, community development and human rights organizations as possibilities for a bilateral development cooperation relationship increased.

The Guatemalan government could now count on (limited) Dutch support, which was mainly the result of affiliation with the governing Christian Democrat party. In this regard, the Dutch government followed the international and foremost European position towards the regional conflicts.

As soon as negotiations between the two parties to the conflict had started to take off, Dutch aid was awarded to projects in support of the peace process. This included support to the Reconciliation Commission (later Civil Society Assembly), but increasingly also to strengthen governmental institutions in preparation for the peace accord and its implementation. Human rights programmes moreover continued to receive financial aid. At the same time, more 'traditional' types of development cooperation were being reinstalled. Rural development and education were central to this policy. Some interventions were also undertaken at the diplomatic level. These included pressure to improve the human rights record, as well as pressure to continue negotiations on peace and the so-called substantive issues. Moreover, although it never materialized, the Dutch government attempted to contribute to the continuation of negotiations with the offer to host a round of talks. The doubling of aid and the opening of the Dutch embassy in 1997 furthermore demonstrated this support to the peace process. Although, overall, the assessment of Dutch support was positive in nature and in line with the idea of 'peace aid', the empirical overview in chapter 4 demonstrates that no conflict analysis or conflict management strategy lay at the basis of these interventions. Instead, initiatives were implemented on an *ad hoc* basis, thereby including objectives of democratization and development alongside conflict resolution. With hindsight, then, it could be concluded that policy was established incrementally, that the agenda was broadened from discrete to overt aid, and from emergency and relief aid to objectives of democratization, poverty reduction and, more recently, good governance. Whereas in the Central American context of the post-Cold War these objectives mutually reinforced each other, in post-conflict Guatemala - and in an era that places conflict prevention and peace-building high on the international agenda - a more explicit, coherent and proactive policy strategy awaits.

Chapter 5 sums up the major findings and some lessons learned are drawn. These include lessons on the role that development cooperation can play in situations of conflict, at the project as well as at the political pressure level. The impact of this instrument, however, has fluctuated strongly with the internal situation and power configurations. Moreover, the instrument of pressure, whether diplomatic or aid-conditional in nature, significantly decreased in effectiveness in the post-conflict setting. The lesson thus implied that it was difficult to influence the parties from outside, during as well as after the conflict. Donor community support to civil society development was successful to such an extent that it created a middle field between the contending parties. Yet a translation of popular participation to political participation has not been established. The prevalence of socio-economic concerns was also not addressed sufficiently, and the absence of land reforms remains the key to contemporary tensions.

To some extent, these inefficiencies seem to point to the general lack of diagnosis of causes and dynamics of conflict at the policy level. This has resulted in a focus on conflict *after* violence escalated in the late 1970s and early 1980s, thereby being of a rather reactive and *ad hoc* nature. Whereas the international community played an important role during the de-escalating phase of conflict and donor cooperation increased to some extent, this was not translated into a coherent strategic approach. Moreover, the international interventions in the Guatemalan post-conflict setting demonstrated a high level of 'naïveté' by passing over these same symptoms or conditions of conflict susceptibility. As structural change after the peace accord was minimal, economic elites remain at the basis of the power structure.

The worsening internal security setting also brings into danger the legitimacy of the judicial sector. Extra-judicial killings, violence and politically motivated murders are on the rise, which has induced the strengthening of private security firms and military involvement in the internal (political) arena. Moreover, highly exclusive power structures, clientelist relations and corruption bring into doubt the legitimacy of governance itself, in particular in the absence of more equitable development and distribution patterns. In the post-conflict period, then, the Guatemalan government, as well as the international community, demonstrates a tendency of shifting towards 'business as usual', thereby leaving aside the important opportunities for conflict prevention. Contemporary fragile peace could then easily be transferred into a reoccurrence of conflict in the future.

Introduction

1.1 Research Objectives and Questions

1.1.1 *Conflict Policy Research Project*

This study is one of six case studies¹ in the framework of the ‘Conflict Policy Research Project’ (CPRP), carried out by the Netherlands Institute of International Relations ‘Clingendael’ at the request of the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The overall aim of the CPRP is to identify and elaborate options for policies and instruments on the basis of which the Ministry could improve on the signalling of and intervention in (potential or actual) violent conflicts in Third World countries. Similarly, it should identify ways and means by which the Ministry could enhance its activities to ameliorate *post*-conflict situations, and hence avoid the reoccurrence of these violent periods. These goals are to be achieved on the basis of a review of relevant literature and research on early warning and conflict analysis, a study of the policies and practices of selected major other-donor countries, and a study into specific Dutch policies and practices in six countries in, or emerging from, conflict. This is to provide an assessment and lessons learned on the availability and efficacy of Dutch policy instruments that are assumed to have conflict-preventive, mitigating, or soothing impacts.

1.1.2 *Case Study Research*

In order to ‘learn the lessons’ of past interventions in situations of latent conflict, open (protracted) conflict and latent peace, the research will assess with hindsight what has been undertaken in practice. This includes an overview of the causes and dynamics of the conflict, as well as the prevailing policies, political perceptions and policy instruments. This should ideally uncover a ‘conflict management strategy’ that incorporates assumptions about what causal factors are most important and how they can be influenced. In this regard, the sample of case studies demonstrates variety in the history of Dutch engagement, the nature and dynamics of internal conflicts, and is a reflection of the complexity of the so-called developing world. The research on policies and practices of the Dutch government in the selected countries attempts to address the following research questions:

- What are the Dutch *policies* for conflict-related interventions in the country?
- What *instruments* were used to realize these policies?

1 Afghanistan, Guatemala, Liberia, Rwanda, Sri Lanka and Sudan.

- Which specific (Dutch-supported) *interventions* were executed in this connection?
- Are there any indications about the results of these interventions?

The case studies will focus on the political and diplomatic instruments, as well as those related to development cooperation. Military and economic instruments were hardly used in practice in these contexts. Several ‘channels’ of aid distribution have been studied. The Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs contributes aid via multilateral channels such as the World Bank or UN organizations, via international NGOs and local NGOs, via so-called *Mede-financierings Organisaties* (MFOs) ² and lastly on a direct bilateral basis.

The individual case-study reports aim at identifying and assessing the objectives or rationales of Dutch policy towards conflict and post-conflict situations, and the instruments with which in particular the Dutch Foreign Ministry tried to realize its goals. The internal coherence of policy instruments is discussed, as well as the expediency and moments of policy interventions in relation to the state and dynamics of the conflict, the question of coordination of policy with that of other external actors and, tentatively, the effectiveness of the policies and instruments employed to respond to the (post-)conflict situation. These result in lessons learned as regards conflict-related (Dutch) foreign policy interventions in the specific country.

1.2 Conceptual Aspects

In the CPRP the concept of ‘conflict-related interventions’ is preferred to the concept of ‘conflict prevention’. Conflict prevention is a relatively new policy strategy and is not made explicit in documents before the 1990s. Furthermore, considerable confusion remains on what conflict prevention means. Whereas the concept ideally should refer to the stages of pre- and post-conflict, prevention or preventive action is also used in interchange with conflict resolution, peace-making, peace-keeping, peace-building and conflict management. In its assessment of measures and policies towards conflicts in so-called developing countries, the CPRP aims at including a broad range of measures in cases of escalating conflict, with the aim of preventing full-scale escalation, mitigating the scope and intensity of the violence, and soothing the consequences of the conflict. Hence, a rather pragmatic approach is chosen, which distinguishes between direct and indirect conflict-related interventions during the stages of latent conflict, open (protracted) conflict, and fragile peace.³

1.2.1 Conflict-related Interventions

In this study the concept of ‘intervention’ encompasses various forms of activity by one actor *vis-à-vis* another. A range of activities is considered as falling under the concept: not only military actions are interpreted as intervention, but also activities in other areas, such as economics, development cooperation and even ‘mere’ communication between one actor and the object of its intervention.

2 The Dutch ‘co-financing organizations’ are HIVOS, NOVIB, ICCO and CORDAID.

3 This categorisation is taken from M. Warner, R. Walker and R. Scharf (1999), *Strategic Conflict Analysis and Conflict Impact Assessment: Discussion Paper* (London: DFID). See also L. van de Goor and S. Verstegen (2000), ‘Conflict Prognosis: A Conflict and Policy Assessment Framework, Part Two’, *Clingendael Occasional Paper* (The Hague: Clingendael).

This approach has the benefit of underlining the importance of gradualism and incrementalism as features of the intervention concept. In this sense the intervention concept does not necessarily have to involve a rupture from conventional or ‘normal’ behaviour of one actor towards another.⁴

Yet our definition of intervention, while allowing for any kind of activity (military, economic, political, diplomatic, cultural or other), is linked to *conflict* and the intention of the intervening actor to affect that conflict. Intervention is thus taken to mean or involve any activity in the above-mentioned areas which is intended to influence the course, intensity or scope of hostilities and/or activity geared at attenuating the effects of conflict. In this sense, intervention amounts to *conflict-related intervention*. Such conflict-related intervention may thus involve, firstly, interventions that are aimed at influencing the hostilities. One could think of political and diplomatic efforts to mediate a settlement; any form of military intervention to affect an end to or mitigation of the conflict; the provision of financial or logistical support to military operations; or the imposition of economic or military sanctions. Conflict-related intervention may, however, also involve activity geared at affecting the pre- or post-conflict situation. Moreover, it also includes interventions that are aimed at attenuating the effects of a conflict through the provision of aid to war-stricken areas and populations to help them survive the hostilities and get back on their feet once these have ended.

1.2.2 *Direct and Indirect Conflict-related Interventions*

‘Conflict-related interventions’ are thus closely bound up with a conflict, yet they are not strictly conflict-synchronous.⁵ They may occur prior to or at the outbreak of a conflict, as well as in the aftermath or following a conflict. Two categories may be distinguished: direct and indirect interventions. *Direct interventions* are those interventions that focus on the violent hostilities. They aim at affecting both the course and the intensity of a future, current or past conflict with a view to safeguarding or eventually concluding peace. Examples are international peace conferences, arms or economic embargoes, the use of peace-keeping forces, disarmament, and the reintegration of ex-combatants. *Indirect interventions* focus on the context of the violent hostilities. These interventions aim at attenuating the negative impacts of a current or past conflict, but may also be of a longer-term character, *i.e.* addressing the underlying causes of conflict. Exemplary of such activities are humanitarian aid, human rights and civil society projects, rehabilitation and reconstruction.

The aim of the broad focus on conflict-related interventions is to include a broad range of instruments that may be put into practice at the short, medium and longer term. In this regard, even so-called ‘regular development aid’ can be valued as conflict-related. It is, however, the objective with which this aid is provided that is the key. What exact measures are included in a ‘toolbox’ is therefore not predefined, but dependent on policy strategy and timing. When conflict has escalated, the toolbox may be reduced to instruments to limit the intensity, scope and course of hostilities and to emergency aid. On the contrary, in pre- or post-hostilities phases development projects of a more general nature - such as education and employment schemes - can be valued as conflict-related when these specifically

4 G. Evans and J. Newnham (1990), *The Dictionary of World Politics: A Reference Guide to Concepts, Ideas and Institutions* (New York), p. 200.

5 Conflict-synchronous here refers to interventions in the affairs of a country in conflict, with another objective than to affect the conflict.

aim at preventing conflicts in the longer term. This implies the need for sensitizing the broader policy context of their *impact* on conflict situations.⁶

1.3 Data Gathering

This report is largely based on written reports and scientific publications on interventions in conflict situations. As regards Dutch policies and interventions, the archives of the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs have been the primary source of information. A number of assistant researchers have spent on average three months per country to assess a sample of important files concerning each country under study. The limitations of this type of research nevertheless need to be taken into account. In addition to severe time constraints, these include the overabundance and complexity of files, differences and changes in filing systems - over time as well as between the various departments and directorates - and the observation that not all discussions, considerations and information are recorded on paper.

In an attempt to fill - at least to a certain extent - this information gap, a number of key individuals have been interviewed on specific topics. Whenever possible, additional fieldwork has been executed, during which a number of international organizations, government representatives and development projects have been visited to obtain feedback. Most of the data on funds spent have been retrieved from the Ministry (the MIDAS system) as well as from OECD/DAC reports.

1.4 Some Case-specific Remarks: Guatemala

1.4.1 *Introduction and Significance of the Guatemalan Case*

While embedded in a conflictive and repressive history, the 'Guatemalan conflict' is often referred to as the period from 1960-1996, during which insurgent forces took up arms against a right-wing military government. Although of a political-military nature, issues such as income inequality, unequal distribution of land and other resources, and the question of how to reverse staggering and widespread poverty definitely created a necessary condition in the broader context of the conflict.⁷ Moreover, these came to play an important role in the negotiating phase to end the violent confrontation.

The twentieth-century Guatemalan conflict cannot be seen outside the context and ideology of Cold War antagonism that characterized conflicts in the region. Of all Central American countries, however, Guatemala has been the nation most sharply divided, most strongly affected by the war, most harshly dominated by military governments and most ostentatiously transformed into an ethnic battlefield.⁸ Warfare was mainly characterized by the indiscriminate nature of violence and repression and an increasing level of militarization of state and society. The conflict has left in its wake countless dead, wounded, repatriated, internally displaced, and disappeared; has destroyed a good part of the country's productive infrastructure; and resulted in the virtual militarization of society.

6 See also van de Goor and Verstegen, 'Conflict Prognosis'.

7 J. Oliver (1999), 'The Esquipulas Process: A Central American Paradigm for Resolving Regional Conflict', in *Ethnic Studies Report*, 17(2), pp. 149-199 at p. 168.

8 D. Kruijt, *Guatemala's 'Military Projects'*, review essay of five studies on the role of the military in Guatemalan politics.

For a long time, international perceptions on the conflict were influenced by Cold War rhetoric. These focused on human rights violations and the absence of democratic structures, as the conflict was viewed as a problem of legitimacy of government, a lack of agreement among the contending parties and government. Only with the ending of the Cold War did the international vision on the conflict start to change as the focus shifted more towards the internal dimensions and dynamics of conflict, such as the struggle for status quo and retention of wealth and power. Democracy and development were considered the main strategies for ending violent conflict. International involvement increased after a first transition to the democratic process in the mid-1980s. The international community became increasingly involved in the peace negotiations, and after the signing of Peace Accords in 1996 it committed itself to post-conflict reconstruction.

Notwithstanding the euphoria of the Peace Accords of December 1996, contemporary Guatemalan society exhibits a large number of (inherited and institutional) factors that have been identified as creating a high potential for violent conflict. These include a violent recent history, deeply polarized and distrustful communities, polarized political parties, high levels of inequality, and lacking state capacity. Many of the underlying causes of the conflict thus remain. The Guatemalan case, then, should enable the formulation of lessons learned with regard to measures of and conditions for conflict resolution, as well as conflict prevention in a post-conflict setting. Especially in the light of growing concern of an ethnic dimension to the potentially conflictive country context, an assessment of donor involvement in the post-conflict setting seems useful.

1.4.2 *Period under Research*

The research on Dutch policies and interventions in the Guatemalan conflict focuses on the period from 1986-1998. As mentioned previously, it will focus on the end of the so-called life cycle, *i.e.* the search for peace and the post-conflict period. Not only does this enable us to assess the extent to which third parties can contribute to peace and the avoidance of a recurrence of violence, it also includes a study on democratization processes in the light of peace agreements, as the two are closely related in the Central American context.

The study, however, cannot be deemed ‘complete’ without including the height of the repression years, *i.e.* the late 1970s and early 1980s. This is even more so since human rights violations have been high on the international agenda towards Guatemala. Research on Dutch policies and interventions during this period was, however, limited to information available in the Dutch Foreign Office archives. Additionally, interviews have been held with representatives of MFOs and NGOs that - in light of the absence of a bilateral development cooperation relationship - constituted the main channel of Dutch involvement.⁹

1.4.3 *Sources and Methodology*

As regards the Guatemalan conflict history, extensive use is made of the Clingendael Institute’s previous research on the causes of conflict in Guatemala.¹⁰ However, since the focus of the present study is clearly directed towards the *solution* or *ending* of the violent conflict (the Guatemalan peace

9 See annexe 2 for a listing of interviews.

10 Causes of Conflict in the Third World (CODW) research project: for the study on Guatemala, see *Report on Central America* (The Hague: Clingendael Institute, 1998), pp. 167-235.

process) and on the post-conflict period, new material has been added. Aside from a study of the literature, much of the material and information on conflict interventions by third parties was collected during a field trip to Guatemala City in May 1999.¹¹ The inclusion of a fieldwork visit had the additional advantage of enabling inclusion of more practical information on donor coordination and ‘dilemmas’ in cooperation, as well as some preliminary assessments on conflict impacts of donor cooperation and behaviour. The main source of information on policy and policy practice, however, has come from the archives of the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Empirical data on Dutch policy interventions in Guatemala were collected by Jeroen de Zeeuw¹² working on behalf of the Conflict Policy Research Project. The analysis is based on a study of some 70 files from the Foreign Office archives.¹³ A detailed description of the selection of these files, as well as a listing of the files that were included in this study, can be found in annexe 1.

1.4.4 *The Report on Guatemala*

In order to enable a better insight into the role of the Netherlands in the Guatemalan conflict and peace, it is first of all necessary to analyse the conflict itself. Chapter 2 therefore focuses on several levels of causation behind the conflict, including historical socio-economic and other systemic sources, institutional and process factors, precipitating events and the parties and their objectives. Furthermore, chapter 2 provides an overview of the conflict history as regards the democratic transition and peace negotiations, and addresses the remaining frailty of the post-conflict situation. Chapter 3 places the historical overview of the conflict in the light of international responses and a description of conflict strategies embedded in the various third-party efforts. Chapter 4 focuses on the Netherlands’ policies and interventions in relation to the Guatemalan conflict. Political and diplomatic as well as aid interventions will be tentatively assessed. Finally, chapter 5 presents conclusions and lessons learned with regard to conflict-related intervention strategies in a (post-) conflict setting.

11 See annexe 2 for a listing of the organizations visited.

12 The author acknowledges the valuable contributions provided by Jeroen de Zeeuw, who reviewed the archives and visited several NGO projects in Guatemala as part of a two-week fieldtrip. He has presented these data in the report ‘The Practice of Intervention: Dutch Foreign and Development Cooperation Policy regarding Guatemala 1987-1998’ (The Hague: Clingendael Institute, July 1999).

13 In general, the files in these archives can roughly be divided into political-diplomatic files, and files on concrete development cooperation projects, the so-called OS files. Excluded from this number are the files over the period from 1978-1984.

2 An Outline of the Guatemalan Conflict History

The Guatemalan conflict, history and society have been studied and described in many instances, and hence are well documented. These publications predominantly focus on a specific problem or element such as the colonial past, military project, the democratization process, or the ethnic communities. Each captures a piece of reality. In this study, the outline necessarily has to be limited, and will focus on factors and dynamics that have been identified as conflict-relevant. Whereas the assessment of international and Dutch interventions focuses on the time period after 1986, *i.e.* the period of peace negotiations and the return to civil government (see paragraph 2.3.), this cannot be seen outside the larger context of the conflict. It is therefore important, first of all, to focus on various factors that have produced, intensified and prolonged the conflict, and analyse how these have interacted over time (paragraph 2.1.). This furthermore includes a description of the parties to the conflict and their objectives (paragraph 2.2.). The remaining potential for conflict in contemporary Guatemalan society is a reminder of the complexity and multi-faceted nature of the context in which conflict resolution and prevention policies have to operate (paragraph 2.4.).

2.1 Background to the Guatemalan Conflict ¹⁴

2.1.1 *Structural Characteristics of Society*

Historically, unfair social, economic, and political structures have generated recurring conflicts in Guatemala at the national as well as at the local level. Land ownership and distribution have become prime factors in this process of social and political polarization. The landholding structure in Guatemala has remained largely unreformed, resulting in a highly divided and unequal society. One of the main features of Guatemalan society is its majority of indigenous populations. In this regard, ethnicity has formed a sharp dividing line as discrimination and racism on the basis of ethnicity have deep roots in society. Although mainly of Mayan origin, these populations differ in language, culture and religion, and do not constitute a homogeneous community. Class, race, gender, religion, geography, and political affiliation all contributed - with varying intensity from community to community across the highlands - to the overall sense of divisiveness within these areas. Moreover, divisiveness has found a clear expression in socio-economic inequalities, and there are significant disparities in levels of development between the country's 22 administrative departments.

14 Unless mentioned explicitly, the body of this conflict history is based on the Guatemala chapter of the *Report on Central America* by Clingendael in cooperation with the Arias Foundation for Peace (1998, pp. 167-235), which is part of the larger research on Causes of Conflict in the Third World (CODW).

Overall, Guatemala ranks third in the world with regard to its level of inequality, which finds an expression in a Gini index of 59.6 per cent in 1998.¹⁵

Despite economic growth and despite having a higher GDP than any other Central American country,¹⁶ the Guatemalan government has not been able to provide for the needs of its citizens, as is illustrated by the fact that Guatemala has some of the lowest social indicators in the region. Government spending in social areas such as health and education has been continuously low and has limited opportunities for human development in Guatemala.¹⁷ Population growth further increased constraints on resources - foremost land - and according to a July 1999 estimate Guatemala is the second most densely populated country in Latin America with about 12.3 million people living on 108,430 square kilometres.¹⁸ Population density further increases in the countryside, when taking into consideration the availability of *arable* land.¹⁹ Capitalization of agriculture has led to rural displacement and subdivisions of land and an increase of partial-seasonal labour. Furthermore, this also resulted in other resources, such as credits and loans, being unequally distributed to the benefit of the agricultural export sector and urban areas. Migration to the capital increased as the subdivision of land gradually led to a loss in ability for self-sufficiency of the *campesino* population. An important result of the development of industrial manufacturing was a shift in concentration of power to urban areas, resulting in the formation of a large middle class, increasing inequality of income distribution, and the spreading of urban social marginalization.

At the macro-structural level, the same incidence of inequality, divisiveness and dependency can be observed, related to the conflictive and contradictory entrance of Guatemala into the emergent global economy and society. The 1940s' attempt to break with the pattern of foreign-controlled economic enclaves, and begin a process of industrial modernization by promoting import substitution and agrarian reform, instigated the first US counter-insurgent involvement in the region. In the 1960s, a new era of growth of industry and basic services began (electricity, transportation and telecommunications). Industrialization in Guatemala gained strength with the creation of the Central American Common Market (MCCA). The MCCA also introduced a new era of foreign investment, which in the 1960s and 1970s shifted from primary materials to finished goods. Guatemala's industrialization increasingly became caught in a situation of dependency, as multinational - especially US-owned - companies dominated the most important industries and Guatemalan industry dedicated to

15 According to a study by the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), <http://worldpolicy.org/americas/guatemala/maps-guat.html>.

16 According to the UNDP, real per capita income (adjusted for differences in purchasing power) was USD 4,100 in 1997. Yet because of the country's extremely unequal distribution of income, these averages are very misleading. According to UNICEF, approximately 53 per cent of the population earns less than one dollar a day, or USD 365 a year (<http://worldpolicy.org/americas/guatemala/maps-guat.html>).

17 Poverty, in this regard, does not just reflect low income but more fundamentally the deprivation of basic human needs. In 1998, the US State Department reported that approximately 80 per cent of the population lived below the poverty line, and that the poverty rate rose to about 90 per cent in the indigenous population (<http://worldpolicy.org/americas/guatemala/maps-guat.html>).

18 *CIA World Factbook* (<http://worldpolicy.org/americas/guatemala/maps-guat.html>).

19 According to the *UNDP 1996 Human Development Report*, only 12.2 per cent of Guatemala's total land area is arable land, and this, moreover, is extremely unequally distributed. According to the World Bank, Guatemala had a rural population density of 458 persons per square kilometre of arable land in 1996 (<http://worldpolicy.org/americas/guatemala/maps-guate.html>).

assembly, thereby remaining highly dependent on the import of semi-finished goods and adequate technology.

The Guatemalan state has been characterized by its fragmented institutional system, excessive centralization, unclear division of powers and a weak justice system. The evolving government structures and policies have been of a clear oligarchic, authoritarian and exclusionary nature, ineffective in representing the interests of all its citizens. This is in part due to the lobbying efforts of the private sector interest group, which has acted practically unchallenged by any similar organization representing the other major sectors of society. The main political forces (military and economic elite), however, never united around one political party. Instead, Guatemalan political parties have been characterized by their weak institutional structure and have generally not presented national political platforms of public policy goals. Indeed, political parties resemble electoral committees that mobilize citizens for electoral campaigns more than actual options for government. Electoral fraud has furthermore weakened the political system's credibility, and denied possibilities for change through the electoral process. To ensure certain loyalties, the government implemented a system of sinecure that included: informal means of remuneration, such as the assignment of political positions and high-level jobs in the public sector; grants of considerable tracts of national land and real estate; and tolerance of certain levels of corruption. A long tradition of verticalism and stratification of society has further undermined participation, transparency and accountability. Disenchantment with political parties, corruption and the closing of political space has been informed by ongoing political violence.

Over the course of conflict, Guatemalan state and society became increasingly dominated by the military and its strategies, at times co-opting presidential authority (1966-1970), and at others attaining it through either legally won elections (1970-1974) or electoral fraud (1974-1982). The army exceeded its constitutional functions and, under the protection of the exceptional conditions created by counter-insurgency tasks, became the axis of the political power structure. By the mid-1980s, military officers had assumed decision-making powers in almost all branches of the state. In the process, they developed professional and economic interests that became 'integrally tied to the maintenance of a coercive state that deploys violence to restrict civil and political society'.²⁰

Group divisions within Guatemalan society are thus strongly related to access to resources and the prevailing power relations, and 'decade after decade of authoritarian rule and the lack of political rights in Guatemala have cemented the existing socio-economic dividing lines, since all demands for reform have been quelled at the outset.'²¹ Socio-economic inequality was replicated through the political system as it became key to the struggles over policy agendas, popular mobilization and political participation. In a response to the situation of instability, social explosiveness and *ingobernabilidad*, governments increasingly came to depend on the use of force to keep 'order'.²²

20 D. Yashar (1997), 'The Quetzal is Red: Military States, Popular Movements, and Political Violence in Guatemala', in D. Chalmers, C. Vilas and K. Hite (eds), *The New Politics of Inequality in Latin America: Rethinking Participation and Representation* (New York: Oxford University Press), p. 239.

21 W. Hauge (1998), 'Annex 3: An Evaluation of Norway's Role in the Guatemalan Peace Process', in M. Sørbrø, *Norwegian Assistance to Countries in Conflict: The Lesson of Experience from Guatemala, Mali, Mozambique, Sudan, Rwanda and Burundi*, Evaluation Report 11.98, Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, p. 27.

22 Centro de Estudios de Guatemala [CEG] (1994), *La Democracia de las Armas* (Guatemala: Nueva Imagen Guatemala), p. 242.

The Guatemalan state and society, then, historically has excelled at repression. Violence, threat and repression in this regard have become the central instruments for the extraction of labour from rural and largely indigenous communities, the delimitation of space for civil society developments, and actions against those ‘suspected of subversion’.²³ Ensuing radicalization further contributed to a severe polarization of Guatemalan society, as the economic and political situation has generated a state of permanent violence and rebellion.²⁴

2.1.2 *The Phases of the Conflict*

The Guatemalan conflict is here roughly divided into three periods: the run-up from the October Revolution to the counter-revolutionary *coup* of 1954 and the resurrection of rebel officers into the first insurgent force in 1960; a second period of open protracted conflict between insurgent forces and government (this period stretches over two-and-a-half decades and includes various levels of intensity and an increasingly closed political/public arena); the third period begins in 1986 with the installation of the first civilian government, covers the years of peace negotiations, and includes the first post-conflict years. The latter phase, which is central to this study, will be discussed in paragraph 2.3.

- *From Latent Conflict to Open Conflict: Social and Political Turmoil in the Aftermath of the Counter-revolution*

After a fourteen-year period of dictatorship under Jorge Ubico Castañeda, the period from 1944 to 1954 - known as the October Revolution - created the ideological and institutional basis for a liberalization programme that attempted to expand structural change at all levels.²⁵ Arévalo’s reforms (1944-1951) included social and labour legislation, the promotion of health and education services, the professionalization of the military, and the formation of cooperatives. Great importance was placed on the right of association and encouragement of popular organization. The Arbenz government (1951-1954) intended to deepen social reform further, and in 1952 legislated an agrarian reform package that confiscated private land and redistributed it to the *campesinos*. Arbenz furthermore legalized the Guatemalan Workers Party (PGT), and communists came to have significance in the government and considerable presence in the country’s labour and *campesino* organizations.

The 1944-1954 revolutionary programme met strong resistance from a trio of national actors: the multinational fruit companies, the landholding elite, and the Catholic Church, all of whom generally enjoyed US backing. Within the Cold War framework, they began to fear greater Soviet influence in Latin America. Mainly through covert CIA operations and diplomatic manoeuvring in the UN and the OAS, the United States set out to destabilize the Arbenz administration, and eventually became involved in a local plot to overthrow the revolutionary government. It was, however, only when President Arbenz lost the support of the armed forces that his government fell. Under a new military junta, Congress was dissolved and the Constitution suspended. The military rule begun in 1954 thus had a clear anti-communist ideological orientation, marked by intolerance and persecution of ideas, statements, or organizations that could be labelled as communist. Many of the measures implemented during the October Revolution were undone and remaining popular organizations and unions were - by

23 Yashar, ‘The Quetzal is Red’, p. 239.

24 CEG, *La Democracia de las Armas*, p. 242.

25 See annexe 3 for an overview of Guatemalan presidencies after 1944.

being accused of communism - forced to dissolve or operate underground. The progressive economic and social measures were cancelled and, most significantly, almost all of the land that had been expropriated was returned to its former owners. To compound the effect of the aborted reforms further, the government began to promote actively the interests of the elite sectors that had supported the counter-revolution. The closing of legal political expression and the government's willingness to resort to violent repression led the opposition itself to opt increasingly for the use of violence. Hence, the overthrow of the revolutionary government, the reversal of structural reforms, and political persecution at all levels gave rise to a period of social confrontation, polarization and instability that escalated the conflict into violence. The year 1954 thus meant a sharp contextual change: there was a surge in violence, an increase in poverty, and institutions weakened. An atmosphere of uncertainty came to prevail, without an alternative ideological project that could lead Guatemala towards a national solution to the crisis.

- *Open Protracted Conflict: The Beginnings of Armed Confrontation and the Militarization of State and Society*

The insurgent struggle in Guatemala began with a military rebellion and abortive *coup* on 13 November 1960, a movement that expressed widespread and generalized discontent and demoralization within the military ranks. The movement's leaders abandoned the army and created a political-military project that embraced the strategies of class struggle and seizure of power by force. Increased protests and demonstrations in 1962 paralysed the country's capital. As the government became unable to build its institutional capacity to govern and began to lose credibility, it increased repression, continued a state of emergency and virtually delivered government control to the military. The economic elite agreed to a militarization of the political system as long as the government would continue the anti-communist struggle, thereby protecting elite interests.

Although counter-insurgency had appeared successful in the 1960s, the resurgence of guerrilla activity in the 1970s led the government to declare a state of emergency. A new wave of terror targeted political and student leaders as well as leaders of popular organizations. As the guerrilla groups sought to build a support base in rural areas, rural organizations and entire communities became the object of repression. In an attempt to rob the opposition groups of their rallying points and to diminish the revolutionary mentality, the Laugerud García administration (1974-1978) introduced some controlled reforms. Right-wing sectors, however, were suspicious and the anti-communist political sectors rejected any suggestions as regards the need to improve the population's living conditions and eliminate poverty as indispensable requirements for the country's modernization.

Provoked by an increase in public transportation fares, popular struggles culminated in a general strike in 1979. The movement evolved into an urban insurrection, but was repressed violently. A new stage of terror was initiated under the Lucas García administration (1978-1982). The escalation in state terror, however, had become out of control, with death squads operating beyond military authority. The situation contributed to the further deterioration of the country's image and isolated Guatemala from the rest of the international community.

At the end of the 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s, the stronghold of the three powers in Guatemala (the army, the private business sector, and the United States) began to unfold. In 1977 the US suspended military aid as a response to the widespread and genocidal nature of human rights violations. Furthermore, global recession hit hard in the early 1980s.

The Guatemalan economy entered a recession and suffered a negative trade balance. The political and social crisis decreased confidence in the government and resulted in the flight of capital and low domestic savings rates. Whereas the business community reproached the army with its inefficacy in combating the guerrillas, the military in its turn held the private sector responsible for the critical social situation and labour conditions.

By the time of the *coup* in 1982 that placed Ríos Montt (1982-1983) at the presidency, several things had become clear: the military model of exercising political power initiated in 1963 had collapsed; the social bases and sphere of action of the insurgents had expanded; excessive corruption had swollen the national debt and weakened the country's financial ability to fight the counter-insurgency struggle; and the capitalist economic sector had lost confidence in the manner in which power was being exercised. Most of all, the use of state terrorism by paramilitary groups, outside the direct control of the military hierarchy, had begun to undermine the aims of the counter-insurgency programme. Reformist sectors were convinced of the idea that structural change was also needed to win the war. This implied a change in the military's political project to include civic action and concerted efforts at reform. Repression, however, did not cease, and the first years of this transitory period meant an escalatory rise in counter-insurgency operations that affected large numbers of the - mainly *campesino* and indigenous - population. Over the course of conflict, 440 villages were completely destroyed, 110,000 civilians killed, 150,000 refugees went to Mexico and nearly one million internally displaced persons fled due to the violence and military's schemes to control the populations. In addition, food shortages as a result of the war destruction forced those who remained to depend on the army for survival.

Military control over the internal security situation strongly increased.²⁶ Yet, the brutality of the regime and the President's Protestant fanaticism, as well as indications from the President that he intended to stay in power longer than scheduled brought more far-reaching promises of a return to civilian rule and constitutional order into doubt.

