

Coping with Internal Conflict Project (CICP)

## **Proceedings**

International Seminar

Political Military Relations

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
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## Executive Summary

This report comprises the proceedings of the international seminar 'Political Military Relations', held at the Clingendael Institute in The Hague at 16 January 2001. The topic 'political military relations' is one of the four sub-themes of the Coping with Internal Conflict Project (CICP). The most important issues that have been discussed by a group of experts during this seminar are listed below. *The discussion was framed by a list comprising 'topics for discussion' as can be found at the end of this paper.*

### 1. *The Use of Western models*

It was discussed that Western models of civil control over the military are very specific to the history of Europe's and the United States' military and therefore must be carefully considered. Western models are also shaped by their local conditions and cannot be easily transferred to other parts in the world. It should be considered what local conditions lead to what different forms of civil military relations. Particularly, in Africa, Western models are difficult to apply, because most states are weak states and it can be doubted if there is a real governmental control over the military. The specific functions of a 'modern constitutional state' should be established as well as the nature of a modern African constitutional state. How then should the military function within this African State? Some participants stated that the role of the military in the African context differed substantially from that in the Western context. Others stated that even though Western States and African ones differ, there is in both cases the desire for civilian control over the military and other security actors, be it that the form of control must be adapted to the local conditions.

### 2. *Definitions regarding Civil Military Relations*

Regarding the control of the state over the military, it should be noted that *civilian control* over the armed forces does not necessarily imply *governmental control*. Certain Latin American cases have shown that the population wanted to have the military some kind of autonomy so that it could ask the military to get rid of that same government. Despite the very little governmental control over the military these situations were characterized by long periods of democratic governance and stability.

Secondly, it is not always clear what people define as civil military relations, because in reality *civilians and military are often intermingled*. Before one can start talking about civil military relations, it has to be defined what comprises the civilian and what the military. Civilian military relations namely is not just a matter of changing the relationship between the two, but to define what the two entities are, and even asking whether they can be defined in a meaningful way at all. For instance Cambodia is a one party state, in which the same people play military and civilian roles. In theory thus the military and the civilians seem to have defined roles, but the situation on the ground often is entirely different.

### 3. *Some Critical Comments on Security Sector Reform*

It was discussed whether *donor policies on security sector reform are the right starting point* for analysis. Some participants suggested first to take two steps back and to analyse the impact on security sector reform of Western foreign policies, particularly military assistance programmes that took place in the past, but also continue these days. Secondly, there are much more external effects, not explicitly labelled as security sector reform instruments, which shape the security sector in developing countries as well and indirectly contribute to the civilian control over the military. Another warning concerned the fact that certain donors have built their security sector reform policy on experiences gained from the Balkans. It can be questioned till what extent these understandings have a *universal value* and to which extent not.

It is good to make a distinction between *reform and transformation* of the security sector. Reform is making something better, by removing problems that stand in the way. Transformation though is fundamentally changing something.

Security sector reform efforts need to *fulfil some fundamental requirements*. At first, this includes the commitment of local leadership to undertake a reform. Local leadership must drive the reform process. Secondly, reform must be based on the legal, institutional frame of a country, and on its context-specific historical experiences. This thus implies that the local needs and objectives need to be taken into account.

To guarantee civilian leadership, as well as accountability and compliance of the military, it is important to *develop capable civil authorities and civil society*. Particularly reference was made to the importance of the executive branch. This branch includes oversight and monitoring organisations, such as the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Finance that do not get a lot of attention. However, it is really critical to train people who *are not defence or security specialists* in order to help developing the functioning of these Ministries in their control over the military.

#### 4. *The Role of the International Community*

Regarding this topic, it was stated that the most *critical contribution* to civil military relations in various countries *must come from external actors* helping to further establish control over the military. For instance the case-study of Ghana showed that the Ghanaian parliament, and government as well, is often unaware of the regulations regarding security issues and that there still needs a lot to be done to have governmental and parliamentarian control over security actors. The case-study on Nicaragua also showed that external actors are needed to strengthen the skills of politicians and government officials active in the executive branch in order to gain control over the military.

For the very practical implementation of security sector reform programmes, donors use so-called *country lists* that are not always congruent with countries that in reality are ripe for security sector reform. In some countries and under particular circumstances, security sector reform can be desirable but not indispensable; or is indispensable but not feasible; feasible, but neither indispensable nor desirable. Hence external actors *must balance between what is desirable, what is indispensable and what is operationally achievable*.

About the *scope for development co-operation*, it was discussed that now security has become an issue for those involved in development co-operation, it seems that all focus on security sector reform. Some participants questioned whether that is correct and pleaded for more *indirect ways* of strengthening the security sector, for instance through the World Bank's Structural Assessment Programmes. Others remarked that unless it is specifically mentioned in the policy to go after the security sector, one would not go after it. The World Bank and other donors have spent years on public expenditure reviews, but have come no way near the defence sector. Hence donors cannot be too indirect, because they will miss some important aspects of structuring the security sector.

### 5. *Suggestions regarding Research Methodology and Topics for Future Research*

Several participants discussed the need to do *comparative studies*. This analytically requires that the comparisons are carried out in a structured manner, which means asking very detailed questions on the same issues and processes. For instance, regarding pacts, knowing that there is a pact is not enough, we must know the details of each pact in order to compare them.

It also was stressed *to narrow down the approach* for the case studies. Follow up research should have a specific focus. Beside taking on board core military issues, it was recommended to analyse the police sector and the rule of law issue as well.

Another suggestion was to put the questions in the “topics for discussion list” (see at the end of the proceedings) in *a larger analytical framework*, particularly pointing out the role of external actors (for a full description see page 28, 29).

Policy relevant follow up research on civil military relations should include a systematic analysis of *what works* (e.g. the set up of budget review on military expenditure, or training politicians in military issues) *under which conditions*.

It also should examine the *local conditions* for success or failure of interventions related to civil military relations. Cases-studies can tell us what is actually happening at the moment on the ground regarding factors emerging from the general analysis.

There also is a need for a very basic *audit* of *what external actor* is doing what, who is working in this field, what areas are they working in in these field and what have their experiences been. For instance, what institutions are working in parliamentary oversight over the military or in policing? It should be analysed what forms of external assistance are given at the *micro-level*. Moreover, you should come up with a kind of list of crime suspects, to exactly figure out *who is doing what*.

This kind of basic audit is not only useful in the field of security sector reform, but *also in other areas for governance reform*. Countries are often crashed by too many demands for too many different kinds of reform. Basic audits thus must also indicate how the different attempts for reform can be combined.





## **Proceedings International Seminar ‘Political Military Relations’**

### **Opening Dr J.S. van der Meulen, Society and Armed Forces Institute**

The chair of the day, Dr. Van der Meulen—a sociologist working at the Institute Society and Armed Forces and specialised in civil-military relations—welcomed the participants and explained the programme. The aim of the workshop was to discuss the topic of civil-military relations based on the presented papers, as well as to identify a tentative agenda for follow-up research.

### **Military and Security Institutions in Developing Countries: Challenges in Civilian Control Governance and Conflict Management by Luc van de Goor**

The topic of civil-military relations can be approached from, mainly, two perspectives: it can be seen as part of the discussion on democratisation and good governance, and it can be seen as part of discussions on the security sector. In his introduction, Mr Van de Goor focused on the first discussion.

Civil-military relations, and especially civilian control over the military, were referred to as a problem of all times. The relationship is inherently problematic, and appears to be sort of a paradox. Because we fear others, we create an institution of violence to protect us, but then we fear the very institution created for our protection. The problem, then, is to find ways for civilian institutions to control or impose policies on their more powerful military agents.

