

The Role of SNV in Developing Countries in Internal Armed Conflict (Unedited Version)

Tsjeard Bouta
Georg Frerks



Netherlands Institute of
International Relations
'Clingendael'
Clingendael 7
2597 VH The Hague
P.O. Box 93080
2509 AB The Hague
Phonenumber: # 31-70-3245384
Telefax: # 31-70-3282002
Email: research@clingendael.nl
Website: <http://www.clingendael.nl/cru>

© Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without the prior written permission of the copyright holders. Clingendael Institute, P.O. Box 93080, 2509 AB The Hague, The Netherlands

Contents

- CONTENTS..... 3**
- I BACKGROUND..... 4**
 - Objective of the study..... 4*
 - Growing Need for SNV Approach on Working in Internal Armed Conflict..... 4*
 - Organization of the Paper..... 6*
- II UNDERSTANDING INTERNAL ARMED CONFLICT..... 7**
 - Defining Internal Armed Conflict..... 7*
 - Characteristics of Internal Armed Conflict..... 8*
 - Conflict Phases..... 9*
- III LINKING INTERNAL ARMED CONFLICT, DEVELOPMENT AND RELIEF 11**
 - Conflict and Development..... 11*
 - Conflict and Poverty..... 12*
 - Conflict, Development and Relief..... 13*
- IV STARTING POINTS FOR INTERVENTION IN INTERNAL ARMED CONFLICT ... 16**
 - Capacities for Peace 16*
 - Negative and Positive Peace..... 18*
 - Civil Society Involvement 18*
 - Gender and Conflict..... 19*
 - Local Governance Structures..... 21*
 - Do no Harm..... 22*
- V DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE BEFORE, DURING AND AFTER CONFLICT 25**
 - Gender-related activities..... 25*
 - Measures with regard to Local Governance..... 28*
- VI PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR WORKING IN CONFLICT 33**
- VII TOPICS FOR DISCUSSION 36**
- REFERENCES..... 40**
- ANNEXE 1 CONFLICT POLICY AND ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORK..... 43**

I Background

Objective of the study

1. This study is commissioned to the Conflict Research Unit (CRU) of the Netherlands Institute of International Relations 'Clingendael' by the Netherlands Development Organization for Technical Assistance to Development Countries SNV. SNV works in development countries through the establishment of field offices from where local and international technical assistance for development processes is organised. In some of these countries the field offices have been confronted with internal armed conflict. Therefore SNV decided to review the experiences of providing development assistance in internal armed conflict situations so far and to explore the possibility of developing an approach to be adopted in such situations.
2. The objective of this background paper is to increase SNV's understanding of providing development assistance before, during and after internal armed conflict. The study will provide the SNV management and field directors with practical considerations and indications for developing a more articulated approach to relate SNV's work to conditions of internal conflict. It's status is that of a discussion paper, written for the SNV Vision Workshop to be held on 20 September 2001 with the SNV management staff and other interested parties. The Conflict Research Unit has reviewed the available key literature on 'development and conflict' and has tried to link the gathered theoretical insights with the day-to-day reality of SNV projects in the field.

Growing Need for SNV Approach on Working in Internal Armed Conflict

3. Conflict and peace relate to the main objectives of Dutch foreign and development policy being the promotion of a just world, where peace, security, welfare and human dignity are guaranteed. In the 1990s internal armed conflict in the developing world has become a theme in international and Dutch development co-operation policy. The basic assumption was that solving the issue of violent conflict was a *condition sine qua non* for attaining development results, specifically the sustainable alleviation of poverty. Moreover, it was argued that conflicts around the world wiped out past development efforts by the enormous humanitarian and economic damage caused. More seriously, they set back the economies of those countries sometimes for decades and at the same time shattered the little future potential for economic and social development they had.
4. The former Dutch Minister for Development Co-operation, Mr. Jan Pronk, mentioned that today evermore countries linger in prolonged states of half peace and half war. He urged development agencies not to wait for peace and then intervene, but already to take action during the conflict and to be prepared to integrate development with politics¹. The OECD/DAC as well recommended

¹) Pronk (1996), p: 5

development agencies to adjust to operating in unstable conditions and to consider the scope for supporting development processes even in the midst of crisis conditions². From within SNV it is increasingly recognized that SNV indeed cannot longer close its eyes for the conditions, consequences and demands of internal armed conflict. SNV experienced internal armed conflict from nearby, for example in Rwanda, Ethiopia, Uganda, Angola and Mozambique, but it also works in various countries where security problems exist and where the situation is, in fact, rather similar to countries in conflict (e.g. Nigeria, Cameroon, Zambia, South Africa)³.

5. According to the British scholar Goodhand⁴, development agencies can work *around*, *in* and *on* conflict. Though in practice the picture may be more blurred, it may help to ideal-typically juxtapose the three forms as follows:

Table 1 ‘Ideal-Typical Comparison between Working around, in and on Conflict’

<i>Approach</i>	<i>Working around conflict</i>	<i>Working in conflict</i>	<i>Working on conflict</i>
<i>Assumptions</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Conflict is a ‘disruptive factor’ over which little influence can be exercised ▪ Development programs can continue without being negatively affected by conflict 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Development programmes can be negatively affected by, and have a negative impact on the dynamics of conflict 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Development programmes can exploit opportunities to positively affect the dynamics of conflict
<i>Strategy</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Withdraw from or keep out of conflict affected areas ▪ Continue to work in low risk areas on mainstream development activities 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Reactive adjustments are made to programmes in medium and high risk areas ▪ Improve security management ▪ Greater focus on ‘positioning’, i.e. neutrality and impartiality ▪ Cut back on high input programmes 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Refocus programs onto the root causes of the conflict, e.g. governance, poverty alleviation, social exclusion ▪ Attempt to influence the incentives for peace and disincentives for violence ▪ Support for mediation efforts ▪ Focus on protection of human rights

Source: Goodhand, J. (2001), p: 21

²) OECD/DAC (1997), p:14

³) Bronswijk, van (2000), p: 2

⁴) Goodhand (2001)(Internal Document)

The current practice of development assistance approximates generally *working around conflict* rather than *working in and working on conflict*. Development agencies should in fact take conflict more consciously into account instead of conducting business as usual.

In addition, it is useful to distinguish between *direct* and *indirect* conflict-related interventions. The former include activities that influence the hostilities directly. The latter aim at attenuating the negative effects of a conflict for the civilian population and victims of warfare in general⁵. A possible third category includes the so-called non-conflict-related measures, which comprise of development activities that act independently of the actual or potential conflict, such as protection of natural resources or improving decentralization processes⁶. Although in practice the different types of interventions are sometimes hard to separate, it can be useful for SNV to decide on what type of interventions it wants to focus. This paper will provide some conceptual and practical guidance to focus the debate on these decisions.

Organization of the Paper

6. The paper has a pragmatic nature, which is reflected in the various sections. Section 2 discusses the definitions and characteristics of internal armed conflict and outlines the several phases of conflict, which are often distinguished in theory and practice, but are not always completely uncontroversial. Section 3 elaborates on the interrelationships between internal armed conflict, relief and development. It also highlights the need to adapt development co-operation under conditions of conflict. Section 4 identifies various starting points for intervention that a development agency such as SNV could take into account when providing assistance in internal armed conflict situations. Topics of discussion, among others, are local capacities for peace, civil society involvement, the role of women and structures of governance. Section 5 focuses on activities that SNV can implement before, during and after internal armed conflict. Special attention will be paid to the dynamics of changing gender relations throughout conflict and to measures dealing with governance. Section 6 will focus on some major issues, with which SNV field directors are confronted with, while working in conflict areas. The last section contains major topics of discussion that SNV needs to consider when involved, either directly or indirectly, in providing development assistance in internal armed conflict situations.

⁵) Douma (2000), p: 12

⁶) Klingenbiel (1999), p: vi

II Understanding Internal Armed Conflict

Defining Internal Armed Conflict

7. In general the concept of conflict is hard to define. Most of the existing typologies of conflict show weaknesses in the field of exhaustiveness, mutual exclusiveness of categories, semantic consistency, and neutrality. Definitions often underestimate the complexity and the dynamics, as well as the multi-causal nature of conflicts⁷. Nowadays, the notion of *complex political emergency* is used frequently to refer to the conflicts at stake. This notion properly indicates the political nature of most internal conflicts, as well as the fact that we normally find a combination of several causal factors. Some of these factors may be seen as pivotal, structural or root causes of the conflict, while others are considered to be triggers or aggravating factors that may prolong or intensify the conflict, but are no cause of and in itself. In most present-day situations the root causes can be found in the political relationship between the state and society. Whereas society is made up of multiple identity groups, the state, in contrast, is often dominated by only one such group that manages to monopolize political power, economic resources and socio-cultural symbols of identity. Other groups find themselves excluded and marginalized. As they experience their socio-economic deprivation as a consequence of conscious state policy, they can easily be mobilised into violent resistance by political leaders and entrepreneurs. From a practitioner's point of view, static labelling of conflicts could result in inadequate measures before, during or after the conflict. Since even simple definitions of conflict are obviously hard to apply, it is not intended to give one encompassing definition here. The only aim here is to clarify the (conceptual) characteristics of internal armed conflict in a way that it is relevant for SNV purposes.
8. When using the concept of internal armed conflict in this paper, the term conflict has been limited to the following preconditions⁸:
 - Conflict deals with violent armed conflict in particular (it does exclude those disputes that do not have a (potentially) violent character);
 - The type of conflict to be observed is intrastate and not interstate;
 - Conflict has some form of organized combat and a planned systematic strategy;
 - Fighting concerns (fairly) continuous or periodic rather than spontaneous, sporadic action. Sometimes, however, countries are in a state of '*latent conflict*' and '*fragile peace*'. A number of countries referred to in this paper are in such a state, either because conflicts are subsiding (positive trend) or showing signs of re-emerging (negative trend)⁹. It will be evident that action is required to sustain and consolidate such situations of fragile peace and to prevent a recurrence of conflict.

⁷) Douma, Frerks, and van de Goor (1999), p: 4

⁸) Douma, Frerks, and van de Goor (1999), p: 4

⁹) Goor, van de and Versteegen (2000), p: 11

It could be argued that the dichotomy between internal and external conflict is inadequate and is in need of a reconceptualization. One must indeed be careful not to ignore the regional and even international character of current so-called internal armed conflicts. There is nearly always external involvement in these conflicts, e.g. by neighbouring states, regional or global 'superpowers' etc. This involvement may be political, or through providing covert or overt support through funding, training, supplies and so on. There is also often the complicity of international business in facilitating so-called 'economies of violence'. Some conflicts like those on the Balkans and in the Great Lake region have a strong regional dimension. To anticipate to this, SNV Burundi, for instance, recently joined a platform where agencies that work in different countries in the Great Lake region meet in order to discuss issues with a clear regional character. An international dimension is also added, when, for instance, various diaspora groups (e.g. Kurds, Tamils) support, and even fuel, the internal armed conflict, from a distance.

