


Coping with Internal Conflict Project (CICP)

Proceedings

International Seminar on
Power Sharing
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Executive Summary

The seminar aimed at investigating the possibilities for power sharing arrangements in the management of conflict, as well as the link between power sharing and democratization. The discussion focused on issues of a more theoretical nature, contextual and practical issues, and the consequences of these debates for policy making.

As regards the relationship between power sharing and democracy, it was questioned whether power sharing is an extension of democracy, or whether it is an instrument toward democracy. The discussion indicated that one has to see democracy and power sharing in a somewhat larger framework. In this regard, remarks were made on the economic dimension of democracy, as well as on legal aspects and institutional arrangements. In addition, it was suggested to look more closely into the processes, the role of elites and their followers, as well as patron-client systems. This focused the discussion on the context in which power sharing and democratization are applied.

It was also discussed whether there is a contradiction between democracy and power sharing. It was found that different types of arrangements could play different roles in different types of democracy. During the discussions it became clear that there is not one single model of democracy, but a variety in democratic systems. This not only applies to the South but also to the models used in the West. This implies that no model can simply be transferred or imposed elsewhere. Hence, there is an empirical variety that needs to be looked into.

This raised questions as to what role external actors should or could play in supporting or improving indigenous processes. It was found that this varies widely according to the circumstances. The position that one can do nothing was counter-positioned by the notion that there are certain steps, incentives and possibilities that might generate moderation or limit immoderation. The mixed results of external interventions at least suggest modesty from the side of external actors. Given the variety in local circumstances, it was found important to look into and compare different empirical settings with different outcomes, and to investigate what has been done, and what lessons can be learned. This is still very unclear, and requires analysis of specific situations, pacts, failures and successes. Overall, there is not only a need for theoretical work or modeling, but also to learn from empirical and comparative analysis.

Proceedings International Seminar Power Sharing

Presentation of Literature Review on Power Sharing: Mr van Leeuwen

In his presentation, Mr van Leeuwen proposed to focus on the following three areas of interest: Firstly, issues of a more theoretical nature; secondly, contextual and practical issues; thirdly, issues that might facilitate a discussion on the consequences of these debates for policy making.

Some Theoretical Issues

With the growing awareness that internal conflict often results from political factors, governance has come to the fore as an important instrument for managing conflicts. If governance is to fulfill a role in conflict management, it is imperative to increase its effectiveness in dealing with a variety of interests. In this context, many analysts promote democracy as very appropriate to reach the goal of governing institutions that include provisions for reconciling and accommodating differences among interest groups. The preferred model for these goals, as well as for promoting liberty and public participation is the Western, 'liberal' type of democracy. In general, both scholars and policy makers seem to subscribe to this idea.

In the paper, it is asserted that the ideal of majoritarian democracy and its contribution to the management of conflict has come increasingly criticized. Attempts to transplant or export the model of democracy prevailing in the Western world have not always had positive results. Democratization in the Western world resulted from particular long-term socioeconomic and political changes, leading to shifts in the balance of power and political reform. It seems as if it is now attempted to find shortcuts for developing countries. Yet, the particular contexts of the countries concerned and institutional weaknesses obstruct these attempts.

Overall, it has to be concluded that 'ideal-type' liberal, majoritarian democracy has its limitations. The concept is most problematic in the context of large numeric differences between groups, when there are large, almost irreconcilable differences in interests, or when ethno-nationalism and identity conflicts are fuelled. In such contexts, democratic processes can result in situations in which 'the majority rules' rather than 'the majority decides, and the minority is respected'. When elections are introduced in such contexts they are very likely to result in 'the winner takes all' situations. The case of Mozambique, to be introduced by Mrs Naidu, seems to hint in this direction. It is in this context that the concept of power sharing has come up as a possible solution. Here, power sharing arrangements are defined as:

Those institutional arrangements that guarantee or enlarge the legitimacy of governance to all important groups within a plural society, the representativeness of the government authorities to these groups, and their participation in political decision making.

Although democracy aims for the same type of representation and participation, power sharing arrangements make these aims more explicit, for instance through incorporating representatives of all important groups within a plural society into governance.

There now exists a growing body of literature covering principles of and conditions for power sharing. Often, power sharing is seen as a simple extension to democracy. However, in the paper it is argued that it might be more useful to perceive power sharing as a collection of institutional arrangements, that may differ from the western notion of majoritarian democratic rule. As such, power sharing arrangements are eclectic solutions in response to the situation encountered in the countries concerned, and in particular to some of the inherent problems embedded in liberal democracy. Rather than being a form of democracy, it is asserted that power sharing contributes to democratization and deepening of democracy. If democracy characterizes the sustainable sharing of power, then power sharing arrangements can be instrumental to reach this condition. Yet, in contributing to democratization, power sharing might paradoxically imply concessions to democratic principles if the situation asks for this. To be more specific, power sharing, in fact, may be seen as an element in the process of democratization that averts democratization from obstructing itself. Power sharing provides an input to guarantee inclusiveness. Hence, a first focal point for our discussion would be *the relationship between power sharing and democracy*. In particular, the following questions could be addressed:

- Should power sharing arrangements merely be perceived as temporary and transitional measures, or as definite arrangements?
- How can non-democratic arrangements contribute to democratization in the longer run?
- Is there a need to reconsider 'ideal-type' democracy?

Some Contextual and Practical Issues

In current literature on power sharing, two major approaches are dominant. First, the consociational approach, and, secondly, the integrative approach. While in a consociational approach the aim is to bring together representatives from the different conflict groups while maintaining their autonomy, a more integrative approach envisages inter-group co-operation and the fostering of moderate policies. This seems to raise the question, which of these approaches is to prefer. However, such an exercise might not very useful. Instead, it is here suggested to focus attention on the conditions for power sharing. In the paper for this seminar it has been argued that in many cases limits to what could or should be done are set by particular circumstances. In the paper a number of enabling and limiting issues in the coming into being of power sharing are identified. Those include a degree of moderation (which may not be assumed nor can be enforced); and a degree of stability and mutual trust. The occurrence of moderation depends on the context in which power sharing takes place, e.g. on the institutional procedures and institutions through which power sharing gets shape as well as on the interaction between the conflicting/local and external/international parties. Special attention could be paid to elite-pacts. Such pacts may be effective in bringing about power sharing arrangements, but they can also be counterproductive. The same goes for the level and kind of international

interventions. Furthermore, we may consider the limitations set to power sharing arrangements in the context of institutionally weakened or failed states.

Regarding contextual issues, when discussing the limitations to power sharing arrangements, we could address the following questions:

- Does power sharing rely on an assumption that there is a willingness among actors to co-operate and is this a realistic assumption? Is it correct to assume that leaders are more moderate than their followers? I.e. should we aim for elite-pacts?
- What types of arrangements are suitable and appropriate when the capacity of the state to fulfil its governing functions is limited?
- Related to the previous question: Is power sharing always an achievable objective? Should we refrain from trying to achieve power sharing arrangements in certain situations? But then, what are the alternatives if democracy is the ultimate goal? Is democracy still an option if power sharing is not achievable?
- Are the available models and approaches for power sharing adequate, or is there a need for more alternatives?

In addition to limitations to getting to power sharing arrangements, it might also be useful to discuss a couple of practical issues. These consider, firstly, the follow-up of power sharing arrangements and limitations to further democratization, and, secondly, power sharing in non-democratic contexts.