As a result, the same reformist group that had put Ríos Montt in power ousted him in August 1983. Former Minister of Defence Mejía Víctores (1983-1986) became the country's new President, and without affecting the continuity of the military project or diminishing the counter-insurgency effort, he began to demilitarize the government. The new government announced that its priority would be to secure the transition towards elections and the installation of a political administration led by civilians, through an impending return to constitutionality. This won the sympathy of the US government in particular, and brought an end to Guatemala's international isolation, which had begun in 1977. These changes also marked the beginning of the de-escalation phase of the conflict.

26 The first phase of the counter-offensive (1981-1983) was defined by a policy of *tierra arrasada*, or scorched earth, in the Mayan territory. The goal was to eliminate the guerrillas' civilian support base and 'drain the sea' in which they operated. Part of the logic in relocation was to break up communities and dilute them by relocating them throughout the country. The effects were staggering, and in addition to the death and destruction, this policy had the key effect of destroying much of the indigenous population. The next major phase (1983-1985) of the military's local effort to fight the guerrillas involved the creation of civil defence patrols (PACs). These were crucial to military action, as the army perceived that it could not monitor completely all of the guerrillas' fronts. It therefore opted for the militarization of local communities, the majority indigenous peoples, as a way of infiltrating guerrilla areas and creating a shield between the civilian population and the guerrillas.

2.2 The Parties and their Objectives

This section will give a short overview of the various parties to the conflict and their objectives. These have gradually changed during the course of the conflict. Revolutionary insurrection in the 1960s and 1970s was mainly fuelled by a systematic exclusion of opposition and reformists from power. Whereas political activity became dominated by the bipartite ‘insurgency/counter-insurgency’,²⁷ Guatemalan politics increasingly centred on the axis of violent confrontation between the state and organized popular sectors. ‘State’ and ‘the popular sector’, however, have never constituted well-organized and united fronts. Moreover, at the height of repression the environment of conflict started to change to such an extent that parties to the conflict, slowly but increasingly, opted for new strategies. Divisions within the parties grew, in particular over the very idea of negotiating peace as opposed to a policy of intransigence and military victory. New actors (re-)emerged, of which some took on a specific role in the national peace process (see also paragraph 2.3.). The role of international actors in this process is discussed in chapter 3.

2.2.1 Political-Military Escalation: ‘Cold War’ Hostility and Economic Status Quo

Joined in their strong anti-communist stance, during most of the conflict the **ruling coalition** was formed by a stronghold of political, military and economic elite groups. The landed oligarchies and dominant groups tied to the traditional agro-export model sought to sustain and reproduce the old model of capital accumulation, and the particular set of social privileges and relations of domination based on authoritarian political systems. New economic elites emerged in the 1970s when the Guatemalan economy became increasingly oriented towards a tighter link with transnational capital. These new sectors, however, were no more tolerant or politically pluralistic. They united with traditional sectors in the *Coordinating Committee of the Agricultural, Commercial, Industrial and Financial Associations* (CACIF) in defence of an ultra-conservative development model. Although the economic elite did not exercise power directly through a particular political party, they had great influence on government policy. By expecting the government to consult them on all important matters, in many ways they exercised a veto power.

The armed forces of Guatemala emerged into a strong political force during the life cycle of the conflict. In its radical anti-communism, the military adopted counter-insurgency as its principal political strategy, projecting the armed forces above the constitution and restructuring political power so as to impede any changes in the system. In line with the military’s dominance and control over state and society, and pursuant to the counter-insurgent model, the army acquired powers, functions, and privileges that transcended the fight against the guerrillas. The messianic vision of ‘protectors of the nation’ converted the military high command into the makers of public policy, although they lacked a broad vision for the country.²⁸

27 CEG, *La Democracia de las Armas*, p. 13.

28 Military control over government in Guatemala is often referred to as the ‘Military Project’. Yet, this ‘illusion’ of a military master plan, as Kruijt (*Guatemala’s ‘Military Projects’*) argues, does not take into account Guatemala’s full politico-military history: the slow emergence of the military governmental formulae; the palace revolutions; the first small guerrilla fronts; the beginning of state terror against possible (future) ‘terrorists’; the first counter-insurgency operations against the *ladino* peasants; the paramilitary operations; the political murders; the building of a ‘society of fear’; the succession of military

The continuing cycle of corruption and illicit enrichment, however, was deteriorating the external and internal image of the military. Rivalries arose in the hierarchy because of the existence of a system of privileges, causing hypertrophy and bureaucratization due to the designation of military officers to public posts. Ríos Montt proposed an agenda for return to constitutional order with the goal of restoring public confidence in and the legitimacy of the state. Of the reforms, the most important change was the military's decision no longer to be an occupying force in its own country. This meant leaving behind the paternalistic civic-military action promoted by the United States. Instead, the military began to play a more active role in collaborating with the civilian population in the conflict zones by increasing military presence in those areas.

The first **insurgent movement** originated from disenchanted officers who had supported the revolution of 1944-1954, and disagreed with the reversal of the accomplishments achieved. When their uprising through the military rank was put down in 1960, they formed the revolutionary movement MR-13N that began guerrilla operations in 1961. The group was joined by students in the urban areas and *campesinos* affected by the overturn of the Agrarian Reform. Mainly absent from this opposition, however, were indigenous groups, as the first insurgent movements did not attempt to include indigenous rights in their objectives or to create political awareness or militancy among those communities, geographically focusing on the majority *ladino* areas. The united movement of opposition groups FAR (Rebel Armed Forces) never managed to achieve real national unity as their tactic was overly militaristic in its commitment to installing socialism through revolution, and did not emphasize the political conscience-building that would have allowed it to mobilize greater support. In the first wave of repression that left some 8,000 peasants and some of the original leaders of the FAR dead, the insurgent movement was virtually defeated by 1970.

The rebirth of revolutionary war occurred between 1972 and 1976 when guerrilla groups decided to change strategies and began political work in rural and indigenous villages in areas that had a large majority of indigenous population. Although the rank-and-file guerrillas were predominantly indigenous, the groups were typically led by *ladinos*. In 1982 the four guerrilla groups FAR, EGP (Guerrilla Army of the Poor), ORPA (Revolutionary Organization of the People in Arms), and FU (Unitary Front) formed a united command structure called the URNG (Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity).

The period 1976-1986 was one of rebirth and increasing strategic unity for the guerrilla movement, which broadened to incorporate left-wing parties, academics, members of civil society, *campesinos* and Mayans. The URNG embraced a traditional revolutionary platform: to guarantee basic rights for all citizens, regardless of race or sex, and to put an end to the elite's monopoly on power. Democratic principles such as representation in government of all sectors of the population and protection of the indigenous culture were also included. The insurgency also changed its tactics, adopting a theory of implantation in local areas and the establishment of local power bases. Yet they could not successfully organize this social base to support them when needed. Massive state repression in combination with a lack of insurgent strategies in this regard prevented the emergence of a massive popular front needed for a successful revolution. In many ways, the different guerrilla groups actually competed for loyalties among union organizations. Others, such as PGT, did not agree to armed

strongmen, even institutionalised by the political parties, which all opted for a couple of generals and colonels as presidential candidates; the system of electoral fraud, etcetera.

struggle as a way to take over state power. Trade unions were not under the leadership of a vanguard political party and did not coordinate their actions with any one of the insurgent groups. The URNG's inability to make alliances with middle-class and moderate opposition groups further contributed to its weakening. The virtual military defeat of the URNG in the early 1980s led it to question its goal of taking state power by force, without however laying down its arms.

2.2.2 A 'Negotiated' De-escalation: Political Opening but Economic Status Quo

The first opening for a de-escalation of conflict started with the democratic transition in which government viewed elections as a new stage or adjustment in its counter-insurgency strategy. Although armed confrontation had decreased compared to the early 1980s, the two sides remained deadlocked, thereby continuing a situation of human and economic losses.²⁹ The absence of a 'mutually hurting stalemate' led many to doubt whether Guatemala would ever be 'ripe' for negotiations. Radical sectors of the **military** and the **private sector** rejected the idea that a negotiated peace settlement was a necessary step in building democracy, particularly if it involved any type of concessions to the URNG rebels. Their strategic victory - and particularly the fact that they had attained success without international support - shaped a state of mind that shunned any negotiated settlement to the armed confrontation. The army was, moreover, fearful that a peace accord would call for prosecution of human rights violations, and the economic sector feared that concessions would be made on socio-economic matters and land issues. Throughout the peace process, then, private sector elites worked to limit government concessions and boycotted reformist civil society fora.

Over time, military leaders increasingly became convinced of political bargaining as the only way to prevent a war of attrition that could go on indefinitely. Moreover, during the late 1980s a transnational elite emerged.³⁰

Together with the United States, they promoted transitions from authoritarian to so-called 'democratic' political systems, and pressure from international financial institutions also led to a gradual increase of commitment to deregulating markets, modernizing the state along neo-liberal lines, and a new 'competitive' insertion into the emerging global economy. Without aiming for a far-reaching popular democratization, **civil government** began to seek a more lasting social stability through consensual modes of social control rather than the old oligarchic dictatorships. Yet although it sought to modernize the state and society, this was to be achieved without any fundamental deconcentration of property and wealth, and without any class redistribution of political and economic power.³¹

29 Hauge, 'Annexe 3', p. 42.

30 W. Robinson (1998), *Neo-Liberalism, the Global Elite, and the Guatemalan Transition: A Critical Macrostructural Analysis*, paper prepared for seminar on Guatemalan development and democratization, University del Valle de Guatemala, 26-28 March 1998, p. 7, <http://www.jhu.edu/~soc/.ladark/guatconf/robinsoneng-.htm>: 'With the introduction of new economic activities in the 1980s, including a powerful new financial sector tied to international banking, incipient export-oriented industry such as maquila textile production, non-traditional agricultural exports promoted by the IFIs, and new commercial groups, a transnationalized faction of the elite assumed its own profile and clashed with the old state-protected oligarchy over fiscal, tax, liberalization, and related policies'.

31 Robinson, *Neo-Liberalism, the Global Elite, and the Guatemalan Transition*, p. 4.

After the military defeats of 1982 and 1983, the **insurgency** was going through one of its worst moments. Faced with its own military weakness, the advances made by the government in terms of elections, human rights and constitutional rule, and the transfer of power to civilians, the insurgency adopted a position in favour of a political solution to end the internal armed confrontation. The insurgents, however, refused to give up military action completely and continued to make strategic attacks. As the URNG did not have the military weight to put pressure on government, it sought to bolster its strength through alliances with national and international actors. Moreover, international events such as the fall of the Eastern Bloc and the electoral defeat of the Nicaraguan Sandinista government in February 1990 made the success of the revolutionary model increasingly unlikely. It was, however, emphasized that dialogue was a form of struggle and not surrender, and that it sought negotiations that would address the structural and political causes of the war and the flagrant human rights violations experienced during the years of armed conflict.

Democratic opening further led to the resurgence of **civil society** organizations. Whereas traditionally, class-based organizations had called for material changes, often posing a challenge to economic elites, now organizations emerged that were an outgrowth of and direct response to the violence. After the years of repression, organization took place around questions of human and civil rights, military impunity, and dignity, thereby ‘...posing an apparent challenge to the military’s penetration of the state and society’.³² The heterodox nature of the emerging society was also reflected in the increasing salience of ethnic- and gender-based demands. In accordance with the Central American Peace Accord in 1987, a National Reconciliation Commission (CNR) was installed. As Monsignor Quezada Toruño was named the head of the Commission, the Church took on a leading role in the negotiation and reconciliation process. Moreover, the CNR facilitated the first involvement of civil society, mainly by the creation of the National Dialogue in 1989. Civic influence working through the Commission was crucial in increasing pressure on the parties for public accountability and in promoting greater political participation. Civil society gradually became more directly involved in the peace process through the establishment of the Civil Society Assembly (ASC), which produced consensus documents as proposals for the formal negotiations and agreements.

Aside from the input that this generated from a large variety of societal groups, a great deal of effort was invested in building trust between groups and individuals in a society that had been through thirty-six years of war.³³

2.3 Towards a Fragile Peace: Nature and Dynamics of the Peace Process

It is difficult to date precisely the beginning of the de-escalation and peace process, as it took place on so many levels. Indeed, before and between the formal negotiations a series of more informal meetings was arranged between various groups in society and between representatives of the most important parties to the conflict. The main route towards a negotiated peace was through democratic opening.

32 Yashar, ‘The Quetzal is Red’, p. 253.

33 Hauge, ‘Annexe 3’.

2.3.1 The 'Pacted Transition' to Democracy³⁴

With the rise of younger officers in the army who supported a return to constitutional rule, Guatemala's democratization began in earnest in 1984, when the National Constituent Assembly adopted new electoral laws and a new constitution and established a Supreme Electoral Tribunal. Although candidates had not dared mention either socio-economic reform or human rights issues during their campaigns, the 1985 elections were pluralistic and relatively clean. These brought Vinicio Cerezo of the Christian Democrat Party (DCG) to power. It has been argued that, with the DCG's connections to powerful sister parties in Europe and its patrons in Washington, Cerezo had the best chance of securing urgently needed foreign aid.³⁵ The Cerezo administration indeed began with strong internal and international support. Initially, Cerezo was successful at building consensus and increasing participation and pluralism in the government. The National Reorganization Programme was initiated in 1987 with the dual objective of introducing tax reforms to strengthen government finances and promoting economic growth through public investment. Various funds were established to promote development measures, such as purchasing and distributing lands and social investment. The limited success of these measures allowed the Guatemalan government to obtain further international support for its development plans. With time, however, party differences and divergent interests weakened Cerezo's political manoeuvring. Internally, the government and the private sector continued to clash over economic orientation and reform, and the economic sector refused to accept the concept of a social debt.

In reality, the much-vaunted democracy of the Cerezo administration appeared no more than a formal exercise. The power base of the military and the oligarchy remained intact, as Cerezo promised not to prosecute human rights abuses or to revoke special privileges. Moreover, human rights violations were not ended by this formal instalment of democracy. The military retained effective control of rural Guatemala. Thousands of highland indigenous peoples and *campesinos* were uprooted, fled to neighbouring countries or were resettled in the so-called model villages. The Cerezo administration was not able to deliver on its economic promises, and its powers decreased so that it could not implement a true reform programme. Both unemployment and inflation remained high, the economy continued to stagnate, and economic aid from the United States and European countries remained below expectations.³⁶ Moreover, at the end of the 1980s international pressure intensified for Guatemala to resolve its external debt crisis.³⁷ Cerezo responded to the crisis with an economic austerity programme. Structural adjustment measures were implemented in order to reduce the fiscal

34 S. Jonas (1998), *Democratization of Guatemala through the Peace Process*, p. 5, <http://www.jhu.edu/~soc-/ladark/guatconf/jonas.htm>.

35 B. Keen (1992), *A History of Latin America* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company), p. 447.

36 Keen, *A History of Latin America*, p. 448.

37 During the 1960s-1970s Guatemala maintained a period of relative growth, and the government began to take out loans to service the deficit. The drastic fall in international prices and rising gasoline prices in the late 1970s, however, gravely affected the current account of the balance of payments. These budgetary shortfalls and consequent foreign debt led to a crisis at the beginning of the 1980s. As the major international financial institutions had made protection of human rights a criterion of qualifying for a loan, the Guatemalan government was forced to borrow from private banks, thus paying higher interest rates and further aggravating the debt crisis.

deficit. These included large cuts in social spending and the dismissal of thousands of public employees, creating even higher levels of unemployment.³⁸

2.3.2 *The Negotiations for Peace: A Slow Start*

Despite the absence of more deep-seated reform, the 1986 transfer of power to a civilian president initiated the creation of conditions for a de-escalation of conflict. Cerezo's presidency helped build democratic institutions and began to seek international support for negotiations with the insurgency and addressed the problem of the war in Guatemala both nationally and internationally. Indeed, Cerezo hosted the first Central American Presidential Summit in 1985, which inspired the regional peace process, and increasingly brought in international pressure. Direct talks, however, were stalled as government and the military were not inclined to start talks before the guerrillas had laid down their arms. The stumbling block to any dialogue then appeared this precondition of the guerrillas disbanding. Whereas the government argued that the 'democratic transition' had inherently invalidated armed struggle, the guerrillas argued that the resolution of the conflict had to be based on negotiations about how to address its underlying causes.³⁹

It took almost two years, until 1987, for the first meetings to take place. These were a consequence of the Esquipulas II Accord. Although a regional governmental negotiating network for peace, much reference was made to domestic matters, such as national reconciliation, ceasefire, democratization and free elections. The most concrete result was the establishment of the National Reconciliation Commission (CNR), which started to function in September 1987 as a forum to guarantee the participation of Guatemalan civil society.⁴⁰ The CNR comprised representatives of various sectors from society: government, the Guatemalan Bishops' Conference (CEG), 'respected citizens' and political parties. During this *indirect* phase of peace negotiations,⁴¹ exploratory meetings between the CNR and the URNG were held to set out the framework for subsequent negotiation. Furthermore, the CNR facilitated the first ever meeting between the URNG and state representatives in Madrid, in October 1987. Internal opposition to negotiations, however, remained staunch, and in particular the private sector, certain political parties and the armed forces were divided.

Through the CNR, however, various sectors continued to seek dialogue by stating that peace must be linked to resolution of the country's social and economic problems. In February 1989 a National Dialogue was started that included participation from broad social sectors. Although boycotted by the country's key economic power bodies (in particular the conservative (agricultural) associations CACIF and UNAGRO), more than 80 organizations participated. Although no progress was made in negotiations between the government and the URNG, the Dialogue did facilitate a series of social agreements, which illustrated a broad consensus on the country's essential problems and established

38 These measures, however, were not accompanied by public finance reform. Since 1954, the political class in Guatemala has been intricately tied to the economic elite, which has pushed for more indirect taxes rather than increased direct taxes. Because revenues remained low, government had to resort to internal and foreign debt and cut spending on health, education, and public investment.

39 P. Ardón (1999), *Post-War Reconstruction in Central America: Lessons from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua*, Oxfam Working Paper (Oxford: Oxfam GB), p. 37.

40 In 1993, the CNR was replaced by COPAZ.

41 D. Azpuru (1999), 'Peace and Democratization in Guatemala: Two Parallel Processes', in C. Arnson (ed.), *Comparative Peace Processes in Latin America* (Washington DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press), p. 104.

the framework for subsequent stages in the process. Yet polarization prevailed as ideological differences existed between ‘those who were hostile to, and those who sympathized with, the URNG’.⁴² In this regard, civil society came to play an intermediary role as the level of distrust and polarization between the two opposing sides remained.⁴³

At the same time, international pressure increased with the fading of international Cold War ideology, the economic global setback, the international emphasis on human rights, and the major changes taking place in the Central American region. In February 1990 government backed a meeting in Oslo between the CNR and URNG, thus marking the start of preparations for *direct* dialogue and initiating a series of meetings and dialogues between the URNG and various sectors of society. Although these meetings failed to produce concrete agreements, they did mark the beginning of a consensus around peace and democracy. Parties disagreed on whether there was a need for structural transformation, but all recognized the need for institutional and constitutional changes, respect for human rights, a participatory form of democracy, and a direct dialogue between the URNG, the government and the military.⁴⁴

The key to the establishment of a negotiating environment became the distinction between substantive issues for negotiation and the operational aspects. Whereas the URNG insisted on reaching an agreement on fundamental points before discussing issues such as a ceasefire and demobilization, the military reiterated its view that the government should only enter into dialogue with the URNG if the URNG first disarmed. No further progress was reached, and instead the incidence of kidnappings, disappearances and politically motivated killings started to rise again and continued during the electoral campaigns of 1990. This was most clearly expressed in the massacre of *campesinos* in Santiago Atitlán.

In a run-off election in January 1991,⁴⁵ the Serrano administration installed a Cabinet that was filled with members of the powerful private sector, who felt that social problems would be alleviated indirectly through reduced inflation and a favourable investment climate and therefore did not require direct investment. In part to stem international criticisms of human rights violations, the Serrano administration made efforts to give the appearance of establishing civilian control over the army. Serrano also understood that taking initiatives to negotiate with the URNG was one of his few hopes of establishing legitimacy for his government. The first months of the Serrano administration, then, were marked by a constant ‘stretching and shrinking’ of statements by both sides for negotiations,⁴⁶ as

42 Ardón, *Post-War Reconstruction in Central America*, p. 39.

43 Ardón, *Post-War Reconstruction in Central America*, p. 38

44 Ardón, *Post-War Reconstruction in Central America*, p. 39.

45 Although the 1991 elections saw the first peaceful transfer of power from one civilian government to another since 1951, it was hardly a full-fledged democratic transition. The basic weakness of the counter-insurgency state - its lack of a broad social base and the army’s coercive relation to civil society - continued under civilian rule (Jonas, *Democratization of Guatemala through the Peace Process*, p. 34). As the elections appeared meaningless to the country’s real problems, they have been referred to as ‘electoral apartheid’ in the light of high levels of abstention (Castañeda), ‘freedom to vote but not to choose’ making the electorate ‘half-way citizens’ (Torres Rivas, Rosada), and the consolidation of an ‘exclusionary democracy’ still lacking in basic political guarantees (NDI) (all in Jonas, *Democratization of Guatemala through the Peace Process*).

46 Ardón, *Post-War Reconstruction in Central America*, p. 39.

each side in turn hardened and softened its position. Significantly, however, the positions of the parties increasingly became dependent on the level of national and international support.

An agreement was finally reached on a first direct meeting of the URNG with the government and the army. This was to take place under the moderatorship of Monsignor Quezada Toruño and the observation of the UN and the OAS. The April 1991 encounter in Mexico City was significant in that it set out the negotiation agenda, which dealt with all the substantive issues that had arisen out of the process of National Dialogue in 1989: democratization and human rights; strengthening civil power and defining the role of the military within a democratic society; the identity and rights of indigenous people; constitutional reform and the electoral system; socio-economic aspects; the agrarian situation; resettlement of refugees; and the war-related matters of a ceasefire, demobilization and reincorporation of the guerrilla groups into the political life of the country. Further progress, however, was slow, although some (formal) advance was made in the democratization process as the document recognized the pre-eminence of civil society and accepted that the armed forces should be subject to civil authority.

The question of human rights, however, hardened the position of the army, and serious differences stalled the process. The rise in incidence of human rights violations led to growing international support for the position of the URNG, which in turn hardened the government line that placed emphasis on military issues. Polarization grew and an increasing number of social organizations demanded to be included in the negotiation process.

The dynamics that had been generated by the negotiations further led to an increase in popular demands, in particular against the background of worsening socio-economic conditions. The government nevertheless held on to a peace plan that called for a ceasefire *before* agreement on substantive issues. Negotiations, then, had virtually broken down by May 1993 and the army began a military offensive. At the same time, Serrano's administration had become weakened by the lack of a majority in Congress and the inability to establish a governing coalition. Without organized parties, a coherent programme, or control of Congress, Serrano came to rely heavily on the armed forces and in particular the intelligence service. By mid-term, then, he met declining popularity, rising criticism and opposition. Following widespread accusations of corruption in Congress and the Supreme Court, Serrano closed these institutions and suspended constitutional rule.

He met staunch opposition, however, to this manoeuvre from politicians and civil society. Opposition within Guatemala, which included large elements of the business sector, was backed up by strong international condemnation that convinced the military not to support the *autogolpe* (self *coup*). Serrano was removed from the presidency and the Constitutional Court named De León Carpio, Human Rights Ombudsman at the time, as the new President.

2.3.3 A New Impetus to Direct Negotiations

With widespread popular support and high expectations, De León Carpio was installed as President on 6 June 1993. To the surprise of many, peace discussions did not appear to be the new government's first priority, which instead focused on issues concerning the modernization and restructuring of the state apparatus, the democratization of political parties and other substantive issues. Two subsequent proposals by the government to resume the peace process were, however, widely rejected, as they were considered to wipe out the achievements of the three previous years of negotiations, did not recognize all parties in the process, and changed the role of the conciliator. The URNG took the view

that it was not treated as a negotiating partner, as the government thought that the URNG's role in previous negotiations had been 'over-dimensioned'.⁴⁷ Key to the critique - from the URNG, civil society organizations, international community and increasingly also some government officials - was the attempt to separate the substantive issues from operational matters. In this way, the causes of the conflict became separated from the peace process and reduced 'peace' to no more than a ceasefire.

Against the background of growing international pressure for peace, a new impetus for the peace negotiations was given in late 1993. Although the government, army and the private sector were not inclined to participate, the Lutheran World Federation and the World Council of Churches organized a series of 'Ecumenical Conferences for Peace in Guatemala'. Furthermore, in a direct meeting between the URNG and the UN Secretary-General, the URNG stated its willingness to participate in a preliminary meeting to be convened by the UN to establish the framework for negotiation. Both the Guatemalan government and the URNG agreed to meet, and in January 1994 signed the *Framework Accord for the Resumption of the Negotiation Process*. All items outlined in the previous agenda agreements of 1991 were now included. Some other significant changes were also made: a UN mediator would be appointed, and to ensure participation by all non-government sectors, a Civil Society Assembly (ASC) was set up that would discuss the substantive issues and make recommendations. Furthermore, the governments of Colombia, Mexico, Norway, Spain, the US, and Venezuela were asked to form a Group of Friends of the peace process, in order to support the UN's role and strengthen the commitments undertaken by the parties to the conflict, acting as 'witnesses of honour' to the accords that had been reached.⁴⁸

The *Accord on the Timetable of Negotiations for a Firm and Lasting Peace in Guatemala* offered a framework for the ASC to put forward proposals, hence offering civil society a way of making their views known to both parties. De León Carpio furthermore made explicit efforts to include the military and the private sector in the negotiations. Within the military, a realization grew that a negotiated settlement was the best way to end the conflict, and the military undertook the task of spreading consciousness among its members that peace was near and that this would imply fundamental changes in the institution.

In March 1994 the *Accord on Human Rights* could finally be signed, coming into immediate effect and with the UN Verification Mission (MINUGUA) in charge of verification. This Human Rights Accord established 'the government's responsibility for ensuring full respect for human rights, challenging impunity for the offences committed, offering guarantees for civil protection, dismantling clandestine or illegal structures, and ensuring freedom of association and movement. The government also agreed to offer special support to the victims of human-rights violations, and to strengthen human-rights organization.'⁴⁹ In the following months, the parties signed the *Accord on the Resettlement of Populations Displaced by the Armed Conflict* (17 June 1994) and the *Accord on Establishing a Commission for the Historic Clarification of Human Rights Violations and Acts of Violence that had caused Suffering to the Guatemalan Population* (23 June 1994). The Resettlement Accord set out the framework for reintegration into society of those who fled the country or were internally displaced as a result of the war. The agreement on a Clarification Commission provided for the establishment of a three-body organ under the aegis of the UN to investigate violations over the

47 Hauge, 'Annexe 3', p. 52.

48 Ardón, *Post-War Reconstruction in Central America*, p. 43.

49 Ardón, *Post-War Reconstruction in Central America*, p. 44.

years of armed conflict, providing for the identification of responsible institutions but not the prosecution of individuals. Both agreements would be set into motion after the signing of the Final Accord.

The terms for the Clarification Commission caused considerable discontent among human rights organizations. Moreover, the Agreement on Human Rights that should have gone into immediate effect in March 1994 with the instalment of an international verification mission was delayed, despite the fact that grave violations persisted. This produced a backlash in Guatemala. Pressure on the URNG to take a less conciliatory line in the talks also increased. The URNG reacted by stepping up military activities, and declared that they would not return to the table until the UN took concrete steps to verify compliance with the Accord on Human Rights. In September 1994 the UN Verification Mission was deployed to Guatemala.⁵⁰

Negotiations resumed shortly after the deployment of MINUGUA, but the complexity of issues involved in the *identity and rights of the indigenous people* led to an Agreement only in March 1995. Although indigenous peoples' representatives in the ASC had reservations about the content and in particular the process through which it was negotiated, it was agreed that it constituted an historic breakthrough for Guatemala's Maya, Garífuna and Xinca peoples. Provisions for constitutional, legislative, policy and organizational reforms were included to end discrimination and guarantee indigenous peoples the capacity to exercise their cultural, civil, political, economic and social rights. The government and indigenous peoples' representatives would compose commissions to guide reforms to the educational system, to other agencies of the state, including the judiciary, and to land tenure arrangements.

The peace process was affected further by the dynamics of the campaign for the November 1995 elections. The URNG issued an unprecedented call urging people to vote, which was interpreted as signalling an implicit shift towards political means of struggle. Moreover, for the first time in 40 years a left-of-centre front of popular and indigenous organizations - the New Guatemala Democratic Front (FDNG) - was formed to participate in the elections. A second round of elections in 1996 brought a marginal victory to Alvaro Arzú of the National Action Party (PAN), with the strong support of the business sector but relatively distant from the military. The change of government signified an alteration in the strategy and orientation of prior negotiations. Efforts were geared towards the conclusion of the civil war in the same year, a goal that was pursued through a strategy of broadening the political spaces available to the insurgency in response to the political consensus that had been reached.⁵¹ In addition, its political reinsertion was stimulated. In March 1996 the URNG announced that it was temporarily suspending offensive military operations. In response, Arzú instructed the army to cease counter-insurgency operation. Moreover, the appointment of prominent business leaders to key government posts, '...finally [secured] private sector commitment to the peace process'.⁵² The May 1996 *Socio-economic and Agrarian Accord* clearly reflected the new government's neo-liberal position.

The *Accord on the Strengthening of Civil Power and the Role of the Army within a Democratic Society* was signed in September 1996, thereby concluding negotiations on the substantive issues.

50 See also chapter 3.

51 Even before taking office, Arzú had already held several direct, secret meetings with the URNG.

52 J. Armon, R. Sieder and R. Wilson (1997), *Negotiating Rights: The Guatemalan Peace Process*, Accord issue 2, p. 7.

The Accord, which requires far-reaching constitutional reforms, would limit the functions of the army to defence of the borders and of Guatemala's territorial integrity. The Accord also eliminated the civil self-defence patrols (PACs) and other counter-insurgency security units, reduced the size and budget of the army by one-third, and created a new civilian police force. Finally, it mandated necessary reforms of the judicial system. Yet before the operational items on the remaining agenda could be finalized, the peace process was shaken by a kidnapping incident implicating a senior field commander of the guerrilla faction ORPA. In a series of separate meetings between the UN moderator and the parties, the URNG publicly took responsibility for the incident and undertook some confidence-building measures that enabled the negotiations to resume.⁵³

In December 1996 a rapid round of negotiations on the operational issues followed, leading to the signing of the *Accord on the Definitive Ceasefire*; the *Accord on Constitutional and Electoral Reforms*; the *Accord on Legalising the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity*; and finally the *Accord on the Timetable for Implementing, Fulfilling, and Verifying the Peace Accords*. On 29 December 1996, then, the *Accord on a Firm and Lasting Peace* was finalized. For its part, the Arzú administration built support for the negotiations among all political parties, which signed an agreement recognizing the peace accords as state agreements, which meant that the different parties assumed responsibility for helping the executive branch comply with the commitments contained in the accords.

2.4 Change and Continuity: Post-conflict Fragility

The opening for the Guatemalan peace process can in retrospect be described as a 'slow process towards maturity, during which a consensus among a fragile coalition of interest groups was gradually built around the idea that peace did not mean solely the end of hostilities but could be achieved only by addressing the major problems in the country that had given rise to the armed conflict in the first place.'⁵⁴ Even though the army had tactically and temporarily defeated the guerrillas in the early 1980s, it was discredited after years of fraudulent rule. The economic crisis had further alienated sectors of the economic elite, and the government needed international legitimacy in order to obtain foreign aid. Elections and a more open political environment were seen as necessary to regain private-sector confidence and to reactivate the economy. Furthermore, it was argued that a civilian government might re-establish stability and limit social protest, hence addressing the political crisis. The return to constitutionality in 1986 was thus a strategic move to legitimize the state, to delegitimize the armed struggle, and to reverse the weakening of the military caused by its counter-insurgency campaigns and government management. The new political path permitted the army to recover unity and confidence, at the same time taking credit for returning the country to civilian rule.⁵⁵

53 UN (1998), *The Guatemala Peace Agreements* (New York: United Nations), p. 6.

54 T. Whitfield (1999), 'The Role of the United Nations in El Salvador and Guatemala: A Preliminary Comparison', in C. Arnson (ed.), *Comparative Peace Processes in Latin America* (Washington DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press), p. 269.

55 Jonas, S. (1995), 'Electoral Problems and the Democratic Project in Guatemala', in J. Booth and M. Seligson (eds), *Elections and Democracy in Central America, Revisited* (Chapel Hill and London: University of North Carolina Press), pp. 25-44.

Another important breaking point came with Serrano's independent *coup* of 29 May 1993. The decision of the military not to support this measure was important in that it changed the complicated power balance of the country's civil-military relations.⁵⁶ Whereas popular mobilization against the *coup* articulated a force of change, and demonstrated the ability and willingness to defend democratic values, reform would not have been brought about without divisions within the elite and military. Segments of the economic elite voiced public opposition to Serrano's authoritarian actions, as they feared losing their trading status accorded by the General System of Preferences (GSP), the suspension of economic assistance and sanctions with the World Bank and IMF. Hence, fearful of the consequences of economic sanctions, Guatemala's industrial export elite joined one of the emerging multi-class opposition coalitions.

Despite the repressive, polarized and violent nature of the conflict, then, Guatemala has managed to attain peace by means of negotiation and reconciliation, at the same time strengthening the process of democratization. Numerous actors participated in these processes, including the consecutive governments, the armed forces, the insurgent movement, civil society organizations and the international community. A large variety of social sectors are now experiencing a process of organizational development under conditions that are completely different from those of the past, when ideological differences dominated all social relations. The indigenous peoples, for example, today have a more unified, stronger presence in Guatemalan political life and civil society. Although the Accord on Indigenous Rights is imperfect in various respects, it is a significant effort to incorporate Guatemala's majority indigenous population into the national political system while still respecting their rights to a distinct culture and its accompanying traditions, values, languages and religious customs.