Characteristics of Internal Armed Conflict

9. Many current perceptions of conflict are still based on notions related to international armed conflict, that is, the interstate war. Though there is some debate whether the current wars are really completely different from these conventional wars, there is now a tendency to treat them as a separate category. Mary Kaldor¹⁰ refers to them as 'new wars' or 'wars of the third kind', that is, after the classical interstate wars and the Cold War. Though in practice the picture may be more blurred, it may help to ideal-typically juxtapose the interstate and intrastate wars along a number of characteristics, so as to get a better grasp of some of its constituent features.

¹⁰) Kaldor (1999), p: 2

Table 2 ‘Features of Interstate and Intrastate Conflict’

<i>Interstate Wars</i>	<i>Intrastate Wars</i>
Between states	Domestic strife
Between armies	Variegated parties and temporary alliances (ethnic, religious, regional, secessionist movements, paramilitary and gangs)
Respect for civilians	90% of victims are civilians
Defined battlefield	No battlefield: hit-and-run, urban warfare, guerrilla. ‘zones of peace’ and ‘zones of war’ co-exist.
Rules, international law and conventions	No rules
Clear beginning and end	More or less continuous situation of latent conflict or fragile peace without clear benchmarks or end-points
Relatively short duration	Protracted, varying intensity, sometimes linked to the seasons of the year (e.g. Afghanistan)
Methods of warfare according to Geneva Conventions and International Human Rights	Methods as starvation, ethnic cleansing, rape, genocide, destruction/burning of civilian infrastructure
Nature and aim of conflict clear	Nature and aim of conflict subject to change
UN-charter: war is prohibited, except in the case of self defence against aggression or on the basis of a UN-mandate	No charters applied

Source¹¹

Conflict Phases

10. As stated before, conflicts are not static, but dynamic. They evolve over time and are shaped by various factors. In order to grasp the dynamic character of conflicts, academics and policymakers have developed the so-called *life cycle of conflict model*¹². Ideally spoken every conflict comprises of three phases: a *pre-conflict phase*, an *actual conflict phase* and a *post-conflict phase*¹³. In the first phase the parties threaten to use force. The conflict nonetheless remains non-violent. In the second phase the use of violence is introduced and the conflict escalates. The conflict thus moves into the phase where the parties involved get organized and begin to use force systematically. At a certain moment, the fighting is over the top and a process of de-escalation begins. This may end with an impasse, cease-fire or a peaceful settlement, after which we will enter the ‘post-conflict’ phase.

¹¹⁾ Table developed by G.E. Frerks for Clingendael lectures on 'Intrastate Conflict and Development'.

¹²⁾ Various conflict cycles can be encountered in the literature. Some authors discern three phases of conflict, others up to seventeen. For a good overview of different conflict cycles, see Schmid (2000), p: 20-21

¹³⁾ In the rest of this paper we will, for the sake of simplicity, use this three-phases-conflict-model: *before*, *during* and *after* a conflict.

11. The conflict cycle though is an *oversimplification of the reality*. Case studies showed that these conflict phases neither do necessarily follow upon each other time-wise nor that each conflict includes all phases. In some cases the threshold of violence was not crossed, while in others no settlements were concluded but outcomes imposed by military defeat of one of the parties. In other cases the conflict passed alternatively through violent and less violent phases, but did not come to a conclusion. In other words the cycle was iterative while not all phases had to be completed in reality¹⁴. Others put it more boldly, stating that in practice there is rarely a neat sequencing of the conflict phases¹⁵.
12. Nevertheless the conflict cycle model can be used as an analytical tool to help the SNV to:
- Gain insight into the alternating intensity of conflicts;
 - Recognize distinct, even though, overlapping phases of conflict ;
 - Discern the opportunities for interventions during these phases;
 - Observe the iterative nature of the conflict in certain circumstances.
13. Most present approaches to conflict analysis and strategic implementation of conflict-preventive activities suffer from a lack of coherence between the conflict analytical, strategic policy and practical implementation aspects. In order to guarantee coherence and consistency the Conflict Research Unit of the Clingendael Institute has designed the Conflict and Policy Assessment Framework, which specifies the substance of these different components, as well as focuses on the crucial linkages between them. For further details see Annexe 1. *It is recommended that SNV adopts such an approach or some of its major components in its practical dealings with conflict situations*¹⁶.

¹⁴⁾ Douma, Frerks and van de Goor (1999), p: 4

¹⁵⁾ Speth (1999), p: 2

¹⁶⁾ Goor, van de and Verstegen (2000)

III Linking Internal Armed Conflict, Development and Relief

Conflict and Development

14. Providing development assistance in conflict areas differs from that in stable and secure areas. These differences are not merely contextual, but also strategic, substantive and tactical. Substantively, it should be made clear what the relations are between conflict and development and how the latter can serve to reduce conflict and promote peace. This is not self-evident as development may very well induce violence, if not contribute to so-called 'development aggression'. Regarding the relation between development and conflict the following observations are in order:
- Development or the lack thereof can cause conflict¹⁷. The development process implies *interfering in social relations* with the objective to introduce qualitative and structural changes, touching upon the distribution of scarce resources and the balance of power in society. This type of changes can count on resistance of those, who lose in the process or are denied access to the funds and commodities that development brings.
 - Development projects may also *create social and economic costs* for those involved and, in extreme cases, even endanger existing livelihoods. Examples are large-scale resettlement and irrigation projects and colonization schemes. Some observers submit that violence is inherent to the dominant model of Western development, which evinces an often arrogant, if not fully mistaken belief in the superiority of Western man, Western knowledge and Western society. Even if one would wish to qualify this statement, it is undeniable that development leads to an increased economic and political differentiation that evokes feelings of inequity, exclusion and relative deprivation. Such feelings can easily become mobilised against the incumbent regime.
 - A third aspect of the relationship between development and conflict is the fact that a *generally low level of economic and institutional development makes a society vulnerable to violence*. The absence of stabilising institutions creates tensions and contradictions between groups in society among one another or between those groups and the regime. Key issues here are the lack of legitimacy of the government, the extra-constitutional position and influence of the army, and the arbitrary or corrupt use of state power for private or corporate interests.
 - A fourth aspect *concerns the destruction of development achievements by the violence of internal conflict*. It is often civilian infrastructure and civilians themselves who are the target of military violence. Apart from financial and economic damage, there is often a heavy loss of human and social capital. In addition to direct costs in terms of damage afflicted, there are long-term indirect costs as a consequence of the harm done to the productive sectors. This may lead to a sustained fall in GDP.
 - Finally, it can often be stated *that development patterns in the past have caused the emergence of tensions and conflicts*. In this connection the failure of prevailing political and economic

¹⁷) For examples of this, see Schrijvers (1992)

structures deserves a central place in the analysis. It is needed to redefine earlier models of development and not to understand rehabilitation as a simple recreation of the situation ex-ante. Only in this way, fundamental causes of tension can be taken away.

In conclusion, it can be said that the relationship between conflict and development is not simple and linear, but very complex. It is often underestimated that development and development co-operation cannot only help to prevent conflicts, but also may induce them¹⁸.

Conflict and Poverty

15. Poverty is frequently understood to be at the root of many conflicts, while the costs of violent conflict increase the levels of poverty and inhibit development. As a result, the assumption has come to prevail that poverty reduction strategies *ipso facto* will advance peace and prevent conflict. The relationship, however, is more complex and hence needs refinement. Conflict cannot be reduced to being the result of a form of development failure. It is as much a consequence of development as it is a constraint on development.
16. It is fairly evident that poverty may result as a consequence of conflict. Economic decline, state failure and violence compound one another to the detriment of the poor and most vulnerable groups in society. A conventional way of responding is through humanitarian and emergency assistance. Here, poverty is mainly perceived as a consequence of conflict that in first instance requires the alleviation of suffering and, once conflict has subsided, enables reconstruction and rehabilitation efforts. This approach to poverty and conflict results in a reactive policy stance.
17. The most salient linkage between conflict and poverty, apart from loss of life and the humanitarian need, is the damage done to infrastructure, property and economic resources. There is, however, also a need to include damage to institutions and the social, legal and political infrastructure. All those factors conspire to produce an often profound, multi-dimensional and long-term deterioration of the overall poverty situation. They further affect the future possibility for regeneration of growth and wellbeing.
18. A greater challenge is found in an appraisal of the causes of conflict, thereby allowing for a proactive approach of conflict prevention. The precise nature of the causal relationship between poverty, development and conflict is widely debated within academic and policy circles. One may even submit that it is now widely recognised that a direct causal link is lacking. Regarding the question whether 'poverty breeds conflict' there is no consensus. Though one may tend to agree that low levels of economic and institutional development make societies extra vulnerable for violence, extreme poverty *per se* is indeed seldom found to be directly converted into collective violence. A growing body of literature on local coping strategies, moreover, has stressed that those living in disaster-prone areas have developed their own ideas and practices for dealing with these situations, rather than turning to violence, apathy or dependence. Instead, impoverishment, and situations of marked deterioration of living conditions (rather than poverty *per se*) are more likely

¹⁸⁾ This section is partly based on Frerks and de Zeeuw (2000), p: 10-12

to be conducive to socio-political discontent that may be mobilised into political violence. In practice however it appears that countries have very different tolerances with regard to economic shocks/changes. At the most one could agree on the multi-causal and complex nature of the linkage of poverty, development and conflict and its place and time-specificity. The causal relationship between poverty and conflict is in fact mitigated by other dynamics and processes and can at the most be considered indirect.

Conflict, Development and Relief

19. Before the 1990s *relief* and *development* were generally thought to be mutually exclusive in conflict situations. Relief was usually seen as a short-term remedial response in relation to extraordinary events. In contrast, development was regarded as a long-term investment aiming to encourage qualitative and structural change¹⁹. The debate on linking relief and development got momentum in the mid-1990's, and is often referred to as the *continuum* between relief, rehabilitation and development. Academics and policymakers realised that better 'development' could reduce the need for emergency relief, and that better 'relief' could contribute to development; and that better 'rehabilitation' could ease the remaining transition between the two²⁰. The main argument in favour of linking relief and development could probably be found in the assertion that any structural, definitive and sustainable solution of an emergency could only consist of measures that moved beyond the provision of relief aid²¹. In other words, there was a need for promoting (sustainable) development in conflict situations.
20. Due to conceptual, political and practical problems it turned out in practice that it was not easy to link relief and development, or, in other words, to fill the gap between *relief aid* and *development assistance*. Conceptually spoken, linking assumes that the content and strategies of relief and development are sufficiently compatible to enable their linkage. However, in practice it appeared that relief and development were two different categories. From a political perspective, development assistance implies decisions about the legitimacy of partners and institutions of the recipient state, whereas in relief aid the donor often tries to remain neutral and impartial. Consequently, external agencies could provide relief to conflict-affected countries, but not be in the position to follow this up by structural development aid. A last set of problems refers to institutional, technical and implementation issues. Structures and organisations for development and relief are often separated, and co-ordination and co-operation are difficult. Co-ordination is hampered by differences in mandate, ideological or religious background, approaches and timeframes. There also may be differences in political stances, while finally organizations may compete for funding, media attention and local personnel.
21. It has been recognized by now that there is in fact no continuum between relief, rehabilitation and development or a necessary temporal and logical sequence between these phases²². OECD writes that the transition from emergency crisis to long-term development does not follow a set pattern,

¹⁹⁾ Bronswijk, van (2000), p: 4

²⁰⁾ Buchanan-Smith and Maxwell in Frerks (1999), p: 2

²¹⁾ Frerks (1999), p: 4

²²⁾ Ibid, p: 6

chronology or order. *Emergency relief, rehabilitation work and development assistance all co-exist in times of conflict and crises and they interact in innumerable ways*²³. Similarly the UNDP²⁴ and the Brookings Institution²⁵ have discarded the idea of the continuum as deeply flawed and obsolete. Table 3 below gives an ideal-typical comparison between relief and sustainable development. It shows that relief and sustainable development are inherently different activities leading to diverging forms of intervention and management.