As regards the follow-up of power sharing and limitations to democratization, the literature reviewed lacked a detailed evaluation and analysis of cases of power sharing arrangements that have proved to be long-lasting. The literature also lacks an analysis of the contribution of power sharing arrangements to democratization. This also applies to an assessment of cases that failed in this respect. Scientific and political discussions in this context often focus on the role of elections. It is here suggested that the process of drafting constitutions deserves more attention than it gets at present. When considering the latter, one needs to take account of the crucial difference between the *process*, that democracy is, and the *ideal* and in fact *fixed conditions* a constitution may form or come to represent. Whereas elections are an instrument in the process, constitutions represent the final aim. To limit this goal bears the risk of fundamentally hampering the processes of both power sharing and democratization.

At the same time, one has to take notice of the following. Debates on democratization mainly focus on the relationship between the (sometimes authoritarian) state and its citizens and on the participation of the electorate in general. In contrast, the primary concern of power sharing approaches is with power relationships between contending groups of citizens. Power sharing, then, can concern settlements about the access to state authority, and not necessarily about the character of that authority by itself. Yet, for the nurturing of a culture of democracy, there is a need somehow to give explicit attention to general public participation in decision-making when considering power sharing arrangements.

In addition to the latter point, attention should be paid to territorial arrangements—e.g. secession or some form of federalism—for ending or preventing conflict. Several authors have pointed to the risks in such arrangements, especially the risk of conflict at the state level being replaced by similar sorts of conflict at regional or local levels. To make secession or federal arrangements successful not only requires a commitment to power sharing or democratization at the level of the state, but also at lower levels. This issue is dealt with in the paper on power sharing arrangements in Sri Lanka.

Considering the ‘follow-up’ of power sharing arrangements, it is here suggested to discuss the following questions:

- How to prevent that power sharing arrangements produce (perceived) vested interests, thereby undermining democratization on the long run?
- Are provisions necessary to make power sharing arrangements ending, and what should they look like?
- Could constitutional arrangements play a role in creating a smooth transition from power sharing to democratization?
- How to foster a culture of democracy when elites or political entrepreneurs play a central role in the coming into being of arrangements?
- How to guarantee that the issues federalism intends to address (e.g. undemocratic policies affecting specific groups, or further fragmentation) do not recur on lower levels in federal systems as well?

Another practical issue concerns power sharing in non-democratic contexts. Although not the first objective, most concepts of power sharing include a high appreciation of democratic values, civilian liberty and public participation. However, in reality one often has to deal with situations where the prospects for democracy are dim. Such circumstances present a dilemma: should one give in on the values of liberal and participatory governance, in an effort to promote power sharing at the risk of thereby legitimizing authoritarianism, or should one aim for democracy even if the chances for success are low? Most important is the question whether there is a risk in aiming for democracy too soon, and thereby harming future prospects for democracy. Hence the questions:

- Are weak democracies to be preferred over authoritarian regimes?
- Less democratic mechanisms can contribute to the management of violent conflict and result in power sharing (for instance, pre-electoral arrangements, or the circumvention of elections through pacts). Yet, can this be done without impairing democratization on the longer run?

Some Issues of Policy Making

The aim of the project is to provide options for policy making. Hence, the suggested focus is on potential implications of the above discussions for policy making. This especially applies to the contribution the international community could make to power sharing arrangements. The literature that was reviewed for this showed quite some discussion on the contribution the international community could make to the designing of power sharing arrangements. However, the review of this discussion on the role of outsiders in negotiations, drafting constitutions, and elections results in the rather depressing finding that the coming into being of power sharing arrangements may only to a very limited extent be the outcome of outside interventions. Yet, the performance of international actors may be crucial, especially concerning the management of spoilers in peace and democratization processes.

To come up with lessons for policy-making, it is here proposed to focus today's discussions on the following questions:

- What role can external actors fulfill in facilitating political and institutional arrangements for conflict prevention? What is the role of external actors in nurturing moderation, stability and mutual trust?
- How can external actors contribute to creating, sustaining and deepening arrangements?
- How could international actors contribute to power sharing arrangements in weak or failed states?

- Can external actors contribute to democratization processes at lower levels? Could this be done through development co-operation projects?

Discussion

The first part of the discussion focused on the concept of democracy. Mrs van Cranenburgh cautioned not to misrepresent the literature on democracy. The paper represents mainly the American literature. It is problematic to speak of a 'western type' of democracy, let alone to generalize everything to liberal, majoritarian democracy. She referred to Lijphart, who has stated that democracy is not the preference of the majority of the people, but of as many people as possible. She also noted that power sharing is not a temporary solution. It should be a permanent characteristic of democracy, and is therefore not anti-democratic. Power sharing arrangements, moreover, are already inherent in the constitutions of many colonies of the UK. These can be the result of territorial arrangements or particular electoral procedures. However, they are not always present in the executive body of governance. The question remains as to what kind of power sharing is possible under specific circumstances.

Attention was also paid to the context of democratization. Dr van Walraven pointed out that limiting the context to ethnic group pluralism would be incorrect. Social stratification, instead, should get more attention. According to Dr van Walraven, this is the biggest difference with the West. Research on democratization, therefore, should focus on the relationship between weak institutions on the one hand, and social stratification on the other. With regard to understanding democratization and power sharing in the African context, special attention should be paid to the link between the leaders and the groups they represent.

Mr Deckers asserted that majoritarianism as in the USA and UK electoral systems is the ideal-type because it implies rule by as many people as possible. Dr Mares, on the other hand, commented that there is a risk of idealizing western democracy, and even the risk to 'over-theorize' democracy. As regards the implementation of democracy, he pointed toward the importance of institutional design and leadership. Concerning the first aspect, he noted that, although not an answer to all problems, institutional design could at least provide a context for credible arrangements. Yet, in order to reach these arrangements and to make them successful, the actors involved require leadership. Basic, however, is that leadership requires some institutional design to strategize on.

According to Prof. Doornbos, there are limits to attempts to promote democracy. Various circumstances may imply that different types of systems can be successful. This is what research should focus on: a comparative analysis of democratization processes in order to find out what is possible given certain circumstances.

In the discussion on power sharing, Dr Ottaway referred to the importance of economic aspects. She questioned whether it is possible to have political power sharing without economic provisions, and whether power sharing can be limited to political arrangements for sharing power. Mr Deckers reasserted that democratization takes time, and that it is an inherently unstable system, particularly in combination with poverty.

Dr Schneckenner concluded that many of the problems mentioned on the relationship between power sharing and democracy would disappear, if one would not over-emphasize 'majoritarian democracy'. Since there is no ideal type of democracy, it would be shortsighted to focus mainly on 'majoritarian' democracy since this is an ideal-type. He also commented that the supposed contradiction between power sharing and democracy, has some grounds, but it is not the most

prominent problem, especially if one does not stick too much to the ideal-type of majoritarian democracy.

Dr Schneckener also referred to the discussion on the dichotomy between the consociational and the integrative approach, which is basically a result of the debate between Lijphart and Horowitz. The differences they identify can be related to the different kinds of research they did. Lijphart was mainly focusing on European cases, while Horowitz focused mainly on African cases. Instead of questioning which model is better, it would be more useful to focus on the various types of arrangements and the options involved. Dr Schneckener, therefore, prefers an empirical approach assessing which option might be more useful given the circumstances. The aim of power sharing is the same for all models: integration. All models and suggested instruments aim for integration. However, Horowitz has added some alternative designs, which could be useful under specific circumstances. A key-question for power sharing, however, is the representation of relevant groups in the executive and the public sector. Each group should be ensured a voice in decision-making. This does not imply that one should focus on the electoral question. This certainly is important, especially from the perspective of the democracy debate, where elections are key. Yet, they are secondary when it is not ensured that representation of these groups is guaranteed at the top level of government. Hence, one should focus on the representation of relevant groups in the executive and how to assure that each voice is represented. In this regard, one should also pay attention to the issue of veto rights, which is a sensitive area.

