

Working Paper Series

Working Paper 11

Managing Group Grievances and
Internal Conflict: Ghana Country Report

Tim Hughes

Netherlands Institute of International Relations 'Clingendael'
Conflict Research Unit
June 2003



Netherlands Institute of
International Relations
'Clingendael'
Clingendael 7
2597 VH The Hague
P.O. Box 93080
2509 AB The Hague
Phonenumber: # 31-70-3245384
Telefax: # 31-70-3282002
Email: research@clingendael.nl
Website: <http://www.clingendael.nl/cru>

© Netherlands Institute of International Relations *Clingendael*. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without the prior written permission of the copyright holders. *Clingendael* Institute, P.O. Box 93080, 2509 AB The Hague, The Netherlands.

Foreword

This paper has been written within the framework of the research project 'Managing Group Grievances and Internal Conflict'*, executed at the request of the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The project focuses on the process of, and motives for, (violent) group mobilisation and aims at the development of an analytical tool to assist policy-makers in designing conflict-sensitive development activities.

In the course of the project, a preliminary assessment tool has been developed in cooperation with Dr. Michael Lund, and discussed with the researchers who carried out the assessment in four country cases: Ghana, Mozambique, Nicaragua and Sri Lanka. On the basis of this testing phase, the tool has been substantially amended and refined**.

The present report, which was finalised in September 2002, results from the testing phase and reflects the structure of the analytical tool in its original form. Section I provides a diagnostic, dynamic narrative of various factors that may explain the levels, course or risks of conflict. Section II could be regarded as the background research to this narrative, and consists of thirteen factor assessments. This second section lays out in a structured way two distinguishable sets of factors the researchers were asked to examine in their country of study. Part A of this section covers broad social and economic factors that help to determine the major interests of groups in society and the degree and kinds of incongruities that exist between those interests. Whether these structural predisposing factors will lead to the outbreak or continuation of violent conflict depends on the extent that other factors are operative as well. These intermediating structures, processes and policies are assessed in Part B of this section.

* The project 'Managing Group Grievances & Internal Conflict' is part of the research programme 'Coping with Internal Conflict' (CICP), executed by the Conflict Research Unit of the Netherlands Institute of International Relations 'Clingendael', at the request of the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Responsibility for the contents and for the opinions expressed rests solely with the author.

** The report that sets out the assessment tool will be made available mid-2003.

Table of Contents

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS	9
I DIAGNOSTIC ASSESSMENT OF CONFLICT COURSE AND PARAMETERS	11
Ghana's Divides and Divisive Issues	12
<i>Asante Dominance?</i>	12
<i>Party Political Competition</i>	14
<i>Conflict over Land</i>	16
<i>Traditional Leadership and Chieftaincy</i>	18
Assessing Institutional Capacities	19
<i>Democratic Consolidation</i>	19
<i>Beyond State Institutions</i>	20
Assessing the Risks of Escalation	22
<i>The Socio -Economic Challenge</i>	22
<i>Political Leadership and the Paradox of Reconciliation</i>	23
<i>The Regional Dimension</i>	24
<i>Conflict Assessment Summary</i>	25
II SOURCES OF CONFLICT AND CAPACITIES FOR PEACE	27
A. Basic Social and Economic Conditions	27
Factor # 1. Level of General Economic Development or Deterioration	27
Factor # 2: Resource Base and Structure of the Economy	33
2.1. <i>Energy Production</i>	36
2.2. <i>Water Supply</i>	37
2.3. <i>Employment</i>	37
2.4. <i>Education and Literacy</i>	40
2.5. <i>Health</i>	41
2.6. <i>Poverty Mediation Strategies</i>	42
2.7. <i>Expenditure on Poverty Reduction and Growth</i>	45
Factor # 3: Population Distribution	46
Factor # 4: Society's Cohesion or Division	49

Factor # 5: History of Inter-Group Violent Conflict or Co-operation	51
5.1. <i>Conflict in the Northern Region</i>	52
5.2. <i>The Bawku Conflict</i>	57
5.3. <i>Continuing Conflict in the Northern Region – The Case of the Yendi Conflict</i>	58
5.4. <i>Religious Conflict</i>	63
Factor # 6: Distribution of Economic and Social Goods	65
6.1. <i>Land Policy</i>	67
6.2. <i>Land Disputes and the Courts</i>	70
6.3. <i>Land Disputes and the Lands Commission</i>	72
6.4. <i>Ethnicity and Wage Differentials</i>	74
B. Intermediating Structures, Processes and Policies	75
Factor # 7: Group Political Mobilisation, Organisation and Strategies	75
7.1. <i>Political Parties and Contending Traditions</i>	75
7.2. <i>Major Identity Groups and Party Politics</i>	77
7.3. <i>Akan Asante</i>	77
7.4. <i>Politics and Ethnicity</i>	78
7.5. <i>The Watershed 2000 Election</i>	82
Factor # 8: Openness of the Formal Political and Governing Political Institutions	86
8.1. <i>Political Background</i>	86
8.2. <i>Popular Political Opinion Survey</i>	86
8.3. <i>Local Government Reform</i>	89
Factor # 9: Exclusive or Accommodative Governing Institutions and Decision Making Processes	92
9.1. <i>Privatisation</i>	93
9.2. <i>Women's Marginalized Status</i>	94
Factor # 10: Group Participation in Non-Official and Informal Processes and Institutions	95
10.1. <i>The Role of Tradition and Kinship</i>	95
10.2. <i>The Role of Non-Governmental Organisations</i>	97
10.3. <i>Institute of African Studies</i>	98
Factor # 11: Efficacy of Political Elites and Leaders	100
11.1. <i>The Efficacy of the State Delivery</i>	101
11.2. <i>Political Leadership and Parliament</i>	103
11.3. <i>Traditional Leadership</i>	104

Factor # 12: Efficacy of Security Forces and Violations of Human Rights	106
<i>12.1. Ghanaian Public Opinion on Human Rights Abuses</i>	<i>106</i>
<i>12.2. Security Force Reform</i>	<i>108</i>
<i>12.3. Security Force Under-Funding and Crime</i>	<i>109</i>
<i>12.4. Budgetary Improvements</i>	<i>110</i>
<i>12.5. The Security Forces Stakeholder Analysis</i>	<i>110</i>
Factor # 13: International Engagement	112
<i>13.1. Ghana's 'Special Status'</i>	<i>112</i>
<i>13.2. Ghana's Diaspora</i>	<i>113</i>
<i>13.3. HIPC</i>	<i>115</i>
<i>13.4. Multilateral Linkages</i>	<i>116</i>
BIBLIOGRAPHY	117

List of Abbreviations and Acronyms

AFRC	Armed Forces Revolutionary Council
AGOA	African Growth and Opportunity Act
AU	African Union
BMATT	British Military Advisory Training Team
CBO	Community Based Organisation
CHRAJ	Commission for Human Rights and Administrative Justice
CPP	Convention People's Party
DFID	Department for International Development
ECOMOG	ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
FOSDA	Foundation for Security and Development in Africa
FTC	Fast Track Court
GCPP	Ghana Consolidated Popular Party
GLSS	Ghana Living Standards Survey
GSE	Ghana Stock Exchange
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GWCL	Ghana Water Company Limited
GPRS	Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy
HDI	Human Development Index
HIPC	Heavily Indebted Poor Country
IEC	Independent Electoral Commission
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IPAC	Inter-Party Advisory Committee
LTA	Long Term Average
MOF	Ministry of Finance
MTDP	Medium Term Development Process
NDC	National Democratic Congress
NDPC	National Development Planning Commission
NEPAD	New Partnership for Africa's Development
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NMC	National Media Commission
NPP	New Patriotic Party
NRP	National Reform Party
OAU	Organisation of African Unity
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PNDC	Provisional National Defence Council
PPA	Poverty Participatory Analysis
PRGF	Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility

REGSEC	Regional Security Council
SMC	Supreme Military Council
TUC	Trades Union Congress
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

I Diagnostic Assessment of Conflict Course and Parameters

Ghana is characterised more by a condition of stable, if somewhat fragile and sometimes broken, peace than by conflict. This condition is dynamic however and the conditions that may give rise to violent conflict, both structural and contingent, are omnipresent. Whilst racially and nationally homogeneous, Ghana is an ethnically divided society that increasingly also exhibits sharp class and regional asymmetries. Additionally, Ghanaian society is a complex overlay of traditional and modern social, economic and political practices that makes both the identification of the drivers of conflict and their mediation and resolution challenging.

Whilst Ghana has undergone a profound process of democratisation, and more closely approximates an institutionalised and increasingly plural democracy, it remains a country in transition and thus vulnerable to reversals. Although exhibiting indicators of economic recovery and social renewal, Ghana remains a poor and heavily indebted country. Its economy remains agriculturally based and its exports are heavily dependent on the export of externally priced commodities, principally gold and cocoa. It is thus vulnerable to both climatic and exogenous shocks and has experienced both in recent years. Whilst the country remains one of the world's poorest, some overall progress has been made in poverty reduction, although this is uneven and has tended to exacerbate a broadly poorer north-more developed south dichotomy.

Despite its recent developments, the country is entering a period of 'conflict risk' or vulnerability. It is undergoing a painful, and by definition, slow process economic restructuring with all its potential attendant social and political dislocations. The process of national reconciliation has recently commenced through the hearings of the National Reconciliation Commission and these have cast the spotlight on human rights abuses committed under previous regimes. Whilst desirable in itself, this process has the potential of raising the level of political conflict and may induce a defensive backlash from within the former ruling elite and elements within the security forces. Ghana has not yet tackled the thorny question of the reform of traditional chieftaincy and lacks the capacity to structure appropriate and effective local government mechanisms to synchronise traditional authority with that of conventional local government institutions. This will continue to hamper development, pro-poor, poverty eradication and conflict management modalities at the local level. Whilst a 'zero tolerance' approach to corruption is avowed public policy, much work has to be done at all levels to excise the corrosive effects of this practice and its effects on conflict.

There are isolated, yet persistent and sometimes bloody outbreaks of inter-group conflict that, whilst not geographically widespread, have proved difficult to ameliorate and resistant to permanent reconciliation. These incidences of traditional conflict are not decreasing in number and indeed may become exacerbated by modernising pressures such as intensifying area specific population pressures, land and resource scarcity, compounded by widening developmental differentials. In the most recent instance of conflict giving rise to the Yendi crisis, the state of emergency imposed in April 2002 had been renewed four times at the time of writing in October 2002, due to the persistence of conditions that threaten peace.

Ghana's Divides and Divisive Issues

Despite some encouraging signs of economic recovery, social renewal and democratic consolidation, Ghana has not effectively tackled (and currently lacks the capacity to tackle) the key factors that give rise to conflict and violence. The reasons for this are manifold.

At the broadest level, Ghana remains susceptible to conflict due to regional, ethnic, tribal and class cleavages, as well as tensions between modern and traditional modes of social, political and economic organisation, ownership and distribution.

Regional divisions in Ghana are deep. The northern regions of the country are characterised by far lower Human Development Indices than those of the Ashanti, Central and Coastal regions. Whilst religious affiliation has not been a marker of conflict in Ghana, the northern regions are home to the majority of the Ghanaian Muslim community and intra-religious conflict is not uncommon in these areas. Thus the *potential* for religion to become a mutually reinforcing marker of differentiation, alienation and conflict between north and central/south exists. There is a deep and widespread sense of political alienation in the northern regions from the locus of power in Accra, which typifies a classic centre/periphery dichotomy characteristic of postcolonial sub-Saharan African countries. Nominal constitutional regional devolution has failed to materially impact this condition. Furthermore, modern and traditional polities in the northern regions view with cynicism attempts to garner electoral support from the populous regions of the north with the promise of developmental spending and political patronage. It is in the northern regions to where decades old traditional conflicts and outbreaks of violence persist and show no signs of abating. Indicative of the intensity and persistence of the threat of violent conflict in the north is the fact that, in the case of the Yendi region, President Kufuor has been unable to visit the scene of the Ya-Na's assassination, nor indeed the region for security reasons.

The threat of regional conflict is not restricted to the northern regions however. The Volta region remains an area of concern. Since the removal of the Ewe dominated NDC in December 2000, the region has lost its special status as the birthplace of President Rawlings and there are indications that the NPP government is engaging in a policy of ethnic balancing within the previously Ewe dominated security forces. In addition to this loss of political and economic patronage, there exists a nascent northern/southern dichotomy within the Volta region that has the potential to stoke conflict, or to be susceptible to manipulation. The relegation of Ewe and Voltarian political leadership has also been matched by a rise in Akan and Ashanti ascendancy and given the traditional antipathy between the two groupings, this dynamic holds worrying potential for future conflict.

Asante Dominance?

The election of the NPP government in December 2000 was a highly significant point in Ghana's democratic history, but also holds the potential for a hardening of political, class and ethnic distinctions and cleavages. For the first time Ghana has elected an Asante President to lead an Asante and Ashanti dominated party that, in turn, is pursuing policies that are broadly favourable to the Ashanti entrepreneurial class.¹ At the same time, since his own election, the Asantehene has come to play a much more active role in public life than his predecessor. Whilst Asante constitute some 18% of

¹ Most of Ghana's post independence leaders and Heads of State have been drawn from ethnic minority groups.

the total population², the population of the Ashanti region enjoys the second highest average standard of living and second lowest regional incidence of poverty.³ Beyond statistical indicators, the Asante and the Ashanti region occupy a particular place in Ghanaian life. Asante represent a cultural quasi aristocracy in Ghana. From the distinctive kente cloth, to the folklore surrounding the golden stool, and peculiar social cohesion, Asante are protective of their culture and have a well-developed sense of the centrality of the Ashanti region to Ghanaian identity.⁴ Taken to extremes this sense of identity manifested itself in secessionist impulses prior to independence in 1957. Ashanti wealth is derived not only from the rich cocoa plantations in the region, but also the region's abundance of gold and other natural mineral wealth. For example, Ashanti Gold Fields is one of the top ten producers of gold globally and has in recent years succeeded in strengthening its output and performance. Notably too, Ashanti Gold pays a portion of its revenue to the Asantehene.

The political strength of the Ashanti region has been substantially re-enforced since the election of the NPP. This is in part due to the electoral system and the fact that all cabinet Ministers are elected members of parliament. Thus in the Ghanaian single member constituency/first past the post electoral system, regional rather than proportional voting is the norm. Despite the constitutional requirement that the cabinet be regionally and ethnically representative, the predominance of regionally elected members of parliament *de facto* loads the National Assembly with members from the party's regional (Ashanti –Akan) support base. This, in turn, tends to make it more likely that the composition of the cabinet will represent the regional strength of the party perhaps more than providing a national balance.

The second driver of Asante political ascendancy is the 'political' role played by the Asantehene. Whilst the Asantehene is prevented from entering formal politics, it is becoming common practice for heads of state and dignitaries visiting Ghana to pay their respects to the Asantehene, although similar protocol is not afforded to other Ghanaian traditional leaders. The Asantehene's 2002 'Royal' visit to the Netherlands is a manifestation of this national statesman role. Furthermore, the President makes increasing use of the counsel of the Asantehene in such matters as chieftaincy disputes. Whilst it is acknowledged that the Asantehene displays considerable personal qualities and that his involvement in educational and developmental programmes in the Ashanti region are laudable, the reinforcement of NPP political supremacy with Asante ascendancy, combined with the burgeoning role and profile of the Asantehene, has the potential to alienate other (and perhaps already disaffected) groups. Questions may be raised too about the desirability of this re-enforcement of power in one section of the population and the potential this holds for the abuse of power, the exclusion, alienation and discrimination against other ethnic groups and the stoking of conflict.

Whilst the Asante's greatest political protagonists, the Ewes,⁵ occupy a distant and relatively disadvantaged regional position (despite years of NDC rule) and no longer enjoy privileged political

² 76% of Asante's live in Ashanti Region, 13,7% in Brong Ahafor, 8% in the Eastern Region and 7% in Greater Accra.

³ As the tables in the report indicate, Greater Accra enjoys by far the highest standard of living and lowest incidence of poverty.

⁴ For example, the funeral rights, selection of a new Asantehene and his enstoolment take place over a calendar year during which time immensely elaborate ceremonies are conducted on a continual basis which require, inter alia, the paying of respect, if not homage, from traditional leaders across the country to the deceased and new Asantehene.

⁵ Ewes constitute some 12.4% of the total population, 72% of whom reside in the Volta Region and 12% in each of Greater Accra and the Eastern Region.

access, an escalation of anti NPP and possibly anti-Ashanti sentiment may be expected prior to the 2004 election. Furthermore, Ewes in the Volta region have historically occupied an ambiguous position vis-à-vis their Ghanaian identity, with some favouring closer affiliation with neighbouring Togo. Although as a group Ewes, and Voltarians in particular, are not in a strong position to prosecute a violent campaign against the NPP government, their concentration around the strategically important Volta dam area, as well as their political and military experience and political alienation from the NPP government, has the potential to become a point of friction in the short to medium term.

Party Political Competition

Whilst the current political stability of Ghana is due in no small part to the peaceful elections and transition to a NPP government in December 2000, the Ghanaian Prague Spring is threatening to turn to autumn. Inter-party competition and possible conflict is more likely the closer the 2004 general and presidential elections approach. The NPP enjoys all the conventional advantages and leverage of an incumbent party. Most importantly its leader, in the form of President Kufuor, enjoys extensive favourable daily media coverage, contrasted with less than proportionate coverage for the NDC and relatively little national media coverage for any other opposition party. The NPP has consolidated its position as the party of business, the middle class and traditionalists and is thus likely to enjoy a considerable funding advantage over its opposition rivals. Furthermore, the NPP has extended its majority in the National Assembly by winning a series of by-elections and increasingly evinces greater confidence in its exercise of office. More broadly, over time, the NPP is set to benefit from the rapid rate of urbanisation in Ghana, which is likely to have a commensurate corrosive effect on the NDC's and CPP's more rural electoral support base. However, despite the fact that the NPP has embarked on a sweeping set of economic reforms and national institutional rejuvenation, such is the depth and structural nature of Ghana's economic, social and political challenges that only modest progress is likely to have been made by the time of the 2004 election campaign. Additionally, the NPP can expect to be inhibited by the self-imposed 'shackles of democracy' as it has set a high public standard in terms of governance and thus it cannot expect to, or be seen to, abuse its political power and office in the run up to the election campaign. Beyond the conventional party political contestation, however, a number of dangers to both the NPP and to broader political stability are looming.

The first is the danger of hardening class divisions within the Ghanaian social formation. The NPP is an unabashedly middle class party and is fully committed to economic and fiscal prudence, HIPC, privatisation and a reduced role for the state. These policies are clearly potentially divisive in the short to medium term, and potentially threatening particularly to inhabitants of the disadvantaged Northern and Volta Regions. In the case of the Northern Regions these policies hold the danger of exacerbating the most intense incidents of conflict over the past decade. Conversely, the NPP's policies hold the potential to boost the life chances and opportunities of not only the middle and urban classes, but also the strongly entrepreneurial Ashanti region.

This leads to a second point. The NPP and particularly President Kufuor has re-introduced a strong traditionalist element in its deliberations, ceremonies and engagement. Kufuor has actively sought to further strengthen and legitimise his own position by raising the profile of that of the Ashanti Asantehene. This holds considerable risks of a national non-Ashanti backlash for Kufuor and indeed his party, by re-enforcing the impression of the NPP as an Ashanti dominated party.

The institutional capacity of the opposition parties is however weak. The NDC is a divided party and lacks clear, credible and unifying leadership. Its funding base is questionable and is struggling to rid itself of the labels of corruption, profligacy and human rights abuse. Furthermore, the absence of strong leadership translates into the party continuing to operate under the shadow of its former leader Jerry Rawlings. Rawlings remains the most potent symbol for the NDC and its most charismatic (though troublesome) figure. Rawlings, who is coming under increasing public pressure due to damning submissions made to the newly constituted National Reconciliation Commission, recently substantially raised the political temperature in Ghana by declaring at an NDC Congress in Kumasi on 20 July 2002:

‘They (NPP) say they are practising democracy, but I think this is one of the worst governments in the history of this country. It’s not nice; it’s not good that they should bring Ghana to such shame. Ghana is a very noble country; a very honest country, a very beautiful country. A very principled country. It must be led by such principles. Menuanom, me pa wo kyew (Brethren with all respects), this time you see it for yourselves, I don’t have to say it before you know it ... Very soon 2004 – the rate at which we are suffering, God help this country. I wish we could find ways and means of preventing the rot from going further down while we wait for the next elections. We don’t have to wait for the next election to prevent the rot. There’s something called unlawful order. We must use it, not just to accept wrong things. I’m afraid; Positive Defiance is what I used to call it. ... I hope when NDC comes to power that day they (the NPP) would have the courage to stay here (in this country) as we (NDC) have done ... Let no one of them run out of this country. This is because when they wake up, all they do is tell lies about us – we people of virtue and nobility. They are accusing people of nobility; people with dignity and principles as if being noble is a crime. They are creating a society that regards lies as truth. There is need to do something about it so that by the time 2004 comes there will be some dignity left in this country.’⁶

This provocative speech has resulted in Rawlings being called in for questioning three times by the Bureau of National Intelligence ostensibly to assess whether or not the former president was guilty of making seditious or treasonable utterances. Suggestions have been made that Rawlings be placed under house arrest, or banished to a rural region of Ghana. Thus the government faces a difficult and potentially explosive situation in dealing with Rawlings. Government inactivity would perhaps suggest weakness, yet a crack down on Rawlings could exacerbate latent regional and indeed ethnic antagonism. At the level of principle, the government is keen not to be labelled as abrogating the rights and freedoms re-established under the NPP government. President Kufuor waited three weeks before responding to Rawlings by commenting:

‘Anybody who will say ‘throw the Constitution away, take the law into your own hands and do as you please’ cannot mean well for Ghana ... nobody should pray for trouble. If they

⁶ This speech and a comprehensive record of other Rawlings speeches is found on www.prosecute-rawlings.com. Commentary on the speech is located on the allafrica.com website, as well as that of the British Broadcasting Corporation.

think when trouble comes they will get away and others will suffer they are deceiving themselves.’⁷

The most plausible scenario is likely to be that former President Rawlings will be caught up in the institutionalised process of ‘truth telling’ and reparations through the National Reconciliation Commission. The evidence is mounting of Rawlings’ authorisation of, or complicity in, murder and human rights abuses on a wide scale. Furthermore, there are growing reports of highly corrupt practices by the former president and first lady. The challenge for the NPP government will be to ensure that the charismatic Rawlings factor is neutralised by the 2004 election and that the electorate is reminded of the legacy of authoritarianism, abuse and corruption bequeathed by the NDC government.

Conflict over Land

As the key factor of production in Ghana, land and incompatible claims to its ownership and usage are the most frequent sources of conflict. Indeed, whilst regional, ethnic and political differences continue to pose a threat to peace in Ghana, conflict in the West African country is principally about control over, access to and distribution of relatively scarce resources, principally land. Conflict over land is a complex phenomenon however and frequently traces its roots back to the pre-British colonial period. British colonial impulses that sought to regularise, institutionalise and legalise land tenure patterns as well as reward and punish, had the effect of clashing with traditional land ownership and usage practices, thereby disrupting not only patterns of production, but also traditional social and political structures. These traditional community structures of economic and political distribution have been further aggravated by the modernising practices and policies of successive post-colonial governments.

Ghana has a rapidly growing population that is placing increasing stress on land usage in densely populated, or relatively densely populated, areas. The majority of Ghanaians still derive their living directly or indirectly from agriculture with land being the key factor of production. Land ownership in Ghana is complex with delineation between stool (traditional), commercial, private and state owned land often unclear and highly contested. Land title and registration are often inaccurate and incomplete, thus making arbitration and adjudication over conventional land disputes difficult. At some point in Ghana’s history all land, whether state-owned, private or commercial, was held by traditional leaders and their communities and thus the potential exists for these communities and their leadership to lay claim to any tract or parcel of land. Furthermore, successive colonial administrations, in particular the British, were responsible for attempting to ‘rationalise’ land ownership into formal ‘western’ legal title, or to reward preferred chieftaincies with right and title to traditional land. This colonial disruption and interference served to heighten already contested land usage patterns and has left a Gordian Knot for contemporary administrators to tackle. The often poor working relationship, or at least poorly defined lines of authority and responsibility between district assemblies and traditional leaders makes the prevention and resolution of local conflicts more difficult.

The traditional practice and ‘courtesy’ of paying tribute to traditional chiefs has further fuelled land-based conflict in two regards. Firstly, it has led to economic and financial outbidding by competing land claimants and secondly, it has exacerbated corrupt practices, such as the multiple selling of land. Conflict is particularly acute where this practice has ‘favoured’ in-migrating peoples into traditionally held lands. The struggle over land use is considerably amplified by generational

⁷ *Ghanaian Chronicle*, 29 August 2002.

disagreements, disputes and conflicts over questions of chieftaincy succession. Again these disputes have been aggravated by colonial and modern authorities and are not easily soluble. In certain instances there is no traditional provision for the ‘destoolment’ or removal of a traditional leader other than death. This is the case in the Dagbon people who are party to the Yendi crisis and has resulted in a number of traditional leaders being assassinated in order to remove them from the stool or skin and to permit the occupation of it by a contending gate, clan or family. Thus conflict is inherent in a number of traditional succession arrangements and conventions and these arrangements have not been successfully mediated. The intractability of these conflicts and the Yendi (Dagomba) conflict in particular is highlighted by the continued extension of the state of emergency (the fourth time), the inability of the President to visit the area for fear of violence⁸ and the calling in of a United Nations task team to investigate and mediate in the conflict.

Land disputes and conflict in non-traditional areas are driven by population pressure and contending claims to valuable land use, be it residential, commercial, agricultural or mining. Residential land disputes are escalating in urban and particularly peri-urban areas. These disputes, which once again are complicated by traditional multiple claimants, have given rise to the phenomenon of land guards. Perhaps surprisingly a majority of those questioned in a recent survey welcomed land guards as means of regulating and enforcing land purchases. These armed private guards have been guilty of some brutal practices however and have the potential to develop into a vigilante or urban militia. The ‘popularity’ of land guards in part reflects the ineffectiveness of land title and registry procedures, as well as failures on the part of an acutely under-resourced police force.

Patterns of conflict are also experienced, particularly in the Ashanti Region, over access to and exploitation of mineral rights, particularly amongst small-scale prospectors and miners.

Conflicts are not all reducible to land disputes however. There is ample evidence of inter group antipathy, goading, provocation, irredentism, scapegoating and exclusive mobilisation. This finds expression most often between groups in close geographical proximity, but is frequently escalated by the provocative action of one group around events or times of traditional symbolic significance. There is a pattern of fighting around the times of the celebration of traditional and religious festivals. It is clearly at these times that group identity is enhanced by feelings of traditional ‘pride’ and at which time the ‘othering’ of groups is most graphically and publicly manifest. Again the resolution of such conflicts is made difficult by the ‘natural’ and widespread identification of Ghanaians, urban and rural, bourgeois and worker, modernist and traditionalist with some personal marker of ethnic, tribal, clan or ‘home village’ identity. Thus it is difficult to effectively prevent, manage and mediate inter group conflict when the traditions of identity groups are broadly cherished amongst the populace.

A further aggravating factor is that of the party politicisation of traditional disputes. Given the structurally influential position of traditional leaders, Ghanaian elections have been characterised by the ‘buying off’ of chiefs or contending stools. The NDC government used the advantage of a party in power to ensure that cash and equipment were distributed to important constituencies with the explicit or tacit support of chiefs.⁹ This practice is divisive and has also stoked nascent conflict. Furthermore, the distribution of large quantities of modern weaponry such as AK47 rifles to local militia under the PNDC and later NDC administrations means that there is an abundant supply of weapons to hand for those involved in conflict. This in part explains the ‘bloody nature’ of many traditional disputes and

⁸ As reported during an interview held at the University of Ghana Legon with a researcher investigating the Yendi crisis, July 2002.

⁹ The NDC is by no means alone in this practice.

such intensity of conflict often demands the involvement of the army in quelling the violence. Thus the supply of small arms, which is being aggravated by smugglers in the northern regions, remains a critical issue in addressing conflict in Ghana.

Whilst religious violence is not widespread and inter faith denominations live in conditions of peaceful co-existence, a number of clashes between Christians and traditionalists have occurred, as well as more violent encounters between intra-Islamic denominations. These have not escalated into broader or sustained conflict. All documented evidence suggests that, when it occurs, religious conflict flairs at times of public and symbolic celebration. Insofar as religious conflict enshrines a material dimension, there are only a few recorded cases of inter-religious conflict over the use of public resources, such as halls or stadia. At the localised level, although outlawed, Trokosi practices in the Volta region bring acute hardship and suffering to its female youth victims and have not been successfully eradicated. The potential for an escalation in religious conflicts exists, however, in the form of religious fundamentalism and perhaps most threateningly from the rise and spread of Sharia and fundamentalist sentiment and practices in Nigeria in particular.

Traditional Leadership and Chieftaincy

The killing of the Dagomba king (paramount chief or Ya-Na) by members of the opposing gate of the same family, not only highlights the persistence and intensity of traditional conflict in Ghana, but also sent out a public and dangerous ‘demonstration effect’ to other disputes involving chieftaincy. These disputes have not been quantified, but in the Central Region alone some 200 are currently under investigation. There is an historical and primordial dimension to such disputes that makes them difficult to mediate and to adjudicate. Additionally, such disputes flare at times of symbolic importance such as annual festivals at which time group identity is most publicly accentuated. Such disputes have not only been amplified by competition over scarce resources and in particular land, but have been manipulated wittingly or unwittingly by party political competition, particularly at election time. Although chiefs are constitutionally prohibited from engaging in party politics, their very authority and the traditional practice of offering gifts of respect to chiefs make them both key players and ‘targets’ for political entrepreneurs. The egregiously violent nature of these conflicts reflects both the depth and intensity of antipathy between competing groups, but is facilitated by a copious supply of modern weaponry including automatic assault rifles, a legacy of the well-armed militias of the previous military regimes. Due to rapid population growth, accelerating patterns of urbanisation and the complications of traditional claimants to urban and peri-urban, land-based conflict is an increasingly urban phenomenon. The financial stakes governing such disputes are often high and has given rise to a small but potentially lethal cohort of armed land guards, who have been guilty of a number of acts of brutal violence.

Traditional leadership and chieftaincy occupies an acutely paradoxical position within Ghanaian society. It can simultaneously be a force for stability and an exacerbator, escalator and intensifier of conflict. Indeed it is the very primordial and spiritual nature of traditional authority that makes its conflicts often intense and intractable. There are very few examples of violent conflict in Ghana that do not directly, or indirectly, have chieftaincy disputes as an element. Additionally, traditional practices are responsible for some of the most reprehensible abuses in Ghanaian society such as that of female genital mutilation and Trokosi practices. Furthermore, the customary practice and obligation of furnishing gifts to chiefs easily slides into corruption on the part of the donor and recipient. The

implications of this are corrosive, particularly in land use and allocations disputes as well as during election time.¹⁰ In his 2002 address to the National House of Chiefs, President Kufuor argued, ‘A dynamic partnership between the government and chiefs would set up the platform for the transformation of our society.’ He went on to warn, however:

‘There has always been rivalry in the process of selecting chiefs, but never before has the nation witnessed such widespread usurpers and false pretenders to thrones ... Today people who have no proper claim to stools or skins have found their way to these sacred places through very dubious means. The practice means that in many a case the institutional memory and wisdom which are so crucial to the functioning of the chieftaincy get lost. It is not surprising then that cynicism about the worth of the institution is spreading. But more dangerous for society is the violent confrontation that now characterises chieftaincy affairs throughout the country.’¹¹

Assessing Institutional Capacities

Democratic Consolidation

Despite its tortuous legacy, the depth of its social and economic decay, and persistent threats to peace, Ghana has made a series of remarkable transitions and increasingly approximates a consolidating and stable democracy. The 2000 election marked the first time the country had completed a peaceful transfer of power through the ballot box. And this through the defeat of a party led by the country’s leader of 22 years. This was only made possible by former President Rawlings accepting the two-term limitation imposed under the 1992 Constitution.¹² Whilst criticisms of the party in power abusing its position to distribute largesse on a national scale are well founded, the procedures, results and final outcome of the election were grudgingly accepted by the NDC and were not even challenged through the courts. A further feature of the election campaign was the free and expansive operation of NGOs and civil society, including a critical and independently minded media. At the time of the inauguration of President Kufuor, symbolically significant meetings were held between the incumbent and his predecessor, which sent out a vital message of acceptance of democratic rules, tolerance and reconciliation. Of crucial significance, the Ghanaian security apparatuses were not called upon to intervene, or disrupt the political process and were effectively confined to barracks during the transfer of power.

It is a moot point as to whether the finely balanced outcome of the election has aided or will continue to aid, a pragmatic, conciliatory and consensual approach to politics at the national level, particularly in the National Assembly. In terms of conventional democratic ‘checks and balances’, however, the presence of a numerically strong opposition in parliament may be regarded as a moderator of policy, exclusion and extremism. Such a slim majority in parliament also serves to ensure that the majority party remains focused on consolidating its position in the 2004 elections through the delivery of sound policy and programmes. The rhetoric of parliamentarians, whilst sometimes peppered with hyperbole and the liberal (ab)use of the walkout tactic, still points to a

¹⁰ Even interviews with Chiefs ‘cost’ between 50,000 and 100,000 cedis or two bottles of ‘schnapps’.

¹¹ *Daily Graphic*, May 6, 2002.

¹² Ghana celebrates its constitution through a week of high profile events, plays, discussions and celebrations.

functioning rule-based institution that gives the appearance of carrying out its public mandate earnestly. The relationship between the legislative and executive branches is yet to be fully tested, but the less bellicose and more conciliatory language of President Kufuor, his absence of anti-democratic baggage, combined with his 'presidential demeanour' have won respect from political allies and opponents alike. In sum, neither parliament, nor the presidency, has engaged in provocative language since the 2000 election. The only bellicose political noises of note have come from the charismatic, but increasingly marginalized former President Rawlings.

The role and independence of the judiciary has been tested during this time and the assertion of its independence in the finding of the Supreme Court against the government in the Fast Track Court case, is a further instance of democratic institutional maturity. This latter decision was particularly significant for its signalling the independence of the judiciary and thereby the legitimacy of the courts.

Though far from adequate in itself, both the presidency and the legislature have committed themselves to transparency and accountability. Public forums are an important step in this direction, but the national institutions of governance remain distant from the broader population.