The table indicates that solving these differences will not be easy, especially in view of the entrenched nature of many characteristics mentioned. The challenge now is to move beyond the notion of a continuum and attain more complex modes of linking. Apart from the conceptual, political and implementation problems mentioned earlier, this requires changes at the level of institutional frameworks, organisational cultures and funding practices.

Table 3 ‘Ideal-typical Comparison between Relief and Sustainable Development’

	<i>Relief</i>	<i>Sustainable development</i>
<i>Objectives</i>	Alleviation of immediate, basic needs of disaster survivors	Improvement of standard of living
<i>Nature of needs</i>	Physical, psychological	Economic, social, political
<i>Type of intervention</i>	Delivery of material provisions and initial reconstruction	Quantitative and qualitative changes in ongoing socio-economic processes
<i>Aid characteristics</i>	Short term, temporary (external)	Long term (embedded)
	Incidental	Structural
	Relief of acute needs	Changes in vulnerability and entitlements
<i>Management characteristics</i>	Donor driven	Recipient focused
	Top-down, <i>dirigiste</i>	Bottom-up, participatory
<i>Main foci</i>	Delivery, speed, logistics and output	Underlying processes, causalities, long term impact
<i>Context variables</i>	Chaos, instability, conflict	Stability
	Lack of infrastructure and counterparts (failed states)	Infrastructure and counterparts available
	Lack of knowledge and documentation	Knowledge and documentation available
	Media attention, fund raising	Less attention

Source: Frerks (1999)

22. It is particularly this situation, in which emergency relief, rehabilitation work and development assistance co-exist, which forces SNV to redefine its position as regards working in conflict areas. SNV defines its mandate and position being a development organisation and not a relief agency. However, the traditional distinction between development organisations at the one hand of the spectrum, and relief agencies at the other end, no longer holds. Relief agencies have started to

²³⁾ OECD/DAC (1998), p: 5

²⁴⁾ UNDP (1998)

²⁵⁾ Brookings Institution (1999), p: 2

provide so-called *developmental relief*²⁶, and, according to Klingenbiel, development organisations working in conflict areas increasingly pursue *short-term objectives* without seeking or achieving the degree of sustainability that is usually called for²⁷. It therefore is important for SNV to *firstly*, clarify what its complementary role is to (developmental) relief programs. *Secondly*, to consider to what extent SNV is willing to shift the focus to the kind of development programmes as Klingenbiel is referring to. And *thirdly*, how SNV can reconcile within the same activity short and long-term objectives in order to address, or, at least not harm, the needs for relief, rehabilitation, development and peace building²⁸. In this regard, it is good to mention that conflict situations more often than stable situations force field staffs to undertake action. Often, local actors more or less expect from an external agency that its activities have a direct impact on the conflict situation, because this, in a sense, legitimizes its presence. Moreover it gives field staff the idea that their presence is useful. This need for direct action might be in contrast with long-term sustainable development activities that SNV is used to implement. Therefore, it can be recommended that the SNV management gives the SNV field directors some room for manouevre to implement projects that have a relatively direct and immediate impact on alleviating the emergency needs of their target groups. *Finally*, the question is how SNV's development activities need to be adjusted or sensitized to respond to the challenge of war. This is highlighted in the sections below.

²⁶) Brandt (2000), p: 2 states “that the rationale behind developmental relief programs is to provide stability, reduce dependency, lessen vulnerability, and provide hope to populations destroyed by conflict”.

²⁷) Klingenbiel (1999), p: vii

²⁸) OECD/DAC (1997), p: 32

IV Starting Points for Intervention in Internal Armed Conflict

Capacities for Peace

23. In every conflict area there are ‘*capacities for war*’ and ‘*capacities for peace*’. They are present at the same time and even can be present in the same institutions and systems. There seems to be a tendency to stress the former set of capacities more than the latter. Development agencies, but also the local actors in conflict settings themselves, tend to focus on divisions and tensions²⁹. Even though they maintain *normal* actions, they see everything as *abnormal*, because of the conflict. They often fail to recognize the many ways they continue to act and think in *non-war* terms³⁰. This is also the case at higher levels, as stated by Jan Pronk: “In the international fora, responsible for peace and security there is still a tendency to focus myopically on the military dimensions of international conflict management to the neglect of the non-military actors and longer term development activities that contribute to peace building”³¹.
24. SNV and other development agencies must keep in mind that in a conflict more people do not fight than do so. And that more people continue their daily *non-war activities* than get involved in *war activities*³². For instance, in Burundi local actors are actively establishing hotels and restaurants, whereas external agencies still have a dominant image of a country in conflict. According to various academics and policymakers though, the non-war activities (capacities or institutions) form the basis for development agencies’ interventions. Development assistance can be given in such a way that it helps people to disengage themselves from their conflicts, by providing a safe space for non-war action and a safe voice for non-war ideas³³. Thus, by identifying and supporting key actors and mechanisms dedicated to peace and reconciliation or to non-war activities at the community level, and avoiding inadvertent support to ‘forces of war’, external agencies can make an effective contribution to sustainable development³⁴, as well as to reconciliation and peace building, even if only initially at local levels.

²⁹⁾ For example, SNV provided the Conflict Research Unit with some features of internal armed conflict, mostly referring to conflict-related activities, such as a decrease of state investment in education and health, forced migration, more pressure on basic resources like water and so on. Of course these issues are important, though here we would like to stress that it is also important to mention the ongoing non-conflict-related activities.

³⁰⁾ Anderson (1999), p: 23

³¹⁾ Pronk (1996), p: 2

³²⁾ Ibid, p: 23

³³⁾ Pronk (1996), p: 4

³⁴⁾ Adapted from OECD/DAC (1997), p: 37

25. In order to identify these *stabilising points*³⁵ or *connectors*³⁶, five categories will be mentioned to illustrate the range of connectors found to exist before and after, but also during conflict. These are:
- *Systems and institutions*. For example, roads, water systems, electrical and communication systems continue to connect people in conflict areas.
 - *Attitudes and actions*. In every conflict area some individuals and groups remain dedicated to non-war activities, disengaging themselves from ongoing war practices;
 - *Shared values and interests*. Various conflicts have experienced situations such as cease-fires and corridors of peace in order to receive food aid or to provide health services;
 - *Common experiences*, which may bridge the gap between people at the opposing sides of a conflict. Examples are women groups that often empathise with each other, so do youth groups, farmers associations, orchestras, hospitals and so on.
 - *Symbols and occasions*, such as music, literature, national celebrations, can also connect people during a conflict and form the base for development co-operation efforts.
26. These five categories can also be used to describe the *destabilising points*, *disconnectors* or the so-called *capacities for war*. These are not simply the mirror image of capacities for peace and connectors. Although the categories are the same, the disconnectors mentioned in each category can substantially differ from those listed as connectors. *Systems and institutions* that may disconnect people, for instance, include arms trade networks. Moreover, it encompasses traditionally established systems of discrimination, exclusion and dominance, which are often manifested in unequal access to education, health, justice, jobs or other social services. In this regard, human rights violations deserve attention as well. Particularly, after a conflict, not convicting human right perpetrators decreases the chance on reconciliation between people. *Attitudes and actions* that may divide people include torture, suspicion, brutality, fear and so on. Regarding *different values and interests*, nearly all societies experience a kind of tension between values that represent subcultures and different religious affiliations. Finally, where national symbols and occasions may link people, distinct subgroup *symbols and occasions* can accentuate differences and excite unease or suspicion between groups³⁷.
27. It is important to think realistically about capacities for peace. People behave as connectors and disconnectors at the same time. Some of their actions reinforce peace, other actions strengthen conflict. Thirdly, capacities of peace form an obvious target for supporters of conflict. However, mentioning these stabilizing points can raise awareness among SNV personnel of where to look for peace capacities, how to recognize opportunities to support them, and how to protect them against the protagonists of conflict.

³⁵) Pronk (1996)

³⁶) Anderson (1999)

³⁷) Anderson (1999), p: 23-37

Negative and Positive Peace³⁸

28. In relation to local capacities for peace, the notion of peace itself, whereby ‘negative’ and ‘positive’ peace can be distinguished, is important. In external conflict interventions, it is possible to work towards different final positions, which can be summarized under the terms *positive and negative* peace. Negative peace simply implies the absence of violence, but still entails accepting the type of unbalanced power relations, inequity, lack of resources, etc. that have in first instance led to the conflict. Positive peace, on the other hand, necessitates an approach through which it is tried to transform society into a more just and equitable direction. In view of our earlier remarks it can be seen that reaching negative peace deals only with the manifestations or even symptoms of violent conflict, whereas achieving positive peace means addressing the root causes of conflict.

Civil Society Involvement³⁹

29. Positive peace requires changes in society that can only be realized gradually and for which the involvement of societal groups and organisations is inevitable. Peace must finally be based in society itself. Society needs to be reformed socially, politically and economically. Reconciliation and peace building are key. In addition, a whole range of reforms is needed in the sphere of good governance, democracy and institutional development. In order to be sustainable results cannot be achieved within the institutions of the state only, but need to encompass civil society. Strengthening of civil society in fact is essential in order to function as an articulate partner, watchdog and countervailing power *vis-à-vis* the government. In this connection, currently a large number of initiatives is undertaken to support local capacities for peace and strengthen civil society in conflict-affected countries.
30. Some *advantages* of including civil society NGOs are the following. NGOs may offer better guarantees for a people-centred approach on the basis of participation of the beneficiaries or the war-affected. As grievances among the population lie at the root of the conflict, it is of the essence that the population itself is part of the solution and that a solution can count on social acceptance. NGOs, in principle, could express the feelings among the population and appreciate the history, background and local context of the problems. Some observers feel that such NGOs may represent a voice of peace. It is also said that they have the local knowledge and empathy to help victims of conflict.
31. Apart from these real or supposed advantages, also a number of relative *drawbacks* have been identified when involving local civil society. In the first place the local NGOs may be liaised to protagonist parties, either implicitly or explicitly. Secondly, the social base and representation of many of such NGOs is dubious and often they are captured by local elites and made instrumental to their interests. A third objection is the lack of transparency and accountability and the resulting danger of abuse and opportunism. Many NGOs emerge from nothing as soon as donor money enters the scene and are more something of a private company than organisations for the sake of

³⁸) Lewer (1999); Panckhurst (2001)

³⁹) This section is partly based on Frerks (2001), p: 8-12

the common good. A next problem lies in the great diversity and number of such organizations, leading to a fragmented, uncoordinated, if not contradictory overall picture. A fifth problem is their lack of executive implementation capacity and their own need for institutional development. Finally, it has been observed that such organizations lack the necessary impact at the national and regional levels and that their eventual contribution to conflict resolution can be easily neutralized or opposed by other actors and levels in society. Moreover, these NGO's would not be able to affect the underlying causes of conflict, such as those related to the political economy of violence, the scarcity of resources, the lack of political influence and the process of underdevelopment. The approach is criticised on the basis of its simplistic assumption that people at the local level inherently wish peace. It seems to forget that conflict is a deep-seated and culturally embedded problem that cannot be solved by a number of well-intentioned activists. Similarly, the notion is criticised that women could offer a special contribution to peace building as the role of women in conflict is much more complicated than that of bringing peace only.