In the discussion, Dr Schneckener also touched upon the role of external actors. Research indicates that external pressure has so far had limited success in making actors comply with the rules of the international community. He sees two important roles. In the negotiating phase, external actors may have an important facilitating role. In the implementation phase, the role of external actors may be even more important. In this regard, Dr Aning noted that it is striking that most of the receiving countries are not seen as 'the international community'. In the discourse, it is often assumed that the activities of the international community are altruistic, without any interests of the actors involved. He questioned the absence of interests. In addition, the process of democratization that started in the 1990s is often perceived as externally driven. In this regard, he concluded that many of the problems since the introduction of democracy result from the fact that countries are forced on short time limits to democratize without taking local dynamics into account. In this regard, the issue of social stratification should also receive more attention.

Presentation of Research Findings on Sri Lanka: Prof. De Silva

Introducing his paper on power sharing arrangements in Sri Lanka, Professor De Silva of the International Centre for Ethnic Studies Kandy, Sri Lanka emphasized the point that Sri Lanka's prolonged ethnic conflict shows how the adoption of forms of power sharing in a democratic political structure does not necessarily guarantee political stability. Nor do these greatly reduce the prospects of eventual breakdown in the political system and outbreaks of conflicts, even violent conflicts. In the early stages—the 1930s and 1940s—the national debate on power sharing was conducted on purely political terms, i.e. on the representation of the island's ethnic and religious diversity in its national legislature, elected on universal suffrage, and in the Board of Ministers. This changed after the mid-1950s when power sharing was viewed largely in terms of devolution of power to the districts and provinces with these claims and demands being advocated largely if not entirely by representatives of Tamil minority.

The second distinguishing feature of these early years of democratic debate is the evolution and development of power sharing in actual political practice from the early 1930s. Throughout the next 70 years, it is to political practice that we need to turn our attention in any study of power sharing in politics and public life. Power sharing at the level of the Board of Ministers came as early as 1931; it came to its own with the cabinet established just prior to independence in 1947. The practice began of representation of all important ethnic and religious groups within the cabinet, a practice that has been followed ever since. Power sharing has been the core of Sri Lanka's multi-party democratic system, a political world where coalition governments are the norm not the exception.

The debate on power sharing took on a new form after the mid-1950s. As early as 1928, the British government had recommended that a second tier of government be established in the island, between the center in Colombo, and local government bodies. It took 52 years before such a scheme could be introduced (in 1980). In 1957 and 1967-68, attempts to introduce such councils had failed, by an upsurge of popular opposition in 1957 and by a fear of similar opposition in 1967/68 respectively.

When the second tier of government in the form of district councils was established in 1980, there was no longer a national consensus in such councils, unlike in the 1930s and 1940s. The lack of a national consensus was even more pronounced in the case of the provincial councils established in 1987, through an accord signed between India and Sri Lanka. This was evident in the riots directed against the accord, and the intense political pressure directed against the legislation on provincial councils stemming from its clauses. That coercive Indian intervention (1987-1990) with all its ambiguous and eventually contradictory objectives failed in almost all of its aims. Its only partial success was to give devolution of power a new form through provincial councils modeled on the states of the Indian Union. The failure of the Indian intervention aggravated the island's ethnic conflict, far from resolving it, and devolution of power remained as controversial as it ever was. Worse still, the Indian intervention left successive Sri Lanka governments negotiating with the most violent of the Tamil separatists groups, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) who established a virtually undisputed dominance in Tamil politics in Sri Lanka thereafter.

The district councils established as the second tier of government did not last long. In the aftermath of the riots of 1983, the Indian government supported the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) in insisting on abandoning these councils, and the establishment of councils based on the provinces. The TULF and most of the Tamil separatists groups including the LTTE have continued to press for a larger regional unit incorporating the Northern and Eastern provinces as a Tamil dominated ethno-region, a political manifestation of the "traditional homelands" of the Tamils in Sri Lanka. The

Sri Lanka governments of the period 1987 to 2001 have opposed the permanent merger of these two regions. Not surprisingly, differences of opinion between the Sri Lanka government, and representatives of Tamil opinion, on this aspect of devolution of power have proved to be virtually unbridgeable. For its part, the LTTE had shown little or no interest in anything other than a separate Tamil state based on the Northern and Eastern Provinces.

The critical stumbling block in the negotiations on devolution of power in Sri Lanka, at present, is the demographic profile of the Eastern Province where the Tamils are a minority of only 40% of the population, perhaps even less today. The deadlock over the linking of these two provinces continues to the present day. While devolution of power has very little support in the Sinhalese areas of the country and devolution of power to units larger than a district or a province is widely perceived by Sinhalese as threatening the territorial integrity of the island, the Muslims, feel threatened by this in a more immediate way, since the Tamils are certain to dominate the affairs of this projected larger territorial unit.

The Indian intervention and its failures, left successive Sri Lankan governments first negotiating with the LTTE and then resuming a military struggle once the negotiating failed. The Sri Lankan situation provides insights into the difficulties faced by democratically elected governments in dealing with a separatist movement captured by the most violent group among the latter, a group which has systematically marginalized its rivals and driven the traditional democratic forces among the Tamils to the periphery of the political system. The radicalization of Tamil politics in Sri Lanka under the leadership of the LTTE makes the search for a negotiated settlement a much more difficult exercise than it was in the years before the LTTE established its dominance in Tamil politics in Sri Lanka.

Discussion

Dr Mares agreed with the conclusion that outsiders cannot impose power sharing arrangements. However, he disagreed with claim that power sharing should come from the locals. He concluded that the fact that actors did not agree upon power sharing so far should mainly be attributed to the lack of incentives for doing so. External actors, therefore, should not impose solutions, but influence the incentives that the local groups are facing and try to shift or correct those so that it is more advantageous to share power or not to engage in violence. The questions of when and under what conditions cannot be answered from a general theoretical model, but have to be discerned from the local context. He thus agreed that the local actors have to make the final decision, but the external actors should identify which factors and incentives may be required to increase the interest of local actors in sharing power. Hence: what is it that outside actors may be able to contribute because of their resources to shift the balance toward more stable power sharing arrangements.

Mrs van Cranenburgh agreed that local actors are crucial for successful power sharing arrangements. Yet, she also asserted that external actors can change the structure of incentives and of costs. However, they should be very cautious in doing so. Sometimes, it may even be better to refrain from action than to pressure for something. The 1992 elections in Kenya were mentioned as an example of counterproductive external pressure. Here, the international community pressured for elections but did not to discuss or question the electoral system. Hence, she noted that it is important to also reach agreement on what one does *not* want as an outcome. As regards the role of external actors in influencing local conditions, Prof. Doornbos also noted the variance in outcomes. He therefore stressed the need for more research on the role of external actors. Adding to this discussion, Dr Mares

concluded that it is easier to influence the short-term calculations of parties than the long-term ones. Moreover, policy making of regimes is mainly short term, because they may never be sure whether they will be still in power on the long term. In this regard, the international actors could also act positively, rather than only through the application of negative sanctions.