Because of the comprehensive nature of the issues that were included in the peace negotiations, the political agenda in Guatemala after 1996 is largely determined by the Peace Accords. Yet progress on all items of the Peace Accord is slow and post-conflict peace remains fragile. Contemporary Guatemala remains a highly polarized society, and the traditionally powerful sectors do not facilitate easily viable and effective spaces for participation. Although the democratic transition has put an end to formal coalitions being formed to attain power, the party system remains splintered, with new factions appearing regularly. The number of parties has increased exponentially since the signing of the Peace Accords, but few parties have a broad social base. The old parties remain cut off from the populace, representing traditional elite interests. Meanwhile, the new parties that have surged out of the URNG have broad popular support but still need to establish links with other sectors, particularly the urban middle class, the key to the electoral system. The Guatemalan political system reveals a fragmented opposition, and under the Arzú administration (1996-2000), exclusionary modes of operation seemed to be consolidating as well as a subordination to the neo-liberal economic agenda. The prevailing strength of the economic elite in contemporary Guatemala is demonstrated by the continued existence of one of the most highly concentrated land tenure systems in Latin America as well as by repeated failures at tax reform. The resulting lack of permanent state economic resources further endangers the state's ability to implement many of the Accords or to have social policies that

56 This, however, did not mean a loss of more indirect influence upon national politics (Kruijt, *Guatemala's 'Military Projects'*). Military autonomy, supported by its institutional stability, has made the military into the new guardian of civilian security, law and order, strengthening or even substituting the newly formed police forces in the cities and provincial administrative centres.

are oriented towards the alleviation of poverty. Moreover, many elements of the Peace Accords require constitutional reforms, an issue that runs into increasing opposition. Post-conflict reconstruction, thus, has obtained a clear political dimension.

'Peace', moreover, has not led to the end of violence. Crime rates have increased drastically, and at the urban level only Medellín and Cali in Colombia have higher homicide rates than Guatemala City in Latin America.⁵⁷ In urban areas the rise of youth gangs has contributed to the rise of this crime, whereas in the rural areas a primary source of violence and insecurity is disputes over land. Of great concern in this regard is the observation that the post-conflict state institutions have proven incapable of ensuring security and justice. Weak institutions, a continuous climate of violence, and the possibility of a power vacuum on security matters has made the internal security setting of key concern to the Guatemalan population, and has increased the call for a strong candidate to restore law and order. Tensions emerging from the violent conflict have not been addressed sufficiently, and violence - although more often socio-criminal than political - remains endemic. Contributing to the prevailing violence is impunity. Revenge has taken the place of justice through the courts and various sectors in Guatemala continue to operate beyond and above the reach of law. Violence therefore remains a choice way to resolve conflict as can be seen by the extrajudicial killings and political assassinations that continue to occur in the country, and of which the still-unresolved murder of Bishop Gerardi in 1998, shortly after the presentation of the REMHI report on human rights violations (a report entitled *Recuperación de la Memoria Histórica*), is exemplary.

With the Peace Accords, a start has been made to reform the military and police system. The task of the military was reformulated towards external defence, but as the rebuilding and training of a civil police force led to a security vacuum in the light of increasing criminality, police tasks have in the short term partly been taken up by the army. Rampant and rising crime, then, has threatened and overwhelmed the capacity of nascent civilian police forces and has generated public support for hardline elements resisting the reform process.⁵⁸ Various other institutions have also taken positions in this vacuum, such as private security firms. Personnel have been recruited from the army and police, and probably include former members of the paramilitary as well. Hence, although constitutional power was established gradually over the military as a part of the peace process, their control over the civilian police, their representation of the public sector in the rural regions, and their de facto legal impunity guarantees a kind of co-governance.⁵⁹ In this regard, 'Guatemala's demilitarization is in fact a reaccommodation of civilian-military power. The new (civilian) security functions of the army, the absence of national post-war development plans and the perseverance of the same social inequalities and tensions as in the 1960s and 1970s, result in the continued necessity of the same military apparatus, justified by new missions and old structures.'⁶⁰

Much of the country remains non-integrated into the national system, due not only to the absence of an overarching force to unite people on a national level, but also to a lack of government services and infrastructure, not to mention the self-exclusion of large parts of the indigenous population in significant regions of the country. Society, moreover, has been largely distrustful of the formal

57 According to a 1999 IDB study (<http://worldpolicy.org/americas/guatemala/maps-guate.html>).

58 G. Vickers (1999), 'Renegotiating Internal Security: The Lessons of Central America', in C. Arnson (ed.), *Comparative Peace Processes in Latin America* (Washington DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press), p. 399.

59 Kruijt, *Guatemala's 'Military Projects'*.

60 Kruijt, *Guatemala's 'Military Projects'*.

political process. Levels of abstention during elections are extremely high, and large parts of the population are not registered in electoral records. Rates of political participation are the lowest in Latin America, with an average voter turnout of only 29.6 per cent during the 1990s.⁶¹

Distrust of official structures remains high as well as a general feeling of insecurity in the countryside. The state of institutionalized terror that excelled in the 1970s and 1980s has left deep wounds, as the cost of the Guatemalan conflict in terms of human suffering has been high. Thousands of union leaders, university faculty and student leaders, church workers and peasant leaders were tortured, disappeared or assassinated. Moreover, the indigenous population has been severely affected as they became a prime suspect for the military. Yet although it is customary to refer to some 35 years of violent conflict in Guatemala, armed combat was in fact sporadic throughout certain periods and only affected particular regions. Moreover, violence and repression were targeted at specific groups that were accused of cooperating with the guerrillas. The Guatemalan conflict, then, was not a conflict of a whole nation, as many people were for the most part of the conflict neither involved nor touched in their daily lives by the conflict. Others, on the other hand, were targeted indiscriminately, which convicted them to a life of physical insecurity and bare living conditions. Moreover, at the local level many *ladinos* used the power structure to settle scores that had less to do with ideology and Cold War justifications, and more to do with the protection of the elite's traditional political and economic interests.⁶² The social cost of the conflict has thus strongly affected the existing inequalities, levels of distrust and feelings of divisiveness.

In post-conflict Guatemala much emphasis is placed on multiculturalism. In a way, however, this strengthening of indigenous identity and organization has also led to a rise in distrust based on ethnicity. As observed by Plant,⁶³ it is not the right for participation of the indigenous movement, albeit through representative indigenous institutions, in national society that is the issue of concern. Rather, it is the striving for a special and sometimes separate status, indigenous autonomy and self-management that is controversial. This mainly involves customary law and the concept of parallel structures with rights and status determined on the basis of ethnicity (ILO Convention 169) that causes strong opposition from non-indigenous sectors. The special 'status' of the indigenous population in the Peace Accords and within the international community's agenda has led to a fear of an 'indigenous takeover' and 'another Yugoslavia' for large parts of the *ladino* population. As is demonstrated by the negative vote in the popular referendum (*Consulta Popular*) on constitutional reforms in May 1999, this fear can easily be manipulated. The *Consulta Popular* furthermore proved that it is no easy task to get the entire complex of constitutional reforms and new laws (as was laid down in the Peace Accords) through the Guatemalan Congress. These were amended to such an extent that the whole package - in combination with a disinformation campaign - led to the rejection of the reforms in the referendum.

With the end of the time-frame for implementation of the Accords at hand, but short of structural reform and noticeable short-term benefits, concern is rising. Both in the army and the private sector there is resistance to the full implementation of the Accords. In particular with regard to the socio-

61 UNDP (1998), *Guatemala: Los Contrastes del Desarrollo Humano* (Guatemala: UNDP), p. 227.

62 T. Lent (1996), 'The Search for Peace and Justice in Guatemala: NGOs, Early Warning, and Preventive Diplomacy', in R. Rothberg (ed.), *Vigilance and Vengeance: NGOs Preventing Ethnic Conflict in Divided Societies* (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press), p. 80.

63 R. Plant (1999), 'Indigenous Identity and Rights in the Guatemalan Peace Process', in C. Arnson (ed.), *Comparative Peace Processes in Latin America* (Washington DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press), p. 320.

economic issues and the agrarian situation, no strategic long-term developmental vision exists. The complexity is enormous when one considers the divergent interests of, for example, landless *campesinos*, tenant farmers and elite landowners. As a consequence, however, low-level and local conflict is increasing and likely to continue. *Campesino* land invasions, strikes and clashes between smallholders and armed agents of wealthy landowners are growing. Many citizens are confronted with the explosive situation of the land tenure system, and as personal short-term benefits fail to materialize, distrust of government increases, leading to a further loss of interest in the overall transition process. Dissatisfaction became apparent with the November-December 1999 electoral vote in favour of the conservative Guatemalan Republican Front party (FRG). Its foreman, former President Ríos Montt, has gained widespread support as he is viewed by many as the strongman able to reinstall stability and internal security. Moreover, the FRG victory can be valued as a vote against the sitting PAN government, despite its earlier success in concluding the peace negotiations and widespread international support.

3 Conflict-related Interventions: Some International and Central American Aspects⁶⁴

Whereas the Peace Accord between the insurgent movement and the Guatemalan government of 29 December 1996 placed Guatemala on the international agenda, the international powers had remained partisan or indifferent for much of the 36-year conflict. US dominance in the region was, at the economic as well as the political and military level, omnipresent. A first break in this tradition came with a regional effort to de-escalate the conflict and to stop the potential geographical spreading of war. The process leading to the signing of the Guatemalan Peace Accord in 1996 was thus part of a larger undertaking to reverse a decades-long cycle of conflict in the Central American region at large (paragraph 3.1.). A second turning point came with the 1986 return to civil government. International attitudes changed and marked a shift towards support for the democratization process. Yet only with the ending of the Cold War did the regional peace initiatives provide a blueprint for peace (paragraph 3.2.). The 1996 signing of the Peace Accord meant a third significant turning point as post-conflict reconstruction and international aid started to boom (paragraph 3.3.).

3.1 From US Dominance to Diversification of Involvement

3.1.1 *US Dominance: From Support to Criticism*

Guatemala was the first country in the region to experience counter-insurgency strategies in the light of the Cold War ideological setting. An explicit alliance was formed between the US government and the most conservative sectors of Guatemalan society in order to defend against the perceived communist threat. Mainly as a reaction to the direct threat of nationalization of US-owned companies under the reform-minded Arbenz administration, the United States' involvement as of 1954 represented a full integration of US military, political, and economic objectives. The 1950s and in particular the 1960s were characterized by active US supplying, tactical training, and ideological formation of Guatemalan armed forces along anti-communist lines of the National Security Doctrine. USAID became an important actor on Guatemala's political and economic scene. The strategy included a combined modernization of the economy and a strengthening of the state. Programmes were oriented at promoting non-traditional products (cotton, sugar, meat) and the development of the

64 Much of this chapter is based on information retrieved during a field trip to Guatemala in May 1999.

Central American Communal Market, with the aim of increasing better access to the international market.

As the internal dynamics of the conflict further consolidated militarization of the state and society, and the National Security Doctrine gained a dynamic of its own, leading to uncontrolled levels of indiscriminate repression, the United States - at least overtly - took on a more critical position. Within the framework of the Alliance for Progress, attention shifted in the 1970s towards *minifundistas* of the high plateau and public assistance projects, as the United States sought to mitigate the violent conflict with reforms that reduced the insurgency's social base. Guatemala's local political and economic elite at the time, however, identified fully with the militaristic counter-insurgency thesis adopted by the government. After 1977 Guatemala lost all military aid from the United States following Carter's decision to condition military aid on a country's human rights record. Indeed, Guatemala did not even go so far as to request aid and suffer the international embarrassment of a refusal. President Laugerud took a preventive strike and refused aid, indicating that the US position did not square with Guatemala's own National Security Doctrine.⁶⁵ By the end of the 1970s these differences had translated into a virtual US divorce from Guatemalan business. In the early 1980s differences between the two countries deepened after a USAID study that questioned the landholding structure and proposed alternative redistribution mechanisms via the market, a proposal that ran into staunch opposition from the large landowners. Economic aid, although never eliminated completely, dropped considerably during the 1970s.

3.1.2 *The Regional Security Setting and Regional Peace Initiatives*

The Guatemalan conflict has been influenced by the regional security setting at various levels. Since the beginning of the counter-revolution in 1954, the political and armed conflict in Guatemala often created tensions with the country's neighbours. These include Honduran cooperation with the overthrow of Arbenz, border tensions between Guatemala and Mexico as a consequence of massive *campesino* migration at the end of the 1960s, and border tensions with Belize in the 1970s. Furthermore, the expansion of the guerrilla war in El Salvador and the civil war that led to the fall of Somoza in Nicaragua were also felt in Guatemala. The fear of the domino effect of communism led to an unprecedented campaign of terror in Guatemala and the 1979 Sandinista victory in Nicaragua coincided with the Guatemalan election of the repressive Lucas García administration. Increasingly, then, the concern rose that armed intervention in Central America would be prolonged and would further escalate the conflict. This instability could well spill over into neighbouring countries.

At the height of the Central American conflicts, regional efforts at de-escalating the regional security context proved crucial in offering a breaking point in the conflict cycle. In 1983 the governments of Colombia, Mexico, Panama, and Venezuela undertook a peace initiative (Contadora) that was followed by consultations among the Presidents of Costa Rica, El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua and Guatemala (Esquipulas I and II). By this time Guatemala had found itself in a position of international isolation. Eager to increase Guatemala's external legitimacy among Latin American nations, the Ríos Montt administration that came to power in 1982 distanced itself from US policy in

65 As a consequence of this suspension of US military aid, the Guatemalan government increased the flow of public resources to the military campaign. This included a reconceptualization of the military, now focusing on infantry and the creation of civil defence forces (PACs).

Central America. An unexpected consequence of the neutral position was that the US Congress agreed to lift sanctions against Guatemala. Guatemalan support for the Contadora process also helped normalize relations, in particular with Mexico.

3.1.3 Expanding International Third-Party Interest

Whereas US dominance in the region had led to limited political influence by other - national/bilateral as well as international/multilateral - actors, some (economic) developmental projects were carried out. Besides USAID, the World Bank and the IDB for example gave out loans for infrastructure and modernization of the economy. An earthquake in February 1976 also mobilized considerable resources from international donors.

The worsening human rights situation under the Lucas García administration (1978-1982) led many donors to take a more critical stance, and justified aid cut-offs by the United States, Canada and the European Community (EC). The resurgence of war with the guerrillas, the uncontrollable violence of paramilitary groups, and the indiscriminate repression had worsened the internal security setting and convinced many international companies, diplomatic missions and NGOs to close their offices in Guatemala. Yet many NGOs remained active in bringing international attention to the incidents of violence, and reports by Amnesty International and Americas Watch, for example, exposed violations of human rights throughout Guatemala. This stimulated public awareness and pressure on national governments to react. Human rights violations increasingly came to determine the bilateral and international stance towards the Guatemalan government. In 1979 Guatemala was placed on the human rights agenda of the UN General Assembly. A Special Rapporteur on Human Rights Violations followed in 1983-1985.⁶⁶

Renewed international attention for the regional wars, in particular Nicaragua and El Salvador, led to a growing dual interest in strengthening the ties between Europe and Central America. This was the result of the Central American wish to ‘...wrest itself from the predominating influence of that superpower [the United States], with which they had a love-hate relationship’.⁶⁷ The EC, for its part, was concerned about the regional implications of the Central American conflict. It feared that the United States could become entangled militarily in the conflict, which would have negative implications for the wider East-West relations.⁶⁸ In contrast to the US position ‘the European Community viewed the roots of the conflict as the inability to reform an economic and social structure dominated by a very conservative oligarchy, in countries where blatant inequalities in wealth and income existed. (...) Another source of the conflict, in the European view, was the lack of democracy and the disregard for human rights.’⁶⁹ The idea of interregional dialogue between the Central American countries and the European Community began to take shape. At the political and diplomatic plane, the relationship was tightened by the establishment of the San José Dialogue. Starting in 1984,

66 K. Tomaševski (1997), *Between Sanctions and Elections: Aid Donors and their Human Rights Performance* (London: Wellington House), p. 160.

67 Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Midden-Amerika Regiobeleidsplan 1992-1995*.

68 G. Henze (1999), ‘Reflections’, in C. Arnsperg (ed.), *Comparative Peace Processes in Latin America* (Washington DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press), p. 444. For a discussion on European interest in Central America, see also A. Pierre (ed.) (1985) *Third World Instability; Central America as a European-American Issue*, New York: Council on Foreign Relations.

69 Henze, ‘Reflections’, p. 444.

the Dialogue consisted of an annually held political forum at the ministerial level for political and economic consultations between the EC (later EU), the European Commission, and the Central American countries.

The regional peace initiatives brought about further external political and diplomatic manoeuvring. At the height of the Central American conflicts, the UN had no history of involvement in the region.⁷⁰ Only in May 1983 did the Security Council make a first, although mild, reference to the Central American conflicts and commended the efforts of the Contadora Group to bring peace to the region. Contadora, in this regard, filled a vacuum that had been created by US resistance to actions by either the UN or the OAS as well as by reluctance of the Guatemalan government to accept UN involvement in its 'internal affairs'. In 1987, with the Esquipulas II Agreement, both the UN General Assembly and the Security Council lent full support to further missions of good offices by the Secretary-General. Through these missions of good offices the United Nations was able 'to do what others engaged in diplomatic efforts to resolve the Central American conflicts had so far refused to contemplate: work towards including the insurgencies within a process of dialogue and negotiation'.⁷¹ As internal negotiations within several of these countries continued in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the UN was moreover called on to establish several mechanisms for observing and verifying commitments.⁷²

3.2 Democratization and Negotiation: New Areas of Intervention

Throughout the decade from 1986 to 1996, the processes of democratization and peace negotiations mutually influenced and reinforced each other. These parallel processes were in line with shifting international foreign policy concerns at the end of the Cold War. In the light of the overall Central American peace negotiations, and more specifically with the election of the Guatemalan Christian Democratic Party and its civil presidential candidate Vinicio Cerezo Arévalo to power, international attitudes began to change in favour of a greater involvement in the Guatemalan transition process. The EC increased its aid package of USD 5 million (channelled through NGOs) to USD 13 million in 1986.⁷³ US economic aid also exploded exponentially in 1985 in support of the democratization process. As a reflection of a changed consensus in the international and inter-American communities, the United Nations and the Organization of American States were increasingly prepared to play a more active role in peace-making and peace-keeping in the hemisphere.⁷⁴ European donor governments also demonstrated an interest in supporting the democratic opening as well as in the possibilities of a resumption of development cooperation.

70 Whitfield attributes this to the fact that the US had made it clear 'they were the ones to address the problems within the bipolar context of the Cold War' (Whitfield, 'The Role of the United Nations in El Salvador and Guatemala', p. 260). Only the appointment of Pérez de Cuéllar in 1981 as the first Latin American UN Secretary-General helped to bring the region to the organization's attention.

71 Whitfield, 'The Role of the United Nations in El Salvador and Guatemala', p. 262.

72 These include the UN Observer Group in Central America, the UN Observer Mission to verify the electoral process in Nicaragua, the International Support and Verification Commission, the UN Observer Mission in El Salvador and the UN Mission in El Salvador.

73 Memo in Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs file Code 9/1985-1989/03895.

74 M. Chernick (1996), 'Peace-making and Violence in Latin America', in M. Brown (ed.), *The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press), p. 281.

3.2.1 *Human Rights and Democratization*

As long as armed confrontation continued, humanitarian aid to civilians in the conflict zones was channelled mainly through intermediary NGOs and church-based organizations. This included support to local communities, trade unions, refugees and displaced persons, and human rights groups. International NGO support also concentrated on ‘accompaniment’, *i.e.* direct physical accompaniment by agency staff or by third parties, and lobbying to legitimize the right of non-combatant civilians to receive humanitarian aid, irrespective of their political affinities.⁷⁵ Yet during much of the 1970s and 1980s ‘social promotion’, ‘community organization’, and ‘awareness raising’ were branded as subversive activities, a threat to the existing order, and resulted in violent responses by the government, landed elites and security forces at local and national levels.⁷⁶ Much of the aid was therefore provided without the Guatemalan government’s prior knowledge. A large part of this aid was directed towards emergency and distress relief to the people affected by the conflict within Guatemala, as well as to refugee groups that in the 1980s had fled to Mexico. As UNHCR had established an office in Mexico in 1982, it took the lead in assisting politically motivated refugees. However, NGOs also came to play a crucial role in this type of support, as many of the refugees fell outside the mandate of the UNHCR or did not register.

Emergency aid was also provided to the internally displaced people through the NGO channel. Uprooted by the conflict, large numbers of people and even whole villages were unable to support themselves. International humanitarian aid in this regard included medical care, food supply, shelter and education. A special group was the Communities of Peoples in Resistance (CPRs), which not only managed to attract considerable financial support but also political attention. Only slowly, when the opportunities for return and settlement increased, did this type of support become of a more traditional (rural) development nature, focusing on agriculture, productive activities and education. The main target groups, however, remained the returnees, the displaced persons, and the indigenous population.

With the return to civilian government and the democratic opening, the more traditional development cooperation to Guatemala was also resumed. Due to the nature of the socio-economic situation in Guatemala, this implied a focus on economic development and poverty reduction (rural and industrial development, the marginalized poor), social sector support (education, health), and programmes for regional development and integration. Guatemala now also qualified for macroeconomic support of the international financial institutions (IFIs). Most of these projects were carried out through international organizations, such as UNDP, World Bank, IDB, IFAD, and UNESCO.

The transfer to civil government furthermore set out a strong lobby before international forums to remove Guatemala from violations’ listings. This was most clearly demonstrated in the discussion on agenda items before the UN General Assembly concerning human rights. In particular the dichotomy between the Latin American countries and European countries in their approach to the Guatemalan human rights situation grew. The European wish for strong declarations met increased opposition. In 1986 Guatemala was transferred from the UN General Assembly violations agenda. The government then came to benefit from extensive international assistance in human rights education and training. Whereas the UN supported the government, local and international NGOs protested and claimed that

75 Ardón, *Post-War Reconstruction in Central America*, p. 50.

76 Lent, ‘The Search for Peace and Justice in Guatemala’, p. 77.

aid for military and police reform was inappropriate. Extrajudicial executions and disappearances continued. Indeed, neither the civilian government nor the UN assistance resulted in human rights protection and an independent expert was appointed on several occasions to combine the provision of assistance with reporting on violations.

Hence, although human rights concerns never disappeared, in the late 1980s and early 1990s the international political agenda turned towards the democracy dialogue. The *apertura democrática* reactivated popular movements, and as of 1986 a panoply of new organizations emerged, increasingly Mayan-led and independent of links to the rebels. With the exception of the United States, most national donors were hesitant to support the government directly. The major part of international aid, then, remained of a more *ad hoc* character, responding to the basic needs of the population affected by the conflict, and support to civil society building and participation. In particular the European donor community was inclined to support activities in these fields.

Significantly, the OAS for the first time also affirmed a commitment to democracy and called for immediate action in the event that constitutional rule was suspended in a member nation. This international commitment to democracy was most clearly tested by Serrano's 1993 *autogolpe*. The international reaction was clear and quick, as the US government, EU, international financial institutions and the OAS immediately condemned the actions. These reactions were emboldened as they reinforced rather than conflicted with the powerful domestic mobilization against the *autogolpe* - including the business opposition, civil society protests, and divisions in the military.⁷⁷ Serrano's *autogolpe*, then, is considered to be a key breaking point in the Guatemalan conflict and transition process, as it had the effect of strengthening democracy and the rule of law. The central strategy now decisively shifted towards political settlement of the conflict. International involvement and pressure had come to guarantee the central place of human rights and democracy in the peace process. When negotiations resumed in 1994, the international community came to play a key role in moderating and facilitating the talks, as well as in the process of monitoring, verifying and implementing of the Accords.

3.2.2 Support for the Peace Negotiations

The democratic opening and international support for popular participation further strengthened the path of negotiations and pluralism, as popular organizations demonstrably acted independently of the guerrillas. Civil organizations came to play a key role in the broadening of debate and the maturation of Guatemalan political society, and they benefited greatly from their links to international human rights groups and NGOs. As the internal peace movement in Guatemala was striving for fundamental changes in society and greater social and economic justice, they found great international support and joined in with the international development agenda. The National Reconciliation Commission (CNR) received support for its activities, as well as its later replacement, the Civil Society Assembly (ASC). The URNG was also financially supported, for example in its transformation towards a political party.

Support for the peace negotiations, however, mainly took the form of political and diplomatic support. In 1990 the Lutheran World Foundation (LWF) and the Catholic Church organized meetings between the CNR and URNG. As the LWF had followed developments in Guatemala closely for many

77 M. Cameron (1998), 'Latin American *Autogolpes*: Dangerous Undertows in the Third Wave of Democratization', in *Third World Quarterly*, 19(2), p. 233.

years, during a 1989 visit it received information that there was willingness to negotiate. The Norwegian Secretary-General of LWF then asked the Norwegian government⁷⁸ to host (*i.e.* finance and provide security for) these talks in March 1990. The presence of Norwegian Church Aid on the 'ground' in Guatemala, and the personal contacts with a variety of groups in Guatemalan society, made the idea feasible. The 1990 Basic Agreement on the Search for Peace through Political Means (The Oslo Accord) formed the basis for a series of meetings in 1990 and 1991 between various sectors of society.

Over the years, the Group of Friends (Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia, Spain, Norway and the United States) was able to increase its influence. These countries acted as a kind of consultative group for proposals from both the guerrillas and the government in connection with the negotiations, and exerted pressure on the parties when considered necessary. Norway, through its network and personal involvement of concerned individuals, as well as through its positive involvement at the beginning of the negotiations (the Oslo meeting), continued to play a role in the peace process. It established good contacts with all of the most important groups involved in the conflict, including the army (and, at a later stage, the landowners), thereby learning to what extent it could 'push' the various groups. It also pressured for MINUGUA deployment and was one of the countries that quickly provided financial support for the UNHCR, MINUGUA and UNDP.⁷⁹

Further consultations with the various parties and rounds of talk were hosted by a number of countries, including Peru and Canada, Mexico, Spain, Norway and Sweden.⁸⁰ Mexico in particular hosted a large number of talks, although it consistently pursued a policy of non-intervention in its relations with Guatemala. This was a result of Mexico's indirect involvement, as the URNG leadership was based in Mexico, as well as a large number of refugees in the province of Chiapas. This position thus kept the Mexican government from becoming a driving force behind the peace process. Spain was also unable to play a key role as it had broken off diplomatic relations after the 1980 incident at the Spanish embassy in Guatemala City.⁸¹ Because of its dubious role in Central America, the United States did not have credibility in society, although this gradually changed. The US role in the Group of Friends thus reflected a change in the administration in Washington, as well as a wider change in the international political climate. The regional domination of the United States and its unquestioned superpower status further made it an influential factor in the process and an important instrument of pressure on the Guatemalan elites.⁸²

78 Norwegian involvement in the Guatemalan peace process was driven by the Latin American Desk of the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and State Secretary Jan Egeland (from 1992). The top political leadership was relatively little involved, as the 'Ministry had to take into account traditional Norwegian foreign policy interests, which were not particularly directed towards Latin America' (Hauge, 'Annexe 3', p. 36). Efforts relating to Guatemala remained at a modest level in terms of both the people involved and the funds employed.

79 For a more extensive discussion of the Norwegian role in the Guatemalan peace process, see Hauge, 'Annexe 3'.

80 See annexe 4 for an overview of meetings and agreements.

81 In 1980, the Spanish embassy was occupied by a group of mainly peasant demonstrators. Although the occupation was of a non-violent nature, the Guatemalan police raided the embassy, employing violence and opening fire. As the building caught fire, approximately 20 people were killed, including an embassy employee.

82 Whitfield, 'The Role of the United Nations in El Salvador and Guatemala', p. 271.

UN involvement in the efforts to resolve the armed conflict in Guatemala dates back to 1990, when at the request of the CNR and URNG and with the support of the government of Guatemala the UN Secretary-General accepted the request to observe the activities and act as guarantor of compliance. The OAS was also accorded the status of observer at the talks. The UN, more than the OAS, was considered to be a neutral forum to dilute to some degree the hegemonic interest of the United States. Until 1994, however, little progress was made. The Guatemalan government remained reserved as regards international interference in its 'internal affairs'.⁸³ In general, the international community was convinced that the negotiation agenda was too ambitious, and the General Assembly and the EPS undertook several attempts to reduce the agenda to the items on which the parties could agree. Internal events as well as the impasse over human rights made the context for peace talks less favourable, and negotiations had completely stalled by the time of the constitutional crisis in May 1993.

When the deadlock continued under the new government, the LWF and World Council of Churches tried to give a new impetus by organizing a series of peace conferences. The resumption of talks under De León Carpio was only revived when the UN Secretary-General invited the URNG to come to New York and after weeks of discrete discussions between UN officials and the parties. This resulted in the signing of the Framework Agreement for Resumption of the Negotiation Process (January 1994). The UN was now assigned the role of sole moderator and primary verifier of all future accords. This was possible when '[t]he advantages of UN mediation of negotiations, rather than just their observation, gradually became evident as both parties came to realize that a purely bilateral process had its limitations and to suspect that the international prestige, impartiality, and resources that the United Nations brings would work to each of their advantages'.⁸⁴

3.2.3 *Deployment of a UN Verification Mission for Guatemala*

In September 1994 the UN General Assembly mandated the establishment of MINUGUA, the 'Mission for the Verification of Human Rights and of Compliance with the Commitments of the Comprehensive Agreement on Human Rights in Guatemala'. This decision authorized MINUGUA to verify compliance of the government and URNG with the Comprehensive Agreement. A Trust Fund was established for MINUGUA's activities. Aside from the shorter-term verification objective, the UN was mandated to propose medium- and longer-term plans to strengthen the key national (governmental and non-governmental) institutions involved in the protection of human rights. In this regard, a commission composed of MINUGUA, UNDP, and government officials was set up to encourage reforms to secondary legislation, improvements to the judicial system and increased awareness of issues of rule of law in civil society.

The objective of the on-site mission was to influence the conflict situation directly, first by making a decisive contribution to put an end to a persisting pattern of human rights abuses, and secondly by bolstering the peace process by promoting full compliance with the Human Rights Agreement. It would further strengthen the confidence of the parties and the Guatemalan people as a

83 Memorandum of November 1992 on the political developments in Central and South America and the Caribbean, in file ddi-dwh/ara/002297/regiobeleidplan Midden Amerika.

84 Whitfield, 'The Role of the United Nations in El Salvador and Guatemala', p. 270.

whole that agreement could be reached at the negotiating table, and consolidate the prospect for an early end to the conflict.⁸⁵

This mandate from the General Assembly, however, came with a six-month delay, as the signing of the Agreement on Human Rights should have led to an immediate UN deployment. Difficulties arose when the URNG and Guatemalan government could not agree on the scale of the mission. Furthermore, certain Latin American countries wanted to see the General Assembly, not the Security Council, authorize the mission, an idea that ran counter to the Permanent Five and the URNG.⁸⁶ Yet the main obstacle was that the international community had made the deployment conditional on further progress in the negotiations.⁸⁷ The idea of a multi-disciplinary monitoring mission to Guatemala was not regarded as opportune by - in particular - the United States as long as no comprehensive peace accord existed.⁸⁸ This produced staunch opposition in Guatemala, and although certain quarters were critical of the URNG threat to step up military action, this resulted in the mandate for deployment being obtained quickly.

A Trust Fund for MINUGUA was established, for which the United States and the Nordic countries (including the Netherlands) became the primary financiers. With the December 1996 signing of the Final Accord, all subsidiary agreements entered into force, which implied a restructuring and expansion of MINUGUA from human rights verification to verification of all commitments.⁸⁹ As the implementation of the Accords covers a period of four years (until the end of 2000), and responsibilities change, the General Assembly has regularly renewed MINUGUA's mandate.⁹⁰ Furthermore, the Security Council agreed to a military observer group, which from January to May 1997 was attached to MINUGUA to verify the implementation of the ceasefire agreement.

3.2.4 *International Donor Meetings: Development Aid as a Pressure Instrument*

Diplomatic and political manoeuvring was complemented by discussions on financial and technical assistance to the Guatemalan government and society. Consultative Group and Donor Meetings, however, had made it clear that this would depend on progress in the peace negotiations.

In 1989 and 1992 informal Consultative Group meetings were held, chaired by the World Bank. While focusing on the macroeconomic position, it was stated that future financial support would depend on

85 Report of the UN Secretary-General on the establishment of a human rights verification mission in Guatemala (A/48/985, 18 August 1994), in S. Baranyi (1996), *The Challenge in Guatemala: Verifying Human Rights, Strengthening National Institutions and Enhancing an Integrated UN Approach to Peace*, p. 1, <http://www.131.111.106.147/policy/pb010.htm>.

86 Baranyi, *The Challenge in Guatemala*, p. 4.

87 Readings on the effects of the ultimatum differ. Whitfield (see Whitfield, 'The Role of the United Nations in El Salvador and Guatemala', p. 273), for example, argues that it was indeed the ultimatum that allowed for the negotiations to move forward, whereas others argue that the late deployment caused a backlash in Guatemala.

88 Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs file nyvi826/13655, 27 August 1994.

89 This implied a MINUGUA name change from 'UN Mission for the Verification of Human Rights and of Compliance with the Commitments of the Comprehensive Agreement on Human Rights in Guatemala' to 'UN Verification Mission in Guatemala'.