This problem, although not new, has gained importance with the wave of democratisation that started in the 1980s. By definition, democracy cannot consolidate until the military becomes subordinated to civilian control and committed to democratic, constitutional order. The result is critical, for a nation can have civilian control of the military without democracy, but not democracy without civilian control. Donor countries that support the process of democratisation also stress the aspect of civilian control over the military as part of efforts to reform the security sector. Yet, the question is *how* to realise civilian control? Will it automatically result from the process of democratisation? An additional question is how to measure civilian control. Is the absence of a military coup sufficient? Or should we, as some seem to suggest, focus on military expenditures as an indicator?

In his introduction, Mr Van de Goor also touched upon some of the tentative findings of his introductory paper. Firstly, that current theory on civil-military relations seems inadequate for providing guidelines for policy-makers in Third World countries. Secondly, the finding of Western security-concepts not being universally applicable either and the consequences this has for the concept of civilian control over the military.

Mr Van de Goor remarked that, while being one of the oldest problems of human governance, it is interesting to see that the issue of civilian control of the military remains unresolved. The problem seems to be very simple. Yet, the subordination of the military to political authority—or, how a society controls those who possess the ultimate power of coercion or physical force—is all but simple. Since the beginning of organised military forces in ancient times, governments, particularly republican or democratic governments, have been vulnerable to being destroyed, overturned, or subverted by their armies. All forms of government must find ways and means to assure the obedience of their military to the overall system of government and to the regime in power. The reasons are obvious: only a few decades ago, military regimes were common in many Third World countries.

Today, as indicated, civilian control of the military has gained special significance, as democracy is spreading in South and Central America, Europe, Asia, and Africa. These newly-emerging democracies face great challenges. They lack experience in combining popular government and civilian control. This is important to take into account when looking at current theory on civil-military relations. Current theory is based mostly on the Western, and particularly Anglo-American experience, and analyses mainly seem to apply to societies that already practice democratic government.

Central to current theory is furthermore the separation of civil and military institutions, and the professionalisation of the military. These concepts are clear. Separating civilian and military institutions obviously prevents the military from becoming involved in political processes, and especially political decision-making. The concept of professionalisation is considered instrumental in this regard. Professionalisation implies the recognition of highly specialised skills for the military, as well as an independent sphere of military action: that is, dealing with external security threats to the state. Professionalisation and relative autonomy in a particular field of professional action would result in a neutral military that is not interested in internal politics.

Recent analyses assert that civil-military relations are more complex. They focus on understanding this complexity, taking into account variations in local circumstances, including political, cultural, and institutional mechanisms. In these analyses, the concepts of separation and professionalisation are also criticised. First, professionalisation provides the military with a privileged position as a pressure group. Second, the concepts of separation and professionalisation presuppose a stable democratic context, resembling the cultural setting of the United States or certain European countries. In this setting, civilians not only control the military, but the military are also accountable to civilian authorities. An additional feature is that internal security threats are not an issue

Attempts to deal with the differences in various countries and world regions, and to develop a comprehensive and universal theory of civil-military relations, have so far not been successful. However, although theories do not provide universally clear guidelines for policy making, findings do suggest a number of essential elements to include in dealing with civil-military relationships.

A first requirement is a type of governance and government accepted as legitimate by elites and by the population as a whole. That is: it has to be effective; it has to guarantee the rule of law and internal stability; and it has to guarantee a stable method for political succession. Key is the finding that without a stable and legitimate government, or when there is a weak government causing (or resulting from) internal chaos and challenge, military intervention is more likely.

A second requirement concerns 'the rules of the game'. In this regard, it is asserted that the military need to be kept disciplined, the civilians need to be well-informed, and both politicians and the military have to be protected from actors who would use their authority for their own power and partisan interests. As absolute dominance by civilians is impossible, and the civilian control of the military resembles a process, civilian direction seems to be a more correct description of reality.

Therefore, more attention should be paid to analysing and assessing regimes for co-operation. These rules may vary per country, but should have the central aim of civilian *guidance*. An important instrument for guidance is the development of accountability and sanction mechanisms.

A third requirement concerns the role of the military itself. Although no clear and direct reference is made to this requirement it is fundamental that the military, given its capacity, is always capable of intervening. Hence, military self-restraint from intervention in government and political life is crucial. In 'classical' thinking the concepts of separation of civilian and military spheres, professionalisation and 'objective control' dealt with this problem. Recent theorising also acknowledges military self-restraint as a problem for which it provides no solutions. The only suggestion in this regard is to keep the military away from internal politics and to focus their mission on external security issues. However, in order to get a better grasp of governance problems in the field of civil-military relations, one could also consider to analyse and understand the role of the military as an actor in politics, as well as the role of various other actors involved in security policy in various political settings.

The assessment of theories on civil-military relations also allows for a number of important observations. The historical, institutional and cultural bias inherent in almost all theories questions their applicability on Third World countries. The typical historical and cultural situations of Europe and the United States are not likely to be found elsewhere. Hence, it is unlikely that the concepts can be superimposed elsewhere or expected to work likewise. Consequently, recent theories stress the need to take local conditions into account. This seems to be especially important for newly democratising countries where civilian institutions are still too weak to control the armed forces, and the search for both an effective government and military is still ongoing.

A second observation is that analyses indicate that civil-military relations cannot be treated in isolation. Civil-military relations are part of a larger complex of developments, especially in the field of governance. Hence, civilian control over the military is key to the process of democratic consolidation because an unprofessional and poorly regulated military is more likely to undermine than to improve security and stability. This also has implications on the political level. When the military is not accountable to civilian oversight and justice, democracy is inherently limited, and the security and legitimacy of civilian democratic authority may be undermined. Hence, civil-military relations are in fact about governance. It will be not easy for external actors to influence these internal conditions. Not just because it is always difficult for external actors to influence, transform or (re)build institutions. It is also hard because these institutions and their complex interrelations with society are still poorly understood. This seems to apply especially to some African countries. The challenge, therefore, lies in formulating appropriate measures based on improved understanding.

In this regard, a third observation was made concerning the Third World security predicament. The security problematic of most developing countries mainly has, but not only, intrastate origins. Mention was made especially of violent identity conflicts, the spread of small arms, 'warlordism', and the issue of the political economy of war. All of these factors add to the complexity of the agenda of civil-military relations and security-sector reform. They indicate that civil-military relations do not stand by themselves. Instead, they are linked to the larger issue of internal and external security, thereby involving a range of actors: government, military, paramilitary, civil police forces and private security companies.

These issues apply especially to the problems of several African countries. In cases where states are on the verge of collapse, civil-military relations can only be treated as part of a larger process of (re)building the state. Where states are involved in transition processes toward democracy, attention

will have to focus on the intricate relationship between democratisation, security, development, and the ongoing process of state building. This implies a comprehensive approach. Ultimately, the solution for these problems can only come from within, through the creation by domestic actors of some framework of development and co-operation.

Yet, these states are also largely dependent on development aid. Therefore, this comprehensive approach will also have to be acknowledged, encouraged and supported by the international community. Ways have to be found for the international community to contribute to these processes in order to make progress sustainable. It is not clear whether donors are currently doing this in a satisfactory way. This presentation will not deal with this issue in more detail, but it is already clear that simply focusing on the scaling down of forces and military expenditures is not adequate. It is imperative for external actors to develop mechanisms to better assess security needs of the countries involved and to prevent one-sided approaches that exclude local actors, including the civilian authorities. It is also clear that special attention will have to be paid to the military's mission. Given the problems that some of these countries have to face, it is obvious that a certain amount of coercive force is required to guarantee security and stability. In addition, it will be important to develop a clear mission for the security forces. In this regard, it is important to include the roles, functions and perceptions of key players, the definition of national security, as well as the nature of defence planning and management.

The aim of the workshop was to identify options for dealing with civil-military relations as part of the discussion on democratisation or the discussion on security-sector reform. In order to focus the discussions, a number of questions was prepared and handed out (see Topics for Discussion).