Dr Schneekener noticed three important topics with regard to the Sri Lankan case. Firstly, who represents whom? At the cabinet-level there seems to be a kind of tradition to share power with Tamil and Muslim representatives through multi-ethnic parties. Yet, is this power sharing if these representatives are not seen as authentic speakers for these communities? The same situation can be found in Turkey, where there are Kurdish representatives in the government, but they are not seen as representatives. The question then is whether there should be multi-ethnic parties or whether there should be several separate ethnic parties or a mixture? As regards the issue of local power sharing, he noted that this is crucial. This certainly deserves more attention. How does local power sharing work? How is local power sharing related to higher levels where power relations may be different? He noted that this might involve a multi-level power game in which power sharing may have something for each group. Depending on the majority-minority situation on each level there may be different tradeoffs. The third topic concerned the 'slippery slope problem': what concessions should one make and where to stop? It is a very difficult problem that is related to the issue of timing. In this regard, Dr Schneekener noted that the government of Sri Lanka often appears to respond one step too late.

Prof. De Silva responded to the comments by referring to the Indian intervention. This indicated the problems involved for external actors. Nobody had foreseen the negative outcome of this intervention. As regards the slippery-slope problem, Prof. De Silva also referred to the problems of India in the North East. Here India has conceded the demand for separate states long before the pressure for such demands was very great. Now the situation in the Northeast consists of seven states (the 'Seven Sisters') over which India has no control. This problem has now been going on for more than 40 years. This indicates the problems involved in timing and the 'slippery-slope' problematic. Prof. De Silva also noted that there is a lot of literature on the topics of democratization and power sharing in South and Southeast Asia, but that this literature is hardly noticed outside these regions.

Presentation of Research Findings on Mozambique: Mrs Naidu

In her presentation, Mrs Naidu of the South African Institute of International Affairs focused on the case of Mozambique. She started by noting that the idea of Power sharing is premised on good governance and the entrenchment of democratic principles. By its very nature democracy and the institutionalization of democratic procedures and culture is the hallmark by which to measure whether a country has successfully moved from a one party state to a multiparty democracy. In the case of Mozambique, she noticed that the report shows that although the country has endorsed these principles, the road to democracy is still a long journey with many bumps along the way.

By way of introduction, she noted that it is important to highlight that Mozambique's transition to democracy represents a success story that was hailed by the international community, especially the United Nations and the brokers of the General Peace Agreement in 1992. The commitment by Frelimo and Renamo to enter negotiations showed that both sides were politically mature and willing to bring democracy to the country. Moreover, it expressed that the antagonists put aside their differences and saw the democratic experiment as the only way in bringing peace and stability to the country after 16 years' of civil war. However, this had deeper connotations. More than anything, Mozambique served as a model story contrary to the turn of events in Angola where political decay between Unita and the MPLA led to renewed fighting.

While some commentators see Mozambique as model case for a transition, others feel that the political situation in the country is extremely fragile. This is so in light of the recent clashes between Frelimo and Renamo, and the invariable turbulent political relationship between the two. On balance, then, it can be gauged that what seems as a success story on the surface is underlined by effervescent tensions beneath which puts the democratic experience in fragile state of affairs. From this perspective the report highlights the threats and dangers to democracy in Mozambique and thereafter discusses some of the current debates that have become known during the research for this project.

Threats and Dangers to Democracy

The most discernible level of debate and contention in Mozambique focuses on the coming about of a multi-party system. At present, the defining framework for political diversity that underpins a multi party system has not been realized in the country. This is reflected in political structures that tend to indicate some form of a one party state. This is evident in the way the Constitution endorses a winner take all system. In this regard, there are a number of issues that have come to the fore. For one, in terms of the Constitution the winner of the presidential race has the right to nominate deputies to the Provinces regardless of whether his/her party had won the provincial vote in the Province. This has been a serious cause of disagreement between Renamo and Frelimo in the 1999 election and the underlying basis for the recent clashes in November 2000. Another point that alludes to the winner take all system is the fact that the Cabinet is made up only of Frelimo cadres and in key portfolios. This posturing has indicated that Renamo does not hold any important influence in the decision-making process of the country. Moreover, it highlights that the idea of multi-party democracy is merely ceremonial. A third point that can be related to this issue is the concern over the electoral process. As it stands, the financial resources for financing an electoral campaign have been skewed. According to reports, it would appear that Frelimo is better positioned in financing its electoral campaign and this mainly because of its rank as the ruling party. In certain instances, it has been

accused of using unfair advantage because of its links to the media, and other resources in getting exposure and canvassing for votes. This imbalance between the parties has dire implications for the smaller political parties who are hoping to make some inroads in the electoral process and gain seats in the parliament. All of this is underpinned by the fact that Mozambique is governed by a presidential system where the President has executive powers and control. Of course, other issues have come to the fore that are mentioned in the paper.

Apart from the 'winner take all' system the democratic experiment has not forged any unity between Frelimo and Renamo. This is evident, as old divides have become more pronounced. On the one hand, Frelimo keeps promising a 'material' or 'social' concept of democracy but fails to deliver it. This is seen in the uneven levels of development between the North/Central Provinces and the South. At the other end of the spectrum Renamo keeps demanding a more procedural and legalistic form of democracy, but fails to practice it. In this regard, it has not boycotted parliament for almost 10 months in 2000, nor has it not offered any policy alternatives to Frelimo's policies. However, most of all it has not clearly articulated a substantive policy document or policy principles. Moreover, it does not feel safe to take its complaint to the democratic structures. One of the subsequent results has been the clashes between government and Renamo supporters in the North. Furthermore, the leader of Renamo has threatened a war of attrition like Unita did in Angola. Some analysts have questioned whether Renamo has the capacity to carry out these threats or is it just another threat by the Renamo leader fashioned in a kind of an "Al Capone Syndrome". Others, however, have not taken these threats lightly. Instead these analysts more sympathetic to Renamo feel that Frelimo has never given up hope that somehow they can provoke Renamo to go back to war which would finally make it possible for Frelimo to operate freely and in a 'state of emergency' of secrecy and reasoning.

A related point to the above is fragmentation within both political parties. In Frelimo and Renamo there seems to be internal dissent and power struggles. In respect of Renamo, the leader of the Party, Dr. Afonso Dhlakama, does not seem open to any challenge to his power as head of the Party. This was evidently captured in the ousting of Raul Domingos (who was tipped to succeed Dhlakama and had good contacts with Chissano and Frelimo cadres). Moreover, Dhlakama is faced with internal constraints by the older guard in the Party whom he promised government portfolios. At the other level, Chissano is faced with a battle between the old guard in the party and the young technocrats who make up the cabinet. These tensions between the two groups in Frelimo are based on differing views on substantive economic and social policies. The old guard is still trying to fashion a socialist vision while younger technocrats are more pragmatic and invoking policies that can significantly reposition Mozambique in the global economy. An acute consequence arising from these internal disputes could be a splintering of Frelimo and Renamo and the emergence of a third party. This Party could try and overcome what one could term "cold war parties" and posture toward a new 'war' for the modernization of Mozambique's society. Some believe the latter could lead to a tragic situation similar to the one that can be seen in Zimbabwe at present.