Gender and Conflict

32. Generally spoken, the relationship between gender and conflict can be approached in three ways. *Firstly*, conflict and violence can have a different form for and impact on men and women. *Secondly*, the role of women as peacemakers during and after conflict is often stressed. *Thirdly*, women's roles, positions and identities can change throughout conflict, to which development agencies working in conflict should anticipate⁴⁰.

33. Regarding the first approach, in the past few years the *victim role* of women⁴¹ often is stressed. Women are among the most heavily targeted victims of a conflict. Their burden increases during conflict. They invariably have to bear greater responsibility for their children and elderly relatives, which makes them less mobile to eventually flee from the (open) conflict. Women are often under direct threat from indiscriminate violence due to their proximity to the fighting. Due to this, they have to restrict their movement, which severely limits their access to supplies of water, food, and medical assistance and their ability to tend their animals and crops, to exchange news and information and to seek community or family support. Limited access to medical assistance, particularly for reproductive and material health, complicates the situation of women even more⁴². Moreover women during or after conflict are often sexually abused and they often experience deep traumas after the war. Systematic rape and sexual abuse of women increasingly becomes a means to punish, intimidate, humiliate opposed groups. Where in many African communities, for instance, the sexual purity of women is of eminent importance, sexual abuse can be regarded as an attack on the entire community⁴³.

Though all this may be perfectly true, it is increasingly recognized that the victim discourse on women is a too narrow discussion. Instead, it is needed to take into account the more *multi-faceted role* of women in conflict.

⁴⁰) AIV (2001), p: 30

⁴¹) See for a discussion on this topic Byrne (1996)

⁴²) Lindsey (2000), p: 564 -565

⁴³) AIV (2001), p: 30

34. In connection to the second approach, women for various reasons are often regarded as peacemakers in conflict. The four main perspectives in this regard have been the following:

- Some authors believe that women are innately more peaceful than men. However, they tend to overlook the active contribution of women to conflict. For example women actively took part in the hostilities during the Second World War, the Gulf War, but also in intrastate conflicts, such as in Sri Lanka where a third of the fighting forces are women⁴⁴. Another example is that women are actively supporting their menfolk in military operations, by providing them with the moral and physical support needed to wage war⁴⁵;
- Others believe that women are more inclined to peace because they are mothers. Women, however, probably do not act as they do *because* they are mothers, but they strategically use their motherhood to justify their actions for building peace as well as being engaged in conflict;
- Other authors assume that women's supposed peacefulness is related to their particular roles in society, such as caring after children and relatives and maintaining social relations in the community;
- A fourth perspective particularly pays attention to the construction of symbols, attitudes and behavioural patterns related to the notions of femininity and masculinity. Cultural definitions of masculinity with attendant aspects of aggression, militarization, dominance, hierarchy and competition feed into the organization of war as well as the building of peace. The transformation of norms of masculinity is key in any peace-building strategy. Most institutional arenas, moreover, are permeated by masculine norms⁴⁶.

Although all these four views may have some validity, we should not generalise such ideas on women's interests in peace and women's or men's roles in war⁴⁷. These are social structures that strongly depend on the local situation and to a large extent are context specific.

35. The third approach stresses the fact that *throughout the conflict women's positions, roles and activities change and may even improve*. Conflict thus also offers windows of opportunities for women's empowerment and for the establishment and flourishing of women groups. In the absence of men during and after conflict women often take over their positions. For instance in African conflict situations, an increasing number of women have obtained key positions in trade relations. They have become the main distributors of goods and they are responsible for maintaining market linkages with diverse communities in other regions.

Kumar shows for six conflict-affected countries that women's public role also has expanded and that they have become more engaged in institutional settings. Some entered the public arena to support war efforts, while others founded peace organizations and became voices for peace. In the post-conflict stage, many women managed to make a head-way in politics⁴⁸. It is important also to emphasize the growing role of women's organizations during and after conflict. Apart that their number has grown, they have been active in almost every conceivable sector in the countries

⁴⁴) Filkins in Lindsey (2000), p: 562

⁴⁵) Lindsey (2000), p: 563

⁴⁶) See for more literature, among others, Byrne (1996), Turner (1999) and Panckhurst (2001)

⁴⁷) Hilhorst and Frerks (1999), p: 11-14

⁴⁸) Kumar (2000), p: x

studied by Kumar. Though these organizations face quite a number of obstacles and limitations, Kumar concludes that they have empowered women in several ways⁴⁹.

36. In short, women in conflict must be seen as a highly differentiated group of social actors, who possess valuable resources and capacities and who have their own agendas. Development agencies, which recognize women as actors, should shift from welfare-oriented projects that aim to reduce the women's suffering here and now, to projects that support women's own *long-term strategic interests*⁵⁰. In this connection, it is important to analyse what impact conflict has on gender-specific tasks, responsibilities, roles and identities of women during and after a conflict; what specific mechanisms lead to a re-negotiation of gender identities and how permanent such changes are after a conflict is over; and, lastly, what practical programs are needed to sustain positive gender-related changes in tasks, responsibilities, roles and identities of women as a consequence of conflict.

Local Governance Structures

37. Sustainable development does not occur in a political vacuum, It depends, among others, on the effectiveness of governance practices in solving conflict, creating development and inducing the empowerment of actors to participate in the decisions that affect their lives. The active involvement of local governance structures is not only a necessity, but also an important condition for the sustainability of development activities as well as for effective conflict resolution and peace-building activities⁵¹. By allowing local communities and regional entities to manage their own affairs, and through facilitating closer contact between central and local authorities, effective systems of local governance enable people's needs and priorities to be heard, thereby ensuring that government interventions meet a variety of social needs. Strengthening local governance structures forms, among others, the core of SNV's development assistance. At the local level the government, civil society and the private sector interact in determining the development agenda and in managing the resources in order to implement development priorities. A critical assessment of the interfaces and collaboration between government, civil society and the private sector is the starting point for SNV interventions in support of local governance structures⁵².
38. The notion of strengthening local governance structures is closely related to the notions of good governance and decentralization. Good governance, in short, refers to principles, including the respect for human rights; respect for the rules of law; political openness; participation and tolerance; accountability and transparency; administrative and bureaucratic capacity and efficiency⁵³. All those aspects are highly problematic under conditions of conflict. The underlying principles of good governance often have to be reconceptualized and specifically acted upon under these circumstances.

⁴⁹) Ibid, p: x-xiii

⁵⁰) Sørensen (1999), p: 66

⁵¹) UNDP (1999A), p: 1

⁵²) SNV (2001A), p: 7

⁵³) UNDP (1999A), p: 1

39. Against this background of good governance and decentralization, SNV *objectives and approaches* to strengthen local governance structures are as follows. The main objectives include:
- To contribute to a more effective and equitable service delivery system within the government and within other providers of services to the population;
 - To contribute to more transparency and accountability of all local development actors;
 - To contribute to more democracy and to an increased influence of the population over policy formulation and implementation⁵⁴.
40. SNV particularly aims to strengthen local governance structures in private sector development and natural resource management, which implies improving the allocation and peaceful management of natural resources in areas where natural resources are exploited. In order to make these objectives operational, SNV has developed an approach to:
- First get a clear picture of the institutional landscape and its main actors: it particularly is important to single out meaningful organizations/actors that need further strengthening;
 - Based on organizational assessment specifically strengthen the culture and structure of the organisation;
 - Improve as a facilitator the human resource management and development. In this connection, smart indicators need to be set to measure results in key intervention areas.
41. It needs to be clarified whether and how these objectives and approaches can be made relevant and operational in conflict situations. To see how strengthening local governance structures in conflict areas can work out in practice, we refer to section 5. It suffices here to state that issues of governance, democratization and decentralization are a controversial and contentious area. These topics are of a deeply political nature and affect power balances between identity groups. Often they are seen as part of conflict resolution and peace-building arrangements, but may paradoxically be equally divisive and conflict-prone.

Do no Harm

42. Development assistance can reinforce, exacerbate and prolong the conflict; it can also help to reduce tensions and strengthen people's capacities to disengage from fighting and find peaceful options for solving problems. Development agencies simply must ensure not to do harm and to do the maximum good⁵⁵. It is good to recognise that the potential influence of outsiders has its limits. Because people and societies fight war for their own reasons, outsiders and intervenors cannot really solve wars. Conflict parties must achieve their own peace. External agencies can work along them in the conflict and have a limited facilitator role at most⁵⁶. Positive peace requires further a long-term social and political transformation process that must be owned locally. Peace is not an event, but a process that needs to be nurtured, sustained and internalised.

⁵⁴) Ibid, p: 12

⁵⁵) OECD/DAC (2001), p: 37

⁵⁶) Anderson (1999), p: 68; Anderson and Spelten (2000)

43. Due to the prevailing mutual suspicion during conflict, transparency and full communication with key internal and external actors are essential for SNV in making its objectives clear. Moreover, SNV should aim at encouraging and sustaining broad and inclusive dialogue. This is one important way to learn about and address the different interests and perceptions of the parties in conflict, so as to ensure that the different ideas of possible ‘connectors’ are taken into account⁵⁷. Also marginalized groups should be listened to, especially as they run the danger of being ignored. Their position may be at variance of that of the protagonist parties.
44. Practically spoken, the development assistance that SNV provides in conflict situations, must be coherent, integrated and aimed at helping address the root causes of conflict. Development activities before a conflict turns violent, can be identified that may help prevent the outbreak of violence. Examples include improving the allocation and management of natural resources; reducing poverty; targeting socio-political activities in support of participatory development; promoting good governance; ensuring the respect for human rights as well as measures supporting the self-help potential among conflict-threatened population groups; and promoting the creation of dialogue and mediation structures. SNV should assess prevailing divisions within the communities and districts, and then determine the appropriate ways to minimise such schisms. During and particularly after the conflict is the re-establishment of security and the rule of law of critical importance. The activities undertaken should help overcome the enduring traumas, promote reconciliation and prevent renewed outbreaks of violent conflict. This is best achieved by a combination of measures in areas, such as the reintegration of uprooted populations and long-term economic, social, political and ecological rehabilitation to reduce structured susceptibility to conflict⁵⁸.
45. In order to avoid doing harm, SNV should anticipate to the fact that economic and political resources implied in development assistance, affect conflict in various predictable ways⁵⁹, such as:
- Development assistance legitimizes agendas of regimes, groups or individuals and their actions, supporting the pursuit of either war or peace. For instance, it was found that decentralization measures helping the government to develop monitoring structures could be easily turned into repressive mechanisms⁶⁰;
 - The distributional impacts of development assistance affect inter-group relationships, either feeding tensions or reinforcing connections. For example, in an irrigation project measures eased the pressure on land use, but also enabled new settlers to move in, thus opening the way to fresh conflicts⁶¹.
46. SNV should also realize that development assistance substitutes for local resources required to meet civilian needs, freeing them to support conflict (*substitution effect*); that development assistance affects markets by reinforcing either the war economy or the peace economy; and that

⁵⁷) OECD/DAC (2001), p: 37

⁵⁸) OECD/DAC (1997), p: 13-16

⁵⁹) Ibid, p: 39

⁶⁰) Ibid

⁶¹) Klingenbiel (1999), p: vi

development resources are often stolen by warriors and used to support armies and buy weapons⁶². Although these issues are particularly relevant to relief agencies that introduce large amount of foreign goods at local markets, SNV can encounter the same issues while distributing locally produced goods or services in conflict areas. In section 6 it will be discussed how to practically deal with these negative effects of development assistance.