Furthermore, the political role and prominence of the security apparatuses has diminished markedly under the Kufuor administration. Training and funding for the military has been increased and measures taken to curtail the potential for rogue elements to stoke conflict and to, once again, intrude into national politics. The 'forced' retiring of senior and long serving members from July 2002 is a further step in rationalising the armed forces under the control of the new administration. However, this progressive development must be balanced with an awareness of the risk to peace posed by the 28% retiring and potentially disaffected military officers. It is believed that these highly experienced non-commissioned officers belong in disproportionate numbers to the Ewe ethnic group. It is also likely therefore that their political allegiance is pro-NDC and pro-Rawlings more particularly. Their demobilisation will see them return to the relatively underdeveloped Volta region, a region known to be awash with weaponry and populated with the remnants of the Rawlings inspired militia groups. Given the sense of political alienation felt by many Voltarians in the post-2000 period, the addition of this disaffected ex-military factor could serve as a catalyst in this already combustible political environment. Any outbreak of conflict in the Volta region would have severe national and regional repercussions, particularly for Togo. Thus whilst the rationalisation of the security forces is to be welcomed and has the potential to reduce political interference from within the military, the process requires deft political handling to manage any backlash and will present a significant challenge for President Kufuor and his Minister of Defence.

Other key constitutional institutions such as the Commission on Human Rights and Justice continue to play a vital ombud and watchdog role and serve as important mediating and moderating bodies. Whilst the CHRAJ in particular has been hampered in its operations by a shortage of funding, steps have recently been taken to strengthen its funding base and thus sphere of operations.

Beyond State Institutions

At the national non-governmental level, a robust media that jealously guards (and cherishes)¹³ its post-Rawlings freedom also has the potential to mediate the risk of conflict. But the government ownership of a host of daily newspapers is unwelcome and draws question marks over the, sometimes

¹³ For example, World Press Freedom Day in May 2002 was celebrated for a week in Accra and the keynote address at the Institute of Journalism celebration was delivered by the Minister of Information.

unquestioning, positions adopted in editorials and coverage. Despite this pitfall, the opposition is afforded media coverage. For example, the April 2002 NDC Congress received comprehensive, print, radio and television coverage for days before, during and after the event. Furthermore, the recent decision by the NCP to withdraw support from the ruling party in parliament earned extensive front-page coverage, with space being provided for the NCP leader to expound on his highly critical reasons for withdrawing the support of his party. The decision by the Supreme Court judges against the constitutionality of the Fast Track Courts has been given broad analysis and the judgement has been serialised in its entirety in the national press. Neither is criticism of the Kufuor administration hidden. For example, a highly regarded scholar recently published an article of the administration's slippage on its promise of 'zero tolerance' for corruption. Furthermore, the highly (constructively) critical open letter to the president drafted by ISODEC was given wide coverage in the media. More recently elements of the media have embarked on a campaign urging moderation and conciliation in the reporting of the hearings of the National Reconciliation Commission, a welcome development in a country perhaps more renowned for its journalistic sensationalism. The occurrence of, and putative reasons for, conflict in Ghana also receives prominent coverage.

Beyond the mere reporting of events, there is a laudable attempt by, in particular, the weekly press to analyse the underlying or propellant issues of conflict. However, reportage of conflict is frequently characterised both by moral outrage and sensationalism. Attempts to vet newspaper reportage of the Yendi crisis met with indignation from the press and it is not clear to what degree editors are complying with government's demand or the extent to which government is enforcing or policing its decision. It is, however, a retrograde step.

Civil society in Ghana is deepening, extensive and active. Ghana exhibits a number of encouraging characteristics in this regard. Despite, and in some respects, because of, years of authoritarian rule, civil society has been forced to develop its own networks and indeed coping mechanisms. These organisations cover the full gamut from community development organisations, to paralegal, to credit unions, advocacy and women's' groups. This study has pointed out that there exist some 106 poverty focused funding and project groups. The Non-Governmental Sector has been the beneficiary of a myriad of aid agencies, foundations and donor country projects throughout Ghana, but unlike a number of other countries that have made the transition from authoritarian to democratic rule, these NGOs have continued to proliferate. In this regard the role of international aid agencies, foundations and the donor community remains critical in strengthening Ghanaian civil society. This factor cannot be overstated. Every facet of Ghanaian civil society is the beneficiary of such support, from educational programmes, to capacity building, advocacy and environmental management support. It is difficult to conceive of one significant civil society initiative in Ghana that has not been, or is not being, supported in some way by the international community. The lack of capacity of the Ghanaian state amplifies the importance of the international community's role in this regard. The removal or withdrawal of support for and engagement with such community organisations would heighten the risk of civil society being disempowered, increasingly marginalized or 'crowded out' by the state. At the same time, any diminution in the capacity of civil society to carry out its activities effectively erodes its capacity for moderating the drivers of conflict and indeed mediating the potential for conflict.

Ghana's extensive diplomatic, multilateral, trade, cultural and political ties with the international community may further reduce the potential for conflict. Ghana is both proud of, and protective over, its status as a valued member of the international community, particularly in a region renowned for

economic decay and civil strife. The Kufuor administration and indeed Ghanaians in general, place great store by their international ties and the approval of the international community. Ghanaian nationalism is most prominent when it is being displayed before the eyes of the international community. Increasingly too, Ghana is developing a self-image as an international success case and a country that is respected for its adherence to democratic norms and standards. The Yendi conflict was regarded as highly embarrassing to the Kufuor administration, not only because of the internal political dynamics, but also because of the image the brutal slaying of the Ya-Na projected to the 'outside world'.¹⁴ A small, yet significant, indicator of Ghana's adherence to acceptable international democratic best practice was the position adopted by the observer mission to the Zimbabwe presidential elections in March 2002. Unlike the Southern African Development Community and the South African observer missions, the latter of whom declared the elections 'legitimate', the Ghanaian observers rejected the elections as flawed.

Furthermore, whilst this is difficult to document, a questioning of a broad cross-section of Ghanaians as to the reasons for the country's condition of relative peace will invariably produce a response to the effect that Ghanaians are 'peace loving'. This in no way endorses the popular 1970s and 1980s research into the national character types that predispose nations to conflict and violence. However, it is remarkable that there is widespread agreement that Ghanaians (whilst proud of their military prowess) primarily actively seek out peaceful solutions to disputes, rather than resorting to violence. This makes the conflict in the Northern Region, for example, all the more 'shocking' to Ghanaians. Such violence in the 'distant' Northern Region does however hold the danger of entrenching notions of 'otherness' and exceptionalism, which further reinforces the yawning south-north dichotomy.

Assessing the Risks of Escalation

The Socio-Economic Challenge

A number of acute challenges confront Ghana, which although structural, have the potential to increase the risk of conflict.

Firstly, despite a sound population policy, Ghana's population continues to grow rapidly. The country's population is now almost twice that at independence. This will have an increasingly deleterious impact on land and resource pressure and will lead to accelerated environmental degradation in agricultural, mining, forestry, urban and peri-urban areas. This will immutably generate a higher number of land conflicts and is likely to produce conflicts of greater intensity. The Ghanaian authorities are currently administratively ill equipped to tackle this problem in a structured and sustainable manner.

Second, whilst the economy is showing signs of recovery and sound economic and fiscal disciplines are bearing fruit through lower inflation and interest rates, the Ghanaian economy remains fragile. Agriculture remains the major employer and contributor to GDP and this, in turn, is vulnerable to acute climatic variations. In turn, Ghana's primary exports, gold and cocoa, are externally priced commodities and thus subject to sharp price fluctuations with concomitant effect on the country's balance of payments. Despite its HIPC status Ghana remains deeply indebted and aid dependent, a

¹⁴ This was conveyed to me by a very highly placed source on condition of anonymity.

condition that is neither desirable, nor sustainable, and one that has severe implications for future development. The danger of Ghana's HIPC-driven macro-economic discipline is that, in the short term, it is likely to result in a measure of dislocation and hardship. A more than 60 per cent increase in petrol and a pending 60 per cent increase in electricity tariffs, whilst deemed necessary in order to remove unsustainable price subsidies, are steps that are felt most acutely by the poor. Liberalisation of trade as well as privatisation of commerce and industry in Ghana is a policy to which the government is committed, but which may have severe consequences on employment in the short term. Furthermore, the measures hold the potential to accentuate class and regional asymmetries. President Kufuor's NPP is regarded as a party of business and has committed itself to heralding the Golden Age of Business, but is faced simultaneously with profound competing claims for social goods and resource from a diverse cross section of the Ghanaian population. Failure to deliver tangible pro-poor benefits from the GPRS debt relief programmes and projects and a failure to attract capital investment into Ghana to boost the Golden Age, will entrench and harden popular resentment and disillusionment with the NPP's failure to deliver on its promise of 'positive change'.

Political Leadership and the Paradox of Reconciliation

Ghana is entering a critical phase of its economic and social renewal, but the keystone to the country's political reconstruction in part hinges on the 'success' of the National Reconciliation Commission (NRC). National reconciliation and the establishment of a commission to investigate human rights abuses in Ghana's modern history were well-publicised planks of the New Patriotic Party's 2000 successful election campaign. There is a broad and well articulated sentiment amongst Ghanaians that their contemporary history of authoritarian and military rule with all its attendant abrogation's of human and individual rights requires some form of social healing, predicated on truth telling. Furthermore, there is anxiousness amongst the broadest cross-spectrum of Ghanaians that the political reversals and human rights abuses of the past should never be repeated. This is in marked contrast to former President Rawlings thinly veiled threat that Ghanaians need not wait for periodic elections to express their dissatisfaction with an under performing government. As chilling as this warning was, it is of significance that during the NDC's National Congress in April 2002, Rawlings' proposals for taking the party forward were defeated at the Congress, as was the pro-Rawlings faction and party leadership candidate within the NDC. Nevertheless, the seriousness of the Rawlings threat was perhaps best borne out by the public reaction of high profile political and military leaders, including the Head of the Ghanaian military, that coups would not be contemplated, tolerated or executed by the military.

Thus whilst there is overwhelming support for both reconciliation and for both restorative and retributive justice in the form of the NRC, the process of establishing the NRC has been fraught and indeed holds the potential for reconciliation *and* for the exacerbation of political conflict. No single issue has been as politically vexed and as divisive as that of the establishment of the NRC.

From the NDC perspective (and more particularly that of the Rawlings aligned faction) the NRC has been portrayed as a thinly veiled political witch hunt with the ultimate aim of removing former President Rawlings and his supporters from the political landscape whilst simultaneously weakening the NDC and entrenching NPP political supremacy. Importantly it should be noted that the NPP rules the National Assembly with a paper-thin majority. Despite two recent by-election victories the NPP has only 102 MPs in the 200-member parliament with the NDC enjoying 92. It is furthermore of

importance to note that in May 2002 the formerly NPP aligned (at least for the 2000 election) CPP withdrew its support for the majority party in parliament.

Thus the Kufuor administration and Ghanaian society more broadly are confronted with two, sometimes competing, moral and political imperatives. For Ghanaian society to be reconciled with itself and its past requires it to embark on a process of truth telling, confession and healing. There is a moral imperative for justice (retributive and restorative) to be done and seen to be done. However the process and consequences of conducting the National Reconciliation Commission hearings are by definition fraught with danger, particularly from unreconstructed elements within the former ruling elite and military.

The Regional Dimension

Ghana enjoys a distinctive competitive advantage given its international ‘special status’ and the extensive economic, trade, social and multilateral ties to and support of the international community. Indeed the international and donor community have invested heavily in Ghana, but the country operates within the context of a highly volatile regional context, which presents current and potential dangers for its stability. These regional dangers to peace and development were brought into sharp relief by the attempted coup in Cote D’Ivoire allegedly led by former military leader and failed Presidential candidate, General Robert Guei on 19 September 2002. Despite the death of Guei in the failed coup, the subsequent rebel uprising in the northern part of the country around the country’s second city Bouake has led to considerable loss of life, dislocation and disruption. For Ghana, social unrest in Cote D’Ivoire threatens the country’s power supply, which is already intermittent, as well as the estimated 1 million Ghanaians working in the cocoa plantations of its western neighbour.¹⁵ Ghana has already set up refugee camps in the contiguous region of Brong Ahafo. The Ivorian conflict holds the potential to convey an alarming ‘demonstration effect’ insofar as the country is divided along northern (largely Muslim) and southern (largely Christian) lines. Furthermore, the regional impact of the Ivorian conflict is highlighted by the fact that, of Cote D’Ivoire’s 16 million population, 2.2 million are Burkinabe, 800,000 are Malians and 230,000 Guineans. Whilst the response to the Ivorian uprising has been regional in nature, despite recent reports of the recapturing of rebel held towns, other African and international forces have already been drawn into the conflagration.¹⁶ Thus whilst Ghana may be viewed as a beacon of democratic hope and stability in West Africa, it is far from hermetically sealed from the maladies of the region. Indeed the integrative impulses of ECOWAS (and globalisation) hold the consequential danger of instability and its attendant symptoms including national conflicts osmotically penetrating Ghana’s borders. Painting a particularly alarmist picture, Robert Kaplan has commented of the region:

‘West Africa is becoming the symbol of worldwide demographic, environmental and societal stress in which criminal anarchy emerges as the real ‘strategic’ danger. Disease, overpopulation, unprovoked crime, scarcity of resources, refugee migrations, the increasing erosion of nations states and international borders, and the empowerment of private armies, security firms and the international drug cartels now most tellingly demonstrate through a

¹⁵ The short term unintended benefit to Ghana is a sharp increase in the cocoa price to sixteen-year highs.

¹⁶ This includes French and reportedly Angolan troops.

West African prism ... There is no other place on the planet where political maps are so deceptive – where in fact they tell such lies – as in West Africa.¹⁷

The West African behemoth Nigeria presents the greatest challenge for regional stability. The ability of that country to resolve and manage its ethnic and religious tensions between the Muslim Hausa north and Muslim Yoruba South and Christian Ibo east, as well as lingering civil military tensions is arguably the key to regional long-term political stability. Nigeria appears to be entering yet another phase of political instability with the threatened impeachment of President Obasanjo. Furthermore, political turmoil is set to increase in the run up to the 2003 general elections in the country.

Ghana has also been directly affected by the Liberian civil war and is the recipient of some 22,000 Liberian refugees outside of Accra. To the north and east Burkina Faso and Togo respectively serve as conduits for the transit of illegal diamonds from Sierra Leone and reportedly Angola. Nigerian criminal and drug trafficking syndicates have also penetrated Ghana. In addition to the over 22,000 Liberian refugees, Ghana houses 2000 Sierra Leonians and a further 1000 refugees from Togo. Neither is Ghana an inert player in the refugee conundrum. After the destruction of some 300 villages in fighting in the Northern Region during 1994-95, an estimated 100,000 people were displaced, with 12,000 fleeing to Togo. According to the UNHCR it is believed that some 10,000 Ghanaians still remain in that country.

Whilst the regional environment presents a clear structural risk to stability and development in Ghana, it simultaneously acts as a warning to Ghanaians and a reminder of their relatively advantaged position as a stable, if nascent democracy. Ghana has not suffered from the destructive effect of a civil war, unlike its neighbours Nigeria, Liberia and Sierra Leone and now potentially Cote D'Ivoire. Whilst it is suffused with ethnic tensions, these have not escalated to a condition of civil war, nor have there been serious revanchist or secessionist impulses, even from the most marginalized regions. Whilst Ghanaians have suffered the economic dislocation of one million migrant workers being expelled from Nigeria, an indignity that lingers long in the social memory, the country has worked consistently with Nigeria to further the integrationist and co-operative agreements enshrined in ECOWAS protocols. The danger lies at the geographical fringes, which in the case of the northern regions of Ghana, coincide with conditions of social, economic and marginalisation. Also it is on the country's northern borders that drug trafficking, diamond and weapons smuggling are most prevalent. These geographic regions coincide too with incidents of violent conflict between migrating peoples settling on, or being granted contested land that sets in motion a chain of claim and counter claim that inherently holds the potential for escalation into violent conflict.

Conflict Assessment Summary

Ghana has justifiably earned its reputation as a country of stability and burgeoning democracy in a region riven by conflict and democratic reversal. Most key macro-indicators, economic, social and democratic point to a slowly improving national picture. Structural conditions that may give rise to, or pre-dispose the country to, the outbreak of conflict, such as regional underdevelopment, relative deprivation, economic exogenous shocks and poverty remain ever present and resistant to either management or improvement. A number of the conflict driving conditions peculiar to Ghana also

¹⁷ As quoted in Greg Mills with Antoinette Handley, *Ghana After Rawlings*, Country Report No. 1, South African Institute of International Affairs, 2001, p.17.

remain highly resistant to management and policy implementation, such as land ownership and reform, as well as traditional political, social and economic modes of organisation. The challenge for conflict prevention, management and amelioration in Ghana is less one of identifying the conditions, drivers and triggers giving rise to conflict, nor indeed the absence of political institutions and will to tackle these questions, but rather the acute lack of basic resources and infrastructure to implement meaningful policy. Given the close linkage between conflict and broad conditions of inequality and underdevelopment, Ghana's predominant condition of (sometimes) unstable peace is likely to remain at risk for as long as this pervasive lacuna in core capacity persists.



II Sources of Conflict and Capacities for Peace

A. Basic Social and Economic Conditions

Factor # 1. Level of General Economic Development or Deterioration

Are basic social and economic resources widely available or increasingly scarce?

Ghana's recent economic development has been both uneven and paradoxical. Uneven in that economic growth, whilst healthy in nominal terms, has been strongly geared to its export of minerals (largely gold) and cocoa. Robust GDP growth disguises a myriad of structural deficiencies within the Ghanaian economy, all of which present considerable challenges not only to the Kufuor government, but more broadly, social stability and, in turn, the potential for conflict. The paradox of the Ghanaian economic dynamic is that the economic crisis, which played a significant part in the result of the 2000 election, is likely to play the defining role in the 2004 election, this time to the detriment of the Kufuor administration. Indeed the Kufuor administration inherited an economy that, in addition to its structural difficulties, had also been mismanaged for decades. It has become clear that prior to the 2000 election, not only did the Ghanaian economy undergo a series of reversals and exogenous shocks, but also the level of fiscal abuse of the economy by the Rawlings administration had reached unprecedented levels. The irony of democracy for Ghana is that whilst the Rawlings government may have been able to successfully manipulate the organs of state for the years preceding the 2000 election, the Kufuor government, which is committed to greater transparency and a 'zero tolerance' for corruption, will have fewer options for the distribution of political and popular largesse. Additionally, a more democratic, open and accountable government (less reliant on the threat of censorship and the security forces) has the potential to create the political space for opponents to demonstrate against the strict fiscal and monetary policies imposed by the Kufuor administration and the concomitant short term hardships these are likely to herald. A number of the key economic indicators are provided below.

Table 1.1. Gross Domestic Product (At constant 1993 prices - billion Cedis)

Year	GDP	Real Growth (%)
1995	4160.0	4.0
1996	4351.2	4.6
1997	4533.9	4.2
1998	4746.7	4.7
1999	4956.9	4.4
2000	5142.1	3.7

Note: At the time of writing the effective exchange rate was approximately 7700 Cedis to the Euro or 7900 to the US dollar.

Source: 'Bank of Ghana Annual Report 2000', Information, Documentation and Publications Services (IDPS) Department, Bank of Ghana, December 2000, Accra, p. 51.

Ghana has a Gross Domestic Product of US\$ 34, 470 billion, which translates into a per capita GDP of US\$ 1,765.¹⁸ The 2001 per capita income was some US\$ 390.

Whereas the Ghanaian economy has exhibited steady if patchy growth in the five years under review, a key Achilles heel has been that of high interest rates and inflation. The pattern of sharp increases in consumer prices and inflation is depicted below:

Table 1.2. National Consumer Price Index and Inflation (1977 = 100)

Year	Consumer Price Index		Rate of Inflation	
	Annual Average	End Period	Annual Average	Year-on-Year
1994	29,069	33,347	24.9	34.2
1995	46,355	56,964	59.5	70.8
1996	67,938	75,569	46.6	32.7
1997	86,883	91,311	27.9	20.8
1998*	114.62	116.91	-	20.8
1999*	128.89	133.03	12.4	13.8
2000*	161.31	186.96	24.9	40.5

*Note: * New series*

Source: 'Bank of Ghana Annual Report 2000', Information, Documentation and Publications Services (IDPS) Department, Bank of Ghana, December 2000, Accra, p. 58.

The sharp increase in both inflation and the consumer price index was a significant factor in the broad 'dissatisfaction vote' in the 2000 election. With regard to the impact on key consumer goods and thus poverty, there was a sharp increase (24.3%) in the Food and Beverages sub-group. Acute hikes were also experienced in: Household Goods Operations and Services increased by 83.1%; Housing and Utilities by 67.6%; Miscellaneous Goods and Services by 57.7%; Clothing and Footwear by 56.1%; Transport and Communications by 50.4%, Medical and Health Expenses by 31.6% and finally,

¹⁸ At the time of writing the most current reliable statistic generally pertain to the year 2000. The 2002 budget contains 'provisional' 2001 statistics. Wherever possible more recent reliable statistic are used.

Recreation, Entertainment, Education and Cultural Services by 30.2%. These price increases were, in part, driven by a sharp (49.3%) decrease (33% decrease against the US dollar in 1999) in the value of the cedi in 2000, a marked increase in the price of petroleum, as well as a relative shortage in food production for the year. Furthermore, in June 2000 Value Added Tax (VAT) was increased by 2.5%.

In addition to a spike in inflation and consumer prices, Ghana has struggled to keep its balance of payments in check. In 2000 the country recorded a deficit of US\$221 million (or the equivalent to 3.6% of GDP) compared to US\$93.7 million for 1999. This is against a backdrop of a balance of payments surplus of US\$249.1 in 1995. Cocoa and gold continued to be the major source of export receipts accounting for 59% of total earned. The extent of the dependence on gold and cocoa is both significant and an issue of concern for the Ghanaian economy given that the price of both commodities is 'externally' determined. Thus the Ghanaian economy remains acutely sensitive to fluctuations in export commodity prices and thereby vulnerable to exogenous shocks. The year 2000 saw a current account deficit of US\$474 million, whereas the capital account registered a surplus of US\$251.6 million. However, external debt increased by US\$63.89 million to a staggering US\$6,038 million by the end of 2000. This was largely due to an increase in long-term debt. Multilateral institutions (excluding the IMF) account for 67% of total debt followed by bilateral institutions with 28% and the IMF accounting for 5%.¹⁹ Another feature of the Ghanaian economy is its acute aid dependence. The table below highlights the extent of dependence.

Table 1.3. Indicators of Ghana's External Dependence

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000
Central Govt. Development Budget					
% Domestically-Financed	42.0	37.0	15.6	26.3	46.7
% Foreign Financed	58.0	63.0	84.4	73.7	53.4
Foreign Debt Service					
% GDP	5.5	5.0	4.2	4.8	4.6
% Tax Revenue	33.5	34.0	28	34.5	31.1

Source: 'Ghana Macroeconomic Review 2000', Centre for Policy Analysis, November 2001, Accra, p. 21.

Furthermore, fiscal performance has been less than satisfactory. In 2000 the budget deficit of 2,397.2 billion cedis (against an estimate of 1,397.0 billion cedis) was financed by domestic borrowing. At the end of 2000 domestic debt was 7,842.3 billion cedis the bulk of which (75.4%) was held by the banking sector. Interest rates were persistently high during the period under review and for the year 2000 the Treasury bill rate hovered around 31%. Lending rates ranged between 28% -47% with deposit rates showing a massive discount, averaging between 1% and 26%. With such a differential in borrowing and lending interest rates savings rates are low in Ghana, as is demand for money. Such

¹⁹ Caution is urged in interpreting a host of Ghanaian macro-economic data, some of which are contradictory and ambiguous. For example, in November 2000 the IMF warned, 'The Mission was unable to obtain basic historical data to verify whether 2000 debt payments were current. All indications suggest that external arrears have persisted through November 2000 ... The Mission found that information provided to the fund before the August 2000 Executive Board meeting was incomplete'. The seriousness of these observations is more acute when it is noted that these criticisms took place whilst Ghana was in the mid-term of a three-year Poverty Reduction and Growth arrangement with the Fund. *Ghana Macroeconomic Review 2000*, Centre for Policy Analysis, Accra, November 2001, p.8.

generous T-Bill rates also created ‘artificialities’ within the banking sector which serve as an active disincentive to lend to the private sector. Such was the reluctance of the banks to deal with the private sector that in 1999 two large foreign owned banks imposed a ‘savings maintenance fee’ of 4,000 cedis per month on accounts that fell below 500,000 cedis.

Whilst the market capitalisation of the Ghana Stock Exchange (GSE) has crept up over recent years, it remains a small and highly illiquid market. Its market capitalisation grew from 2,763.36 billion cedis in 1997 to 3,655.04 cedis by the end of 2000. As a small emerging market the GSE suffered considerable reversals in 1999 in particular as a result of the contagion effect of the East Asian and emerging market economic and financial crises.

Construction (Roads and Housing)

Road construction and rehabilitation continues to fall short of the planned and projected national demand. In 2000, 594 km of roads were re-gravelled, 106km resealed and 529km were rehabilitated. However, this falls considerably short of the planned 1100km of re-gravelling, 350km of resealing and 1395km of rehabilitation. The annual housing requirement in Ghana is for some 140,000 units, yet in 2000 a mere 30,000 were constructed.²⁰

The Service Sector

The service sector continues to be the fastest growing sector of the Ghanaian economy, growing consistently at some 5% for the period under review. The following growth indices for 2000 are of note. Community, Social and Personal Services (6.9%); Transport, Storage and Communication (6.0%); Government Services (6.0%); Finance, Insurance, Real Estate and Business Services (5.0%); Wholesale and Retail Trade, Restaurants and Hotels (4.0%) and Producers of Private Non-Profit Services (3.1%).

Telecommunications

The telecommunications sector has been a significant beneficiary of the previous and present government’s policy of liberalisation and privatisation. This has resulted in a healthy growth in the number of communication service providers. There are now two National Network Providers, one rural operator, four mobile cellular operators, twenty-nine Internet Operators, three Free to Air TV stations, forty-nine privately owned radio stations, seven pay-per-view cable/satellite operators and seven pager companies. The number of phone lines to urban and rural users increased by 27.2 per cent in 2000 from 160,308 in 1999 to 203,922 in 2000. Payphones increased by 5.2 per cent over the year and cell/mobile telephone subscriptions increased by 159 per cent to 152,850 in 2000.

Tourism

This sector continues to show healthy growth. International tourist arrivals grew from 256,680 in 1993 to 399,000 in 2000. With receipts growing from US\$ 205.62 million to US\$ 386.00 million in 2000. Whilst tourism is one of the most effective job and economic ‘multiplier’ industries, tourism to Ghana is largely concentrated in the coastal areas and to a lesser extent Kumasi (Ashanti Region). Thus the direct benefit is regionally specific, further accentuating the regional economic and developmental asymmetries within the country.

²⁰ Sector Handout, Government of Ghana, Ministry of Works and Housing (PPME), Accra, 2000. p.4.

Presenting the 2002 budget to Parliament, Minister of Finance, Yaw Osafo-Mafo stated that financial policy was aimed at intensifying efforts to strengthen public sector financial management and lay the foundations for sustained economic growth.²¹ In keeping with the broad objectives of the government's medium-term economic and financial programme, the key macroeconomic targets for 2002 are:

- A real GDP growth of at least 4.5 per cent;
- A reduction in the rate of inflation from 21.0 per cent at end-2001 to 13.0 per cent by end-2002;
- An overall budget deficit equivalent to 6.9 per cent of GDP;
- A domestic primary budget surplus of 4.2 per cent of GDP;
- The rebuilding of gross official reserve holdings, equivalent to 2.6 months of imports of goods and services.

In order to achieve these targets and lay the foundation for further gains in subsequent years; the following key policies in addition to other policies would be adopted:

- A more effective control and monitoring of public expenditures;
- Reduction in the government's domestic debt as a share of GDP, and using any un-programmed receipts from divestiture and programme aid, as well as a portion of HIPC relief, to retire domestic debt;
- The containment of the indebtedness of the main parastatals through price adjustments and explicitly allocated subsidies from the budget, until full cost recovery can reasonably be obtained;
- The continued monitoring and protection of the health of the banking system;
- The development of an effective inter-bank foreign exchange market to improve the allocation of external resources;
- The development of a vibrant secondary market in the trading of government financial instruments.

Overall real GDP growth in 2002 is projected at 4.5 per cent. Agriculture was programmed to grow at 4.1 per cent. Within the agricultural sector, the crops and livestock sub-sector is programmed to grow at 4.0 per cent, and cocoa production and marketing is expected to recover strongly from -1.0 per cent in 2001 to 4.3 per cent. Forestry and logging is expected to show a stronger growth of 5.8 per cent over the figure of 4.8 per cent in 2001. Industry is forecast to grow at 4.7 per cent due mainly to a strong recovery by the mining sector from a growth of -1.6 per cent in 2001 to 4.5 per cent in 2002. The recovery in gold prices is expected to boost growth in that sub-sector. Manufacturing and construction are also projected to show improved growth rates of 4.8 per cent and 5.0 per cent, respectively. The growth in the Services sector is projected at 4.7 per cent, showing a lower projected growth in 2002 than in 2001. The decline in projected growth is attributable to the decline in projected government services, as the government reduces the provision of direct services in favour of private sector participation, through the provision of better policies and regulatory support. The Minister of Finance projected the following sectoral growth rates:

²¹ http://ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/GhanaECONS/budget_2002.pdf.

- Transport, Storage and Communication 5.7 per cent;
- Wholesale/Retail Trade, Restaurants and Hotels 5.6 per cent; and
- Finance, Insurance, Real Estate and Business services 5.5 per cent growth.

Key Issues

An economy that has suffered from decades of mismanagement, culminating in a series of crises in 2000, is now showing signs of stabilisation and recovery. Fiscal and macro-economic discipline is bearing fruit in lower inflation, lower interests rates and healthy GDP growth rates. Improvement in key export prices such as cocoa and gold are currently aiding this recovery by having positive impact on the balance of payments.

Factor # 2: Resource Base and Structure of the Economy

Do the country and society in question have diverse and expanding, or limited economic production capacities?



The map above provides a graphic depiction of Ghana's ecological zones, which broadly correspond areas of greatest prosperity (Greater Accra, the southern and central regions) to those of agricultural dependency in the north.²² A statistical snapshot of the Ghanaian economy is provided below:

Table 2.1. Gross Domestic Product by Sector (At constant 1993 prices - billion Cedis)

Item	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000
Agriculture	1,511.20	1,590.1	1,658.4	1,743	1,810.8	1,849.1
Crops & livestock	1,038.40	1,103.5	1,132.7	1,182.5	1,238.1	1,251.7
Cocoa	134.7	138.6	151.5	168.3	167.5	177.9
Forestry & Logging	111.8	114.8	139.5	153.5	163.9	182.1
Fishing	226.3	233.2	234.7	238.9	241.3	237.4
Industry	1,035.30	1,084.4	1,153.3	1,190.1	1,248.4	1,295.3
Mining - Quarrying	234.3	244.2	257.8	273.5	281.7	285.9
Manufacturing	375.4	388.4	416.9	433.6	454.4	471.7
Electricity - Water	111.2	118.3	130.4	117.4	126.6	132.3
Construction	314.4	333.5	348.2	365.6	385.7	405.4
Services	1,170.80	1,220.3	1,300.2	1,378.7	1,447.8	1,525.3
Transport, Storage Communication	183.50	192.7	206.6	218.0	231.0	244.9
Wholesale and Retail, Restaurants & Hotels	252.50	273.4	299.4	317.4	338.0	351.5
Finance, Insurance, Real Estate & Business	170.10	177.3	189.2	201.5	209.6	220.2
Government Services	451.90	462.6	482.4	512.3	532.8	564.8
Community & Social Services	74.80	75.6	81.1	85.9	91.0	97.3
Producers of Private Non- Profit Services	38.00	38.7	41.5	43.6	45.4	46.8
GDP in Purchaser's Values	4,160	4,351.2	4,533.9	4,746.7	4,956.9	5,142.1

Source: 'Bank of Ghana Annual Report 2000', Information, Documentation and Publications Services (IDPS) Department, Bank of Ghana, December 2000, Accra, p. 52.

The above table illustrates that the agriculture sector continues to dominate the Ghanaian economy contributing some 39.6% of GDP in 2000. Within the sector, crops and livestock (principally subsistence farming) predominate. Forestry and logging show the most growth in the sector. Although financially lucrative, this growth has distinct implications for environmental management as well as the ecology. Industrial production shows slow, if steady growth, but a slow down in a number of sub sectors in 2000, particularly manufacturing, damaged growth. Whilst gold production was stable

²² Map reproduced from *Ghana Living Standards Survey Report of the Fourth Round (GLSS 4)*, Ghana Statistical Service, Accra, 2000.

during the period under review, 2000 again saw a decline in the expected production due to the closure of a number of mines on the back of a weaker than expected gold price.

Cocoa has shown slow but steady growth and fishing has remained stable, although exhibiting a decline from 1999 to 2000. Notably, the year 2000 saw a decline in cocoa prices to an average of 594 pounds per tonne compared with 723 pounds for 1999. The relatively low price paid to local producers resulted in extensive illegal cross-border shipments of cocoa to neighbouring states where higher 'black market' prices were achieved. In 2002 the government announced that the price of cocoa would follow the world market. Thus the price paid for cocoa to the producer by the government increased from 4.3 million cedis to 6.2 million cedis²³ per metric tonne, an increase of 31%. The price of cocoa has risen by 70% since September 2001 and is now at 1,210 sterling.²⁴

With the exception of a marked increase in rice production, cereal production over the five-year period has been stable. A more healthy increase in starchy staples such as Cassava and Yam is noteworthy. Livestock production over the same period showed marginal increases, with the exception of poultry and goats. Poultry production grew from 14,589 thousand units in 1996 to 20,472 in 2000 and goat production from 2,340 thousand units to 3,076 thousand units in 2000. Pig production showed a slight increase over the same period.