Finally, the main institutions that underpin a democracy seem to be either lacking or potentially weak in capacity. At this juncture the role of the media, civil society and the trade union movement are not very strong to serve as a watchdog role in effecting a level of transparency and accountability with regard to government. With the exception of certain small-scale publications, both electronic and print media do not show any bipartisanship and seem inclined toward endorsing Frelimo when it comes to elections and so forth. At the same time investigative journalists like Carlos Cardoso have been vigilant in exposing corruption and nepotism both at the official level and within the private sector. However, such attempts have cost Cardoso his life while other journalists have been threatened. From this perspective, then, it seems quite clear that the culture of democracy and the institutions of

accountability and transparency are still to be realized in the country. However, such issues must also be seen within the broad context of teething problems associated with newly emerging democracies. The latter is, of course, underpinned by an interdependent world where borders are porous thereby allowing international crime syndicates to set-up their operations in emerging markets. At the same time civil society organs still need to be strengthened as a result of the destabilization of the civil war. In this context, the institutions of civil society must go hand in hand with feelings of nationhood. A weak civil society does not bode well for strengthening democracy.

Critical Issues in Mozambique

One central issue is the idea of statehood. Given the uneven levels of development between the North/Center and Southern Provinces the question remains whether people in the former (who have not seen any tangible benefits since the democratic process) feel part of the country and seem themselves as Mozambicans. If not this could lead to conflict and possibly even secession. A moot point, since commentators are divided on this issue. Yet there are real concerns that if the situation is not addressed then the concept of democratization would lead to conflict. This definitely requires one to investigate a package for power sharing, especially in keeping the country together.

The role of external actors in Mozambique also proved essential. A potential area for investigation is to what extent have external actors fostered the situation in Mozambique and how can they improve their role in ensuring that the country does not fragment. Questions hang over whether external actors can play a more substantive role and work with local organizations in trying to foster a democratic culture in the country, which could invoke the prospects for power sharing. This is an important lesson for external actors who very often make the mistake of associating democracy with legitimacy.

The above are some of the problems associated with the democratic experience in Mozambique. However, at the same time it would be unfair to say that the process of democracy in the country has not been altogether a successful one. It must be borne in mind that the process is new and should not be judged too harshly. Yet, essentially, it must be said that the process is fragile especially if one considers that power is a valuable instrument, which no one would want to give it up. Therefore, to reread the past would not be a useful starting point to measure Mozambique's democratic success, but to measure human experience and the actions of the main actors would be more appropriate.

Discussion

Dr Ottaway questioned whether the case of Mozambique is not judged too severely. She considered Mozambique as a fragile experiment, a case in which very little else could have been done given the circumstances. The reality is that there exists a contradiction between Renamo and Frelimo, as well as between the North and the South. Given the circumstances and compared to the situation in the beginning of the 1990s, Mozambique could even be considered a success. However, she admitted that there are still enough reasons for concern.

Dr Kingma noted that the case of Mozambique indicates that external actors can play an important role. This especially applies to the EU initiatives by Ajello. However, the most interesting aspect of Mozambique according to Dr Kingma, is the finding that Maputo is not Mozambique. The state is not very much felt in the North. He questioned whether there is any power of the state in the North of the country. In this regard, Dr Kingma questioned the link of the deals struck in Maputo with

the broader process of democratization in Mozambique. The aim should be to give the people in the north a feeling of being part of the state. He also questioned the objectives of the deals that were made. Is the aim to prevent violent conflict in order to give democratization a chance, or are the elite pacts in Maputo frustrating this process?

In comparing the cases of Sri Lanka and Mozambique, Dr Mares concluded that in both cases there are potential secessionist tendencies. These are underlying the power sharing issues. The question then is, why should these countries stay together. He identified two reasons: security and resources. In both cases, especially Sri Lanka, most resources are in the majority section of the country. This would imply the option of resources. In Sri Lanka, it might be an option to transfer resources to poor areas. In resource-poor Mozambique, external assistance can serve this role in the negotiation package: providing additional external resources to the north with the aim of keeping the country together. However, this would imply that the center would have to provide these extra resources to the North. This could be part of a power sharing arrangement in this country.

Dr Aning commented that it is not uncommon that incumbent governments exploit state resources. This especially applies to elections. He noted that there are no constitutional provisions for governments to support opposition parties during elections in terms of transferring state resources. Secondly, he questioned the supposed trajectory from war to peace to democratization and development. Liberia and Sierra Leone already indicate the limitations in this regard. As regards the role of civil society, he noted that the role of the media—printed as well as electronic—could contribute greatly to the process of democratization.

Mrs van Cranenburgh questioned whether there are constraints to power sharing arrangements in Mozambique. She also questioned whether there is a general tendency in Africa towards one-party type of systems. If so, such an inherent prevalence for dominant party systems in which one party gets an overwhelming majority, and an executive presidency in which there is no room for opposition, might be a legacy of pre-colonial times and patrimonial systems. In this regard, she also referred to the Netherlands' program to support South African political parties. Perhaps it would be an option to use this as an example and to support RENAMO. However, she also noted that this bears certain risks as well.

Dr Mills agreed with Dr Ottaway that Mozambique is a success story. Yet, he also asked what stops the settlement from falling apart. In this regard, he also was interested in the question whether there is a regional dimension to the problems in Mozambique. This especially seems to apply to the situation in the North, where there seems to be a problem concerning the nature of the state and the identification with the state and politics within the state. He wondered whether this is also related to an ethnic and religious dimension. As regards the role of external actors and the NGO community, he commented that it would be useful for these actors to assess their effects on politics, especially in the system of political patronage in Mozambique. According to Dr Mills, this was clearly to be noticed in the case of the aid after the floods. He also stressed the role of South Africa as critical, both in 1994 and thereafter, in terms of the South African government facilitating investments, aid flows, et cetera. Lastly, he wondered whether power sharing, or the lack thereof, influences transparency as well as socioeconomic and political development.

Mrs Ball related Frelimo's attitude to power sharing to its lack of tradition to pluralism and participation. According to Mrs Ball, Renamo put the issue of power sharing on the agenda during the negotiations. Frelimo was not in favor of power sharing at that time, especially since it found that it had won the war. The negotiators at that time did not push for this issue. However, just before the 1994 elections, part of the international community pushed hard for power sharing. At that time, this

had a completely adverse effect on the government. She wondered whether this still has a lasting impact and whether it has resulted in an enduring resentment of Frelimo against power sharing.

Prof. Doornbos found that it was quite remarkable that two competing liberation fronts converted themselves into political parties. He still finds this quite an achievement in which external parties did play an important role. Based on the case of Mozambique, he thinks that external actors can play such a role in the case of a complete stalemate.

In response to the questions raised, Mrs Naidu agreed that it is too early to conclude that democracy in Mozambique has failed. She asserted that a remarkable process has been going on, which is recognized by international actors. Hence, it is justified to ask what can be expected in such a short period. However, donors expected many changes on the short term. The Third Wave of democratization resulted in various donor agencies promoting democracy. This certainly has created a lot of pressure on local actors to try and address the expectations of the international community.

As regards the issue of power sharing she answered that at that time the war ended Frelimo thought that it was legitimate to claim power. Renamo may have raised the issue of power sharing during the negotiations, but has never been successful in doing so afterwards. She attributes the timing also to these demands being supported by external actors at that time in order to get Renamo back to the negotiations. The issue of development or democracy first is still open. To compare the East Asian model to the African states could be difficult because of the vast differences in nature of the state. Concerning the role of South Africa, Mrs Naidu confirmed South Africa's interest in regional stability. Destabilization would have considerable consequences for South Africa. In this respect, economic activities are seen as important stabilizing factors.

