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## **Working Paper 12**

Managing Group Grievances and  
Internal Conflict: Mozambique Country Report

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# Foreword

This paper has been written within the framework of the research project 'Managing Group Grievances and Internal Conflict'\*, executed at the request of the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The project focuses on the process of, and motives for, (violent) group mobilisation and aims at the development of an analytical tool to assist policy-makers in designing conflict-sensitive development activities.

In the course of the project, a preliminary assessment tool has been developed in cooperation with Dr. Michael Lund, and discussed with the researchers who carried out the assessment in four country cases: Ghana, Mozambique, Nicaragua and Sri Lanka. On the basis of this testing phase, the tool has been substantially amended and refined\*\*.

The present report, which was finalized in September 2002, results from the testing phase and reflects the structure of the analytical tool in its original form. Section I provides a diagnostic, dynamic narrative of various factors that may explain the levels, course or risks of conflict. Section II could be regarded as the background research to this narrative, and consists of thirteen factor assessments. This second section lays out in a structured way two distinguishable sets of factors the researchers were asked to examine in their country of study. Part A of this section covers broad social and economic factors that help to determine the major interests of groups in society and the degree and kinds of incongruities that exist between those interests. Whether these structural predisposing factors will lead to the outbreak or continuation of violent conflict depends on the extent that other factors are operative as well. These intermediating structures, processes and policies are assessed in Part B of this section.

\* The project 'Managing Group Grievances & Internal Conflict' is part of the research programme 'Coping with Internal Conflict' (CICP), executed by the Conflict Research Unit of the Netherlands Institute of International Relations 'Clingendael', at the request of the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Responsibility for the contents and for the opinions expressed rests solely with the author.

\*\* The report that sets out the assessment tool will be made available mid-2003.

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## List of Abbreviations

ACT	African Caribbean and Pacific States
ALIMO/UE	Aliança Independente de Moçambique/União Eleitoral (Independent Alliance of Mozambique/Electoral Union)
AMODER	Mozambican Association of Rural Development
ANAVO	Associação dos Naturais e Amigos de Vilanculos (Association of Indigenous and Friends of Vilanculos)
ANAZA	Associação dos Naturais e Amigos de Zavala (Association of Indigenous and Friends of Zavala)
AU	African Union
CCA	Common Country Assessment
CCM	Conselho Cristão de Moçambique (Christian Council of Mozambique)
CDU	Congresso dos Democratas Unidos (United Democrats Congress)
CEEI/ISRI	Centro de Estudos Estratégicos Internacionais – Instituto Superior de Relações Internacionais (Centre for International Strategic Studies/Higher Institute of International Relations)
CNE	National Electoral Commission
CPI	Centre for the Promotion of Investment
CPLP	Comunidade dos Países de Língua Portuguesa (Organisation of Lusophone Countries)
DHD	Associação Direitos Humanos e Desenvolvimento (Association of Human Rights and Development)
DPDS-UEM-IFPRI	Department of Population and Social Development - University Eduardo Mondlane - International Food Policy Research Institute
FADM	Forças Armadas de Defesa de Moçambique (Mozambican Defence Force)
FAP-UE	Frente de Acção Patriótica/União Eleitoral (Patriotic Action Front/ Electoral Union)
FAM	Forças Armadas de Moçambique (Mozambican Armed Forces - pre 1992)
FRELIMO	Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (Mozambican Liberation Front)
FUMO-UE	Frente Unida de Moçambique/União Eleitoral (United Front of Mozambique/Electoral Union)
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GDR	German Democratic Republic
HDI	Human Development Index
HIPC	Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative
HIV/AIDS	Human Immunodeficiency Virus/Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
ILO	International Labour Organisation
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INE	Instituto Nacional de Estatística (National Institute of Statistics)

IPADE	Institute for Peace and Democracy
ISDSC	Inter-state Defence and Security Committee
LDH	Liga dos Direitos Humanos (Mozambican Human Rights League)
MJRD	Partido da Juventude para Restauração da Democracia (Party for Youth and Democracy Restoration)
MONAMO-EU	Movimento Nacional de Moçambique (National Movement of Mozambique)
MPF	Ministry of Planning and Finances
NEPAD	New Partnership for Africa's Development
NPP	National Population Policy
OAU	Organisation of African Unity
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OIC	Organização da Conferência Islâmica (Organisation of Islamic Conference)
OPDS	Orgão de Política, Defesa e Segurança (Organ on Politics, Defence and Security)
PACODE	Partido do Congresso Democrático (Democratic Congress Party)
PADELIMO	Partido Democrático para Libertação de Moçambique (Liberal and Democratic Party of Mozambique)
PADEMO	Partido Democrático de Moçambique (Democratic Party of Mozambique)
PADRIGU	Peace and Development Research Institute (Gothenburg University)
PALMO	Partido Liberal e Democrático de Moçambique (Liberal and Democratic Party of Mozambique)
PAMOMO	Partido Democrático para a Reconciliação em Moçambique
PIMO	Partido Independente de Moçambique (Independent Party of Mozambique)
PANADE	Partido Nacional Democrático (National Democratic Party)
PANAMO	Partido Nacional de Moçambique (National Party of Mozambique)
PANAOC	Partido Nacional dos Operários Camponeses (National Party of the Proletariat and Peasants)
PARPA	Action Plan for the Reduction of Absolute Poverty
PASOMO	Partido para a Ampliação de Moçambique (Party for the Greater Mozambique)
PCN-UE	Partido de Convergência Nacional/União Eleitoral (National Convergence Party/Electoral Union)
PIC	Polícia de Investigação Criminal (Criminal Investigation Police)
PIR	Polícia de Intervenção Rápida (Rapid Reaction Police)
PPLM	Partido Ecologista Movimento da Terra (Ecologist Party Earth Movement)
PPPM-UE	Partido para o Progresso de Povo de Moçambique/União Eleitoral (Party for the Progress of the People of Mozambique/Electoral Union)
PRD	Partido Renovador Democrático (Democratic Renewal Party)
PRE	Economic Recovery Programme
PROAGRI	National Agricultural Sector Program
PRM	Mozambican National Police
PT	Partido Trabalhista (Workers Party)
PUN-UE	Partido de Unidade Nacional de Moçambique/União Eleitoral (Party of National Unity of Mozambique/Electoral Union)
QUIBB	Questionário de Indicadores Básicos de Bem-Estar (Basic Household Income Survey)