## Discussion

### *Western Models*

It was mentioned (**Mares**) that all models on civil-military relations are local. Hence, we must realise that Western models of civil control over the military are very specific to the history of Europe and the United States military. These local, Western models cannot simply be transferred to other parts in the world. More attention should be paid to what local conditions lead to which different forms of civil military relations. In this regard, it was commented that particularly in Africa, Western models are difficult to apply. Most states here are weak, and it can be doubted if there is a real governmental control over the military. Yet, even given the fact that African states are weak, the question of what the function and role of the military within these weak African states should be remains of importance. In the end, all states seem to aim for the 'universal modern, constitutional state'. Hence, there is a need for benchmarks that are applicable to local conditions (**Aning**).

Other participants had the opinion that although civil military relations in the African context differed substantially from those in the Western context both African and Western states have the desire for civilian control over the security and the defence forces. This should be the focus. The question then is how to adapt to local conditions (**Ball**).

### *Actors in civil military relations*

With regard to civilian control over the military it was mentioned that we deal with three major actors, namely society, the military, the government.. Hence regarding the control of the state over the military, it should be noted (**Mares**) that civilian control over the armed forces does not necessarily imply governmental control. Certain Latin American cases have shown that the population wanted the

military to have some kind of autonomy. In some cases, the population even wanted to be able to ask the military to get rid of a civilian government. Despite very little governmental control over the military, these situations were characterised by stability. It was also mentioned that governmental control over the military sometimes is relatively meaningless. Especially when the military are part of the government or even control government. There are also cases where a government needs the military in order to stay in power. Thus, one can distinguish four models or ideal types of civil-military relations:

- military control over the government
- governmental control over the military
- a pact between military and government (they co-operate under certain terms)
- the military and the government have parallel spheres of influence and do not interfere with each other

This indicates that local conditions are important to take into account, as they allow for different relationships. The question then is what kind of conditions will allow for stability and democratic politics? (**Mares**)

## **Donor Policies on Security Sector Reform: Some Notes for Discussion by Mr Tsjoard Bouta**

In his presentation, Mr Bouta did not deal with the policies on security sector reform of individual donor countries. The presentation focused on general observations based on an assessment of various donor activities. He neither included the actual implementation of the policies of Western countries and institutions with regard to security sector reform in developing countries. Moreover, his research only paid little attention to a theoretical perspective on security sector reform. Lastly, there was no research on the developing countries' own initiatives and policies regarding security sector reform. During the presentation, Mr Bouta raised five topics for discussion:

### 1. Defining security sector reform

Based on his assessment of donor policies, Mr Bouta concluded that these policies lack clear definitions and conceptualizations. The range of activities included in security sector reform activities is now too broad to be practical. He pleaded for a practical and well-defined approach that enables better structuring and coordination of activities in this field.

### 2. Aims, criteria for involvement and entry and exit strategies

Due to the lack of clear definitions it is also not clear what specific aims the donors have in mind regarding security sector reform. This not only applies to aims, but also to entry strategies. Is a 'too high' military spending in a certain developing country a reason for specific conditionalities? Is it the number of crimes committed by the police? Or, is it the poor quality of civilian control over the military budget that makes the donor decide to act upon security sector reform? Most donors have not made this explicit. Hence, donors should develop practical criteria for involvement.

Related to this is the issue of an exit strategy. Mr Bouta indicated that security sector reform requires a long-term commitment from donors. Most interventions concern a type of first structuring instead of a more fundamental reform of the security sector. Present-day interventions, hence, seem more or less focused on short-term crisis management. Yet, long-term interventions require clear aims and exit strategies. Donors, therefore, should develop both entry and exit strategies for security sector reform.

### 3. Limiting the security sector reform efforts per donor

The assessment indicated that donors are currently developing policies that include as many security sector reform elements as possible. This raises questions as regards their realism and practical implementation. Programs should become more manageable. The question then is how to limit the number of security sector reform elements without ignoring the fact that a coherent, integrated donor policy is required. One suggestion for setting priorities in aims and correlated instruments for security sector reform is a division between more classical and more innovative elements of security sector reform. More classical approaches refer to, for example, the non-proliferation of small arms and the reintegration and demobilisation programs. More innovative ways comprise for example police training and civilian control over the military (budget). In making a selection, policy makers have to ask which instruments are most suited for a specific situation, or whether a certain order of importance and implementation is required.

Another option is for development actors to select those instruments that fit best within their own overall approach. This would imply sort of a specialisation per donor.

#### 4. Lessons learned and best practices regarding security sector reform

The most practical way to improve donor-efforts in the field of security sector reform is to make an inventory of the lessons learned by various donors. Important questions in this regard are how to select the countries and partners within these countries? What short, medium and longer-term activities should donors support? How to identify local needs, set priorities and develop programmes regarding security sector reform? In this regard, donor countries still lack practical analytical tools.

#### 5. Division of labour

Related to limiting the efforts per donor is the issue of division of labour. In this regard, the following actors are of importance: local actors (national governments, as well as NGOs), donors and international institutions. So far, only Germany and the United Kingdom have attempted to come up with some sort of division of labour. Germany recently announced the establishment of an Inter-Ministerial Working Group on security sector reform. The United Kingdom also has an Interdepartmental Group on security sector reform that defines the issues at stake and strategies needed in and for certain countries. However, most other donors still lack such an approach.

### **Discussion**

#### *Division of Labour*

Regarding the division of labour in security sector reform, it was mentioned that beside the question of how to bring security, it is important to consider who is willing and able to tackle the issue of security (**Ball**). From the perspective of the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs it was stated that the Netherlands still is in a preliminary stage regarding security sector reform. Currently the division of good governance (DMV) together with the division for security issues (DVB) is in the process of developing a policy framework that meets the needs and requirements of Third-World countries, and also of OSCE countries. The next step will be to figure out the Netherlands' comparative advantage in this field and to actively consult other players in this area, such as the Ministry of Defence (**Poldermans**).

#### *Side-effects of Demilitarisation*

It was commented that donors often stipulate recipient countries to quickly demilitarise. Demilitarisation, however, should go hand in hand with creating an effective police force, as well as with setting up well-functioning judicial and penal systems. This is a slow and costly process. Instead of setting 'conditionalities' regarding demilitarisation beforehand donors should consider to financially assist the reorganisation of the security sector when a country starts the process of demilitarisation (**Mares**). Most donors currently seem to prefer a long-term critical involvement in a country's security sector above implementing 'conditionalities' to force countries to restructure their security forces (**Bouta**).

Secondly, demilitarisation in a context of high crime rates often leads to the rise in private security companies, which cause serious damage to the democratisation process. Private security companies delegitimise a democratic government, because security is only available for the rich and not the population as a whole (**Mares**).

#### *Changing and widening the approach on security sector reform*

As regards security sector reform, it was stated that the donor policies on security sector reform are not the right starting point for analysis. Firstly, it was suggested to take two steps back and to analyse the

impact of Western foreign policies and particularly military assistance programmes on security sector reform. Secondly, there are much more external effects, not explicitly labelled as security sector reform instruments, which shape the security sector in developing countries as well and indirectly contribute to the civilian control over the military. For example downsizing the state apparatus through Structural Adjustment Programmes affects states and their options to monitor and control the security sector, as well as options for providing security. Such effects require more attention (**Kingma**).

Another comment concerned the fact that certain donors have built their security sector reform policies on experiences gained in the Balkan. It can be questioned to what extent these understandings have a universal value. A last suggestion was to include into the research the effects of international regimes and security institutions (NATO, OSCE) on the security sector. Both these organisations have also gained valuable experience and developed practical policies regarding civil military relations and security sector reform in different parts of the world (**Schneckener**).