Presentation of Research Findings on Nicaragua: Mr Vílchez Perreira and Mrs Oliver

In his presentation, Mr Vílchez Perreira of the Arias Foundation addressed the issue of power sharing in the Nicaraguan context.

Mr Vílchez Perreira noted that the negotiated end of the war has led to the creation of values and attitudes that are potentially useful for the creation of a culture of peace that would positively influence power sharing.

The revolution implied a strong organizational development of society, both on the left and on the right. Today, this fact has several concrete manifestations:

- Politicization of society in general, which implies that there are active demands for citizen participation in decision-making processes.
- There is strong pressure concerning citizen participation, particularly locally and at the municipal level.
- Freedom of expression is strongly defended.
- There is a deterioration of the government because of the conflict. On the part of civil society, there is irreverence for various manifestations of power of the different branches of government (the police, the military, the president, mayors, et cetera).
- A wide growth of NGOs (up to more than 1500 in the whole country).

For its part, the state has not developed in a similar way. To the contrary, it tends to exclude broad sectors of society that could be considered the natural social base of any government. This is demonstrated in various ways:

- Weak institutions, especially in the sense that the executives branch invade with impunity in the realms of other branches (judiciary, elections, et cetera).
- Lack of transparency in management of state resources. There is a high level of discretion, which is even reflected in the general budget of the republic. Around 10% of the national budget is allocated to the discretionary funds for the President.
- An arrogant attitude toward civil society. The executive seems to be under the negative assumption that he who has been elected to govern no longer has to consult anyone. In other words, for the executive, periodic elections are the only desired form of expression for civil society.

The situation described above gives a first impression that civil society is immersed, and in chaos and disorder. However, this situation can evolve positively if steps are taken in the following directions:

- Efforts should be made to strengthen public institutions: the approval of the Civil Service Law should be pressured; the installation of a court for administrative issues would provide citizens protection against state abuse; the fulfillment of a process for creating laws; the effective fulfillment of a law for citizen participation; the effective fulfillment of a municipal law.
- Strengthening civil society's ability in order for it to become a social watchdog: to make information available, to promote the study of spaces for participation; to train in the alternative management and modification of conflict; to support civil society through coordination of networks (local, national, and international).

Finally, Mr Vilchez Perreira noted that there has been an experience with power sharing over the course of the 1990s, beginning in 1991 and the government of Chamorro with the Transition Protocol, in 1994/95, in 1997 with President Aleman, and in 1999 as well. All of these accords concerned governance, not necessarily democratization.

The different efforts at power sharing have mainly been elite pacts. However, at the same time this has contributed to the process of democratization. Democratization is a process, and these pacts have contributed to governance over the last decade.

Discussion

Dr Ottaway wondered what an 'exaggerated' explosion of NGOs meant. According to Mr Vilchez Perreira, this explosion has resulted in very dispersed and fragmented initiatives. It also has dispersed international funding. There furthermore is a conflict between Sandinista and anti-Sandinista organizations at the level of NGOs, which additionally fragments initiatives.

Dr Mares asserted that the case of Nicaragua points out how useful it is to talk about the coming into being of pacts and to find out who were involved and what the terms of the agreement were.

Mr Vilchez Perreira noted that the peace in Nicaragua was the result of war-fatigue and external pressure by the USA in particular. The Peace Accords were the result of the elite negotiations and the efforts of the international community. The counterrevolutionary forces were not involved in any way, neither the leadership, nor the troops or their social base. Therefore, the accords in many ways do not have any legitimacy among the people or within the country.

The accords initially worked because society was highly militarized, and the troops obeyed what they were told to do. But that rapidly fell apart with the demilitarization process, which was not very well handled. This has resulted in the resurgence of armed groups on both sides. Yet, the relations between these groups continuously shift.

The later pacts signified fractures among the political forces. The pacts, in a sense, were pragmatic solutions to specific problems at specific times. As regards the role of external actors, it was noted that initially the USA and other actors were of importance. But now especially the IMF and the WB force some kind of agreement among the parties in order to qualify for their assistance. This implies that the Structural Adjustment Programs are now implemented with minimal political stability.

Participant presentations on the topic

Dr Schneckener started a discussion based on the model below. The model, based on Lijphart, considers ideal-types of democratic systems:

	Nation State	Multinational Polity
Elite competition (majoritarian democracy)	Centripetal democracy	Centrifugal democracy 'ethnic democracy'
Elite co-operation (consensus democracy)	Corporatism	Consociationalism

According to Dr van Walraven, this model focuses too much on the intra-elite level of arrangements. Mrs van Cranenburgh noted that there is a difference with Lijphart's model. Lijphart distinguishes between homogeneous and heterogeneous societies, rather than between 'nation state' and 'multinational polity'. In addition, he refers to 'cartelism' rather than to 'corporatism'. Mrs van Cranenburgh also stated that one might distinguish four ways to realize power sharing:

- Horizontal power sharing (concerning the division in responsibilities between parliament, the courts, the executive);
- Territorial power sharing (including secession and federalism);
- Power sharing *within* the executive (coalition cabinets), and;
- Functional power sharing (socioeconomic power sharing, neo-corporatism, e.g. the 'poldermodel').

In the context of Africa, more informal mechanisms of power sharing should be added, for example ethnic group balancing, or redistributive policies. Moreover, she noted that it would be wrong to focus on the mechanisms and development of electoral systems only. It would be more important to look at their outcomes.

Dr Aning compared the situation in the United Kingdom—with people speaking Welsh and Scottish—to the situation in Ghana where people cannot understand each other's language. In order to understand the problems in Ghana, he pointed to the problems involved in creating wide public participation. In this regard he referred to Claude Ake's assertion that democracy is not about abstract regulations, but about the capacity of governance to fulfill the economic needs of its population.

Dr van Walraven stressed the need for a more sociological analysis of democratization. Up until now, the democratization debate pays little or no attention to the class structure. In Africa, societies are still highly skewed. Democracy, therefore, should be seen as an integrative concept, comprising economics, politics, and institutions.

Prof. de Gaaij Fortman questions whether the purpose of power sharing is to get to democratization. He finds this too limited. The purpose should be that people, in the end, are better off in all aspects of life, including the economic aspects of life. Otherwise, there is the risk of a revival of violence due to frustration-aggression mechanisms. Hence, the purpose should be a culture of pluralism, and a functioning economy (development with economic, social and cultural rights), to ensure that those at the bottom of society get better off. As regards the prize to be paid for power sharing, he noted that it severely limits—if not renders impossible—the substitutability of those in power, i.e., to get rid of bad leaders. He asked the question whether there are alternatives. If even

democracy seems to be able to produce bad leaders, and if democracy makes it hard to get rid of these leaders, this raises the question of the meaning and the purpose of democracy. In a period of power sharing, the other aspects of democratic government—that it is accountable and participative—should not be neglected. This implies the establishment of institutional arrangements that enhance accountability and participatory use of governmental power.

Dr Ottaway asked the question what any of the models presented by Dr Schneckener has to offer to countries where those systems are not present. Perhaps it would be better to start analysis from countries where there is no power sharing rather than from an ideal model. In those cases, the question is not which model is the better one, but which are the conditions that make particular models in particular circumstances possible.