RENAMO	Movimento de Resistência Nacional
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SARPPCO	Southern Africa Regional Police Corporation Co-ordination
SIMPOCAF	National Union Committee for the Railway Sector
SINTEVEC	National Union for Textile Sector
SINTIAB	National Union for Food and Beverage Sector
SISE	State Information and Security Service
SOL	Partido Social Liberal e Democrático (Liberal, Social and Democratic Party)
SOTEMAZA	Sofala Tete Manica Zambézia
UDF-UE	Frente Democrático Unida/União Eleitoral (Democratic Front/Electoral Union)
UN	United Nations
UNAMO-UE	União Nacional Moçambicana/União Eleitoral (Mozambican National Union/Electoral Union)
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
WB	World Bank
WTO	World Trade Organization



# I Diagnostic Assessment of Conflict Course and Parameters

Mozambique is generally regarded as one of the success stories of Africa within the context of democratisation that swept the continent in the early nineties. Ten years after the cessation of hostilities between Renamo and Frelimo and the signing of the Rome Peace Accord on 4 October 1992, one would have hoped that post-settlement reconstruction and reconciliation would have achieved the development of a national consciousness and consensus about the various challenges facing Mozambicans and their society. Instead Mozambique has achieved a fragile peace; the consolidation of its fledgling democracy is under threat; and there is an emergence of intra and inter-party tensions. These are mutually enforced along traditional ethnic, urban/rural, socio-economic and party lines and are expressed in a geographical south/centre-north divide – thus leading to increasing polarization and an intensification of tensions with occasional acts of low to high-level violence.

## Society's Dividing Lines

### *Geographical South/Centre-North Divide*

There is a clear recognition in Mozambique that the south/centre-north divide is a serious political concern. Generally speaking the 'south' within the context of this divide refers to the provinces of Maputo (and Maputo city), Inhambane and Gaza, whereas the centre/north refers to the rest of the provinces north of the Save river. Manica, Sofala, Tete, and Zambezia constitute the centre and Nampula, Cabo Delgado and Niassa constitute the north. Politically, the 'south' is perceived to be dominated by Frelimo, whereas the 'centre/north' (more specifically the central region) is the traditional stronghold of Renamo and its alliance partners in the Electoral Union.<sup>1</sup>

The south/centre-north division is partly a colonial legacy. It is worth recalling that the Portuguese colonial economy in Mozambique was heavily dependent on the geo-strategic regional position of the country. Thus its economic survival was intrinsically linked to servicing the vibrant economies of the surrounding British colonies by providing transport corridors to the sea for the landlocked countries of Zimbabwe, Zambia, Swaziland, Malawi and the northern part of South Africa. Infrastructure was subsequently developed along transport corridors from west to east, from South Africa via Maputo, from Zimbabwe via Beira and from Zambia/Malawi via Nampula. Mozambique's infrastructure thus reflected a west-east orientation effectively subdividing the country into three distinct semi-autonomous economic regions. The Mozambican governments that followed independence have been severely constrained by these parameters and have not succeeded in setting up a different framework for development. Indeed, a proper south-north highway linking the

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<sup>1</sup> Renamo won the majority support in the 1999 national elections in all of the six 'northern' provinces, with the exception of Cabo Delgado whereas Frelimo won the southern provinces.

provincial capitals into a cohesive whole is still absent in Mozambique.<sup>2</sup> The result has been that the northern part of the country has always been relegated in terms of priorities, despite its enormous agricultural potential.

Developmentally and financially, the south - and more specifically Maputo City - has by far outstripped economic development in the centre/north. The south has also been far more successful in attracting investment despite various attempts by the Mozambican government to ensure investment in the rest of the country.<sup>3</sup> This is partly due to its proximity to South Africa, the state of its infrastructure (especially the banking sector, port, railways, etc.) and the concentration of capital and business in Maputo. However, a closer look at the GDP contributions of the various provinces in the south indicate that Gaza and Inhambane respectively produced only 4% and 5% of the overall southern contribution of 47.6% in 1998.<sup>4</sup> Still the south's apparent economic prosperity has led to increasing resentment in the rest of the country. Renamo's 1994 campaign slogans tapped into this resentment stating 'What you produce, those in Maputo eat' and 'Frelimo takes all to Maputo'.<sup>5</sup>

The slow pace of development in the central/northern areas is ascribed to deliberate neglect by Frelimo to penalise those provinces that have not voted for it. However, other factors also have to be taken into account. The location of a mega-project such as Mozal in Maputo province has led to an increase of 28% of the provincial GDP per capita. Likewise in Tete, the resumption of mining at Moatize provided an 11.1% increase in GDP per capita for the province. The central belt of Mozambique, especially Manica and Sofala provinces and the port city Beira, in contrast, has been severely affected by the political and economic crisis in Zimbabwe.<sup>6</sup> It is generally agreed that the agricultural potential of the northern provinces of Mozambique will never be developed to its fullest potential until the infrastructure is developed adequately.<sup>7</sup>

Still the regional GDP contribution figures confirm the eschewed development of Mozambique. 25% of the population of Mozambique based in the south (of which 6% are in Maputo City) benefit from 47.6% of the national GDP, whereas 75% of the population have to be satisfied with the remaining 52.4%.

This economic south/centre-north divide has also found expression in negative political terms. The most serious public expression of a possible secession of the 'centre/north' from the 'south' was made in September 2000 following Renamo's electoral defeat in 1999. Manuel Pereira, a Renamo delegate from Sofala province, and Ossufo Momade, a Renamo delegate from Nampula province, suggested that the centre/north would 'secede' from the south and would be ruled by Dhlakama.

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<sup>2</sup> As pointed out by Lourenco do Rosario in *Savana* on 4 February 2000 if one wishes to travel from Maputo to Zambezia, Nampula, Niassa or Cabo Delgado one has to travel through a neighbouring country. *Mozambique Human Development Report* (1999): 17.

<sup>3</sup> The Mozambican government has an elaborate incentive scheme that is directed at attracting investors to the centre/north. CPI CD-ROM 2001.

<sup>4</sup> The rest was contributed by Maputo City with 34% and Maputo province with 4%. *Mozambique Human Development Report* (1999): 39.