### **Presentation of Research Findings on Sri Lanka by Mr K. de Silva**

In his talk on political military relations in Sri Lanka, Professor K.M. de Silva of the International Centre for Ethnic Studies, Kandy, made the point that as a former British colony, the island inherited a more civilian - oriented administration than the countries that formed part of the British *raj* in South Asia, India, Pakistan and later Bangladesh. In contrast to all of them Sri Lanka has traditionally taken pride in its social welfare system developed since the 1930's.

Beginning with the army, the two other military services were formally established in 1949, more than a year after independence. For many years thereafter the services, and the army in particular, were drawn out on ceremonial occasions. They did not have much else to do. The officer corps in all three services were dominated by Sinhalese Christians and Tamils. Within 10 years of their foundation Sri Lanka's armed services confronted some troubling problems, reflecting the issues and tensions that were disturbing the larger Sri Lankan society: namely these relating to the prominent position of religious and ethnic minorities in the officer corps. In addition, the armed services were wary of being used during civil disturbances in support of the police, especially during the ethnic disturbances that erupted in the mid and late 1950's.

In the early 1960's the hitherto untroubled relationship of the subordination of the armed services to the civilians authority came under great strain, when the then Prime Minister, Mrs Sirimavo Bandaranaike, initiated a policy of changing the ethnic and religious composition of the officer corps and the police leadership. These changes were accelerated after an abortive coup d'etat in 1962.

Professor de Silva referred to one of the paradoxes of civil-military relations in Sri Lanka, that two abortive coup attempts came in 1962 and 1966, at a time when there were no significant episodes of civil commotion, and when the armed services and police were so much fewer in numbers than they became in the 1980's and 1990's. The tradition of subordination of the military to civilian authority has prevailed in the much more turbulent 1980's and 1990's when the Sri Lankan state faced a severe threat from the principal Tamil separatist group, the Liberation Tigers of Eelam (LTTE), and the Marxist-nationalist Sinhalese group, the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP). Since the 1960's there has been no attempt by the military to play a role in Sri Lankan politics, much less to subordinate the civil power to the military.

Nor has the regular use of the armed services to quell disturbances led to any relaxation of civilian control over them by the country's political leadership through well-established administrative mechanisms. After 1984-85 when the numbers in the armed services began to increase rapidly, a new military institutional structure was introduced -- the Joint Operations Command -- which apart from providing co-ordination of campaigns against the Tamil separatists also helped to bolster civilian authority.

Moreover, despite the rapid increase in the numbers in the defence services, since the mid - 1980's, and the constant use of the armed forces against Tamil separatists guerrillas, and against the JVP (from 1987 to 1990) Sri Lanka has been spared any significant militarisation of its politics. However, in the late 1990's, senior politicians have begun the practice of using their personal security troops, in their political activities. Should this continue it would pose a threat to the country's democratic system.

He also made two other points. (I) The Sri Lankan army now has over 140,000 men and women, and there is constant pressure to increase their numbers. There is one startling conclusion from these figures. Sri Lanka has more servicemen, per million of the population, than either India, Pakistan or Bangladesh. While there has been no threat to the civilian control over the security services, the

political leadership could not easily ignore the concerns of these services on matters of public importance, with an army of this size. (ii) The Sri Lankan armed services and the police are overwhelmingly Sinhalese and Buddhist -- 95% to 98%. Minority representation is minuscule. The pendulum that had swung against the Sinhalese Buddhists, especially in the officer corps of the armed services, in the early days of independence, has swung so far in the opposite direction that even a modest shift towards the minorities would be good for the country.

## **Discussion**

### *Third World Armies and Peacekeeping*

It was commented that the engagement of Third World military in peacekeeping operations in other parts of the world, can have positive as well as negative effects. It was asserted that in the case of Fiji, the external engagement of the military actually led to the recent coup in that country. And there are more examples to mention (**Doornbos**). Hence, the circumstances in which peacekeepers have been involved during their missions and the experiences made, may encourage them to stay out of politics, as well as to make an attempt to do better in their own country. This makes peacekeeping for Third World armies an important area for further research (**Mares**)

### *Civilian Perception on the Army*

One participant posed the question how the army in Sri Lanka is seen through the eyes of the civilians and how the general attitude in the country is towards army deserters (**Ayissi**). The answer was that the army is very popular, but the police are not. This has to do with the fact that the army does not have to confront with the civilians directly, whereas the police does. Moreover, the army is regarded as a generous employer. The army employs large numbers of people, which is considered positive in a situation of high unemployment. The role of the army as employer becomes even more important in view of the fact that soldiers are not recruited because of specific capacities or qualities. In addition, the army is rather generous in the payments it makes. Once retired, soldiers get a pension. This also applies to the families of soldiers that were killed in action. Families get a pension for the rest of the soldier's presumed life. This system started in the 1980s in an attempt to recruit large numbers of military. Although the system no longer is needed, it still operates. New problems are, however, expected to arise in the case of demobilisation. This will create enormous pressure on the economy. This issue, however, has not yet attracted the attention of the policymakers.

### **Presentation of Research Findings on Ghana by Mr G. Mills**

From independence in 1957 until the second coup of Rawlings in 1981, eight governments—of which five military and three civilian—succeeded in Ghana. Five were overthrown by violence and not by civilian elections. Rawlings' coups, though, were different from previous coups. It was an authoritarian, populist action rather than a military action, albeit one that was executed with military means. Rawlings brought Ghana economic recovery and political stability through a pragmatic, economic policy coupled with external and domestic developments. The recent regime change, which brought the opposition to power by means of democratic elections, is a critical step forward in the democratisation process initiated by Rawlings.

Hence, Ghana under Rawlings moved from dictatorship and a situation in which the military was above scrutiny, to a system where the military is increasingly if not totally being held accountable by both international and domestic constituencies. Eight factors made this transition possible:

1. Rawlings' government was not a democratic one, neither was it a classical 'junta' government as is known from Latin America. It was not a government by the soldiers and for the soldiers.
2. Regimes are most likely to be responsive to pressure in those areas where they are most vulnerable. In the Ghanaian case this was the need to have access to international flows of capital through the IMF and the World Bank as a means of restructuring the vulnerable economy.
3. The transition away from military rule is more likely to be successful if undertaken and even sponsored by the military, and as long as it guarantees the influence and security of key figures within the regime. This was also the case in Ghana.
4. It is important to provide the military with resources and prestige without the military occupying the highest posts in the country. In Ghana's case international peacekeeping fulfilled part of this function.
5. The implementation of civilian control of the military remains a very critical point for long-term stability, particularly the oversight of military acquisition and budgets. This is not yet fully developed in the sense that there is not yet parliamentary oversight, nor is civil society actively involved in debating military issues. Moreover, the military is very sceptical towards those who want to analyse the military budgets.
6. External military actors (a. o. the British Military and Advisory Training Team (BMATT)) can be of great help to the Ghanaian military by assisting in institution building, demobilisation and reintegration of the military and strengthening the role of civil society in military issues.
7. Police forces in Ghana are widely seen as weak and ineffective. Policing remains a matter of state control and oppression rather than of safety of the community. To deal with public order issues is both a measure of the desire to retain political control and the low level of police maturity. Police forces are not undergoing a structural reform, nor is there evidence that external assistance is focusing on this area. There are at least an extra 16,000 police men needed in order to fulfil the job properly.
8. The military is back in the barracks and this will likely to remain so as long as the internal security is guaranteed. In this regard, the regional and domestic environment poses an ongoing challenge on the stability of Ghana, but this will probably not result in an increased role of the military.