Dr Kingma also made some conceptual observations. According to Dr Kingma, the objectives of power sharing should be peace and development. However, power sharing should never be seen apart from democratization. In this regard he also stressed the difference between democracy and democratization. Democratization is a process. If power sharing would undermine the process of democratization, the concept should be viewed with distrust. As regards the links between democratization and conflict he notices a link between democratization and peace building. It is one of the main pillars next to economic aspects, and social, cultural and psychological aspects. Peace building was presented as a set of measures to prevent falling back to conflict. Dr Kingma, however, interprets peace building as a process supported by measures. This process would include democratization, state and nation building, reconciliation and demilitarization. These broader perspectives can help in providing a focus and in keeping away from narrow theoretical aspects. Hence, they can provide a focus for using the concept of power sharing.

Dr Mares would not like to rule out power sharing, even if it does not directly lead to democracy. It often is difficult to know what is down the road. An example is the Civil War in the USA. The bargain made in that period saved the Union, but it took another 100 years for civil rights in the South to improve.

Another question by Dr Mares concerned the issue of power sharing in constitutional arrangements. Once power sharing is built into a constitutional arrangement the aim should be to facilitate a movement away from anti-democratic power sharing. The question then is how to do this. Dr Mares presented the case of Chile as an example on how one could deal with these issues if society is evolving in a direction that it no longer needs such arrangements. The transition in Chile highlights in this regard the importance of super-majority. There, 43% of the votes was in favor of a continuation of the dictatorship by Pinochet. Hence, in 1989, the Chilean society was polarized. The transition in Chile was undertaken by adding so-called authoritarian enclaves to the constitution. These were necessary in order to convince the Right that the Left would not make use of its winning the elections to attack the Right. This system consisted of designated senators. The President, as well as the commanders of the armed forces could designate senators. This implied institutionalized power sharing. In addition to this there were also mechanisms to move away from these arrangements. Constitutional amendments required a super majority. A super majority requires coalition building among the actors in order to make changes. The minority groups, therefore, know that they have to be part of the decision-making process. This motivated coalition formation and resulted in the left gaining credibility in the eyes of the right. In the end, even the right voted for abolition of designated provincial leaders, which had served as a safety provision.

As regards the contribution of external actors, Dr Mares focused on the issue of political will. He interprets political will as incentives. Options to influence the calculations of internal parties are not limited to cases of hurting stalemates. One group expects to get a number of benefits out of immoderation relative to the costs of being immoderate. In the case of majority-minority situations in which the minority is inherently weak, one cannot focus simply on the domestic aspects. In such cases, external actors would have to elevate the costs of being immoderate. Sanctions alone may not be sufficient. International interventions should aim for preventing groups from accessing the benefits of being immoderate. These benefits can be material as well as psychological. The threat of intervention, however, needs to be credible. In this regard, ad hoc interventions are counterproductive. What are needed are international, universal norms for interventions. However, all parties involved should be clear of the fact that no one will benefit from immoderation, neither the strong nor the weak party.

Prof. Doornbos and Mrs van Cranenburgh questioned the possibility of Dr Mares' argument for such external interventions based on an international agreement. It is not self-evident that external actors will intervene. It is highly likely that in each case a new judgment will be made of what is possible and what is desirable. Dr Aning added to this that African cases of Liberia and Sierra Leone indicate the limited probability of such type of interventions. Dr van Walraven, however, noticed some positive changes, especially now that the Netherlands is planning to send troops to the border between Eritrea and Ethiopia. The intervention of the UK in Sierra Leone was seen as an indication of these changes in the position of Western countries toward Africa.

Plenary Discussion to Define a Future Research Agenda

Dr Mares commented that there are different ways of power sharing. Part of the reason why some groups want power sharing is because the legal systems are too weak. Without access to power, they do not feel their interests are protected. In this sense, democracy is not just majority rule in the sense that it implies that the majority can do whatever it wants. It is majority rule within the context of a legal system. Hence, majoritarian democracy is only democratic when it is legally embedded. Contributions to make legal systems more effective are in this regard important for conflict prevention, and could make power sharing a little less pressing.

Prof. de Gaaij Fortman added to this that more attention could be paid to the concepts of democracy. Majority rule as such is in this regard insufficient. Without legitimacy, there is little use for democratic government. Hence, minority groups should respect the outcome of elections. This implies that when the majority rules the minorities should be respected. What should be looked at is a set of institutional arrangements connected with a legal system that protects minorities and that guarantees that minorities respect the outcomes of elections. In addition, the economic aspects of democracy should be addressed. Democracy, in this regard, could also be defined as access to resources. This concerns various aspects of which the protection of minorities from discriminatory majority rule is an important one. The majority that is in power should not be in a position to rob the minority of its possessions. In addition, there is the so-called justice gap. People often expect from new institutional arrangements and governments that things will be better. Hence, the economic dimension of democracy not only means access to resources, but it also means improvement in terms of economic justice. These issues may already become part of power sharing arrangements, or should at least be addressed in such arrangements.

Dr van Walraven suggested a more comparative, historical approach in which the process of democratization as it took place in the West is also analyzed. This should not be done with the aim of repeating the European processes, but in order to better understand the processes of growth in political equality between the various social strata of society. This would imply not so much a focus on institutions but on processes, and especially the role of the political economy in the process of democratization.

Prof. Doornbos added that it would be useful to look at policy processes in various countries in order to find ways for influencing them. Especially with regard to power sharing and democratization it would be useful to find out when certain approaches are appropriate and when not. For this aim, actual examples of how various approaches—constitutional, electoral, et cetera—have been put forward, as well as at their outcomes, could be investigated. In this connection he also suggested to investigate under which conditions governments and political parties might flourish. As regards external actors, he suggested a critical analysis of interventions and under what conditions they were successful or why they failed.

Dr Ottaway suggested to further the agenda, and to make case studies of concrete situations. It would, e.g., be useful to try and understand the demands of the actors involved. This could be done by first making an inventory of the problems to be addressed. Secondly, she recommended to make an inventory of what has been done, what worked and what did not work, and what has caused more damage. Finally, it would be useful to investigate whether there are ‘models’ that might be applicable, or processes that might be replicated elsewhere.

Dr Schneckener suggested to focus research more on the settlement phase. He presented six points of interest. The first concerned the question of timing. Suggested solutions to a problem are often only as good as the moment at which they are proposed. Hence, are there indications for good timing? The second issue related to the implementation problems. The cases presented referred to implementation problems. In some cases they were solved. The question then is how this was done, and why other cases failed. What could be good practices or processes for implementation? Thirdly, he focused on the question of reforms. The issue of reforms refers to changes in the settlement or the implementation thereof. This should be done in a specific way. He therefore suggested to investigate how such reforms could best be realized. A fourth suggestion concerned the ending of settlements. What could be an adequate mix of aspects of shared rule and self-rule? As regards settlements, he also suggested to investigate whether they are comprehensive in the sense that they include the local as well as the broader perspective, e.g., the regional. This is often crucial for the success of a settlement. Lastly, he suggested to investigate how internal conflicts with a zero-sum game character, could be transformed in a positive sum situation. Which factors were most relevant for this change? Were there specific designs? Were there external incentives? Were internal factors and incentives most important? This should be compared in a number of cases in order to get some indication of the character of these factors.

Prof. De Silva suggested comparing the Sri Lanka case of power sharing to that of Malaysia. One could say that Malaysia succeeded where Sri Lanka failed. However, there were certain tradeoffs: economic growth in change for a less democratic system. According to Prof. De Silva, the most interesting question in this regard is why the Chinese minority in Malaysia put up with this given the fact that they are the engine of economic growth. Hence, a comparison of the two cases could be useful for finding factors that contribute to success or failure.