<sup>5</sup> Haines R & Wood G (1995): 364-365.

<sup>6</sup> Manica and Sofala's economies grew by only 1.8 and 1.9% respectively during 1999. *Mozambique Human Development Report* (2000): 27.

<sup>7</sup> Niassa province for example, is blessed with abundant cultivable land, with a huge potential for agricultural development, not only as a supplier for the domestic market, but also for the export market. However, agricultural development in the poorest province of Mozambique is severely hampered by a lack of resources ranging from inadequate infrastructure, transport and credit for commercialisation purposes.

Although Renamo's leadership subsequently stated that this did not represent its formal policy it added that the statements reflected the 'feelings of the people of Sofala'<sup>8</sup>.

The fear of possible secession, aside from the financial implications of a more federalist system, is also mooted as the reason for the enormous reluctance in government circles to adopt a more decentralised and federalist system in Mozambique.<sup>9</sup> Instead a gradual approach of 'deconcentration' is being pursued through the incremental introduction of local government.

### *Urban/Rural Divide*

In addition to the geographical divide, the urban/rural divide is a clear feature of Mozambique that furthermore coincides with political affiliations. Renamo's support base is predominantly in the rural areas, whereas Frelimo enjoys majority support in most of the urban areas.<sup>10</sup> Mozambique has an urbanisation rate of 29% implying that approximately 70% of the 17.2 million population reside in rural areas.<sup>11</sup>

The rural areas have suffered the brunt of the 16-year civil war, which was in effect a rural terror campaign. The urban areas were relatively untouched and not involved in direct street battles although the impact of the war in the form of food, fuel shortages, blackouts and medical supplies was keenly felt. The systematic devastation of the under-developed rural infrastructure has had serious repercussions for the rural areas right up to the present.

The level of illiteracy in the rural areas in comparison with the urban areas, combined with a lack of access to basic services, educational facilities, credit facilities, the neglect of the agricultural sector,<sup>12</sup> lack of employment and the absence of basic infrastructure have translated into a keenly felt urban/rural divide.

This is also expressed in political terms. The legacy of Frelimo's 'villagisation' policies in the 1970s, combined with its ill treatment of the *régulos* and traditional leaders (or in fact any individual that had been associated with the colonial regime) has had a lasting resonance in present day Mozambican politics. Frelimo's autocratic measures during the early-1980s, which involved the reintroduction of the old colonial policies of forcing peasants to produce cotton in Nampula province, the introduction of public floggings and executions and the policy to bring in so-called 'Dynamising Committees' dominated by southerners has translated not only into a south/centre-north divide but found political expression in a rural/urban divide.

Renamo has successfully managed to tap into this resentment and most of its success in the 1994 and 1999 elections is attributed to the disenchantment with Frelimo in the rural communities and the general feeling of being dominated by distant and uncaring southerners.<sup>13</sup>

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<sup>8</sup> *Mozambiquefile*, AIM, n°285 (2000): 5.

<sup>9</sup> Interview on 19 March 2002. The interviewee pointed out that although cost is a major factor prohibiting the adoption of a federal system, the danger of secession tendencies and ungovernability due to the weak control of the central government are also important considerations.

<sup>10</sup> Frelimo won 59% of the urban vote at a national level, while Renamo won 29%. See Manning C (2001): 147.

<sup>11</sup> *Mozambique Means Business*, CD-ROM, Investment Promotion Centre of Mozambique (2001).

<sup>12</sup> The neglect of the rural agricultural areas has continued since 1994 with underdevelopment, a lack of clear strategies, land disputes, as well as limited market and credit access. Fertiliser consumption is interesting indicator of this neglect. It was 2.2 kg per hectare in 1970 in contrast to only 1.5 kg per hectare in 1998. See *Human Development Report* (2001).

<sup>13</sup> As noted by the Vice-*régulo* of Mandimba, 'the superiority of Renamo -UE and its leader Afonso Dhlakama in the political arena in Mandimba derives from the way the government representatives have been acting since the

However, Renamo considers its traditional support base in the rural areas to be seriously threatened by the Frelimo government's more recent efforts to provide some form of legitimacy to traditional leaders.

### *Ethnic Divides*

Mozambicans are in general very hesitant to identify potential conflict along ethnic lines. Indeed, Frelimo prides itself on the fact that it is a completely representative party with representation from every single ethnic group in Mozambique, as well as substantial representation from 'mixed' ethnic groups and Mozambicans of Portuguese descent. President Joaquim Chissano, the leader of Frelimo, is a good example of the manner in which Frelimo has managed to integrate various factions of society. He is a Shangaan speaker from the Gaza province, a baptised Catholic, with a Protestant education and with strong personal ties with the Muslim north.

Frelimo's membership base is mainly linked to the urban centres of Mozambique - that act as ethnic melting pots and that attract rural Mozambicans from all parts of the country in search of work - and the south, although it has substantial support in the central belt of the country and in Cabo Delgado province.<sup>14</sup>

The reluctance to analyse Mozambican political life along ethnic lines is a result of an aversion to the 'divide and rule' policies of Mozambique's colonial rulers, as well as Frelimo's feverish attempts in the 1970s and 1980s to establish a socialist state where creed, ethnicity and class had no place. However, the introduction of multiparty democracy in 1991 opened the door for the establishment of parties according to ethnic lines. Still it should be noted that there is not a single dominant ethnic group in the country. The biggest 'ethnic group' is the Macua, but it represents only 26.4% of the population and is one of more than 17 different ethnic groups.

However, it is still useful to look at the ethnic make-up of the major parties. Frelimo's past leaders, Eduardo Mondlane, Samora Machel and also Chissano all came from the Gaza province. Indeed, Chissano has indirectly admitted that ethnicity/regionalism is an important factor in Mozambican politics by pointing out that the next leader of Frelimo should be from the 'north' of the country.<sup>15</sup> (Ethnicity is clearly linked to certain geographically defined areas.)

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end of the armed conflict. Those representatives have been denying the intervention of the traditional authorities in decision-making regarding district issues, a situation that contrast with the historical legacy of the district. Those representatives were committed to top-down governance and were not interested in getting any feedback of their orientations neither the feasibility of their decisions. This perspective has created among the traditional authorities the feeling of anger, which was extended to their own communities, and therefore their shift to the opposition, namely Renamo and Pademo'. Macuacua L (2001): 50.