47. In view of the above, SNV needs to assess the potential impact of development co-operation measures, before these are going to be implemented. In this regard, so-called *Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment (PCIA)* tools have been developed⁶³. PCIA can be applied to assess (ex-ante and ex-post) the impact of development activities on the conflict. It thus may help to improve the design, conduct and evaluation of development work in conflict-prone areas and to provide a means for evaluating its potential for peace building.

⁶²) Authors, like David Keen (1998) have demonstrated many other ways in which humanitarian or development assistance feeds economies of violence and functions to perpetuate war.

⁶³) See, for instance, Gaigals and Leonhardt (2001); Nyheim, Gaigals and Leonhardt (2001)

V Development Assistance before, during and after Conflict

48. Development actors come more and more to the conclusion that development assistance can be provided before, during and after a conflict. As Speth, UNDP, puts it “one way to avoid gaps between relief and development is never to stop development assistance during a conflict, whenever possible. From a development perspective, we must have preventive development before the crisis. We must have ameliorative development during the crisis. And we must have curative development after the crisis”⁶⁴. Or as stated in a recent OECD publication on violent armed conflict “to work effectively toward peace, development agencies need to work alongside partners in developing countries before, during and after the conflict”⁶⁵. This approach leads to the assertion that, in principle, *every measure that SNV undertakes in a ‘normal’ situation also can be undertaken in a conflict situation*⁶⁶. This section firstly focuses on specific gender-related activities that can be implemented before, during and after a conflict. Secondly, it stresses the measures related to the role and needs of local authorities in the face of conflict. It also highlights how these structures may be strengthened to better cope with conflict and peace conditions.

Gender-related activities

49. It is important that development agencies adjust their activities to the changing gender relations before, during and after the conflict. During a conflict, development agencies must, among others, take into account that women are heavily targeted victims of violent acts. As elaborated upon in section 4, they are less mobile than men, often carry a greater responsibility for relatives in terms of physical protection, nutrition and health issues. And women are often sexually abused as well. Therefore development agencies must evidently address the urgent and immediate problems that women face during and in the aftermath of conflict. On the other hand, development agencies must not forget to contribute to women’s social, economic and political empowerment, thereby promoting more balanced gender relations⁶⁷. In other words, development agencies must avoid a type of peace, in which peace-building policies address the needs of women less adequately than those of men, or which result in a deterioration in the position of women⁶⁸. In this context, it is important to ‘engender’ conflict management, resolution and peace-building.

⁶⁴) Speth (1999), p: 3

⁶⁵) OECD/DAC (2001), p: i

⁶⁶) It is not ignored that *working in conflict* may require reactive adjustment to the conflict, such as cut back the level of inputs or reduce the scale of the project, and that *working on conflict* may imply introducing direct conflict related activities.

⁶⁷) Kumar (2000), p: 56

⁶⁸) Pankhurst (2000), p:27

50. Specific opportunities that development agencies have before, during and after a conflict to mitigate the negative impact of a conflict on women and even to strengthen the position of women, include the following main categories that will be further elaborated in the rest of this section⁶⁹:

- *Protection of women against violence and insecurity;*
- *Promotion of the political empowerment of women (groups);*
- *Provision of assets and skills/job training to secure employment and sustainable livelihoods for women;*
- *Support to renegotiating gender relations and sustain positive changes affected as a consequence of conflict.*

51. The enhancement of women's physical security includes food security and the protection against violence. In a conflict food can be scarce and on average more women than men are near to starvation. It is generally acknowledged that during a conflict, women, who easily fall prey to sexual harassment and abuse, need protection. Protecting women after the conflict seems often less of an issue for development agencies. However, the presence of demobilized soldiers and unemployed militias, and the absence of rules often lead to a serious threat of women, also, in the aftermath of the conflict.

52. Conflict offers windows of opportunities for women's emancipation and for the establishment and flourishing of women groups. Many women become active at the community level, for example in voluntary health services, distribution of food aid, providing relief to families of the victims of political repression. In the absence of men during a conflict, women often take charge of local political positions as well. However, once hostilities cease, many women retreat from public life. Reasons for this tendency vary from the reintroduction of the traditional social and political order existing before the conflict, to war fatigue that grips some women leaders or men seeking to reassert their authority. On the other hand, conflict also can lead to the introduction of open democratic systems with political space for women and even the explicit recognition of gender equality in their constitutions⁷⁰. *The challenge thus is to maintain the newly obtained roles and responsibilities of women after a conflict.* Development agencies can contribute to this by focusing on political power sharing mechanisms, through the formation and strengthening of new women's organizations by mainstreaming gender in policies and structures, and by articulating women groups' agendas and supporting women candidates.

Finally, women organisations should not target women exclusively, but must be integrated in larger development initiatives, strengthening the organisation's institutional capabilities⁷¹. In such a way, women groups can become the implementing partners of development agencies, such as SNV.

53. In the framework of sustainable rehabilitation efforts, development agencies can introduce vocational training programmes that aim at strengthening local institutions in creating employment

⁶⁹) See, among others, Byrne (1996), Sørensen (1998) and Kumar (2000)

⁷⁰) Kumar (2000), p: 27

⁷¹) Ibid, p: 56

opportunities, skills training and on-the-job workshops. This training could be provided in several fields, including the agricultural sector, the urban informal and formal sectors. Special attention in this connection is required for specific needs and skills of female-headed households, whose number increases in practically all conflict situations. These women face serious limitations of access to means of production and related services. Conflicts may force women living in the urban areas to find badly remunerated work in the *informal sector* selling clothes, vegetables or fruits and household items. Whereas in certain situations women before a conflict could depend on food subsidies and social services (particularly health and education), governments reallocate resources toward the military during a conflict⁷².

54. The provision of productive assets not only covers physical assets such as tools and seeds, but also needs to include technical skills and knowledge. New activities for women require new tools, assets, skills and knowledge. Practical ways of increasing the access to productive assets may encompass:
- The provision of seeds, pesticides, agricultural tools and livestock;
 - The funding of micro-credit programmes, for instance to stimulate private sector development in remote areas and with neglected groups, and very practically, to buy food, seeds and tools for agriculture and livestock for breeding;
 - The support of educational and training programs, which may range from literacy training to computer and business courses⁷³;
 - The restoration of communal assets and improving people's access to them. Projects in this connection are removing mines, cleaning the environment, and constructing and repairing roads, houses or bridges;
 - The support of legal reforms to enable women to inherit and own productive assets⁷⁴.
55. All mentioned gender-related activities require a conscious assertive and 'knock-on' attitude. Even though sufficiently aware of cultural, religious and social sensitivities, this means that determination and advocacy are essential to sustain empowering changes in gender relations. Also implementing development agencies have to be aware of the need to support renegotiated gender relations. In post-conflict situations women are often relegated again to traditional roles and domestic spheres. To carry out a fundamentally gendered approach to conflict and post-conflict activities, gender needs to be mainstreamed in policy, structure and daily management. Operational practices need to be re-deliberated.
56. Finally, this section has mentioned the main areas of gender-related interventions in conflict areas. However, there are various other possibilities to focus on women in conflict areas. For instance, women have played an active role in limiting the flow and diffusion of arms by acting as "watchwomen" for illicit arms transfers among community members and influencing their

⁷²⁾ Kumar (2000), p: 68

⁷³⁾ It is often hard for women to enter training programs due to women's obligations and social norms defining their mobility. One way to decrease the time women spend is by introducing labour-saving devices, such as grinding mills etc.

⁷⁴⁾ Kumar (2000), p: 58

children's decisions to take up the weapons⁷⁵. In other occasions, women have rehabilitated former child soldiers. Moreover, they have played active roles in the promotion of dialogue and mediation between conflicting groups, or have intensively participated in reconciliation and counselling efforts. For the sake of brevity, we have only mentioned and not elaborated these issues here.

Measures with regard to Local Governance

57. The central focus of development assistance should be to support measures to improve the legitimacy and effectiveness of the state as well as the emergence of a strong civil society. This requires from development agencies an approach focusing on all relevant types of governance. Work, according to the OECD, must thus focus on influencing and reinforcing state policies of social inclusion, based on principles of equality and non-discrimination (specifically addressing gender-based discrimination). This should include the support aimed at building links between state and civil society and enhancing appreciation of the social contract between state, citizens, civil society, and the conditions needed to make it a reality⁷⁶. The creation of a climate and the capacity for constructive interaction between civil society and the government is a critical component for long-term development. Assistance for the promotion of democracy, participatory mechanisms in the political system, and the rule of law can all be elements of development assistance helping to integrate individuals and groups into society, building their stake in the system and preventing their marginalization and potential recourse to violence⁷⁷.
58. This crucial linkage at the micro, meso and macro level between state and society can be implemented or strengthened by supporting:
- Government institutions and other organisations (including the business community), which are able to establish or maintain social networks and associations enhancing participation in mainstream society, or that support commonly shared values, such as cultural or sportive programmes;
 - Access of information through education, and institutions such as local media;
 - Support to local NGOs and community-based organisations to help them become more capable and responsive to their constituencies⁷⁸.
59. Some key orientations for development agencies in state capacity building approaches require them to:
- Seek out opportunities to identify and influence potential change agents and structures within a state/regime since state institutions and regimes are not monolithic;
 - Aim at supporting effective, functioning, viable and legitimate institutions rather than specific governments in power;

⁷⁵) Mansaray in Ayissi (2000), p: 139-158.