The agricultural sector is particularly vulnerable to climatic shifts and extremes. Having experienced an exceptionally dry spell in 1998 following the El Nino phenomenon in 1997, agricultural output was severely hampered in 1999 by extensive flooding. Within the Savannah Belt each region recorded at least one month that was more than 70 per cent above the long-term average. In some cases this was up to 84 per cent higher than the long term average (LTA).²⁵ This was immediately followed by an unexpected hot spell, which, in turn, induced a massive armyworm invasion in the three northern (poorest) regions that constitute the Guinea Savannah Belt. This resulted in an estimated 5% loss of cereal production. The extent of the flooding resulted in considerable damage to road and rail infrastructure, the stranding of farms and farmers and the loss of large stock of perishable produce. Likewise in 1999 the Forest Belt farmers (principally cocoa farmers) were negatively affected by the terms of trade shock that eroded real incomes by an estimated 15 per cent. The loss of export revenues had a knock-on effect on both tax revenues and the budget.

The Transitional Belt experienced exceptionally dry conditions in 1998 receiving only 57 per cent of the LTA for the region. These drought-like conditions were reversed in 1999 with a precipitation excess of 15 per cent LTA for the year. With this recent acute variation in rainfall patterns it is understandable that some 66 per cent Ghanaian farmers regard rain as the primary variable to determining the success of their crop.²⁶

A disturbing trend of the 1990s was the increasing number of failed businesses. This indicated amongst other things a lack of competitiveness of Ghanaian business. From 1995 to 1999 an average of 470 enterprises per year closed down. During this period the rate of business failure was increased by over 80 per cent, with the largest increase occurring in 1998 when the country experienced a series of chronic power shortages and failures. The Greater Accra area experienced a disproportionately high number of business closures suffering about 48 per cent of all failures during the period. The Ashanti region's share of failed businesses was second at some 12 per cent. The four regions of Volta,

²³ The equivalent of 873 euro per tonne.

²⁴ *Daily Graphic*, March 14, 2002.

²⁵ *Ghana Macroeconomic Outlook and Review 2000*, Centre for Policy Analysis, Accra 2000, p.14.

²⁶ *Ghana Macroeconomic Outlook and Review 2000*, p.13.

Western, Eastern and Upper East all improved their relative position. However business failure in the poorest regions of Upper West, Central, Brong Ahafo and Northern was marked.

In addition to inefficiencies, relatively low productivity, a shortage of skills and capital, high levels of corruption in both the public and private sectors have also hampered Ghanaian business. Ghana's Transparency International score hovers between 3.3 and 3.4 (out of a maximum score of 10), currently ranking it in 59th place.

Table 2.2. Enterprise Failure By Region

Region	1996	1997	1998	1999
Greater Accra	180	124	298	291
Ashanti	41	51	54	70
Western	33	24	28	30
Eastern	35	17	27	31
Volta	21	28	14	17
Upper East	21	48	23	21
Upper West	1	37	37	14
Central	26	57	48	70
Brong Ahafo	17	25	30	35
Northern	2	11	42	29
Total	377	422	601	608

Source: Ghana Macroeconomic Review and Outlook, CEPA, 2000, p.29.

2.1. Energy Production

In terms of energy generation whilst the period under review has shown a slow but steady increase the production of electricity remains sometimes episodic and relatively inefficient. The Akosombo dam is by far the largest producer of electricity representing 5,557.26 million kilowatt hours out of a total generation of 7,222.72 million kilowatt hours. Hydropower generation remains some 89.32% of total power generation. The problem with this disproportionate dependence on hydroelectric power is the dependence on rainfall and dam levels. For example, in 1998 the Akosombo and Kpong hydro electrical power stations generated 3,166 and 664 million kilowatt hours respectively compared to 5,711 and 1,140 million kilowatt hours in the preceding year. The poor rainfall levels resulted in exceptionally low levels in the Volta dam giving rise to chronic power shortages and outages. Ghana also imports electricity principally from Cote D'Ivoire.

Other problems with electricity generation stem from the lack of connectivity between the Takoradi plant, which has surplus capacity that cannot be linked to the Greater Accra region where the need is greatest. A further point of significance is that the unit price of electricity is slated to increase by some 60% in 2002. This is likely to have a major impact on affordability levels, production prices and indeed consumer prices. Whilst an increase in electricity prices may not directly affect the acutely impoverished (who by definition do not have access to electricity reticulation and rely on firewood and charcoal for heating and cooking) the 'knock-on' or indirect effect may be significant. The increase in electricity prices is a further manifestation of the NPP government's policies of macro-

economic and fiscal discipline, but which are likely to have deleterious short-term social consequences and indeed may negatively impact on Ghana's poverty profile.

2.2. Water Supply

In terms of water supply, the Ghana Water Company Limited (GWCL) operated a total of 98 urban water systems in 2000. The GWCL also operates in 35 small towns including water supply from boreholes and hand dug wells. Alarming, of a total of 20,110.2 million gallons, the company accounted for only 49.4% by way of distribution, with the rest being lost through illegal connections and waste.

2.3. Employment

Employment levels of the economically active sector of the Ghanaian economy are relatively high at some 82 per cent. Formal rates of unemployment are broadly higher in urban than in rural areas. Employment rates both regionally and nationally are slightly higher for men than for women. Agriculture is by far the largest employer by sector. In the rural areas agriculture accounts for some 70 per cent of all employment. Three out of every four economically active males in the rural areas are employed in the agricultural sector whereas for women this figure is one in three. In urban areas sales and commercial activities are the largest single employer. These are largely vendors and informal traders however. Production (including manufacturing) is the highest employer of men in the urban areas.

Table 2.3. Employment Status of Population aged 15+, by sex and locality (%)

	Urban			Rural			Ghana		
Employment Status	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total
Employed	79.6	77.4	78.3	86.0	82.3	84.0	84.0	80.7	82.1
Unemployed	13.2	10.9	11.9	4.4	4.2	4.3	7.2	6.4	6.7
Student	1.0	0.8	0.9	1.6	0.8	1.2	1.4	0.8	1.1
Home-maker	1.6	4.2	3.0	2.0	4.4	3.3	1.9	4.3	3.2
Too Old	0.5	0.4	0.5	0.2	0.5	0.3	0.3	0.5	0.4
Sick/Disabled	1.6	3.0	2.4	2.5	3.3	3.0	2.2	3.2	2.8
Other	2.6	3.2	3.0	3.3	4.6	4.0	3.1	4.1	3.7

Source: 'Ghana Living Standards Survey Report of the Fourth Round (GLSS4)', Ghana Statistical Service, October 2000, Accra, p. 29.

The majority of economically active Ghanaians are self-employed either as subsistence farmers in the rural areas or agricultural and one-person traders in the urban areas. The table below illustrates this pattern.

Table 2.4. Type of Employer for population aged 15-64 years by locality and sex

	Urban			Rural			Ghana		
Main Employer	Male	Female	All	Male	Female	All	Male	Female	All
Self-Employment (agriculture)	22.0	16.2	18.8	71.1	64.0	67.2	55.9	48.7	52.0
Public Sector	17.5	6.5	11.4	6.3	1.8	3.9	9.8	3.3	6.2
Private formal	25.0	6.0	14.5	7.6	1.4	4.2	13.0	2.9	7.5
Private informal & self-employment (non-agriculture)	35.5	71.4	55.3	15.0	32.8	24.7	21.4	45.1	34.3

Source: 'Ghana Living Standards Survey Report of the Fourth Round (GLSS4)', Ghana Statistical Service, October 2000, Accra, p. 30.

Two further indicators are of importance. Firstly, the relatively high state sector employment rate in urban areas and conversely the low private formal employment rates throughout the Ghanaian economy, but most significantly in the rural areas. Secondly, gender disparities are acute, with four times the percentage of males than females being employed in the formal private sector. The pattern of a dearth of managerial and clerical employment across regions in Ghana is depicted in the table below. This illustrates perhaps a shortage of opportunities in this area of employment, but more importantly highlights the critical lack of managerial and clerical skills that fetter the Ghanaian economy and indeed the public sector. Whilst the picture for professional and technical employment is not as critical, the low level of employment in this and the managerial sector exemplifies the problem of a severe brain drain out of the Ghanaian economy.

Table 2.5. Main Occupation of Population aged 15-64 in the last 7 days, by locality and sex (%)

	Urban			Rural			Ghana		
Main Occupation	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total
Professional/Technical	9.4	4.7	6.8	4.1	1.8	2.8	5.7	2.7	4.1
Admin./Managerial	1.3	0.2	0.7	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.4	0.1	0.2
Clerical	8.2	2.6	5.1	1.7	0.5	1.0	3.7	1.2	2.3
Sales/Commercial	15.0	48.2	33.4	4.6	17.6	11.6	7.8	27.3	18.5
Service	11.3	7.3	9.1	2.9	2.5	2.7	5.5	4.0	4.7
Agricultural	24.8	15.9	19.9	74.3	66.5	70.1	59.0	50.3	54.3
Production	30.0	21.1	25.1	12.5	11.2	11.8	17.9	14.4	16.0

Source: 'Ghana Living Standards Survey Report of the Fourth Round (GLSS4)', Ghana Statistical Service, October 2000, Accra, p. 31.

It is of significance to note that even though the mining industry is a major contributor to the Ghanaian economy and to export earnings in particular, given the capital-intensive nature of the sector, it is not a major direct contributor to employment. The lack of capital investment in the Ghanaian economy is also reflected in the relatively low employment figures in the construction sector.

Table 2.6. Distribution of Population aged 15-64 in the last 7 days, by type of work and sex (%)

	Urban			Rural			Ghana		
Main Industry	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total
Agriculture	25.7	17.1	21.0	75.1	66.9	70.7	59.8	51.1	55.0
Mining/Quarrying	2.3	0.0	1.0	1.0	0.1	0.5	1.4	0.1	0.7
Manufacturing	13.6	20.9	17.6	6.8	10.7	8.9	8.9	13.9	11.7
Utilities	0.8	0.3	0.5	0.1	0.0	0.1	0.4	0.1	0.2
Construction	4.9	0.1	2.2	1.9	0.2	1.0	2.8	0.2	1.4
Trading	13.5	48.6	32.8	4.6	17.5	11.6	7.4	27.4	18.3
Transportation/comm.	11.2	0.2	5.1	1.7	0.1	0.8	4.6	0.1	0.8
Financial Services	4.2	0.4	2.1	0.5	0.0	0.2	1.7	0.1	0.8
Community/Social Services	23.8	12.5	17.5	8.2	4.5	6.2	13.0	7.1	9.8

Source: 'Ghana Living Standards Survey Report of the Fourth Round (GLSS4)', Ghana Statistical Service, October 2000, Accra, p. 32.

The table below depicts sectoral earnings patterns. The lowest earnings per sector are to be found in the agricultural sector, with average earnings approximately half that of major other sectors including mining, manufacturing, utilities and construction. The wage differential is even more marked when measured against traders and in particular against clerical, professional and managerial classes. But perhaps the most significant pattern is the earnings differential within sectors between males and females. At the extremes in the manufacturing sector, women earn 45 per cent of their male counterparts. Even in the agricultural sector women earn just 64 per cent that of their male counterparts. The exception to this phenomenon is found in the administrative and managerial sector where female earnings outstrip those of their male counterparts.

Table 2.7. Average Basic Hourly Earnings in Main Job, by sex and industry and by sex and main occupation of active population aged 15+ (cedis)

Main Industry	Male	Female	Total	Main Occupation	Male	Female	Total
Agriculture	598	381	512	Professional/Technical	1390	1249	1339
Mining/Quarrying	1505	832	1484	Admin./Managerial	2599	3452	2694
Manufacturing	1787	801	1156	Clerical	3485	1223	2859
Utilities	1199	600	1105	Sales/Commercial	2802	1093	1427
Construction	1062	512	1019	Service	936	644	805
Trading	2554	1123	1411	Agricultural	616	383	519
Transportation/Comm.	1196	920	1187	Production	1009	761	889
Financial Services	1478	1257	1454				
Community/Social Services	1126	896	1035				
Total	1070	785	928	Total	1084	756	918

Source: 'Ghana Living Standards Survey Report of the Fourth Round (GLSS4)', Ghana Statistical Service, October 2000, Accra, p. 35.

In summary, employment opportunities, particularly in the formal sector, remain highly circumscribed. This has not been aided by the increasing company failure rate. Thus, President Kufuor's policy of creating a 'Golden Age of Business' and that of the country's investment and business development initiatives is crucial for growth in formal employment.

2.4. Education and Literacy

Table 2.8 (below) indicates high levels of illiteracy in Ghanaian society and relatedly a substantial number of people never to have attended school. A number of studies have indicated that education levels of the household head and members of the household is a key determinant of poverty. Thus such high levels of illiteracy can be seen to be a compounding factor to the high poverty levels in the country as well as fettering broad development in Ghana.

Table 2.8. Selected Educational Characteristics of Population by Region		
Educational Characteristics	All Regions	
<i>Literacy (15yrs+)</i>		11,161,576
Not Literate	45.9%	5,120,945
Literate in Ghanaian. Lang. Only	6.4%	718,247
Literate in English Only	12.7%	1,420,393
Literate in Eng. & Ghanaian. Lang.	34.2%	3,812,152
Literate in Other Languages	0.8%	89,839
<i>Full Time Schooling (3yrs+)</i>		17,246,465
Never Attended School	43.4%	7,493,584
Now in School	28.5%	4,913,628
Attended School in the Past	28.1%	4,839,253
<i>Highest Level in School (3yrs+)</i>		9,752,024
Pre-School	7.4%	723,007
Primary	32.7%	3,186,414
Middle/JSS	37.3%	3,638,535
Secondary/SSS	10.7%	1,045,766
Voc./Tech/Commercial	4.0%	387,689
Post Sec/Agric/Nurse/Teaching	2.8%	268,307
Tertiary	5.2%	502,306
<i>Source: 'Ghana 2000 National Census', Ghana Statistical Service, 2000, Accra.</i>		

Furthermore, marked regional asymmetries exist in education and literacy between regions. This literacy and education cleavage generally mirrors the north/south divide that characterises most of Ghana's Human Development Indexes (HDIs). At the extremes the Great Accra Region has a literacy rate of 79 per cent, with Ashanti above the national average at 60 per cent. In contrast, the Northern Region lags with a literacy rate of just 21 per cent. The three northern regions of Upper West, Upper East and Northern have an aggregate mean literacy rate of just 22 per cent. This position is not static however. Along with the health sector, education has been at the centre of much of the developmental

discourse in Ghana in recent years. Educational reform in Ghana began in earnest in 1987 and sought to:

- Expand and make access more equitable at all levels of education;
- To change the structure of the school system;
- To improve pedagogic efficiency and effectiveness;
- To make education more ‘relevant’ (including the teaching of more ‘practical’ subjects, such as agriculture);
- To ensure financial sustainability of the sector;
- To enhance sector management and budgeting procedures.

This programme (including the establishment of free compulsory basic education) resulted in some significant improvements in school enrolments, most notably in the northern regions. Enrolment in public primary schools in the Northern Region increased by some 10.375 per cent between 1988/89 and 1999/2000. For the Upper East Region the increase was 7.97 per cent and for Upper West Region some 3.139 per cent. A feature of the higher enrolments particularly in the northern regions is the disproportionately high number of female enrolments. This was driven by a deliberate and effective policy of providing a dry ration pack to mothers who enrolled their female daughters for primary education. This has resulted in a 6.78 per cent increase in the number of female over male enrolments in the three northern regions. Scholastic performance scores remain strongly skewed in favour of the southern regions and with Greater Accra, Central Region and Ashanti scholars performing particularly well. Thus, despite some 15 years of focused policy intervention, stark regional inequalities persist and are likely to be a feature of Ghanaian society for some time. Such clear disparities are structural and have the potential to exacerbate entrenched feelings of social and economic marginalisation by the population of the northern regions.

2.5. Health

The causal link between poverty and health is axiomatic. Ill health is both a cause and consequence of poverty. The World Health Organisation ranks Ghana 149th at a rating in terms of equality of health care. Its overall health system performance is ranked 135th in the world and 149th in terms of overall levels of health. Some 25% of all Ghanaian children are underweight by age 5. With an infection rate of 11,941 per 100,000 of population Malaria remains a debilitating disease for hundreds of thousands of Ghanaians. Tuberculosis remains a lesser, yet persistent health problem with 53 per 100,000 of population.

HIV/AIDS infection rates are increasing at an alarming rate. There are already 160 000 so-called AIDS orphans in Ghana. The country currently has an infection rate of 4.6%, which whilst considerably lower than many of its southern African counterparts, there are considerable problems confronting the health authorities and the Ghana HIV/AIDS Strategy Framework (2001-2005) in particular. Not least of these is the relatively low contraception use amongst the population. With a 4.6 fertility rate, a mere 13 per cent of women and 20 per cent of men use modern contraceptive methods. A number of the key health indices are highlighted below:

Table 2.9. Commitment to Health: Access, Services and Resources

One year olds fully immunized against tuberculosis (%)	88
Total government expenditure on health as % of GDP	5.5
Medical Doctors (per 100, 000 people)	6
Births attended by skilled health staff (%)	44
Contraceptive prevalence (%)	22
One year olds fully immunized against measles (%)	73
Population with access to essential drugs (%)	44
Population using improved water sources (%)	64
Population using adequate sanitation facilities (%)	63
Oral re-hydration therapy usage (%)	36

Source: United Nations Development Programme Human Development Report 2001 and GPRS p. 95.

Once again regional disparities are present in core health profiles. For example, whilst the country's overall under five mortality rate is 110/1000, the three northern regions fare far worse with the Northern Region (171/1000); Upper West (156/1000) and Upper East (155/1000) scoring lowest on this critical health index.

Table 2.10. Regional Disparities in Safe Water and Environmental Sanitation

Rural population with access to safe water	51%
Rural population with household latrines	15%
Urban population with access to safe water	70%
Urban population with household latrines	34%
Population with unsafe method of solid waste disposal	91%

Source: 'Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy 2002-2004 - An Agenda for Growth and Prosperity', Analysis and Policy Statement, Fourth Draft, January 22 2002, Accra, p. 97.

2.6. Poverty Mediation Strategies

Poverty in Ghana is understood as:

'A state of extreme forms and long-term deprivation, the dimensions of which include social-economic exclusion, financial deprivation and powerlessness (limited capacity) to influence decisions that affect people's lives. (It) is not or ought not to be about persons in temporary difficulty. Rather it has to do first and foremost with those who are unable to become integrated into a socio-economic system for a variety of reasons. In short, poverty also concerns and afflicts people or groups of people who are marginalized in community or society.'²⁷

The national blueprint for the reduction of poverty in Ghana is the Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy (GPRS), which serves as the country's Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP), the counterpart to

²⁷ GPRS Core Team on Governance, Decentralisation and Public Policy, *Report on Strategy for Poverty-Targeted Governance*, Accra, December 20, 2000, pp.7-8.

its acceptance of the Enhanced Heavily Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) status. The GPRS draws heavily on the National Development Policy Framework, Ghana Vision 2020. The vision for 2020 was that:

‘Ghana will have achieved a balanced economy and middle income status and standard of living. This will be realised by creating an open and liberal market economy, founded on competition, initiative and creativity from the use of all our human and natural resources and optimising the rate of economic and social development with due regard to the protection of natural resources and to equity in the distribution of the benefits of development.’²⁸

The National Development Goal Setting Exercise in turn preceded the Ghana Vision 2020 policy framework. The objective of this latter exercise was to, ‘improve the quality of life of all Ghanaians by reducing poverty, raising living standards through a sustained increase in national wealth and a more equitable distribution of the benefits there from’.²⁹ The GPRS has a number of new features, but also seeks to co-ordinate and enhance existing poverty reduction strategies. The GPRS seeks *inter alia* to achieve:

- A comprehensive understanding of poverty and its causal relationships;
- Measures to ensure macro-economic stability;
- A framework for sustainable economic growth to support poverty reduction;
- Three years of costed growth and poverty reduction measures (integrated into medium term expenditure frameworks and annual budgets);
- A broad based sequence of future events in support of growth and poverty reduction;
- Mechanisms to detect and prevent future events causing poverty;
- Comprehensive monitoring and evaluation methodology to assess efficacy of measures taken;
- A reversal of the effects of the socially constructed inequities on women.

The GPRS also identifies the factors that led to previous poverty reduction strategies achieving limited success, centrally, a disjuncture between the National Development Planning Commission (NDPC) and the Ministry of Finance (MOF). To this can be added the setting of unrealistic financial and economic targets, as well as poor co-ordination between central, regional and local government in pro-poor programmes. The table below illustrates the variance between forecast and actual macro-economic targets.

Table 2.11. Major Economic Indicators: Average Annual Growth Rates (1996-2000)

	GDP (%)	Inflation (%)	Budget (+/-)	Money (%)	BOP (US\$M)	Ex. Rate (%)
Plan	7.8	17.6	N/A	19.5	104.3	11.4
Budget	5.3	13.3	-668.7	14.6	64.6	N/A
Actual	4.3	24.7	-1,201	29.2	-36.7	25.4

Source: Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy, 2002, p.2.

²⁸ *Civil Society Participation in Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers*, Report for the Department of International Development, Volume 2, Ghana Case Study, May 2002, p. 3.

²⁹ *Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy 2002-2004: An Agenda for Growth and Prosperity*. Analysis and Policy Statement, Fourth Draft, Accra, January 22, 2002. p. 1.

The above table depicts an overall pattern of misalignment, but masks the fact that the gap between forecast and achievement was widening by the year 2000. For example, 2000 saw both the lowest growth rate of 3.7 per cent and simultaneously the highest inflation rate at 40.5 per cent for the period indicated. Nevertheless, the incidence of poverty in Ghana fell from 52 per cent in 1991/1992 to 40 per cent in 1998/1999, based on an upper poverty line of 900,000 cedis per adult per year. The decline in the incidence of poverty was both geographically and socio-economically uneven however. The greatest improvement in poverty reduction was experienced in the Greater Accra area, as well as the forest (urban and rural) areas. In some areas, poverty increased. The test of the GPRS will be its ability to contribute to a structural and marked reduction in the incidence of poverty in Ghana and in this regard it suffers from a number of weaknesses. Firstly the process of formulating the GPRS was less than optimal. One of the causes of this was the regime change in 2000, but other controllable factors bear mention. The first of these is the uneven process of consultation in its formulation. In preparation for the GPRS A Participatory Poverty Analysis (PPA) was conducted administered in thirty-six sample communities from fourteen districts and six regions. No explanation is given as to the selection and exclusion criteria. In its drafting the final GPRS has some of the hallmarks of a top-down technocratic intervention designed more to meet the expectations of the Bretton Woods institutions and the donor community than as a thoroughgoing attempt to define and formulate sustainable pro-poor policy. Once the decision had been taken to embark on the HIPC programme the formulation of a GPRS became obligatory with the attendant tension that, despite taking local conditions into account, the overall design of the GPRS falls within an externally designed template. Surveys conducted by DFID show a remarkably low awareness of, and engagement with, the GPRS formulation process from abroad section of civil society. This was found to be the case even amongst journalists.³⁰ Furthermore, Ghanaians questioned were highly sceptical both of the then government's commitment to poverty reduction and indeed its ability of the GPRS to improve their objective condition. Those elements of civil society that were informed about the GPRS were often unsure about the modalities of engagement and input. This was found to be the case amongst a host of NGO's and the churches. There is little mention made in the literature of the consultation with or role for traditional leaders in the drafting and implementation of the GPRS. Trade unions, in the form of the Trades Union Congress (TUC) did, however, serve on a number of Cross-Sectoral Planning Groups. Likewise, independent policy institutes and academics were called upon for their input and expertise on both a secondment and ad hoc basis. Access to relevant government information has been a serious problem for civil society engagement. Furthermore the selection and composition of the five 'Core Teams' dealing with the macro-economy, gainful employment/production, human resource development/basic services, vulnerability and exclusion and governance, were selected on a less than transparent basis. It is further contended that the Core Teams lacked the governmental institutional support required to optimally complete their tasks in preparing the GPRS.³¹ The involvement of the donor community in the GPRS has also been uneven, with countries being bifurcated into an 'in' group invited to contribute to the Core Teams and 'out' that was not. At the substantive level the GPRS has been criticised on a number of important grounds. At the broadest level is the 'disconnect' between the analysis of the poverty

³⁰ 'Civil Society Participation in Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers', *Report to the Department for International Development*, Vol. II Ghana Case Study, May 2000.

³¹ The most thorough critique of the GPRS is to be found in Tony Killick and Charles Abugre, *PRSP Institutionalisation Study: Final Report*. Chapter 3, 'Institutionalising the PRSP Approach in Ghana', Submitted to the Strategic Partnership with Africa, 26 September 2001. This commentary draws heavily on this study.

problem and the formulation of policy. The GPRS speaks of decentralisation as the key mechanism for delivery of poverty reduction policies, but there remain chronic capacity and institutional limitations at the regional and local level throughout Ghana. It is argued too that in addition to the institutional disjuncture between the National Development Planning Commission central and regional government, there is a failure to adequately disaggregate the statistics and data gleaned by the Core Teams that would allow greater targeting of programmes, particularly in regions most in need of development. Given the objectively disadvantaged position of women and children in Ghanaian society the GPRS is remarkably light on this issue. Women and children rank as a sub-set of the ‘Special Programmes for the Vulnerable and Excluded’ but both warrant no more than one or two paragraphs within the GPRS. Finally, there is a dearth of attention paid to the linkage between environmental and social questions that are crucial to both poverty reduction and the sustainability of livelihood. This dimension is a critical for poverty reduction in Ghana, but also has potentially acute implications for the exacerbation or reduction of conflict in urban (inadequate housing, inadequate infrastructure and pollution), peri-urban (including environmental damage caused by mining activities) and rural areas (alarming rates of commercial and consumptive deforestation and land degradation). This is a critical lacuna in the GPRS.

2.7. Expenditure on Poverty Reduction and Growth

Expenditure on poverty reduction and growth in Ghana has been both relatively low and focussed on recurrent expenditure (primarily salaries). Salaries represent some 30 per cent of total government expenditure.³² Expenditure on health and education is 2% and 2.8% of GDP respectively. These two, in turn, represent 90% of social sector spending. Of the non-wage expenditure donors contribute the major share. Donor contribution was as high as 75% in 1997, but declined to approximately 66% in 1998. However, donor aid to economic services and infrastructure is highly significant. As the GPRS notes, this level of donor support is unsustainable. For 2001 the donor proportions are as follows:

Table 2.12. Donor Proportions to Economic Services and Infrastructure

Agriculture	86%
Energy	90%
Industry	72%
Water	76%
Roads	76%

Key Issues

The resource base of the economy, whilst relatively diversified, is still heavily dependent on production in the agricultural sector. Manufacturing growth has been slow and the economy has suffered from acceleration in company failures with commensurate job losses. Whilst employment levels are relatively high, this is overwhelmingly in the informal and single trading sector. There are few new opportunities particularly in the managerial professions in Ghana. This has contributed to the Ghanaian ‘brain drain’ and the growth of the vast Ghanaian Diaspora.

³² Civil service employment in Ghana is the third highest (1.8%) in Sub-Saharan Africa and the government wage bill (5.6%) is significantly higher than the average for low wage non-CFA countries.

Factor # 3: Population Distribution

Are population pressures exacerbating competition over resources?




Table 3.1. Regional Distribution of Population by Sex and Locality of Enumeration

Region	Total Population	Sex		Locality of Enumeration	
		Male	Female	Rural	Urban
Western	1,916,748	970,698	946,050	1,247,912	668,836
Central	1,593,888	761,110	832,778	1,002,363	591,525
Gt. Accra	2,903,753	1,431,883	1,471,870	364,532	2,539,221
Volta	1,630,254	790,184	840,070	1,195,799	434,455
Eastern	2,101,650	1,034,591	1,067,059	1,371,732	729,918
Ashanti	3,600,358	1,809,970	1,790,388	1,685,405	1,914,953
Brong Ahafo	1,798,058	902,754	895,304	1,126,348	671,710
Northern	1,805,428	900,076	905,352	1,317,435	487,993
Upper East	919,549	442,430	477,119	780,375	139,174
Upper West	575,579	277,098	298,481	474,728	100,851
All Regions	18,845,265	9,320,794	9,524,471	10,566,629	8,278,636

Source: 'Ghana 2000 National Census', Ghana Statistical Service, 2000, Accra.

The above table highlights the two most populous regions (Ashanti and Greater Accra respectively) also have the highest number of urban dwellers. This contrasts with the two least populous regions, Upper West and Upper East, whose populations are overwhelmingly rural.

Table 3.2. Population Density and Increase over 1984

Region	Share of Population	Proportion Urban	Population Density	Sex Ratio Males to 100 Females	Increase Over 1984 (%)	Intercensal Growth Rate
Western	10.2	34.9	80.1	102.6	65.5	3.2
Central	8.5	37.1	162.2	91.4	39.5	2.1
Gt. Accra	15.4	87.4	894.8	97.3	102.9	4.4
Volta	8.7	26.6	79.3	94.1	34.5	1.8
Eastern	11.2	34.7	108.8	97.0	25.0	1.4
Ashanti	19.1	53.2	147.6	101.1	72.3	3.4
Brong Ahafo	9.5	37.4	45.5	100.8	49.0	2.5
Northern	9.6	27.0	25.7	99.4	55.0	2.7
Upper East	4.9	15.1	104.0	92.7	19.0	1.1
Upper West	3.1	17.5	31.2	92.8	32.4	1.7
All Regions	100.0	43.9	78.9	97.9	53.3	2.6

Source: 'Ghana 2000 National Census', Ghana Statistical Service, 2000, Accra.

One in six Ghanaians lives in Greater Accra which translates into a population density of almost 900 per square kilometre. Some 87 per cent of Greater Accra residents are urban dwellers. Population growth (102 per cent since 1984) in the Greater Accra region has far outstripped that of all other

regions. This rapid rate of urbanisation has placed severe stress on scarce resources, goods and services in the Accra area. One of the consequences of this rapid urbanisation has been a heightened scarcity of land, an exponential increase in prices and a commensurate increase in land disputes in and around the capital. Additionally this phenomenon has fuelled high levels of corruption in land sales and management. Some 22 per cent of people surveyed stated that they had experienced corruption in their dealings to acquire land and 39 per cent had experienced inefficiency or incompetence.³³ The Ashanti Region has also shown steep population growth (72.3 per cent) over the same period. Under the weight of development the Ashanti capital Kumasi has turned from being a ‘garden city’ to a sprawling metropolis encroaching on traditional and agricultural lands. The road infrastructure of Kumasi is simply inadequate for the density of usage. Shacks and informal structures are preponderant and whilst vibrant, it is now a city seemingly bereft of clear urban planning. Strikingly, the least population growth is shown in the economically, politically and socially marginalized Upper East Region. Nevertheless, all regions have shown marked population increases over a 16-year period. As the table below shows, this substantial population growth rate has produced a classic ‘youth bulge’. Some 40.8 per cent of the Ghanaian population are under the age of 14. A further 10 per cent are below the age of 20 years, thus the youthful population of Ghana is over 50 per cent. A further feature of Ghanaian demographics is that some 46 per cent of the population is classified as dependent (<15+>64) by age.

Table 3.3. Age Structure of Population by Region

Age Group	All regions	
0 - 4	(14.4)	2,705,746
5 - 9	(14.5)	2,729,089
10 - 14	(11.9)	2,248,853
15 - 19	(10.0)	1,886,835
20 - 24	(8.5)	1,606,948
25 - 29	(7.9)	1,496,316
30 - 34	(6.5)	1,215,862
35 - 39	(5.5)	1,037,081
40 - 44	(4.7)	892,208
45 - 49	(3.8)	724,664
50 - 54	(3.0)	570,748
55 - 59	(1.9)	357,734
60 - 64	(2.0)	368,582
65 - 69	(1.4)	260,284
70+	(3.9)	744,315
Total Population		18,845,265
Dependent Population (<15+>64)	(46.1)	8,688,287
Adult Population (18+)	(53.1)	10,001,234
<i>Source: ‘Ghana 2000 National Census’, Ghana Statistical Service, 2000, Accra.</i>		

³³ *Corruption and Other Constraints on the Land Market and Land Administration in Ghana: A Preliminary Investigation*, Centre for Democracy and Development, Accra, Ghana, 2000.

Key Issues

Ghana shows and exceptionally high population growth rate. This is matched by sharp rates of urbanisation. Both absolute population growth and urbanisation are placing pressure on increasingly scarce resources and services. The country also exhibits a classic youth bulge and it is this group that exhibits the highest unemployment and underemployment rates.

Factor # 4: Society's Cohesion or Division

What are the principle distinguishable groups in the society as defined by differences in social and cultural practices and institutions such as religion and language, economic circumstances, location, and other non-political factors that have the potential to create political divisions? Are there many small groups or just two or three large groups?

Ghana is a nationally and racially homogeneous society. As the table below indicates, 96 per cent of people living in Ghana are nationals, with a further 2.3 per cent being nationals of other countries of the region.

Table 4.1. Selected Background Characteristics of Population by Region

Background Characteristics	All Regions	
<i>Birthplace</i>		
Locality of Enumeration	(71.6)	13,494,901
Other Locality in Region	(9.9)	1,873,962
Other Region in Ghana	(17.5)	3,299,802
ECOWAS Country	(0.5)	100,559
Other African Country	(0.2)	42,342
Outside Africa	(0.2)	33,262
<i>Nationality</i>		18,845,265
Ghanaian by Birth	(92.1)	17,348,452
Naturalised Ghanaian	(3.9)	741,001
ECOWAS National	(2.3)	440,329
Other African	(0.9)	176,885
Non-African	(0.7)	138,598
<i>Ethnicity (Ghs. By Birth)</i>		17,348,452
Akan	(49.1)	8,512,560
Ga Adangbe	(8.0)	2,383,064
Ewe	(12.7)	2,203,763
Guan	(4.4)	757,491
Guma	(3.9)	675,310
Mole Dagbani	(16.5)	2,867,270
Grusi	(2.8)	487,757
Mande	(1.1)	192,884
Other Groups	(1.5)	268,353

Source: 'Ghana 2000 National Census', Ghana Statistical Service, 2000, Accra.