Regarding Ghana's future, in particular the development of its civil-military relations, three scenarios might emerge, ranging from the most to the least likely:

- Smooth political transfer of power to the NPP with continuing economic challenges, as well as an ongoing deterioration of the regional security environment;
- Swift economic recovery under the NPP and enhancement of Ghana's regional position through strong co-operation with Nigeria, ECOWAS and ECOMOG;
- Continuing economic and political instability, in which the military finally intervene to re-establish law and order.

Mr Mills furthermore mentioned six options for future research in Ghana;

1. Potential for reforms; continued reforms in the Ghanaian military, in particular of the presidential guards, the so-called 64 battalion, and the role of external agencies, state agencies (including NGO's) and specifically external consultants;
2. Assessment of the role of Ghanaian military in peacekeeping and post-conflict rehabilitation in West Africa and other regions, as well as the nature of deployment patterns;
3. Assessment of what type of issues and assistance can provide a stimulus to greater civil military interaction as an element of establishing greater control of the civilians over the military;
4. Assessment of the need, as well as the requirements for police reform, with a special focus on the size of corruption among the police and armed forces;
5. Assessment of the role of external agencies (ACRI (African Crisis Response Initiative by the USA and the EU), the French, the Canadians and pre-1990 assistance) in the military transition in Ghana. Mainly focusing on the three E's, the impact of these agencies of the *ethos, equipment and expertise* of the military;
6. Role of women in security sector reform in Africa, which is a barely discussed topic.

## Discussion

### *Civil military Relations*

The South African experience regarding civil society and the interactions with several security forces might be useful for the Ghanaians as well (**Ball**). There has been some sharing of notes between various security actors of both countries. However, the most critical contribution to civil military relations must come from external actors helping to further establish control over the military. The parliamentary oversight committees often do not have the resources, as these are channelled through the government to get to parliament. Maybe it is better to attach those resources to civil society institutions directly to empower parliament (**Mills**). The Ghanaian parliament, and government as well, is often unaware of the regulations regarding security issues, for example rules towards the establishment of private security companies. So there still needs a lot to be done to have governmental and parliamentary control of security (**Ayissi**).

### *International Peacekeeping Operations*

Beside the military, also Ghanaian police has been actively in international peacekeeping operations (a.o. Cambodia) (**Henry**). It can be questioned what the impact has been on them, since they are still widely regarded as ineffective and corrupt<sup>1</sup> (**Mills**).

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<sup>1</sup> In contrast though to the police, the Ghanaian courts and judges are regarded with a degree of trust as people that contribute a considerable amount of value to the state (**Mills**).

Regarding the sources of income derived from international missions, one participant remarked that monetary resources for the military are not enough. For example, the Pakistan military joined international peacekeeping missions, but it could not prevent Pakistan from a coup. In addition, it was remarked that there were no specific sanctions as regards Pakistan's role in peacekeeping missions (**Mares**). Nevertheless it is evidently in the mind of Ghanaian soldiers that their external sources may be off if there was to be a coup (**Mills**).

#### *Private Security*

In Ghana it is taken for granted that the police is ineffective and corrupt and therefore those who have the money hire in private security companies. These companies themselves must be downsized as well. In Ghana they often consist of petty crooks that are neither armed nor trained. Therefore there is a need for a much more sophisticated way of thinking on private security, also in Ghana (**Aning**).

### **Presentation of Research Findings on Nicaragua by Mr R. Peirera**

The Sandinista National Liberation Front was not simply a traditional political party, but also a political military vanguard. The head of the Front aimed at a total modification of society as well as a new correlation of the forces within Central America. Moreover, the Sandinista people's army cannot be seen as an army at the service of a party, but the instrument par excellence of a global project. This vision still remains in the heads of many of the high-ranking officials in the Nicaraguan national army. It is important that we value these ethical and moral principles for the army's future dis-involvement.

After more than 10 years of war the Nicaraguan society is still highly militarised, and this implies that there is not a mature path yet that has been found for resolving conflicts within the civilian domain. This means that the use of force continues to be a problem for all sectors, but in particular for the military class. Though violence and threats of violence are still just perceived as delinquencies, the actual condition of the state indicates that political violence is quite possible in the future.

Given this situation, the state has gone into a love-hate relationship with the army. On the one hand, it intends to weaken the role of the armed forces, but at the same time it is pressurising the armed forces to serving the apparatus for internal oppression and security. The bourgeois itself also pressurises the army to take on functions related to internal order. The army knows that is it considered as an unpleasant and necessary partner, and therefore takes advantage of the situation in contrasting ways. On the one hand, it remains at a distance from the public policy scene, while on the other hand it promotes a subterranean policy that influences various ambits of national life. This latter is because the army sees itself as a social actor with the tasks to keep up the values related to justice and social balance. The army does not consider it in its best interest that the social activities deteriorate and go beyond its span of control and thereby having the army forced by the government to act against the popular sector.

Given the strong financial restrictions on the government, which has prevented allocating sufficient resources to the army, the military has begun to directly intervene into the business sector in order to generate an independent source of income. This does not bother the society that still thinks the army is needed and only questions its probable relation with the Sandinista party. It is apparently not realistic to propose a policy aimed at the abolition of the army nor is it realistic to see the national budget as the only source of resources for the military, because of the government's own weakness. So, it is important to insist on transparency and respect for the rules of the market as long as the military continues to act in the business sector

To conclude, policy related to civil military relations in Nicaragua should include the following points:

- Pressure to improve the civil service law that gives stability to the bureaucracy and allow them to attain a minimum degree of specialisation in military topics;
- Strengthen research and public debate through specialised centres and universities;
- Promote a training plan not only for public officials, but also for NGO's that work in this field and also in the field of human rights

Practice proves that the national army's level of development is not equalled by a similar institutional development of the Nicaraguan State, which though is need to establish a democratic control over the armed forces.

## Discussion

### *The role of the international community*

The question was posed whether there is a role of the international community in trying to mould the new relationship between the government and the military (**Mares**). The influence of the international community actually started during the peace process, which was practically forced on Nicaragua by the other Central American countries, but particularly by the United States. After the peace accords there was pressure for demobilisation from the same international actors, but also from within society itself, because the excessive size of the Nicaraguan military absorbed a large part of the national resources. In a country of 4 million people the military comprised 90,000, and they used around 35% of the national budget. In the end, the number of military dropped to 14,000—amounting to a drop of 82%—and about 8% of the national budget, thus making the demilitarisation process in Nicaragua relatively speaking one of the largest in history. The IMF and the World Bank encouraged Nicaragua to re-orientate the budget through readjustment and structural adjustment policies. At the same time they pressured Nicaragua to adopt the so-called poverty reduction strategies. This made Nicaragua in the perception of donors a so-called highly indebted country. Consequently donors qualified Nicaragua for their debt ‘forgiveness’ programmes.

### *Elements of Somoza and Sandinista forces*

It was asked whether there were still elements of Somozan forces retained in the New Nicaraguan army, and how this process of absorption was carried out (**Mills**). The answer was that when there was a change from Somoza to Sandinista, there were no inclusions of the former military. Most of them fled the country; thus complete disbanding the former guards. The Somoza national guards were totally different from the Sandinistas. It was a small army, basically more a paramilitary force than a military, which mixed police and military functions. It was no threat to the system, because on average its size on average was around 7,000 soldiers.

In contrast, the Sandinistas permeated the entire society. This was partly because of its origins as a revolutionary force, so once it attained power there was this geopolitical threat within the context of the Cold war. The Sandinistas position was with the Soviet Block against the powers from the United States. This perceived threat of security led to an enormous growth in the Sandinista’s army, which also grew because military service became obligatory.

When the peace accords were signed, the Somozistas did not come back. They were gone to the United States and other parts of the world, totally dis-articulated from Nicaragua. Neither did the contras join the new army. The contras hardly formed a unity, they were just bands and they were regarded as dangerous for the Sandinista military. Some contras though were incorporated within the police force, but not in the military.