<sup>14</sup> Frelimo's attempts to make the party more representative in terms of ethnicity and regional representation were actively pursued during its fifth and sixth congresses. An open letter to the Frelimo leadership from 58 Nampula-based members published in *Savana* shortly after the 1994 elections claimed that party leaders in Maputo were seeking to repress the Macua people in favour of the southern leadership and was neglecting Nampula's social and economic development. After the elections the first Macua governor was appointed in Nampula, the former secretary-general of a new provincial voluntary association based on ethnic sympathies, the Association of Friends of Nampula. A similar course of action was followed by the Mozambican ambassador to the UN of the Massena ethnic group who published a letter in the press calling for greater representation of his group. A Massena governor was appointed to Sofala, the province with the highest concentration of Senas in Mozambique. Manning C (2001): 160.

<sup>15</sup> Chissano made this statement following his announcement that he will not be seeking a next term as president and responding to media inquiries about a possible successor.

The ethnic allegiance of Renamo's party leadership is just as telling. Renamo's initial tribal base was among the Ndaou and still enjoys strong support throughout the middle belt/central region of the country.<sup>16</sup> Afonso Dhlakama, the president of Renamo, and most of its senior representatives are either Ndaou or Sena, representing mostly the central area of the country.<sup>17</sup> Renamo's appointment of a new Secretary General of Sena tribal affiliation is directed at countering possible Sena support in the centre of the country for Raul Domingos (previously the anointed successor of Dhlakama) who is now in the process of pursuing his own political ambitions after being ousted by Renamo.

Indeed the potential for conflict in Mozambique seems to be more closely associated with regional economic disparities and perceptions of exclusion from economic progress and growth. Where these divisions run along ethnic lines, the ethnic bias seems to reinforce these perceptions of real and imagined neglect and exclusion.

### *Political Party Divides: Increasing Polarization of Society?*

The competition for economic resources, expressed along ethnic, south/centre-north alliances and in a rural/urban divide, has led to the increasing polarisation of Mozambican politics. Renamo draws its political support from those who consider themselves marginalised and excluded from the centres of power, which is inevitably associated with Maputo City and the south of the country. Frelimo in contrast seems to draw political support from its long-established and socially connected political networks that are both urban and rural-based - it includes substantial support from Cabo Delgado, Nampula and Niassa (the latter is a traditional stronghold despite the fact that Frelimo lost the province to Renamo during the last elections) and the south.

It is important to look *beyond* the party elites in terms of assessing party's dividing lines. The high voter turnout during both past elections and the close tally of votes between the two main parties is a clear indication that the polarisation of Mozambican society extends beyond the elite to the grassroots level. Mozambican society aligns itself along clear political lines irrespective of whether this is done consciously or unconsciously as illustrated by the fact that two of its most important human rights organisations are perceived to be either pro-Frelimo or pro-Renamo.<sup>18</sup> Yet this polarisation of society does not point necessarily to an immediate outbreak of conflict between two relatively numerically balanced groups. In fact, there remains an enormous reluctance in society to revert to violent means to resolve conflict in view of Mozambique's relatively recent emergence from the civil war.

With regard to the emergence of new groups with substantial grievances, such as the urban unemployed, there seems to be a growing impatience with the lack of government action (especially related to the position of the ex-GDR workers), and a growing willingness to publicly mobilise. However, the scope of this mobilisation is still limited. Also anti-government protest does not necessarily translate into unconditional support for Renamo. There is a chance that smaller parties may benefit from this emerging group - especially if the bigger parties do not respond adequately to their grievances.

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<sup>16</sup> See Haines R & Wood G (1995).

<sup>17</sup> Vines A (1991): 156.

<sup>18</sup> The HDH (Association of Human Rights and Development) is aligned to Frelimo, whereas the LDH (Mozambican Human Rights League) plays a much more independent role. However, in the Mozambican context if one is not pro-Frelimo, one is assumed to be pro-Renamo. This perception was confirmed in various interviews throughout Mozambique.

Aggressive union activity in Mozambique against government is unheard of and is largely the result of the fact that the trade union movement was previously largely government-driven and aligned - a result of Mozambique's socialist past. The growth of private, independent union movements is a very recent occurrence and their strike actions are directed mostly at foreign businesses.<sup>19</sup>

Among the socially mobile and wealthy groups in society there seems to be general dismay with the disorganisation of Renamo and there is a tendency to support Frelimo. Mostly because of the fact that many members of this group were either previously members of the Frelimo party or government,<sup>20</sup> or because they believe that Frelimo is the only Mozambican party that can manage the economy.

Against this background the propensity to resort to large-scale conflict still remains fairly uncertain. Indeed the Mozambican population has resoundingly endorsed peaceful means to voice unhappiness with government policies during the last two national elections.

### **Assessing Institutional (In)capacities**

#### *Addressing Imbalances: The (In)efficacy of Government Response*

The Mozambican government has attempted to deal with inequalities and groups grievances mainly through its redistribution policies. The main orientation of these policies is stipulated in the government's five-year programme, which coincides with its term in office and which is supported by annual social and economic management plans. Various sectoral policies have been adopted in line with World Bank and IMF requirements and recommendations, including public sector reform, fiscal and monetary policies, as well as focused poverty reduction policies based on regional/provincial poverty profiles. Indeed Mozambique received very positive comments during the conclusion of its 2002 Article IV IMF Consultation in July 2002 with regard to its efforts to strengthen tax collection, to improve public expenditure management and to manage monetary and fiscal policies.<sup>21</sup> However, disappointment was expressed with regard to the delay in finalising judicial reform and the report pointed out that a major challenge is now to ensure that the legislative changes are implemented to ensure more transparency and improvements in public expenditure.<sup>22</sup>

Despite serious attempts by the government to implement the necessary reforms to overcome regional inequalities, investment inflows ironically seem to contribute to the disparities between regions. Investors tend to focus on those areas with an existent supportive infrastructure.<sup>23</sup> Despite the

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<sup>19</sup> Interview with Mr Jeremias Timana, Secretary General of Consilmo on 20 March 2002 and Dr Astrid Becker, Resident Representative, Friedrich-Ebert Foundation, Maputo on 15 March 2002.