By far the largest identity group in Ghana are the Akans, who in turn, are divided into some 15 sub-ethnic groups the largest of whom are the Asante (34%) and Fanti (25%) Akans are concentrated in three regions. The Asante largely occupy Ashanti and constitute some 76% of the population. A further 14% of Asante live in Brong Ahafo Region. With Fanti's and other Akan accounting for a further 5% each of the Ashanti population. Fanti's constitute 66% of the population of the Central Region and some 21% of the Western. A further 8% of the Fanti's are located in greater Accra Region. The other major Akan sub-ethnic group, the Brongs, constitute a majority of the population of the Brong Ahafo region. The Ewes are concentrated in the Volta Region and make up 72% of its population. A significant number of the residents of Greater Accra (12%) and the Eastern Region (12%) are also Ewes. The original inhabitants of the Greater Accra Region, the Ga, now make up only a minority (48%) of its population. In the north, the Dagomba constitute 48% of the population of the Northern Region. The most ethnically homogenous region is the Upper West in which 99% of its population come from the Dagarti ethnic group.

As the table below indicates, some 94 per cent of Ghanaians profess some religious faith, with Christianity being by far the most popular. The 15.6 per cent figure for adherents to Islam is highly contested. Most adherents to traditional faiths live in the rural and northern regions in particular.

Table 4.2. Population by Religion

Religious Affiliation	Percentage	Total
Catholic	15.3	2,885,531
Protestant	18.6	3,502,126
Pentecostal/Charismatic	24.1	4,544,740
Other Christian	11.0	2,079,639
Islam	15.6	2,942,124
Traditional	8.5	1,597,049
Other Religions	0.7	132,410
No Religion	6.2	1,161,646

Source: Ghana Statistical Service, National Census, 2000.

Table 4.3. Extent of Migration by present locality and sex (%)

Sex	Accra	Other Urban	Rural Coastal	Rural Forest	Rural Savannah	Ghana
Male	46.6	49.4	46.6	60.9	45.3	51.4
Female	42.9	51.8	48.3	60.6	46.8	52.2
All	44.7	50.7	47.6	60.8	46.1	51.8

Source: 'Ghana Living Standards Survey Report of the Fourth Round (GLSS4)', Ghana Statistical Service, October 2000, Accra, p. 41.

The table above highlights the high migration levels in Ghanaian society. Of the total adult population, some 52 percent are migrants. In the rural forest area this figure is even higher at over 60 per cent. High in-migration patterns into the Greater Accra, Volta and Western areas are indicated below. The Upper West, Upper East and Northern Regions exhibit far less fluid migration patterns. In general

terms, the North-South economic dichotomy is re-enforced, with few Ghanaians seeking new economic and social opportunities in the north.

Table 4.4. Population Migration Status by region (%)

Region	In Migrants	Return Migrants	Non migrants	Total
Western	40.0	10.1	49.9	100.00
Central	35.1	22.1	42.8	100.00
Greater Accra	42.5	6.2	51.3	100.00
Eastern	34.7	17.1	48.2	100.00
Volta	42.7	14.3	43.0	100.00
Ashanti	37.4	19.2	43.4	100.00
Brong Ahafo	35.1	17.7	47.2	100.00
Northern	24.1	11.6	64.3	100.00
Upper West	19.2	9.1	71.7	100.00
Upper East	10.4	35.7	53.8	100.00
All	35.7	15.7	48.6	100.00

Source: Ghana Living Standards Survey, ibid, p.42.

Key Issues

Ghana is a racially and nationally homogeneous country. Its principal social divisions are those of ethnicity, with one identity group, the Akans, statistically pre-eminent. Akans are themselves ethnically divided. Within the Akan the Asante constitute a dominant plurality. Above and beyond Akan/Asante numeric preponderance, distinctive Asante history, culture, traditional socio-political organisation, party political ascendancy and control of economic resources (gold, minerals and cocoa production) set the group apart. The dominant religious groups are Christianity and Islam who live in a condition largely characterised by peaceful co-existence. There are however patterns of intra-Muslim conflict and perennial disputes between Christians and traditional religious adherents, particularly at times of popular public celebration. Ghana is also riven by significant regional (north/south; east/west) socio-political and economic cleavages. Furthermore, social indicators such as Human Development Indices are characterised by a more affluent (urban); more impoverished (rural) dichotomy.

Factor # 5: History of Inter-Group Violent Conflict or Co-operation

Have major groups engaged in violent conflict with or coercion of each other in the past, or have they lived more or less amicably?

A considerable number of the contemporary inter group conflicts and indeed antipathies in Ghanaian society have deep historical roots and antecedents. Scholars date a number of the conflicts in the Northern Region to events occurring in the 19th century. Indeed antipathy to perceived Asante chauvinism pre-dates the British colonial period, finding its roots within the Asante Empire, which at its apogee, controlled an area the size of contemporary Ghana.

In the case of Asante identity, conflicts with and resistance to British colonial rule (which, broadly termed, was a clash of empires) enhanced the social mythology attached to Asante nationhood, which in turn, was reinforced by military success and prowess.³⁴ Indeed it was only in 1900 that British colonial forces finally subjugated the Asante.

There is no history of civil war, nor widespread group clashes in contemporary Ghanaian society. During the time of the Ashanti Empire, however, military conquest, expansion and social subjugation were widespread. However, inter-group conflict in Ghana insofar as it has escalated into violent conflict, has taken the form of inter tribal and clan conflict as opposed to large scale inter ethnic conflict.

5.1. Conflict in the Northern Region

Persistent inter group conflicts in the Northern Region date to the 19th century where three broad groups were identifiable. These comprised a majority indigenous group, a second invasive and conquering group from the Togo region and a third group of Muslim Wangara and Hausa traders arriving in the area over a period of two to three centuries earlier. There are now some 16 identifiable ethnic groups occupying the region and only one area, Nanumba, which is ethnically homogenous. Four groups, namely, the Mamprusi,³⁵ Dagomba, Gonja³⁶ and Nanumba are cephalous (have traditional leadership) and have asserted dominant control over the region and have, over time, ascribed to themselves ownership of all traditional land in the region.³⁷ In so doing they established a ruling elite and *de facto* class identity as 'landlords'. This ethnic, and effectively class stratification, was both entrenched, complicated and further de-legitimised by decades of colonial rule and attempts by the British authorities over periods of indirect and direct rule to codify, regularise and institutionalise patterns of traditional rule and succession. British colonial interests manifest in the removal of chiefs and the establishment of selected and preferred rulers assuming the skin, thereby creating and entrenching patron-client relations. These patterns, in turn, had the consequence of often de-legitimising those who were elevated to chieftaincy positions, thereby exacerbating contending claims to rule and sovereignty and scarce resources.

These disputes in the Northern Region escalated into bloody clashes between the Gonja on the one hand and Nchumuru and Nawuri in 1935. Subsequently the hand picking of members to the traditional councils and their exclusion of the Nchumuru led to the latter refusing payment of the local Council levy between 1952 and 1955. This pattern of subjugation and political exclusion was exacerbated by the recognition of traditional chiefs from the Volta and Brong Ahafo regions in their respective Regional Houses of Chiefs, when the same degree of recognition had not been accorded to the Nchumuru and the Nawuri. This led the Nchumuru to petition the United Nations Organisation and to ally themselves with the Togo Congress.³⁸

³⁴ Whilst anecdotal, discreet questioning in Ghana reveals a general belief in, or perception of, a distinctive identity for the Asante in particular. 'You can see the way he walks, that he is Asante' is a typical comment. The wearing of traditional clothing is often the most obvious marker of regional and ethnic identity however.

³⁵ Civil wars between the Mamprusi and Gonja broke out in 1892 and again in 1895.

³⁶ Gonja itself was effectively reduced to vassal status between 1742 and 1874 by the Asante empire.

³⁷ The practice of brigandage was common throughout the north of Ghana during the 19th century.

³⁸ A detailed account is provided by N.J.K. Brukum, 'Ethnic Conflicts in the Northern Region of Ghana: A Study of the Conflict in the Gonja District: 1980-1994', in Mike Oquaye (Ed) *Democracy and Conflict Resolution in Ghana*, Gold Type Publications, Accra 1995.

Lingering tensions persisted in the region but did not break out into violent conflict until 1991. The catalyst for these clashes was a dispute over youth mobilisation and a land dispute involving the ceding of a plot of land to the Catholic Church by the Gonjas, to which Namuris had laid claim. The subsequent violence saw the Gonjas pitted against all other ethnic groups in the area save for the Kotokolis. Having been evicted from the area, in 1992 the Gonjas made an attempt to reclaim to take back the disputed area inducing the Gonja opposed ‘allies’ to ‘take the war to Gonja proper’ resulting in villages being raised and the burning of the site of the seat of the regional chief. Official reports placed the death toll at 60, whilst unofficial reports placed the figure in the hundreds.³⁹ In 1994 violence broke out once again along the traditionally demarcated ethnic cleavages, reportedly resulting in the deaths of 1000 people and a further 150,000 displaced.⁴⁰

It is important to note that in the case of the chieftaincy conflict of the Northern Region one key drivers of conflict is the exclusion of acephalous ethnic groups from political office and the benefits of development. To better understand the complexity of ethnic, chieftaincy and land disputes in Ghana, provided below is the verbatim record of the grievances of the major conflicting groups in the North as recoded at the Kumasi III Peace Accord in 1995.

Dagomba

Damage/loss suffered

- Great loss of human lives
- Displacement
- Deprivation and dependency
- Destruction of educational, social and economic infrastructure
- Dislocation of social life
- Loss of trust, confidence and security
- Breeding of a culture of violence
- Trauma

Causes of conflict

- Confusion over customary land rights
- Wilful refusal to acknowledge chief’s titles and allegiance owed
- Disregard for chieftaincy laws relating to chieftaincy in Dagbon
- Disregard for judicial roles of chiefs
- Attacks against Islam
- Discriminatory practice of some Christian NGO’s
- Misinformation
- Unguarded statements by high-ranking government officials
- ‘Konkombas are prone to fighting’

³⁹ Yankah, Kewsi, ‘The Massacre Up North’, *Mirror*, June 6, 1992. As cited in D.K. Agyeman, ‘Democracy, Politics of Ethnicity and Conflict in Contemporary Ghana, in Oquaye (*ibid*).

⁴⁰ In addition to these violent episodes, there are documented cases of Gonjas attacking and laying waste to an Ewe fishing village, as well as attacks carried out against the Vagala and Nawuri.

Gonja Group

Damage/loss suffered

- Loss of life and property
- Strained relations with ‘our brothers the Nawuris and Nchumurus’
- Loss of goodwill from the outside, which has retarded development
- Break in traditional ties between Gonjas, Nawuris and Nchumurus
- Loss of mutual trust between Gonjas, Nawuris and Nchumurus

Causes of conflict

- Agitation for land by Nawuris and Nchumurus from Gonjas
- ‘We cannot explain why there is conflict between us and Konkombas’

Konkomba

Damage/loss suffered

- Broken marriages and friendships
- Loss of property, loss of life, educational and health facilities, drain on manpower, loss of marketing facilities
- Displaced people in their own country
- Politically isolation at District and National levels
- Cultural values broken down and undermined
- Destruction of places of worship, churches and mosques
- Lack of trust amongst different religious groups

Causes of conflict

- Denial of right of the ruled to elect their leaders
- Imposition of leaders who are not popular with the governed
- Tendency of one tribe to feel superior to the other
- Lack of respect for other's cultural values
- Dominance of the minority over the majority, 4 ethnic groups rule over 16
- Denial of the right to self-governance
- Use of derogatory term ‘alien’ for Konkombas
- Rumours

Nanumba Group

Damage/loss suffered

- Loss of interaction between the two tribes
- 80% of the population of war-torn areas displaced
- Most farms destroyed
- 80% of herds stolen
- Farm equipment stolen
- Property and cash lost
- Economic interaction between two tribes ceased
- No District Assembly elections held
- Eight chiefs killed and funerals not held
- Customary regalia destroyed
- Traditional celebrations not fully observed
- Houses of worship destroyed

Causes of conflict

- Misinformation
- Enskinment of self-styled chiefs
- Settling without permission
- Main cause of the conflict with Nanun is the intention to seize Nanun lands by force of arms

Nawuri Group

Damage/loss suffered

- Loss of life, especially women and children
- Displacement
- Collapse of social structure
- Education ceased
- Fear and distrust
- Destruction of houses
- Farming activity halted
- Loss of jobs, workers displaced
- Breakdown of government administration (District and Regional)
- Development projects halted
- Aggressive future generation produced
- Bitterness
- Drift from the fear of God

Causes of conflict

- Natural boundaries
- Colonial administration policies
- Post independence disregard for Nawuri status
- Imposition of chiefs from non-indigenous ethnic groups in the Northern social system
- Suspicious agenda of certain religious organisations
- Distinctive cultural practices
- Destructive weapons (sophisticated warfare)

Nchumuru Group

Damage/loss suffered

- Loss of life and property
- Loss of farms and products
- Destruction of economic and commercial activity
- Destruction of communication/trade routes
- Disintegration of families
- Dislocation of society
- Migration and immigration
- Destruction of educational infrastructure
- Exodus of educational and health/medical personnel
- Non-participation in political decision-making (District and regional)
- Destruction of places of worship and activities of Christian bodies
- Destruction of human values and social ethics

Causes of conflict

- Pre-colonial history
- Colonial era under Germans and British
- Indirect rule
- Fragmentation of regions and Districts
- Cultural assimilation
- Lack of development education
- Representation of tribes at regional House of Chiefs
- Lack of recognition of our chiefs
- Lack of involvement in decision-making at the Regional and District levels
- Lack of cultural identity
- Lack of representation and involvement in decision-making
- Lack of political will on the part of the government

Whilst it is not the purpose of this study to discuss policy proposals, it is instructive to record some of the proposals made by respective leaders in the aftermath of the 1994 Northern crisis. They reflect a high degree of awareness of, and reflection on, actions that could be taken to de-escalate the crisis and map a way forward. The recommendations include:

- At the national level, the need for a nationally funded rehabilitation and reconstruction programme, greater involvement from the National House of Chiefs in dispute mediation and resolution, the need for the NGO Consortium to be engaged at the level of national government, security to be provided by national government, action taken to stop the flow of arms, higher levels of professionalism and discipline from soldiers, avoidance of inflammatory statements from national representatives, greater attention paid to rumours of conflict and early warnings national conflict education programmes to be launched.
- At the regional level the following recommendations were made: the establishment of a regional peace committee with representatives from all ethnic groups represented, 'sincere apologies' to be made, greater involvement of the regional House of Chiefs, greater engagement from and with the regional Minister, Youth Associations to become involved in peace workshops, Regional Security Council 'should be objective and serious in handling ethnic problems'.
- At the local level: NGOs should pull together the warring parties, Traditional and District Councils should become more involved, chiefs, opinion makers and youth leaders need to meet and engage in peace workshops, involve 'other actors' – women's groups, Muslim Council, Christian Council and the Catholic Secretariat.

The salient point is that grievances from all groups are clearly articulated and share a number of commonalities. Secondly, the recommended actions from the warring factions are constructive, rational and within the realms of achievement.

5.2. *The Bawku Conflict*

On December 8, 2000 during the highly contested election campaign, violence erupted in the town of Bawku in the Upper East Region. Such was the intensity of the clashes that for a number of days the town was reduced to a state of siege. The clashes appear to have been partially planned and orchestrated and involved the use of sophisticated automatic assault rifles. The clashes left some 50 people dead with hundreds more displaced. Whilst the proximate cause of the fighting was latent clan antipathy (the term most commonly used by the popular press was 'hatred'), it is clear that that party political affinity added a key combustible element to an already volatile set of conditions. The violence was generally and broadly attributed variously to inter tribal or inter ethnic antagonism. The popular Joy FM station asserted, 'It's not an electoral problem, it's a tribal problem'. The Daily Graphic opined, '... Irrespective of how comprehensive and unbiased the explanation may be, to what happened on December 8, 2000, it is still a factor of ethnicity; everything boils down to the chieftaincy dispute, and nothing else.' Some two months prior to the election a Ghanaian journalist asserted, 'One can simply say that Bawku is a place where a mere argument or fight between two people can result in an uncontrollable inferno'. Bawku was termed by others as 'the topmost violent area in the region'. Another contended that 'tribal wars are devastating Bawku, and with no feasible solution, it will not be surprising if the next tribal war annihilates Bawku and its surroundings beyond repair and beyond human habitation'. One notable feature of the early reporting of the Bawku violence was its inaccuracy, superficiality and the ignorance of the journalists. As Smith has noted, 'Among those living in the south, political knowledge of the Upper East generally begins and ends with the assassination attempt on President Nkrumah during his state visit to Kulungugu in August 1962'. Furthermore, the events in Bawku re-enforced the view of southerners of the tribalistic and 'backward' nature of the inhabitants of the Upper East.⁴¹

Whilst conventional wisdom holds that the Bawku conflict was sparked over fears that the victorious NPP aligned independent candidate Hawa Yakuba⁴² would instigate moves to revert control of the Bawku skin from the Kusasi to the Mamprusi, this fails to account for a host of factors and forces that may have predisposed the area to manipulation by political entrepreneurs.

Indeed the Bawku conflict brought into play a complex matrix of structural and contingent factors that makes the disaggregating of the events particularly difficult. The area in which the conflict occurred is ethnically heterogeneous and has one of the lowest income (80% living in extreme poverty) and literacy (26.3% of adults functionally literate) rates in the country. It is a relatively densely populated area with over 100 residents per kilometre. There is relatively strong religious (66%) and ethnic (64%) attachment by the populace. Voter consciousness is high and party affiliation (NDC, NPP and PNC) strong with 2000 voter registration figures of 95 per cent. Additionally

⁴¹ An anecdotal yet frequent and consistent set of response from a range of interviewees was, 'Those people (in the northern regions) are Ghanaians, but they are different'. 'They have their own way of settling their disputes'. 'Those people will never live in peace'. 'Those people have a different understanding of chieftaincy that leads them to be in constant conflict with each other, there isn't the same discipline as say amongst the Asante'.

⁴² Ms Yakuba was 'rewarded' for her electoral victory with a cabinet position as Minister for Tourism. She subsequently resigned this position in May 2002.

simmering disputes over the Bawku skin have persisted for years. A number of the protagonists have been brought before the courts, but to date no credible insights have been gained into the motivation for and execution of the attacks.

In a significant development in the aftermath of the clashes, President Kufuor received Bawku Chiefs and reiterated his position that the government should not interfere in chieftaincy matters. Kufuor reasoned that experience had shown that whenever the government interfered in chieftaincy disputes, the result is ‘catastrophic’. He announced that the government would provide the Traditional House of Chiefs ‘with support in finding a lasting solution to the numerous chieftaincy disputes’.⁴³

5.3. Continuing Conflict in the Northern Region – The Case of the Yendi Conflict

The murder of the King (Paramount Chief) or Ya-Na⁴⁴ of the Dangomba's on March 27th 2002 represents the most egregiously violent incident in a long history of tribal conflict in Ghana. The killing of the Ya-Na clearly illustrates the interaction of some of the key drivers of conflict in Ghana and the resultant escalation of conflict through a number of stages to that of violence. Like many conflicts in Ghana the roots of the Dagomba conflict are deep and complex and not readily amenable to easy or rational resolution. An ethnological map of the Northern Region of Ghana is provided below.⁴⁵

⁴³ *Daily Graphic*.

⁴⁴ Terminology: ‘Na’ denotes Chief; Ya Na translates as ‘Absolute King’, chieftaincy in Northern Ghana is known as ‘skin’, because a chief sits on a skin (the equivalent amongst the Akan is a ‘stool’). A ‘gate’ is a chieftaincy through which one gains access to higher chieftaincy. Although reference is made to ‘enskinment’ or ‘enstoolment’ one only refers to the ‘destoolment’ of a chief upon his removal. The area inhabited by the Dagomba is also known as Dagbon. The Dagbon region is heavily influenced by Islam. Yendi has been termed ‘the biggest village in West Africa’.

⁴⁵ Reproduced from Ada van der Linde and Rachel Naylor, ‘Building Sustainable Peace: Conflict, Conciliation and Civil Society in Northern Ghana’, Oxfam Working Paper, 2001.



The Dagomba are the largest ethnic group in Northern Ghana and number over 250, 000, their capital is Yendi east of the regional capital Tamale. The Dagomba are cephalous and strongly identify with the institution of chieftaincy and this in part explains the intensity of the conflict over the skin. The current dispute dates back to the 19th century and involves two sides of the royal family. Historically the skin has alternated between the two sides of the family.

The Yendi conflict has been exacerbated by the interference of colonial administration in matters of succession. The British involved themselves in 1938 and again after the death of Mahama 11 in 1948, believing the dispute to have been settled. Whatever the motives of the colonial administration, interference in succession disputes served to exacerbate the conflict and indeed de-legitimise the process of occupancy of the skin for successive generations.

Furthermore, the Yendi region has historically been the seat of political contestation and, unlike the majority of the Northern Region, has exhibited sharply mixed political sympathies including support for the NPP, NDC, NCP and its antecedents. The NPP was regarded in the north as the chief's

party and protection of chieftaincy was a prominent feature of its electioneering. During 1954 the campaign in the Yendi areas was focussed on the question of the status and role of chiefs. The dispute escalated up to the Presidency with Nkrumah finally arbitrating on the 'rules' governing succession. The Legislative Instrument issued by the Minister of Justice in 1960 asserts, 'Succession to the Yendi skin shall be in rotation between the Abudulai and Andani ruling families'.

In 1969 the recently murdered Ya-Na was a prince regent when the Busia Progress Party government sent in troops to dislodge his father from the stool. The prince regent was seriously injured but escaped. The fighting had broken out as a result of a government announcement upholding the findings of a commission of enquiry into the chieftaincy dispute. Within five days, police outside the Chief's palace had killed 23 people with more than 700 arrested for holding an illegal assembly. A dusk-to-dawn curfew was imposed and a ban imposed on four chiefs from residing or visiting Yendi. In a replay of the events of three decades earlier, simmering tensions emerged in January 2001 over the celebration of the Muslim Eid ul-Adha festival, but the 2002 conflagration was finally ignited during the Bugum (fire) Festival. Reports of the impending disruption of the festival led to a meeting with the Yendi District Security Council, the outcome of which was the imposition of a curfew. The curfew was subsequently lifted after a meeting with the Regional Minister and the Regional Security Council. The arrival of the competing Abudu Gate precipitated the clashes. During the clashes some 50 people including the Ya-Na and a number of chiefs were killed in fighting between two families making claim to the Dagbon skin. A dusk to dawn curfew was imposed and later extended by six weeks.

The Yendi conflict speaks to a number of the key issues that characterise a number of chieftaincy disputes throughout Ghana. In summary the Yendi conflict manifests a clash between traditional authority structures with those of the colonial period overlaid with modern forms of administration which in turn have been exacerbated and indeed exploited by contemporary part politics.

The assassination of the Ya-Na holds the potential of establishing a volatile 'demonstration effect' and resulted in the cancellation of the 'outdooing' of the enskinment of the Wa Naa of the Upper West Region, scheduled for April 2002. The government deployed security personnel into the Wa area to ensure peace. This came as a result of protests lodged with the Upper West Regional Security Council (REGSEC) by three royal gates of the Wa skin against moves by a fourth gate to enskin Alhaji Yakubu Seidu as the paramount chief of the Wala Traditional Area. The REGSEC has postponed the inauguration of the Wa Na elect until the dispute is amicably resolved. In January the National House of Chiefs upheld the judgement of the Judicial Committee of the Upper West Regional House of Chiefs in favour of Naa Yakubu Seidu as Wa-Na contrary to the wishes of the Yejihi, Nagera and Junyosi gates. These three gates filed leave to appeal the Supreme Court. The National House of Chiefs dismissed this on February 22nd. Following this Naa Seidu was enskinned on March 11 and later announced inauguration for April 8. Following the Yendi crisis the inauguration was postponed.⁴⁶

One potentially positive outcome of the recent violence in addition to the appointment of a Presidential Commission of Inquiry (including the Asantehene as one of the troika of members) is the establishment of a campaign to rid the chieftaincy institution of all factors that breed conflict within it. In addition the government has committed itself to the retrieval of firearms illegally acquired by

⁴⁶ *Daily Graphic*, April 12, 2002.

groups in an attempt to defuse the potential of chieftaincy disputes to escalate into violence. The special assistant to the Minister of Information announced in April 2002 that:

‘The government is about to approach the National House of Chiefs to mount a joint campaign to ensure that chieftaincy becomes there revered and respected institution we have come to know it to be so that it does not in any way militate against progress and development.’⁴⁷

Of interest, the Ministerial spokesperson noted that the considerable fuel cost alone to the state of sending troops to the Yendi conflict. This economic cost of violent conflict in Ghana has never been documented.

The Yendi conflict has also brought into focus the question of reforming traditional leadership with argument being proffered that all chiefs should be popularly elected. Some proposals go so far as to suggest the ‘mainstreaming’ of traditional chieftaincy into a second upper house of parliament.

A development of further significance in the immediate aftermath of the Yendi conflict was the resignation of both the District Chief Executive and the Regional Minister. The latter was also the NPP M.P. for Yendi. Such resignations were unthinkable under previous regimes and it is a mark of the entrenchment of democratic and public accountability that these officials tendered their resignations. This step also lent additional credibility to the workings (and potentially findings) of the Presidential Commission of Inquiry into the Yendi conflict. A less sanguine interpretation of these moves points to the possible complicity or tacit ‘ignorance’ of the signals leading up to the conflict and failure to act on these early warning signals. Further reports speculate that the pattern of activities leading up to the assassination of the Ya-Na would suggest that it was a planned attack that was preceded by a build up of weapons (including AK47 and J3 assault rifles) as well as the cutting of communication links to Yendi. Reports state that weapons were taken from the armoury in Yendi before the attack. A related contention is that there may have been NPP complicity in the attacking of the Ya-Na as a *quid pro quo* for the support of the Abundua gate in the 2000 general election. Perhaps significantly, the Ya-Na is reported to have supported a constitutional amendment to allow traditional leaders to fully participate in mainstream party politics. Prior to the outbreak of violence, former President Rawlings had travelled to the Northern Region and had reportedly warned the Ya-Na not travel as he was in danger of being killed. It is noteworthy too that after the events in Yendi, the NDC and its former Chairperson J.J. Rawlings in particular, have been vociferous in their condemnation of the assassination of the Ya-Na. During the NDC Congress in April 2002, Rawlings pointedly referred to the assassinated king as ‘our Ya-Na’.

Security force reform is discussed later in the paper, but some of the key challenges facing civil military relations are highlighted by the events in Yendi. The Ya-Na’s palace is some 300 metres from Yendi police station and about 500 metres from a military camp. On the night of the death of the Ya-Na, a spokesperson of the Andani clan stated, ‘No policeman or soldier came to the scene despite the gunshots and their proximity to the palace.’⁴⁸ The report continues that in the heat of the battle, the army detachment in Yendi - which had 13 soldiers - sought reinforcements, which arrived on the night of 26 March, but remained in the camp. A soldier in Yendi confirmed the army’s ineffectiveness:

⁴⁷ *Ghanaian Chronicle*, April 5, 2002.

⁴⁸ IRIN UN Office for the Co-ordination of Human Rights Affairs News Service, ‘Focus on the Yendi Crisis’, August 13, 2002.

‘We arrived in Yendi about midnight on 26 March. By then, there were no gunshots and we went to the camp. At about 4 a.m. heavy shooting resumed. We sat in the camp waiting for a command to go to the scene, but none came. Fierce shooting went on but we uneasily stayed put. Later on, we heard the ‘talking drums’ announcing the death of the Ya-Naa. We were so distressed, embarrassed and humiliated. The military had failed.’⁴⁹

The Ghana NGO Foundation for Security and Development in Africa (FOSDA) added that the police, too, did not intervene. ‘The police said the key to their armoury was not available but it was found somehow after Ya-Naa’s death. There were too many coincidences,’ The FOSDA spokesperson continued, ‘The district security office knew about it (the sporadic gunfire that had been building up for a week) and even delivered information to Accra but nothing was done.’⁵⁰

According to the family of the slain ruler, his death was ‘the climax of a grand and well orchestrated conspiracy involving some highly placed government officials who wilfully exploited the state security apparatus and resources’.⁵¹

Submissions made by the Abudu family to the (Justice) Wuaku Commission established in Brong Ahafo to investigate the Yendi crisis, paint a sharply contrasting picture. According to the written submission made by the Abudu, the Ya-Na had been guilty of gross discrimination against the Abudu in the enskinment of Chiefs by both removing Abudu’s and the enskinment of many more Andani’s.⁵² Furthermore, far from the Abudu plotting an elaborate conspiracy, the Abudu claim that mercenaries were called into the Yendi area armed with weapons over a period of weeks prior to the Bukum festival. The submission reads:

‘Na Yakubu II (the Ya-Na) also openly threatened the Abudu’s with mercenaries and guns ... The tension in Yendi was such that the District Security Committee imposed a dusk till dawn curfew on 24th March 2002. The Ya-Na prevailed upon the Regional Minister to lift the curfew. When the curfew was lifted and more militia and heavy guns kept arriving in Yendi, we the Abudu’s sensed that the Ya-Na was going to use the Fire Festival as a cover for some mischief to be directed against us. We therefore kept to our houses. Sure enough the mischief came. The Ya-Na’s militia with heavy guns blasting went through the streets of Yendi. They completely ignored the police and went towards where the Abudu’s were concentrated. We Abudu’s used many methods to defend ourselves. When we realised that we could be mowed down if we stayed in a static position holed in our houses, we broke out and counter-attacked to try and silence our attackers. At the end of it all, we found that some houses had been burnt and Na Yakubu had been killed ... The first house burnt was built by an Abudu ... no Abudu would have set that house on fire ... We do not know who killed Na Yakubu II, whether it was an Abudu or a disenchanted Andani or a disappointed mercenary

⁴⁹ IRIN, Focus on the Yendi Crisis, August 13, 2002.

⁵⁰ IRIN, Focus on the Yendi Crisis, August 13, 2002.

⁵¹ IRIN, Focus on the Yendi Crisis, August 13, 2002.

⁵² For example, 50 out of 61 in Yendi, 19 out of 21 in Gushegu and 15 out of 16 in Zabzugu, chiefs enskinned by the Ya -Na were Andani.

who did it. What is clear is that Na Yakubu II died in (sic) a consequence of war he unleashed against the citizens of Dagbon in respect of whom it was his duty to protect'.⁵³

A further discouraging development in the maelstrom following the assassination of the Ya-Na and the subsequent state of emergency, was the imposition of an information embargo by the Minister of Information and Presidential Affairs on reportage of the conflict. The Minister directed media organisations to submit reports to his office for vetting before publication 'to prevent a situation where media reports will inflame passions'.⁵⁴ Whilst a state of emergency often translates into governments monitoring press reportage more closely and for official spokespeople to become more publicly assertive, the imposition of a censorship mechanism is a retrograde step. Arguably the Yendi conflict is the first major test of the NPP government commitment to a free and independent media, and in this instance, it has faltered.

5.4. Religious Conflict

Whilst the majority of Ghanaians practices Christianity, Islam is professed by some 18 per cent of the population. It is noteworthy that at the time of the publication of the 2000 census this figure was highly contested by Muslim leaders, arguing that the 'true' figure stood at 30 per cent and that this under-reporting of Islamic adherents was sinister and deliberate. The Islamic population is strongly concentrated in the urban areas of Accra, Kumasi, Sekondi-Takoradi, Tamale (Northern Region), Wa and the northern regions. Significantly, Kufuor elected a Muslim from the Northern Region as his running mate for the 2000 elections.

Whilst less frequent and less acute in form, religious conflict in Ghana has been a feature of the country's recent past. Conflict is seldom violent however and rarely between differing faiths.⁵⁵ All three major religious groups, Christian, Muslim and traditional, have engaged in conflict and indeed violent conflict in the recent past. The most intensive conflict has been between intra-religious Muslim faiths. Religious labelling is a markedly public act in Ghana. In the capital Accra, thousands of vehicles carry stickers pronouncing slogans of religious belief such as 'protected by Jesus', 'God Alone Knows', 'Powered by God', 'Jah Glory' and whilst the number of church goers is relatively low, for example 1.8 million Christians, deference to religious leaders and beliefs is pervasive.

Annually there is tension and occasionally violence between practitioners of the ethnic Ga⁵⁶ tradition (which some consider to be a religion) and members of some charismatic churches over the annual ban by Ga traditional leaders on drumming and noise-making prior to the Ga 'Homowo' (harvest) festival. Traditionalists believed that their time-honoured beliefs should be accorded due respect, while some Christians resented the imposition of bans, which they believed infringed on their right to worship as they pleased. In 1999 three incidents of violence were reported during the May-June ban on drumming. On May 15, May 29, and May 30, 1999, groups of men attacked churches that were not observing the drumming ban. Church equipment and money was stolen, and a church facility

⁵³ 'Re-Presentations (sic) Made On The Yendi Crisis By The Abudu Family' to the Wuaku Commission (Undated).

⁵⁴ *Daily Graphic*, April 26, 2002.

⁵⁵ Although the protagonists in the Yendi conflict were Muslim, there has been no reportage of religion playing any part in the conflict.

⁵⁶ The Ga are the original inhabitants of Accra.

was vandalized. Minor injuries but no fatalities were reported. Although there were no reports of violence during the May 8 to June 8, 2000 ban, 2001 again saw violent clashes.⁵⁷

Although the Constitution prohibits slavery, religious slavery exists on a limited scale. Trokosi, a traditional practice found among the Ewe ethnic group and primarily in the Volta region, is an especially severe human rights abuse and a flagrant violation of women's and children's rights. It is a system in which a young girl, usually under the age of 10 years, is given by her family as a slave to a fetish shrine for offences allegedly committed by a member of the girl's family. The belief is that, if someone in the family has committed a crime, such as stealing, members of the family may begin to die in large numbers unless a young girl is given to the local fetish shrine to atone for the offence. The girl becomes the property of the fetish priest, must work on the priest's farm, and perform other labours for him. Because they are the sexual property of the priests, most Trokosi slaves have children by them. Although the girls' families must provide for their needs, such as food, most are unable to do so. There are an estimated 2,000 women and girls bound to various shrines in the Trokosi system, a figure that does not include the slaves' children. Even when freed by her fetish priest from the more onerous aspects of her bondage, whether voluntarily or as a result of intervention by activists, a Trokosi woman generally has few marketable skills and little hope of marriage and typically remains bound to the shrine for life by psychological and social pressure arising from a traditional belief that misfortune may befall a Trokosi woman's family or village if she abandons her obligations to the shrine. When a fetish slave dies, her family is expected to replace her with another young girl, thus perpetuating the bondage to the fetish shrine from generation to generation.