### *Abolition of armies*

Only a very few countries totally abolished their armies (**Doornbos**). Beside less known examples of Haiti and Panama, Costa Rica abolished its army. However there were only 700 soldiers present in Costa Rica at the time of abolition so this was not a very big deal. The effects of the clear peace dividend nevertheless are clear. The country knows a very high rate of literacy and also economically it is doing very well. The fact that Nicaragua and neighbouring countries are not (yet) ready to have no army is that the population in Central America still want have military forces in order to keep the social order and to oppress criminality. Would the circumstances for abolition become more

favourable, then this has to be tackled regionally to help balancing out the perceived fears and threats **(Oliver)**.

*Power sharing arrangements*

Regarding pacts and power sharing arrangement as a method for civilian control over the military, there was some sort of a pact after the loss in power of the Sandinistas **(Ball)**. How to perceive this? According to the speaker pacts are very interesting as transitory agreements. The main issue after the Sandinistas lost power was 'governance'. The specific pact that in Nicaragua was agreed on came in a time when the chances for governance were very low and the counterrevolutionary forces very dispersed and disorganised, whereas the Sandinistas were not. Therefore it was very right not to suggest immediate and total control, but rather this progressive submission off the forces. It also was a good idea no to just have civilian control, but also control by the military and the government. The military thus were involved as well, because rather than talking about abolition of the military, there was a need for an institution to counterbalance the culture of violence at the time **(Peirera)**.



## General Suggestions by the Participants

The next part of the seminar gave the floor to the participants to present their views on pertinent issues that need to be addressed in studying the civil military relations and security sector reform.

### *Transition from Single Party Army to National Army*

One remark was made on the case of Nicaragua regarding the transition from a single-party, and partisan army, to a non-partisan, nationalist army. It would be nice to analyse what factors made up for this transition process. Once it is known what the criteria for this successful transition in Nicaragua were, then it might be possible to come to a more general list of conditions that seem to be more relevant than other conditions for establishing a national army out of partisan forces. These lessons learned possibly can be applied to transformation processes in other countries as well. Moreover, the presence of a national army is an absolute precondition for realising civilian control over the armed forces at all. Without a national army, this discussion is useless (**Schneckener**).

Regarding the South African experience with the transition from a single party army to a national army, indeed some general factors can be discerned, including the principle of political inclusivity, of force inclusivity and of personnel inclusivity. In the South African experience all personnel of the armed forces were gathered and then demobilised and re-trained. This did not fully work out according to plan, because not yet enough soldiers were demobilised, and people have not been sufficiently re-trained.

Very important in this transition process was the role of external agencies as neutral arbiters. For instance, the BMATT provided a critical buffer and arbitrating force in Namibia, Zimbabwe and South Africa during the transition of the army that served only one political single party to an army that served the national interests. Hence, it is important to analyse the work of external agencies, particularly BMATT. This must be done both in terms of the absorption or reconfiguration experience on the one hand and in terms of the ongoing training role that BMATT plays throughout Africa on the other (**Mills**).

An interesting country in the sense of the above mentioned transition is Liberia that has emerged from a war in which the national army itself was destroyed and split up into four competing faction groups. Currently, the Liberian President Taylor has to reintegrate portions of these four groups into a coherent national army (**Aning**). Moreover, Uganda and Mozambique are very interesting examples. For the wrong reasons the case of Angola is interesting, in which all the elements described above are absent.

### *Security Sector Reform: Local Ownership and Definitions*

It was commented that there is a fundamental difference between security sector reform and security sector transformation. Reform is aiming to make something better by removing problems. Transformation, though, is fundamentally changing something.

Security sector reform efforts need to fulfil some fundamental requirements. At first, this includes the commitment of local leadership to undertake a reform. Local leadership must drive the reform process. Secondly, reform must be based on the legal, institutional frame of a country, and on its context-specific, historical experiences. This thus implies that the local needs and objectives need to be taken into account (**Ball**). However, the locals cannot always make clear what they want, so to take their objectives into account might sometimes be a little problematic (**Mills**).

While discussing some topics and questions raised by the Conflict Research Unit (see annexe), the definition of Hendrickson<sup>2</sup> was considered a first, good attempt. However, it was noted that it still lacks a number of important issues. First, it does not include the intelligence services. This was considered very important. Moreover, the use of the term non-governmental organisation should be broader, namely civil and political society. Related to this, it is interesting to make a distinction between *the security sector* versus *the security family* (as used by Rocky Williams). The latter includes all kind of awkward groups, such as informal armed groups and private security companies, which are part of the security landscape, but which are not part of the security sector (**Ball**).

In addition, there is the question how the various security actors relate. This was seen as a matter of discussion for the executive branch. Ideally, it should first be considered what the role of each actor finally should be, before any security sector reform programme can start.

Regarding the usefulness of the concepts ‘professionalism’ and ‘national security’ in the setting of developing countries, it was commented that what counts are not the concepts as such, but the principles underlying professionalism and national security. One should aim at identifying what the principles are and the ways of influencing those principles or getting to these principles.

To guarantee civilian leadership, as well as accountability and compliance of the military, it is important to develop capable civil authorities and civil society. Particular reference was made to the role of the executive branch. This branch includes oversight and monitoring organisations, such as the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Finance that up until now do not get much attention. However, it is really critical to train people who are not defence or security specialists in order to help developing the functioning of these Ministries in their control over the military.

Finally, with regard to the role of external actors it was mentioned that the so-called ‘conditionalities’ external actors impose on countries to encourage security-sector reform, are not always effective. This often results from insufficient insight in the way in which the security forces operate. Instead of simply imposing ‘conditionalities’, external actors should identify which actors are potential allies, and build on these insights. It should, however, be recognized that in some cases this implies working in difficult situations (**Ball**).

### *Discerning the Military and the Civilians*

It was reiterated that it is not always clear what civil-military relations refers to. In reality, civilians and military are often intermingled. Hence, before one can start talking about civil military relations, it has to be defined what is civilian and what is military. Civil-military relations, consequently, is not just a matter of changing the relationship between the two, but to define what the two entities are, and even asking whether they can be defined in a meaningful way at all. For instance, when talking about pacts between the civilians and the military, it can also happen that pacts have to be made among civilians or among the military. To take the example of the Democratic Republic of Congo, what in that situation is the state? Who is part of the civilian government? And, who is in this military that eventually has to be reformed? (**Ottaway**)

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<sup>2</sup> In his definition the security sector comprises: “...those bodies that are responsible for, or should be responsible for, protecting the state and the communities within it. This would include three pillars: (a) Groups with a mandate to wield instruments of violence – military, paramilitary and police forces; (b) Institutions with a role in managing and monitoring the security sector – civilian ministries, parliaments and non-governmental organizations; and (c) Bodies responsible for guaranteeing the rule of law – the judiciary, the penal system, human-rights ombudsmen and, where these bodies are particularly weak, the international community.”

Cambodia has the same problem. The country is a one-party state, in which the same people play the military and the civilian roles. The Prime Minister is also the head of the armed forces and right down to village level, the security apparatus is in fact the party apparatus as well. In theory the military and the civilians seem to have clearly separated and defined roles, but the situation on the ground is entirely different (**Henry**)

#### *Donor Policies: Harmonisation and Limitations*

The so-called country lists that certain donors use are not always congruent with countries that in reality are ripe for security sector reform. So it happens that countries that are ripe for security sector reform are not on the foreign policy agenda. The other way around is also true in that not every country involved in security sector reform is actually ready for this. Hence, in some countries, security sector reform can be desirable but not crucial; can be crucial but not feasible; or can be feasible, but neither crucial nor desirable. Hence it is important to balance between what is desirable, what is crucial and what is operationally achievable (**Ayissi**).