<sup>20</sup> Mr Mario Ussene, the Director General of the new independent Centre for Arbitration, Reconciliation and Mediation, remarked that in the past 'everyone was Frelimo' on the question why there is such a reluctance in Mozambique's intellectual community to publicly voice an independent viewpoint on the challenges facing Mozambique as a society. Interview on 9 May 2002 in Maputo.

<sup>21</sup> Despite the fact that the private sector absorbs the majority of highly qualified personnel, the government can still count on a considerable number of skilled personnel. Thus at a managerial level government capacity is relatively sound, however, at the implementation level government administration falters substantially.

<sup>22</sup> See *Public Information Notice: IMF concludes 2002 Article IV Consultation with Mozambique*, n° 02/70, International Monetary Fund, 9 July 2002.

<sup>23</sup> The 2001 World Bank Country Economic memorandum addresses the question whether the introduction of large investment projects is setting Mozambique on 'an irrevocable path of economic dualism and inequality' by

fact that the government actively encourages investment in the centre and the north of the country<sup>24</sup> this has not met with a great deal of success, nor has the government done enough to offset the lack of foreign investor interest with public funds and support.

The World Bank pointed out in its February 2001 Country Economic Memorandum that a key problem hampering economic development and social service delivery in Mozambique is indeed the inadequacy and uneven distribution of its public services. This is not only linked to low overall expenditure, but includes inefficient intersectoral allocation and the overall ineffectiveness of domestic and externally-financed public expenditures. This has led to insufficient expenditure and service delivery in most sectors, namely education, health, the judiciary, water, power and road rehabilitation.<sup>25</sup>

The Mozambican government is highly reliant on donor assistance and most of its budget process remains donor-driven. In fact, external assistance currently finances about 54% of government budgetary resources and about 70% of public investment. The same report points out that aid has provided more than 65% of all foreign exchange available to Mozambique since 1987.<sup>26</sup>

Provinces have been ‘allocated’ to individual donors with the blessing of the Mozambican government in an effort to support a more focused approach to the development concerns of provinces. In some instances this seems to have resulted in a tendency to cultivate closer working relations with the provincial authorities than with the national authorities, which does not necessarily lead to an integrated or effective national development framework.

One of the instruments that the government has created to establish a more direct relationship with the grassroots is the ‘rural development approach’. According to this policy, each cabinet member is responsible for two or three districts. They are supposed to work closely with the local administration to engage in consultation with the population about government policies; to organize development plans according to the needs of the people; and to engage all the relevant stakeholders in the development of the districts.

However, despite all the efforts of the government to address the existing regional imbalances, the inequalities remain blatant. The populations of the central and northern regions of the country have developed a keen sense of marginalisation and southerners are described as ‘those who come from the nation’. There is an obvious, deeply felt sense of exclusion that is strengthened by the existing structural constraints and that prevail despite a series of counter-acting measures and policies.

### *Elections*

The right to vote and to express support or disapproval with the performance of political parties on a regular basis is considered a key tenet of democracy. It is therefore ironic that elections have emerged as one of the main sources of instability in Mozambican society.

The UN described the first national elections on 27 - 28 October 1994 in Mozambique as the most successful and free on the continent. An overwhelming majority of Mozambicans registered for the

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pointing out the overall value to the country of the employment that is created, the generation of foreign exchange and the potential to create tax revenues through these investments. Yet this is not the perception of those in the marginalised areas.

<sup>24</sup> *Mozambique Means Business* (2002).

<sup>25</sup> *Mozambique Country Economic Memorandum: Growth Prospects and Reform Agenda*, report n° 20601-MZ, World Bank, 7 February 2001.

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid*: 6.

elections and over 88% voted. The results were split almost equally between the two main parties, Frelimo and Renamo, and are generally interpreted as a vote for peace by Mozambicans. The close result could be partially ascribed to calls on voters by prominent figures such as the Bishop of Beira, Jaime Gonzales, to split their votes between the main parties to avoid a return to war.<sup>27</sup> The extent of support for Renamo surprised most international observers who expected Renamo to fade away in view of its history as a construct of ex-Rhodesian and South African security forces and the fact that this support had fallen away in the post-cold war era and the democratisation of South Africa.

Renamo won 44.4% of the seats in the Assembly of the Republic, although Afonso Dhlakama, the leader of Renamo, managed to secure only 33.7% of the presidential vote. Joaquim Chissano, the leader of Frelimo, in contrast managed to obtain 53.3% of the vote. Despite the fact that Dhlakama threatened to boycott the elections (and in fact did boycott the first day) the elections proceeded successfully and Renamo accepted the outcome despite minor rumblings.

The acceptance of the results of the 2 - 4 December 1999 national and presidential elections proved more problematic. There was a relatively high voter turnout of 70% (not as high as in the case of the 1994 elections - due to bad weather, as well as problems with the registration of voters and last minute changes of polling stations). Renamo and its coalition partner of 10 smaller parties, the Electoral Union, managed to win an additional province from Frelimo, obtaining victories in 6 of the 10 provinces. This win is extraordinary in view of the fact that Niassa is a traditional stronghold of Frelimo where it established itself in the 1960s. In fact a tally of the total provincial votes translates into support of 57% for Renamo and 43% for Frelimo although this did not translate into a corresponding number of seats.

Only two presidential candidates stood for the 1999 presidential elections, namely Chissano and Dhlakama in contrast to the 1994 presidential elections, which were contested by 12 candidates.<sup>28</sup> Renamo's coalition partner, the Electoral Union, supported Dhlakama's candidacy and Chissano won narrowly by a margin of only 4.6% (204,678 votes).

The results of the election were contested from the beginning. The coalition parties refused to recognise a Frelimo victory and called for a recount of the vote. The Supreme Court dismissed a case brought by Renamo-UE on 4 January 2000 due to lack of sufficient evidence of electoral fraud. The Court ruled that 550 tally sheets were unprocessable due to major errors and were thus excluded from the official results. According to the Court's findings, this represented an estimated 377 773 potentially valid votes, but the Court chose not to pronounce on the fact that this figure was larger than Chissano's margin of victory.<sup>29</sup> Renamo-UE boycotted parliament for most of 2000 and in August 2000 increasing threats of mass action and civil disobedience were made against the government.