In June 1998, Parliament passed and the President signed legislation to ban the practice of Trokosi in comprehensive legislation to protect women and children's rights. Non-governmental organizations, such as International Needs, and government agencies, like the Commission for Human Rights and Administrative Justice (CHRAJ), have been campaigning against Trokosi for several years and are familiar with the locations of the fetish shrines and the numbers of women and children enslaved. Activists know the community leaders and fetish priests and thus know with whom to negotiate. CHRAJ and International Needs have had some success in approaching village authorities and fetish priests at over 316 shrines, winning the release of nearly 1,000 Trokosi slaves as of mid-2000 and retraining them for new professions.⁵⁸ The followers of Trokosi claim this to be a religion, but the Government does not recognize it as such.

In November 1999, in Agona Nyakrom, central region, a dispute during a soccer game between an Islamic middle school and a Methodist middle school led to arson and other destruction of property (corn mills, livestock, approximately 100 houses, and 3 mosques). A group of youths also attacked Muslims in the area, including the headmaster of the Islamic school, who was beaten severely. Five persons suffered gunshot wounds. Police detained 30 men, including a chief. As a result of the conflict, large numbers of Muslims moved out of the area.

In January 2000, members of the Christo Asafo Christian church clashed with members of the Boade Baaka traditional shrine at Taifa, in the greater Accra region. The dispute arose days earlier after shrine members accused a Christian woman of witchcraft. In the process, the woman was injured slightly and a crowd formed. Christo Asafo members attacked the shrine in retaliation. There were some minor injuries.

⁵⁷ This summary draws heavily on the United States Department of State, *2000 Annual Report on International Religious Freedom*.

⁵⁸ United States Department of State, *1999 Annual Report on International Religious Freedom*.

In March 2000, a dispute between five Pentecostal churches and landowners (tendaabas) created tension in Jirapa, Upper West region. After a member of the Kingdom of God ministries allegedly burned down a local shrine, the tendaabas banned religious activities of all churches except the Roman Catholic Church, until May 2000, when the regional coordinating council brokered a resolution.

As recently as April 2002 the Ga (Greater Accra) Traditional Council vowed to engage the Christ Apostolic Church in violence if it pursued its intended course of having Ga youth imprisoned for attacking the church when it broke the ban on drumming in 2001. Bans on drumming by Pentecostal Christian churches for the month of May were introduced in response to environmental concerns and as a consequence of the clashes between traditionalists and the Pentecostal Christian church members in 2001. As a consequence of this and other conflicts in the Greater Accra Region a five member Greater Accra Permanent Conflict Resolution and Management Committee was established in April 2001. The Committee deals with matters relating to Chieftaincy, land, religion and customary practices in the region.⁵⁹

Key Issues

The antecedents of contemporary conflict in Ghana are deep and complex. The social memory of conflict is preserved, in part, through traditional leadership succession patterns. Successive colonial, post colonial and contemporary governments have disrupted these patterns. Given the cardinal role played by chieftaincy in legal, authoritative, spiritual and resource allocation issues, such disputes have far broader consequences. Such conflicts have been exacerbated by contemporary party political competition. Whilst not pervasive, religious conflict is a persistent risk.


Factor # 6: Distribution of Economic and Social Goods

What is the distribution of vital economic and productive resources and social goods among major groups?

Ghana exhibits acute regional asymmetries in the allocation of economic and social goods. This has led to a popular conception and reality of a country bifurcated into a more prosperous and well-endowed southern geographical stratum and a northern impoverished and underdeveloped north. By extension, the coincidence of ethnic geographical regionalism translates into marked socio-economic group differentials. The prevalence and incidence of poverty in Ghana is indicated below.⁶⁰

⁵⁹ *Ghana Chronicle*, April 5, 2002.


⁶⁰ *Poverty Trends in Ghana in the 1990s*, Ghana Statistical Service, October 2000, Accra, p. 9.

Figure 6.1. Poverty incidence (Po) by locality (Poverty line = 900,000 cedis)

The chart below⁶¹ highlights the disproportional incidence of poverty particularly in the rural savannah belt. This is in marked contrast with Accra, which occupies a distinctively advantaged position. The only other region exhibiting a disproportionate poverty to population share incidence is that of the rural coastal region. The broad urban-rural poverty differential is exemplified by the contrast in poverty incidence between the urban forest and the heavily impoverished rural forest communities. This dichotomy is reinforced in the pattern of poverty between urban and rural coastal areas. Whilst most regions have shown marked improvements in the incidence of poverty and particularly that of Accra, the Rural Savannah Region has show a worsening in the proportion of impoverished and extremely impoverished in the population.

⁶¹ *Poverty Trends in Ghana in the 1990s*, Ghana Statistical Service, October 2000, Accra, p. 10.

Figure 6.2. Population shares and contribution to poverty incidence (Co) by locality (%) (Poverty line = 900,000 cedis)



Land is the key factor of production in Ghana. Land is both a source of social cohesion and conflict. Beyond this, however, land holds religious⁶², social and political significance. This is particularly true of the powerful Ashanti region. Historically the traditional relationship to land holds that it belongs to the ancestors and it is they that have passed it on to their living descendents. It is also held that the spirits of the ancestors continue to take an interest in the land and to protect it from ill use. Whilst the ‘consent’ of ancestors is not required for the mortgaging of land, their help is called on for its recovery. A further belief is that the consent of the ancestors is required in order to sell the land outright otherwise the vendor will be killed. Perhaps most importantly however, is the custom that ownership of land vests in the Stool in trust for the tribe, ancestors and posterity. The Stool in Ashanti represents departed rulers.⁶³

6.1. Land Policy

The complexity of the land question is born out by the matrix of legislation operating in this area. There are at least 26 statutes on access to land and its management with a further 56 pieces of subsidiary legislation.⁶⁴ There are a further 84 pieces of cognate and subsidiary legislation dealing with forestry, wildlife, water management, pollution control and related institutions. The Ghana National Land Policy (1999) notes the following (summarised) problems and constraints of the Land Sector⁶⁵

⁶² The religious significance of land is disputed and can be regarded as of decreasing importance.

⁶³ A. A. A. Kyerematen, ‘Inter-State Boundary Litigation in Ashanti’, *African Social Research Documents* Vol 4. University of Cambridge, 1970. pp. 11-12.

⁶⁴ A substantial number of these relate to Land Title Registration matters in urban Accra and Kumasi in particular.

⁶⁵ *National Land Policy*, Ministry of Lands and Forestry, Accra, 1999.

- General indiscipline in the land market, characterised by a spate of land encroachments, multiple sales of land, unapproved development schemes, haphazard development that leads to environmental problems, disputes, conflicts and ‘endless litigation’.
- Indeterminate boundaries of stool/skin lands (lands under the control of traditional leadership and authorities) resulting from a the lack of reliable maps/plans and the use of illegal and unreliable maps/plans leading to conflict, dispute and litigation between competing stools/skins and land claimants
- Compulsory acquisition by government of large tracts of lands, which have not been utilised and or which payment of compensation has been delayed. This policy has left people landless or tenants on their own land, thus threatening their livelihoods, giving rise to poverty and engendering a raft of disputes between private landowners, stools and the state.
- Inadequate security of land tenure due to conflicts of interests due to disputes, land racketeering, slow disposal of land cases by the courts and a weak land administration system.
- Difficult accessibility to land for agricultural, industrial, commercial and residential development.
- Weak land administration system which is characterised by the absence of a comprehensive land policy framework, outmoded legislation, lack of geographic information systems and networks, including opaque guidelines and poor capacity and capability to initiate and co-ordinate policy actions.
- Lack of consultation with land owners and chiefs in decision making for land allocation, acquisition, management, utilisation and development which has created ‘intractable’ disputes between the state and land owning groups.
- Lack of consultation, co-ordination and co-operation among land development agencies
- In adequate co-ordination with neighbouring countries in the management of Ghana’s national borders giving rise to disputes regarding cross-border activities such as farming, human settlement, smuggling and cattle grazing. In addition inadequate management of shared water bodies within the West African sub-region.

As far back as 1970 Kyerematen noted the following causes of land litigation in the Ashanti region: The absence of or indefinite boundaries, wrongful interpretation of boundaries by litigants, the Executive and the courts, confusion over the authority of traditional chiefs particularly where English legal principles have crept in, the ignoring of customary law, careless exercise of chiefs of their traditional prerogatives such as concessions to migrant farmers or gifts of land, transfer of jurisdiction from one court or authority to the other, failure of litigants to comply with the awards of an arbitrator, admission of hearsay evidence, courts acting ‘ultra vires’, the absence of records of decided cases, court members being personally involved or interested in suits before them and political unrest affecting court members. In addition Kyerematen points out that social factors such as new economic and commercial value of land, population movements, the introduction of ‘modern conveyancing methods’ giving rise to confusion and dispute over jurisdiction, growing indebtedness and the emergence of a prosperous middle class with the capital to use for loans on mortgage and charge securities.⁶⁶ In order to tackle these key challenges the National Land Policy identified the following policy actions:

⁶⁶ Kyerematen, *op.cit.*, pp. 126-129.

- Securing Ghana's international boundaries and shared water resources with Burkina Faso, La Cote d'Ivoire and Togo via joint border commissions. The establishment of joint technical committees under the border commissions to manage the Oti, Black Volta, White Volta and Bia Rivers.
- Facilitating equitable access to land including reviewing the phenomenon of landless and migrant farmers and to eliminate (or at least to reduce) the conditions that give rise to migration and encroachment.
- Collaborating with traditional authorities and other land stakeholders to 'review, harmonise and streamline' customary practices usages and legislation to govern land holding, land acquisition, land use and land disposal. The policy also recommends a number of financial measures to ameliorate this source of poverty and conflict namely: the establishment of land banks for present and future generations, the use of negotiable land bonds for timely government acquisition, the imposition of appropriate levies on allocated but undeveloped lands, the establishment of standards and registration requirements for real estate dealers and developers and removing price subsidies on government land.

Of particular significance is the establishment of mechanisms for co-operation with traditional authorities, which includes:

- Development of land management knowledge and skills among stool, skin, clan and family landowners;
- The institution of administrative mechanisms to guide the allocation and disposal of land by traditional authorities
- The development of systems to facilitate proper record keeping
- Assistance with the establishment of land secretariats to facilitate the work of all government departments and agencies involved in land service delivery.

In addition the Land Policy document seeks to enhance the security of tenure and protection of land rights through tenurial reform which documents and recognises the registration and classification of title, including:

- Speed up title registration
- Implement programmes for the production of large-scale maps of land parcels and in all urban areas where disputes are prevalent
- Enactment of legislation requiring stools, skins, clans, families and other landowners to survey and demarcate their land with the approval of the Survey Department
- The establishment of an early warning mechanism to detect potential areas of land disputes for the purpose of taking preventive measures
- The establishment by the Chief Justice of a special division of the High Court properly equipped to deal solely with land cases.

The Land Policy also seeks to ensure planned land use. The principle element of this policy is the establishment of a comprehensive District, Regional and National Land use Plan and Atlas via the

Ministry of Lands which ‘zones sections of the country into broad land uses according to criteria agreed among various public and private stake holders’. Key to the Land use Plan and Atlas is the establishment of an inter-ministerial technical working group with the Ministry of Lands and Forestry as the lead agency to resolve user-conflicts and harmonise land resource use among competing users. Finally, the policy attempts to develop effective institutional capacity and capabilities. A number of elements are noteworthy:

- The establishment and maintenance of a geo-spatial database to which all thematic data bases are to be referenced
- The establishment and maintenance of a land information system of networking amongst related agencies and sub-regional and regional networks
- The encouragement of international co-operation and support in all aspects of land policy, land administration and sustainable land development.
- The establishment of human development programmes.
- The establishment of mechanisms to enhance active collaboration between traditional authorities and land stakeholders.
- Review and consolidate all land legislation into a comprehensive legal code and to provide transparent guidelines

A key issue in understanding the dynamic of conflict in Ghana is the degree of institutional capacity of entities within the Ghanaian policy to express, regulate and ameliorate land management and conflict. There are two sets of institutions that are central to the management and mediation of land conflict and require brief discussion. The first is the courts and its officers and the second is the Lands Commission.

6.2. *Land Disputes and the Courts*

The role of the courts and indeed the legal system in general in Ghana is problematical with regard to the question of land disputes. The legal framework of jurisprudence in Ghana is essentially unaltered since British colonialism and whilst this may not in itself be problematical, given the peculiarities of Ghanaian land disputes, the development of a corpus of legal jurisprudence pertinent to Ghanaian conditions may be usefully considered. Land disputes may be regarded as structural as they are chronic, widespread and arise due to a multitude of complex and interrelated factors from chieftaincy disputes, to migrations patterns, to ecological and land usage crises, to the pressure of scarce supply not meeting increasing demand. Given that land disputes are the major source of conflict in Ghana and that this phenomenon is a growing and structural condition, the absence of dedicated land courts is noteworthy. It is also clear that traditional modalities of land dispute lack the necessary regularisation, objectivity and test of principle to serve as an adequate mechanism for the range of disputes afflicting the country. Indeed the particularistic role played by chiefs and chieftaincy and the potential for arbitrary decision-making may be regarded as inherently conflictual. As Ghanaian Attorney General and Minister of Justice Addo Dankwa Akufo-Addo, has lamented, ‘Many of our customary laws on land are outmoded, and effective policies to address these issues have still not been put in place.’⁶⁷

⁶⁷ *Ghana Daily Graphic*, March 19, 2002.

Linking land disputes and the outbreak of conflict, Akufo-Addo added, ‘The remote causes said to trigger off these attacks have involved issues of either ethnicity, chieftaincy disputes or religious intolerance.’ However, under current conditions finding relief through the courts is itself highly problematical. Thus Ghana finds itself vulnerable to two competing yet inadequate forms of land dispute regulation the traditional chieftaincy and the modern courts and legal system. Assuming that neither system, modern or traditional is likely to fall away in the foreseeable future, the challenge is to modernise and regularise the chieftaincy land dispute mechanism and to adopt the modern court and judicial system to become more attuned to the sensitivities of the traditional land disputes, whilst simultaneously boosting its efficiency.

The courts suffer from a number of identifiable shortcomings. The first is the calibre of the judiciary. This is a constant source of criticism and concern amongst Ghanaian commentators and whilst there is no objective benchmark of acceptable performance, the problems confronting the judiciary have been acknowledged by their peer group. The second problem is in the common choice of litigation over alternative dispute mechanisms. It is estimated that just 5% of land dispute cases brought before the courts are settled without further litigation. The courts themselves are clogged with a backlog of cases, which is exacerbated by the use of ‘perpetual injunction’, which essentially freezes the usage or transfer of land, and which may render it unusable for the period of the dispute. There are an estimated 60 000 land dispute cases currently within the system.⁶⁸ The difficulty in clearing this backlog is highlighted by figures gleaned from the Central Registry in Accra.

Table 6.1. Land Disputes Cases registered in Central Registry Accra

	1998	2000	2001	2002 (to July)
Land cases heard	719	608	608	378
Land cases disposed of	30	27	16	(unavailable)

Note: Figures supplied by Justice Georgina Wood, ‘The Courts and Land Dispute Resolution in Ghana: Situation, Problems and the Way Forward’ delivered at a GTZ Legal Pluralism Workshop on Alternative Dispute Resolution, Accra, July 2002.

Land disputes take from a minimum of 3-5 years to a maximum of 8-15 years to travel through the whole ambit of the legal process from trial court to Supreme Court.⁶⁹ This state of affairs has left the courts and judges in particular swamped with an increasing backlog of cases, which leads to a drop in efficiency and is a costly process for litigants and indeed the country as a whole. On a purely practical matter, courts lack modern business machines, including electronic recording equipment and resort to slow and time consuming hand-written recordals. This dearth of modern office equipment means that judgements and proceedings of the courts are not transmitted to other courts resulting in a loss of shared expertise, again at the expense of both the judicial system as a whole and litigants more particularly.

Questions exist over the appropriateness of the courts to fully understand or to adjudicate fairly on land disputes that date back generations, are infused with emotive, religious, cultural issues and that

⁶⁸ K.W. Brobby, ‘Land Law, State Courts and Other quasi-Judicial Institutions, Can Access Be Improved?’, Paper delivered at the Workshop Land Rights and Legal Institutions in Ghana Wood Industries Training Centre Accra, 28 February 2002.

⁶⁹ Local or circuit courts hear cases of up to Cedis 10 million (€1,250), the Supreme Court deals with matters above Cedis 10 million.

do not lend themselves to the application of modern jurisprudence. Furthermore, legal practitioners themselves have come under repeated criticism for a range of corrupt and unethical practices. For example, attorneys have been accused of having a vested interest in the process of litigation that leads to the failure of potential ‘whistle blowers’ to alert the authorities to the early warning signals of growing land disputes.

Furthermore, the State Lands Tribunal system that had been established to adjudicate specifically on statutory land acquisition matters has collapsed due its contested legal status, the reportedly poor standard of judges appointed to them, as well as their dysfunctional relationship with the High Courts. In addition, whilst the establishment of a Land Title Adjudication Committee of the Land Registry was agreed to several years ago this has yet to be established.

Whilst these criticisms of the institutions of the modern legal system, there is a pressing imperative for the establishment of mechanisms for modern and traditional juridical traditional leaders to improve, regularise and ‘professionalise’ their own land adjudication activities and responsibilities as well as to better understand the operation of modern legal practice as it relates to questions of land. It is contended that this need for regularisation of chieftaincy land adjudication activities is particularly acute in regions in which chieftaincy is weak and contested. By way of contrast it is held by commentaries that where the authority of the chieftaincy is widely embraced and where the operation of traditional land dispute mechanisms is effective (particularly in Ashanti) this may serve as an effective model for other regions. Nevertheless questions must be raised regarding the transferability applicability of Ashanti modalities of land regulation and dispute mediation to other regions.⁷⁰

6.3. Land Disputes and the Lands Commission

The Lands Commission Act of 1994 empowers the Lands Commission to perform the following:

- Exclusive management of public lands and any lands vested in the President;
- Giving consent and concurrence to any private stool lands;
- Advising government, local authorities and traditional authorities on the policy framework for the development of particular areas of Ghana to ensure that the development of individual pieces of land is co-ordinated with the relevant development plan for the area concerned.

At the most practical level the Lands Commission fails in its duties due to a chronic lack of capacity. This is the case in each of the regional Lands Commissions as well as that of the National Lands Commission in Accra. Since the welcome lifting of the suspension of the regional Lands Commissions the central challenge has been that of engendering consistency in land administration amongst regions as well as difficulties of national to regional communication and feedback. On the question of infrastructure the Lands Commission simply lacks adequate office accommodation, storage for documents, and basic computer equipment.⁷¹

⁷⁰ It is noteworthy that a group calling itself Ashanti Concerned Citizens has been pressing for greater transparency and accountability from traditional leaders and has recently gone to court to press chiefs to render accounts for inspection for income earned in the disposal of traditional lands.

⁷¹ Five visits were made to the Lands Commission in Accra. On each occasion the impression was re-enforced that the institution is incapable of carrying out its mandate. Offices are stacked to the ceiling with files, offices are overcrowded and clerks continue to make use of typewriters. Time-keeping is poor, inter-departmental communication is threadbare. An examination of files demonstrates the problems of manual file management

The Lands Commission also suffers from critical shortages in human resources. It is understaffed, personnel lack appropriate training in both managerial and line function activities and for those with access to information technology inadequate information systems training is provided. Whilst all regions have 'at least one computer' to date these have not been networked or connected.⁷² Currently staff and skill shortages are met on an ad hoc basis through departmental secondments, for example the legal section of the Lands Commission is aided by secondments from the Attorney General's Office.

The Lands Commission also stands accused of being vulnerable to manipulation by the rich and influential elements seeking to secure urban land without adequate compensation to traditional leaders. Another statutory land body the Office of the Administrator of Stool (traditionally held) lands, is stridently criticised for failing to collect or to pass on revenues due on stool lands to traditional leaders. The Lands Commission does attempt however to act as an alternative dispute mechanism and to provide a forum for disputatious parties to settle their grievances. Furthermore, whilst the issue of land disputes falls largely outside the ambit of operation of the Commission on Human Rights and Justice (CHRAJ) this mechanism has been lauded for its effective if limited role played in land dispute resolution. As is mentioned elsewhere in this report, the CHRAJ is itself severely under-funded and subject to the budgetary largesse or strictures of central government. In summary, two key failures exacerbate land disputes and their resolution in Ghana. The first is the failure of their respective institutions to adequately carry out their functions. The second is the poor, patchy or non-existent working relationship between traditional and state established land regulation bodies. This failure at the institutional level is crucial to an understanding of the persistence of land-based conflict in Ghana. Land disputes are not exclusively rural phenomena however. Simmering land disputes in both Greater Accra and Cape Coast have recently spilt over into violent conflict. In the case of the Cape Coast dispute the major protagonists are the Efutu and Efutu Mampong communities who live some 6 kilometres apart. The communities have been in litigation over disputed land for some 30 years, yet in March 2002, they engaged each other in violent conflict resulting in injury to at least 10 combatants. It is noteworthy that the focus of the violent conflict even in this instance was aimed at the chief's palace (who escaped with his life, reporting to a police station some 25 kilometres away).⁷³ Rapid urbanisation has exacerbated the demand for scarce land in urban and peri-urban areas. These conflicts tend to add an additional layer to land disputes, as they introduce intermediate elements such as land developers, estate agents and lawyers/conveyancers. Urban land disputes are in this sense perhaps more complex and intractable. These disputes are not isolated, nor do they merely occur on economically marginal land. One high profile international mission in Accra found itself in dispute with a traditional chief over the building of the embassy complex in the heart of diplomatic belt of the capital city.⁷⁴ Certainly the financial 'stakes' are often higher in these cases. This convoluted overlay of claims and counter claims is compounded by extensive official corruption and maladministration. A development of particular significance has been the employment and deployment of so-called land guards. These armed individuals are often military or police veterans who are employed by owners or claimants to land to prevent others from occupying land. A number of disputes over the access to and

requiring, for example signatures, stamps and authorisations from a myriad of chiefs, managers and clerks. An error on any one of these halts the process of registration or transfer, which can result in delays of months.

⁷² Interview with Lands Commission Principal Officer, Accra July 2002.

⁷³ *Ghana Chronicle*, April 10, 2002.

⁷⁴ Personal interview held in Accra January 2002.

distribution of other key resources have been prominent over time. Amongst these is the fishing dispute between canoe fishermen and inshore fishermen over the issue of new technology. The canoe fishermen lack the resources to acquire the new ‘aggregate light fishing’ technology that has been adopted by the competing fishing authority and has thus impacted on the effectiveness and catch of the canoe fishermen. This has led to the vandalising and destruction of fishing equipment and bloodshed has been averted through the timely intervention of the Tema police.

6.4. Ethnicity and Wage Differentials

Finally, although inconclusive, a study of wage earnings differentials amongst and between ethnic groups in the manufacturing sector Ghana is of interest. The study concludes that whilst regional wage earnings show marked regional differences, there is little evidence of inter-ethnic wage discrimination. Wage differentials between regions are explained by underlying educational standards, qualifications and regional wage payment practices. The study indicates that within the Akan ethnic group, Asantes and Fantis tend to earn less than other Akans. But Ewes earn relatively poorly due principally to the lower wage structures within the Volta region. The study found that family ties and kinship play a significant role in employment and in discriminatory wage structures. Akan other than Asante and Fanti appear to successfully use their kinship networks to secure employment and advantageous wage incomes. In summary, the study did not find evidence of inter ethnic discrimination in wage patterns such that one group is either favoured or paid at an unequal wage rate.⁷⁵ These findings are of particular interest given the common perception of Asante chauvinism, as well as economic and financial avarice.

Key Issues

Whilst economic and social goods are not concentrated in the hands of any single identity group or groups, the country is geographically bifurcated. In broad terms, the population of the coastal, southern, and central regions enjoy higher incomes, levels of education and literacy, better social services and suffer less poverty. The highest rates of illiteracy and poverty are to be found in the northern regions and insofar as this coincides with the concentration of specific ethnic groups in regions; class and ethnicity can be seen to be mildly re-enforcing cleavages.

⁷⁵ Barr, A. & Aduro, A., *Ethnicity and Wage Determination in Ghana*, First Draft Report for the CSAE’s Conference on ‘Opportunities in Africa: Micro Evidence from Firms and Households, April 9-10, 2000. University of Oxford and the Centre for Policy Analysis, Accra, Ghana.

B. Intermediating Structures, Processes and Policies

Factor # 7: Group Political Mobilisation, Organisation and Strategies

To what extent have various groups actually formed into exclusive cultural, social and political organisations, such as political movements, religious political movements, ethnic-based and nationalist political parties, that articulate the groups' interests and grievances, and pursue them collectively through political action, coercive or violent action?

7.1. Political Parties and Contending Traditions

Table 7.1. Ghanaian Political Leadership 1957 (independence) – present			
	15/05/1957	Sir Arden Clark	Governor prior to independence
15/05/1957	13/11/1957	Sir Arku Korsa	Acting Governor General
13/11/1957	01/07/1960	Lord Listowell	Governor General
06/03/1957	24/02/1966	Dr. Kwame Nkrumah	President – Convention People's Party
24/02/1966	01/10/1969	Ankra, Kotoka, Afrifa	Military Heads of State
01/10/1969	13/01/1972	Dr. K A Busia	Prime Minister – Progress Party
01/08/1970	13/01/1972	Mr. Edward Akuffo-Addo	President
13/01/1972	01/07/1978	Gen. I.K. Acheampong	Military Head of State
01/07/1978	04/06/1979	Gen. F.W. K. Akuffo	Military Head of State
04/06/1979	24/09/1979	Fl. Lt. J.J. Rawlings	Military Head of State
24/09/1979	31/12/1981	Dr. H Limann	President – People's National Party
31/12/1981	07/01/1993	Fl. Lt. J.J. Rawlings	Military Head of State
07/01/1993	07/01/1997	Fl. Lt. J.J. Rawlings	President – National Democratic Congress
07/01/1997	20/12/2000	Fl. Lt. J.J. Rawlings	President - National Democratic Congress
20/21/2000	Present	John A Kufuor	President New Patriotic Party

The ruling New Patriotic Party (NPP) is a conservative, traditionalist and pro-free-market party founded in 1992 at the time of the restoration of political rule in Ghana. Although failing to defeat the Rawlings led National Democratic Congress (NDC) in both 1992 and 1996, the party is publicly and privately convinced that it 'won' the 1996 election, but had to wait until the December 2000 election to take over the mantle of office. The NPP may be regarded as conservative in the British Tory sense of the word in that it draws its support from the business, middle, managerial and educated classes in Ghana. The NPP's ideological predilection is driven in part from its funding and class support base, but also stems from the fact that its heartland is in the Ashanti region. Ashanti identity is synonymous with adherence to, and reverence for, tradition and entrepreneurialism and these are two of the core planks of NPP ideology. The NPP declaration of a 'Golden Age of Business', accelerated privatisation programmes as well as taking Ghana into the Heavily Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) status with the World Bank are but three indicators of its neo-liberal programme. Many of the NPP leadership and

cabinet (including President Kufuor)⁷⁶ are successful businessmen. The NPP draws its political lineage from the conservative Danquah-Busia tradition (see the above list of Ghana's leaders) of liberal democracy and a free enterprise economy. The NPP 2000 election manifesto espoused six core values and beliefs: development in freedom, a free enterprise economy, provision of quality education, respect for human rights, freedom of expression and the rule of law.⁷⁷

The National Democratic Congress Party (NDC) is the political party founded by former President Rawlings which was spawned out of the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) that ruled Ghana from the 1981 'second coming' Rawlings coup. Given the authoritarian control Rawlings (an Ewe) exercised for two decades, and indeed his considerable personal charisma, the NDC has become known as an Ewe party, that is dominated by and favours this minority ethnic group by rewarding the blanket support the party receives from its heartland Volta region with high government and military appointments. By the time of the 1996, and in particular the 2000 elections however, ethnic tensions had emerged between an Akan Fante faction in the party and its core Ewe support base. The party draws its support predominantly from the Volta, Eastern, Central and Northern regions and rural areas. The party is comprised of a sometimes-paradoxical admixture of socialist, populist and neo-liberal tendencies. The former two tendencies drawn from conviction and the latter stem from the necessity of forced 'pragmatism' derived of intensive engagement with the World Bank and donor governments. Indeed the party has developed an unenviable reputation for engaging in 'donor democracy', which is doing just enough in terms of governance and economic reform to satisfy the prescriptions of the Bretton Woods institutions and donor community. The philosophical core of the party, however, is an adherence to social democracy, social welfare and a central role for the public sector. It is instructive to note however, that an analysis of NDC policies reveals them to have been far from 'pro-poor' and that the percentage of government welfare expenditure under the NDC was lower than the average for sub-Saharan Africa countries. After the resignation of Rawlings as party leader and his retirement from active politics, the party has undergone several identity and potentially existential crises. Nevertheless the party remains a potent parliamentary party with some 92 seats in the national Assembly and confident that it can unseat the NPP in the forthcoming 2004 election.⁷⁸ The Convention People's Party (CPP) is the direct inheritor of the Nkrumahist political tradition. Thus the party espouses a pro-worker and pro-rural class programme and policy agenda. Simultaneously however, it articulates strong position on internal security, policing and defence. The party draws a spectrum of support from the labouring classes, socialists, students and ideologues. The party's regional support base is in the Northern and Volta regions and contests support with both the NPP and NDC in the respective regions. However, the party is poorly funded to the point of threatened bankruptcy and suffers from acute organisational shortcomings. Indeed so weak is the CPP that the tiny People's National Convention threatens its claim to stewardship of the Nkrumahist tradition. The National Reform Party (NRP) is essentially a rebel rump of the NDC that left the party accusing it of deserting its traditions, beliefs and commitment in favour of 'big money' interests and tribalism. The

⁷⁶ John Kufuor became a Deputy Foreign Minister at age 30 and served briefly as a Secretary for Local Government under Rawlings' post 1981 regime before resigning seven months later to go into business.

⁷⁷ <http://www.nppghana.com> or <http://www.ghanareview.com/npp.htm>.

⁷⁸ A fieldwork interview with former NDC Secretary General Honourable Kofi Attor M.P. in July 2002 evinced a confidence that the party could at least overturn the loss of seats it lost with a slim majority thereby restoring its electoral majority.

potency of the NRP lies in its ability to expose NDC corruption and questionable electoral practices and to serve as a spoiler for the party.

7.2. Major Identity Groups and Party Politics

Ghanaian society is marked by, rather than riven by, ethnic and cultural diversity. Adherence to and identity with ethnic identity is, however, unevenly spread throughout the country. Whilst the Akan group (constituting some 49% of the population) are bound by a linguistic intelligibility between their constituent ethnic groups, solidarity within the Akan is highly uneven. Indeed at the political level, sharp competition between (Akan) Asante and (Akan) Fanti has been a feature of recent elections.

7.3. Akan Asante



By far the most distinctive and socio-politically cohesive group in Ghana is the Asante. Asante social cohesion and the use of adhesive rhetoric, symbolism, mythology and notions of a *sui generis* history clearly border on irredentism. The Asante come closest to popular notions of an ethnic aristocracy. Furthermore, such sentiments are used by political opponents to galvanise opposition to the perceived threat of Asante dominance. The current Asante can trace their social identity back to the enstoolment of Nana Osei Tutu in 1695, who succeeded in bringing extant Asante states into a loose confederation. The mythological, yet symbolically powerful⁷⁹ Golden Stool (throne) was said to have descended from the skies and fell into the lap of Osei Tutu. Osei Tutu is largely ascribed with bringing form and structure to the Asante and indeed forging them into a formidable and efficient fighting entity. This is the epicentre of a strong Asante centralising cohesion that was later developed into an ordered and mutually protective social and familial structure (principally to protect women and children whilst men were at war). Soon after the British took over the administration of the slave forts on the Cape Coast in 1821, they went to war with the Asante, but suffered the death of the then Governor of Sierra Leone (from where the British administered the slave forts). In 1826 the Fanti coastal states defeated the Asante and captured the Golden Stool (later recaptured the Asante). But apart from this event and a

⁷⁹ The closest western/Christian analogous symbol would be that of the Holy Grail.

period of some 20 years from the defeat of the Asantehene by the British in 1900, an Asante king has ruled continuously to the present King (or Asantehene) Osei Tutu II. The Asantehene is regarded as the most powerful political figure in Ghana after the President. Significantly at the death of the Asantehene in 1999, the NDC sent a high level delegation to the capital of the Ashanti Region, Kumasi - the seat of the Golden Stool - to influence the appointment of the new Asantehene to one more positively disposed to the party, but with negative consequences. The NDC's preferred candidate was not elected to the Golden Stool and relations with the subsequent Asantehene were less than optimal.

7.4. *Politics and Ethnicity*

Before developing this analysis, it is worth re-iterating that Ghana is characterised by conditions of oscillating stable and unstable peace. For a country populated by some 92 ethnic groups, conflict tends not to coalesce along ethnic, but rather intra-ethnic and clan lines. One of the more perplexing characteristics of Ghana, however, is the constant suggestion of ethnic distinction and discrimination, particularly in public life. Indeed ethnic identity forms part of the every day discourse of Ghanaian people, yet there is seldom, if ever, open conflict between the major ethnic groups. Indeed whilst there is a constant public debate over the 'ethnic question' in the public domain, public opinion surveys suggest low levels of ethnic antagonism, and rather point to other markers of social identity and cohesion that have greater salience or credence for Ghanaians.

A recently released study reinforces these impressions.⁸⁰ The study found that although 33% of Ghanaians state that all their friends come from the same ethnic groups as themselves, some 53% state that their friends come from a variety of ethnic backgrounds. 11% state that all their friends come from an ethnic background other than their own. Furthermore, some 60% of respondents stated that they feel positively towards people of a different ethnic group and 33% felt moderately positive about people of a different ethnic origin. A mere 3% felt negatively towards people from a different ethnic group. A somewhat higher number of respondents (12%) stated that they felt that they had been discriminated against because of their ethnic identity.

Yet these figures do not gel with regional voting patterns that suggest a strong regional and ethnic political cohesion, particularly in the Ashanti and Volta regions. Perhaps this would suggest that at the level of social and perhaps commercial interaction, there is little cause for ethnic tension, but at election time and when issues of the allocation of scarce resources are at risk, Ghanaians are susceptible to ethnic outbidding.