⁷⁶) OECD (2001), p: 42

⁷⁷) OECD (1997), p:13

⁷⁸) Ibid, p: 38

- Include the views of local society in implementation combined with the support of civil society organizations to monitor the state behaviour and hold it accountable. Enhancing participation in political discourses of marginalized ethnic, regional or political groups is key⁷⁹.
60. To strengthen the capacity of the local governance structure requires a clear understanding and in-depth knowledge of the local circumstances. The challenge for many development agencies is to establish the right balance in responsibilities between local governments, NGOs, private sector institutions and communities throughout the conflict. Development agencies often encounter difficulties in deciding who to strengthen in what aspects.
61. It is essential to develop an approach for analysing how to strengthen local governance structures. The following issues may serve as a starting point for such an approach:
- *Stakeholder analysis*: development agencies first should identify and assess the local authorities, civil society organizations, private sector actors and other actors in the community. Two important questions in this connection are how responsibilities with regard to local governance currently are allocated within the public sector, and between it, private companies and civil society organizations. Secondly, what alternative allocations of responsibilities might enhance the effectiveness, efficiency and economy of local governance structures. It is important here to keep in mind the need for a critical approach vis-à-vis the role of NGOs in conflict;
 - *Inventarization, prioritization and sequencing* of relevant activities and target groups: development agencies should create an overview of the possibilities for intervention;
 - *Linking stakeholders and activities*: development agencies should clarify which local stakeholders are to be involved in which activities;
 - *Specify types of capacity building* required: development agencies must analyze what capacities of which local institutions or actors need to be strengthened in what way. Development agencies can apply institutional assessments, which can serve as a tool to assess what the strengths and weaknesses are and what the possibilities or impediments for strengthening the specific institution comprise;
 - *Planning and implementation* of capacity building activities for local governance.
62. In situations of conflict the decision whether or not to collaborate with government structures is not an easy one. At a principle level there are the potential issue of the government's complicity in conflict and the resulting hesitations to work with one of the protagonist parties. In addition, the state may be weakened to such an extent that the success of practical interventions might be in serious doubt. During conflict, many governments cease to function or to operate effectively, particularly in areas of heavy violence. These weakened institutions face several obstacles: often, competent staff have fled or been killed; records and infrastructure have been destroyed; and policies must be developed from scratch. At the same time, the needs of the population tend to be more acute: refugees need to be resettled; critical infrastructures rebuilt; service delivery programmes regenerated, and the economy kick-started⁸⁰. It will be obvious that such demands are way beyond what a government is able to offer.

⁷⁹⁾ OECD (2001), p:43

⁸⁰⁾ OECD (2001), p: 42

63. At an operational level SNV has to develop a strategy for dealing with such issues. Apart from the political and moral aspects of the question, there is also a need to guide practical operations on the ground. The development of clear indicators or benchmarks could be contemplated support of direct decision-making in this connection. It is important to note here that also other agencies struggle with similar questions and that internationally work is underway to guide what DfID has appropriately called *Principled Action in an Unprincipled World*.
64. Similar issues arise when working at other levels and with different counterparts. What are the possibilities and problems of providing development assistance through ‘dubious’ local counterparts (e.g. warlords). In some cases, development agencies refuse to work with partners that have been actively involved in the conflict or still are. However, another option is to cooperate with the ‘bad guys’ without approving their acts and to try to be critical on their performance from within. For example, in contrast to various other organizations, SNV decided to work in Angola and to support local governments. SNV was one of the few development agencies that opted for long-term, coherent and constructive engagement and was able to raise a critical consciousness on the responsibility and the performance of local government structures from within⁸¹. This however raises a number of dilemmas. For instance, how and to what degree to interact with warlords, show them respect, trust and tolerance? How to involve commanders/warlords even in the active provision of development assistance so that they may develop responsibility for the civilians? How to avoid that long-term engagement could appear to be tacit endorsement of unacceptable practices, even where it is intended as an attempt to mitigate or stop them? External actors must be clear about their assessments, concerns and goals in this connection⁸². We would suggest to develop a code of conduct for dealing with warlords or other partners in conflict areas. This code should include specific benchmarks and requirements, which have to be met by these partners.
65. Apart from the points mentioned above, Prendergast warns development agencies that they may not deal with credible local structures, but with ‘shells’ (good English speakers adept in ‘Western’ ways) without substance or true constituency⁸³. Moreover, during conflict, sometimes, parallel local governance structures are emerging. How then to discern between the previous and emerging local authorities and how to decide which to assist?
66. Practical suggestions developed by SNV itself to find reliable local counterparts include a needs assessment and capacity gap analysis in order to assess and/or analyse the existing capacities, structures and resources prior to providing support. It is important to verify whether the above deliberations and dilemmas are sufficiently reflected in the envisaged needs assessment and capacity gap analysis.

⁸¹) Oranje (1999), p: 36

⁸²) OECD (2001), p: 15

⁸³) Prendergast (1996), p: 100

67. At present it is well understood that structures of governance do not only encompass the official government authorities per se, but also several institutional arrangements within civil society, the private sector and local communities. Current thinking on internal armed conflict emphasizes that all stakeholders need to be included in attempts to deal with the conflict in whatever stage these attempts may take place. According to this reasoning the strategic focus of SNV on local governance issues by necessity should comprise partnerships with intermediary institutions at different levels, apart from the government. One particular example of attaining local commitment to broader issues of governance is by formulating local monitoring or watchdog committees that critically follow and/or supervise the execution of policies agreed upon or local level activities to be executed. In other cases, such committees may assume a role in the management of practical activities or the distribution of goods and services. This may be seen as important first steps in the direction of a self-sustaining, self-managed and autonomous process of development.
68. It is important to target local governance programmes on particular beneficiary groups and sensitive issues. Specific groups, here referred to as conflict-related groups, are present in larger numbers in conflict-affected areas than elsewhere. These, for example, include (former) child soldiers, orphans, demobilised soldiers, war veterans, female-headed households (see above) or war widows, refugees and internally displaced persons, and returnees. Often there are plenty possibilities to do something good for these groups, but neither these groups themselves nor the local governance structure often do know or feel secure enough how to undertake collective action. It therefore is important to train the local authorities, civil society groups and private sector actors in establishing organizations that specifically deal with their needs, setting priorities in the development activities to be undertaken, and planning and managing the implementation of these activities.
69. It has been mentioned that a multitude of factors could contribute to conflict in any specific case. Only through a detailed conflict analysis priorities for action can be established, preferably by, or in close consultation, with the stakeholders involved. A separate point of attention is *conflict resolution*. If local parties are to co-operate in future endeavours, a resolution of old tensions and divisions is a precondition for success. SNV could increasingly create strategic alliances with churches that are active in this field of strengthening institutions to deal with conflict resolution and reconciliation. In a number of occasions this already has proven to be fruitful. Capacity building in reconciliation programmes focusing the attention on common concerns of villagers, could include training for local authorities in:
- Integration of representatives with allegiance to all the different political factions in development institutions and mechanisms in disputed areas;
 - The integration of beneficiaries from territories held by different military and political factions under common programmes;
 - Ensuring that specific projects outputs such as roads, agriculture and small enterprise development straddle political and military boundaries;
 - The creation of forums for the discussion of problems of common concern.
70. Generally spoken, there are various other options left for interventions in and on a conflict, *which are less directly related to gender relations or local governance structures*. Possibilities for post-conflict interventions include activities aiming at the reconstruction/rehabilitation of war-torn

societies These have not been discussed in this section. For further literature on this topic see, for instance, Kumar and Miall ⁸⁴.

⁸⁴) See, for instance, Kumar (1997) and Miall, Ramsbotham, and Woodhouse (2000)

VI Practical Considerations for Working in Conflict

71. SNV field directors obviously play an important role in providing development assistance in conflict areas. To a large extent, they are responsible to avoid the negative side-effects of development assistance and to apply the principle of ‘do no harm’, but the maximum of good. In the end the field directors have to work under conditions of minimal levels of security and stability. They are confronted with pertinent issues, such as, whether to continue projects during the conflict or to stop, or whether to work with ‘dubious’ local counterparts. This section deals with some of the pertinent issues field directors and other SNV personnel are confronted with while working in conflict areas.
72. At a more general level, providing development assistance in conflict areas differs from that in stable and secure areas. However, as argued, development activities very well can take place before, during and after a conflict. As the saying goes the devil is in the details here. It is important that SNV realizes what working in conflict areas requires, in terms of *capacity and procedures*, from SNV management and staff. Moreover, SNV should clarify under what circumstances of *insecurity and instability* it is willing and able to work. Finally, SNV needs to assess what *requirements for success* have to be fulfilled before SNV decides to provide development assistance in conflict-affected areas.
73. To achieve effective development co-operation in conflict areas, development agencies must, among others⁸⁵:
- Show a high degree of flexibility of project staff and project co-ordinators;
 - Accept and manage the heightened risks encountered in this type of work;
 - Modify procedures: it is advisable to make procedures with respect to applications, project approval and project implementation more flexible;
 - Accept restrictions as it regards the principles of sustainability and partnership (ownership). Conflict situations often may make it necessary to pursue short-term objectives without seeking or achieving the usual degree of sustainability;
 - Acknowledge that political will to forge solutions is crucial;
 - Be more creative in providing aid that promotes systems that allow for the peaceful management of conflicts.

Consequently, SNV might, among others, provide retraining for its field staff in conflict related issues, such as security, conflict resolution and potentially political awareness. It might consider reviewing its existing procedures, and where needed, to revise these into procedures that are more adapted to conflict situations. And most important probably, SNV might reconsider the concepts of sustainability and ownership in the light of providing development assistance in conflict areas.

⁸⁵) OECD/DAC (1997) and Klingenbiel (1999).

74. As former Minister of Foreign Affairs Jan Pronk stated “where a minimum degree of *security* and *stability* does exist, we must do more than emergency relief and humanitarian assistance⁸⁶”. The question is what SNV regards as the lowest level of safety and stability required for interventions in internal armed conflict. Generalizations must be avoided. Development agencies working in conflict should think of a:

- *Risk assessment*. It is important to list threats, see how important they are, how often do they take place, where do they take place, and what the trend is. Indicators in this connection can include conflict related deaths, shooting and shelling, human rights abuses, outflows of refugees, role of security forces, legacies of past conflict, flow of weapons.
- *Risk-impact reduction assessment*, which analyses how certain measures can avoid or decrease risks;
- *Threshold of unacceptable risk*, which indicates when the area is no longer secure enough to go to (*entry strategy*) or to stay in (*exit strategy*). SNV should develop *benchmarks* with regard to security and stability. In this connection, it can be considered at what level representation is required. Is it sufficient to be represented in the capital of a conflict-affected country without being represented in the actual conflict zone, where the fighting takes place;
- *Action plan*, including a possible evacuation, which clarifies what to do when the threshold of unacceptable risk is passed.
- In order to, effectively, deal with risks in conflict areas, it is required to continuously *monitor the risk indicators and trends*. Good information, incident reporting and analysis, and telecommunications are needed. Frequent co-ordination with other relief and development agencies is required and developing, at the moment of arrival, good working relations with the military authorities, police forces and transport branches, because they are needed in case of an emergency evacuation, is practical as well. Secondly, security planning and management only is effective as it is mainstreamed in the organisation, when at all levels explicit procedures for dealing with security are implemented, and human and financial resources are made available in order to increase the security of the SNV field staff. This may imply costs, though a good risk assessment can save money as well. At the local level, for example it should be considered to employ a security officer, whose main task is to be informed on the security context and to advice the field director on all security matters. Specific tasks may include developing the evacuation plan, proposing a system of security measures and establishing a communication system⁸⁷.