On 9 November 2000 Renamo demonstrations in 12 cities across the country degenerated into violence resulting in 40 deaths. On 22 November - the same day of the assassination of Carlos Cardoso, a prominent Mozambican journalist investigating allegations of high-level corruption involving prominent government figures - 119 Renamo detainees died of suffocation in an overcrowded police cell in Montepuez in Cabo Delgado. Mozambicans and the international

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<sup>27</sup> The Bishop was subsequently severely reprimanded by the Frelimo government for his expressions of support of Renamo. The Christian churches in Mozambique (both Catholic and Protestant) have since played a much reduced, low-key but important reconciliatory role in politics, in contrast to its prominence in the conduct and conclusion of the peace negotiations.

<sup>28</sup> A third presidential candidate, Ya-Qub Sibindy of PIMO was excluded from the presidential race 5 days before the election on technical grounds.



community were aghast at the incident although most in Maputo and in Frelimo circles ascribed the deaths to the troublemaking of the bandits.<sup>30</sup> This was the first outbreak of serious violence since the signing of the peace agreement.<sup>31</sup>

### *Exclusive Governance*

Aside from rising tensions prior to and subsequent to election time, a more worrying trend has been the rise in social disaffection with government, as well as a general disillusionment with the institutions of democracy leading to a crisis of confidence in public service institutions, parliament and the courts. This disaffection and disillusionment is widespread and touches on every level of society.

The role of the media, the judiciary and the police, for example, all represent serious areas of concern with the erosion of the independent space of the media to investigate allegations of high-level corruption seriously hampered by the murder of Carlos Cardoso. Most of the media representatives and human rights organizations that were interviewed during the fieldwork in Mozambique emphasized that there is only one clear taboo issue in Mozambique, namely a public discussion of the involvement of high-level politicians and senior government officials in corruption. This distrust of politicians and institutions of democracy and service delivery have serious repercussions for Mozambique especially in view of the coming 2003 local elections and 2004 national elections and for the consolidation of democracy.

Several interviewees emphasised that positions in the public service remain closed to Renamo supporters - especially at middle-ranking and senior level. One interviewee pointed out that there is not a single director in the public service that is not an official member of Frelimo. And indeed those that may be Renamo supporters in private have to toe the Frelimo line. The result is a frequent distrust of government institutions to deliver a service that is unbiased - especially in Renamo-dominated areas.

Among the youth it has led to a situation where there is no serious engagement with politics. Young Mozambicans realise that the Frelimo party membership card provides them access to possible job opportunities in the public sector in a very tight and difficult job market. For most young Mozambicans this means no real engagement with the serious issues that confront Mozambican society. The only matter of importance is quick, immediate economic redress. The guarantee of upward social mobility is Frelimo membership.<sup>32</sup>

Despite Renamo's majority support in six out of 10 provinces, it has been excluded from government at all levels except at parliamentary level. The numerical supremacy of Frelimo in parliament, even if it is with such a small margin has meant that the opposition has been completely dominated and sidelined. Renamo's participation in parliament has had very little impact on the development and adoption of policy. Good proposals that have been made by the opposition are

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<sup>29</sup> *Observing the 1999 election in Mozambique: Final Report*. Atlanta: Carter Centre (2000): 11.

<sup>30</sup> The use of the term 'bandits' is loaded with negative symbolism and has been assiduously avoided since the first election in 1994. It only crops up during time of crisis. One interviewee suggested that the Montepuez incident was a total aberration and unlikely to happen again due to the 'peaceful nature of Mozambicans'.

<sup>31</sup> Some interviewees condemned the mass action campaign of Renamo, a whole year after the 1999 election – pointing out that trouble should have been expected from Frelimo. Renamo in contrast points out that they had first utilised democratic avenues, the courts, before seeking redress through mass action. The delay in the mass action campaign is also ascribed to the devastation caused by the 2000 floods. Renamo chose to postpone its campaign until after the worst effects of the floods had been ameliorated.

<sup>32</sup> Interview in Maputo with social sciences lecturer, 20 March 2002.

dismissed out of hand only to emerge as government policy at a later stage.<sup>33</sup> This deliberate policy of exclusion, in contrast with the Mandela-inspired policy of a government of national unity, therefore includes every tier and institution of government.

This has had very negative consequences for Renamo's approach to parliament. Renamo's boycott actions - despite the fact that it reflects very badly on the role of the opposition - seem for many Renamo members as the only option left to them. However, this tactic to boycott everything that might prove to be controversial, has led to a situation where parliament as an institution deals mostly with the mundane and banal. Parliament therefore is not an effective channel for mediating and regulating conflict.

A telling example is the special joint commission that was established to investigate the Montepuez incident and the other complaints of the use of undue force against Renamo-UE members in November 2000. The commission concluded its findings during the first 2002 session of parliament. However, Renamo disrupted the sitting to such an extent when the report was supposed to be presented in parliament that the results were never tabled before parliament. This type of response is unfathomable for most Mozambicans and analysts at first glance.

The structure of the report explains Renamo's stance. The 'joint' report reflects clearly each party's different positions and interpretations of these events. Every single incident of violence in the run-up to the Montepuez incident is discussed on a case-by-case basis followed by a separate Renamo and Frelimo analysis of the same incident. However, the final conclusion of the report was adopted by majority vote and represents in its entirety a Frelimo interpretation of events. It was this final conclusion that was to be tabled in parliament. Renamo feared that this Frelimo interpretation of events would form the foundation for a judicial process against Renamo, which could sully its image with the voters and jeopardise its chances in the next elections. It could also lead to the beginning of a draining judicial process against the Renamo leader as in the case of Morgan Tsvangirai, the Zimbabwean leader of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC). Those close to the Renamo camp are already suggesting that Frelimo will 'steal' the next election from Renamo as Robert Mugabe did in Zimbabwe this year.

Whereas parliament therefore is the only institution where power sharing and a joint national approach could have been formulated - this has not happened, for observers confirm that on controversial issues strict party discipline is enforced and party members vote strictly according to party positions.<sup>34</sup> Ironically, constitutional reform measures that would have created greater balance of power, especially on a national level between the President and parliament, were discarded shortly before the 1999 elections, despite widespread consultation and broad public and party support. Both Renamo and Frelimo reneged on their commitment to constitutional reform fearing that it could result in a political split between the president and parliament resulting in ineffective government. Renamo was also firmly convinced at the time that it would win an outright majority during the 1999 elections and did not wish to be saddled with a weak presidency.<sup>35</sup>

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<sup>33</sup> The adoption of 4 October (commemorating the signing of the peace agreement) as a national holiday is a good example of this. This was initially a Renamo proposal that was rejected by Frelimo only to be later adopted by Frelimo.