Despite the concerted and deliberate efforts of a sequence of modern political leaders from Nkrumah to Rawlings to downplay ethnicity as a marker of social and political significance, it has remained a persistent factor in Ghanaian politics. Soon after independence in 1957, Nkrumah's CPP passed the Avoidance of Discrimination Act to prohibit the formation of political parties on ethnic, regional or religious lines. The 1969, 1979 and 1992 Constitutions all contain provisions aimed at curbing ethnic electoral politics. However, the response to the Avoidance of Discrimination Act was the founding of the United Party with core support from Ashanti's, Voltarians and Northerners.⁸¹

⁸⁰ Joseph Ayee, 'Political Claim-Making and Community Issues in Ghana', Institute for Development Studies and the Centre for Policy Research and Social Engineering, Legon, 2002.

⁸¹ A. Kaakyire Duku Frempong, 'Ghana's Election 2000: The Ethnic Under Current', in Joseph R. A. Ayee, *Deepening Democracy in Ghana – Politics of the 2000 Elections* Vol. I, Freedom Publications, Accra, 2001. p. 63.

Nkrumah's modernising African socialism found the notion of tribalism and indeed the 'anachronistic' adherence to tribal and ethnic group identity a threat to nation building and development and a political factor demanding remedial attention, rather than tolerance. From the politically expedient measure of splitting the Ashanti Region in two, to form the Brong Ahafo Region,⁸² to the destoolment and installation of preferred traditional chiefs, Nkrumah actively sought to dilute the power and influence of traditionalism, its structures and leadership, but in particular, that of the Asante. Such is the nature of the social and political cohesion of the Asante and such is the political authority of the Asantehene, however, that as a group, they present any modern or modernising political leader with a potentially problematical electoral constituency.⁸³ Highly significantly, beyond social and political cohesion, the Ashanti Region controls both the country's gold and the bulk of its mineral reserves. It is also the principal region of cocoa production. With this level of ethnic cohesion it is not surprising to find that ethnic identity intrudes into national politics and manifests most clearly at the time of general elections. Furthermore, the 'carefully balanced' composition of party tickets and subsequent cabinet and senior governmental posts is strongly influenced by popular and ethnic considerations.

However, class may also be regarded as an increasingly significant crosscutting cleavage within Ghanaian politics, particularly during the 1970's, 1980's and 1990's. At the time of the 'second coming' of Rawlings in 1981, the Ghanaian economy was facing collapse, with both class and regional income differentials particularly acute. Thus Rawlings' appeal (insofar as the coup was prosecuted and 'justified' on socio-economic grounds) was a rising dissatisfaction with economic decline and mismanagement. Rawlings' claim, under the rubric of justice, was to champion the masses and in particular the disadvantaged regions. Class inequalities were acute in urban and rural areas, with the bourgeoisie in both sectors becoming the target of Rawlings' opprobrium. As one commentator has noted, 'Overnight the country was divided into 'people' and 'bourgeoisie', 'revolutionaries' and 'reactionaries', 'exploited' and 'exploiters'.⁸⁴ Despite Rawlings' modernising, populist and class-based rhetoric and policy orientation, members of his own Ewe ethnic group were significantly over represented in his PNDC administration. Significant positions such as the Head of National Security, the Head of the Army, the Governor of the Reserve Bank and the Head of the National Investment Bank were Ewe. Some 80 per cent of the top echelons of the Ghana military in the early 1990s were Ewe. Furthermore, Ewes constituted a full 60 per cent of all military personnel at the time. Ewes also 'over-populated' the state bureaucracy. As the support of the military and indeed the Ghana Reserve Bank were critical to Rawlings administration, these appointments were viewed sceptically. Indeed during the 1986 to 1991 period, people from the Volta Region, whilst representing a little over 10 per cent of the population, constituted a disproportionately high percentage (1986 – 28.6%), (1987 – 21.4%), (1988 – 20.7%), (1989 – 20.7%), (1990 – 20.7%) and (1991 – 18.5%) of the PNDC membership.⁸⁵ During this period, ethnic hostility at the level of public rhetoric and within the media became markedly heightened.

⁸² Expedient insofar as it resolved the simmering disputes and claims for regional identity by the Brong and Ahafo peoples, it served as an electoral reward for massive CPP support and critically split the threateningly powerful Asante Region. A fuller account of this process is provided by Joseph Ayee, *Regionalism in Ghana: An Overview*, Indian Institute of Public Administration New Delhi 1994.

⁸³ The alleged disrespect shown towards the Asantehene by President Rawlings at a meeting after the enstoolment was both widely reported and deeply resented by the Asante.

⁸⁴ Agyeman, p.104.

⁸⁵ Not all Volta residents are Ewe it should be noted.

However, an examination of history shows that the civilian governments of the 1960s and 1970s also gave the appearance of favouring Akan appointees. Thus the Governors and Managing Directors of both the Ghana Reserve Bank and National Investment Bank were Akan, as were successive Chiefs of the Defence Force and the Vice Chancellors of the three Universities. As Chazan has noted during the 1969 to 1982 period, however:

‘Only at the centre, at the most dependent juncture, did ethnic boundaries achieve any degree of coherence, with ethnic differences surfacing as important principles distinguishing among groups closely associated with the state power nexus. As the distance from the state grew, so did the utility of ethnic differentiation as an instrument of social organisation and personal mobility. At the lower levels, ethnicity became a framework and not a means for social interaction’.⁸⁶


Whilst Ghanaian general elections are far from ethnic censuses, clear regional voting patterns persist, particularly in the Volta and Ashanti Regions. In the 1996 general election the NDC took some 93.2 per cent of the popular vote in Volta, whereas support for the NPP in Ashanti was some 61 per cent. However, the ethnic pattern of voting is not at all widespread. Ethnic bonding or mobilisation cannot explain the NDC victories in the Greater Accra, Brong Ahafo, Upper East, Northern and Upper West regions. Nevertheless, the fact that former President Rawlings’ wife is Akan and that his Presidential running mate Arkaah was a Fanti are both significant and were undoubtedly politically ‘useful’ not only during election campaigns.

The regional voting pattern of both the 1996 parliamentary elections and presidential elections is depicted below. Insofar as regions are densely populated by, or coterminous with, particular groups, ethno-political voting patterns are vivid.⁸⁷

⁸⁶ Naomi Chazan, *An Anatomy of Ghanaian Politics – Managing Political Recession, 1969-1982*, Boulder Colorado, Westview Press, 1983, p. 36.

⁸⁷ All voting pattern maps in this section are reproduced from Nugent, P., *Winners, Losers and Also Rans: Money, Moral Authority and Voting Patterns in the Ghana 2000 Election*, African Affairs, Volume 100, 405-428, 2001.

Key to Parties



Ashanti Region

1. Akyem Nkwabiga
2. Akyem Sekyere West
3. Akyem Sekyere East
4. Kwabre
5. Efikuse Asokore
6. Kumasi
7. Akyem Nkwame
8. Bosomtwe
9. Fante

Western Region

1. Sekondi
2. Takoradi
3. Effia-Nkwanta

Central Region

1. Twifo-Hemang/Lower Denkyira
2. Cape Coast
3. Akyem Asokwa Kwamankese
4. Mfantseman West
5. Akyem Oboase/Brakwa
6. Akyem Enyan Esiam
7. Mfantseman East
8. Agona West
9. Agona East
10. Akyem
11. Effiduasi
12. Komenda/Adirala/Eguafo/Abrem

Greater Accra Region

1. Ododododoo
2. Klottey/Korle
3. East Ayawaso
4. Ayawaso Central
5. Ayawaso West Wagon
6. Adakuma North
7. Adakuma Central
8. Adakuma South
9. Osu/Aburi
10. Osu/Aburi North
11. Ode-Kpong
12. Ledzokuku
13. Krowor

Eastern Region

1. Kolofonia
2. New Juaben North
3. Ofo
4. Akropong
5. Akropong South
6. Upper West Akum
7. Nkwanta
8. Upper Manya Krobo
9. Lower Manya Krobo




Figure 1. The 1996 parliamentary election



The maps graphically illustrate the broad national voter support for the NDC, but with little penetration into the Akan and particularly Ashanti Regions. One other notable feature that would have particular salience in the 2000 elections is the NPP/PCP alliance in the Northern Region.

7.5. The Watershed 2000 Election

Perhaps due to the intensity and closeness of the 2000 general election, (and in particular the second round voting), ethnic outbidding became a feature of the campaign. In the Western and Central Regions the NDC urged the electorate not to vote for Kufuor (an Akan Asante), but rather to give their vote to their 'native son' Professor Atta Mills (an Akan Fanti). Chiefs and the general populace were

urged to ‘wizen up’ and to vote for one of their own.⁸⁸ Similarly NDC vehicles roamed the streets of Accra populated by Ga locals, broadcasting warnings that voting for the NPP would herald a wave of Asante and other ‘outsiders’ that would flood Accra and take over their land. The NDC campaign also made much of the physical attacks on NDC supporters in the Volta and Northern Regions. In contravention (at least in spirit) of the provision within the 1992 Constitution prohibiting Traditional Chiefs from becoming engaged in national or party politics, President Rawlings held meetings with Volta and Accra Ga Chiefs reportedly to encourage them to mobilise support for the NDC presidential candidate. Subsequently Volta Chiefs reportedly held meetings with their counterparts in the Central Region to plan a strategy of support for the ‘native son’ Mills. For their part the NPP urged voters in the Volta Region⁸⁹ to ‘come out of their isolation and join the rest of the country in voting for J.A. Kufuor and positive change’.

The ethnic dimension to the 2000 election was further complicated by the fact that the three other major parties, namely the Convention People’s Party (CPP), Ghana Consolidated Popular Party (GCPP) and the National Reform Party (NRP), all chose Fanti’s as their respective flag bearers. Intense lobbying by the Northern Region for an indigene to be placed on the ticket as Deputy Leader of both of the main parties led one commentator to castigate the region for its ethnic crudeness. The so-called ‘Savannah Club’ had appealed to voters not to vote for any party that had not chosen a northerner as a running mate, leading to the accusation of ‘blackmail by northern ethnic agitators’.⁹⁰ In a further element to the ethnic tinder box, the people of the Northern Volta region had been clamouring for their own Oti Region whilst the Kwahu’s had called for the renaming of the Afram Plain district as the Kwahu North District in recognition of their land ownership.

One of the crudest appeals to the conjoining of ethnic and political loyalty was made by the NDC in the (largely ethnically Akan Fanti) Central Region where election billboards pronounced, ‘Adze we fie a oye’, (It is better to have your own). Once crossing regional borders these billboards reverted to the standard ‘Vote for Professor Mills’ exhortation. This appeal to Fanti solidarity was, however, diluted by the election of the three Fanti leaders of the respective minor parties. Conversely, the challenge for Kufuor was to judiciously downplay his Asante identity on the national stage, as numerically, this could have been disadvantageous and had been used effectively against him and other Asante political leaders in the past. Kufuor had some difficulty in countering the anti Fanti label ascribed to him by, amongst others, then First Lady Agyeman Rawlings. Despite appealing to Mills to dissociate himself from such political ethnic agitation and reminding the electorate of his wife’s Fanti origins, Kufuor failed to shake off the stigma of having insulted Mills as a Fanti and by extension, hundreds of thousand of others in the Central Region. Additionally, symptomatic of both the primordial and political instrumentality of ethnic identity, particularly at election time, was the tendency for ‘failed’ candidates to engage in ethnic ‘scapegoating’, by attributing their failure to gain nomination and subsequent resignation from parties to ethnic chauvinism and exclusivity.

Although highly significant markers of political mobilisation, organisation and strategy, class and ethnicity are not the only factors. Other elements were neatly captured by an NPP memo published in the Ghanaian press stating that the running mate for Presidential candidate Kufuor ‘must broaden and

⁸⁸ Frempong, *op.cit.*, p. 63.

⁸⁹ In electoral terms the Volta Region has become known as the NDC’s ‘World Bank’, an epithet with particular relevance given Ghana’s umbilical relationship to the Bretton Woods institution.

⁹⁰ Frempong, *op.cit.*, p. 154.

enhance the electoral appeal of the ticket by nature of ethnic, or gender or religious contribution that person will bring to the ticket’.

The maps below graphically demonstrate the gains made not just by the NPP in the 2000 election, but also by other opposition parties and independents. Whilst Ewe/Volta support for the NDC remained solid, it is of importance to note that almost all Akan populated areas voted against the NDC if not for the NPP. Furthermore, the presidential election depicts most clearly how opposition forces coalesced across regional and ethnic lines to support Kufuor.⁹¹




Figure 3. The 2000 parliamentary election

⁹¹ No data could be found that provided clear, or numeric ethnic voting patterns, yet the above maps present a clear graphic depiction of significant regional and thus ethnic voting patterns.




Figure 5. The 2000 Presidential election, run-off

Key Issues

Despite the banning of ethnic identity political parties, in certain instances ethnic identity is a key indicator of political affiliation. This is particularly true of Ewe affiliation with the NDC and to a lesser extent, Akan identity with NPP support. Such ethno-political affinity is susceptible to manipulation, particularly at election time and is a cause for concern. Ethnic identity in Ghana is deep and primordial and shows little sign of dilution. It has not however escalated into large-scale inter ethnic warfare, nor has it given rise to serious secessionist impulses, perhaps in part due to Ghana's centralised, rather than federal system of government.

Factor # 8: Openness of the Formal Political and Governing Political Institutions

Does the country in question have an open or closed political system?

8.1. Political Background

From the halcyon days of 1957 when Ghana became the first British African colony to achieve independence, the country's history has been politically tumultuous. To understand contemporary Ghanaian sentiment towards the domestic polity, it is important to briefly sketch the advances achieved and reversals endured leading to the successful transfer of power through the 2000 election.

In 1964 President Kwame Nkrumah declared Ghana a one party state. In 1966 Ghana experienced the first of its five coups d'état led by Generals Ankrah and Afrifa. Democracy was restored in 1969 under Dr Kofia Busia's Progress Party, only to be overthrown by Colonel Ignatius Acheampong and the Supreme Military Council (SMC1). In 1978 a 'palace coup' was conducted by General FWK (Fred) Akuffo and the SMC11 established. One year later Flight Lieutenant Jerry John Rawlings failed in a coup attempt, but later escaped from prison and on 4 June 1978⁹² was installed as head of state with the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council. On 16 June 1978 presidential elections took place as planned resulting in the election of Dr Hilla Limann of the People's National Party as head of state. Three years later on 31 December 1981⁹³, saw Rawlings seized power once more (the so-called 'second coming' of Rawlings), establishing a military government under the aegis of the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC). In 1992 a new Ghanaian constitution was adopted, which saw the PNDC re-engineer itself into a political party the National Democratic Congress and subsequently win highly disputed multi-party elections by 58.3% to 38.4% over the New Patriotic Party's Professor Albert Adu Boahen. In 1996 a second highly contested and controversial election was won by Rawlings' NDC defeating the NPP's John Kufuor by a similar margin, 57.5% to 39.5%. The year 2000 saw two remarkable events in the chequered odyssey of democratic development in Ghana. The first was the decision by then President Rawlings to abide by the provisions of the 1992 constitution and not seek a third term of office. This was all the more remarkable given Rawlings' personal popularity, the absence of an 'obvious' or popular replacement candidate and aged 54, his relative youth. The second remarkable event was the outcome (and acceptance) of the election. Despite failing to secure the pre-requisite 50%+1 popular vote, Kufuor won the second round vote, thus heralding the first democratic change of government in Ghana's history.

8.2. Popular Political Opinion Survey

Opinion surveys have not been conducted into the performance of the Kufuor administration, but valuable insights are gained into Ghanaians political understanding, consciousness and evaluation of political institutions through an opinion survey carried out in the final years of the previous NDC administration.⁹⁴ The survey conveys a pervasive and deep-seated dissatisfaction with the performance

⁹² This date is more than symbolically significant in that it became a Ghanaian national holiday, which the current NPP government rescinded on 3 June 2001, causing a furious outburst from former President Rawlings and his NDC supporters.

⁹³ This is a date of further political significance as it served as the masthead title of the powerful PNDC and later NDC supporting women's movement headed by the wife of President Rawlings Mrs Nana Konadu Rawlings.

⁹⁴ *Parliament and Democratic Governance in Ghana's Fourth Republic*, Centre for Democracy and Development - Friedrich Naumann Stiftung, Accra, 2000.

of key institutions of democracy and suggests a partially occluded, rather than open, polity at that time.

The major findings of the survey are: Only 17 per cent of respondents were satisfied with the performance of parliament. Key functions of parliament were rated as follows: deliberation (12%); legislation (15%); vetting (16%); ratification (13%), approval of loans (15%); review of Auditor General's Report (14%) and oversight a mere (7%). Elite respondents surveyed in March 2000 were more positive about the performance of parliament and in particular saw an improvement in parliament's performance over the previous five years. 65 per cent of respondents in this group felt that parliament has done well in its oversight function. These results are somewhat anomalous in that the NDC is broadly a centre-left populist party and its NPP opponents are identified as a centre right, middle class, traditionalist, and 'pro-business' party. Of major concern for respondents, however, was the failure of parliament to assert its independence and oversight of the Executive and that it had presided over (or allowed) the erosion of parliamentary powers and functions.

Whilst a slight majority (55%) surveyed were moderately satisfied with the (10%) representation of women in parliament, some 45 per cent of the elite survey was dissatisfied with the extremely low levels of female representation in parliament. In addition, there were relatively low levels of satisfaction at the frequency of constituency contact with members of parliament with 24 per cent stating that they did not find parliament accountable to the people. Some 30 per cent felt that neither they, nor their communities had any influence on the work of parliament. Unsurprisingly the highest perception of parliamentary influence on government policy was in the strongly pro-NDC Volta Region. Intriguingly, a mere 11% of 'uneducated' Ghanaians surveyed believed that they or their community had an influence on parliament, yet believed strongly in the capacity of parliamentarians to provide needed assistance. A mere 24 per cent of those surveyed believed that public opinion had an impact on parliamentary decisions. This is a strong indictment of the perception of the degree of openness of the workings of parliament. This low level of satisfaction indicates a failure of M.P.s to relay the content of bills, motions and questions raised in the National Assembly. It in turn denies constituency members the opportunity to provide feedback into the legislative process and to allow constituency members an opportunity to make an input into policy formulation or change. However, some 60 per cent of respondents felt that there were sufficient channels for participation in the work of parliament and indeed a remarkable 70 per cent stated that they had seen their parliamentarian since the previous election. Whilst there was an overall sense of improvement in the functioning and performance of the work carried out in parliament the drafters of the survey noted, 'Some of the Bills (parliament) had passed betray shoddiness and pedestrian treatment and others have dubious democratic validity'.⁹⁵ Additionally, for six years parliament did not consider a single private members bill, but merely considered and amended bills initiated by the executive.

It is significant to note that even though this survey was conducted during the final months of the NDC government, those respondents from opposition strongholds did not question the legitimacy of parliament as an institution. Indeed the channel of parliamentary protest, such as staging a walk out, was regarded as a legitimate form of protest by some 74 per cent of those surveyed in the Ashanti Region. Conversely, this form of protest was seen as legitimate by only 18 per cent of respondents from the pro-NDC Volta Region. Less encouraging is the finding that only 33 per cent of those

⁹⁵ *Parliament and Democratic Governance in Ghana's Fourth Republic*, p. 7.

surveyed had an adequate understanding of the operations of parliament, with the highest rating being amongst those from Ashanti (42%) and a mere four per cent of 'uneducated' Ghanaians.

No equivalent survey exists for the NPP Kufuor administration, but the following observations can be made. The composition of the National Assembly is in democratic terms perhaps more healthy than previous administrations, in that until recent by-elections, the NPP enjoyed 100 out of 200 seats thus requiring the support of minority parties to govern.⁹⁶ Secondly, the NDC is far from a spent force as it was elected with 92 members and thus has the numerical and indeed political capacity to act as an effective opposition within parliament. Thirdly, there has rarely been a breakdown of parliamentary operations since the election of the NPP. There have, however, been a number of boycotts and walk outs by the NDC over issues such as the tabling of the highly controversial National Reconciliation Commission Bill and the appointment of a Supreme Court Judge. Fourthly, President Kufuor has made national reconciliation a key tenet of his presidency and this sentiment appears to have (to date) permeated the National Assembly. Debates and deliberations in the National Assembly generally take the form of robust, yet consensus-seeking behaviour and are conducted in a Westminster style demeanour and protocol.⁹⁷ In a recent interview, whilst bemoaning the NDC for obstructionist behaviour in the House, majority leader Owusu-Ankomah commented of the NDC's performance,

'I believe they have done very well. They have the benefit of a great deal of experience, and many of their frontbenchers have been ministers for over four years. Some of them have been chairmen of committees in the past two parliaments ... so they've done quite well, but there have been occasions when I've thought that they've been rather petty'.⁹⁸

This suggests a polity that is functional, and one in which, at the parliamentary level, there is a degree of democratic tolerance and maturity.

In terms of public access to the polity, President Kufuor has conducted a number of 'People's Assemblies' around the country. During these meetings, rank-and-file members of the public are invited to attend the assemblies and to 'interrogate' members of the executive over matters of concern. Such assemblies are perhaps of more symbolic importance than meaningful interventions into the political process, but they convey an impression of a greater openness of the polity than hitherto.⁹⁹ They also point to a greater (if nominal) commitment to transparency and accountability. Given the relatively low ratings of the previous administration in terms of its openness, these developments are significant. In addition to People's Assemblies, parliament holds an annual Public Forum during the first week of the parliamentary session to bridge the perceived gap between the National Assembly and the ordinary man (sic) on the street'.¹⁰⁰

A further sign of the deepening of constitutionality and indeed the operation of the principle of separation of powers was the recent striking down by the Supreme Court of the so-called 'Fast Track

⁹⁶ At the time of writing the NPP had a working majority of 107 members to the minority 93.

⁹⁷ This was concluded from personal interviews conducted with M.P's from both the main parties, interviews with parliamentary officials, observation of National Assembly debates and interviews with a range of journalists, researchers and academics during the course of fieldwork.

⁹⁸ *Ghana Review International*, April 2002, p. 37.

⁹⁹ I was informed in an interview that whilst there may be one or two 'plants' in the audience who are primed to ask questions, 'to get things going', public participants are free to ask any questions and indeed have subjected Cabinet Ministers to a severe grilling on occasion.

¹⁰⁰ Minister of Information and Presidential Affairs quoted in the *Ghanaian Times*, January 2002.

Courts' (FTC) ¹⁰¹ as unconstitutional. The decision was prompted after the appearance of Tsatsu Tsikata former Ghana National Petroleum Corporation Chief Executive on a charge of 'wilfully causing a financial loss of 2.15 billion cedis to the state'. Tsikata filed a motion at the Supreme Court that the 'constitution, in making provision for the administration of justice, did not establish any court known as the FTC'. The Supreme Court upheld Tsikata's motion in a 5-4 vote and the case was dismissed. This is significant at a number of levels. The Fast Track Courts had been successful in trying a number of high profile corruption cases and served to publicly reinforce President Kufuor's publicly avowed policy of 'zero tolerance' of corruption. Secondly, these courts had been used to prosecute senior public officials including a former Minister of Sport. This sent out a clear political message to both past and present public and elected officials. Thirdly, the FTCs were widely regarded as a sharp, rather than blunt, instrument to prosecute former NDC officials and public office bearers at the conclusion of investigations into rampant fraud and corruption under the previous administration. The appearance of former President Rawlings at the hearings of the FTC in a show of public support for the accused highlighted the political significance and indeed tension surrounding these institutions. Thus the decision of the Supreme Court was seen as a political defeat for the NPP government and President Kufuor in particular and a setback for his policy of zero tolerance for corruption. It is clear too, that the Supreme Court judges were intent on making the most of their powers as conveyed in their lengthy, yet convoluted, ruling. Yet the decision, which is to be appealed by the Attorney General, is an encouraging indicator of a robust judiciary and a signal of a serious adherence to constitutionality and a separation of powers in the modern Ghanaian state.

8.3. Local Government Reform

In addition to greater openness and democratic consolidation at the national institutional level, although Ghana is a unitary state it embarked on a programme of local government reform and decentralisation in 1989. The avowed thrust of this programme was to, 'promote popular participation by shifting the process of governance from command to consultation and by devolving power, competence and resources to the district levels'.¹⁰² A detailed discussion of the decentralisation programme is beyond the ambit of this paper, but, in summary, the programme sought to:

- Create manageable and viable local districts;
- Establish District Assemblies as non-partisan local government bodies (70% of members elected and 30% executive appointees)¹⁰³;

¹⁰¹ Notably Fast Track Courts are characterised *inter alia* by the possession and usage of modern recording and information technology equipment, thereby vastly streamlining court proceedings. The contrast between the grid locked conventional court system and the success of the Fast Track Courts further reinforces the point that Ghana's social development is hamstrung more by institutional constraints and lack of basic capacity, than social and political will.

¹⁰² *Enhancing the Decentralisation Programme: District Assemblies and Sub-Structures as Partners in Governance*, Kwamena Ahwoi, Address to the Institute of Economic Affairs, Accra, 2000.

¹⁰³ The putative intention of the 30% executive appointees was to ensure the inclusion of politically, economically and socially excluded groups. The reality is that these appointees are highly political and a source of controversy. The NDC government claimed an affirmative action policy goal that would see 40 per cent of DA members being female. Current numbers fall woefully short of this figure. Nevertheless, women are being strongly encouraged to run for the forthcoming DA elections and much public advocacy work is being conducted (with considerable media support) by groups such as FIDA, DANIDA and The Friedrich Ebert Stiftung.

- Empower District Assemblies in their legislative, administrative, development planning, budgeting, service delivery and rating authorities;
- Transfer responsibility for 86 statutory functions of state to local government bodies;
- Integrate the functioning of local, regional and central government functions;
- Establish sub district councils and unit committees to create greater access to political authority;
- Restructure resource allocation and establish resource allocation mechanisms between central and local government;
- Rationalise roles and functions such that national government is responsible for policy formulation, regional government is responsible for co-ordination and district level is responsible for planning and implementation.

District Assemblies in Ghana are either metropolitan (population over 250,000), Municipal (one town assemblies with population over 95,000 or District (population 75,000 and over). There are three Metropolitan Assemblies, four Municipal Assemblies and one hundred and three District Assemblies. Additionally there are in excess of 1,300 Urban, Zonal and Town/Area Councils and some 16,000 Unit Committees.

The major financial vehicle for the implementation of this policy was the establishment of the District Assemblies Common Fund, which came to constitute some 25 per cent of the country's total development budget from domestic sources. This is principally derived as a transfer of 5% of total government revenues in quarterly instalments.¹⁰⁴

Whilst the policy of decentralisation has afforded greater popular access to the political process and brought decision making closer to the point of delivery, acute problems persist. These principally relate to inadequate capacity for policy implementation and delivery.¹⁰⁵ Furthermore, low levels of skills amongst local government personnel, logistical difficulties, fraud and corruption severely hamper the efficacy of local administration. A number of these difficulties are rooted in the insufficient funding through the District Assemblies Fund. Critically, policy ambiguity and questionable political will have continued to dog the role of local and regional government in development delivery. Finally, the relationship between District Chief Executives and M.P.s has often been dysfunctional and marked by conflict over roles, responsibilities and accountability rather than co-operation.¹⁰⁶

The importance of decentralised decision-making and delivery is well understood yet relatively poorly articulated in Ghana. The GPRS Core Team on Governance, Decentralisation and Public Policy has identified a number of the key issues. After a decade of economic collapse between 1975 and 1984 Ghana embarked on a structural adjustment programme between 1984 and 1990. Between 1988 and 1993 the Programme of Action to Mitigate the Social Costs of Adjustment was introduced as a short-term programme to assist the poor and vulnerable groups. In 1995 Ghana developed its Ghana Vision

¹⁰⁴ Other sources of local funding are derived through trading activities, grants in aid, recurrent expenditure transfers and ceded revenue.

¹⁰⁵ *Ghana – The New Local Government System*, Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development, Accra, 1996. pp. 56-61. An interview held with the Executive Director of the Department suggested that efforts to create a more effective local government system were a work in progress to which the current government was strongly committed.

¹⁰⁶ *Decentralisation and Conflict: The case of District Chief Executives and Members of Parliament in Ghana*, Joseph R.A. Ayee, Friedrich Ebert Foundation, Ghana 1999.

2020 that set the long-term objective of Ghana becoming a middle-income country by the year 2020. The Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy (GPRS) and the Medium Term Development Process (MTDP) were the culmination of these programmes and the direct outcome of a policy review process in 1999. The challenge for the Core Team was produce a framework that linked pro-poor policies to the institutional capacities at both national and local level and by so doing permit greater participation in important decision making by communities most in need of such policies. The core principles of the programme are worth enunciation:

- Active and perpetual participation of people in decision-making, such that the poor are able to influence resource allocation and the direction of state development policies towards pro-poor priorities;
- Effective organisation and efficient institutions that promote and sustain dialogue and participation;
- Legal/regulatory framework that promotes accountability, transparency, openness of government;
- A thorough system of decentralisation;
- Improving capability of the poor by supporting them to organise and responding to their demands for basic services;
- Increasing access to economic opportunities and markets for the poor;
- Security from economic shocks and from corruption, crime and violence, while re-enforcing coping mechanisms for the poor;
- The exercise and integration of traditional authority into the governance matrix.

The Core Team however identify the following four areas as problematic:

- Public institutions have not been assigned roles consistent with the fundamental changes envisioned in the distribution and exercise of power envisioned under decentralisation;
- The lingering and widening gaps between popular participation and the channels established for developmental interventions;
- Ambiguity regarding fiscal decentralisation and increasing pressure local financial resources pursuing decentralised development;
- A lacuna in the authority to plan and implement pro-poor programmes.

Further buttressing the operation of democracy in Ghana at the institutional level is a number of constitutionally entrenched institutions such as the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) that was established in 1993) and the National Media Commission (NMC). Both of these independent bodies have and continue to play an important part in the deepening of democracy. The Independent Electoral Commission has played an important role in setting the operating rules and regulations of Ghanaian elections, as well as mediating in disputes. An important feature of the IEC has been the establishment of a joint Inter-Party Advisory Committee (IPAC) that serves as an independent forum to thrash out matters pertaining to elections and by elections. The IPAC has the advantage of acting as an early warning system prior to election campaigns and also a conflict mediation mechanism. The National Media Commission has 18 members from a broad sector of civil society, as well as two persons

nominated by the President and three persons nominated by parliament. The NMC is tasked *inter alia* with:

- Promoting the freedom and independence of the media;
- Promoting a high standard of journalism;
- Insulating the state-owned media from government control.

Key Issues

Ghana's political system is showing tangible signs of strong institutionalisation and consolidation. In broad terms it can be regarded as an open and increasingly political pluralistic democracy. Much work is to be done however at the local government level (not least financing, clarity of authority and policy definition and alignment) to give meaning to improved popular participation and effectiveness at this vitally important (particularly in the realm of poverty reduction) stratum of government.

Factor # 9: Exclusive or Accommodative Governing Institutions and Decision Making Processes

What is the actual distribution of political participation and power among major groups that are or could be parties to conflict?

Identity group mobilisation has been discussed earlier in the paper. Data does not exist indicating the 'capturing' of any sector of the economy or polity by any sector of the population, although skewed income patterns have been noted. Insofar as group identity and regional socio-economic profiles overlap this has significance. For example, control of the land from which gold and other minerals resides is centred in the Ashanti Region. It is also the case that the Asantehene derives an annual royalty from mining companies in the area. Furthermore, the relatively lucrative cocoa production is also a prominent feature of the Ashanti economy. However, the commercial and political hub of Ghana, Accra, is a cosmopolitan mix of ethnic groups and in-migrants. Whilst most traditional land claims revert to indigenous Ga chiefs, the commercial and residential land sector within Accra, although highly contested, is controlled by a broad spread of private, commercial and government interests. Coastal and Volta river and dam dwellers derive their incomes from fishing and related activities, but apart from intra group conflict, which can be acute, the sector is not viewed as having been 'captured' by a particular identity group. Ewe concentration in the Volta region and importance of the Volta Dam to the regional community translates into effective control of fishing and transport resources around the dam, but this is not generally a source of inter-ethnic conflict or resentment.

As mentioned elsewhere in the paper there is no reliable or written evidence of the either and ethnic group 'capturing' any part of the state apparatus or any area in which there is regional dominance of a particular institution. The only exception to this is the predominance of Ewes in the military, which is dealt with elsewhere. Research has commenced into a study of ethnic representation

in state and civil institutions, but this is in its formulation stage and at least two years from completion.¹⁰⁷

9.1. Privatisation

Privatisation of state owned assets has been a policy of the previous administration and will be boosted by the current administration's pro-business policies. Previous privatisations have been controversial, due to perceived opaque processes and practices. In addition the selling of stakes in public utilities has raised nationalist opprobrium. The privatisation of Ghana Telekom and sale of a stake to Malaysian interests is a case in point. There is no evidence of a particular identity group being favoured, placated or bought off in the privatisation process, save for the impact this process has on the growth and strengthening of an indigenous middle class. Insofar as the NPP is perceived as a party of traditionalists and the middle or business class, this process has the potential to accentuate class and political tensions however. A further danger lies in the perception amongst Ghanaians that the Akan and Asante in particular are economically avaricious and acquisitive. There is a tangible sense amongst many, that Akans and Asante are culturally and behaviourally predisposed to dominate and control sources of wealth. These 'person on the street' perceptions easily escalate into a language of prejudice such as 'You must be careful when dealing with an Ashanti, they can't always be trusted in business'. These social stereotypes are currently reinforced by the fact that President Kufuor an Asante is an independently wealthy businessman, as are a number of his cabinet members.

Ghana is committed to a policy of privatisation, which is reinforced by its HIPC agreement. It is contended then that the privatisation process has the potential to stoke conflict as much as be the harbinger of a more equitable and popular distributor of wealth. Furthermore, the preparation for sale of utilities is often preceded by job losses, rationalisation and price increases, in order to make these entities more attractive Initial Public Offerings. Just one socially and economically controversial consequence of this process is the imminent increase in electricity tariffs by some 60 per cent.