90 UN, *The Guatemala Peace Agreements*.

social sector investment and human capital development by the Guatemalan government, combined with improvements in the area of national reconciliation and human rights.⁹¹

In response to the worsening economic and financial situation and increasing political unrest after Serrano's May 1993 *autogolpe*, an informal Friends of Guatemala donor meeting was organized on 24 September 1993. As the meeting was organized at the request of De León Carpio, it was intended to be an international political signal of support towards the new government. Yet the only pledge made was a 'meagre' USD 10 million by the US government.⁹² Although the international community declared that it favoured peace negotiations, it did not agree to the revised plans of the De León administration. The UN Secretary-General concurred with this position, while the EU went further and suggested that the government revise its plan to accommodate those areas of consensus within Guatemalan society.⁹³ Whereas until 1993 the emphasis had been on ending the war, the international community and UN had become convinced of the need to include the substantive issues in the peace negotiations, thereby including the so-called root causes of the conflict. The instrument of aid promises, then, gave the international community the opportunity - at least to a certain extent - to pressure for structural change.

When talks between the parties resumed in January 1994, confidence grew that a final agreement was to be expected in the same year. At a subsequent informal donor meeting in June 1994, convened by the World Bank, participants indicated willingness to proceed with discussions on a post-war development effort parallel with the peace talks. This revealed awareness of the need for early coordination of donor support. Further informal donor meetings were organized in 1994 and 1995 by UNDP to convince donors to assist financially the various components of the peace accords. Although willing, the donor community stressed that it expected the Guatemalan government to take the lead in financing the implementation of the accords, foremost by doubling the tax burden.⁹⁴ This same pressure on the government's financial commitment was used as regards the treatment of human rights violations of the past. The Guatemalan government's pledge of USD 50,000 to a budget of USD 8 million for the Historical Clarification Commission (CEH) was considered insufficient. The government was thus pressured to increase this contribution considerably.⁹⁵ The international donor community did not yet make any substantial financial pledges, as it was agreed that a Consultative Group would be organized as soon as all the Accords were signed.⁹⁶

International support to the Peace Accords was indeed vividly demonstrated at the Consultative Group meeting in January 1997, as the international donor community pledged an amount of USD 1.9 billion.⁹⁷ Whereas the Guatemalan government's contribution was considered vital, multilateral and bilateral donors made large commitments for financial and technical support. The IDB, for example, announced a total of USD 800 million in loans for the period 1997-2000, with priorities directed towards infrastructure, modernizing the state, agriculture and the judicial system. The World Bank

91 VN/1985-1994/02914 (in De Zeeuw, 'The Practice of Intervention', pp. 31-33).

92 DLA/2015/00136 (De Zeeuw, 'The Practice of Intervention', p. 33).

93 Ardón, *Post-War Reconstruction in Central America*, p. 42. Others, however, questioned this 'strategy' and argue that support to the De León administration would have speeded up the process.

94 DLA/2015/00136 (in De Zeeuw, 'The Practice of Intervention', p. 34).

95 Plant, 'Indigenous Identity and Rights in the Guatemalan Peace Process', p. 320.

96 DLA/2017/0037 (in De Zeeuw, 'The Practice of Intervention', p. 35).

97 Most of the pledges consisted of loans and grants from the EU and the IFIs. A smaller part consisted of grants from multilateral and bilateral donors.

also increased its technical and financial support substantially, concentrating on education, modernizing the public sector, land issues, biodiversity, macroeconomic reform and structural adjustment. The European Commission committed ECU 200 million to technical assistance for the period 1997-2000. Priority areas were identified as demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants, land registration, strengthening local government and modernizing the state with the emphasis on tax reform. Bilateral donors also expressed their interest to renew or intensify their relations with Guatemala, first by opening diplomatic representations, and secondly by financial donations. The United States committed to USD 260 million; Norway increased aid from USD 15 million in 1996 to USD 20 million in 2000; and Sweden committed USD 65 million for a period of four years.⁹⁸

Subsequent Consultative Group donor meetings held annually remained politically critical. In the absence of financial pledging, however, they proved to demonstrate international support to the peace process. That the international community was still able to put pressure on Guatemalan developments through Consultative Group meetings was clearly demonstrated in the October 1998 meeting. At a moment of political deadlock, it managed to stimulate renewed discussions in Congress with regard to passing constitutional reforms through a referendum.⁹⁹ Overall, however, the political leverage of international pressure seemed to be diminishing, as the Guatemalan government has increasingly become reluctant to discuss issues of human rights and reform of the judicial and fiscal sector.¹⁰⁰

3.2.5 *The Peace Accords: An Agenda for National and International Policy*

The implementation of the Peace Accords has been central to international intervention strategy since 1997. The main platform for these commitments has been the Consultative Group meeting in 1997. At this first official Consultative Group meeting, the Guatemalan government presented a *Programa de Cooperación para la Paz*, which contained four strategic areas for action: reintegration of the displaced population and demobilization; integral human development; sustainable productive development; and modernization and strengthening of the democratic state. The programme had a price tag of USD 1.6 billion, of which the Guatemalan government committed itself to contribute USD 500 million.¹⁰¹ Overall, this Peace Cooperation Programme and its four action areas would form the structure for the international community's post-conflict aid.

- *Demobilization, Reintegration, and Reconciliation*

With the signing of the Accords a lot of the international resources became available for the process of demobilization and reintegration of the ex-combatants. The demobilization process started in March 1997 and included the temporary housing of the ex-guerrillas in camps and the return of arms.¹⁰²

98 These numbers are taken from a report of the first Consultative Group meeting in January 1997, in Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs file dwh/ara/03609.

99 Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs file Dwh/ara/03609, report on the Consultative Group meeting of 21-23 October 1998.

100 Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs file Dwh/ara/03609, report on the Consultative Group meeting of 21-23 October 1998.

101 De Zeeuw, 'The Practice of Intervention', p. 35.

102 This process of disarmament, however, has been imperfect. Only a limited number of arms have been collected, and instead of being destroyed, these were handed over to the Guatemalan Ministry of Internal Affairs.

An extra contingent of 155 UN military oversaw the whole process. Furthermore, a start was made with demining. Responsibilities within the demobilization camps were divided: the OAS focused on alphabetization and basic education; the European Union documented the ex-combatants; the University of San Carlos oversaw a dental and health programme; and the Spanish Red Cross took care of alimentation. Although the international community was mostly inclined to finance the demobilization of the URNG, the UNDP Trust Fund included activities concerning the military. The Nordic countries in particular were prepared to contribute to this least-favoured element of demobilization. After three months a reinsertion and reintegration programme replaced the process of demobilization. Yet increasingly, after the short-term first phase of demobilization, the UNDP ran into increasing difficulties in obtaining funding from international donors. Problems were moreover related to the difficult transfer of land.

The issue of refugees and displaced persons had already received considerable attention before the Accord was signed. In 1989, for example, this had taken place within the larger context of refugees in Central America.¹⁰³ In 1991 CEAR was established as the official government organ for repatriation of refugees and displaced persons. The high level of distrust from both sides, however,¹⁰⁴ aggravated tensions on multiple levels and slowed down the actual process of return to Guatemala.¹⁰⁵ In the light of the Resettlement Accord, a so-called 'Technical Commission' (CTEAR) was set up, consisting of CEAR as the government component, representatives of refugee populations, and the country representative of the UN in Guatemala (as representative of the donor community). Also a 'Trust Fund for the Implementation of the Agreement on the Resettlement of Populations Uprooted by the Armed Conflict' was set up, administered by UNDP. Whereas contributions to the Fund were mostly earmarked to specific projects, it could count on continued availability of funding. The main financiers were UNDP, the Netherlands and Switzerland. Other important donations to the resettlement of displaced peoples were made by Norway and Sweden through UNHCR, and the European Union (mainly through the government fund for peace FONAPAZ). As access to land and employment were main concerns (including devolution or compensation for land given up during the conflict), a trust fund FONATIERRA was set up, again administered by UNDP and financed by the United States, UNDP, Japan, and the Nordic countries. In the light of continued distrust in government, UNDP also came to play an important role as mediator and representative of the displaced population. Moreover, some conflicts and tensions between various recipient groups needed to be managed,¹⁰⁶ as well as problems that were raised with the transfer of land.

Donor support was also provided for communal development for peace. Spain and Sweden, for example, gave financial support to NGOs to execute projects in relation to peace. The major part,

103 The Development Programme for Displaced, Refugees, and Repatriated in Central America (PRODERE). This programme was a joint effort of among others UNDP, UNHCR, ILO and WHO. The main financier was the government of Italy.

104 This was mainly the result of the fact that the refugees were considered to be guerrilla supporters, hence forming a threat to the state.

105 Lent, 'The Search for Peace and Justice in Guatemala', p. 89.

106 In some communities, tensions arose between the CPRs and the demobilised guerrillas, as the former felt that the ex-combatants received larger benefits (M. Mooney and J. Oliver (2000), 'El Proceso de Negociación y los Acuerdos de Paz en Guatemala', in J. Oliver (ed.), *Después de Esquipulas: Apuntes Sobre los Procesos Nacionales de Paz* (Costa Rica: Arias Foundation/Clingendael), pp. 121-122.

however, consisted of reimbursable funds provided by IDB and the Central American Bank for Economic Integration (BCIE).

Within the Peace Programme, reconciliation projects covered – limited - support to the victims of the conflict, as well as the establishment of a Historic Clarification Commission. Financial commitments to the Commission came from a wide range of donors. Although this Commission would not publish the names of individuals found guilty of human rights violations, it would include recommendations to preserve this ‘collective history’. The mandate of the Commission extended over a period of six months, with an extension of another six months. The short mandate, as well as the inaccessibility of all information sources, however, considerably weakened the Commission’s work.¹⁰⁷

- *Integral Human Development*

The second component of the Peace Programme consisted of projects that were of a more ‘traditional’ development aid nature as well as emergency aid for the poor, education, health, housing and infrastructure. Financiers include the Nordic countries, the United States, Germany, Spain and the EU. The World Bank also lent substantial amounts in support of these programmes (among others, contributions to the Social Investment Fund of the Guatemalan government). Education in particular involved the indigenous community. A number of projects, for example, focused on the contents of education, in particular on pluralism and intercultural programmes. Although a commission of educational reform was established, UNESCO also took the lead in educational programmes. The main executor, however, was the Guatemalan Ministry of Education. Also UNDP and local/national NGOs were involved in projects that focused on the dissemination of information on the Peace Accords, and in particular on the Accord on Indigenous Identity and Rights. Projects were further carried out that focused on the cultural identity of indigenous peoples. The Nordic countries (including the Netherlands) and UNESCO were mainly inclined to finance these projects. A substantive category of this component of the Peace Programme also comprised projects to increase participation by women. Infrastructure projects were financed mainly with reimbursable funds from international financial organizations, the BCIE, Japan and China. Yet donations also came from the United States and Germany.

- *Sustainable Productive Development*

The component on sustainable productive development was foremost linked to the Socio-economic Accord, but also included elements of, for example, the Accord on Indigenous Identity and Rights¹⁰⁸ and the Resettlement Accord. The main categories were the programme for the development of ‘agriculture, forestry, and fishery’, and the programme for ‘investment, employment and exports’. Other projects focused on labour reform and vocational training. Also the before-mentioned Land Trust Fund (FONATTIERRA) constituted an important project, as it was mandated to provide credit to small and medium-sized enterprises, as well as to facilitate the process of land transfer. Major donations for this Land Fund came from the United States, UNDP, Sweden, Denmark and Japan. The Guatemalan government also compromised its own funds to this component of the Peace Programme

107 The report *Recuperación de la Memoria Histórica* (REMHI), executed by the Archbishop’s Human Rights Office (ODHA) outside the context of the Peace Accord, is considered more complete and of greater impact.

108 A Commission for the Land Rights of Indigenous Populations was established.

(in particular in agriculture, fishery, and infrastructure). The main international donors include the United States (for example, with a large-scale food programme carried out by CARE, Caritas and Save the Children) and the IDB, and to a lesser extent the Japanese and Dutch governments.

- *Modernization and Strengthening of the Democratic State*

The fourth component of the Peace Programme included issues of democratic reform, institution-building, rule of law and human rights. The main projects concerned civil society security (for example training and support to the National Civil Police, financed by the government of Spain and the European Union), municipal strengthening (with the Netherlands, Spain, Denmark and the United States as major donors), strengthening of fiscal reforms (World Bank and IDB, but also from the United States, Spain and the Netherlands), and judicial reform. Reform projects included alternative forms of conflict management in the justice system, an extension of possibilities to relieve the system, and a pilot project for administration of the law by members of the community. Furthermore, importance was given to the acknowledgement of customary and indigenous law (*derecho consuetudinario y indígena*). Projects on *juezes de paz* were also supported.¹⁰⁹

Other programmes included development councils, a land register, modernization of the legislative and executive offices, legal and constitutional reform, and the strengthening of human rights institutions, all with a wide range of donors and financiers. Projects that focused on the modernization of the military were mainly financed by the Guatemalan government, and no external donors have subscribed to these projects.¹¹⁰ Lastly, there were projects and donations to facilitate the development and the execution of the Peace Programme itself. SEGEPLAN and SEPAZ, for example, received support, as well as NGOs. Donors include the United States, the Nordic countries and Spain.

3.3 Post-conflict Aid Interventions: A Tentative Assessment ¹¹¹

3.3.1 A Change in Aid Patterns

Some trends can be deduced from the renewed international involvement after 1986. First, an increase in aid and, moreover, a diversification of donors took place. Whereas net ODA from the United States to Guatemala decreased, other bilateral OECD countries renewed their commitments.¹¹²

¹⁰⁹ These *juezes de paz* form the lowest level of the justice system and deal with minor offences and civil conflicts involving amounts below a certain limit. Here alternative, less formalistic methods of conflict resolution are possible. It is the most effective way of strengthening the quality of the rule of law, as well as reducing the quantity of long cases.

¹¹⁰ According to a governmental inventory of projects up until 31 March 1999, prepared for the Consultative Group meeting in May 1999. M. Mooney and J. Oliver (in 'El Proceso de Negociación y los Acuerdos de Paz en Guatemala', pp. 137-138) explain that international efforts of support to the military in designing a reform and reduction plan have been rejected.

¹¹¹ This paragraph is largely based on interviews held in Guatemala in May 1999 with international organizations, national donor government representatives and international NGOs, as well as with Guatemalan counterparts on the national and local (governmental and non-governmental) level. At the request of several informants, no specific personal references are made. The overall list of organizations that have been visited is included in annexe 2.

¹¹² See annexe 5.

Secondly, there was an increasing presence of European aid, not only from individual countries such as Spain, Germany and the Nordic countries, but also from the European Union. After 1997, Europe (*i.e.* the European Union and the European donor governments) in fact became the major donor in Guatemala.

A third trend that can be deduced from international funding is that loans from multilateral organizations took about two-thirds of the total aid offered, hence exceeding substantially the non-refundable aid. Between 1990 and 1995 the government received an average of USD 140 million annually as bilateral and multilateral loans (less than 1 per cent of GNP), and approximately USD 60 million annually of non-refundable aid, primarily through NGO channels.¹¹³ Additionally, a majority of aid was provided through the multilateral channel. Over the 1990s, moreover, an increasing number of activities were caught under the heading of support to the peace process, including projects of a more traditional development nature and projects on democratization, participation, and human rights. New areas of development cooperation, such as 'good governance', also found a place within the peace programme under the heading of modernization of the state and institutional reform.

Finally, over the years a clear change took place in the relationship between the international (donor) community and the Guatemalan government. The 1986 election of the Christian Democrat Vinicio Cerezo had convinced many donor countries to resume (bilateral) aid in support of the opening to a democratic political system. The Reagan administration, for example, spoke of a 'full return to democracy' and US aid to Guatemala was given a new boost. Others, including the then EC, were more cautious. There was a reluctance to support the Guatemalan government directly. Although under a civilian and democratic heading, the Guatemalan government had been a party to the conflict, and remained entwined with the economic, political and military elite. Moreover, human rights violations did not end. Until the second half of the 1990s the major part of aid was directed through NGOs or the multilateral channel. This led to a sharp increase in the number of local NGOs.¹¹⁴ With the signing of the Accords in 1996, however, international donors began to support, or jointly execute, projects with the government. Relations expanded from the ones that were almost exclusively directed towards national NGOs, and funds were now also channelled to government projects (to various Ministries, but also to commissions that were established under the peace process such as SEPAZ and FONAPAZ). This was also a reflection of the observation that many donors (especially the smaller ones) chose the multilateral channel (in particular the United Nations) to do so. As is observed by International IDEA,¹¹⁵ the signing of the final Peace Accord and the commitments made in the Consultative Group thus marked a clear demarcation with the past, in the sense that the Guatemalan government became a viable partner. The bilateral development relation from government to government, however, remained low.

113 International IDEA (1998), *Democracia en Guatemala: La Misión de un Pueblo Entero*, report of the Mission of International IDEA (Colombia: Tercer Mundo Editores), p. 274.

114 C. Sereseres (1998), 'The Interplay of Internal War and Democratization in Guatemala Since 1982', in D. Mares (ed.), *Civil-Military Relations: Building Democracy and Regional Security in Latin America, Southern Asia, and Central Europe* (Boulder CO, Oxford: Westview Press), p. 208.

115 International IDEA, *Democracia en Guatemala*, p. 274.

3.3.2 *The Impact of International Conflict-related Interventions*

Overall, international interventions have had a positive impact on the de-escalation and formal ending of the conflict. First of all, there was a direct impact on the hostilities, *i.e.* the containment of violence or coercion, as human rights violations came to play a central role in international involvement. One could, for example, argue - as is done by many Guatemalan human rights organizations - that foreign staff and political pressure have indeed saved lives. Through various interventions it became clear that 'the world was watching'. This kept pressure on, for example, the installation of the Historical Clarification Commission. The UN verification mission present on the ground may also have helped to contain violence. In general there was a large willingness among Western donors to support projects focusing on human rights, in particular in relation to indigenous rights.

On the other hand, however, this optimistic assessment may be inappropriate as violations continued. And although the conflict formally ended in December 1996, violence has not. Although the violence is today mainly of a socio-economic nature, extrajudicial and politically inspired killings also continue. The legacy of violence in combination with inefficient judicial systems and procedures thus continue to prevail. Post-conflict reconstruction appears to have insufficiently addressed the issues of security and security sector reform (reform and training of the National Civil Police and military, as well as the judicial system).

Secondly, the international - including regional - environment has undertaken diplomatic initiatives and has facilitated parties in negotiating and reaching political settlements. Hence a positive impact includes the engagement of the various parties to reach settlements, thereby decreasing the scope and intensity of the hostilities. Democracy and the idea of peaceful conflict resolution have strengthened. The consistent support to civil society organizations has furthermore contributed to the build-up of an internal, non-combatant counter force. This has proven successful in particular after the democratic opening, when more political room was created for the popular opposition. To some extent, then, the international community has responded to the changed post-war context. International NGOs, for example, have moved away from the more ideological priorities of the 1970s and 1980s towards training of NGOs, organizational autonomy, management and decision-making capacities within community groups, and communication, negotiation and coordination between state and civil society. UN organizations also look for ways to promote confidence, tolerance and consensus-building between various sectors of society so as to promote effective implementation of the Peace Accords.

Yet again, there are some reservations, as popular participation has not been translated into *political* participation. In this regard the international community has been hesitant in its support to the development of political organizations. Conflict resolution is thus only limited in the political arena. Although some projects are carried out in the area of conflict resolution skills, it is hard to find financial support for such projects as the results are not measurable in the short term, or in concrete terms. There indeed seems to be an imbalance between short-term, 'hard', visible reconstruction measures and 'soft', longer-term civil society programmes. Donors such as the United States and the EU, for example, prefer hard reconstruction to social mediation. The Nordic governments on the other hand are perceived as more supportive of social and human rights programmes.¹¹⁶

116 M. Pugh (1998), *Post-Conflict Rehabilitation: Social and Civil Dimensions*, <http://www-jha.sps.cam.ac.uk/b/b365.htm>.

It is in particular this latter group of donor countries that do support these types of projects, such as an OAS-PROPAZ project on the establishment of a 'culture of dialogue'.

Thirdly, the international community has over a long period of time contributed to attenuating the negative effects of the conflict. Humanitarian and emergency aid have been provided to refugees and displaced persons in the areas of food, medical and educational aid as well as housing, small-scale agricultural activities and employment projects. This type of aid has been continued in the post-conflict period, now focusing on returnees as well as former combatants. Indigenous groups, in addition to refugees and displaced persons, also became explicit target groups for aid. This was a result of the fact that the conflict had mainly taken place in the highlands, the 'homeland' of the indigenous populations, and as a result of the overall absence of government institutions in large parts of the countryside.

In the post-conflict setting in particular, the sensitivity of such a focus on 'conflict-related' target groups has become apparent. Aside from the before-mentioned target groups, this is clearly illustrated by a predominating 'indigenous' emphasis in contemporary international development-policy design in Guatemala. Without negating the importance of cultural identity projects, nor the disadvantaged and discriminated position of indigenous peoples within Guatemalan society, it is important to acknowledge the diversity and heterogeneity of this 'target group'. Moreover, this choice on specific programme target groups may strongly influence the perceptions of the ones 'left out'. The international community's interventions are not unambiguously appreciated. In a country where indigenous peoples make up a majority of the national population, fears are expressed that too much focus on the identity and rights of one ethnic group will divide rather than unite society. Hence, it is in the post-conflict setting that questions arise regarding the expediency of projects, for example the strong and continued focus on 'conflict-affected target groups' (in particular refugees and internally displaced peoples, ex-combatants, and more generally the indigenous population and those in the highlands), thereby bypassing the Guatemalan population in its entirety. The negative effects of such an approach become ever more visible in contemporary Guatemalan society, thereby pointing to a lack of vision regarding *future* conflict prevention.

Contemporary references to an 'ethnic battlefield' in Guatemala, however, appear illusive, as it leaves the divisions and distrust existent between various indigenous communities out of consideration. Many issues remain contentious even within the indigenous community, and socio-economic positions appear of overriding importance. As regards the land question, for example, the views of organizations inevitably vary, among those representing farm workers, seasonal labourers, landless small farmers, medium farmers with a stake in the export economy, communities that still retain a communal structure, and people who are pursuing claims to specific land areas from which they or their ancestors have been dispossessed.¹¹⁷ In this regard, not only issues of local autonomy, but also community development are of relevance, as many indigenous peoples find themselves in a situation of extreme poverty and (near-)landlessness.¹¹⁸

Finally, the international community has supported measures that address the root causes of conflict. This could at least be concluded when taking into account the resumption of development aid

117 Plant, 'Indigenous Identity and Rights in the Guatemalan Peace Process', p. 335.

118 R. Plant (2000), 'Indigenous Rights and Latin American Multiculturalism: Lessons from the Guatemalan Peace Process', in W. Assies, G. van der Haar, A. Hoekema (eds.), *The Challenge of Diversity: Indigenous Peoples and Reform of the State in Latin America* (Amsterdam: Thela Thesis).

focusing on agricultural development, poverty reduction and civil society building. During the reconstruction phase, there was a strong proliferation of investment in social development projects.

Yet although the beneficiaries of these investments have often been villagers in areas with little prior contact with the state, these funds were often meted out without prior needs' analysis and without supporting sufficient coordination between the people and local governments. The emphasis on top-down poverty alleviation has remained, thereby neglecting to enhance local implementation capacities or grass-root involvement in defining investment priorities.¹¹⁹ Moreover, there is a fear that too much emphasis is put on short-term elements of the peace programme that offer 'quick and visible' results. It was argued that compromises have been made with regard to the quality of the reforms, and that continuity is preferred above quality. These are most clearly observed in the area of civil police training, where a lack of adequate numbers of qualified policemen in the light of rising crime and a security power vacuum has allowed the military to step in partly. Moreover, compromises have been made regarding the duration and quality of the training.

3.3.3 Donor Strategy

The intention of the Guatemalan 'peace aid' was to come to improved coordination within the UN system and among other actors of the international community. UNDP took the lead in this regard. Moreover, the Consultative Group meetings have been an important instrument in gearing aid from the separate donors. In collaboration with the international community, the Guatemalan government developed the *Programa de la Paz*, which formed the main structure for post-conflict aid. In the field, coordination took place at various levels and between a variety of donors.

In an attempt to coordinate international aid and avoid complementarity, a division of efforts of the main donors has taken place over the various regions of the country. Yet this type of coordination has had the unwanted and possibly conflict-stimulating side-effect of diversifying the developments in the different regions. Rather than being a result of the different content of a programme, these were related with 'technical' matters such as the speed of administration, decision-making and releasing financial contributions. This has been the case during the demobilization and reinsertion campaigns, when some regions already had well-developed projects running, while others were still waiting for final approval and financial disbursements. Furthermore, there has been a strong focus on the highland regions, as these constituted the main theatre for warfare and house the majority of the indigenous population. Lately, however, there is a growing concern of a shift of local conflict and potential future conflict escalation towards the north-eastern regions.

In the case of post-conflict rehabilitation and reconstruction in Guatemala, the international community has placed a lot of emphasis on the coordinating role of the Guatemalan government. Through SEGEPLAN, the Guatemalan government was expected to play a coordinating and steering role and make international aid complementary to domestic capacities. Worries, however, remained with regard to the absorption capacity of the Guatemalan government. These include technical, as well as institutional and financial shortcomings. Furthermore, it has been argued that 'national' funding through government organizations such as SEPAZ and FONAPAZ has often tended to nurture

119 T. Palencia Prado (1997), 'Advocates and Guarantors: Establishing Participative Democracy in Post-War Guatemala', in J. Armon, R. Sieder and R. Wilson (eds), *Negotiating Rights: The Guatemalan Peace Process*, Accord issue 2, p. 30.

'clientelist' relations in support of the government of the day. Although the importance of measures of land reform, a more equal distribution of wealth, and tax reform are widely acknowledged in this regard (and 'lip service' is paid to this international donor agenda), a vision on *how* to reach these more fundamental changes is lacking.

Moreover, non-governmental organizations remain highly dependent on external funding, and there has been a strong increase in the number of NGOs. Little has been invested in networks of NGOs, thereby splintering aid and contributing to the personalistic and often confrontational and competing character of societal organizations. The past international preference for supporting NGOs, then, should be more carefully monitored. Yet support to other channels for aid has not been without difficulties. In this regard, a large variety of actors have focused on the modernization of the state and have supported activities that are implemented through public policy. And although the Peace Accords have, for example, resulted in some reforms in the judicial system, implementation remains problematic. These problems are related to financial matters, but more importantly to internal resistance to these reforms as these may harm individual/group power positions.

Although coordination has indeed improved, with regard to strategy some disagreement remains.¹²⁰ In particular for the post-conflict period, a strategy seems to be lacking as the international community's aid is spread out over a multitude of 'topics', without a coherent and long-term approach to the process of transition. Instead, individual organizations have expanded on their 'project portfolio', thereby covering an increasingly wider range of issues and objectives. An international congruent strategy is lacking for the middle term in particular. In the absence of clear overall objectives and an intervention strategy, *ad hoc* behaviour increases, in particular since funds are assigned for a limited period. Many of the commitments made at the 1997 Consultative Group meeting have not even been released.

Yet measures for 'success' are often strongly linked to the Peace Agenda, and as the timetable ends in 2000 the fear of further discontinuity of funds appears realistic. *Ad hoc* and short-term responses try to fill this gap of 'grip' on the process, as statements are heard about the cutting of aid and aid relations in response to 'dissatisfactory' developments. The withdrawal of funds, however, is neither without impact. Among many national and international field workers the impression therefore exists that in the donor community speed has been prioritized over substance. This could be seen as proof of the lack of a sound policy strategy in situations of latent conflict and fragile peace, and moreover is an indication of a lack of commitment to timely conflict prevention.

3.3.4 International 'Negotiating Capacity': The Prevalence of Macroeconomic Development

Political interventions have proven difficult on more than one occasion. In the early 1980s, for example, international isolation strengthened the Guatemalan government in its position of being able

120 Overall, these disagreements consist of differences in priorities. In the case of indigenous groups, for example, some disagreement arose between the World Bank and USAID. Whereas the former chose to support a well-established group with the idea of enhancing unity within and thereby strengthening the indigenous voice, USAID supported other indigenous organizations in the light of democratic diversity, leading - in the vision of the World Bank - to an increase in competition between the groups.

to cope on its own.¹²¹ Moreover, the issue of human rights violations was dismissed in a variety of bilateral and multilateral meetings. Against the background of an 'unwilling' Guatemalan government, the large number of démarches did not have any effect.

A key variable for 'success' in putting pressure on the Guatemalan government has been economic, rather than political, in nature. Pressure has been most successful in situations of economic deterioration, when the Guatemalan economic elite began to feel the implications of international isolation. Furthermore, threats of economic sanctions proved successful during Serrano's May 1993 *autogolpe*. In post-conflict Guatemala overall economic development has also been identified as the key to reconstruction - including issues as diverse as agricultural development, land redistribution, tax reform, income redistribution and access to credit schemes. Yet, *macroeconomic* concerns seem to prevail in practice, both nationally and within the large international financial institutions. And although military spending has decreased, social spending is up and efforts have been made to increase the state's tax income, the government's political priorities mainly focus on the macroeconomic climate to negotiate and secure international financial support, and to conserve alliances with the reformist wing of the Guatemalan business community.¹²²

In this regard, the capacity of third parties to impose change upon post-conflict government clearly varies. Whereas the IFIs and the United States prefer to focus on the achievements of the peace implementations, thereby taking a more favourable position towards the Guatemalan government, the 'like-minded countries' (Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Canada, the Netherlands) prefer a more critical position in order to discuss the shortcomings of the process (with regard to human rights and the murder of Gerardi, fiscal issues, the election process, democratic participation of women and indigenous peoples in the elections). Expressions of concern by - mainly bilateral - donors regarding civil society democratization and participation, social development and indigenous participation take a clear second place. As is argued by Palencia Prado,¹²³ this reflects the government's primary need to finance its political and economic programme by satisfying the conditions of 'structural adjustment' on which assistance from international financial institutions depends. To this end, a number of measures have been implemented to satisfy IFI preoccupations with macroeconomic 'stability' and state 'modernization'. These have included extensive privatization, fiscal reform, decentralization of public institutions and a drastic increase in public utility charges. Furthermore, the government has reflected a need to maintain its alliance with the business sector consisting of modern and dynamic companies that cover agricultural, industrial, commercial and financial activities, but that is characterized by its low capacity to absorb labour. Negotiation with other political parties and with civil society, however, has remained low, and economic strategy thus fails to take into account the interests and requirements of the *campesino* economy consisting of a sector dedicated to non-traditional export, traditional *campesinos* and the informal economy concentrated in the principal cities.¹²⁴

121 Report of the Dutch Ambassador in Mexico to Guatemala in January 1982, Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs file DBD/1975-1984/721.

122 See also Palencia Prado, 'Advocates and Guarantors', p. 31.

123 Palencia Prado, 'Advocates and Guarantors', p. 31.

124 See V. Gálvez Borrel (1995), *La Gobernabilidad en Centroamérica: Sectores Populares y Gobernabilidad Precaria en Guatemala* (Guatemala: FLACSO), p. 36.

Hence, it appears that during the post-conflict period in particular bilateral donor governments (with the exception of the United States) have lost influence. Reference has been made in this regard to the strong orientation of the Arzú government towards the international financial institutions and his 'distant' positioning towards bilateral donors that Guatemala has settled its problems.¹²⁵ The instrument of political pressure (including the aid conditionality instrument) seems to have lost most of its power in the post-conflict setting.

The international community has apparently run into many obstacles in the Guatemalan post-conflict situation, which needs careful study and a balanced response. Growing awareness has taken root that not only do changes and accords have to be discussed and disseminated to the 'affected parties', but are equally important with those in opposition. On the other hand, however, not enough pressure is placed on reticent factions, for example within the organized private sectors to increase direct taxes, which should be the guarantee for a truly sustainable transition. The importance of such a careful approach that focuses on these obstacles is that these may contribute to preventing a *recurrence* of conflict. Indeed, in Guatemala the power structure has not changed profoundly, violence and injustice are on the rise, group divisions remain and these become influenced by the post-conflict setting. Not everyone has been affected by the past conflict to the same degree, and as personal gain from the peace process fails to materialize, this undercuts the whole process of peace as well as of democratization. The large influx of international assistance and its focus on specific sectors of society is contributing to further distrust, and the conservative sector is now regrouping in ultra-nationalism. The impact of international interventions, then, is not one-dimensional, and may require an adaptation of approach and strategy that integrates an assessment of its impact on a conflictive setting.

125 Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs file dwh/ara/03609.

4 Dutch Policies and Interventions

In the absence of a long-term historical relationship between the Netherlands and Guatemala, interest in the Central American region increased with the establishment of the Central American Common Market in the 1960s. While economic opportunities were opening in the region, Guatemala was considered the most viable market. Until the 1980s, then, the activities of the Dutch embassy in Guatemala City focused on the economic and commercial sector as a result of the relatively intensive economic relations and the presence of some important Dutch companies.¹²⁶ When conflict further escalated in the late 1970s, this however changed. Economic interest faded. A new focus on Guatemala mainly stemmed from the emergency aid that was provided after the 1976 earthquake. A (limited) number of development cooperation activities came to the fore. In the late 1980s Dutch foreign policy and development cooperation policy became increasingly directed towards support for democratic transition.

Policy-making for Guatemala has mainly been assigned to the Department of Development Cooperation of the Dutch Foreign Ministry. Bilateral cooperation with Guatemala was laid down in a regional policy strategy. In the 1990s, the Netherlands Minister of Development Cooperation furthermore specified policy towards countries in conflict (paragraph 4.1). This chapter applies an empirical perspective in order to view the extent to which these policy statements have been translated into the practice of policy implementation. It will focus on the particular Dutch initiatives developed towards the Guatemalan conflict, at the political and diplomatic level (paragraph 4.2.) as well as at the project-aid level (paragraph 4.3.). It should then become possible to reconstruct the policy that was executed in Guatemala, to identify its objectives and rationales, and to assess the instruments employed. In a final paragraph a tentative assessment will be made on the effectiveness of the interventions and policies in helping to prevent or settle conflict (paragraph 4.4.).