75. The *management and recruitment of staff* deserves special attention. Working in conflict areas differs from working in stable, peaceful zones. Standard procedures, in terms of recruiting staff or training personnel, should be reviewed and where needed, revised. Items for reconsideration, comprise of:

⁸⁶) Pronk (1996), p: 3

⁸⁷) For a more elaborate overview on staff security issues, we would like to refer to the recent study of van Brabant (2001). His work offers a systematic step-by-step approach to security management, from context analysis and threat and risk assessment, to choosing a security strategy to security planning. The paper reviews major types of threats (battlefield survival, vehicle safety, site security, sexual assault, abduction and kidnapping), measures to prevent them, and guidelines on how to survive and manage an incident if it occurs.

- Managing stress at the organizational, field-level management, and individual level. The SNV management needs to assess, and if needed revise, what they expect of field directors in complex, volatile and highly constraining situations and the practical support they offer them. Often the communication between headquarters and field directors must be improved and intensified. At the field level, various options exist to better prepare field directors and other staff by training them to work under stress. For instance, briefing and familiarising staff on/with the situation; training in issues as delegation, leadership and teambuilding in order to avoid overload; talking about stress; and providing traumatic stress support to field staff should be considered to deal effectively with the issue of stress. At the individual level, issues, such as, personality characteristics, realistic expectation, lifestyle and knowing yourself are important to take into account⁸⁸;
- Stricter guidelines for the recruitment of expatriate and local staff. Particularly attention should be paid to ability to cope with stress and insecurity; willingness to take risks and responsibility; creativeness; and seniority. Regarding local staff it must be ascertained that prospective candidates did not play an active role during the conflict, for example by perpetrating human rights violations or even war crimes;
- Supplementary employment conditions, eventually more in line with those applied in relief agencies;
- Delegate more authority and resources to field-level operations to design and fund projects⁸⁹.

76. There appear to be well-developed funding procedures for relief aid, but not for development assistance before, during or after a conflict. This type of assistance often is a matter of *quick-financing*, instead of going through lengthy procedures. An option to be considered is to finance the initial development activities itself and in the meantime find other sponsors for the longer run. Another idea is to establish a kind of *trust fund* that particularly finances development activities in conflict areas. In this regard, flexible procedures for disbursing rapid development assistance funds could to be developed along the same lines of procedures for emergency assistance. If not, there is the risk that funds are too late and planned field activities have to be cancelled.

⁸⁸) Brabant (2001), p: 284-291

⁸⁹) Bronswijk, van (2000), p: 14

VII Topics for Discussion

77. The paper has aimed to increase SNV's understanding of providing development assistance before, during and after conflict. Increased insight should lead to a renewed conceptualisation of conflict and to a reorientation of SNV's principles and strategies of working in conflict, to practical adaptations in SNV's procedures and to designing specific programmes and projects in conflict areas. The issues raised in this paper and summarized below can serve as a starting point for these discussions.

78. *Topic 1: No conflict phases.*

In this paper, we have shown that the so-called phases of conflict hardly exist in the reality of conflict. Conflict is never over and conflicted-affected countries find themselves mostly in a state of latent conflict or fragile peace. Development agencies must not wait for peace and then intervene, but must never stop with development assistance in conflict areas. It no longer makes sense that development agencies discuss what opportunities for intervention exist before, during or after the conflict. Instead, they must take conflict for granted and then ask themselves if they want to intervene and how to do this. It is important to understand the conflict and to relate it to strategic policies and practical implementation measures. Here it is advised to apply the CPAF-model (Annexe 1) in one or more SNV conflict-affected countries by way of pilot.

79. *Topic 2: Define your development activities.*

The notion of a continuum between relief, rehabilitation and development is no longer valid. Emergency relief, rehabilitation work and development assistance all co-exist in times of conflict. A division in tasks on the basis of a temporal sequence is not possible anymore. SNV cannot cover the whole spectrum of relief, rehabilitation and development assistance efforts. Since SNV defines its mandate and position being a development organisation and not a relief agency, the following topics for discussion arise:

- What does SNV regard as relief activities, what as rehabilitation efforts, and what as development activities;
- Which of these activities does SNV want to implement itself, and which activities does it want other organizations to take up;
- How to deal with the interrelationships between the different activities and consequently how to ensure an effective co-operation with other implementing agencies.

80. *Topic 3: Work in and on conflict, not around.*

SNV aims to increasingly work in conflict areas. In theory, there are three possibilities to do so. SNV can work around, work in or work on a conflict, as is illustrated in Table 1 on page 4. Until now SNV predominantly has worked around conflict. We, however, would like to suggest that SNV prepares for working in and even on conflict. This implies that SNV must analyse what

consequent adjustments should be made to SNV programmes in conflict areas. In order to take up this challenge, the following topics can serve as a starting point for discussion:

- I. What SNV activities can be fully continued in conflict areas?
- II. What SNV activities have to be adapted and what are the implications in this regard in terms of time span, sustainability and ownership (see below) and financial and personnel input?
- III. What extra, specific programmes have to be developed in order to address root causes of conflict and to build towards a 'positive peace' (like reconciliation efforts or human rights programmes)?

81. *Topic 4: Working around Conflict, no Change Required*

If SNV can answer the first question (I), then this already is a valuable indication of what the opportunities for intervention are in conflict areas. In view of the arguments forwarded in this paper, this position needs, however, to be substantiated. Why is it that despite the often fundamental consequences of conflict, business can go on as usual? How is it guaranteed that the ongoing SNV programmes will not suffer from the negative impact or side effects of conflict?

82. *Topic 5: Working in Conflict, Adaptations Required*

To answer the second question is perhaps more demanding, because it has thorough implications for the existing SNV programmes. However, it should be realized that simply entering conflict areas with 'traditional' development assistance is not appropriate and that adaptations in programming are often a condition for sustainable results. Development activities need to be adapted and sensitized to respond to the challenge of conflict. An important adaptation relates to the *time span* and *size* of projects, which due to various reasons, often must be limited in conflict areas. Reasons are that security and stability are not guaranteed and large schemes are too risky, because of the higher chances of failure. SNV must analyse how it can shorten the project's duration in conflict areas, without falling into the trap of quick-fix solutions without any sustainable positive impacts.

83. *Topic 6: Sustainability and Ownership*

In addition, the principles of *sustainability and ownership* of development activities are difficult, if not impossible, to apply to projects in conflict areas. The situation simply can be too fragile in order to have certainty on the long-term impact of projects. Flows of people during and after conflict make that investments in people become risky enterprises. Particularly, the issue of direct impact projects that reconcile within the same activity short and long-term objectives and that might legitimize the presence of development agencies in conflict areas is relevant. It is a topic of discussion whether and how field directors should be given more room for manoeuvre to implement projects that have a relatively direct and immediate impact on alleviating the emergency needs of their target groups. *Ownership* is also difficult to guarantee, because shortages in human resources make that projects are often implemented by the people from outside the community or district, and that external actors take the lead. SNV must realize and anticipate to these pitfalls.

84. *Topic 7: Working on Conflict, Specific Programmes Required*

Working on conflict demands from agencies to take up additional development activities in order to actually influence the conflict dynamics in a positive and sustainable way. SNV's focus here

needs to be on the damage done to institutions and the social, legal, political and governance infrastructure. All those factors conspire to produce an often profound, multi-dimensional and long-term deterioration of the overall poverty situation. They further affect the future possibility for regeneration of growth and wellbeing. Therefore, we encourage SNV to consider whether it is willing and able to:

- Refocus its programs onto root causes of conflict;
- Attempt to influence incentives for peace and disincentives for violence;
- Support mediation efforts;
- Focus on the protection of human rights.

85. *Topic 8: Local Governance Structures and Conflict*

Regarding strengthening local governance structures throughout conflict, topics for discussion include, how SNV perceives the allocation in tasks between local authorities, NGOs, private sector actors and communities and on which local counterparts SNV is principally going to focus its programmes. Further, how is SNV going to deal with ‘dubious’ counterparts? And how does SNV intend to explicitly link its support to local governance structures to conflict? Finally, to what extent is SNV prepared to support conflict resolution and reconciliation initiatives?

86. *Topic 9: Gender and Conflict*

Conflict has negative as well as empowering effects on women. Development agencies should support women’s own *long-term strategic interests*⁹⁰ and try to sustain the empowering effects. In this connection, SNV could analyse in larger detail the impact of conflict on gender-specific tasks, responsibilities, roles and identities of women during and after a conflict. It is encouraged to examine what specific mechanisms lead to a re-negotiation of gender identities and how permanent such changes are after a conflict is over. And, lastly, it should explore what practical programs are needed to sustain positive gender-related changes in tasks, responsibilities, roles and identities of women as a consequence of conflict.

87. *Topic 10: Pilot projects to test impact assessment and avoid harm*

Development agencies working in conflict areas increasingly see the need for *conflict-sensitive* programming, avoiding the negative impact of their programs. Some development agencies therefore have started to apply so-called *peace and conflict impact assessment* tools to identify strategic opportunities for sustainable and conflict-relevant development activities and anticipating on the impact of these activities. PCIA, in close consultation with the beneficiaries, must be tailored towards the specific conflict situation and end-user (SNV). We would like to encourage SNV to start using a PCIA tool on a pilot-project base. SNV can test the usefulness of such a tool and tailor it to identify options to empower changes in gender-relations and to provide sustainable support to local governance structures.

⁹⁰⁾ Sørensen (1999), p: 66

88. *Topic 11: Security and the “frog in boiling water syndrome”.*

Regarding the security of SNV staff, SNV should make very clear to staff, outsiders and beneficiaries what its threshold of unacceptable risk is. It is advisable to do this before entering a conflict area. Then only you can avoid the ‘frog in boiling water syndrome’. The frog feels the water heating up but does not jump out in time and when the water reaches boiling point it is too late⁹¹. The following is required:

- Risk assessment of events and trends;
- Risk-impact reduction assessment, which analyses how to avoid or decrease risks;
- Defining the threshold of unacceptable risk (including entry and exit strategies);
- Good information, incident reporting and analysis, and telecommunications (for instance in the form of a security officer).

It should be debated whether these issues are sufficiently in place and whether procedures are mainstreamed at all organizational levels.

89. *Topic 12: Human Resources and Funding*

External agencies regularly have to be adapt procedures in connection to their own *financial and human resources*. Field staff must be experienced and creative in finding ways of intervention, be able to deal with stress and traumas, and be willing to accept higher risks than in non-conflict areas. It can be recommended that SNV management and staff start a discussion on how to mainstream effective conflict personnel procedures at all levels of the organization.

Governments and other external agencies have funds either for development assistance or short-term relief aid. It still is difficult to fund rehabilitation activities after a conflict, let alone development activities during a conflict. The SNV management should anticipate to this by negotiating with their donor agencies the funding of such projects. It can be recommended to the SNV management to review, in close co-operation with the field directors in conflict areas, existing internal procedures for project funding and where needed to make the procedures on project applications, approval and implementation more flexible for specific ‘conflict projects’. Another idea is to create separate tracks of funding of conflict project, by establishing a reserve fund or trust fund for conflict projects.