<sup>34</sup> The delay of the introduction of an electronic voting system has not assisted in this area - with most voting taking place with a show of hands prohibiting parliamentarians to adopt individual positions. Interview in Maputo, 20 May 2002.

<sup>35</sup> Discussion with Prof. Andre Thomashausen, UNISA, 29 April 2002.

### *Internal Party Politics: Leadership Issues*

#### *Frelimo*

Chissano's announcement in May 2001 that he will not be seeking a third term as president has opened the door for a variety of national and internal political scenarios. Although the Mozambican constitution does not prohibit him from seeking a third term, there was broad agreement in Frelimo that his announcement was timely. The 62-year old Chissano who came to power after the death of Samora Machel in 1986, was apparently highly offended that there was not more support in the rank and file for a further third term.<sup>36</sup>

His announcement immediately led to wide-ranging speculation on possible successors. Frelimo has two broad wings. The first group is concentrated around Chissano, and is mostly represented in government positions. He is backed at a senior level by Pascoal Mocumbi, the Prime Minister, and Leonardo Simão, the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Both have a medical background and share Chissano's education as medical students. The government group is supported by a young group of prominent technocrats.

The second group is concentrated around Armando Guebuza, the leader of the Frelimo parliamentary group, who has his main support in parliament, in the political committee of Frelimo and in the rank and file of the party.<sup>37</sup>

Although several contenders for the post of party leader had been mooted, Guebuza has now emerged as the chosen candidate.<sup>38</sup> The choice of Guebuza as Chissano's successor reveals a great deal about the consolidation and relative strength of the various factions in Frelimo.

The internal party machinations are indicative of the extent to which Frelimo has had to reinvent itself from its Marxist legacy. The various adjustments made by the party since the late 1980s have led to an internal ideological crisis. The weakened emphasis on ideology has facilitated the spread of corruption causing growing discontent in the more militant sections of Frelimo.

Guebuza's attractiveness as a possible successor resides in the fact that he is expected to adopt a hard line against corruption and that he will deal effectively with the growing strength of Renamo. However, others are less convinced of his suitability despite his substantial political experience as a former cabinet minister and his involvement in the 1992 peace negotiations, because of his past political role in the socialist era.<sup>39</sup> However, his appointment points to a possible further hardening of attitudes towards Renamo, which could in itself create a greater potential for conflict.

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<sup>36</sup> Interview in Maputo on 10 May 2002.

<sup>37</sup> In analysing the power centres of the two factions it is interesting to note that only two ministers are represented on the Frelimo political committee, namely Mocumbi and the Minister of Education, Alcido Nguenha. Parliamentary figures dominate the political committee, namely the Speaker, Eduardo Mulembwe, the Deputy Speaker, Veronica Macamo, Guebuza and his deputy Margarida Talapa.

<sup>38</sup> Besides Guebuza, who was the strongest contender, other included Mocumbi (Prime Minister), Mulembwe (Speaker), Felicio Zacharias (Governor of Sofala Province) a popular choice with a prominent anti-corruption record and an outside contender, Helder Muteia, the Minister of Agriculture. Graça Machel has also been mooted as a possible contender, although her candidacy would have been interpreted as a lack of consensus and unity in Frelimo and a desperate attempt to tap into remaining sympathies of a so-called golden era under Machel.

<sup>39</sup> Guebuza's nickname, shortly after the attainment of independence in 1975, was 'Mr 2420'. This referred to his function as Minister of the Interior to deport any person within 24 hours with only 20 kilograms of luggage classified as a counter-revolutionary or an enemy of the newly independent state. Many Mozambican citizens were relieved of their properties, livelihoods and indeed citizenship in this manner.

### *Renamo*

Renamo held its first post-war party congress on 28 – 29 October 2001 in Nampula. The numerous delays in the holding of the party congress have been ascribed to a lack of financial resources. However, numerous offers of assistance have been made to Renamo in the past for this purpose. It seems that the reluctance to engage in any form of democratic party consolidation and organisation of the party is more related to the fears of the Renamo president of emerging contenders on a democratic ticket. Dhlakama's ousting of Raul Domingos in September 2000 is generally regarded as a reflection of this fear. For many years Raul Domingos was the public face of Renamo as the head of its political department and because of the prominent role he played during the 1992 peace negotiations.

The appointment of Joaquim Vaz, the former Renamo representative in Portugal as the new secretary general of the party is an interesting development. He has considerable organisational skills and is expected to assist the party in preparing for the upcoming elections. The record of Renamo as an effective opposition party has indeed been dismal and has been predominantly attributed to a lack of sufficient organization and pro-active policies. Members of the UE have warned Renamo to begin organising as soon as possible if it wishes to secure a victory at the polls.<sup>40</sup> However, Vaz is not trusted by Dhlakama and he is broadly sidelined when it comes to key decisions affecting the future of the party.<sup>41</sup> He was recently dishonourably discharged from his duties by Renamo's leader and the National Council due to 'incompetence'.<sup>42</sup>

Dhlakama's reliance on David Aloni, the head of his presidential office, and Renamo's apparent 'second in command', as well as his over reliance on external advisers are regarded as responsible for the bad advice that has informed many of Dhlakama's decisions.

### *An Emerging Third Alternative?*

The ousted second-in-command of Renamo, Raul Domingos, has managed to maintain his seat in parliament on technical reasons and has established a non-governmental organisation IPADE. IPADE is widely regarded as a vehicle for Domingos to relaunch his political career and eventually a new Mozambican party. His approach has been novel in the Mozambican context where elections linked with political trust funds have given rise to numerous 'parties' sprouting overnight. Instead of establishing a party immediately (which would have meant the loss of his parliamentary seat) he has embarked on a strategy to attract membership on a grassroots level, while at the same time seeking support among Mozambican intellectuals and 'independent' thinkers.