4.1 Introduction: Development Cooperation Policy towards Countries in Conflict

4.1.1 *Bilateral Relations: Development Cooperation Policy towards Central America and Guatemala*

Although economic interest faded, Dutch representation and involvement in Central America have been determined largely by the social engagement of the Dutch public in the 1970s and 1980s with the

126 Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs files DBB/1975-1984/00721, 00722, 00723.

violent processes of change in particularly Nicaragua, El Salvador and Guatemala.¹²⁷ As a consequence of this public interest, political manoeuvring increased somewhat, whereas financial support for refugees and displaced peoples took place through private organizations on a confidential basis. Due to the worrisome human rights record of the Guatemalan government, financial aid was given on humanitarian grounds. A long-term development cooperation relationship with the region was only established after 1987. Considerations underlying this decision included the observations of high poverty levels among much of the Central American population; the historical development of democratically elected governments in all five countries in the region; the need to strengthen social and economic rights in addition to political support; and the attempts of the regional governments (however hesitant and small-scale) to set up socio-economic development programmes.¹²⁸ At this time other Dutch interests, such as the vicinity of the Antilles and Aruba, investment and trade, or consular services, had become of minor importance.¹²⁹

In 1987 a Regional Development Programme was set up in which socio-economic development as well as political support for 'young democracies' was deemed key. The objective - as described in the *Regional Policy Plan for Central America* (1990) - has been to 'strengthen the democratization processes that were already under way, directly and indirectly, and to anchor them in society, within the framework of a policy to relieve poverty'.¹³⁰ Priority was given to reform of agricultural production, development of labour-intensive and agro-industrial enterprises, and the development of human resources (education, primary health care and family planning). A selective number of bilateral activities were developed, whereas the main part of aid remained channelled through multilateral and private (MFO) organizations. In the case of Guatemala, emphasis was put on the most disadvantaged groups in society: small farmers, of which most are *indigenas*; urban workers in the informal sector; and those with little or no access to education. Furthermore, an approach of regional concentration on Zacapa/Chiquimula and Huehuetenango/Cuchumatanes was chosen, in order to have a bigger impact given the relatively small scale of the Dutch aid programme in Guatemala. During the following years, some additional policy priorities were added, such as the importance of continuation of the peace process, bilingual education, decentralization and good governance.

4.1.2 Foreign and Development Policy Objectives towards Countries in Conflict

Whereas human rights have been key to foreign policy since the late 1970s, a more explicit conflict component was added in the 1990s. Dutch conflict policy towards Third World countries has been firmly entrenched within overall development cooperation policy. In the post-Cold War era Dutch foreign policy objectives towards Third World countries have been laid down in various policy documents and statements. The policy papers *Een wereld van verschil*¹³¹ (1990) and *Een wereld in*

127 *Yearplan 1997 of the Royal Netherlands Embassy in San José*, in Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs file dwh/ara/03795.

128 'Regional Policy Plan for Central America' (1990), Department of Development Cooperation (The Hague: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, p. 36; and De Zeeuw, 'The Practice of Intervention', p. 17).

129 De Zeeuw, 'The Practice of Intervention', p. 17.

130 In De Zeeuw, 'The Practice of Intervention', pp. 17-18.

131 Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1990), *Een wereld van verschil*, (The Hague).

*geschil: de grenzen van de ontwikkelingssamenwerking verkend*¹³² (1993) are considered to be central to this policy. Policy objectives have focused on contributing to freedom, democracy and human rights as a precondition for socio-economic development in Third World countries; in assisting sustainable development; and in helping to realize peace and preventing or settling violent conflicts. In 1996 the then Minister of Development Cooperation Jan Pronk broadened the approach by explicitly stating that war-torn societies should be provided with development aid. This implied that an emergency-aid approach needs to be extended by measures of a more structural nature. 'Peace aid', then, should help in sustaining preventive diplomacy and peace-building measures of a political nature. This, for example, would involve support for indigenous mechanisms to resolve conflict, for programmes reintegrating ex-combatants in society, for programmes sustaining the freedom of information, and for reconciliation. Development, then, needed to become firmly integrated with politics. As stated by Mr Pronk, this approach required finding the most adequate combination of conflict management, humanitarian assistance and socio-economic programmes in order to pave the way for sustainable development.

The empirical approach mentioned earlier is followed in the following paragraphs in order to reconstruct Dutch involvement in the Guatemalan conflict in practice. In this way it should uncover a conflict management strategy that enables an assessment on the goals, means and, tentatively, effect of Dutch policy practice in the Guatemalan context.

4.2 Political and Diplomatic Initiatives

Bilateral political and diplomatic interventions towards Guatemala have in large part been part of a regional strategy towards the Central American region, and initiated with the regional peace processes of Contadora and Esquipulas. Although there is no specific historic relationship between the Netherlands and Guatemala (nor with Latin America in general) that could account for an intensive involvement by the Netherlands in the Guatemalan civil war, clear concern about the internal volatile situation did exist. In this regard, human rights have played a key role in the relationship of the Netherlands with Guatemala. The 'Regional Policy Plan for Central America', for example, stated that 'the main contribution which the donor community can make in this respect ... remains the political pressure it can exert, including pressure in the context of its aid relations'.¹³³

Over the years of conflict the issue of human rights has been brought up during bilateral meetings at the presidential, (sub-)ministerial and embassy level. Whereas in the early 1980s these expressions of concern were ignored by the Guatemalan government,¹³⁴ after 1986 and in particular in the 1990s the human rights issue was made debatable. Aside from a direct intervention in the Third Commission of the UN General Assembly in 1982 concerning the human rights situation in Guatemala (see below), however, explicit bilateral interventions were shunned. Increasingly pushed by public opinion to take a stance in the conflict, the Netherlands chose a strategy of multilateral political and diplomatic intervention and kept a low profile regarding initiatives. Political involvement has mainly taken place

132 Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1993), *Een wereld in geschil: de grenzen van de ontwikkelingssamenwerking verkend* (The Hague).

133 'Regional Policy Plan for Central America', Department of International Cooperation (The Hague: Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, October 1990).

134 See, for example, Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs file dbd/1975-1984/721.

through the UN and the European Community (later Union). Furthermore, and more significant in the light of the almost exclusively development-oriented relations with Guatemala, the Netherlands has participated through Consultative Group and Donor meetings.

4.2.1 *Multilateral Interventions: a Low-profile Approach*

Through the UN system, the Netherlands has participated in the UN General Assembly meetings focusing on human rights violations. Its position in the early 1980s was mainly the result of an intervention at the 1982 Third Commission of the UN General Assembly, during which it requested clarification from the Guatemalan delegate with regard to a supposedly military siege of an indigenous group. Although questions remained about the correctness of the information on which the intervention was based,¹³⁵ it received a lot of attention from the media as well as from Guatemalan human rights groups. Although incidental, and never meant as a basis of future policy, it was acknowledged that the 1982 intervention had created 'clear expectations' regarding the Netherlands' position towards human rights violations in Guatemala. As of that time, a more active position was taken in the General Assembly meetings on human rights and the submittal of Resolutions. In this regard, Dutch human rights policy was based on the idea of effectiveness, *i.e.* that UN Resolutions should receive broad Western support, in particular of the 'governments whose opinion mattered greatly to the addressed'. In the case of Guatemala this concerned in particular the then BRD, France, the United Kingdom and the United States, and a unanimous position of the EC member countries. Broad support in this regard, however, meant less critically formulated Resolutions.¹³⁶

Staunch political and diplomatic interventions were thus shunned, but these were also hampered by a strong diplomatic offensive by the Guatemalan delegation around the UN meetings on human rights. Moreover, since 1987 an imbalance has been observed when the Latin countries support Guatemala in being removed from the violations' list. The mandate of the Special Rapporteur came to an end in 1987, and he was replaced by an expert to advise the Guatemalan government. This was a compromise between Western proponents of agenda item 12, including the Netherlands, and the opposing Latin American countries.¹³⁷ The Netherlands and Canada in particular attempted to stimulate the discussion in 1992 with these Latin American countries with regard to the issue of agenda items. The Netherlands, in accordance with Germany and Austria, clearly favoured agenda item 12 (violations anywhere in the world), since a shift to 21 (advisory services and technical aid) would give the wrong political signal to the military.¹³⁸ Yet no unanimous standpoint could be formulated for the (then) twelve member countries of the European Union, nor could they gain the support of the Latin American countries or the United States.

135 Information came from Amnesty International but could not be verified.

136 Information on Dutch interventions in the General Assembly on human rights is taken from Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs file 999.232.154 VN/Rechten van de Mens-Guatemala.

137 Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs file Code 9/1985-1989/3896.

138 Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs file gevi110/3489.

4.2.2 *The 'Hospitality' Offer: Hosting a Round of Talks*

In 1991 a UN observer of the peace talks made enquiries into the willingness of the Netherlands to offer to host a round of talks between the Guatemalan government and the URNG. The request was made in the light of the search for a location outside the limelight of public opinion and the regional press, which on some occasions had a negative effect on the talks and the negotiations' climate. In September 1991 the Dutch government officially offered this 'hospitality' of a round of talks on Aruba to the various parties. Yet the negotiations reached a low point in 1992-1993, and notwithstanding various repetitions of the offer, no progress was made. In the second half of 1993, the offer was finally dropped after the reasoning of the UN that it was inopportune to hold a round of talks in Aruba. In consideration of Mexico, which had hosted a number of fruitless talks, it would be unfair to shift location at the time of a positive turning point.¹³⁹

4.2.3 *A Joint Position: European and Donor Cooperation*

The Netherlands has preferred the EC (EU) channel above the bilateral one to react to particular events in Guatemala. These mainly took the form of démarches in which concern was expressed with regard to internal developments. Furthermore, political (and economic) relations with the Central American region have been formalized with the San José Dialogue. In 1997 the Dutch Minister for Development Cooperation took a lead role in an EU troika to Guatemala as the Netherlands held the EU presidency at the time. Donor coordination and the recipient's absorption capacity were the main issues during this visit. In this regard, coordination of priorities was considered insufficient. This should instead primarily take place at the implementation level and with regard to methodology. Moreover, the Guatemalan government should take a lead role in this coordination.

As regards political signals (rather than initiatives), the Consultative Group and Informal Donor Meetings have also become an important channel for the Dutch government to pressure for change. In the 1992 Consultative Group meeting, for example, the Dutch delegation explicitly linked the reduced room for social expenditures to the high level of military expenditure.

4.2.4 *Diplomatic Representation in Guatemala*

The inconstant nature of Dutch representation in Guatemala seems to be foremost linked to the nature and size of the development cooperation programme. Political motives in upgrading development cooperation offices (OS offices) to embassies have been explicitly denied. Instead, these were linked to the expanding aid relationship and executing capacity of the regional development programme.

Diplomatic representation in Guatemala was absent at the height of the repression, as the Dutch embassy was closed in 1980. During this period of growing upheaval and decreasing economic interests for the Netherlands (as Dutch companies such as Philips closed their office in Guatemala), representation was taken up by an Honorary Consul. Only after the 1986 return to civil government did contacts with Guatemala increase. As development cooperation ties intensified in 1987, an OS office was opened in Guatemala. For reasons of facilitating these development cooperation activities, the OS office gained the status of embassy in 1989, seconded to the embassy in San José, Costa Rica.

139 In Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs file dwh/ara/002214.

Yet the embassy would refrain from political activities. The 1992 cutback in diplomatic expenditure once again resulted in the closing down of the embassy, and only in 1994 was a new OS expert assigned to Guatemala. Diplomatic status, however, was lacking, until in 1997 the current embassy, again seconded to the one in Costa Rica, opened.

4.3 Project Interventions

4.3.1 *The Aid 'Card'*

The coming to power of Vinicio Cerezo Arévalo and the Christian Democratic Party in 1986 introduced a new period of international political and development cooperation relations with Guatemala. Notwithstanding the 'wait-and-see' attitude of many actors - mainly a result of the extremely weak position of the Cerezo government and the powerful opposition of the army and conservatives - the then Netherlands Minister of Development Cooperation, Mr Bukman, already in 1985 decided to institute a special, so-called 'remedial' aid programme for the region, a decision that is unofficially assigned to the similar political colour of Bukman and Cerezo.

During a 1986 visit by President Cerezo to the Netherlands, the Minister thus pledged a 'small positive bilateral signal from the Dutch OS side'¹⁴⁰ to support Cerezo's policy towards the peace process. Although several alternatives were mentioned, the pledge never materialized. Missions by Dutch NGOs advised not to finance any bilateral activities in the context of rural development, due to continued military control of the countryside and the lack of trustworthy governmental counterpart organizations. It was therefore concluded that the best strategy would be 'to follow the chosen path', *i.e.* development cooperation through private organizations.¹⁴¹ Various departmental missions followed in the second half of the 1980s but no concrete projects were located. In a 1988 memo this development was, however, considered worrisome, as it was argued that the Netherlands would lose its credibility by sending another identification mission, studying all sorts of things but without financing anything.¹⁴² In June 1988 a Dutch development cooperation specialist arrived in Guatemala to set up an OS office.

The implementation of the Regional Development Programme in 1988 led to an increase of the total bilateral ODA disbursements to Guatemala from NLG 2.3 million in 1987 to NLG 9.7 million in 1988.¹⁴³ In the beginning of the 1990s, the programme in Guatemala was consolidated at approximately NLG 12 million annually.¹⁴⁴ The signing of the final Peace Accord in (December 1996) stimulated another sharp raise in funds assigned to Guatemala. At the meeting of the Consultative

140 Memo in Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs file code 9/1985-1989/03895.

141 Memo in Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs file code 9/1985-1989/03895 (J. de Zeeuw 1999: 16).

142 Memo in Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs file OSLA/1985-1990/01113.

143 Numbers are taken from the *Annual Reports on Development Cooperation*, as published by the Information Service of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Hague.

144 Sharp differences in annual total ODA can be attributed not to a change in the level of development cooperation, but instead to the financial budgetary system that accounts the costs for a project that runs several years to the implementation year. In 1993, for example, the sharp increase in bilateral ODA can be attributed to the start of a large rural development and forestry project in Cuchumatanes.

Group in January 1997, the Netherlands decided to double its assistance to Guatemala in support of 'the process of democratization'. Total Dutch bilateral ODA amounted to NLG 30 million in 1998.¹⁴⁵ In order to gain a first, rough idea of the nature and priorities of Dutch project interventions it may be useful to give an overview of the contents and rationales of Dutch project support in Guatemala (GT-coded projects), which number some 210 projects over the period 1986-1998.

4.3.2 Contents and Rationales

Until the end of the 1980s humanitarian aid to displaced persons and refugees was the major component of Dutch assistance to Guatemala. This included a range of activities from health care and housing to agricultural projects, psychological help, training, education and self-help projects. This help was provided through financial support to UNHCR but mainly took on the form of 'discrete' support via the MFO channel. This was in particular the case with regard to assistance to internally displaced peoples. It was acknowledged by the Dutch government that large numbers of indigenous peoples had fled repression and were drifting within their country. The hostile physical environment, as well as the nearness of the guerrillas (which easily turned them into a target for the army), strongly hampered their attempts at survival. This type of assistance did not change after 1986, as the Guatemalan government's offer that they could settle in model villages was not considered a valid alternative.¹⁴⁶ For the same reason the Dutch government, through the MFO channel, financially supported intermediary organizations in Mexico, which again supported the activities of organizations in Guatemala in the area of emergency aid and rehabilitation for poor, often displaced, rural groups. These activities also continued in the early 1990s.¹⁴⁷ A specific group of internally displaced peoples that received assistance in this regard were the so-called *Comunidades de Población en Resistencia* (CPRs). Although these had existed throughout the 1980s, in the 1990s in particular they were able to come forward with their claim for recognition, thereby receiving a lot of national and international attention, which increased pressure on the Guatemalan government and army. The Dutch government was also willing to support these groups, with the acknowledgement that, when opportunities opened, this aid should be extended to other groups of rural poor.¹⁴⁸

Before 1986, the expansion of rural development activities was not considered opportune, mainly as a result of the remaining military structures in the countryside.¹⁴⁹ Yet after this date, and in the light of the regional policy plan that prioritized rural development, employment programmes and educational projects, some larger-scale rural projects were supported. This was, for example, the case for the IFAD programme on rural development of small farmers. The Dutch government decided to support the Zacapa/Chiquimula part of the larger programme for the amount of over NLG 3 million.¹⁵⁰ This programme was carried out in cooperation with the Guatemalan Ministry (Mincomtrob), and over several years received assistance for the amount of over NLG 11 million. In the Cuchumatanes region, another target region of Dutch support, the IFAD programme, received support amounting to another

145 See also annexe 6 on the distribution of Dutch government aid to Guatemala.

146 Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs project BEMO GT003601.

147 Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs projects GT/91/901; GT92901; GT003601.

148 Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs project BEMO GT003601.

149 Memo in Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs file Code9/1985-1989/03895.

150 Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs project GT/89/019.

NLG 11 million in 1993.¹⁵¹ Hence, as of the late 1980s a growing support through the multilateral channel was noticeable, mainly through UNDP. After the return to civil government, opportunities for (indirect) support to the governmental channel increased. In the late 1980s, then, support was given to some initiatives of the Cerezo administration. These included the before-mentioned ‘emergency projects’, *i.e.* short-term rural activities initiated by the Guatemalan Ministry of Agriculture, but executed by NGOs and administered by UNDP.¹⁵² A micro-enterprise programme was also supported for NLG 1.8 million, again administered by UNDP but at the initiative of the Guatemalan Vice-President.¹⁵³

Within the wider aim of rural and regional development, support was given to the ‘women’s village banking project’ of CARE International. In 1990 the project was directed towards the improvement of the socio-economic situation of 1,600 women and their families in 40 rural communities. In 1994 the project was extended to 5,000 families in 128 communities, and again supported by the Dutch government, now for the amount of NLG 2.5 million. Community development had been one of the issues that was supported through the MFO channel.¹⁵⁴ While focusing on improving the living conditions of the poor, these programmes also explicitly included activities to support organization-building, again in the light of participation and democratization. Whereas these activities mainly took place in rural communities, in the early 1990s these also focused on urban slums.

Aside from the more ‘traditional’ aid to rural and economic (informal sector) development, projects were carried out to develop human resources. A UNDP/UNESCO project on ‘curriculum improvement basic education’ was one of the first large projects that were supported for the substantial amount of NLG 4,000,000.¹⁵⁵ In following years this topic continued to receive large contributions.¹⁵⁶ Yet at the same time support through the MFO channel continued. Although humanitarian aid to refugees and displaced persons remained on the agenda, this was broadened to issues of democratization, participation and development. Moreover, support to the former target groups began to take on more ‘permanent’ forms, focusing on reintegration in some instances,¹⁵⁷ and more generally shifting to indigenous populations and small peasant farmers. Again, in the main part the MFO channel was preferred.

151 Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs project GT89021.

152 Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs projects GT/88/003; GT/88/005; GT/88/006.

153 Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs project GT/88/019. See also briefing memo from DLA/MA to Plv. DGIS on the February 1989 visit of Guatemalan Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs, OSLA/1987-1990/02947.

154 Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs projects GT/88/012; GT/88/013; GT/88/014; GT/88/015; GT90018; GT91003; GT91004.

155 Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs project GT/88/009.

156 Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs project GT90007A for the amount of NLG 4,832,019. In 1992 a follow-up was given (project GT90007B) for the amount of NLG 1,263,053. In 1993 project GT003400 also focused on reform of the curriculum of primary education. The Dutch contribution to the UNDP/SIMAC project was NLG 1,907,027. In 1998 another contribution of over NLG 7 million was made in order to strengthen formal and non-formal (primary and adult education) in Zacapa and Chiquimula.

157 Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs projects GT/86/009; GT/88/901.

In the late 1980s, emphasis also focused on research. Through the MFOs, several research projects by Guatemalan counterparts were financed, such as AVANSCO and INIAP.¹⁵⁸ These projects mainly focused on participation and democratization. The INIAP programme (Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs projects GT/89/008 and GT91006), for example, focused on political training to enhance the managerial capacities of the staff, to increase the internal democratic functioning of these civil organizations, and to enhance the capacity to translate organizational goals into political terms and strategies.¹⁵⁹ Research by FLACSO on the informal sector was also supported financially. In direct cooperation with Guatemalan universities, programmes for higher education and long-distance learning were developed.¹⁶⁰ These included the objectives of improving the quality of teaching staff, as well as decentralization to increase rural facilities. Through NUFFIC, support was also given for institutional strengthening of universities.¹⁶¹

As of this time more direct conflict-related issues also found support. A direct contribution to the peace negotiations was given with a NLG 100,000 support to the National Reconciliation Commission in 1989.¹⁶² Furthermore, support was given to the *Procuraduría* for a project on children's rights.¹⁶³ The Human Rights *Procurador*, moreover, received support for education and training.¹⁶⁴ Human rights in general took on a more prominent stand, and human rights counterpart organizations of Dutch MFOs received financial support over a number of consecutive years. The focus in this regard was on the strengthening of democratization and the stimulation of respect for human rights, by giving support to awareness-raising activities in human rights issues. Some press agencies and workers unions also received support.¹⁶⁵ In this regard, objectives focused on independent and objective news gathering, as well as independent union consolidation and the stimulation of democracy.

As of 1994, support to repatriation projects increased. Through MSF projects in the area of health care, assistance was received to the amount of over NLG 1 million,¹⁶⁶ but also organizational support to refugee groups such as CCPP (via the MFO channel). These had been established after the Esquipulas II accords and functioned as organizations in the Mexican refugee camps, becoming the official negotiation partner for the Guatemalan government. In 1995 the UNHCR programme on voluntary repatriation of Guatemalan refugees from Mexico received NLG 700,000 in support. This was repeated in 1996.¹⁶⁷ Yet (mainly rural) development projects also continued that increasingly focused on sustainable management of natural resources in combination with objectives of improving living conditions, organizational and entrepreneurial capacities.¹⁶⁸

158 See, for example, Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs projects GT/89/008, GT/89/011.

159 Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs project BEMO GT/89/008.

160 Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs projects GT/89/001; GT/89/009; GT90015.

161 Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs project GT90951.

162 Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs project GT/89/015.

163 Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs project GT/88/021.

164 Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs project GT92002.

165 Projects for the press/media: GT/90/003; GT004901. Projects for workers unions: GT/86/008, GT/90/017, GT003701.

166 Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs project GT004001.

167 Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs projects GT006301; GT006302.

168 See, for example, the 1996 project GT007801, managed by UNDP and executed by MAGA. Dutch support here amounts to over NLG 3 million.

Another change was the increase in emphasis on support to indigenous communities and groups. These included objectives in the areas of community organization, improvement of the educational level of Mayan youth, overall improvement of the position of the Indian population by training, educational material and economic production capacities, and the strengthening of indigenous languages through education, bilingual textbooks and distance education.

The cultural identity of the Mayan population also became an objective in itself in the light of democratization.¹⁶⁹ This latter objective was most apparent in the UNESCO project to strengthen the Mayan educational system (GT006001) that received financial assistance from the Dutch government of over NLG 4 million. After the signing of the agreement on the identity and rights of the indigenous population in 1994, this was further strengthened and extended to distribution and participatory involvement of the population.¹⁷⁰

Support to the democratization process also increased after 1994. Firstly, this support included continued support to the Human Rights *Procurador* (PDHG). In 1995, for example, over NLG 1 million was contributed to strengthening the PDHG's local offices.¹⁷¹ In 1998 the *Defensoría de la Mujer* of the PDHG also received a large contribution of NLG 700,000 for the strengthening of departmental offices and education.¹⁷² The human rights commission CDHG over a long period of time had already received support through the MFO channel. In 1996, however, it wanted to transfer its headquarters from Mexico to Guatemala City for which it received the support of the Dutch government, as well as for its project of the promotion of Indian rights.¹⁷³ Education in the area of democratization, social organization and reform of political power structures has formed a second area of Dutch assistance. Women's participation and the fight against inequalities between sexes and ethnic groups has often taken a central place in these projects.¹⁷⁴ The objective of democratization was also increasingly translated into institutional support. The Dutch government financed part of the larger PDHSL (*Programa de Desarrollo Humano Sostenible a Nivel Local*) project on local development processes for close to NLG 2.5 million. In general, the programme focused on the operationalization of the Peace Accords in the regions most affected by the conflict. The Dutch government financed the project with the objectives of supporting local government, improving knowledge and understanding of the Peace Accords and stimulating cooperation between various human rights groups. Thirdly, it aimed at increasing gender awareness within organizations and increasing the number of women participating in local government programmes. This project was executed by UNOPS and FONAPAZ, under the auspices of UNDP.¹⁷⁵

In the area of good governance and democratization, local governance and popular leaders - and more generally decentralization - received project funding.¹⁷⁶ These projects focused on the improvement of the organizational and managerial capacities as well as participation of civil society

169 Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs projects GT004301; GT005201; GT001903; GT005801; GT006001; GT006901; GT008301; GT009401.

170 For example, Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs project GT007701.

171 Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs project GT001002.

172 Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs project GT0010101

173 Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs project GT003802.

174 Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs projects GT002902; GT006201; GT007501.

175 Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs project GT006801. See also BEMO GT006801.

176 Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs projects GT008003; GT008005; GT008013.

and communication. The most demonstrable support in this regard has been the Good Governance Fund, established in 1996 and administered by the Dutch embassy in San José, Costa Rica. Local NGOs also received direct support for their programme on increasing participation of civil society and particularly the indigenous population. Stimulation of the implementation of the Peace Accords constituted an ever-greater part of their objectives.¹⁷⁷

Institutional strengthening has also been directly linked to the execution of the Peace Accords. Support in this regard focused on capacities to coordinate international cooperation, as well as the increase of capacities in project planning. In 1996 Dutch support was limited to small, short-term support, including technical assistance in strategy development, policy-making and reorganization and modernization. Exemplary in this regard was a project in support of the Office of the Guatemalan Vice-President to design a National Strategy and Action Plan for 1996-2000 for the modernization of the executive power and different ministries, as well as reforming bureaucracy in the area of tax collection. The Ministry of Agriculture and the Ministry of Education were also supported in a similar fashion. Similarly, there were projects aiming at strengthening SEGEPLAN in the area of project planning, regional and socio-economic policy and international cooperation. Although mainly channelled through UNDP, 'these contributions [were] closer to the [Guatemalan] government than ever before, which [implied] an acknowledgement of the work of the Arzú administration'.¹⁷⁸

With the signing of the Comprehensive Agreement on Human Rights in March 1994, a Trust Fund was established for MINUGUA concerning international verification of the agreement through the UN. As of 1995, then, consecutive contributions were made to the MINUGUA Trust Fund. Dutch support was in particular earmarked to juridical pluralism (including *derecho consuetudinario*) and multilingual justice (such as training of translators and preparation of translation procedures). In 1995 this consisted of a NLG 600,000 contribution for the verification of the human rights accord, the strengthening of institutions and programmes and instruments for the protection of human rights. In 1996 a second contribution of approximately NLG 900,000 was earmarked for the improvement of independent jurisdiction, the prison system, and the strengthening of local activities. MINUGUA III in 1997 received a contribution of nearly NLG 4 million from the Dutch government. After the signing of the Final Accord in December 1996, a Dutch financial contribution was made to the operationalization of a 'Truth Commission' (CEH). A second, more substantial contribution followed in 1998.¹⁷⁹

Another project that has been closely related to the implementation of the peace agreements was the *Proyecto del Coordinador Residente*, which received Dutch support for the amount of approximately NLG 900,000. The project aimed at strengthening UN institutions in Guatemala, and came to play an important role in coordinating external support. In the light of the finalization of peace negotiations, then, UNDP established a Trust Fund focusing on the four themes as laid down in the peace programme of the Guatemalan government. The Netherlands made a considerable contribution to this Trust Fund in 1997 of NLG 8 million, of which half was earmarked for the reintegration and

177 For example, Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs project GT008009.

178 Short governmental report on the peace process in Guatemala at the beginning of 1997. No data on file retrieval available. The projects referred to include: GT007001; GT007101; GT007201; GT007301; GT007601; GT008003; GT008011; GT008012; GT009501.

179 Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs projects GT008007; GT011301.

resettlement of displaced persons and refugees, and the other half to (the third phase of) demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants (guerrilla soldiers and army).¹⁸⁰

In 1998 there were more projects that relate closely to the implementation of the Peace Accords. The importance of *multiculturalidad* as well as indigenous rights remained central to many efforts of development and reconciliation. The UNDP Q'Anil B-project, for example, received Dutch support for the amount of over NLG 2 million.¹⁸¹ More generally focusing on conflict management and resolution, a project on alternative (traditional) modes of conflict resolution was supported. This project was managed through the MFO channel, for the amount of approximately NLG 1.5 million. Yet the judicial sector and the rule of law also continued to receive support. This was the case through the above-mentioned support to MINUGUA, focusing on the school for judges and the set up and strengthening of the *Defensa Pública*. In 1998 this was also done through support to the UNDP programme of *Jueces de Paz*.¹⁸² The central aim here was to improve access to the justice system, by 'bringing' the system to all parts of the country.

Another theme in the peace agenda has been sustainable economic development. In this regard, assistance was also provided through the UNDP programme, now in close cooperation with the Guatemalan Ministry of Agriculture (MAGA). The PROZACHI project, which was supported for approximately NLG 11 million focused on strengthening management and executive capacity of farmers in Zacapa and Chiquimula with the aim of improving access to and control over knowledge, services and goods, and the improvement of sustainable management of resources.¹⁸³ Also the large-scale PRODESAGRO project was considered as direct execution of the Peace Accords, in particular the Subsidiary Accord of May 1996 on the socio-economic aspects and rural situation. Whereas poverty in general was considered a priority, the agrarian sector has been vital with regard to the development of the country, as well as strengthening farmers' organizations.¹⁸⁴ Another 1998 contribution in this area was made to the starting phase of the Land Registry Office, which should enable the creation of the technical and judicial basis to ascertain property and land use rights in the departments of Zacapa and Chiquimula. This project was under UNDP management and executed by MAGA.¹⁸⁵

With a clearly increasing aid package since the mid-1980s, the Netherlands has become a significant donor at the bilateral level. Over the period from 1987-1997, the Netherlands became the fourth-largest bilateral donor to Guatemala, with a net ODA flow of USD 104.3 million.¹⁸⁶ Over the period 1992-1998, total Dutch government aid amounted to NLG 107.6 million. Of this aid, a minimal part (NLG 187,270 or 0.2%) was administered directly by the Guatemalan government; instead, approximately two-thirds of the aid was administered by international organizations (NLG 71.1 million or 66 per cent), and one-quarter by NGOs and Dutch co-financing organizations (NLG 25.5 million or 24 per cent).¹⁸⁷

180 Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs projects GT010001; GT010002.

181 Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs project GT007702.

182 Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs project GT010601.

183 Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs project GT009701.

184 Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs project GT009501.

185 Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs project GT.012001.

186 According to OECD-DAC. See also annexe 5.

187 Based on MIDAS. See also annexe 6.

For a complete overview of Dutch project support to Guatemala during the period from 1988-1998 as registered in the MIDAS system, see annexe 9. The projects during the period from 1984-1993 have been retrieved from the FOS and DAS (financial administration) system, of which an overview is provided in annexe 8.

4.3.3 *Relationship to the Conflict*

In general terms it can be argued that the majority of aid to Guatemala has been of a conflict-related nature. This is first of all the case because the Netherlands did not have a permanent relationship of development cooperation before the 1980s, whereas the conflict - although of a low-intensity and protracted nature - had already started two decades before. Hence, it was at the height of the conflict in the late 1970s and early 1980s that the Guatemalan conflict started to catch Dutch attention. The 'conflict-relatedness' of the projects, then, results from the observation that these have been initiated *because* of the (intensification of) conflict. Yet this can also to a large extent be argued with regard to the contents of the projects, as well as for their objectives. These have mainly been of the type labelled as indirect conflict interventions: they were directed at the context of the violent hostilities. While they aimed at attenuating the negative impact of the conflict, at the same time they were of a longer-term character by addressing the underlying causes of conflict. Dutch development aid interventions, then, strongly focused on humanitarian and refugee aid during the course of conflict, human rights and civil society projects during and after the conflict, and rehabilitation and reconstruction in the post-conflict setting. Moreover, project support focused on specific groups that originated through and in the course of the conflict, such as refugees and internally displaced, and in a later stage the 'returnees' and ex-combatants. More generally, support was given to groups that were deemed to be especially vulnerable, such as the indigenous communities, children and women.

In addition to this classification, it can be argued that a number of these projects, which here have been labelled as indirect conflict-related interventions, have indeed exercised *direct* influence on the scope, course and intensity of the conflict itself. Besides support to projects of demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants, these include projects in support of the peace negotiations and implementation of the Accords. Indeed, the Guatemalan Peace Accords comprise a full range of political, economic, social and cultural reforms, which is an acknowledgement by all actors involved of the significance of including these elements in a comprehensive solution to the conflict. Furthermore, support to the Clarification Commission should contribute to reconciliation, whereas organizational development and democratic support should lead to participation through the political system. In this regard then, the direct conflict relatedness stems from a possible consolidation of peace as well as the prevention of *future* conflicts. However, as has been argued in previous chapters, these preventive effects are hard to prove in practice.

4.3.4 *Intervention Moments*

On the most general level one could argue that Dutch project interventions were expedient in terms of the point in time at which they were undertaken, as they broadly followed the course of the conflict. Yet at the same time it should be said that Dutch project support was only initiated at a moment in time at which internally as well as regionally the efforts at de-escalating the conflict were starting to pay off (return to civil government, regional peace initiatives). Furthermore, the international context

changed favourably towards the end of the Cold War. Hence, Dutch development support became 'active' at a positive moment in the process, and thus is reactive rather than proactive.

The change in the nature of projects demonstrates a strong logic with regard to the timing of intervention. At the height of the conflict in the late 1970s and early 1980s project interventions were almost exclusively directed towards internally displaced peoples and refugees, and consisted of emergency relief and humanitarian aid. The return to civilian government in 1986 did not change the emphasis that was placed on this type of aid, which continued as long as these needs remained. What changed however, was the way in which the *discrete* nature of these projects was translated into open support (whenever possible).