⁹¹⁾ Brabant (2001), p: 284-291

References


- Anderson, M.B. (1999) *Do no Harm: How Aid Can Support Peace- or War*. Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- Anderson, M.B. and A. Spelten (2000) *Conflict Transformation: How International Assistance Can Contribute*. Policy Paper 15 of the Development and Peace Foundation. Bonn: Development and Peace Foundation.
- Brabant, K. van (2001) *Operational Security Management in Violent Environments*. London: Overseas Development Institute.
- Brandt, D.P. (2001) 'Relief as Development, but Development as Relief?', *The Journal of Humanitarian Assistance*, <http://www.jha.ac/articles/ao24.htm>
- Bronswijk, P. van (2000) *Possible SNV Interventions in Post(Conflict) Regions*. The Hague: SNV.
- Byrne, B. (1996) *Gender, Conflict and Development. Volume 1: Overview*. Report prepared for the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Brighton: Institute of Development Studies.
- Brookings Institution (1999) *Report on the Roundtable on the Gap between Humanitarian Assistance and Long-term Development*. Washington DC.
- Douma, P., Frerks, G. and L. van de Goor (1999) *Causes of Conflict in the Third World: Synthesis Report*. The Hague: Clingendael Institute.
- Douma, P. (2000) *The Netherlands and Rwanda: A Case Study on Dutch Foreign Policies and Interventions in the Contemporary Conflict History of Rwanda*. The Hague: Clingendael Institute
- Frerks, G.E. (1999) *Refugees between Relief and Development: 'Continuum or Discontinuity?'* Paper presented at the International Conference "Refugees and the Transformation of Society: Loss and Recovery". Soesterberg.
- Frerks, G.E. and J. de Zeeuw (2000) *Conflict en Ontwikkeling vanuit Nederlands Perspectief*. Paper geschreven voor Expert Meeting bij CIDIN te Nijmegen.
- Frerks, G. E. (2001) 'De Rol van Maatschappelijke Organisaties bij Vredesopbouw', *Atlantisch Perspectief*, 2001, 25(3), p: 8-12.
- Gaigals, C., Leonhardt M. and D. Nyheim (2001) *Development in Conflict: A Seven Steps Tool for Planners*. London: FEWER, Saferworld and International Alert.
- Gaigals, C. and M. Leonhardt (2001) *Conflict-Sensitive Approaches to Development: A Review of Practice*. London: Saferworld, International Alert and International Development Research Centre.
- Goodhand, J. (2001) *DFID Guide to Conflict Assessment: Third Draft (Internal Document)*. London: DFID.
- Goor, L. van de and S. Verstegen (1999) *Conflict Prognosis: Bridging the Gap from Early Warning to Early Response, Part One*. The Hague: Clingendael Institute.
- Goor, L. van de and S. Verstegen (2000) *Conflict Prognosis: A Conflict and Policy Assessment Framework, Part Two*. The Hague: Clingendael Institute.
- Hilhorst, D. and G. Frerks (1999) *Local Capacities for Peace: Concepts, Possibilities and Constraints*. Paper Presented at the Seminar "Local Capacities for Peace" in Utrecht, The Netherlands.

- Kaldor, M. (1999) *New & Old Wars. Organized Violence in a Global Era*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Keen, D. (1998) *The Economic Functions of Violence in Civil Wars*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Klingenberg, S. (1999) *Impact of Development Cooperation in Conflict Situations*. Berlin: German Development Institute.
- Kumar, K. (ed)(1997) *Rebuilding Societies after Civil War: Critical Roles for International Assistance*. Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- Kumar, K. (2000) *Women and Women's Organizations in Postconflict Societies: The Role of International Assistance*. Washington: USAID.
- Lewer, N. (1999) *International Non-governmental Organizations and Peacebuilding – Perspectives from Peace Studies and Conflict Resolution*. Working Paper 3, Center for Conflict Resolution, Department of Peace Studies. Bradford: University of Bradford.
- Lindsey, C. (2000) 'Women and War', *IRRC September 2000*, 82 (839), p. 561-580. Geneva: ICRC Productions.
- Mansaray, B. (2000) 'Women Against Weapons: A Leading Role for Women in Disarmament'. In: Ayissi, A. and R. E. Poulton (eds)(2000) *Bound to Co-operate: Conflict, Peace and People in Sierra Leone*, p. 139-158. Geneva: UNIDIR.
- Miall, H., Ramsbotham, O. and T. Woodhouse (2000) *Contemporary Conflict Resolution: The Prevention, Management and Transformation of Deadly Conflicts*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- OECD/DAC (1997) *DAC Guidelines on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation*. Paris: OECD/DAC.
- OECD/DAC (1998) *Conflict, Peace and Development on the Threshold of the 21st Century*. Paris: OECD/DAC
- OECD/DAC (2001) *Helping Prevent Violent Conflict: Orientations for External Partners*. Paris: OECD/DAC.
- Oranje, J. (1999) *Perspectives for SNV in Angola: Mid Term Evaluation*. Amersfoort: DHV.
- Pankhurst, D. (2000) *Women, Gender and Peacebuilding*. Working Paper 5, Center for Conflict Resolution, Department of Peace Studies. Bradford: University of Bradford.
- Prendergast, J. (1996) *Frontline Diplomacy : Humanitarian Aid and Conflict in Africa*. Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- Pronk, J.P. (1996) *Development in Conflict: Speech for the Conference 'Healing the Wounds: Refugees, Reconstruction and Reconciliation'*. Princeton University.
- Richter, C. (2000) *Strengthening Development Initiatives during Low-Intensity Conflict in Moyo, Uganda*. Draft. SNV.
- Schmid, A.P. (2000) *Thesaurus and Glossary of Early Warning and Conflict Prevention Terms*. Leiden: Poom.
- Schrijvers, J. (1992) *De Boodschap van het Vijfde Ontwikkelingsdecennium*. Utrecht: Jan van Arkel.
- SNV (2000A) *Strategy Paper*. The Hague: SNV.
- SNV Angola (2000B) *Multi Annual Plan 2001-2003. Lubango: SNV*.
- SNV (2001A) *Playing a Trump Card: SNV and Local Governance in East and Southern Africa: A Synopsis*. The Hague: SNV.
- SNV (2001B) *The Role of SNV in Development Countries in Internal Armed Conflict*. Terms of Reference for Consultancy. The Hague: SNV.
- SNV (2001C) *Jaarverslag 2000*. Den Haag: SNV.

- Sörensen, B. (1998) *Women and Post-Conflict Reconstruction: Issues and Sources*. Occasional Paper No.3, UNRISD/The War-Torn Societies Project. Geneva: UNRISD.
- Speth, J.G. (1999) *Linking Relief to Development: Lessons and Perspectives*. Paper presented at the Brookings Institution, Washington D.C.
- Turner, S. (1999) *Angry Young Men in Camps – Losses and New Opportunities*. Paper presented at the International Conference “Refugees and the Transformation of Society: Loss and Recovery”. Soesterberg.
- UNDP-Rwanda (1998) *Linking Relief to Development*. UNDP.
- UNDP (1999a) *Factors to Consider in Designing Decentralised Governance Policies and Programmes to Achieve Sustainable People-Centred Development*. New York: UNDP
- UNDP (1999B) *Governance in Post-Conflict Countries*. New York: Management Development and Governance Division, UNDP.
- Verhulst, G. (2000) *SNV Experience in Rwanda as a Conflict Area*. The Hague: SNV.

Annexe 1 Conflict Policy and Assessment Framework

In the light of the prevailing gap between conflict early warning and policy response, there is a compelling need for an integrated approach that includes issues such as predicting and understanding conflict escalation, as well as guidelines for policy intervention. In contrast to many approaches towards early warning for the policy context, the *Conflict and Policy Assessment Framework (CPAF)* can best be characterized as ‘response oriented’. The suggested response-oriented approach does not imply an early warning or prognosis model *per se*. Instead, the aim is a conflict and policy assessment framework that integrates conflict analysis and policy analysis, as well as issues of institutional capacity and political priorities, in order to come to realistic policy opportunities for intervention.



The CPAF thus aims at linking conflict and policy analysis to processes of policy planning and implementation (see Figure 1). As such, it not only provides a ‘risk assessment’ of a particular situation, but also options for response that fit the ‘toolbox’ of the framework’s specific end-user. The CPAF in this regard offers a procedural approach for designing conflict-related policies.

This approach consequently departs from the common practice of developing models with an overtly global reach. Indeed, the potential response capacities of members of the international community vary widely, and governments, civil society/NGOs and international organizations each have their own range of instruments to intervene. On the one hand, therefore, it appears to be most appropriate to develop a conflict and policy assessment framework that takes these specific instruments and capacities into account, and that includes prospective policy analysis, lessons learned and missed opportunities. On the other hand, however, the risk of compartmentalization of conflict prevention should be minimized by taking the capacity of the organization only as a starting point in the search

for complementary capacities of other actors, and hence streamline cooperation between specific policy desks, departments and international partners.

In practice, the answer may lie in sensitizing the policy context to the need for a conflict-preventive focus. As an institutional memory with regard to conflict and causes of conflict often appears to be weak or lacking, sensitizing the policy context to conflict prevention and creating a 'culture of prevention' at the national level is an important first step. Instead of focusing on and searching for new policies and new instruments, it is here argued that the currently available policies and instruments still leave enough room for conflict-preventive actions when properly understood, realized and utilized. Nevertheless, many lessons still need to be learned, and one should not underestimate the fact that issues of peace and conflict are highly complex. Indeed, early warning and 'early action' do not end a problem, but will often also require later action. This, in effect, becomes a question of commitment to the prevention process. The box on the following page summarizes the main operational objectives of the CPAF.

The Main Operational Objectives of the CPAF

A. Clearly define the mission

Before propagating the possibility of a 'global' approach, it is important to have clarity of mission within a particular institutional context. This includes and asks for:

- Standardization of approach and analysis
- Clear choice on the objectives of an integrated foreign and security policy, and the role of conflict prevention within this policy
- Identification of tasks and responsibilities
- Formalization of communication within the institution/organization
- Improved coordination between various policy areas

B. Catalogue and assess the situation *in relation to the policy and response capacity available*

It is imperative to focus analysis of conflict situations in such a way as to derive guidelines for policy interventions. Analysis should be directed towards understanding, anticipation *and* intervention:

- *Understanding* requires analysis directed towards conflict processes in general as well as the particular contextual conditions (country profile)
- *Anticipation* asks for the monitoring and analysis of dynamic processes and risk evaluation criteria (trend analysis)
- *Intervention* refers to an inventory of the institution's toolbox, an analysis of the applicability of the policy tools to the goals and the conflict's various needs, and identification of potential moments and fields for intervention

C. Deal more effectively with the outcomes of analysis

Preventive action is about knowing how to do 'the right thing'. The standardized analysis then needs to be applied for the purpose of:

- Helping to identify and prioritize options for operational response
- Finding the right mix of short-term, medium-term, and long-term projects
- Committing to sustained efforts instead of *ad hoc* operations and betting on instant successes
- Identifying shortcomings in existing policies and instruments, adapting these, or developing new ones