¹⁰⁷ Even when I questioned the Centre for Democracy and Development in Accra in some detail about the reasons for and purpose of, the research they were undertaking, the responses provided were vague and unsatisfactory. During the course of a number of interviews I asked the researcher concerned why the research project was being undertaken in the first place and why it would be funded if there were no prima facie grounds for undertaking the programme. I further asked the researcher what the working hypothesis of the research programme was, for example whether or not there is any written or even experiential evidence of ethnic capturing or over representation, or even regional dominance of state and civil institutions. The same question was also asked, for example, of the Head of the Sociology Department at the University of Ghana and the same of the Dean of the Faculty of Social Sciences at the University. Their responses were remarkably similar. They were all convinced that there had been a history of ethnic capturing of key institutions, particularly the military, yet none was able to provide evidence, or direct one to such evidence, or research data. The reasons put forward for this lacuna were that ethnic dominance is circumscribed in the constitution and thus any research establishing the empirical facts would be highly politically sensitive. Furthermore, people argued that ethnicity is 'such a sensitive question' that it would be difficult to secure co-operation and thus to acquire accurate data. All those questioned were confident that there is currently a growing Akan dominance in both governmental institution and in the private sector in Ghana, but none was able to produce any substantial evidence of this that would suggest a pattern let alone a trend. A frequent comment of interest was, 'Maybe Akans prefer to go into business than the military'. None of this is to suggest that ethnic capturing does not and is not taking place. Indeed the stakeholder analysis produced in this report points out the nascent dangers in a perceived growing Akan-Asante dominance in Ghanaian society. What is suggested, however, is that there is a dearth of data and research on this important area.

More positively, one successful form of economic liberalisation has seen a proliferation in the number of gold producers, with Ashanti Goldfield's share of gold production dropping from 90 per cent to 50 per cent. The government intends retaining its 20 per cent stake in Ashanti.

9.2. Women's Marginalized Status

Of all marginalized groups, the largest and most pervasive problem centres on that of the effective exclusion of women from positions of political office and influence. At the national level a total of 18 female M.P.s (nine representing the NPP and nine from the NDC) won seats in the 2000 election. This represents some 9 per cent of total seats in the assembly. Almost half of these female M.P.s come from the Central and Western Regions with two each from Ashanti and Greater Accra. The Northern, Upper East and North Western regions have just one female M.P. each. There is no female M.P. representing the Eastern Region. Whilst the percentage of female candidates on election tickets is much higher than their representation in parliament (as high as 23 per cent in the case of the NDC), that so few candidates are elected calls into question the nomination of women in marginal or 'un-winnable' constituencies. In addition, women suffered heavy defeats in nomination contests at the constituency level. Indeed without a proportional representation party list system, it is hard to envisage national leaders ensuring greater female political representation. This is despite an official female affirmative action policy being put in place during the Rawlings era. At the regional level the picture is more iniquitous, as there are currently just 385 District Assembly members out of a total of 7,700 positions. In the case of the Upper West, for example, where men have actively discouraged women from standing for office in the District Assembly elections to be held in July 2002, women's under-representation is acute. Of 296 Assembly members in five districts of the region, a mere 15 are women and only three are elected.¹⁰⁸ Despite laudable work being conducted by NGOs, and coalitions of women's and governance groups, (with strong support from donor countries) the struggle for female political emancipation is daunting.¹⁰⁹ Whilst patriarchal behaviour patterns are pervasive in Ghana, its most lamentable and pathological manifestations is that of female genital mutilation. This is practised principally amongst the Muslim population of the Upper East and Upper West Regions. Most observers place the level of female genital mutilation at 15 per cent. Other pathologies include the high levels of violence against women and spousal abuse. A bill is currently before parliament that seeks to address the latter scourge. The establishment of the Ministry for Women and Children is a welcome development in addressing gender issues at both the institutional and socio-economic levels. A further challenge lies in altering socially entrenched discriminatory behaviour and practice that is reinforced by traditional patriarchy.

¹⁰⁸ *Ghana Review International*, May 2002.

¹⁰⁹ For example amongst other 'women's groups', I visited the National Council on Women Development (established by the government in 1975) in Kumasi. For an office of eight people there was no computer, one typewriter, two desks and two telephones. Communication to women in the rural area, although sometimes by telephone, is often reliant on a postal service that can take up to two weeks to deliver a letter. These capacity shortages exacerbate highly prejudiced and discriminatory behaviour patterns amongst many men throughout Ghana. The high rate of spousal abuse is just one symptom of this social malady.

Key Issues

The socially, economically and politically unequal position of women in Ghanaian society is perhaps the key impediment to the country reaching a deeper level of democratic consolidation and social development. Male-female income disparities are vast, political representative inequalities are acute and patriarchal behaviour patterns are pervasive. The appointment of a Ministry of Women and Children is highly welcome, but requires considerable appropriate resources to give effect to its egalitarian objectives. Whilst the programme of economic and liberalisation and privatisation is welcomed, it may have the unintended consequence of accentuating private wealth concentration, further hardening class distinctions and antipathies within Ghanaian society. This potential conflict, in turn, may have political repercussion for the NPP government.

Factor # 10: Group Participation in Non-Official and Informal Processes and Institutions

To what extent are non-governmental institutions in the wider society, including informal ones such as the economic markets and traditional dispute resolution mechanisms, providing valued social goods to a wide range of groups and helping to resolve or absorb the conflicts of interest?

10.1. The Role of Tradition and Kinship

There is a constant and often visible interplay between modern and traditional in Ghanaian society. Both worlds intrude on each other and the distinction is often quite blurred. A number of factors require brief elucidation. The first one is the importance of kinship. Kinship in Ghana plays a crucial role in the economic, political, spiritual, legal and cultural life.¹¹⁰ Kinship in cephalous (traditional) societies in Ghana is the distinguishing marker of identity. At the material level, kinship determines inheritance patterns, residence patterns and property relations. Kinship also determines political patterns of authority, seniority and 'rank'. Culturally, the times and places of worship are determined by kinship ties. Behaviourally kinship has a determining role in etiquette patterns including gender and generational status, behaviour and reverence. Although kinship is central to the social and economic organisation of traditional societies in Ghana, issues of etiquette are still pronounced in urban and modern life. Courtesy and respect are highly valued and culturally intrinsic qualities to Ghanaians. It is impossible to ascribe such behaviour patterns as 'explanatory' or determinant in the relative peace of Ghanaian society, but notions of order and respect derived of kinship identity no doubt play a significant role in this.

Furthermore, major ethnic groups including the Akan, Ga, Ewe, Adangbe, Gonja and Dagomba, Mamprusi and Wala all exhibit highly centralised political systems. Authority amongst these groups is generally well defined. Political units have discrete boundaries within which well-developed legislative, administrative and judicial governance institutions operate. Patterns of social control are also elaborate and comprehensive amongst traditional groups in Ghana. These include patterns of approval, sanction and redress, including traditional punishments of public reprobation, chants and floggings. At the spiritual level there exists a strong belief in the notion that ancestral spirits and gods

¹¹⁰ Nobody in Ghana is unclear about his or her kinship. Everybody interviewed from professors to engineers to drivers has an immediate knowledge of their ancestral background and their 'traditional home'. Even amongst urban workers who are second or third-generation Accra residents, there is a strong identification with kinship and their 'home village'.

will punish bad behaviour. Beyond social sanction there is an extensive and well-developed body of traditional law that operates particularly amongst cephalous groups. Unlike modern or 'western' legal practice or jurisprudence, Ghanaian traditional legal practice tends to try each case on its merits and attempts to avoid the time delayed disruption caused by formal court cases. An important principle is that any person who feels aggrieved can have a decision taken on his or her particular case.¹¹¹

The scope and depth of traditional social control and law is demonstrated by the adjudication of 'oath cases'. These are cases that threaten the peace, harmony or integrity of the social group. Oath cases arise out of disputes over land, trespass or boundary disputes. They also include cases of suspected adultery, debt and insults. Although they may be regarded as private issues, oath cases are escalated up to the chief who is obliged to take action to protect the integrity of his community. Formal procedures of evidence, adjudication, plea, exhortation to change, promise to change and then punishment follow. Once adjudication is made an offering has to be made to the ancestors (of a sheep or drink) and appropriate sentence passed. The point to be made is that traditional patterns are vital and elaborate and continue to play a crucial role in broad social relations in Ghanaian society. Conversely, the primordial and spiritual nature of traditional authority patterns also holds the potential for generating intensive conflict. Where authority patterns are rigid and revered any abrogation, disruption or insult to these authority and behaviour patterns holds the likelihood of escalation to violent conflict. Furthermore, there is a widely held belief amongst traditional leaders that respect for their institution is diminishing, not only amongst their community, but is being (or has been) undermined by the central policy in Accra. This sense of frustration was expressed in a series of fieldwork interviews. Contemporary chiefs are at great pains to stress their socially stabilising effect and rather blame 'Western' laws, white colonialists and politicians for 'causing all the trouble'. As the son of a paramount chief commented:

'As a chief I have authority that is accepted by everybody in the community, because my authority has been handed down over generations and accepted by the community. When I want to discipline somebody, it is because the community demands that I discipline them. You won't find a young one giving cheek to an elder here; he wouldn't even look at me in a disrespectful way. What do you get with politicians? They are anonymous. They come here once every four years and they bring their money and their schnapps and gifts for you. They want you to tell your community to support them. They know that we cannot involve ourselves in party politics, but they cannot do without us. We can do without them. Tell me, what does this politician know about this community? What does he know about its land, its people, and its families? What does he know about our problems? He sits in the assembly at Accra, he drives his car and he only knows us when it is campaign time. I want to tell them politicians and their lawyers to fuck off back to Accra and leave us alone for God's sake. They should just leave us alone to live our own way, it is better that way. That is the way the people want to live.'¹¹²

Thus traditional social and authority patterns possess both ameliorative and potentially inflammatory elements that may at once instil order, but also hold the potential to trigger conflict.

¹¹¹ G.K. Nukunya, *Tradition and Change in Ghana*, Ghana University Press, Accra, 1992.

¹¹² Personal interview conducted in the Central Region May 8, 2002.

10.2. *The Role of Non-Governmental Organisations*

Non-governmental organisations often straddle the traditional and modern in Ghana. It is difficult to empirically demonstrate the assertion that the extensive network and operations of community based organisations and non-governmental organisations in Ghana has made a significant contribution to the relative peace and stability of the West African country. As a general statement it can be concluded that NGO's have played a crucial role in Ghana during times when political access (particularly under military regimes) has been severely curtailed. As is discussed later in the paper, the donor community has invested heavily in Ghana, not just in terms of political and economic commitment, but also social investment through the funding of a vast array of projects and NGO's. Fieldwork in Ghana confirms the impression that development agencies, NGO's and CBO's are vital to the development and welfare of Ghanaian society. The proliferation of NGOs is illustrated by the fact that the national Poverty Reduction Programme (NPRP) Ghana Resources Guide lists over 120 pages of support agencies.

All significant social and economic research in Ghana appears to be at least in part, donor funded. All major NGO's are also donor funded. All major conferences (even where these include the participation of the government) and private policy interventions are donor funded or supported. Whilst the government plays a lead role on policy formulation and co-ordination, without donor funded NGO support, it is difficult to conceive of any significant social project achieving success in Ghana. This relationship is dynamic, however, and it will be significant to observe how the 2000 regime change in Ghana impacts on the donor to NGO relationship in years to come. Secondly, the mainstreaming of donor funding commitments, in accordance with the GPRS, has yet to begin to play itself out. Both developments are sure to have an impact on NGOs.

Nevertheless identifying and measuring the impact or effect of NGO's and CBO's is a difficult task. However an analysis of the role of NGOs in conflict prevention, mediation and peacekeeping may help to illustrate a number of the key dynamics. The conflicts in the north have proved to be persistent and intractable. Furthermore, government agencies in the form of the security forces, as well as regional and local administrations, have proved demonstrably ineffective in eradicating outbreaks of violence, less still tackling the underlying causes of conflict. A 1994 NGO report on a meeting held with the then Minister of Welfare regarding the conflict in the North comments:

‘Even government admits not to have anticipated the scale and intensity of the fighting which was unprecedented and that the conflict has very serious fundamental undertones. Until 1994, similar eruptions had been very localised; but this time there was use of very sophisticated weapons, which exposed the fact that there could be some external factors at play as well.’¹¹³

Indeed it is widely held that government partisanship, particularly during election time, fuels nascent conflict. Prior to the outbreak of the 1994 conflict members of parliament from the respective factions were effectively complicit in escalating the conflict by making inflammatory public statements. These in turn were picked up by the media and retransmitted, further aggravating the situation. Unlike some

¹¹³ Quoted in Ada van der Linde and Rachel Naylor, ‘Building Sustainable Peace: Conflict, Conciliation and Civil Society in Northern Ghana’, Oxfam Working Paper, 2001, p. 24.

NGO's the security forces have proved insensitive to, or unaware of, conflict early warning signals.¹¹⁴ Such early warnings sometimes require an intimate understanding of local culture and tradition. For example, it is emerging from field research into the 2002 Yendi conflict that early warnings were sent out before the outbreak of conflict. However these were difficult for outsiders to detect as they included, shifting allegiances from market to another for the sale and purchase of goods, drumming, dancing and as some would believe, 'dogs howling'.¹¹⁵

Thus questions have to be raised about the capacity of the official structures to deal with conflict prevention, resolution and peacekeeping particularly in the Northern region. Conversely this highlights the potential value of CBO's and NGO's involved in conflict mediation. It must be pointed out however that during times of intensive conflict in Ghana, the security forces have provided protection for NGOs, as well as the provision of refugee and relief camps. Crucial to successful peacekeeping and conflict rehabilitation has been a generally good working relationship between the security forces and NGO's. NGO's active in the north of the country have been supporting agricultural, health, education, credit provision and well digging for almost thirty years. During times of conflict, those NGO's that are not forced to abandon their activities completely have at times been able to adapt or transform their activities from those of development, to that of relief work.

In response to the 1994 conflict in the north, the NGOs operating in the region formed an Inter-NGO Consortium, the most active members of whom included: Amaschina, Assemblies of God Development and relief Services, Business Advisory Development and Consultancy centre, catholic Secretariat, Council of Churches, Gubkatimali, Pendorudas, Ti Yum Taaba Development Association. International NGOs actively involved in the consortium included Action Aid, Action on Disability and development, catholic relief Services, Lifeline Denmark, Oxfam UK and Ireland, the Red Cross and World Vision.

In order to enhance the effectiveness of NGO's operating in areas of conflict in Ghana, so called 'joint neutral teams' have been established to ensure ethnic or clan balance in the delivery of aid and programmes. Such neutrality is critical for successful peacekeeping and was the reason for the Consortium's rejection of an offer to join the government Permanent Peace Negotiation Team in the wake of the 1994 Northern conflict. The peace-making role of NGOs during periods of conflict is also enhanced by the institutional and personal experience developed during previous outbreaks of conflict in specific areas. NGO's are also particularly well placed to assess the immediate and short-term needs of communities in conflict and have played an important role in post conflict rehabilitation in Ghana.

10.3. Institute of African Studies

In addition to the developmental, conflict mediation and ad hoc role played by NGO's, the Institute of African Studies at the University of Ghana, has established an important programme, 'Chieftaincy, Governance and Development'. The programme has been designed not only to study the institution of chieftaincy in Ghana, but also 'to teach courses on chieftaincy for the benefit of chiefs, administrators,

¹¹⁴ For example donor community intelligence on the Yendi conflict is scant, but that which is communicated comes almost exclusively from development agencies, NGO's and churches. Before the outbreak of the 1994 crisis in the north, NGO's had begun gathering early warning signals during the previous rainy season.

¹¹⁵ Interview with Richard Ahadzie, University of Ghana Legon Centre for Social Policy Studies Researcher, July 2002. Ahadzie is heading a project to investigate ethnic conflict in Northern Ghana and to develop guidelines for social workers in the field.

politicians, NGO's, students and civil society'.¹¹⁶ One of the objectives of the programme is to establish a collaborative and participatory management system for institution building. The National House of Chiefs has been involved in drawing up and sharpening the programme through a series of meetings and workshops. Seminars have been held with stakeholders in nine regions involving 30 Traditional Councils and 30 District Assemblies, women's groups, worker's groups, youth groups, churches and mosques. A national conference held in 2001 highlighted a number of issues of concern for chieftaincy. The encroachment on the political authority and financial resources of chiefs by successive governments since the colonial era has resulted in a severe erosion of the resources on which the chiefs can maintain themselves. For example, chiefs are angered by the situation in which the government receives 60% of all revenues from stool lands, 10% goes to the Forestry department and 55% of the remaining 30% goes to District Assemblies.

Chiefs further expressed their concern regarding the ambiguous political status of chieftaincy as the 1992 constitution debars them from partisan politics. Other areas of concern are those around chieftaincy and gender as well as the question of chieftaincy and Christianity. Most importantly however, the unit has begun conducting a series of seminars and workshops with chiefs on a national scale to enhance their skills with respect to:¹¹⁷

- Chiefs as the political head of state;
- Legislative functions;
- Judicial functions (including conflict management and resolution);
- Social functions (including health and education);
- Customary functions;
- Rituals and religious functions;
- Diplomacy and inter-state Protocol;
- Checks and balances and the authority of the chief.

Furthermore workshop have been held on the following skills development:

- The management of natural resources;
- The effects of modern legislation;
- Utilisation of revenue and accountability;
- Environment conservation;
- Local development planning;
- Marketing systems.

A further battery of workshops has dealt with the relationship of the chief to modern political structure including local, regional and national government. Chieftaincy and gender is extensively covered in the workshops and finally, the question of traditional constitutions and succession disputes, including

¹¹⁶ Institute of African Studies, University of Ghana, Legon, 'Chieftaincy, Governance and Development Project', Interim Report, February 2001, p. 1.

¹¹⁷ Interviews with Project Manager Dr Irene Odotei, Accra July 2002 and 'Chieftaincy, Governance and Development Project' (Research Agenda Document 111) July 2000.

rules of succession, eligibility, rotation, patterns of succession and processes of constitutional change is covered.

Key Issues

It is impossible to quantify the role played by traditional, informal and non-governmental institutions in the prevention, mediation and resolution of conflict. However, fieldwork and observation, as well as research into the activities of the numerous NGOs would suggest that all of these factors play a highly significant role in the relatively low levels of conflict and violent conflict in Ghana. The future status, role and operations of these institutions is however open to question and an area worthy of further in-depth research and analysis.

Factor # 11: Efficacy of Political Elites and Leaders

Do political leaders engage in ongoing rule-governed negotiations and decision-making in order to transact common public business and is the state actually able to produce desired public policies and public resource distributions?

Political leadership has played a critical role in the social and political trajectory of Ghana. However, personalised politics and cults of personality have been fostered often at the expense of good governance, cabinet decision-making and the politics of policy and principle. President Kufuor is criticised by his political opponents as ‘lacking charisma’ and of not being as ‘smart’ as some of his cabinet. This is despite his Oxford University education. However, the election of Kufuor and the critique of his detractors may indicate an important shift in Ghanaian politics away from ‘big man’ politics, to that of policy and programme driven affiliations. In April 2002, President Kufuor asserted:

‘We have a responsibility to transform the lives of many people who look up to us for a way out of their current difficulties. It is time for us to move up a gear. From now onwards our language should change. It should shift from we shall do this or the other, to we have done this or that this or we are doing this or the other. Time is not on our side we do not have the time to bicker among ourselves. We are lucky that Ghanaians are hardworking and anxious to learn. What we have been missing so far is honest and inspired leadership.’¹¹⁸

Ghanaian politics is riven with irony and none more so than at the level of national leadership. The populist leader Jerry Rawlings prosecuted two coups, predicated and justified on claims of ‘justice’. The same leader oversaw an autocratic military regime guilty of the most excessive human rights abuses in the country’s history. Whilst claiming to represent the interests of the masses and without derogating from some of the progressive and pro-poor policies of the NDC government, economic decline and poverty became endemic under Rawlings. In contrast, at the commencement of his administration, President Kufuor declared a ‘Golden Age of Business’ for Ghana and yet, has substantially increased the minimum wage¹¹⁹ and has established a Ministry for Women and Children,

¹¹⁸ *Daily Graphic*, April 20, 2002.

¹¹⁹ Despite this year’s 30% increase the minimum wage in Ghana is now still only the equivalent of 30 euro per month.

as well as forging ahead with the country's poverty reduction programme. Indeed Kufuor has placed poverty reduction and national reconciliation at the centre of his first term of office.

11.1. The Efficacy of the State Delivery

It has been pointed out earlier in the report that the NPP government has enjoyed some success in instilling macro-economic discipline into the economy. This has manifest in relative currency stability, lower inflation and lower interests rates. There has also been greater efficiency in tax collection. The NPP government set itself six targets for the economy when it took office, namely, to keep expenditure down, to reduce inflation, to stabilise the value of the cedi, to increase revenues and see that revenue targets are met, to improve overall fiscal discipline and to contain net domestic borrowing. All of these objectives have to some degree been met. It is evident however, that the economy and indeed the treasury were in a more parlous state than the NPP had believed when it first took office. Given the NDC government's excessive borrowing, un-budgeted expenditure and 'forced lending' by commercial banks to the Reserve Bank (thus creating amongst other things artificially high level of Treasury Bills and a stagnant banking sector) the NPP is severely circumscribed in its ability to rapidly reform the Ghanaian economy. Indeed it is further circumscribed in terms of the operation of its HIPC conditions, particularly with respect to the extent of the role of the state. Significantly the NPP government has reduced the number of ministers and deputy ministers from over 90 under the NDC to 76. Despite this a number of portfolios have been created and others split. Perhaps the most notable has been the establishment of the Ministry of Women and Children's Affairs. Furthermore, the Lands, Mines and Forestry Department has been split and a separate Ministry of Mines formed. It is also still less than two years into the NPP's term of office and thus premature to draw conclusions. Nevertheless, a number of trends are emerging. The price of fuel and utilities, which were kept 'artificially' and unsustainably low by the NDC, has risen dramatically. Petrol has risen by over 60% since the NPP cam to power and utilities by over 100% with further increases slated. To date the government's economic diversification plans have produced scant results, particular with regard to export diversification and the attraction of fixed investment into Ghana. In terms of education and social welfare the state is facing an enormous task. Like its predecessor the NPP allocated the largest portion of its 2001 budget to education, but there is as yet no evidence of greater in terms of delivery. However the government has carried out forensic audits to assess and evaluate the effectiveness of the education budget. A significant Achilles heel in state policy is the so-called 'cash and carry' health policy in which before patients are treated they have to pay in cash for the treatment at state clinics. There is ongoing discussion regarding the implementation of a National Health Insurance system, but if this is implemented it will firstly only apply to civil servants and then be expanded in accordance with the state's affordability levels. Little or no impact has been made on unemployment levels, although the state has undertaken an extensive data gathering exercise as a first step in formatting a more comprehensive employment policy. Small breakthroughs have been made in the aforestation programme which has employed some 20, 000 people. The divestiture programme has enjoyed at best limited success and is the source of ongoing controversy. The recent buy-back and resale of part of the telecom licence is a case in point where the original privatisation partner Malaysia Telekom proved unsatisfactory. The government has set itself the broad objectives of delivering economic stability to ensure growth, increased production and productivity, the provision of special programmes for the vulnerable and excluded, ensuring good governance and increased capacity for the

public sector, and active private sector participation in national-building.¹²⁰ Whilst the government may wish to see itself measured against its own objectives, there are significant elements within civil society that argue that the state has set itself 'inappropriate' targets and priorities and that are critical of the direction the government is taking. Perhaps foremost amongst these has been the comprehensive report by ISODEC on the state's budgetary and policy programme¹²¹. The report criticises the government on the following grounds:

- The budget is too technical and does not permit of appropriate civil society input into the process. More technically the budget was criticised for seemingly abandoning the Medium Term Expenditure Framework. Furthermore, the budget has been criticised for differing far too little from previous NDC budgets.
- There is persistent criticism of the HIPC initiative some of ill-informed and some of it reflective. There is deep scepticism around the neo-liberal prescriptions of the HIPC decision and acute questions as to whether HIPC will deliver long term debt relief.
- The failure of the state to provide farmers with appropriate support including few field extension workers, insurance schemes, land bottle necks and the timing of the increase in the producer price of cocoa after most of the production had been sold.
- The low salary and income level of civil servants was the source of much criticism, particularly in the light of \$US 20, 000 loans to parliamentarians for the purchase of motor vehicles.
- The government has failed to make any material impact on the process of decentralisation and more particularly in the fiscal decentralisation.
- The need for an improvement in school and education facilities is critical, as is the need for an improvement and upgrading of the calibre of teaching staff in many schools throughout country. Ghanaians are finding education expensive and this is set to have a deleterious impact on future schooling and qualification levels unless remedial action is taken.
- In health care the call has been made to expand the current free medical care for those under five to other age groups and to scrap the 'cash and carry' medical payment system.
- The government has come under further criticisms for failing to disaggregate its policies and spending so that they may be orientated towards improving the condition of women and children.
- Despite the government's commitment to 'clean administration' and a 'zero tolerance' policy on corruption ISODEC argues that the government needs to go further than paying lip service to this and needs to formulate concrete policies and steps to eradicate corruption, particularly in public life.
- Significantly the call is also made for the security forces to become more integrated into the broader society including abandoning the exclusive use of barracks thereby enhancing the civic nature and role of the security forces including the police.

¹²⁰ 'Interview with President J.A. Kufuor on His First Year in Office', *Ghana Review International*, Dec/Jan 2002, p. 14.

¹²¹ The Centre for Budget Advocacy of ISODEC, Open Letter to the President: The Outcome of Public Forums Held Throughout the Country on the 2002 Budget (July 2002), Weekend Agenda, July 19-25, 2002.

These critiques not only speak to the shortcomings of the state, but on the positive side, reflect the degree of engagement and openness of civil society to tackle the state in an open and forthright manner.

11.2. Political Leadership and Parliament

Whilst there have been no constitutional amendments to introduce political power sharing at any level of government, nor is there any such public discussion, the Minority Leader in the House of Assembly has called for a bipartisan caucus as a mechanism for consensus building, claiming, ‘The caucus could regularly take up national development issues prior to their introduction, debate and consideration on the floor of the House or in committee’. The Minority in parliament also called for a new form of relationship between the Majority and Minority that focussed on co-operation, consultation, compromise and consensus building, asserting:

‘Therefore, the saying in Parliament that the Minority ‘have their say’ and the Majority ‘have their way’ defeats consensus building. Perhaps, all should ‘have their say’ but national interest ‘should have its way’. Consensus in essence, involves a form of negotiations of positions. Therefore, to reach a consensus on any issue, parties have to make a minimum movement away from their entrenched positions’.¹²²

This keenness on consultation and power sharing coming from the minority party is clearly, in part, tactical, but even operating from Ghana’s first-past-the-post, single member constituency electoral system and the potential this holds for over- and under-representation, political governance at the parliamentary level has operated remarkably smoothly since January 2001. Responding to Minority Leader Bagbin, (and after castigating the NDC for excessive use of the parliamentary walk-out protest) the Majority Leader Owusu-Ankomah asserted:

‘There is the urgent need for Parliament as a vital component part of the machinery of governance to facilitate the achievement of the socio-economic and development agenda, which the sovereign people of Ghana mandated the government of the day through the ballot box, to execute’. (The Majority Party) ‘will continue to build bridges; we will continue to reach out to our colleagues on the other side of the same road, which we are mutually bound by history and providence to tread as we continue on our journey towards entrenching democracy and the search for peace, stability and prosperity for our people’.¹²³

Indeed the performance of the National Assembly is particularly noteworthy. In 2001 Parliament passed all the bills that were presented to it by the Executive. 23 bills were passed including the Criminal Code (Repeal of Criminal Libel and Seditious Laws) (Amendment) Act, 2001, (Act 602), the Bank of Ghana Act, 2001, the National Honours and Investiture Act, 2001 and the National Reconciliation Act, 2001, (Act 611).

In addition to the legislation passed, 17 Legislative Instruments were laid before the House in 2001 and none were annulled. Parliament also extensively debated a raft of motions and resolutions, as

¹²² *Ghana Review International*, January 15, 2002.

¹²³ *Ghana Review International*, January 15, 2002.

well as foreign policy issues including 25 International Agreements. During 2001, 169 questions were submitted by members and answered by ministers; while 90 statements were made by members and 14 by Ministers on policy issues to bring to the fore for public scrutiny, problems concerning their constituencies and of urgent public importance.

The 2002 parliamentary session will see the Courts (Amendment) Bill, the Ghana Maritime Authority Bill, the Ghana Investments Fund Bill, the Forest Protection (Amendment) Bill and the Timber Resources Management (Amendment) Bill tabled. Other bills will include the Value Added Tax (Amendment) Bill and Forest Plantation Development Fund (Amendment) Bill. The House will also consider a number of Legislative Instruments, International Agreements and other papers.

With some justification the Speaker of the House, as well as the respective leaders of the majority and minority parties, indulged in a self congratulatory discourse at the opening of parliament in 2002, with each reinforcing a consensus-seeking approach to 'doing business' in the house. The Speaker noted that such consensus building had enabled the leadership of the House to handle deliberations in a mature manner 'thereby blunting the sharp edges of conflict and promoting compromise and conciliation'.¹²⁴ This consensus-seeking rhetoric is the more remarkable given the fact that Ghana has been a parliamentary democracy for less than half of its 45 years of independence. However, it no doubt also reflects a less bellicose approach to conducting politics by the NPP than its predecessor, the delicate numeric balance in parliament and possibly the threat of the National Reconciliation Commission hearings over the coming 18-24 months.¹²⁵ Of both symbolic and political significance, the opening of the first sitting of the Second Session of the Third Parliament of the Fourth Republic in January 2002 was conducted by the Speaker of Parliament, rather than the President, as has been customary.

The impact and efficacy of the Kufuor administration's policy delivery is mixed. Much time has been spent on re-writing policy and delivery on a raft of some of the most pressing issues is clearly beyond the first term of the administration. Indeed so deep and structural are the socio-economic challenges of reconstruction and development, that the Kufuor administration faces a central political challenge of convincing the electorate to 'give it more time' to deliver tangible, pro-poor and developmentally progressive policies on education, health and employment in particular. Nevertheless, the government has made good on its promise of macro-economic discipline, zero tolerance for corruption and the establishment of the National Reconciliation Commission. Perhaps the most intangible, yet significant, dividend arising from the Kufuor government is that of a more tolerant and permissive social and political environment in which freedom of speech, constitutionalism and the rule of law have, to date, been largely respected.

11.3. Traditional Leadership

Political leadership operates not only at the level of national elected representatives however. A potentially significant cohort of leadership for development, poverty alleviation and conflict management is that of traditional leaders. One significant case is worthy of profile. During a World Bank delegation visit to Kumasi in 2000, the Asantehene challenged Bank officials to 'test' traditional leaders by designing programmes to firstly build their capacity and thereby help better preserve their

¹²⁴ The Speaker credited God for making it possible for the country for the first time in its 44 years of independent nationhood to witness a transfer of power from one democratically elected government to another.

¹²⁵ Provision is made for an extension of the life of the NRC to two years.

cultural assets. A meeting followed between the Asantehene and World Bank President James Wolfensohn. The outcome of this meeting was the design of a pilot project to build partnerships with traditional leaders for the furtherance of local socio-economic development. Reportedly this pilot project is the first of its kind in the world.¹²⁶ The four major elements of the project are capacity building, education, health and cultural heritage preservation. The capacity building exercise will see the complete re-organisation and modernisation of the Asantehene administration, structure and staffing, including its computerisation. Whilst this development does not impute any causal connection between ‘modernising’ traditional leaders, development and conflict management, the Asantehene in particular provides a powerful and significant model for the potentially progressive role that can be played by traditional leaders. Amongst his accomplishments has been the establishment of the Otumfuo Education Fund, which has drawn widespread support from businesses and the donor community. In addition, the Asantehene has been at the forefront of the region’s HIV/Aids awareness campaign. Further he has been an ardent supporter and promoter of local business and was pivotal in the establishment of the Golden Development Holding Company that seeks to promote business development and investment in the region.¹²⁷

A further encouraging model has been that of the role played by the Asante Paramount Chief, who serves as patron of the Environmental Protection Agency and is a strong and public advocate of sustainable environmental management in Ghana.

Key Issues

Ghanaian political leadership is faced with two sometimes competing political imperatives, that of national reconciliation and nation building and of consolidating the power of the ruling party. Whilst Ghana has been dominated by ‘Big Man’ politics, it is showing encouraging signs of shifting to a more institutionalised political ethos and understanding of leadership. The rhetoric of political leadership in Ghana is now less bellicose and currently marked by an issue-driven discourse. Political leadership appears intent on galvanising a programme of nation building and reconciliation. However, antagonism between former President Rawlings and the NPP government has been re-ignited and the manner in which ‘the Rawlings factor’ is dealt with by the government will be a key test of its political will and a highly symbolic indicator of its interpretation of national reconciliation and nation building. Shortly after mid-term (at the end of 2002) the NPP government is likely to be subjected to a concerted onslaught from its political opponents at which time the depth of its commitment to national reconciliation and nation building will be further tested. Of importance too is the, sometimes paradoxical, position that chieftaincy leadership holds as a force of order, peacekeeping and development, whilst at the same time enshrining conflictual practices and anachronistic influences. A key challenge is to help reform traditional chieftaincy to play the former, rather than the latter leadership role.

¹²⁶ Personal interview with the Ashanti Regional Minister, May 8, 2002.

¹²⁷ *West Africa*, 29 April – 5 May 2002, pp. 10-25.

Factor # 12: Efficacy of Security Forces and Violations of Human Rights

To what extent are disputes solved without the use of force? Is violence politically inspired?

Human rights abuses carried out by the Ghanaian security apparatus during a period of over thirty years cast a long shadow over contemporary Ghanaian society. Successive regimes were largely defined by their relationship to and dependence upon the military, police and security apparatus for their political survival.

12.1. Ghanaian Public Opinion on Human Rights Abuses

Ghanaians hold a dim view of the human rights record of the postcolonial governments. 3% of Ghanaians claim to have suffered direct human rights abuses, with 6% claiming to know somebody who had suffered human rights abuse.¹²⁸ Some 22% of Ghanaians claim to have knowledge of other friend and relatives who were victims of human rights abuse. They are equally clear and consistent about their understanding of human rights abuses, citing death/murder, arbitrary arrest and asset confiscation as the most serious human rights abuses perpetrated under the AFRC and PNDC. In particular those regimes associated with former President Rawlings are perceived as guilty of human rights abuses. Some 68% of Ghanaians believe the AFRC regime to have a negative human rights record, whilst the Rawlings led PNDC has a negative rating of 56% and the civilian government of the Rawlings led NDC is viewed as poor by some 45% of the population. Beyond the widespread negative perception of the human rights record of the military and Rawlings led governments, the human rights record of the CPP and PP regimes is far from exemplary. Eighteen per cent of Ghanaians regard the CPP government as negative and 22 per cent as mixed. The record of the PP is regarded as poor by 13% of Ghanaians and mixed by 24%.