The 1986 democratic transition was followed by an expansion of project support towards popular participation, civil society organization, and some carefully scrutinized projects in cooperation with Guatemalan governmental organizations. This all took place in the light of support to 'young democracies'. Projects in the area of human rights were also openly supported, such as, for example, the Human Rights *Procurador*. Also the opening up of opportunities for interventions in the more 'traditional' areas of development support were seized upon. Since 1993-1994 the 'indigenous issue' has been taken up, in particular in the area of education. Many of these projects and support to organizations could also count on follow-up support over consecutive years, thereby (ideally) contributing to longer-term developments.

Another expression of the expediency of Dutch support is found after 1994 when negotiations truly started to take off and a peace agreement came into sight. Projects in good governance and institutional strengthening were increased. Dutch support, for example, has been provided to several governmental institutions in order to help them prepare and build capacities for the implementation of the Peace Accords. The establishment of the Good Governance Fund has also been widely appreciated for its flexibility, and has for example been used to prevent stopping MINUGUA's project *Justicia y Multiculturalidad* due to financial problems. The operationalization of the Truth Commission was supported in the same manner. Overall, support was provided to MINUGUA, and thereby an important contribution was made to human rights verification as well as some first steps in the reform of the judicial system.

The final signing of the Firm and Lasting Peace in December 1996 resulted in a sharp rise in Dutch funding, and support was given to various areas of implementation of the Peace Accords, as well as spreading knowledge on the contents of the Accord to indigenous communities. Moreover, the Dutch government has supported activities and initiatives that aimed at increasing donor coordination.

4.3.5 Outcomes

In general it is very hard to comment on the outcomes of the projects, as they cannot be assessed outside the broader context of support and aid of other donors and contributions by the Guatemalan government. Dutch policy interventions in this regard have followed overall international donor policy. Furthermore, and in particular with regard to the aid support to more recent projects, the often-stated objective of strengthening the peace process is hard to measure in qualitative terms (see also paragraph 2.4.).

Bilateral development cooperation only began to take shape in the protracted yet de-escalating phase of conflict, which makes it difficult to distinguish clearly between conflict-related and non-conflict-related elements of project intervention. Development-related objectives that are related to an

agenda of poverty reduction, democratization and good governance prevail. Direct objectives of conflict prevention and conflict resolution are not clearly stated in Dutch policy towards Guatemala. Moreover, as conflict - in terms of repression, violence and (counter)-insurgency attacks - peaked in the late 1970s and early 1980s, it was in particular the consequences of the conflict that came to form the basis of intervention. Human rights and humanitarian aid to internally displaced persons and refugees, then, constituted key elements. Whereas all of the above issues are inextricably linked to a conflict-policy agenda (in particular *structural* conflict prevention by addressing the root causes of conflict), it is also important to look at the intentions of policy interventions and the coherence of political and project aid interventions. Paragraph 4.4. will therefore focus on an assessment of overall policy.

An important 'outcome' of the increased aid programme to Guatemala was the 1997 opening of a Dutch embassy in Guatemala. This has played an important role in various regards. First, it was a clear statement of political support towards the Guatemalan peace process, further strengthened by the doubling of aid. Secondly, the embassy has played a key role in designing Dutch development cooperation activities towards post-conflict Guatemala. Diplomatic presence has clearly improved cooperation, information-gathering, and decision-making. And, although of a limited volume, the Good Governance Fund has added some flexibility in short-term response-capacity.

Furthermore, importance is attached to a coherent approach regarding the contents of the projects. This, for example, is illustrated by concerns when components of large projects are not linked up, such as socio-political ones (human rights, gender) with political (local government) and economic ones. The same concern exists for cooperation between different projects that mutually affect each other (such as local government projects and democracy projects). As regards the latter, the Dutch representatives in Guatemala are in close contact with the 'like-minded' countries as well as with international organizations. The Dutch embassy in this regard participates in donor consultations at three levels: first, through regular meetings with UNDP, open to all donors, on specific topics, such as reform of the justice sector or education; secondly, through EU meetings, in which only the member states participate; and lastly, through informal meetings of the like-minded countries (Denmark, Norway, Sweden, the Netherlands). The latter meetings are of an *ad hoc* nature and in some cases include Germany and Canada as well.

Much importance is attached to the involvement of the Guatemalan state. This concerns financial burden-sharing as well as the need to work towards a congruence of local or regional programmes and national policies. Progress is made at yet another level, as the Dutch embassy is increasing its informal contacts at the civil society level (for example with organizations that are supported through the MFO channel). In this regard, the closing down of KAP (the 'small embassy projects') was considered the loss of an effective and flexible instrument for creating 'goodwill'.

4.4 Tentative Assessment of Dutch Policies and Interventions

Dutch policy towards Guatemala has changed substantially over the years of conflict and peace. In the 1980s Dutch governmental support was mainly of a humanitarian and emergency nature. MFOs and NGOs were the main channels for this aid. In the early 1990s, a shift could be noticed towards overall development objectives, for which the international organizations (IGO) have been the preferred channel. When the peace negotiations took a positive turn in the second half of the 1990s, direct conflict-related aid increased. Again IGOs were the preferred channel. Whereas direct support to the

Guatemalan government has remained minimal, much of this aid is provided to projects managed in cooperation with the Guatemalan government. Dutch policies and interventions have been mainly reduced to instruments of development cooperation. Political and diplomatic manoeuvring, at least at the bilateral level, has been minimal. Dutch foreign policy in general lacks a focus on Latin America. Overall, the assessment of Dutch project interventions in Guatemala has been positive. Yet it should be acknowledged that this was related to the openings that were offered by the changing international context. In particular in post-conflict Guatemala it appears that many lessons still need to be learned regarding a policy that aims at preventing future conflicts. This mainly involves the politically oriented aspects of such a policy. In a mid-term review mission to Central America in July 1990, the importance of political reporting is already made explicit, by saying that ‘...cooperation with Central America requires very thorough coordination of socio-economic and political analysis ...’.¹⁸⁸ It further observes that ‘...in this region, more than anywhere else, development cooperation involves intensive and extensive political reporting and, where necessary, making *démarches* and adopting positions in the UN and the EC, and providing support to human rights organizations.’ Although these comments refer to a period in Guatemalan history when peace had not been signed, the observation is important as it discards the ‘illusion’ of neutral aid.

But also at the time it appears that the observation has remained without clear further consequences at the policy level. Moreover, this absence of a coordinated analysis has been reflected at the political and diplomatic level. Most exemplary in this regard may be the rather ‘restless’ and unstable history of diplomatic representation and Dutch presence in Guatemala. During the period under research, representation changed from OS office to embassy, back to OS office and finally the current embassy, each with intervals of only Honorary Consul representation. Furthermore the embassies and OS offices have been accredited to the Dutch embassy in Mexico as well as the Dutch embassy in Costa Rica. But also the 1980 closing of the embassy is worth mentioning in this regard, as it came at a time of growing political and social unrest in Guatemala. Moreover, as the Dutch embassy in Guatemala covered El Salvador and Honduras as well as Guatemala, the decision can be valued as ‘indifference’ towards regional developments at the time. Hence, too little attention has been given to the unintended side-effects of this lack of consistency, over the years as well as with regard to the separate changes in (diplomatic) representation. Although - with the exception of the 1997 opening of the embassy - in all instances explicit reference is made that neither the closing/opening of subsequent offices nor the status of Dutch diplomatic representation in Guatemala had any political connotation, in practice however this political impact cannot be denied.

The Dutch ‘disinterest’ in Guatemala further corresponds with the inactive position of the Netherlands before the Human Rights Commission of the United Nations in the early 1980s and the acknowledgement that the 1982 intervention in the Third Commission meant a first cautious but rather unintentional breaking point in this regard. Dutch involvement at the height and the aftermath of the Guatemalan (and more generally, the Central American) conflict should therefore foremost be contributed to public interest and pressure for action. The MFO and NGO channel was chosen to support activities, mainly of a humanitarian nature, but inherently obtaining a political connotation as a result of the particular conflict dynamics and perceptions of the parties involved. The ‘discrete’ nature of support further enabled the Dutch government’s wish to take on a ‘neutral stance’. Although military government and human rights violations were rejected, no forward support to the guerrillas or

188 MTR report of July 1990 in Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs file OSLA/1985-1990/03376.

direct involvement was desired (yet this was most likely the case through the MFO channel). The sensitivity of financially supporting projects in (and even concerning) Guatemala is demonstrated by a number of carefully scrutinized project proposals from solidarity movements, for which the argument of ‘contravening foreign and development cooperation policy of the Dutch government’ was applied as why not to grant a subsidy. This was because these movements maintained close ties and supported the armed URNG, and these relations had not been cut after the return to civil government.¹⁸⁹

Increasingly however, the idea of neutral aid was left aside, as the possibilities for more critical stances opened up in the 1990s. Here, a clear shift in the Dutch approach towards the development programme in Guatemala is noticeable. Support to civil society and human rights organizations as well as the Human Rights *Procurador* was now of an open character. Moreover, this concrete support is acknowledged to be an important expression of the importance attached to the issue of human rights. The political signal thereof should thus give organizations operating in the field, and in particular NGOs, a bit of ‘encouragement’ (apart from the financial assistance).¹⁹⁰ Furthermore, it was acknowledged that these types of projects have a high ‘immaterial’ character, of which results, and in particular short-term results, cannot easily be measured. Dutch support in another area plays a crucial role, namely in the field of education, and in particular curriculum improvement, decentralization of education and bilingual education. The UNESCO programme in Guatemala is for the major part financed by Dutch governmental support. Although it remains difficult to categorize these activities in the ‘conflict-related category’, the importance of these projects has been widely acknowledged. Whereas some donor governments such as the Nordic countries have strongly focused on the success of the peace process and negotiations, various Guatemalan counterparts have stressed the importance of realizing that ‘this could not have worked without the particular assistance given by other European countries... This emphasis on the peace process has only succeeded because there were capable actors on the ground, who would not have existed without the assistance of, for example, the Netherlands, which has much more promoted such long-term development programmes in the rural areas.’¹⁹¹ Seen from this perspective we can conclude that some form of complementarity - however unwittingly - existed between assistance provided by the different donor countries.¹⁹²

Hence, to a certain extent it is difficult to negate that the Guatemalan conflict has only been the context in which a development cooperation relationship was developing. Particularly in the 1980s, objectives of democratization and poverty reduction prevailed. This is most clearly demonstrated by attempts of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs to ‘neutralize’ aid interventions from any political connotation. This, however, cannot be seen outside the Cold War context and the role that the United States played in the region. At the time, then, the particular role of the Netherlands in the Guatemalan conflict had to do with the regional and international context of the conflict as much as with Dutch foreign policy and status. Yet at the same time - and with hindsight - it can be argued that Dutch development cooperation in Guatemala in the 1980s and 1990s contains examples of what has become known as ‘peace aid’ and support for activities that create the conditions for peace. Whereas at the time they could be merely conflict-synchronous, in the light of the later peace negotiations and post-conflict setting these have almost inherently become of a conflict-related nature. This observation,

189 Memo in Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs file OSLA/1985-1990/01113.

190 Memo in Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs file DLA/2014/00134.

191 De Zeeuw, ‘The Practice of Intervention’, taken from an interview with an NGO in Guatemala.

192 De Zeeuw, ‘The Practice of Intervention’, taken from an interview with an NGO in Guatemala.

however, cannot lead one to conclude that Dutch development cooperation policy towards Guatemala has been *explicitly* conflict-related or mitigating in nature. Instead, policies have been incrementally applied. An explicit conflict-related or preventive element is lacking for the future. This is moreover the case as one considers the lack of a strategic conflict policy, policy priorities, or an idea of sequencing interventions. ‘Measuring’ effects, then, is limited to the project level. Furthermore, as in the past, political analysis has mainly come down to reporting on events, rather than an attempt at constructing a type of analysis that could form the basis for more appropriate aid intervention planning. In this regard, current political events in Guatemala have only led to reactive actions through, for example, *démarches*. In particular the political nature of (needed) change and reform in contemporary Guatemalan state and society would justify a more structured approach towards analysis, reporting and monitoring, in order to identify priority fields of Dutch intervention as well as coordination with other actors. The challenge would thus consist of the development of a clear coherent strategy on how to avoid *future* conflicts.

5 Conclusions and Lessons Learned

This study has focused on the period 1986-1998 as the ‘end phase’ of the Guatemalan civil war. This enabled a study on the conflict-related nature of Dutch interventions not only in the narrow sense of conflict prevention, but rather in finding a negotiated solution to armed confrontation and the potential of democracy-building in this regard. It has furthermore offered the possibility to assess the options for international mediation in situations of conflict. Whereas strong economic and political interests in the Central American region were absent from Dutch policy motivations, the Guatemalan case has, moreover, been interesting in that it offered the possibility to assess the role of development cooperation instruments in relation to conflict.

As was the case for the international community in general, the Netherlands for a long time remained passive in the Guatemalan conflict. This can be attributed to the Cold War context and more specifically the dominant role of the US in the Central American region. With the escalation of conflict in the 1960s, the excesses and abuses that were committed as part of the counter-insurgency effort¹⁹³ met some reactions from the diplomatic force accredited in Guatemala. Recommendations that control should be established over the military proved successful, and some changes were carried out in the military command. Overall, however, relations were directed towards (limited) economic interests in the region as a result of the establishment of the Central American Common Market. Conflict moreover was of a low-intensity nature during most of the 1960s and 1970s. Only in the second half of the 1970s did unrest increase. Popular protests and violent repressive measures by the military (which were supported by the elites) drove out most international companies and diplomatic representations. Whereas in some cases this led to a breaking-off of diplomatic relations (Spain), in the case of the Netherlands this was confined to the closing down of the embassy and the instalment of an Honorary Consul. There was a lack of international observance or accompaniment, and little outside pressure was exerted on the government.¹⁹⁴

When the conflict turned more violent in the late 1970s and early 1980s, the ‘genocidal’ nature of the Guatemalan civil conflict resulted in an overall condemnation of the Guatemalan government. This led to a virtual situation of international isolation from 1977 until 1986. The fact that Guatemala became an ‘international pariah’ at the same time stimulated political and diplomatic manoeuvring before international, multilateral forums. Public pressure on the Dutch government to intervene was the main driving force. Yet whereas during the 1960s diplomatic pressure had been successful in containing violence, this changed when the military had established firm control over the state

193 The counter-insurgency campaign in the Zacapa region, for example, is estimated to have cost thousands of civilian lives in 1968.

194 Lent, ‘The Search for Peace and Justice in Guatemala’, p. 87.

apparatus. At that time international isolation did not affect the regime and indeed even boosted the military's self-esteem. Only after 1983, when the regime became more divided on counter-insurgency strategies and ambivalence increased over the issue of political and social reform, did external pressure help to tip the balance.¹⁹⁵ Human rights violations, democratization, and economic decline moreover created an internal enabling environment for pressure and support. International political pressure continued before the UN General Assembly on Human Rights, and the aid instrument also gained in importance (see below).

After the democratic transition, the European countries were moreover inclined to question the US position in the region. The same was true for the regional countries, as the Contadora group and the Central American Presidents started a regional peace negotiation process with internal implications. After a slow start in the late 1980s, negotiations between the Guatemalan government and the guerrillas started to pay off in the mid-1990s. International influence was significant in pressuring the two sides to continue negotiating, as was Guatemala's desire to restore its international image.

Conditionality was used as well as outright sanctions and the stopping of aid to pressure for change. The promise of substantial post-war economic assistance was also used to induce cooperation, and external financial and technical assistance had a great influence on the actions of the parties and their positions and concessions in the discussions. Significantly, the threat of political isolation and economic sanctions proved successful at a critical moment in the Guatemalan transition: Serrano's *autogolpe* in May 1993. Diplomatic pressure from a variety of donors (of which most notably the United States) played an important role in dissuading the Guatemalan military and economic elite from putting its weight behind the *autogolpe*. Of even greater significance may have been the unanimous reaction of the OAS member states. Yet both the OAS and international pressure worked as rapidly as they did only because of the massive mobilization of Guatemalan civil society.¹⁹⁶

In other instances, however, international pressure proved less successful or was applied inappropriately. This was the case, for example, in the 1994 postponement of MINUGUA deployment, as this delay affected the population and not the combating parties. The UN was criticized for conditioning its on-site verification to progress in the peace talks, in particular with regard to the 'human rights' costs and consequences of delayed deployment. This led many to conclude that the international community was 'only interested in a ceasefire, not in seeing a resolution of the substantive issues which are considered to have originated and fuelled the armed conflict.'¹⁹⁷

Although a large number of international organizations, (international) NGOs and national governments came to play various roles in the Guatemalan peace process, the facilitator role of the government of Norway is worth mentioning here. This was first of all the result of its neutral position as a small country, with no historic relations to Guatemala or economic or political interest. This further enabled a professional relationship with the various parties to the conflict. More significant, however, was the fact that Norwegian organizations (mainly Norwegian Church Aid) and personalities had for many years already 'taken up' the Guatemalan case. This implied that a solid network and

195 See also L. Diamond (1995), *Promoting Democracy in the 1990s: Actors and Instruments, Issues and Imperatives*, Report to the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict (New York: Carnegie Corporation), p. 51.

196 Diamond, *Promoting Democracy in the 1990s*, p. 54.

197 Monsignor Quezada Toruño cited in Baranyi, *The Challenge in Guatemala*, p. 4.

knowledge of the country had been built up over the years. The lesson that small countries in particular can learn from this experience is that, in the absence of strong political or military instruments, there are indeed crucial opportunities for more direct and active involvement in conflict situations. Yet, this is conditioned on a thorough understanding of the conflict, the various partners, their perceptions and objectives, and the ability to create a minimum level of trust with the combating parties. Another important lesson of the Guatemalan conflict, however, is the *internal precondition* for creating an environment for change and ending the conflict. Whereas the Norwegian offer to act as facilitator of talks proved successful, the 1991-1993 Dutch offer did not materialize as a result of an internal deadlock to the negotiations. Indeed, it has been the internal break-up of the power-holding elites (military supported by economic elite) and the coming to the fore of more reformist sectors that proved crucial in this regard. From that moment on, international intervention was considered possible and crucial.

The potential for pressure and aid conditionality, in particular for bilateral donors but more generally for the international community on influencing the course, scope and intensity of violent conflict, then, is limited as long as the internal dynamics and combating parties' interests do not allow for such intervention. It is hence the internal situation that draws the parameters for the nature of intervention and the implementation of a strategy. These parameters may have become less favourable again in post-war Guatemala, as the government appears increasingly impervious to international pressure or critique. This is true in particular for bilateral donor governments (with the exception of the United States), more than for the international financial organizations.

Yet whereas external actors cannot create political will in these areas where none exists, they can, and should, seek all opportunities to nurture existing political will. The possibilities of this type of support were clearly demonstrated during the de-escalating phase of the Guatemalan conflict. The 1986 return to civil government instigated a rise in overt support for popular organizations. The Dutch government started to implement a policy line of support to 'young democracies'. Although cooperation with governmental institutions was limited to some support to the Guatemalan Ministries of Agriculture and Education (via multilateral organizations), most aid was provided to civil society development projects via NGOs and MFOs. Popular organizations came to play an important role as the 'middle player' between the polarized positions of the Guatemalan government and guerrillas. The international agenda of democratization, then, has positively contributed to pushing ahead a negotiated way out of the conflict. Moreover, the support to civil society organizations stimulated the coming to the fore of previously excluded groups or demands that had been absent from public debate. Indigenous groups, women's organizations and victims of the violent conflict, among others, now expressed their demands. This further stressed the importance of including substantive issues such as indigenous rights, socio-economic development and democratization in the peace negotiations.

Democracy and peace have thus become intricately linked in the Guatemalan peace process. Due to the nature of military- and economic elite-dominated regimes in Guatemala, the emphasis has been on civil society development in the form of support to local NGOs. This approach to civil society-building largely remains unchallenged. These organizations, then, have flourished in post-conflict Guatemala. At the same time, most of these NGOs are highly dependent on external resources; some capitalize on the international discourse; and others contribute to divisiveness and distrust by focusing on particular interests and target groups. Moreover, the aiding of numerous interest groups with particularistic demands may diminish other ways of expression that are crucial to democracy, such as

through political parties.¹⁹⁸ This implies that a diversification of partners is needed at several levels of 'democracy-building'. The state and its institutions cannot be excluded in this regard. Only when strategies are absorbed into public policies can they be expected to be of a more sustainable nature. Post-conflict aid, and more specifically the peace agenda, has included elements of modernization and strengthening of the democratic state. On the other hand, the state struggles with a legitimacy deficit. This is a legacy of the past, but is moreover preserved by the lack of true reform.

The discussion on democratization in post-conflict Guatemala thus needs to move beyond a focus on either democratic institution-building at the macro-level, or social movements operating at the micro-level. What is needed is a more integrated analysis that returns to discussions of the ways in which state-society relations are constructed. Institutional support should focus on the political-institutional structure but should not lead to the modernization and legitimizing of old institutions, thereby masking the need for profound reforms in certain areas.¹⁹⁹ 'Democratic' change is impossible as long as power - openly or covertly - remains beholden to the priorities of the military and the economic elite, as appeared to be the case after 1986 but also in contemporary Guatemala. Western aid, therefore, should also contribute to creating an *environment* for civil society organizations to function in a way that they can act as participatory, rather than mere protest movements. An electoral system does not suffice to establish this legitimacy, and other expressions of 'democracy' need to be explored, including power-sharing, devolution and decentralization. This furthermore includes issues of transparency of institutions and organizations, which allow for the development of a public sphere.²⁰⁰

Dedication to an agenda of reform should include to some degree the interests and views of the forces capable of subverting it. In Guatemala these above all include the conservative sectors of the economic elite and the armed forces. The inclusiveness of the process is significant because when survivors do not have a stake in making adjustments, or in reforming relationships, then the process itself is likely to fail.²⁰¹ In the post-conflict situation, then, the international conceptualization of civil society in terms of national reconciliation appears less appropriate. As is argued by Stepputat, '[the] objectivation of the social landscape works through a number of categories of intervention - repatriate, returnee, displaced, widow, etc. - which define differentiated entitlements'.²⁰² Herein lies the possibility of numerous conflicts. This asks for a more 'creative' approach in exploring opening paths, to include/accommodate so-called spoilers in the process and search for interlocutors, such as the constitution of alliances with modernizing sectors of government and parts of the private sector that also aspire to transform.

An overall lesson of the support to the Guatemalan peace process is hence that attention should be paid to the identification of relevant partners. These may differ in the post-conflict setting. Knowledge of the role of certain actors may moreover enhance the assessment of the potential for success of certain policies and instruments and show the necessity to co-opt or exclude groups with interests in

198 Diamond, *Promoting Democracy in the 1990s*, p. 48.

199 Baranyi, *The Challenge in Guatemala*, p. 9.

200 See also Yashar, 'The Quetzal is Red', pp. 259-260.

201 Pugh, *Post-Conflict Rehabilitation*, p. 2.

202 F. Stepputat, 'At the Frontier of the Modern State in Post-War Guatemala', Centre for Development Research Copenhagen, draft paper.

frustrating attempts to reach peace. In dealing with these issues, a balance needs to be struck between the role of central and local institutions, as well as governmental and non-governmental actors.

Another lesson in this regard is that intervention in conflict as well as in post-conflict situations requires a *political* approach. Any intervention that aims at transforming socio-political relationships within a society is political in nature. The political commitment to governance reforms is vital. Yet as was already observed, pressure for change and reform affects the status quo interest of particular groups that could negatively affect the efforts of post-conflict reconstruction. Hence, as aid is not neutral *vis-à-vis* the different interests in society and always constitutes a contested reality that needs to be managed carefully, its political effects need to be analysed. The challenge of development, democracy and conflict prevention is thus to find a balance between the needs and interests of a divided society.

Development cooperation should be duly valued as an instrument of conflict prevention. Particularly the post-conflict phase comprises a suitable moment to put a number of structural forms of conflict prevention into practice. Without denying the continuing importance of a proactive and preventive conflict approach in the temporal sense, the opportunities to incorporate a 'culture of prevention' in post-conflict rehabilitation and development should not be left unutilized. In the post-conflict phase there is often more political preparedness to work on this than there is prior to the outbreak of conflict. A promising area of support, for example, may be found in the field of education. Although ineffective as an 'instant remedy', educational support holds high expectations with regard to conflict prevention in the middle and longer term. Moreover, it can include various elements of democracy and participation, intercultural education, and indeed in the short term can involve the population in the building of, and awareness-raising about peace. This may help to strengthen more 'objective' levels of information, strengthen knowledge and make dialogue a tool.²⁰³ This, however, would imply the need for a commitment to conflict prevention in the longer term.

The broad agenda for post-conflict reconstruction is foremost an acknowledgement of the fact that the strengthening of peace requires a range of activities, stretching from socio-economic development to democratization and conflict resolution. First, this concerns the reform of security structures. This includes shorter-term measures such as the demobilization and reintegration of former combatants, and the role of the police and security forces. Secondly, political rebuilding focuses on the political, judicial and legal structures as well as issues of human rights and accountability. Furthermore, after decades of war, high levels of poverty and the build-up of highly unequal structures, the issue of economic rebuilding is central. These include macroeconomic considerations, but should also address issues of distorted economies, appropriate assistance strategies, and in the shorter term the impacts of war. Finally, social rebuilding, local empowerment and capacity-building are considered vital in the post-conflict rehabilitation process. In the shorter term the issues of reintegration of repatriates and displaced persons needs to be addressed, as well as health care, social services and cultural issues.

The Guatemalan Peace Accord, with provisions for security, nation-building and economic rehabilitation built into it, is indeed far more comprehensive than more traditional ceasefire

203 UNDP (1999), *Civil Society: Participation and Transparency in Central America*, paper prepared for the workshop on 'Transparency and Governance' at the meeting of the II Consultative Group for Reconstruction and Transformation of Central America, Stockholm, 25-28 May 1999, p. 11, http://www.iadb.org/regions/re2/consultative_group/groups/transparency_workshop5.htm.

arrangements. Nonetheless, it has been argued that the Accords were not as substantive as they should have been, leading to concessions and a short-term practical view instead of considering the consequences for the longer term. On the other hand it is often argued that 'too much is promised' in the Accords, with neither a clear idea of how results should be achieved, nor the resources to reach them. From both critiques it may be concluded that a clear conflict-related strategy is lacking. Also Dutch support was characterized by its *ad hoc* nature, although with hindsight one could distinguish a clear, yet incremental, policy line. The absence of a well-defined strategy and objectives for the post-conflict situation further underlines this argument.

As is demonstrated by the Guatemalan study on international and Dutch conflict-related interventions, a peace agreement and international support for a broad agenda and mix of peace, rehabilitation, democratization and development issues by themselves do not guarantee a smooth transition to stable peace. A strategy that links and prioritizes the various elements of poverty, inequality, access to resources, participation and economic development to the power structure is lacking. This is most notable in the area of land reform, an issue that appears to be vital to Guatemala's conflictive past and present, but that both national and international actors are reluctant to address. In contemporary Guatemalan society many indicators of conflict potential remain.

Commitment to an agenda of conflict prevention and peace-building inherently implies that one may be confronted with a highly politicized environment of uneasy peace with deep political cleavages between parties to the conflict. As is demonstrated in post-conflict Guatemala, it remains of significance to ascertain which trends could still affect the fragile peace and latent conflict, and how an approach could be designed towards addressing them. Awareness has grown that international community intervention is not without impact. The 'priority areas' of the Guatemalan Peace Programme are in no way well-crystallized areas of intervention. In particular in the absence of a clear strategy, these may contradict each other and even clash. Hence, whereas the 1996 Agreement for a Firm and Lasting Peace formally put an end to the conflict, the post-conflict situation has not taken away the possibility of recurring violent conflict. Explicit conflict and policy analyses, including conflict-impact assessment, are essential instruments in this regard.

The key to whether the tools actually do fulfil their role depends on when and how they are used in relation to particular conflicts. The dynamics through which various short-, medium- and long-term factors interact thus has to be understood, to help pin down what kinds of preventive priorities are most appropriate in a specific situation and in what magnitude. Needs will hence vary in urgency and priority. Too often, however, 'policy debate has stimulated instant prescriptions rather than starting with the nature of the problem, through ground-up, in-depth assessments of particular conflict settings. Responding to potential trouble spots thus goes beyond responding to certain 'early warning' signals and includes a wider and deeper analysis of the particular sources of the potential for violence, and the constraints and opportunities that indigenous parties in conflict have available for coping.'²⁰⁴ Better and more structured conflict *and* policy analysis could thus contribute to an improvement in the identification of support and aid projects. The central issue, then, is not as much the question of *what* to do, but *how* to apply this agenda in practice, *i.e.* proper conflict-strategy design that prioritizes objectives and sequences activities, to make peace sustainable.

204 M. Lund (1999), 'The Meaning and Components of Preventive Diplomacy', in J. Ginifer, E. Eide and C. Rønnfeldt (eds), *Preventive Action in Theory and Practice: The Skopje Papers* (Oslo: NUPI), p. 147.

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Annexe 1

Files from the Foreign Office Archives

Files from the Foreign Office Archives

*Files from the archives of the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs that have been included in the study on Dutch policy interventions in the Guatemalan conflict and peace.*²⁰⁵

These files were selected as follows²⁰⁶: from a total of 1,479 records corresponding with ‘Guatemala’ or ‘Guatamala’ a first selection was based on the variable *time period* (1987-1998).²⁰⁷ Furthermore, the OS files were left out in order to focus on the diplomatic and political ones.²⁰⁸ By also leaving out financial files (so-called *F-mappen*) that contain information about administrative budgets of embassies and consulates, and KAP files that comprise very specific financial information on small-scale local activities at the embassies, 462 files remained.

These files have been categorized on the basis of their departmental/sectional origin, in order to exclude the irrelevant ones.²⁰⁹ The final sample, then, consisted of 348 files, which were further classified under headings such as ‘Guatemala political situation’, ‘international organizations’, ‘policy’, ‘meetings’, and ‘visits and journeys’, but also more specific ones such as ‘human rights’, ‘debts’, ‘good governance’, and ‘refugees’. The most relevant information was found in files under the headings ‘policy’ (comprising a broad range of policy papers, and official and internal memos that provide us with an accurate description of Dutch foreign and development cooperation policy towards Guatemala), ‘meetings’ (that include memos on Dutch policy priorities as propagated during meetings with officials from other donor countries or international organizations) and ‘visits and journeys’ (of Dutch as well as Guatemalan officials, during which the views of the Dutch government on its policy and the particular situation/political climate are expressed). A final list of some 70 files remained.

Policy and Diplomatic Relations

Dla/2012/00064

Dla/2013/00067

Dla/2013/00081

Dla/2017/00404

Dla/2014/00113

Dla/2016/00226

Dla/2016/00227

Dwh/ara/02297

205 The categorization of the files is mainly taken from the report of De Zeeuw, ‘The Practice of Intervention’.

206 The description of the selection procedure is taken from the report of De Zeeuw, ‘The Practice of Intervention’, p. 7.

207 Regional files - a total number of 368 - have been excluded, since the most relevant also turn up in the country-specific sample (De Zeeuw, ‘The Practice of Intervention’).

208 Because of the large number of projects executed in Guatemala, the files on specific projects have only been consulted on a selective basis. For an overview of these development cooperation projects, the MIDAS system was mainly used.

209 Excluded are files from the archives of *Directie Kabinet Protocol* (DKP); *Hoofddirectie Dienst Buitenlandse Zaken* (HDBZ); *Directie Personenverkeer, Migratie, en Consulaire Zaken* (DPC); *Centrale Directie Financieel-economische Zaken* (FEZ); *Directie Culturele Samenwerking en Voorlichting Buitenland* (DCV); *Bureau Noodhulp en Humanitaire Noodkwesities DMP* (CDB); *Directie Voorlichting* (DVL); *Dienst Gebouwen Buitenland* (DGB); *Milleniumproject* (MILLEN); *Facilitaire Dienst Telecommunicatie* (FDT); *Accountantsdienst* (ACD); *Directie Organisatie en Informatievoorziening* (O&I).