Regarding what security sector is desirable, the example of Somalia was mentioned. After the state-collapse and the failed external interventions, Somalia was without a state and without 'official' security forces. People started to take care of security issues in their own manner. So the very basic question came up where do we exactly need a security sector for in such as situation? This question has a more general value with regard to (re)structuring the security sector, what is its use, and what then are the actual needs it should meet (**Doornbos**).

As regards the relationship of security sector reform with development co-operation, it was mentioned that now that *security* has become an issue for those involved in development co-operation, it seems that all focus on security sector *reform*. It can be strongly questioned though whether this is correct. There are quite a number of issues in which development co-operation can be involved in strengthening the security sector *indirectly*. One example is the role of governance programmes in general that aim at improving the capacity of the state. Another example is the strengthening of civil society, for example through opening up the debate on changes in the security sector and aiming for broader participation. Yet, donors have to be modest about the potential positive impact of their programmes. The negative side effects of donor interventions, which are a core-element of Mary Anderson's so-called 'Do no Harm' approach, must be taken into account as well (**Kingma**). In contrast, it was remarked that unless it is specifically mentioned in the policy to go after a certain sector, one would not go after it. The World Bank and other donors have spent years on public expenditure reviews, but have come no way near the defence sector. Hence, donors cannot be too indirect, because they will miss some important aspects of structuring the security sector (**Ball**).

As regards Dutch development co-operation, the approach is to develop policy in a dialogue with the recipient countries. The Netherlands finds it important that the recipient countries have a sense of ownership. In a number of countries that have qualified for a structural, bilateral relationship, the Netherlands is working in a number of sectors that have been selected in close co-operation with the government and the civil society of those particular countries. As regards the appeal of security sector reform for the Division of Good Governance and Peace-building, it was mentioned that this is exactly the point where security sector reform and governance issues meet. The comparative advantage of this Division, hence, is not so much in the military aspects, but on the crossing point where government and civil society jointly can exercise control over the military. (**Poldermans**)

### *Research Methodology*

It was asserted that there is a need to do comparative studies in order to improve understanding of civil-military relations, and especially pacts between civilians and the military. For instance, regarding these pacts, knowing of their existence is not enough. One has to know more about the details of each pact in order to compare them. This analytically requires that the comparisons are carried out in a structured manner, which means asking very detailed questions on the same issues and processes.

**(Mares)**

Another participant stressed the need to narrow down the approach for the case studies. Follow-up research should better specify the focus. At the same time, it was recommended to analyse the police sector and the rule of law issue next to core military aspects. **(Schneckener)**

A last comment concerned the questions that are posed in the “topics for discussion list.” **(Mares)** These should be put in a larger analytical framework, particularly pointing out the role of external actors. Such a framework could have the following outline:

Civilian military relations or security sector reform is a three-actor game:

1. Those who would govern (those who make the decisions);
2. Those who have military power (formal or informal group); and,
3. The people in whose name the government functions (the electorate or the ‘selectorate’).

It firstly is assumed that these actors are rational calculators. Secondly, these actors seek more resources for themselves than they independently can provide. And, thirdly, the three actors also seek autonomy over how to utilise those resources. Thus, they want resources and they want autonomy.

The implications of these assumptions are that the actors end up interacting in a strategic environment, and that they should make trade-offs with each other over the amount of resources they want to get and the degree of autonomy they want to maintain. This question can be further developed in a model with the co-ordinates of autonomy and resources.

In analysing this situation, firstly, the ideal points of each of these actors have to be identified. This indicates the kind of trade-off between resources and autonomy they want to make. The range that is acceptable to each of these actors can be mapped out along the co-ordinates. The policy space within each agreement between these three actors is ultimately what we are talking about in civil-military relations. The range or the degree in which they co-operate will be defined by the overlap of their preferences.

Analytical questions that come in are: Is it possible to broaden the overlap of preferences in order to increase the range of co-operation? How is this possible and towards what ends? Is there a role for external actors in this contextual situation? Do external actors want a minimum of stability or do they want to put the country on a path towards a Western model of civil-military relations?

Other important questions are: What are the costs to change these preferences of actors in this context? Are these acceptable for the donors? The overlapping preferences simply identify the possible solutions. Then it becomes important to identify for each actor what incentives and disincentives that donors have in mind to move them along their preference curve. Often donors use tools that do not provide the right incentives for the local actors.

The last phase concerns the negotiation dynamics. Can external actors influence the internal dynamics of negotiation? What is the preferred point of agreement within the accepted policy space? Why is that? Donors may not only want to move the military through incentives and disincentives, but also the government or the people. This entire model provides a approach for linking the ‘topics for discussion’ as presented in the list, i.e. how it can be avoided that they become de-linked from each other. **(Mares)**

## Final Discussion

In this final session, the participants were invited to give their comments with regard to the seminar's topic and a future research agenda.

### *Country Lists*

A first comment came from the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The objectives for future research, it was mentioned, relate to concrete policy recommendations in the field of civilian control of the armed forces with a link to the judicial and penal systems. The emphasis is not on core military issues (**Poldermans**). As regards the methodology and the countries to be investigated, it was mentioned that it might be useful to focus research on those countries that qualify for assistance in the field of good governance and peace building. However, it was also mentioned that it is possible to draw lessons from research done in other countries. In this regard, Ghana—not on the list for good governance or peace building—could still be investigated for lessons learned. (**Poldermans**).

### *What works under which conditions? Who is doing what?*

As regards policy relevant research, it was commented that there are two ways in which Clingendael can contribute to the Ministry's interests. One is to have a systematic analysis of what works under which conditions. However, in order to try and figure out what works, a systematic approach is required that takes information and analysis one step further than the information that can be acquired from NGO's. Secondly, the policy relevant research aims to examine the local conditions. People on the ground not necessarily have an idea of what the local conditions are. From a general analysis one may come up with 10 conditions, of which the local actors know four. Cases studies, hence, can provide information on what is actually happening on the ground with regard to the relevant factors that the general analysis suggests are important. Such analysis would prepare the Ministry to go forward with the kind of things that might work under certain conditions.

There was also a suggestion with regard to the link with governance. USAID, for example, is promoting good governance in Latin America. In doing so, they found that it is important to talk to the military and their academies in order to learn about their perspective on democracy. It is too easily assumed that everybody is in favour of democracy. In practice, everybody has idealised yet differing views of what democracy means. Thus part of USAID's training is to get a better appreciation of these perceptions as well as the range of institutional designs that are available, and to come to grips with the implications of the different designs. (**Mares**)

In response to the research as proposed above, it was commented that the body of literature and examples regarding best practices ('what works') of security sector reform in particular is relatively small, except in the case of police. Hence the Ministry must do some additional research, specifically regarding the executive branch. (**Ball**)

The lack of information on what is actually being done by external actors was identified as another field for research. There is a need for very basic information on which external actors are working in this field, what areas are they working on, and what their experiences have been. For instance, who is working on parliamentary oversight over the military? Who is dealing with the police? Hence, it should be analysed what forms of external assistance are given. (**Mills**)

It was commented that this kind of basic audit is not only useful in the field of security sector reform, but also in other areas of governance. Countries are often crashed by too many demands and conditionalities for too many different kinds of reform. This is like taking too many drugs at the same

time. So a basic audit must also indicate how the different attempts for reform can be combined. **(Ottaway)**

*The Need for a Regional Perspective*

The great porosity of state borders in Africa makes it illusory to think that conditions imposed on one country, or priorities selected for this specific country, would work efficiently without taking into consideration its closest neighbourhood. In many African sub-regions, unrest, violence and instability are percolating across state borders. For instance, in West or Central Africa, circumstances require that the proliferation of small arms and light weapons to be a high priority on the security sector reform agenda. The regional perspective, hence, is essential and should be added to the research. **(Ayissi)**

*Final Comments on South Asia (Sri Lanka)*

Civil-military relations remain a complex topic with regard to South Asia. Civil-military relations in Sri Lanka seem to typify the situation in the whole of South Asia. For instance, both India and Pakistan do have the problem of a too large army. It would be an interesting research to ask the military establishment if they need such large armies. This has never been questioned. Hence the topic for policy relevant research in Sri Lanka, and for that matter other South Asian countries as well, would be to find ways to reduce the army substantially without creating problems as a result of demobilisation and reintegration in society. **(de Silva)**

*Final Comments on Africa (Ghana)*

One of the elements to further touch upon would be the relationship between business and governance. There is more room for co-operation between the Ministries of Economic and Foreign Affairs on the topic of, for instance, the economic benefits of regional integration. This would be an area for more research.