Beyond these statistics there is broad condemnation of the Rawlings associated regimes in Ghana amongst seven out of ten regions. This sentiment is particularly pronounced in regions traditionally opposed to Rawlings associated political movement. Thus in Kumasi region 81% views the AFRC as having a negative human rights record. This no doubt also reflects the sense of hostility felt towards Rawlings in particular due to traditional Akan versus Ewe antipathy. This sentiment is not a purely Ashanti phenomenon, however, as Brong Ahafo (69%), Eastern Region (78%), Northern region (81%) and Central Region (78%) are critical of the AFRC's human rights record. The Western (11%), Greater Accra (10%), Brong Ahafo (10%) and Central (10%) regions record the highest levels of human rights abuse from government agents. It is significant however, that the most negative sentiment towards the AFRC regime's human rights record is found amongst those areas populated by the Akan ethnic group. Significantly (and mirroring the overwhelming electoral support for Rawlings in these regions) the Volta (42.3%) and Upper East regions (36.5%) view the 'Rawlings' associated human rights record less critically. Of considerable political significance (and perhaps for the current NPP government in particular), the Ghanaian civilian regimes receive overwhelmingly positive ratings – PNP (76%), PP (63%) and CPP (60%).

¹²⁸ All statistical data is derived from Public Opinion on National Reconciliation in Ghana: Survey Evidence, CDD-Ghana Research Papers Number 10, Ghana Centre for Democratic Development, Accra June 2001.

Against this backdrop, prior to the establishment of the National Reconciliation Commission there was overwhelming (89%) popular support for some form of national reconciliation. Ghanaians expect the reconciliation process to produce ‘peace/comfort/heal wounds’ (45%), ‘unity’ (26%) and ‘progress and stability’ (13%). Some 41% of Ghanaians believe that the NRC should achieve ‘peace’, with 29% believing unity ought to be the primary goal with 15% believing reconciliation ought to be the primary goal and 13% believing forgiveness to be the major aim of the reconciliation process. A small minority (9%) are however opposed to a formal national reconciliation project citing concerns such as the wastage of resources and the potential for the commission to degenerate into a ‘witch hunt’ and victimisation as reasons for their opposition.

Despite the overwhelming national support for a process of reconciliation, the format, composition, authority and terms of reference of the National Reconciliation Commission have been and remain highly politicised and contested. Even popular opinion has been divided over these issues. Just over half of all Ghanaians believe that the central government ought to have oversight of the NRC, but as much as 21% believe that the process should be managed by civil society. Furthermore, the question of how far back the NRC ought to probe has been pivotal. There is agreement amongst 74% of Ghanaians that the AFRC of 1979 ought to be investigated. Conversely, 71% of Ghanaians were not in favour of the NRC probing the Progress Party government of 1969-1972. The majority of Ghanaians favoured excluding civilian regimes from the ambit of the NRC, with older Ghanaians being more opposed than their younger compatriots. In the event, the NPP government has determined that all governments from 1957 are to fall under the ambit of the NRC. There is far more agreement however, about the question of exclusions from the process, with some 91% opposing any *a priori* individual or group exclusions from the NRC. Ghanaians also support the NRC performing a restorative and retributive justice function. An overwhelming majority (89%) want to see victims of human rights compensated. For 72% of Ghanaians this should take the form of asset restitution, for 42% non-monetary compensation is favoured and 41% believe that monetary compensation is warranted. Some two thirds of Ghanaians believe, however, that the government should be responsible for compensation. One-in-six Ghanaians believes that perpetrators of human rights abuses should be held financially responsible for restitution. Despite the overwhelming majority of Ghanaians favouring some form of national reconciliation, a more paradoxical view emerges when account is taken of the fact that a full 82% of Ghanaians are opposed to the granting of amnesty (despite the existence of an amnesty provision in the 1992 constitution). Furthermore, almost two thirds of Ghanaians believe that perpetrators of human rights abuses should be tried in court. Whilst both Christians (66%) and Muslims (60%) hold that human rights abusers should be tried, African Traditionalists are more or less evenly split (54% in favour).

Table 12.1. Human Rights Ratings of Previous Governments (%)

Regime	Positive	Negative	Mixed
Convention Peoples Party (1957 – 1966)	59.9	18.4	21.7
National Liberation Council (1966 – 1969)	36.0	22.4	41.6
Progress Party (1969 – 1972)	62.8	13.3	23.9
NRC/Supreme Military Council (1972 – 1978)	46.3	21.6	32.1
Supreme Military Council 11 (1978 – 1979)	37.7	22.9	39.4
Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (1979)	18.1	67.5	14.4
People's National Party (1979 – 1981)	76.1	4.3	19.6
Provisional National Defence Council (1982 – 1993)	23.4	56.5	20.1
National Democratic Congress (1993 – 2001)	32.1	45.1	21.8

Source: 'Public Opinion on National Reconciliation in Ghana: Survey Evidence', Ghana Centre for Democracy Development Survey, Report Number 10, June 2001, Accra, p. 13.

12.2. Security Force Reform

One of the key challenges confronting the Kufuor government is the reformation of the security apparatus from one of security and repressive functionality, to one of conflict preventive and community orientated policing. The need for security force reform was broadly recognised and articulated during the final years of Rawlings government as a Report of a 1998 National Workshop on Governance notes:

'Effort (sic) is underway to develop the security services in line with the constitution in support of the rule of law ...It is necessary to teach and practice military ethics and discipline at all levels of military education and promote a culture of discipline at all levels. The proliferation of arms and ammunitions in the country should be reduced as it could contribute to instability and undermine good governance ... Paramilitary organs should be streamlined in a similar direction. While demanding high standards of performance by the security servicemen, it is equally incumbent on Government to ensure that their job satisfaction and efficiency are assured through adequate training, as well as provision of adequate pay and the necessary tools and equipment for the performance of their tasks ... there is need for caution on the part of the Intelligence Establishment against excess. Excess would undercut democracy and good governance.'¹²⁹

The significance of the military legacy to the new NPP government and the potential threat it holds for democratic reversal is born out by the appointment of President Kufuor's brother as Minister of Defence. A further task confronting the new administration was the redeployment of the 'elite' 64 Battalion, established by President Rawlings as a specialised and better-equipped unit under the direct command of the President. Ironically the establishment of the 64th, whilst an effective tool of fear and repression for former President Rawlings, created resentments not only from within society, but also from within the army itself, given the preferential treatment meted out to the special unit. In addition,

¹²⁹ National Workshop on Governance in Ghana, *Workshop Report Volume 1, Parliament of the Republic of Ghana*, Accra, 1998. p. 14.

the protected and entrenched position of the Rawlings supporting senior officers generated a concomitant cohort of disillusioned and disaffected young soldiers that were effectively blocked from meritorious promotion to the senior ranks. Perversely this is one of the factors that militate against former President Rawlings being able to call on the military for support in any form of political comeback. In addition, the Kufuor administration has been careful to encourage the military to remain loyal to the government of the day. In a further rationalisation of the military, the government announced a programme of retirement of senior and long serving members of the force commencing on 1 July 2002.

The military and security apparatuses have had very few tests of their resolve to loyally serve the Ghanaian people under the new administration. When violent conflicts have occurred since December 2000 the military has been called in under the respective Regional Security Councils. Encouragingly, no special or elite units have been drafted in to deal with the local violence; rather local soldiers have been used. Less encouraging is the fact that these conflicts have necessitated the calling in of the military, rather than the use of the police force. However the performance of the military has drawn criticism both for its tardiness in responding to the crises and for failing to pick up and respond to the 'early warning' signals that had been transmitted. Whereas the behaviour of the security forces under the Rawlings administration was at times characterised by fear, repression, intimidation, and political favouritism and frequent threatening behaviour, these characteristics appear to be evaporating under the new administration. Indeed some have described the victory and new era ushered in by the Kufuor government as Ghana's 'Prague Spring'. However the security establishment has not been put fully to the test since the 2000 election. Notably security forces were placed on alert in the run up to the 2000 election and the military carried out 'training exercises' around Accra two days before polling in December. It would now go against the grain of democratic consolidation since 2000 and broad popular opinion for the security forces to begin to play anything other than a constitutional role in Ghana, all other things being equal. The Kufuor administration has, however, been careful (as indeed has the media) in ensuring that the message of a protective, but benign, security apparatus is projected to the public.¹³⁰ However, the sight of police vehicles and the sound of a siren in towns across Ghana still often evoke a fearful reaction from people on the street.¹³¹

12.3. Security Force Under-Funding and Crime

Furthermore, it must be pointed out that the Ghanaian police are acutely under-staffed, under-funded, under-equipped and ill trained. It has been argued that to make the police force more effective some 16 000 more members need to be recruited. The police force has also been faced with a number of growing challenges particularly since 2000. Perhaps expectedly, the transition from an autocratic government, dependent on military and security apparatus and making liberal use of heavy handed tactics, to one of a government committed to the rule of law and greater degrees of tolerance, has created the impression or reality of the 'space' for criminal elements to ply their trade in Ghana. This too may relate to shifting loyalties from within the former security apparatus, exacerbated by the vast quantity of weapons shipped into support the militias under the Rawlings government. Whatever the case, Ghana has been experiencing a notable upsurge in crime, and more particularly violent crime, since December 2000. Armed robberies have become a high profile feature of media reporting in

¹³⁰ The most recent assurance that the military would not carry out a coup was published in May 2002.

¹³¹ For example street vendors are sometimes seen rapidly exiting from roads at the sound of a police siren.

recent months. Whilst there is evidence that these gangs form part of organised syndicates with regional ties to Nigeria and Liberia, there is an increasing public clamour for the Ghana police force to deal effectively with this crime wave and to re-establish a sense of security amongst the populace.

One particularly significant feature of this increase in crime is the widely reported crime activities emanating from the Liberian refugee camp some 35 kilometres outside of Accra. The camp was opened in 1990 for Liberians fleeing the civil war, but although 4,000 in the camp are registered refugees, an estimated 22,000 are crammed into the area. Local residents have become increasingly hostile to the 'permanent' presence of the Liberians, as they have developed a reputation as being 'armed and dangerous'. From January to May 2002, 104 crimes were recorded in the camp, including 49 cases of assault, 32 of theft, 12 of armed robbery, 11 of fraud and two of rape. This situation has prompted the Head of the Ghana Immigration to reiterate that legitimate refugees are welcome, but that criminals would be expelled.¹³² The potential for escalating conflict between local residents and rogue elements amongst the Liberian refugees is high.

12.4. Budgetary Improvements

Under public pressure to stem the perceived wave of crime in Ghana the Minister of Defence Dr Addo Kufuor recently assured the nation that armed robberies (and serial killing of women) would 'soon become a thing of the past so that the nation can move forward with its cherished goal of developing in freedom'.¹³³ Encouragingly, adding material commitment to the Defence Minister's rhetoric, the Finance Minister announced a marked improvement in the amount allocated for 'governance' in the 2002 budget (720 billion cedis = €92 million). This would permit the recruitment of 1000 new police officers, 100 new attorneys for the criminal justice system, 400 new vehicles and a communications system upgrade.

Encouragingly too, in recent actions taken by the police against demonstrating students, a more restrained and professional approach to crowd control was reportedly adopted, despite stone throwing and alleged provocation from the students.

12.5. The Security Forces Stakeholder Analysis

The Ghanaian military is relatively small, numbering some 7000 professionals, but has played a lamentably intrusive, if not determinant, role in Ghanaian politics. This is contrasted with the exemplary work carried out by the Ghanaian military in its external peacekeeping roles in both West Africa and around the globe. Indeed the Ghanaian military has been the second most active peacekeeping force in UN operations.

The nature of civil-military relations in Ghana has been well documented¹³⁴ and is beyond the scope of this study, of relevance however is the current dynamics within the military that have the potential to contribute to, or directly give rise to conflict and instability.

Three sets of challenges have confronted the NPP government in respect of the military. The first of these has been to establish and galvanise a relationship of trust between the new administration and

¹³² *Ghanaian Chronicle*, April 25, 2002.

¹³³ *Ghanaian Chronicle*, May 9, 2002.

¹³⁴ For example, Antoinette Handley and Greg Mills, 'From Military Coups to Multi-Party Elections, The Ghanaian Military-Civil Transition', *Working Paper 2*, Conflict Research Unit, Clingendael Institute, November 2001.

the security forces. In essence this has been a relationship characterised by a 'trust, but verify' approach, with the principle method of verification coming through the appointment of President Kufuor brother as the Minister of Defence. The upper echelons of the military regard the fact that they did not actively intervene in the December 2000 electoral process, nor its outcome, as the strongest demonstration of its commitment to constitutionalism, civilian government and the rule of law.¹³⁵

The second challenge is that of security force reform. In a parliamentary debate on parliamentary private member's motion in June 2000 NPP M.P. Agyare Koi-Larbi argued, 'Analysis of recruitment patterns of armies and especially the Ghana Armed forces would indicate a correlation between the political objectives of the army, which also underscores its pattern of recruitment and the government which controls it'.¹³⁶ Beyond ensuring more balanced recruitment patterns into the military, the challenge of re-engineering the security forces away from that of repressive and 'heavy handed' anti-civilian action to that consistent with the demands of a civilian administration operating in conformity with democratic checks and balances, remains the central focus of research and training within the Ghanaian military. The reasoning behind this re-engineering process is welcomed by the younger generation of senior officers, yet as the reported (mis) handling of the Yendi crisis has demonstrated, the security forces are still some way from achieving their objective of modernising and moulding the institution into a force capable of dealing with internal conflict in a manner that is consistent with the maintenance and protection of civil liberties.¹³⁷ The importance of this exercise is re-enforced by the need for an early and appropriately moderated response to the numerous land and chieftaincy disputes across the country. The second challenge looming for the new security forces will come in the run up to the 2004 election, during which time political tensions will be sharply heightened and existing regional conflicts exacerbated.

The third and perhaps most immediate danger for stability in Ghana is the disruption and dissatisfaction caused by the forced resignation of some 2000 Non-Commissioned Officers (NCOs) commencing in July 2002. The official government reasoning for this decision is that these NCOs are above retirement age, but were retained by the NDC administration, as it could not find sufficient resources in the budget to pay out the retirement and pension packages due to the officers.¹³⁸

The forced retirements are causing consternation amongst those affected and have created an element of uncertainty within the forces. The retirement of a full 28% of the professional armed forces in Ghana is highly contentious and has been seized upon by the opposition parties as a further demonstration of government victimisation and supporter patronage. It is contended by the opposition and in particular the NDC, that a disproportionate number of known Rawlings supporters, and Ewes in general, have been earmarked for retirement. Furthermore, the NPP government has announced a number of high profile redeployments of senior military personnel (including diplomatic postings) adding grist to the mill of the political opposition.

These retirements add a further dimension to the perennial themes of disproportional ethnic representation in the military and in particular the senior ranks. Proposals for a regional balance in

¹³⁵ Interview with Colonel Phil Lilleyman, Head of Training British Military Advisory Training Team (BMATT), Accra, July 2002.

¹³⁶ *Ghana Daily Graphic*, June 16, 2000.

¹³⁷ One senior military official reported during fieldwork that the only reason the death toll in the Yendi crisis was not higher was that an armed armoured personnel carrier failed to start and therefore could not be used against civilian attackers.

¹³⁸ The NPP government has approached the international community for financial assistance to pay for these retirement and pension packages, but such requests have reportedly been turned down.

recruitment into the military date back to at least 1999 and have been subsequently raised in debate in parliament. Whilst the principle of proportionality and representivity in recruitment is desirable, the potential shortcoming of this proposal is the possible involvement and bias of District Chief Executives appointed by the presidency. Informal reports are emerging of verbal language tests for new recruits that tend to favour Akan speakers and discriminate against non-Akan speakers.¹³⁹

The critical issue is the potential threat posed by the disaffected 28% of the military, with years of experience and training that may belong in disproportionate numbers to the Ewe ethnic group. Furthermore, if this group of retirees is more favourably disposed to former President Rawlings and the NDC and return to the opposition Volta Region, they may constitute a particularly potent threat to regional and indeed national stability. Should many of the retirees return to the opposition stronghold Volta Regions they will be returning to a region in which is stored an abundance of small arms stashes, a legacy of Rawlings' militias.

Key Issues

Historically the security forces have, together with pernicious political leadership, been the greatest blockage to democracy in Ghana. Yet under military rule, human rights abuses notwithstanding, Ghana enjoyed relative peace. Whilst the current security forces leadership cohort may have no truck with former President Rawlings and the NDC, the government is faced with a formidable task of turning both the army and police force into a modern, professional and effective force for stability and democracy. The government, with the support of the international community, is making headway in this regard, but far greater resources are required. Confidence in the police force needs to be restored by affecting a decrease in crime and in particular the highly publicised violent crime that has caught the country in its grip.

Factor # 13: International Engagement

How engaged in the course of domestic affairs are international bodies offering significant specific incentives and opportunities?

13.1. Ghana's 'Special Status'

Ghana occupies a distinctive place within the international arena. The 'special status' is derived of a number of factors. The first set of factors is historical. Ghana's ties with European powers are deep and extensive. It has variously been a Danish, Dutch and British colony and was the site of the export of some 2 million indigenous people as slave labour to Brazil, South America, the West Indies and North America. The slave forts at Cape Coast have been declared world heritage sites and draw many thousands of visitors each year from European and African origin. Ghana holds particular historical and cultural appeal for African American tourists. Ghanaian, or more specifically Asante, resistance to and defeat of British colonial forces during the 19th century forms an important part of Ghanaian

¹³⁹ These reports are wholly unsubstantiated, but come from, inter alia, an interview held with a researcher in July 2002 at the Centre for Democratic Development in Accra, who has recently commenced a research project into ethnicity in Ghanaian institutions and has received such reports first hand. The significant point is that the belief in the ethnic rebalancing of the security forces is widely held amongst politicians, academics and the media. There is however a dearth of reliable data or evidence in support of the beliefs.

national history and indeed folklore, but enhances the attraction of international visitors, historians and scholars to the country.

As the first sub-Saharan African state to gain independence and the first African state to gain independence from Britain, Ghana set a political benchmark for many African and indeed colonised countries. At the time of independence in 1957 Ghana enjoyed a per capita income on par with countries such as Malaysia. Furthermore, Kwame Nkrumah's pan-Africanist philosophy, ideology and policies guaranteed a special place for Ghana in the political history of the continent.¹⁴⁰ A number of contemporary Pan Africanist political parties view the West African state as a political 'Mecca' in the struggle for colonial and postcolonial emancipation. This ideological leadership was further enhanced by Nkrumah's socialist affiliations and strident support for African (and indeed many other) liberation movements.

Ghana's unique historical trajectory has ensured that a myriad of leaders from developed, developing, socialist and OECD countries states visit Ghana. In the recent past Ghana has hosted, U.S. President Clinton, British Prime Minister Blair and the Crown Prince of the Netherlands. Similarly, Ghanaian leaders have been active and prominent players on regional and multilateral stages, with UN Secretary General and Nobel Peace Prize Laureate Kofi Anan, the most prominent. Notably, after stepping down from office former President Rawlings was appointed as a special UN representative. Furthermore, shortly after assuming office President Kufuor as received by the British Queen and Prime Minister.

13.2. *Ghana's Diaspora*

Ghana's internationalism has also produced the unintended consequence of a vast Ghanaian Diaspora. The political significance of the Ghanaian Diaspora is perhaps overshadowed by its economic significance, in that remittances from Ghanaians constitute a major contributor to GDP. Ghanaians abroad invested 228 billion cedis into the economy since the Homecoming Summit in July 2001. This represents some 30% of foreign direct investment of \$97.3 million in 2001. Solely Ghanaians have established 60 businesses in this period.¹⁴¹ The obvious downside to this dynamic is the loss of vast numbers of talented, educated, professional and productive people out of the Ghanaian economy.

There is an exceptionally high degree of domestic engagement of international bodies in Ghana. In broad terms, there has been a dialectical relationship between the international community and the domestic Ghanaian polity that has manifest in a 'reform-reward' nexus. Whilst the international community continued to encourage Ghana to reform during its successive periods of military rule and autocracy, economic decline provided the impetus for the Rawlings-led PNDC and NDC regimes to engage constructively with both the donor community and the Bretton Woods institutions. Despite its autocratic, militaristic and at times despotic behaviour, the NDC government and Rawlings in particular, enjoyed a generally constructive working relationship with the IMF and World Bank.¹⁴² Significantly, Ghana remains the Bank's largest African country programme. The pace, tenor and quantum of international co-operation and engagement with Ghana has been directly proportionate to its level of economic liberalisation, political reform and reconstruction as a full-fledged democracy.

¹⁴⁰ Nkrumah's marriage to an Egyptian and his promotion of a West African federation of states ensured him *inter alia* offers of refuge from a number of countries after his ousting in the coup of 1966.

¹⁴¹ *Daily Graphic*, March 20, 2002.

¹⁴² Personal interview with Mr Peter Harrold, Head of the World Bank Mission in Ghana, Accra January 2002.

The international community has played a significant role in this often-tortuous process. For OECD countries, Ghana represents a beacon of hope and a democratic success story. In turn, the international community has invested heavily in Ghana's democratic reform process.

Efforts to support and propel Ghana's nascent democracy gained momentum after the decision by the PNDC to re-engineer itself as a political party and to hold multi-party elections in 1992. The adoption of the broadly liberal 1992 constitution acted as a further catalyst for international support particularly from the donor community. From 1993 to 1996 a considerable investment was made into ensuring that the 1996 election more closely approximated universally acceptable standards and indeed, despite strident protests from the opposition parties, the 1996 election (with a 78.4% turn out) was declared 'free and fair'. Thus in 1997 USAID commented:

'Over the past five years Ghana has experienced a spectacular political opening. In no other state in West Africa has the transition from authoritarianism to multiparty democracy been more promising'.¹⁴³

The statement went on to warn conversely, that:

'Any wholesale failure of the recently established democratic institutions constitutes a major setback to political reforms, not only in Ghana, but in the Africa region'.¹⁴⁴

It is important to note the organic relationship between economic reform, liberalisation and broader improvements in consensus building and governance in Ghana. The World Bank in Ghana has noted:

'In the 1980s, the bank dealt with a small group of leaders and technocrats accountable to an un-elected head of state. In the 1990s, Ghana has an increasingly active parliament ... and new forms of decentralized organisation and accountability. The political reforms may slow decision-making and policy making and policy implementation in the short term. But insofar as they broaden the 'ownership' ... they will serve to deepen and to speed development over the long-term'.¹⁴⁵

As Jeong points out, generous amounts of international aid at politically important moments in the reform process in the past helped neutralise the contested nature of the process.¹⁴⁶ All the major donor countries and multilateral agencies have either conducted good governance programmes or have funded or assisted civil society organisations, community based organisations or NGOs in governance programmes. Whilst this funding is not in the main focussed specifically on conflict prevention, mediation, management and resolution issues, it has served to strengthen the democratic programme in Ghana. A number of interventions have specific event-driven foci, such as the 2000 general election in which, for example, EU funding ensured the provision of photo voter identification documents. Other critical focused initiative in the 2000 election was the provision of cellular phones to the Electoral

¹⁴³ Julie Hearn, *Foreign Political Aid, Democratisation, and Civil Society in Ghana in the 1990s*, Centre for Democracy and Development, Accra, 2000, p. 4.

¹⁴⁴ Hearn, *ibid.*

¹⁴⁵ Hearn, *ibid.*, p. 6.

¹⁴⁶ As quoted in Hearn *ibid.*, p. 7.

Commission, monitors, officials and volunteers, which played a pivotal role in conveying public information to FM radio stations at the time of ballot counting. Voter education and election official training in Ghana elections is heavily funded by, and dependent on, donor monies.

There are a number of important international military and police training programmes that have contributed to a more professional approach to conflict resolution in Ghana. Programmes such as the US African Crisis Response Initiative and the African Centre for Strategic Studies initiatives, as well as the UK British Military Advisory Training Team have been important in raising standards of professionalism in responding to crises. In keeping with its strong internationalist credentials, as well as the seminal role played by Kofi Anan, the Ghanaian military has contributed up to 2000 (out of a total national force of 7000) troops at a time to United Nations peacekeeping operations. Along with Nigeria, Ghana has played a leading role in the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)¹⁴⁷ and its Ceasefire Monitoring Group ECOMOG.

13.3. HIPC

Undoubtedly the biggest single international driver of governance reform in Ghana, however, is set to be the country's decision to enter into the Enhanced Heavily Indebted Country (HIPC) arrangement with the World Bank and IMF. Ghana reached decision point on February 22, 2002 and qualified for a total of US\$ 3.7 billion in debt relief over a 20-year period. The government has allocated some US\$ 96 million this year for projects earmarked under the GPRS. The conditionalities imposed by the IMF include:

- Macroeconomic Stability - Continued commitment to the financial and economic program supported by the IMF's Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF).
- PRSP - Satisfactory implementation of the GPRS for at least one year, as evidenced by the joint staff assessment of the country's annual progress report. The full PRSP is to be published before mid-2002.
- Governance – A strengthening of public expenditure management, as evidenced by the publication of detailed budget reports and the adoption of computer-based information systems in key ministries. Implementation of procurement reforms and internal audit procedures and a firm movement towards decentralization of government functions to the local level.
- Priority Sectors - Implementation of an agreed set of measures identified because of their importance in reducing poverty, specifically in the areas of: education (primary enrolment for girls), health (access to safe water and increased spending on health), and the energy sector (automatic price adjustment mechanisms for full cost recovery in the petroleum and electricity sectors).¹⁴⁸

Whilst the provisions of the HIPC agreement do not mention issues of conflict specifically, the key conditionalities of poverty reduction, economic stability and good governance lie at the heart of a

¹⁴⁷ Ghanaian and former senior NDC member Mohamed ibn Chambas was recently appointed ECOWAS Executive Secretary. The by election created by Chambas's election was won however by the NPP, thereby increasing its majority in parliament.

¹⁴⁸ IMF Press Release No. 02/11, February 27, 2002: <http://www.imf.org/external/np/hipc/index.asp>

more textured understanding of the structural conditions predisposing society to conflict. As such, the HIPC agreement may be seen as a potentially positive international agreement for Ghana.

An unintended, yet significant, issue emerged over the decision to 'go HIPC' early in 2002. Whilst there was no objective disagreement with the economic reality that Ghana is a highly indebted country, the epithet 'poor' when applied to Ghana caused considerable popular outcry. Such labelling was seen as a slight on the Ghanaian national pride and character to the extent that the decision became and unexpected embarrassment for the Kufuor government. Selective and tactical political points scoring from the opposition NDC and NPC also fanned national sentiment, which resulted in the government being forced to defend its decision in the national media. The NDC mischievously succeeded in (temporarily) creating the impression that it was the NPP government who had sullied Ghanaian pride by 'turning the country HIPC', rather than decades of economic mismanagement.¹⁴⁹

13.4. Multilateral Linkages

Whilst the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) is still some way from full acceptance, implementation and delivery of material benefits to African states, it is clear that Ghana would be a prime candidate for membership of the 'club' in West Africa and would thus stand to benefit from any trade, aid and developmental improvements delivered through NEPAD agreements between the African Union and the OECD countries. Ghana has already made use of the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) to boost its textile trade with the United States.

In addition to the above engagements, Ghana is a member of the OAU/AU, which in 1999 adopted the Algiers Declaration rejecting governments brought to power by non-constitutional means. It has also been a member of the Commonwealth since 1960.¹⁵⁰ Whilst the 'Club of 54' may be little more than a useful focal point for members to engage on matters of mutual significance, the Commonwealth has adopted clear positions on thorny issues such as governance (particularly since the Harare Declaration) as witnessed by the suspension of Nigeria, Pakistan and Zimbabwe. It is difficult to ascribe an improvement in Ghana's levels of governance and the positive impact this may have on conflict prevention, to membership of such bodies, but the fact that Ghana prizes its international and multilateral positions perhaps plays some role in its adherence to the norms and standards enshrined and adopted by these organisations.

Key Issues

Ghana enjoys a significant competitive advantage through its extensive international linkages and engagements. It is seen as a special (test) case for the donor community and holds particular significance for the region. Ghanaian political leadership has deftly used this special status to earn favourable terms of aid and assistance, but the concomitant responsibility for Ghanaian political leadership is to uphold and entrench economic and political good governance. In addition to its international historic, trade, diplomatic and political linkages Ghana's decision to embark on its HIPC programme is significance in terms of domestic good governance. The international community has and continued to play a profound role on the development of Ghana.

¹⁴⁹ The leader of the People's National Convention Party accused the NPP of performing worse than the NDC by declaring Ghana HIPC.

¹⁵⁰ The Secretary General of the Commonwealth visited Ghana as recently as May 2002.

Bibliography

Adjetei, F., Ametewee, A., & Poku, L. (Eds), *Networking in Promoting Women's Rights*, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Golden Type, Accra, (Undated).

Ahwoi, K., *Enhancing the Decentralisation Programme: District Assemblies and Sub-Structures as Partners in Governance*, Institute of Economic Affairs, Accra, 2000.

Annual Report 2000, Bank of Ghana, Accra, 2000.

Ayee, J (Ed), *Deepening Democracy in Ghana, Politics of the 2000 Elections* (Volumes 1 and 2), Freedom Publications, Accra, 2001.

Corruption and Other Constraints on the Land Market and Land Administration in Ghana: A Preliminary Investigation, Centre for Democracy and Development, Ghana 2000.

Ghana and the World Bank, Accra, 1999.

Ghana Country Report Series, Economist Intelligence Unit, London, 2000.

Ghana Demographic and Health Survey 1998, Ghana Statistical Service, Accra, 1999.

Ghana Living Standards Survey Report of the Fourth Round (GLSS 4), Ghana Statistical Service, Accra, 2000.

Ghana Macroeconomic Review 2000 – Special Feature on Basic and Secondary Education, Centre for Policy Analysis, Accra, 2001.

Ghana Macroeconomic Review and Outlook, Centre for Policy Analysis, Accra, 2000.

Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy 2002-2004: An Agenda for Growth and Prosperity, Fourth Draft, Accra, 2002.

Ghana Programming Framework, Canadian International Development Agency, Quebec, 1999.

Ghana The New Local Government System, Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development, Accra, 1996.

Government of Ghana and the World Bank Group – *Country Assistance Strategy for Ghana 2000-2003*, Accra (Undated)

Government of Ghana, Ministry of Works and Housing, *Sector Handout*, (PPME), Accra, 2000.

Kunfaa, E.Y., *Ghana Consultations With The Poor – Country Synthesis Report*, CEDP, 1999.

Kyerematen, A.A.Y., Inter-State Boundary Litigation in Ashanti, *African Social Research Documents*, Volume 4, Accra, (Undated).

Mills, G & Handley, A, *Ghana After Rawlings*, SAIIA Country Report No.1, Johannesburg 2001.

National Land Policy, Ministry of Lands and Forestry, Accra, 1999.

National Poverty Reduction Programme – Resource Guide – A Directory of Resource Institutions in Poverty Reduction, Accra (Undated).

National Workshop on Governance in Ghana, *Workshop Report Volume 1, Parliament of Ghana*, Accra, 1998.

Nugent, P., *Winners, Losers and Also Rans: Money, Moral Authority and Voting Patterns in the Ghana 2000 Election*, African Affairs, Volume 100, 405-428, 2001.

Nukunya, G.K., *Tradition and Change in Ghana*, Ghana University Press, Accra, 1992.

Oquaye, M. (Ed), *Democracy and Conflict Resolution in Ghana*, Gold-Type Publications, Accra, 1995.

Parliament and Democratic Governance in Ghana's Fourth Republic Centre for Democratic Development, Accra, 2000.

Poverty Trends in Ghana in the 1990s, Ghana Statistical Service, Accra, 2000.

Public Opinion on National Reconciliation in Ghana: Survey Evidence, Ghana Centre for democratic Development, Accra, 2001.

Quarterly Economic Bulletin April-June 2001, Bank of Ghana, Accra, 2001.

Research Review – Supplement No. 5, Institute of African Studies, University of Ghana, Accra, 1990.

Svanikier, J.O., *Women's Rights and the Law in Ghana*, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Golden Type, Accra, 1997.

The Role of Government in Strengthening Country Ownership of Development Agenda, Roundtable of Senior African Government Officials, Accra, 2001.

Journals, Periodicals and Briefing Papers, Magazines and Newspapers.

Daily Graphic

Democracy Watch, A Quarterly Newsletter of the Centre for Democratic Development, Accra

Ghanaian Chronicle

Ghana Review International

Ghana Times

Governance, A Publication of the Institute of Economic Affairs, Accra Ghana

Legislative Alert, A Publication of the Institute of Economic Affairs, Accra, Ghana

Briefing Paper, Centre for Democracy and Development, Accra, Ghana

Parliament Fact Sheet, Parliament of Ghana, Accra

West Africa

Interviews conducted during fieldwork

African Security Dialogue and Research

Bank of Ghana

Business and Financial Times

Canada High Commission

Central Region House of Chiefs

Centre for Democracy and Development

Centre for Policy Analysis

Centre for the Development of People

Daily Graphic

Department of Political Science University of Ghana Legon

Education Ministry

EU Mission in Ghana

FIDA

Finance Ministry

Friedrich Ebert Stiftung

Ghana Broadcasting Corporation

Ghana Institute of Management and Public Administration

Ghana Stock Exchange

GS Telecom Ghana

Health Ministry

Health Ministry

Housing and Works Ministry

Independent Electoral Commission

Institute for Journalism

Institute of African Studies University of Ghana Legon

Institute of Economic Affairs

Institute of Statistical, Social and Economic Research

Kumasi Cultural Centre

Kumasi District Assembly

Land Ministry
Legon Centre for International Affairs
Local and Regional Affairs Ministry
Local Government and Rural Development Ministry
National Lands Commission
National Council on Women and Development
National Development Planning Commission
Netherlands Development Organisation
Parliament of Ghana
Red Cross Society Ghana
Regional Co-ordinating Council
Registrar of the National House of Chiefs
Royal Danish Embassy
Royal Netherlands Embassy
South African High Commission
Spanish Embassy
Trade and Industry Ministry
UNICEF
United Kingdom High Commission
United Nations Development Programme
United States Embassy
USAID
World Bank