Dwh/ara/03795
Dwh/ara/04002
Dwh/ara/02214
Dwh/ara/01181
Dmp/eg/ara/00172
1/guatemala/os/beleid; 1997-05-23
Code 9/1975-1984/1287 (912.1)
Dbd/1975-1984/00721
Dbd/1975-1984/00722
Dbd/1975-1984/00723

Political Situation

Code 9/1975-1984/287 (911.31)
Code 9/1975-1984/2758 (911.31)
Code 9/1975-1984/4858 (911.31)
Code 9/1975-1984/5049 (912.2)
Dla/2014/00140
Dwh/ara/02217

Meetings

General

Dmp/eg/2007/00020
Dmp/mz/2002/00408
Dmp/ib/2002/00099
Dmp/2025/01715
Dmp/mz/ara/00232
Dch/2018/00466
2/midden amerika/eu/san jose xiii/werkmap T
EG/1975-1984/06111 (996.912.110)

AVVN

Dpv/ara/01629
Osla/1985-1990/02623
VN/1975-984/2357 (999.214.9)
VN/1975-1984/2621 (999.232.154)
VN/1975-1984/2622 (999.232.154)

Consultative Group for Guatemala

Dla/2015/00216
Dla/2015/00136
Dla/2016/00225
Dla/2017/00337
Dwh/ara/04154

Visits and Journeys

Code 9/1985-1989/03895

Code 9/1985-1989/03896

Code 9/1985-1989/03897

Osla/1985-1990/03376

Osla/1985-1990/01113

Osla/1985-1990/02958

Osla/1985-1990/02947

Dla/2014/00134

Dla/2017/00336

Dla/2017/00337

Dmp/2025/00989

Dmp/2025/01071

Dwh/ara/03187

Dwh/ara/03882

Dwh/ara/03883

Dwh/ara/03884

Dwh/ara/03885

Dwh/ara/03299

Dwh/ara/00726

Dwh/ara/00688

1/guatemala/bezoeken/van Ned.; 1999-04-07

Human Rights

Ddi-dio/2006/00561

Ddi-dio/2007/00450

1/guatemala/mensenrechten; 1998-05-07

1/guatemala/mensenrechten; 1996-10-23

1/guatemala/mensenrechten/doodstraf; 1997-08-25

1/guatemala/os/mensenrechten; 1999-02-22

Other*Research on Archives*

Ddi-bi/2014/00154

Ddi-bi/2015/00149

Ddi-bi/2014/00110

Ddi-bi: 1995-05-15; 153.3 lottum thhjm van

Country Screening

2/westelijk halfmond/os/landenscreening; 1999-02-10

Economy and Economic Relations

1/guatemala/os/economie/schulden; 1997-02-18

code 6/1975-1984/2737 (614.033)

Good Governance

1/guatemala/os/good governance

Parliamentary Questions

1/guatemala/kamervragen; 1999-01-28

Refugees and Humanitarian Aid

Unhcr/1975-1984/109 (997.4)

Code 7/1975-1984/610 (726.1)

Dal/1975-1984/02798 (610.32)

Dla/2005/00010

Dla/2015/00009

Ex-combatants

1/guatemala/vn-eu/exstrijders; 1997-02-20

Peace Process

Dwh/ara/03186

Files 1978-1984

General and Diplomatic Relations

Relations with the Netherlands

Code 9/1975-1984/1287

Code 6/1975-1984/2737

Dbd/1975-1984/00721

Dbd/1975-1984/00722

Dbd/1975-1984/00723

Political Relations and Parties

Code 9/1975-1984/287

Code 9/1975-1984/2758

Code 9/1975-1984/4858

General and Diplomatic Relations between US-Guatemala

Code 9/1975-1984/5049

EG

Eg/1975-1984/2357

International Organisations

UNHCR/1975-1984/109

ILO/1975-1984/191

VN/1975-1984/2357

VN/1975-1984/2621

VN/1975-1984/2622

Humanitarian Aid

Code 7/1975-1984/610

Dal/1975-1984/02798

Development Cooperation (OS) Files (see annexes 6 through 9):

The OS files were scanned with the help of the MIDAS inventory, a documentation system that lists all OS activities under an 'activity number'. Since the system came into operation only in 1992, the number of projects included during the period 1987-1992 may not be exhaustive. The so-called FOS system, an inventory that came into operation in 1985 and was predominantly financial and budgetary in nature, was researched separately by research assistant J. van der Lijn. The development cooperation activities have been coded by country or region. In our case, the code that starts with 'GT', standing for Guatemala, is of particular relevance. Further activities that include Guatemalan 'beneficiaries' are coded 'RF' (activities initiated for the Central American region as a whole) and 'WW' (activities with worldwide application). These activities have been included only to a limited degree. They have been studied when relevant, but have not been included in the quantitative representation of Dutch financial aid to Guatemala, since it has proven to be impossible to decompose the total budgets for specific countries.

BEMOS and Evaluations of Projects:

GT90903	GT006301	GT010001
GT90003	GT006302	GT010002
GT92901	GT006801	GT006503
GT90018	GT008006	GT011301
GT93951	GT008007	GT009501
GT003601	GT008009	GT010401
GT003801	GT008014	GT010601
GT005301		

Annexe 2

Interviews and Meetings

Interviews and Meetings

This annexe provides an overview of the interviews and meetings held with key informants at the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Dutch NGOs and MFOs, headquarters and field offices of international organizations, and with representatives of 'other' Western donors, the Guatemalan government and local NGOs. These include interviews held by the author as well as by the assistant researcher, Jeroen de Zeeuw.

The Netherlands

Chris Brands	HIVOS
Abe Dijkstra	NOVIB
Susan van der Meij	ICCO
Edith Boekraad	Bilance
Sandra Boets-Van Wakeren	DWH/MC
Christina van Kooten	DMD/PO
Dirk Kruijt	

Washington DC, 10-12 May 1999

Manuel Martin de Moya	
Francisco Guillermo Fuentes	IDB - Country Coordinator Guatemala
Patricia Cleves	World Bank - Post-Conflict Unit
Tully Cornick	USAID - Central American Affairs, Guatemala Desk

Guatemala, 13 May-4 June 1999

W. Plomp	Royal Netherlands Embassy
J. Berghuis	Royal Netherlands Consulate
Kurt Lange	Danish Mission <i>Coordinadora de la Cooperación Danesa en Guatemala</i>
Jon Otto Brodholt	Embassy of Norway
Manuel Montobbio de Balanzo	Embassy of Spain
Letitia Butler	USAID

Jack McCarthy	USAID
Christina Elich	UNDP
Edelberto Torres Rivas	UNDP/FLACSO
Federico Figueroa	UNESCO
Elizabeth Gibbons	UNICEF
John Wiater	MINUGUA (during late 1980s and early 1990s representative of CRS - Christian Relief Service in Guatemala)
Fernando Calado Bryce	OIM - <i>Organizacion Internacional para las Migraciones</i> (former representative of FONAPAZ)
Jeannie Zielinski	CARE
Jean-Marc Bornet	<i>Comite Internaccional de la Cruz Roja</i>
Guillermo Pacheco Gaitán	OAS - <i>Programma de Asistencia para el Desminado</i>
Roberto Menendez	OAS - PROPAZ
Raúl Rosende	OAS
Silvio Andrade	IDB
Maria Fernández	European Union
Héctor Morales Delgado	SEPAZ - <i>Secretaria de la Paz, Presidencia de la República</i>
Pedro Obando Sosa	
Fredy Osmar Salazar Orantes	SEGEPLAN – <i>Secretaria de Planificación y Programación de la Presidencia</i>
Prof. Raúl Hernández Chacón	<i>Conferencia Episcopal de Guatemala</i> <i>Pastoral de la Movilidad Humana</i>
Monroy	ODHA
Miriam Milian	
Felipe Antonio Aldana	PDHG

Eddy Orlando Armas Ocaña	<i>Asamblea de la Sociedad Civil (ASC)</i>
Dr. René Poitevin Dardón	FLACSO
Hugo Leonel Maul Figueroa	CEDECON - <i>Centro para la Defensa de la Constitución</i>
Enrique Alvarez Domínguez	URNG/IPES - <i>Instituto de Estudios Politicos, Economicos y Sociales</i>
Zyni Ríos	
Eduardo Humberto Weymann	FRG - <i>Frente Republicano Guatemalteco</i> <i>Comite Ejecutivo Nacional</i>
Monique Larose	CECI - <i>Centro de Estudios Canadiense y Cooperación Internacional</i>
César Montes (Julio César Macías)	<i>Fundación Turcio Lima</i>
Olga Pérez	INCIDE (former board member of <i>Fundación Toriello</i>)
Rigoberto Juárez	Saqb'ichil-Copmagua
Manolo García	
Rodrigo de Batres	SERJUS
Gustavo Meoño	<i>Fundación Rigoberta Menchú Tum</i>
Clara Arenas	AVANCSO
Emilia de Garcia	GAM
Mynor Hernandez	Muni-k'at (Quetzaltenango)
Don Gregorio Tzoc	CDRO (Totonicapan)
Lili de Batres	Hogar Nuevos Horizontes (Quetzaltenango)
Miguel Morales	
Alberto Mazariegos	FUNDADESE (Quetzaltenango)
Luisa Eugenia Morales	INIAP
Helani Aiza	<i>Fundación Myrna Mack</i>

Conrado Martínez	CDHG
Antonio Coolen	Seprodi
Manuel Cedio	CCPP
Luis Ramírez	ICCPG

Annexe 3

Guatemalan Presidents, 1944-2000

Guatemalan Presidents, 1944-2000

Juan José Arévalo	1944-1951
Jacobo Arbenz Guzmán	1951-1954
Carlos Castillo Armas	1956-1957
Miguel Ramón Ydígoras Fuentes	1958-1963
Enrique Peralta Azurdia	1963-1966
Julio César Méndez Montenegro	1966-1970
Carlos Manuel Arana Osorio	1970-1974
Kjell Eugenio Laugerud García	1974-1978
Fernando Romeo Lucas García	1978-1982
José Efraín Ríos Montt	1982-1983
Oscar Humberto Mejía Víctores	1983-1986
Marco Vinicio Cerezo Arévalo	1986-1991
Jorge Serrano Elias	1991-1993
Ramiro de León Carpio	1993-1996
Alvaro Arzú Irigoyen	1996-2000
Alfredo Portillo	2000+

Annexe 4

Peace Negotiations: Meetings and Agreements

Peace Negotitations: Meetings and Agreements

A Indirect Phase of Negotiation, 1987-1993

Meetings (and Agreements)	Date	Place
<i>Government - URNG (no agreement)</i>	7-9 October 1987	Madrid, Spain
<i>CNR - URNG (Oslo Accord/Basic Accord on Seeking Peace by Political Means)</i>	26-30 March 1990	Oslo, Norway
<i>CNR delegation of 10 political parties - URNG and UN observer</i>	27 May-1 June 1990	El Escorial, Spain
<i>CNR business sector - URNG and UN observer (seperate communiqués)</i>	31 August-1 September 1990	Ottawa, Canada
<i>CNR religious groups - URNG and UN observer</i>	24-26 September 1990	Quito, Ecuador
<i>CNR - unions - popular organizations - URNG and UN observer (joint declaration)</i>	23-25 October 1990	Metepec, Mexico
<i>CNR academics - cooperatives - URNG and UN observer</i>	27-28 October 1990	Atlixco, Mexico
<i>CNR - government - URNG and UN observer (Mexico Accord/Accord for a Procedure to Seek Peace by Political Means)</i>	25-27 April 1991	Mexico City, Mexico

B Direct Phase of Negotiation, 1994-1996

Meetings and Agreements	Date	Place
<i>Framework Agreement for the Resumption of the Negotiating Process between the Government of Guatemala and the Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca</i>	10 January 1994	Mexico City, Mexico

<i>Agreement on a Timetable for the Negotiation of a Firm and Lasting Peace in Guatemala</i>	29 March 1994	Mexico City, Mexico
<i>Comprehensive Agreement of Human Rights</i>	29 March 1994	Mexico City, Mexico
<i>Agreement on Resettlement of the Population Groups Uprooted by the Armed Conflict</i>	17 June 1994	Oslo, Norway
<i>Agreement on the Establishment of the Commission to Clarify Past Human Rights Violations and Acts of Violence that have Caused the Guatemalan Population to Suffer</i>	23 June 1994	Oslo, Norway
<i>Agreement on the Identity and Rights of Indigenous Peoples</i>	31 March 1995	Mexico City, Mexico
<i>Agreement on Social and Economic Aspects and the Agrarian Situation</i>	6 May 1996	Mexico City, Mexico
<i>Agreement on the Strengthening of Civilian Power and on the Role of the Armed Forces in a Democratic Society</i>	19 September 1996	Mexico City, Mexico
<i>Agreement on the Definitive Ceasefire</i>	4 December 1996	Oslo, Norway
<i>Agreement on Constitutional Reforms and the Electoral Regime</i>	7 December 1996	Stockholm, Sweden
<i>Agreement on the Basis for the Legal Integration of the Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca</i>	12 December 1996	Madrid, Spain
<i>Agreement on the Implementation, Compliance and Verification Timetable for the Peace Agreements</i>	29 December 1996	Guatemala City, Guatemala
<i>Agreement on a Firm and Lasting Peace</i>	29 December 1996	Guatemala City, Guatemala

Annexe 5

**Net ODA Flows of the Most Important OECD
Donors to Guatemala; in Millions of USD per year**

Net ODA Flows of the Most Important OECD Donors to Guatemala; in Millions of USD per Year

	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	Total
USA	155	134	146	88	75	106	71	54	37	-1	35	900
Germany	29.8	22	14.2	18	26.9	18.7	18.3	17.7	27.5	29.3	31.7	254.1
Japan	2.5	4.4	3.9	5.3	14.9	10.5	37.9	43	37.1	44.6	49.8	253.9
Netherlands	2.6	6.7	7.3	11	7.3	8.6	11.9	6.6	13.5	12.3	16.5	104.3
Italy	7.2	16.9	28.8	15.2	13.5	10.3	10.2	6.5	-0.2	-2.3	-2.4	103.7
Norway	1.2	1.3	1.9	2.6	2.6	3.5	4.1	8	11.8	15.1	15.2	67.3
Spain	0	0	1.6	0.3	1.8	3.1	6.4	3.9	8.3	17.5	23.9	66.8
Austria	1.9	2	2	3.5	3.3	0.5	5	4.8	6.4	5.5	5.7	40.6
France	12.1	3.1	1.9	2	2.6	2	2.3	1.9	3.9	2.1	1.6	35.5
Sweden	0.2	0	0.1	0.2	0.5	1.6	1.9	2	6.1	8.2	13.6	34.4
Canada	1.1	1.3	1	0.8	2	2.7	2.7	3.7	3.2	2.5	5.5	26.5
Switzerland	0.3	0.6	0.8	1.1	1.9	6.8	2.6	1.9	1.2	2	1.4	20.6
Belgium	0.3	0.7	1.7	1.3	1.8	1.6	1.4	1.7	3.3	2.5	2.6	18.9
Denmark	0	0	0	0.1	0.2	1	1.1	1.1	1.7	2	10.6	17.8
UK	0	0	0	0.2	0.2	0.1	0.4	0.2	0.3	0.7	0.8	2.9
Finland	0	0	0	0	0.1	0	0.2	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.8
Luxembourg	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.4	0.4
New Zealand	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.1	0.1	0	0.2	0.4
Australia	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.1	0.1	0.1	0	0	0.3
Ireland	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.1	0.1	0	0.1	0.3
Portugal	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.2	0	0.2
Total bilateral	214.2	193	211.2	149.6	154.6	177	177.5	157.5	161.5	141.3	212.3	1949.7
Multilateral	26.6	42	51.6	53.9	44.1	21.3	34.5	67	53.4	75	89.5	558.9
Total ODA	240.8	235	262.8	203.5	198.7	198.3	212	224.5	214.9	216.3	301.8	2508.6

Source: OECD-DAC, Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Aid Recipients

Note: ODA is defined by the DAC as ‘those flows to developing countries and multilateral institutions provided by official agencies, including state and local governments, or by their executive agencies, each transaction of which meets the following tests:

1. It is administered with the promotion of economic development and welfare of developing countries as its main objective; and
2. It is concessional in character and conveys a grant element of at least 25 per cent. To calculate the grant element of an ODA transaction, a 10 per cent discount rate is used.’²¹⁰

The table displays *net* ODA, which, in the explanation of DAC, differs from gross ODA in the following sense: ‘At the same time as DAC Members are extending new grants and credits to the developing world, they are also receiving repayments of principal. Accordingly, the data on total new

²¹⁰ *Development Assistance Committee Statistical Reporting Directives*, DAC (88)10, part I (24 February 1998).

flows (gross disbursements) are adjusted to a net basis by deducting amortization receipts, recoveries on grants or grant-like flows, and repatriation of capital occurring during the period of the report (“net flow” or “net disbursements”). Flows originating from transactions undertaken on initiative of residents of developing countries (balance-of-payment liability side entries) are not recorded in DAC statistics.²¹¹

211 *Development Assistance Committee Statistical Reporting Directives*, DAC (88)10, part I (24 February 1998).

Annexe 6

Distribution of Dutch Government Aid, in NLG

Distribution of Dutch Government Aid, in NLG²¹²

Total Dutch government Aid (TDGA)

	NCR*	CR**	Total Dutch Government Aid	% CR of TDGA
1992	7.215.935	1.253.133	8.469.068	14.8%
1993	11.075.762	1.604.966	12.680.728	12.7%
1994	12.578.833	911.771	13.490.604	6.8%
1995	9.667.818	3.564.263	13.232.081	27.6%
1996	6.150.263	4.486.728	10.636.991	42.2%
1997	8.841.219	10.728.328	19.569.547	54.8%
1998	17.996.490	11.539.956	29.536.446	39.1%
	73.526.320	34.089.145	107.615.465	31.7%

Dutch government aid administered by the Dutch government

	NCR	CR	Total (NCR + CR)	% of TDGA	% CR of Total
1992	363.635	-	363.635	4.3%	-
1993	594.229	-	594.229	4.7%	-
1994	797.141	-	797.141	5.9%	-
1995	983.860	-	983.860	7.4%	-
1996	1.176.650	449.723	1.626.373	15.3%	27.7%
1997	348.843	76.683	425.526	2.8%	18.0%
1998	387.183	325.512	712.695	2.4%	45.7%
	4.651.541	851.918	5.503.459	5.1%	15.5%

Dutch government aid administered by MFOs

	NCR	CR	Total (NCR + CR)	% of TDGA	% CR of Total
1992	2.044.471	753.134	2.797.605	33.0%	26.9%
1993	2.548.296	1.144.509	3.692.805	29.1%	31.0%
1994	2.306.351	624.984	2.931.335	21.7%	21.3%
1995	1.058.245	253.313	1.311.558	9.9%	19.3%
1996	681.290	301.618	982.908	9.2%	30.7%
1997	959.107	132.670	1.091.777	5.6%	12.2%
1998	674.986	492.103	1.167.089	4.0%	42.2%
	10.272.746	3.702.331	13.975.077	13.0%	26.5%

* NCR= not conflict-related

** CR = conflict-related

212 Data collection and analysis of these tables was undertaken by J. van der Lijn.

Dutch government aid administered by NGOs

	NCR	CR	Total (NCR + CR)	% of TDGA	% CR of Total
1992	254.152	499.999	754.151	8.9%	66.3%
1993	14.500	460.457	474.957	3.8%	97.0%
1994	1.114.794	286.787	1.401.581	10.4%	20.5%
1995	1.655.638	1.376.046	3.031.684	22.9%	45.4%
1996	109.813	567.894	677.707	6.4%	83.8%
1997	2.005.430	882.575	2.888.005	14.8%	30.6%
1998	1.927.033	340.042	2.267.075	7.7%	15.0%
	7.081.360	4.413.800	11.495.160	10.7%	38.4%

Dutch government aid administered by IGOs

	NCR	CR	Total (NCR + CR)	% of TDGA	% CR of Total
1992	4.096.710	-	4.096.710	48.4%	-
1993	7.465.576	-	7.465.576	58.9%	-
1994	6.689.479	-	6.689.479	50.0%	-
1995	5.276.831	1.934.905	7.211.736	54.5%	26.8%
1996	4.013.650	3.167.493	7.181.143	67.5%	44.1%
1997	5.165.819	9.636.399	14.802.218	75.6%	65.1%
1998	14.543.054	9.138.313	23.681.367	80.2%	38.6%
	47.251.119	23.877.110	71.128.229	66.1%	33.6%

Dutch government aid administered by the Guatemalan government

	NCR	CR	Total (NCR + CR)	% of TDGA	% CR of Total
1992	-	-	-	-	-
1993	-	-	-	-	-
1994	-	-	-	-	-
1995	-	-	-	-	-
1996	70.400	-	70.400	0.7%	-
1997	59.220	-	59.220	0.3%	-
1998	57.650	-	57.650	0.2%	-
	187.270	-	187.270	0.2%	-

Dutch government aid administered by others

	NCR	CR	Total (NCR + CR)	% of TDGA	% CR of Total
1992	456.967	-	456.967	5.4%	-
1993	453.161	-	453.161	3.6%	-
1994	1.671.068	-	1.671.068	12.4%	-
1995	693.244	-	693.244	5.2%	-
1996	98.460	-	98.460	9.3%	-
1997	302.800	-	302.800	1.6%	-
1998	406.584	1.243.986	1.650.570	5.6%	75.4%
	4.082.284	1.243.986	5.326.270	5.0%	23.4%

Note: These tables and figures are presented foremost to give an indication of ‘trends’ in the choice on aid channels, as well as the spending on conflict and non-conflict-related aid. Because of the absence of a clear distinction between the two categories, depending on interpretation and conflict-specificity, these do not completely correspond with the overview of conflict-related projects as presented in annexe 7.

Annexe 7

Conflict-related Interventions: Dutch Project Interventions through the Bilateral, Multilateral, and MFO Channels

Conflict-related Interventions:²¹³ Dutch Project Interventions through the Bilateral, Multilateral, and MFO Channels

Bilateral (to Local NGO and Government)

Year	Amount in NLG	Theme	Direction	Administrative Organization	Executing Organization	Activity Number
1992-1995	960,456	Support to Human Rights <i>Procurador</i> ; training and education	DMD/PO	Procuraduria	Procuraduria	GT92002
1995	51,032	Electoral observers	DWH/MC	DGIS	DGIS	GT006601
1995-1996	318,816	Educational programme to support indigenous participation in elections 1995	SJO	<i>Fundacion Rigoberta Menchu</i>	<i>Fundacion Rigoberta Menchu</i>	GT006401
1995-1999	1,282,551	Local agencies of Human Rights <i>Procurador</i>	DMD/PO	Procuraduria	Procuraduria	GT001002
1996	43,177	Electoral observers, second round	DWH/MC	DGIS	OAS	GT006602
1996-1998	116,869	Institutional strengthening of INE Central Bureau of Statistics	GUA	INE	INE	GT007601
1996-1999	87,500	Institutional strengthening of Ministry of Education; coordination unit for international cooperation	SJO	Min. Education	Min. Education	GT007301
1997	146,747	Forensic research	GGF	NGO: FAFG	FAFG	GT008014
1997-1998	52,202	Human rights and democracy	GGF	NGO: Fundadese	Wuqu'b No'j	GT008009
1997-1998	140,984	Decentralization and strategy development for MAGA, Ministry of Agriculture	GUA	CIPREDA	MAGA	GT008002
1997-1998	93,810	Strengthening local governance and participation, Alta Verapaz	GUA	DOLORES	DOLORES	GT008003

213 Here, these include activities that the OECD guidelines have identified as contributing to peace and development in war-torn societies: first, activities that support peace initiatives. The second category consists of the provision of humanitarian aid, including emergency aid, assistance to refugees, food aid and medical and health aid. The third category involves 'peace-building' activities, such as support for disarmament, demobilization, the reintegration of ex-combatants, the return and reintegration of refugees and displaced people and the organization of elections. The last category includes assistance for the consolidation of peaceful conditions, i.e. support for rehabilitation and reconciliation, assistance to civil society and human rights, good governance and democracy (OECD/DAC (1997) *DAC Guidelines on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation*, Paris: DAC).

1998-1999	636,000	Human rights training, Policy Academy, <i>Procuraduría</i> , universities against domestic violence	GUA	ILANUD		GT009201
1998-2000	717,341	Institutional strengthening of <i>Procurador Defensoria de la Mujer</i> and education of women's rights	GUA	Procuraduría	Procuraduría	GT010101

Multilateral

Year	Amount in NLG	Theme	Direction	Administrative Organization	Executing Organization	Activity Number
1995	700,000	Repatriation and reintegration of refugees (Appeal 1995)	DCH/HH	UNHCR	UNHCR	GT006301
1995-1998	599,352	Verification of human rights, strengthening institutions, training penal system (Trust Fund)	DMD/PO	MINUGUA I	MINUGUA	GT006501
1996	174,000	Strengthening SEGEPLAN, project planning, policy and international cooperation	SJO	UNDP	SEGEPLAN	GT007101
1996-1997	175,000	Design National Strategy and Action Plan: modernization of executive powers and tax collection	SJO	UNDP	Vice-presidency	GT007001
1996-1997	700,000	Repatriation and reintegration of refugees (Appeal 1996)	DCH/HH	UNHCR	UNHCR	GT006302
1996-1998	175,000	Institutional modernization of MAGA, Ministry of Agriculture, and strategy development Action Plan 1996-2000	GUA	UNDP	MAGA	GT007201
1996-1999	871,778	Verification of human rights, strengthening institutions, <i>Escuela de estudios judiciales</i> (Trust Fund)	DMD/PO	MINUGUA II	MINUGUA	GT006502
1996-1999	2,357,134	Local institution-building, human rights and gender	GUA	UNDP	UNOPS, FONAPAZ	GT006801
1996-2000	913,240	<i>Coordinador Residente</i> , strengthening UN institutional role in implementation of peace agreement	GUA	UNDP	UNDP	GT007401
1997	146,250	Continuity support to project	GGF	MINUGUA	MINUGUA	GT008006

Justicia y Multiculturalidad

1997	150,000	CEH operationalization	GGF	UNOPS	CEH	GT008007
1997	100,187	Reform Military Geographic Institute to National Geographic Institute	GUA	UNDP	MAGA	GT008011
1997-1999	4,000,000	Reintegration of displaced peoples (Trust Fund)	GUA	UNDP	UNDP	GT010001
1997-1999	4,100,000	Demobilization and reintegration of former combatants (Trust Fund)	GUA	UNDP	UNDP	GT010002
1997-1999	3,946,250	Justice system education, penal system, legal studios and <i>consuetudinario</i> , multilingual justice, local government (Trust Fund)	GUA	MINUGUA III	MINUGUA III	GT006503
1998-1999	2,052,000	CEH	GUA	UNOPS	CEH	GT011301
1998-1999	1,807,110	Justice system, <i>Jueces de Paz</i> (Profed), deconcentration	GUA	UNDP	<i>Organismo Judicial</i>	GT010601
1998-2000	5,804,205	Decentralization of Ministry of Agriculture	GUA	UNDP	UNDP, MAGA	GT009501

MFO/NGO

Year	Amount in NLG	Theme	Direction	Administrative Organization	Executing Organization	Activity Number
1988-1989	408,800	Emergency relief to displaced persons	DCH/HH	Cebemo	Coban	GT88902
1990-1993	853,082	Human rights and conflict management support, CIEPRODH	DMD	HIVOS	CIEPRODH	GT90903
1990-1993	979,184	Press agency support for objective news-gathering and reporting	DSI	HIVOS	ACENSIAG	GT90003
1991-1992	476,494	Emergency and rehabilitation of indigenous displaced persons (CPR)	DCH/HH	ICCO	IOCE, OSS	GT92901
1991-1994	902,581	Institutional support to INIAP democratization strategy	DSI/MY	NOVIB	INIAP	GT91006
1993-1994	508,375	Emergency and rehabilitation of indigenous displaced persons (CPR)	DCH/HH	ICCO	IOCE, OSS	GT003601

1993-1995	293,750	Human rights, national dialogue, reconciliation	DMD	ICCO	CDHG	GT003801
1994-1995	254,967	Repatriation of refugees, support to <i>Comision de Tierras</i> CCPP	DCH/HH	ICCO	CCCP	GT005301
1994-1995	347,500	Support unions (conflict) management training	DMD/PO	HIVOS	EAPSGT	GT003701
1994-1996	1,073,249	Medical assistance for returning refugees, village health care, Cuchumatanes	SJO	AZG	AZG	GT004001
1996-1997	268,349	Human rights, institutional support to CDHG, promotion of Indian rights	DMD/PO	ICCO	CDHG	GT003802
1996-1998	430,000	Institutional support for INIAP democratization strategy	GUA	NOVIB	INIAP	GT002902
1997-1998	129,980	Support to migrants and those deported in Mexican border area	GUA	CRS	CRS	GT008010
1998-2001	1,555,390	Justice and peace conflict resolution	GUA	ICCO	ICCPG	GT010401

Annexe 8

GT-coded Projects in FOS and DAS, 1984-1993

GT-coded Projects in FOS and DAS, 1984-1993

Year/term	Project nr.	Description	Administr. Org.	Appr. amount in NLG
1984-1989	GT/00/001	Bouwmaterialen sociale woningbouw	CEBEMO	400.000
1984-1985	GT/00/003	Ontheemden	GOM	780.000
1984-1985	GT/00/004	Humanitaire hulp indigenas	COPREDIN	620.000
1984-1986	GT/00/005	Humanitaire hulp slachtoffers onderdrukking	CEBEMO	200.000
1985	GT/00/006	Hogar Rabinal Rural	CEBEMO	660.000
1985-6, 1989-90	GT/00/007	Promotie basisgroepen	CEBEMO	830.000
1985-1986	GT/00/008	Medische hulp Guatemala	?	730.000
1985-1986	GT/00/009	Steun Comite Pro Justicia y Paz	CEBEMO	350.000
1985	GT/00/010	Programma mensenrechtencomm issie	?	220.000
1988, 1989	GT/86/001	KAP projecten		1.900.000
1986, 1987	GT/86/002	Steun mensenrechtencomm issie CDHG	ICCO	160.000
-	GT/86/003	Landbouw en pluimvee ontheemden	CEBEMO	-
1986	GT/86/004	Landbouw en veeteelt ontheemden	CEBEMO	25.000
1986, 1987	GT/86/005	Landbouw en gezondheidszorg El Peten	HIVOS	43.000
1986	GT/86/006	FAC multilateraal 86	WFP	1.200.000
1986, 1987	GT/86/007	Ontheemden	ICCO	70.000
1986	GT/86/008	Humanitair solidariteitsprogram ma	CNV	40.000
1986	GT/86/009	Rabinal herintegratie ontheemden	ICCO	270.000
1986, 1987	GT/86/010	Remedierende hulp ontheemden	CEBEMO	400.000
1986, 1987	GT/86/011	Hulp interne ontheemden	ICCO	890.000
1987	GT/86/501	Hermanas de la Caridad		86.000
1987	GT/87/002	Steun Anu- Guatemala	Embassy	10.000
1987	GT/87/003	Steun mensenrechtencomm issie CDHG	ICCO	150.000
1988-1990	GT/87/004	Preventieve gezondheidszorg en alfabetisering	ICCO	70.000
1987	GT/87/005	Landbouw/veeteelt	CEBEMO	375.000

1987	GT/87/008	ontheemden Tijdelijk onderdak overstromingsslacht offers	UNDRO	55.000
1987	GT/87/009	Medische noodhulp overstromingsslacht offers	PAHO	55.000
1987	GT/87/010	Documentatie informatie centrum AGNU	HIVOS	35.000
1987	GT/87/011	Hulp overstromingsslacht offers Huehue	CEBEMO	65.000
1988, 1989	GT/87/012	Landbouwontwikkel ing	HIVOS	255.000
1988, 1989	GT/87/014	Milieu educatie ASIES	UNDP	130.000
1988	GT/87/015	Landbouw en Gezondheidszorg El Peten	HIVOS	70.000
1987	GT/87/851	MCC Guatemala	?	10.000
1987	GT/87/852	Workshop woodstove	?	140.000
1987	GT/87/950	Ontheemden project	?	4.000
1988	GT/88/001	Gezondheidsproject	HIVOS	200.000
1988, 1989	GT/88/002	Juridische steun indiaanse arbeiders SERJUS	NOVIB	65.000
1988, 1989	GT/88/003	Emergentieprojecten	UNDP	1.750.000
1988, 1989	GT/88/004	Ambachtelijk Nijverheidscentrum	UNDP/ILO	335.000
1989	GT/88/005	Emergentieprojecten MAGA	UNDP	50.000
1988, 1989	GT/88/006	Emergentieprojecten 2	UNDP	1.300.000
1988, 1989, 1990	GT/88/009	Curriculumverhogin g lager onderwijs	UNDP/UNESCO	4.000.000
1988	GT/88/010	Twee-talig leerboekjes	UNDP	85.000
1988-1990	GT/88/011	Pixabal, CDRO	NOVIB	80.000
1988, 1989	GT/88/012	Gemeenschapsontwi kkeling	ICCO	410.000
1988-1990	GT/88/013	Gemeenschapsontwi kkeling	ICCO	550.000
1988-1990	GT/88/014	Chimaltenango Gemeenschapsontwi kkeling	ICCO	55.000
1988, 1989	GT/88/015	Chimaltenango Gemeenschapsontwi kkeling	ICCO	200.000
1988-1990	GT/88/016	Onderzoek FLACSO informele sector	HIVOS	140.000
1988-1990	GT/88/017	Watervoorziening platteland	ICCO	350.000
1988-1990	GT/88/018	Drinkwaterproject platteland	CEBEMO	660.000
1989, 1990	GT/88/019	Simme Micro Empresas	UNDP	1.800.000

1988-1990	GT/88/020	Landbouwontwikkeling	HIVOS	2.350.000
1989, 1990	GT/88/021	Kinderrechtenproject Procuraduria	OS-Guatemala	625.000
1988-1990	GT/88/901	Reintegratie ontheemden Alta Verapaz	NOVIB	45.000
1988-1990	GT/88/902	Opvang ontheemden	CEBEMO	410.000
1988	GT/88/903	Hulp vluchtelingen en ontheemden	ICCO	85.000
1988	GT/88/905	Hulp ontheemden in Quiche	ICCO/FUMEDI	295.000
1989, 1990	GT/89/001	Hoger afstandsonderwijs	RNTC	560.000
1989, 1990	GT/89/002	Landbouwontwikkeling cooperatie La Estrella	HIVOS	1.100.000
1989, 1990, 1991	GT/89/003	Moeder en kind programma	IPPF/APROFAM	310.000
1990	GT/89/005	Regio Chiquimulilla kanaal	?	25.000
1990	GT/89/006	Women's village banking	CARE	400.000
1989, 1990	GT/89/007	Ontwillelingsprogramma El Quiche	ICCO	1.100.000
1989, 1990	GT/89/008	Participatie Democratiseringsprocess, onderzoek INIAP	NOVIB	100.000
1990	GT/89/009	Afstandsonderwijs	RNTC	100.000
1989, 1990	GT/89/010	SERJUS organisatie	NOVIB	340.000
1989, 1990	GT/89/011	Onderzoeksprogramma AVANSCO	NOVIB	260.000
1989, 1990, 1991	GT/89/012	Microprojecten fonds IDEASAC	CEBEMO	510.000
1989, 1990	GT/89/013	Soc-ec ontwikkeling rurale indigenas Solola	NOVIB	130.000
1989, 1990	GT/89/014	Plattelandsontwikkeling en indianenonderwijs	CEBEMO	445.000
1989, 1990	GT/89/015	CNR Nationale Reconciliatie Commissie	CNR	100.000
1989, 1990	GT/89/016	Drinkwater en trainingswerkplaats	ICCO	360.000
1989, 1990, 1991	GT/89/017	Integrale plattelandsontwikkeling ALIANZA	ICCO	1.500.000
1990	GT/89/018	Milieu onderwijs 2° fase	UNDP	370.000
1990	GT/89/019	Rurale ontwikkeling kleine boeren Zacapa/Chiquimula	IFAD	3.330.000
1990	GT/89/023	Aanpassing Simme Microempresa project	UNDP	2.400.000
1989	GT/89/901	Noodhulp	GOM (ICCO)	500.000

1989	GT/89/902	ontheemden OSS/IOCE Steun mensenrechtenorg. CDHG	CDHG	140.000
1990	GT/90/001	Jongerenprogramma	ICCO	380.000
1990	GT/90/002	Textielproject	ILO/UNDP	800.000
1990	GT/90/003	Persagentschap ACENSIAG	HIVOS	380.000
1990	GT/90/004	Mensenrechtenonder wijs	Guatemala	350.000
1990	GT/90/005	Vrouwen en stedelijke werkgelegenheid FLACSO	HIVOS	55.000
1990	GT/90/006	Noodhulp en jaarprogram FUMEDI	ICCO	270.000
1990	GT/90/007	Curriculum hervorming lager onderwijs SIMAC	UNDP/UNESCO	3.000.000
1990	GT/90/008	Rurale ontwikkeling Pixabal	NOVIB	280.000
1990	GT/90/009	NGO participation tropical forestry	WRI	65.000
1990	GT/90/010	Aanvullend voorstel 3 ^e jaar COCADI	ICCO	108.000
1990	GT/90/011	Deskundige mensenrechten centrum	VN-Mensenrechten centrum	40.000
1991	GT/90/013	Tweetalige leerboekjes 2 ^e fase	Univ. Landivar/UNDP	200.000
1990, 1991	GT/90/014	Internat. Congres microempresa programmas	?	80.000
1991	GT/90/017	Roterend fonds CGTG	CNV	250.000
1990, 1991	GT/90/850	KAP Guatemala		410.000
1990	GT/90/901	Steun mensenrechtenorgan isatieCDHG	ICCO	140.000
1990	GT/90/902	Medische hulp ontheemden	?	440.000
1990	GT/90/951	SV/RUU-USAC Fisica	NUFFIC	450.000
1991	GT/91/005	FLACSO onderzoek indianen en arbeidsmarkt	HIVOS	35.000
1991	GT/91/901	Ondersteuning OSS/IOCE	ICCO	900.000
1991	GT/91/902	Mensenrechtenorgan isatie CDHG	ICCO	140.000
1991	GT/91/903	Mensenrechtenorgan isatie CDHG	ICCO	250.000
1993	GT004801	Reg. bijeenkomst inheemse cooperaties	?	48.000
1993	GT004901	Ondersteuning radio Farabundu Marti	?	100.000

Annexe 9

GT-coded Projects in MIDAS, 1988-1998

GT-coded Projects in MIDAS, 1988-1998

This annexe contains a list of projects that have been financed by Dutch government over the period 1988-1998 as recorded in MIDAS.²¹⁴ As MIDAS was set up in 1992, the list of projects before this year is not complete. See annexe 8 for an overview of projects in the period 1984-1993.