Another area is that of the role of corruption in relation with judicial and police reform. There has already been some research on the role of organised crime in Africa, but it is important to analyse what role Parliament can play and what aspects of assistance would be best suited to strengthen this role. **(Mills)**

*Final Comments on Central America (Nicaragua)*

In case of Central America the countries are already demilitarised, though there are still problems regarding the effective integration of ex-combatants into society. Nevertheless from this experience, from the civilian control over the military, from the adapted curricula at the military academies, and from the studies on soldiers as business men and several other projects lessons might be learned for other parts of the world. However, more attention could be paid to the politician and government-side of political-military relations. There still seems to be a lack of progress on this side of the civil-military relations. This could be a topic for further research, namely to increase the skills of the politicians and government executives. **(Oliver)**

Another topic for research is the role of civil society as opposed to the role of the military and the politicians. For instance, the political class wants the military to intervene in conflicts that arise over economic interests. What is left for the role of the civil society as the civilians and military group together? **(Peirera)**

## Seminar Programme

9.30	Welcome and Coffee
10.00	Opening Dr J.S. van der Meulen, Director Society and Armed Forces Institute
10.10	Presentation of Review on Political Military Relations Luc van de Goor and Tsjearb Bouta, Conflict Research Unit
10.30	Discussion
11.00	Presentation of Research Findings South Asia International Centre for Ethnic Studies (ICES)(Sri Lanka)
11.15	Discussion
11.35	Coffee Break
11.50	Presentation of Research Findings Africa The South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA)
12.05	Discussion
12.25	Presentation of Research Findings Central America Arias Foundation for Peace and Human Progress (Costa Rica)
12.40	Discussion
13.00	Lunch
14.15	Participant presentations on the topic (max 5 minutes)
15.45	Tea Break
16.00	Plenary Discussion to define a future research agenda
16.45	Closure
17.00	Reception





## Topics for Discussion

The discussion on civil-military relations contains links to a number of related topics. Most important is the discussion on security-sector reform. For this discussion, we would like to use Dylan Hendrickson's definition as a starting point. In his definition the security sector comprises:

"...those bodies that are responsible for, or should be responsible for, protecting the state and the communities within it. This would include three pillars:

- Groups with a mandate to wield instruments of violence – military, paramilitary and police forces;
- Institutions with a role in managing and monitoring the security sector – civilian ministries, parliaments and non-governmental organizations; and
- Bodies responsible for guaranteeing the rule of law – the judiciary, the penal system, human-rights ombudsmen and, where these bodies are particularly weak, the international community."

This definition provides a broad perspective on security-sector issues and security-sector reform. This is also required given the problems developing countries are facing. However, it also implies that many fields are interrelated, and that special attention will have to be paid to this. We acknowledge the interrelatedness of these fields, but for our discussions we will mainly focus on the oversight, control, and management of the military.

### *The Context of Overall Governance, Democratization and Security*

The linkages between the overall context of governance and civil-military relations are not clear. This raises the following conceptual question:

- How to perceive the issue of civil-military relations in the overall context of governance in developing countries?

The issue of civil military relations also relates to the issue of security. The classical and more recent theorizing, as well as policy proposals on civil-military relations focus on a military involved in dealing with external security threats. The main security problem of developing countries seems to be dealing with internal security threats.

- How to perceive the issue of civil-military relations in the context of severe internal security threats?

### *Policies on Civil-Military Relations and Security-Sector Reform*

Complete civilian control over the military cannot be expected. In addition, certain conditions of overall governance and security may hamper the application of Western concepts of civil-military relations and the security sector, or even make its application impossible. This raises the following conceptual questions:

- What guidance can Western models provide for civil-military relations in developing countries?

- Are the concepts of ‘professionalism’ and ‘national security’ useful in the setting of developing countries?
- Are the ‘classical’ models useful, or are the concordance model and regime model (with shared responsibility, accountability and civilian direction) more practical?

Instead of civilian control, co-operation is considered more likely, and maybe even the only way to deal with the issue civil-military relations. This raises questions as to what type of civil-military relations should be aimed for, where co-operation should end, and how to attain this goal. What we are dealing with in particular is the issue of pacts between civilians and the military. Therefore, the following questions are key:

- Can pacts and power-sharing arrangements be effective in bringing about civilian control or guidance of the military?
- Should such arrangements have a prescribed duration and be considered as a temporary solution?
- How to prevent elements of pacts from becoming incorporated in constitutions, or get permanency otherwise?
- How to guarantee civilian leadership, as well as accountability and compliance of the military?

Given the prominent role of internal conflict in a number of African and Asian countries, it is not obvious how the various security actors and institutions interact. This raises the following questions:

- How do the various sectors of security relate? Who is going to provide what type of security under which conditions?
- Can and/or should the tasks of these security institutions in countries facing internal disorder be de-linked? Is the Western concept of separation of security-providing institutions (i.e. the armed forces and the police) a universally viable model?
- In case of de-linking and separation, what tasks should be kept away from the military?

### *The Role of External Actors*

It is remarkable that external actors attempt to intervene in the internal security policies of countries. This development signifies an even further decomposition of the concept of national sovereignty. Hence, the following questions:

#### Parameters

- Are external actors in a position to formulate policies in developing countries in such crucial domains as security?
- What would be the legitimate parameters for external actors to intervene in security-sector reform?
- What could be specific aims of security-sector reform for external actors?
- Should, given the complexity, priorities be set by donors? What would those be?
- Should countries comply with certain conditions in the field of governance, democratization and security, before embarking on a trajectory of security-sector reform?
- What would be criteria for involvement in the field of civil-military relations and security-sector reform (a certain level of democracy, security, et cetera)?

#### Local Context and Ownership

- How are developing countries currently dealing with control and restructuring of the military and the security sector (what are best practices, lessons learned and missed opportunities)?
- How can external actors link up with these local initiatives?
- How to intervene in such a way that the recipient countries do not feel alienated?

#### Actors and Division of Labour

- What would be the appropriate task for each actor involved, i.e., local actors (varying from national governments to NGOs), donors and international institutions?
- Is there a comparative advantage of development co-operation over other sectors, e.g., foreign affairs and defence?
- Should development co-operation actors be involved in security-sector reform at all?
- What would be the appropriate task for each institution within donor countries (intra- and interdepartmental)?

Security-sector reform policies of national actors vary considerably as regards definitions, range, aims and instruments. Key questions, therefore, are:

- Should security-sector reform focus on the ‘hardware’ (disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, de-mining, et cetera), or the ‘software’ side (civilian control of the military and governance issues in general)?
- Donors tend to have a socio-economic bias in their approach of security-sector reform (debt relief, good governance, military expenditures vs. health and education expenditures). Is this a legitimate approach, or should the security setting be used as a starting point?
- How to provide for greater international coherence?
- How to make development cooperation actors more effective in the field of civil-military relations and security-sector reform? Which instruments and skills are required?
- Is Hendrickson’s definition of security sector reform sufficient, or should it be redefined?



## List of Seminar Participants

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