Mrs Naidu recommended to look more closely at the economic aspects of power sharing in Mozambique. There is a general perception in Mozambique that democracy is not just about procedures and institutions, but also about economic performance, betterment of life and the class structures that emerge out of that. In addition, she also stressed that it is important to investigate how the legal system can be reformed in order to strengthen the political system.

Mrs Oliver and Mr Vélchez Perreira focused attention on the issue of political culture. To what extent is there an ability to adopt certain systems and make them work? In this regard civic education was mentioned, as well as the accessibility of institutions. In addition, there is, in the Nicaraguan case, a need for a rapprochement between the elites and their pacts on the one hand, and the NGOs and their supporters on the other. Each now seems to be operating very well, but in between there seems to be a vacuum. Lastly, there is the issue of external intervention and support. There has to be some modesty on the side of external actors, especially since local actors do not perceive them as well informed. Interventions, therefore, should focus on support of local processes. This should not just imply resources, but also training and sharing experiences.

Seminar Program

9.30	<i>Welcome and Coffee</i>
10.00	<i>Opening</i> <i>Prof. Dr Ir Georg.E. Frerks, Head Conflict Research Unit</i>
10.10	<i>Presentation of Review on Power Sharing: Mr van Leeuwen</i>
10.30	<i>Discussion</i>
11.00	<i>Presentation of Research Findings South Asia</i> <i>International Centre for Ethnic Studies (Sri Lanka)</i>
11.15	<i>Discussion</i>
11.35	<i>Coffee Break</i>
11.50	<i>Presentation of Research Findings Africa</i> <i>The South African Institute of International Affairs</i>
12.05	<i>Discussion</i>
12.25	<i>Presentation of Research Findings Central America</i> <i>Arias Foundation for Peace and Human Progress (Costa Rica)</i>
12.40	<i>Discussion</i>
13.00	<i>Lunch</i>
14.15	<i>Participant presentations on the topic (max 5 minutes)</i>
15.45	<i>Tea Break</i>
16.00	<i>Plenary Discussion to define a future research agenda</i>
16.45	<i>Closure</i>

17.00 Reception

18.30 Dinner

Topics for Discussion

Annotations to the Concept of Democracy

Liberal or Western democracy is often regarded as the only process for the creation of legitimate government, and for the assurance of the central values of liberty and public participation. Research findings suggest that attempts to transplant or export the model of democracy prevailing in the Western world have not always had positive results. Overall, it has to be concluded that 'ideal-type' liberal, majoritarian democracy has its limitations. Apparently, 'a one size fits all' approach is not adequate. What does this situation imply and what type of dilemmas does it raise? Is there a need to reconsider 'ideal-type' democracy or need it be linked to certain phases or trajectories? To focus the discussion, the following questions could be looked into:

- How to prevent potentially destabilizing 'the majority rules' outcomes?
- Are there situations where democracy is not so feasible, and should we (temporarily) refrain from applying the concept in such situations?
- Is the problem the timing of the introduction of democratic principles or a culture of democracy? Are they premature or inadequate in particular situations?
- Or is the problem rather in the introduction of specific democratic institutions? Are there ways to promote the concept and its implementation in a more successful way?
- Is there then a need for conceptual alternatives to Western, liberal types of democracy?

Power Sharing as an Alternative

We presented power sharing as an alternative for situations in which democracy fails to work out properly. Often power sharing is seen as an extension to democracy. However, rather than being a form of democracy, power sharing contributes to democratization. If democracy characterizes sustainable power sharing, then power sharing arrangements are an instrument to reach this condition. Two major approaches have been discussed: the consociational approach, and the integrative approach. Yet in contributing to democratization, power sharing might paradoxically imply concessions to democratic principles. This raises the following questions:

- How does power sharing relate to 'ideal-type', majoritarian democracy? Is it an alternative, or does it complement or modify it?
- How should power sharing arrangements be positioned in a time-perspective: as more definite arrangements or merely as temporary and transitional measures?
- How can non-democratic arrangements contribute to democratization in the longer run?

Conditions Facilitating and Obstructing Power Sharing

A major issue raised in the discussion on the approaches for power sharing currently availing is in how to translate those rather *descriptive* approaches into *prescriptive* models for policy making. Rather than the question ‘what is the best approach, a consociational or an integrative approach?’ we need to turn attention to the conditions for power sharing. We identified a number of enabling and limiting issues:

1. **Moderation.** Conflicting parties may only be persuaded to peace deals when each of them is willing to some extent to give in on its demands. In this context, we could ask the questions:
 - What is the role of external actors in nurturing moderation (for instance, which ‘carrots and sticks’ are available)?
 - How to make the electoral winners more moderate in their demands? This relates to questions as what is the best timing for interventions? And, is it possible to stimulate moderation after elections, rather than in pre-electoral arrangements?
 - Is it correct to assume that leaders are more moderate than their followers are? If not so: what can be done about that?
 - Is the crafting of successful arrangements basically a result from adequate analysis and the most ‘suitable’ institutional design, or does it come down to statesman-ship and the capacity of individual diplomats to generate political will?
2. Another critical issue is the degree of **stability and mutual trust**. This raises the question of:
 - How to guarantee stability and mutual trust?
 - Are temporary arrangements stabilizing or destabilizing?
 - Can constitutions play a stabilizing role?
3. **Elite-pacts** may prove to be important for creating power sharing arrangements. However, pacts may also preclude further democratization, while pacts may be difficult to maintain. This raises the following questions for further discussion and research:
 - How sustainable do power sharing arrangements need to be?
 - How to perceive pacts in the process of democratization (for instance, as an objective or as a means)?
 - How to prevent pacts from producing vested interests, that could obstruct the process of democratization?
 - What type of provisions are necessary to make power sharing arrangements ending?
 - What role could constitutional arrangements play in creating a smooth transition from power sharing to democratization?
 - What is the correct timing for elections in the transition from power sharing to democratization?
4. There is quite some discussion on the contribution of the *international community* in designing and building power sharing arrangements. Yet, as with other processes, outsiders might only have limited influence on the coming into being of power sharing arrangements. Hence, the following the questions can be raised:

- What role can external actors play in facilitating institutional arrangements for conflict prevention?
- When are their contributions the most valuable? What is the best timing for intervention?
- How can they sustain arrangements, and become instrumental in deepening the arrangements?

In view of the above, the question remains in which situations power sharing is not adequate. The following questions could be raised here:

- Are models and approaches presently availing adequate, or is there a need for more alternatives?
- Is power sharing still feasible in the absence of moderation? Or can it create moderation?
- In how far is power sharing feasible in institutionally weak states?
- Power sharing relies on the belief that parties are willing to co-operate. Is this assumption realistic?

Power Sharing From Above and Below: A ‘Culture of Power Sharing’

Debates on democratization focus on the juxtaposition between the (authoritarian) state and its citizens and the participation of the electorate in general. The discussion of power sharing arrangements focuses on power relationships between groups of citizens and their representation within the state. The literature on pacts especially points out the elite character of many power sharing arrangements. Yet, for the nurturing of a culture of democracy, general public participation in decision-making should not be excluded. This raises the following questions:

- How to foster a culture of democracy when élites or political entrepreneurs play such a central role in power sharing arrangements?
- Can the Center promote the evolution of democratic principles?
- Should civil society be included in the negotiating process preceding power sharing agreements?

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