This overview has been prepared by De Zeeuw.²¹⁵ The activities are classified per year, determined by the starting year of each project. The category 'activity no' refers to the number with which projects are listed in MIDAS. The second category 'activity name and objectives' gives a brief description of the project or activity. The category 'KBE' stands for 'Kleinste Budget Eenheid' (smallest budgetary item), which indirectly refers to the type of aid. The following category indicates the duration of the project. 'Adm. Org.' refers to the administrative organization within the Ministry that is responsible for the specific activity. The listing further shows the amount in Netherlands guilders that have been assigned to the project. The final category first indicates the managing organization and secondly the organization that is responsible for the execution of the project.

214 The MIDAS usually includes OS activities from the so-called S, B, C, U and E phases of the activity cycle. The latter three stand for commitment phase, implementation phase and finalization phase. The overview in this annexe only contains the projects in the C, U, and E phase.

215 Some modifications have been made as regards the original listing. Regional projects (coded RL) have been mainly excluded, with the exception of projects that distinctively could be linked to Guatemala. Further, projects that have not been implemented were dropped from the listing. For a complete overview, see De Zeeuw (1999).

1988						
Activity no.	Activity name and objectives	KBE	Duration	Adm. Org.	Amount in NLG	Man. Org. Exe. Org.
GT88902	Food-aid and construction of houses; relocation and support of displaced.	749.0 Emergency relief	01/04/88 - 01/05/89	DCH/HH	408,800	Cebemo Coban
Total 1988: 1						

1989						
Activity no.	Activity name and objectives	KBE	Duration	Adm. Org.	Amount in NLG	Man. Org. Exe. Org.
GT89001	Higher distance-education	741.0 Education	01/09/89 - 01/09/91	DCO/OO	565,189	RTNC URL
GT89002	Agricultural development Cooperative La Estrella	733.0 Country Program Agriculture / Regional development	29/08/89 - 30/06/93	DRU/RR	1,100,000	Hivos IDEPSO
GT89014	Program rural development and Indian education	766.1	14/11/89 - 14/11/92	DRU/RR	604,742	Cebemo IIS
Total 1989: 3						

1990						
Activity no.	Activity name and objective	KBE	Duration	Adm. Org.	Amount in NLG	Man. Org Exe. Org
GT90002	Textiles project Cenat	731.0 Country Program structure / employment	21/11/90 - 31/03/94	DRU	1,311,232	UNDP ILO
GT90003	Press agency; collecting and circulation of news in an objective way	766.1	01/01/90 - 31/12/93	DSI	979,184	Hivos ACENSIAG
GT90007A	Curriculum reconstruction primary education	767.0 Primary Education	23/11/90 - 31/12/93	DCO	4,832,019	UNESCO SIMAC
GT90903	Support human rights organization CIEPRODH; Strengthening of democratization by awareness- activities in human rights issues	711.0 Human rights and Conflict management	01/01/90 - 31/12/93	DMD	853,082	Hivos CIEPRODH
GT90951	RUU-USAC 1990-1993; institutional strengthening	722.1 Co-operation	01/01/90 - 31/12/93	DCO	775,000	Nuffic RUU, USAC
GT90952	Feasibility study on production fructose	706.1	01/01/90 - 31/12/92	DCO/OZ	74,152	ICAI ICAI
GT89009	Program distance education	741.0 Education	01/08/90 - 01/01/93	DCO	584,257	RTNC USAC
GT89006	Women's village banking project	733.0 Country Program Agriculture / Regional development	19/10/90 - 19/06/93	DRU/RR	814,858	CAREINT

Total 1990: 8

1991						
Activity no.	Activity name and objectives	KBE	Duration	Adm. Org.	Amount in NLG	Man. Org. Exe. Org.
GT89019	Rural development small farmers Zapaca/ Chiquimula	733.0 Country Program Agriculture / Regional development	24/06/91 - 30/06/98	GUA	11,706,451	IFAD Mincomtrob
GT90015	2nd phase higher distance education Univ. Rafael Landiv; decentralization of higher education to increase rural facilities	741.0 Education	01/08/91 - 31/12/95	DCO/OO	1,475,647	RTNC URL
GT90018	Rural community development; improvement of position of mostly Indian rural population	733.0 Country Program Agriculture / Regional development	17/09/91 - 31/12/95	DRU/RR	772,901	Cebemo CAPS
GT91003	Improvement of urban poor and support of organization-building	747.0 Urban development	13/08/91 - 31/12/94	DRU/RR	973,160	ICCO SODIFAG
GT91004	Formation of community organization in slums Tierra Nueva and El Mezquital	741.0 Education	28/08/91 - 30/06/95	DCO	311,000	ICCO ESFRA
GT91006	Contribution to democratization process in Guatemala	745.0 Institutional development / non-sectoral	01/06/91 - 30/06/94	DSI/MY	902,581	Novib INIAP
GT91008	Development program Jacaltenango	733.0 Country Program Agriculture / Regional development	01/06/91 - 01/06/95	DRU/RR	1,224,471	Hivos Comunicar, Guayab
GT92901	Relief to Indian displaced	730	01/04/91 - 31/03/92	DCH/HH	476,000	ICCO IOCE, OSS

Total 1991: 8

1992						
Activity no.	Activity name and objectives	KBE	Duration	Adm. Org.	Amount in NLG	Man. Org. Exe. Org.
GT90007B	Reform of curriculum primary education; follow-up of GT90007A	767.0 Primary education	01/01/92 - 31/12/93	DCO	1,263,053	UNESCO SIMAC
GT90953	Education and support of coffee cooperatives in Guatemala	744.1	01/02/92 - 01/02/93	DSI	5,000	Gozevenber Kofcoopgua
GT91012A	Improvement of food security of families in rural areas and city	733.0 Country Program Agriculture / Regional development	12/11/92 - 30/04/99	GUA	3,778,063	UNDP
GT92002	Support of Human Rights Procurador; education and training program and archive of human rights procurador	711.0 Human rights and conflict management	01/12/92 - 31/10/95	DMD/PO	960,456	Procuradoria Procuradoria
GT92006	Construction of drinking water facilities and sanitation	737.0 Country Program; social development	10/11/92 - 30/06/96	DSI/SB	1,398,424	ICCO ADP
GT92007	Plan de tres anos-Alianza	737.0 Country Program; social development	04/12/92 - 31/12/95	DSI/SB	881,861	ICCO ALIANZA
GT92950	KAP-program; support of local small- scale activities	742.0 KAP	01/01/92 - 31/12/92	DSI/MY	363,635	SJO

Total 1992: 7

1993						
Activity no.	Activity name and objectives	KBE	Duration	Adm. Org.	Amount in NLG	Man. Org. Exe. Org.
GT003201	Forestry Cuchumatanes; improving living conditions of farming population	733.0 Country program Agriculture / regional Development	01/01/93 - 31/03/99	GUA	3,228,607	UNDP FUNDAP
GT003301	Bilingual study books; recognition of Indian language and cultural heritage	700.0 Culture in developing countries	01/01/93 - 31/03/97	DCO/CO	350,000	OPS URL
GT003400	Reform of curriculum primary education	767.0 Primary education	01/07/93 - 31/12/94	DCO/OO	1,907,027	UNDP SIMAC
GT003501	Advancing the rights of children: call to action for NGOs; capacity-strengthening of Central American NGOs	717.0 Country program Children and development	01/11/93 - 30/06/94	DSI	61,844	UNICEF UNICEF
GT003601	Continuation of relief to Indian displaced; activities in the field of production; agriculture, animal husbandry, healthcare, crafts, education and humanitarian and relief activities	749.0 Emergency relief	01/07/93 - 01/02/94	DCH/HH	508,375	ICCO IOCE OSS
GT003801	Support of human rights commission CDHG; improving of human rights situation by publications, filing of complaints and participation in UN forums	711.0 Human rights and conflict management	01/07/93 - 01/07/95	DMD	293,750	ICCO CDHG
GT004102	Assistance to project formulation of GT004101	715.1 Country program Environment	01/11/93 - 15/01/94	DML	6,342	DGIS IKC
GT89005	Rehabilitation and management plan Chiquimullila canal	733.0 Country program Agriculture / regional development	01/01/93 - 30/04/95	DRU/RR	1,725,458	Eurocons Mincomtrob

GT89021	Rural development small farmers Cuchumatanes	733.0 Country program Agriculture / regional development	01/11/93 - 01/06/2000	GUA	10, 995,686	IFAD
GT90012	Forestry Cuchumatanes; see also GT003201	733.0 Country program Agriculture / regional development	01/01/93 - 01/01/97	SJO	1,562,438	UNDP FUNDAP
GT91016	Drainage- training program; improving educational level of Guatemalan engineers in the field of water control, drainage and irrigation	733.0 Country program Agriculture / regional development	09/08/93 - 09/02/98	SJO	644,973	ILRI IHE ILRI LUW
GT92004	Plan trienal de trabajo COINDI; stimulation of soc-ec. Development process in Solola (indigenous population)	733.0 Country program Agriculture / regional development	01/01/93 - 30/06/96	DRU/RR	570,825	Novib COINDI
GT92009	Programa global Sojuma; organization of young people	717.0 Country program Children and development	01/01/93 - 31/12/95	DSI/SB	588,924	ICCO Sojugma
GT92951	Tejocate fishery project	735.0 GI-KPA ODA	01/01/93 - 31/12/93	DSI	14,500	Hvijver SCTEJO
GT93950	KAP-program Guatemala 1993; support of local small-scale activities	742.0 KAP	01/01/93 - 31/12/93	DSI/MY	432,327	SJO
GT93951	Support of AGES (education for Mayan girls); improving position of Mayan women	717.0 Country program Children and development	15/01/93 - 31/12/93	DSI	160,623	DGIS AGES

Total 1993: 16

1994						
Activity no.	Activity name and objectives	KBE	Duration	Adm. Org.	Amount in NLG	Man. Org. Exe. Org.
GT001402	Strengthening of sales-association of indigenous textiles (TRAMA)	731.0 Country Program; structure / employment	01/04/94 - 15/11/94	DOB	552,285	ILO MINECGT
GT001403	Evaluation of GT001402	731.0 Country Program; structure / employment	01/01/94 - 31/12/94	DOB	39,052	
GT001602	Women's village banking II	731.0 Country Program; structure / employment	01/01/94 - 31/12/98	GUA	2,444,220	CARE CARE
GT001603	Evaluation of GT001602	731.0 Country Program; structure / employment	01/10/94 - 31/12/98	SJO	6,911	
GT002402	Educational program; income generating activities and improvement educational level of youth and women in poor Guatemalan ghettos	767.0 Primary education	31/12/94 - 31/12/97	SJO	321,882	ICCO ESFRA
GT003701	Support of union management training; Consolidation of independent union in Guatemala and stimulation of democracy	711.0 Human rights and conflict management	01/01/94 - 31/12/95	DMD/PO	347,500	HIVOS EAPSGT
GT004001	Healthcare Cuchumatanes; medical assistance to returning refugees, fighting and prevention of cholera, establishment of system of village healthcare	737.0 Country Program; social development	01/01/94 - 01/01/97	SJO	1,073,249	AZG AZG
GT004301	Strengthening of indigenous community organizations '94-'95; consolidation of current programs in the context of socioeconomic development	733.0 Country program Agriculture / regional development	01/01/94 - 01/01/96	DRU/RR	801,968	NOVIB CDRO

GT005101	KAP-program Guatemala; support of small-scale local initiatives	742.0 KAP	01/01/94 - 31/12/99	DSI/MY	337,112	SJO
GT005201	Scholarships Mayan girls, 2nd phase; improvement of educational level of Mayan girls, and organization-building and capacity strengthening of AGES	717.0 Country Program children and development	15/01/94 - 31/12/95	DSI/SB	300,388	AGES AGES
GT005301	Repatriation program Guatemalan refugees; support of Comisión de Tierras of CCPP	749.0 Emergency relief	01/10/94 - 01/12/95	DCH/HH	254,967	ICCO CCPP
GT91017	Program support OS Guatemala; the establishment of a consistent Dutch aid program in Guatemala, with integration of Women & Development, poverty and environmental elements	737.0 Country Program; social development	01/05/94 - 01/07/97	SJO	1,223,286	DGIS DGIS

Total 1994: 12

1995						
Activity no.	Activity name and objectives	KBE	Duration	Adm. Org.	Amount in NLG	Man. Org. Exe. Org.
GT001002	Stimulation of constitutional state by adherence to human rights and improvement of dealing with human rights violations by local agencies of PDHG	711.0 Human rights and conflict management	01/12/95 - 30/08/99	DMD/PO	1,282,551	Procurador Procurador
GT001404	Support of TRAMA; income-generating for weaving women	731.0 Country Program; structure and employment	01/03/95 - 30/06/98	GUA	261,827	ASOTRAMA ASOTRAMA
GT001702	Last phase Rehabilitation Chiquimulilla canal; continuation of GT89005	733.0 Country program Agriculture / regional development	01/10/95 - 30/11/96	SJO	612,506	DGIS EUROCONS
GT001903	Proyecto de desarrollo Santiago (PRODESSA); improvement of position of Indian population by training of Indian staff,	767.0 Primary education	01/01/95 - 31/12/96	SJO	505,212	CEBEMO PRODESSA

	production of educational material and productive activities						
GT003901	Stimulation of forestry coordination at national level	715.1 Country Program Environment	15/02/95 - 30/06/99	SJO	3,248,022	FAO	FAO
GT005601	Tierra Viva support to women movement in Guatemala	739.1 Country Program women and development	01/07/95 - 31/12/97	SJO	537,500	NOVIB	Tierra Viva
GT005801	Improving educational capacities of teaching staff and production of teaching material for distance education in Mayan languages Q'eqchi and Poqomchi in Verapaz	793.0 Institutions in developing countries	01/08/95 - 31/07/98	GUA	257,192	URL	URL
GT005901	Institutional strengthening of savings- and credit federation (FENACOAC); improving living conditions of marginalized groups of population	731.0 Country Program; structure and employment	01/03/95 - 31/12/99	GUA	2,100,000	FENACOAC	FENACOAC
GT005902	Evaluation GT005901	731.0 Country Program; structure and employment	01/03/95 - 28/02/98	GUA	33,225	DGIS	
GT006001	Contributions to strengthening of cultural identity of Mayan population by developing a Mayan education system in the context of democratization	767.0 Primary education	01/09/95 - 31/03/99	GUA	4,097,514	UNESCO	CNEMG
GT006101	APP 1995; support of local small-scale activities via KAP, ADB and SIR	742.0 APP	01/01/95 - 31/12/95	DSI/MY	357,548	SJO	
GT006301	Contribution to UNHCR program directed at support of voluntary repatriation of 10,000 Guatemalan refugees from Mexico	749.0 Emergency relief	01/06/95 - 31/12/95	DCH/HH	700,000	UNHCR	UNHCR
GT006401	Rigoberta Menchu "Campana Civica"; development of intensive educational program which promotes the participation of Mayan population in general elections 1995	769.0 Good governance and democratization	01/10/95 - 31/03/96	SJO	318,816	FRMT	FRMT
GT006501	MINUGUA Trust Fund; stimulation of complying to human rights and strengthening of constitutional state; verification of Human rights accord, strengthening of institutions, programs and instruments	711.0 Human rights and conflict management	15/12/95 - 30/09/98	DMD/PO	599,352	MINUGUA	MINUGUA

GT006601	Electoral observers Guatemala; observing presidential elections in Guatemala	769.0 Good governance and democratization	05/11/95 - 14/11/95	DWH/MC	51,032	DGIS DGIS
RL013301	Support to "Emergency Appeal for the Americas 1995"; support of ICRC program in Central America	749.0 Emergency relief	01/01/95 - 31/12/95	DCH/HH	1,275,000	ICRC ICRC

Total 1995: 16

1996						
Activity no.	Activity name and objectives	KBE	Duration	Adm. Org.	Amount in NLG	Man. Org. Exe. Org.
GT001405	Evaluation TRAMA-project	731.0 Country Program; structure / employment	01/02/96 - 30/11/96	SJO	22,658	
GT002002	Alianza, Plan de tres anos '96-'98; Improving of living conditions of Guatemalan population, especially indigenous people, women and children	737.0 Country Program; social development	01/05/96 - 31/12/98	GUA	634,874	ICCO ALIANZA
GT002202	Institutionalization of PROFASR; construction of center aimed at extension and production of educational audiovisual material	767.0 Primary education	01/06/96 - 31/05/99	GUA	76,300	URL URL
GT002902	INIAP-projecto triannual; support of democratization process, fundamental reform of social organization and modification of political power structures. Development of alternative development plan for Guatemala, strengthening of popular movement, promotion of participation of women in political process	767.0 Primary education	01/01/96 - 31/12/98	GUA	430,000	NOVIB INIAP
GT003802	Support of human rights commission CDHG '96-'97; transfer of headquarters to Guatemala City, promotion of Indian rights	711.0 Human rights and conflict management	01/03/96 - 31/12/97	DMD/PO	268,349	ICCO CDHG

GT004101	Protection of biological diversity of tropical rainforest of Lachua Park and sustainable use of natural resources in buffer zones	715.1 Country Program Environment	01/08/96 - 31/07/2000	GUA	2,987,651	IUCN
GT006302	Contribution to Appeal 1996 for repatriation Guatemalan refugees; voluntary repatriation from Mexico	749.0 Emergency Relief	01/01/96 - 31/12/97	DCH/HH	700,000	UNHCR UNHCR
GT006201	Fight against inequalities between sexes and ethnic groups in Guatemala by education of soc-pol. engaged Mayan women	793.0 Institutions in developing countries	01/01/96 - 30/04/96	DCO/OO	25,000	FLACSO FLACSO
GT006502	MINUGUA Trust fund; improvement of adherence to human rights and strengthening of constitutional state, improving independent jurisdiction, prison system and strengthening of local activities	711.0 Human rights and conflict management	01/07/96 - 31/03/91	DMD/PO	871,778	MINUGUA MINUGUA
GT006602	Electoral observers Guatemala, second round; observing presidential elections	769.0 Good governance and democratization	02/01/96 - 09/01/96	DWH/MC	43,177	DGIS OAS
GT006701	APP 1996; support of local small-scale activities via KAP, ADB and SIR	742.0 APP	01/01/96 - 31/12/96	GUA	444,659	SJO
GT006801	PDHSL; strengthening of democratization process in Guatemala by stimulating local development processes in Huehuetenango	745.0 Institutional development / non-sectoral	15/06/96 - 30/04/99	GUA	2,357,134	UNOPSGT
GT006901	Plan bianual aug. '95- aug. '97; stimulation of soc-ec. development of rural communities around Patzun by giving impulse to communal organization and construction of alternative productive activities for local Indian families	733.0 Country program Agriculture / regional development	01/08/96 - 31/07/98	GUA	323,958	NOVIB APSIR
GT007001	Modernization of the state; design of National Strategy and Action Plan 1996-2000 for the modernization of the Executive Power and different ministries. Reform bureaucracy in the area of collection of taxes	745.0 Institutional development / non-sectoral	01/07/96 - 30/04/97	SJO	175,000	VICEPRES
GT007101	Strengthening of National Planning Bureau (SEGEPLAN) in the area of project planning, regional and soc-ec. policy and international co-operation	745.0 Institutional development / non-sectoral	01/07/96 - 31/12/96	SJO	174,000	SEGEPLAN

GT007201	Support of Ministry of Agriculture in developing strategies of institutional modernization and formulation of National Program of Rural development and corresponding Action Plan 1996-2000	733.0 Country program Agriculture / regional development	01/06/96 - 31/05/98	GUA	175,000	UNDP MAGAGT
GT007301	Institutional strengthening Ministry of Education; coordinating unit for international co-operation	767.0 Primary education	01/07/96 - 31/01/99	SJO	87,500	MINOWGT MINOWGT
GT007401	Proyecto del coordinador Residente; contribution to implementation of peace agreements and strengthening of UN-institutions in Guatemala	745.0 Institutional development / non-sectoral	01/07/96 - 31/12/2000	GUA	913,240	UNDP UNDP
GT007501	Reform of legislation and formalization of Instituto Nacional de la Mujer; promotion of participation of women, eliminating inequalities and discrimination of Guatemalan women in legislation	739.1 Country Program women and development	01/07/96 - 30/06/99	GUA	498,435	UNDP ONAM
GT007601	Institutional strengthening and restructuring of Central Bureau of Statistics, INE	745.0 Institutional development / non-sectoral	01/08/96 - 31/12/98	GUA	116,869	INEGT INEGT
GT007701	Policy preparation "Sustainable development indigenous population"; participatory distribution of implementation of accord on Identity and Rights of Indian Population	737.0 Country Program; social development	01/07/96 - 30/06/97	SJO	217,412	MENCHU SSPR UNDP
GT007801	Sustainable management of natural resources in Chiquimula; improving living conditions of population via development of grass-roots organizations and entrepreneurship	733.0 Country program Agriculture / regional development	01/09/96 - 31/08/2000	GUA	3,080,000	UNDP MAGAGT
GT008001	Good governance Fund Guatemala; strengthening of project formulation, planning and executive capacity of central authority, local authorities and popular organizations to create a better administrative climate. Improvement of quality of juridical system	769.0 Good governance and democratization	01/09/96 - 31/08/97	GUA	750,000	SJO

GT008101	Centro de Atencion Integral "Marie Langer"; judicial, psychological-social and medical assistance to female victims of violence and influencing government policy and attitudes in society to prevent violence against women	739.1 Country program Women & Development	01/07/96 - 31/12/98	GUA	679,060	HIVOS GGM
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Total 1996: 24

1997						
Activity no.	Activity name and objectives	KBE	Duration	Adm. Org.	Amount in NLG	Man. Org. Exe. Org.
GT003202	Evaluation Forestry Cuchumatanes;	733.0 Country program Agriculture / regional development	01/11/97 - 30/11/97	GUA	28,389	IKC IKC
GT004002	Healthcare [continuation] of GT004001; improving primary healthcare of Indian population at village level in two districts of Northern area of Cuchumatanes	737.0 Country Program; social development	01/01/97 - 31/12/99	GUA	1,563,750	AZGZW AZGZW
GT006002	Evaluation GT006001	767.0 Primary education	01/01/97 - 31/03/99	GUA	31,368	DGIS UVA
GT006503	MINUGUA III; improvement of justice in Guatemala	769.0 Good governance and democratization	01/11/97 - 31/12/99	GUA	3,946,250	MINUGUA MINUGUA
GT008002	Descentralización MAGA; development of strategies for decentralization of services	769.0 Good governance and democratization	01/06/97 - 30/04/98	GUA	140,984	CIPREDA MAGA
GT008003	Civil society participation and local governance in Alta Verapaz	769.0 Good governance and democratization	01/07/97 - 01/06/98	GUA	93,810	DOLORES DOLORES
GT008004	Monitoring contract for Good Governance Fund	769.0 Good governance and democratization	01/04/97 - 15/12/97	GUA	6,262	DGIS

GT008005	Education of leaders social groups in the areas of management, control, participation, communication and gender	769.0 Good governance and democratization	15/07/97 - 15/07/98	GUA	150,000	CEDES CEDES
GT008006	MINUGUA; advance in order to prevent the halt of project Justicia y Multiculturalidad	769.0 Good governance and democratization	01/07/97 - 31/12/97	GUA	146,250	MINUGUA MINUGUA
GT008007	Operationalization truth commission in order to comply to the peace accords	769.0 Good governance and democratization	10/07/97 - 31/12/97	GUA	150,000	UNOPSGT UNOPSGT
GT008008	Gobernabilidad, genero y consejos de desarrollo; introduction of gender model; program of capacity-building in radio	769.0 Good governance and democratization	01/10/97 - 01/05/98	GUA	112,072	INIAP USAC
GT008009	Increasing knowledge about human rights, increasing participation in defending rights, stimulation of implementation of peace accords concerning Mayan population of Altiplano	769.0 Good governance and democratization	01/09/97 - 01/09/98	GUA	52,202	FUNDADESE FUNDADESE
GT008010	Migrants in border area Mexico; improving situation of migrants and deported in border area with Mexico	769.0 Good governance and democratization	01/10/97 - 01/09/98	GUA	129,980	CRS CRS
GT008011	IGM-IGN; reform of Instituto Geografico Militar to Instituto Geográfico Nacional	769.0 Good governance and democratization	01/10/97 - 01/01/98	GUA	100,187	UNDP MAGA
GT008012	Strengthening of two regional offices of Instituto Nacional de Bosques (INAB)	769.0 Good governance and democratization	01/11/97 - 01/11/98	GUA	150,000	PAFG PAFG
GT008013	Decentralization and strengthening of municipality of Movimondo;	769.0 Good governance and democratization	01/11/97 - 15/12/98	GUA	150,000	MOVIMOND MOVIMOND
GT008014	Antropologos Forenses, massacre at Panzos; Clearing up of events around mass murder in Panzos, 1978	769.0 Good governance and democratization	01/09/97 - 18/08/98	GUA	146,747	FAFG FAFG
GT008015	Strengthening of Ministry of Economic Affairs in area of international trade	769.0 Good governance and democratization	01/12/97 - 01/12/98	GUA	0	UNDP MINECONO MI

GT008201	Improving quality of education by training of 4200 teachers and parents in Quetzaltenango	742.0 APP	01/05/97 - 01/11/97	SJO	0	APPORG APPORG
GT008202	APP-program 1997	742.0 APP	01/01/97 - 31/12/97	GUA	299,417	APPORG
GT008301	Bilingual study books; implementation of Indian languages and cultural heritage in primary education curriculum; guiding teachers in using new school material	700.0 Culture in developing countries	01/04/97 - 31/10/99	DCO/OO	184,172	URL URL
GT008601	Environmental program Puerto San Jose and surroundings; awareness raising and training, improving co-operation between governmental institutions and local population in carrying out environmental activities	715.1 Country Program Environment	01/03/97 - 01/12/98	GUA	396,146	EUROLATIN EUROLATIN
GT009401	Pop Wuj teatro / Timach, Merade; education in making of masks and puppets for a theatre project about the Mayan history of creation: Pop Wuj. Mobilization of Mayan population and giving back identity and thereby supporting the peace process	700.0 Culture in developing countries	01/11/97 - 31/01/99	DCO/OO	77,784	TIMACH TIMACH
GT010001	UNDP Trust Fund for the reintegration of displaced; contributions to activities of resettlement and reintegration of refugees and displaced of the armed conflict	745.0 Institutional development / non-sectoral	01/11/97 - 31/12/99	GUA	4,000,000	UNDP UNDP
GT010002	Demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants; of guerillas as well as army soldiers	745.0 Institutional development / non-sectoral	01/11/97 - 31/12/99	GUA	4,100,000	UNDP UNDP

Total 1997: 25

1998						
Activity no.	Activity name and objectives	KBE	Duration	Adm. Org.	Amount in NLG	Man. Org. Exe. Org.
GT006802	Evaluation of GT006801	745.0 Institutional development / non-sectoral	01/03/98 - 16/03/98	GUA	23,515	VERBAKEN
GT007702	Sustainable development indigenous population Q'anil B	745.0 Institutional development / non-sectoral	26/10/98 - 30/09/2000	GUA	2,055,770	UNDP UNDP
GT008102	Evaluation of GT008101	739.1 Country Program women and development	22/06/98 - 05/07/98	SJO	11,337	HIVOS GGM
GT008501	Strengthening of formal and non-formal education in Zapaca and Chiquimula; application of SIMAC methodology on primary schools and adult education organizations in the municipalities of PROZACHI	767.0 Primary education	01/12/98 - 30/11/2001	GUA	7,257,926	UNESCO SIMAC
GT009201	Extension Procurador and universities in prevention and fighting against intra-family violence	769.0 Good governance and democratization	01/12/98 - 28/02/99	GUA	636,000	ILANUD
GT009501	PRODESAGRO; strengthening and supporting the decentralization process of services of the Ministry of Agriculture, Husbandry, Forestry and Fishery, in order to contribute to sustainable development	733.0 Country program Agriculture / regional development	01/05/98 - 31/10/2001	GUA	5,804,205	UNDP UNDP MAGA
GT009701	PROZACHI II; strengthening of sustainable management of resources and executive capacity of farmers to improve access and control of knowledge, services and goods	733.0 Country program Agriculture / regional Development	01/07/98 - 30/06/2002	GUA	10,986,000	UNDP UNDP MAGA
GT010101	Defensoria de la Mujer; women rights fight against violence against women; strengthening of departmental offices, extension and education	769.0 Good governance and democratization	01/07/98 - 30/06/2000	GUA	717,341	Procurador Procurador
GT010401	ICCPG/ Resolución de conflictos; strengthening of traditional and alternative mechanisms of conflict resolution	769.0 Good governance and democratization	01/10/98 - 30/09/2001	GUA	1,555,390	ICCO ICCPG

GT010601	Jueces de Paz; improving administration of judicial process	769.0 Good governance and democratization	26/10/98 - 31/12/99	GUA	1,807,110	UNDP CORTESJGT
GT010801	Good Governance Fund 1998	769.0 Good governance and democratization	01/01/98 - 31/12/98	GUA	1,813,985	
GT010901	APP 1998	742.0 APP	01/01/98 - 31/12/98	GUA	360,000	APPORG APPORG
GT011001	Evaluation of GT89021	733.0 Country program Agriculture / regional Development	28/02/98 - 23/03/98	SJO	54,667	HMASJO IKC RNT
GT011301	Support of Guatemalan Truth Commission;	769.0 Good governance and democratization	15/04/98 - 31/03/99	GUA	2,052,000	UNOPS CEH
GT011401	UNICEF, Integr. Basic services Huehuetenango	745.0 Institutional development / non-sectoral	15/12/98 - 15/12/99	GUA	1,100,476	UNICEF UNICEF
GT012001	Contribution to land registry office, starting phase; creating and strengthening of technical and judicial basis in order to ascertain property and use-rights in departments Zapaca and Chiquimula	745.0 Institutional development / non-sectoral	01/12/98 - 01/12/99	GUA	608,360	UNDP MAGA
RL022004	Emergency aid Mitch	749.9 Block allocation Emergency Relief	06/11/98 - 06/01/99	GUA	99,998	UNDP
RL022005	Emergency aid Mitch;	749.9 Block allocation Emergency Relief	06/11/98 - 06/01/99	GUA	100,000	UNDP
RL022006	Emergency aid Mitch;	749.9 Block allocation Emergency Relief	06/11/98 - 06/01/99	GUA	100,000	UNDP

total 1998: 19