Domingos has indicated that he will participate in the local elections in 2003 (which he can do as a civil society organisation) to test the political waters and the measure of support for IPADE.<sup>43</sup> IPADE is expected to achieve widespread support amongst the intelligentsia and especially among the Sena in the central belt of Mozambique.<sup>44</sup> However, Domingos is expected to have difficulties in gathering enough support on a national level to become a significant third alternative. It is in this regard that possible coalition partners might become an interesting option.

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<sup>40</sup> Interview with Renamo-UE coalition partner on 20 May 2002.

<sup>41</sup> Interview in Maputo, 10 May 2002.

<sup>42</sup> See 'Domingos Comments on Renamo Crisis', Agencia de Informacao de Mocambique, 2 August 2002.

<sup>43</sup> Interview with Raul Domingos, IPADE, 15 March 2002.

<sup>44</sup> The appointment of Joaquim Vaz of Sena lineage as secretary general by Dhlakama is generally regarded to counter Domingos' support among the Sena.

### *A Shift in Traditional Allegiances and New Coalitions?*

Frelimo has managed to keep a variety of factions within its fold for a remarkable amount of time and Chissano has been the lynchpin around which this support has been organised. However, the recent May Day events in Maputo during which the President was insulted and obstructed from delivering a national address by former Mozambican workers in the ex-GDR is perhaps the most telling public indicator of simmering discontent about Frelimo policies.<sup>45</sup>

The fact that Frelimo will be entering the next election with a leader that is not as well-known as Chissano and with a 'notorious' past could have serious implications for the party. Several interviewees pointed out that Chissano had made a huge mistake by not selecting an anointed successor earlier to ensure that such a person would have a national platform from which to launch his/her presidential campaign in the next elections. This implies that Frelimo might be forced to move out of its normal comfort zone to seek alliances with other parties – especially in view of the inroads made by the Renamo-UE in the last elections. Tentative discussions have already taken place with PIMO and the Labour Party of Mozambique, although PIMO insists that it will not enter into coalitions with any of the major parties.<sup>46</sup> The reintroduction by Frelimo of a draft bill on the role and rights of the official opposition in parliament (an initiative that was initially launched by Renamo shortly after the 1994 elections), is another indication that Frelimo is accepting that the political scenario is changing and that it might in future fill the seat of the opposition in parliament.<sup>47</sup>

### **Assessing the Risk of Potential Violent Escalation**

Mozambican society has reached a decisive juncture in its brief experience with multi-party democracy. It is poised on the brink of a potential renewal of a serious rise in conflict in the lead up to the next municipal and national/presidential elections planned for 2003 and 2004, respectively.

### *Rising Political and Social Instability in the Face of Elections*

It is ironic that elections have proven to be so fatal for national reconciliation and peacebuilding in Mozambique. The reasons for this could partly be ascribed to:

- the close political contest between Frelimo and Renamo which is expressed in a zero-sum game and is focused on absolute and exclusive control of power;
- the growing electoral support for Renamo and specifically for Dhlakama, who showed a 13% increase in national support since 1994;
- the threat of retribution and socio-economic exclusion of Frelimo in the case of a possible Renamo victory;

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<sup>45</sup> The group referred to here was summarily repatriated to Mozambique after the fall of the Berlin wall in 1992. The ex-DDR government paid a certain amount to the workers themselves whereas a certain percentage was paid to the Mozambican government to be held in trust for the workers until after their return from Mozambique. That money has now disappeared and the workers have been involved in an ongoing process since 1992 to ensure a return of the funding to its rightful owners without success. The incident boiled over on 1 May 2002 as one of the most significant recent indicators of disaffection with Frelimo and corruption in government circles.

<sup>46</sup> Interview with Ya -qub Sibindy and human rights organizations close to the Frelimo camp.

<sup>47</sup> Interviews in Maputo in May 2002.

- the chance that a possible Renamo victory could be snatched away by a potentially threatening rearguard action launched by Raul Domingos, a former prominent Renamo member, in areas traditionally dominated by Renamo.

This potential for conflict is intrinsically linked to the perceptions and experiences of political exclusion and economic marginalisation at a national and local level, as well as a growing disaffection with the unbroken domination of the political scene by Frelimo since 1975.

More serious however is the slow pace, and in certain cases, the lack of service delivery and the perceived unresponsiveness of government to the needs of the population. This has contributed to increasing popular distrust of the integrity of Mozambique's democratic institutions and also to gradually rising social discontent. This is partly related to the adverse impact of the stringent economic policies, introduced under the HIPC scheme and endorsed by the IMF and the Worldbank, on the domestic labour market and employment opportunities. There is an unfortunate time lag before the dividends of greater debt relief on government expenditure become evident and before the high-growth economic policy of the last decade can begin to reduce poverty levels significantly - this period is potentially loaded with social instability and discontent. Local observers interpret the unusual public demonstration of disaffection within a traditional Frelimo constituency (the former GDR-workers) on 1 May 2002, as the tip of the iceberg of growing disillusionment with the government and its policies. Thus we find a new dimension to the traditional demarcation of political affiliation between Frelimo and 'the rest', namely disaffection within the rank and file of Frelimo with the political leadership and growing accusations of corruption and mismanagement.

There are, in short, clear signs that the potential for violent confrontation between groups of divergent political affiliation exists, as well as between aggrieved groups and the authorities - such as between the unemployed and the Police. With upcoming elections, the stakes are very high, and irrespective of who wins the day, may well result in conflict. A scenario that is characterised by political crisis and social unrest with occasional flair-ups of localised violence that would tend to increase as the elections approach seem the most plausible. The response of government, the leadership of Renamo and the general restraint that has characterised the response of the Mozambican populace will determine whether this violence tips the balance into large-scale political instability.

### *Inhibitors of Violent Conflict Escalation*

At this point in time, a full-scale war scenario is not envisaged, nor that of low intensity warfare or guerrilla activities. The secession of the central and northern regions from the south also seems highly unlikely in view of the massive mobilisation of human and military resources that would be required for such an exercise. Renamo does not seem to command either the resources for such an exercise, nor does it inspire sufficient confidence to launch such an effort.

Militarily, capacities are limited and there is no obvious build-up or mobilisation of 'armed groups' in the country. However, the prevalence of small arms in the region could be a negative factor if conflict escalates to crisis levels. Mozambique is fortunate that there appears to be no 'external interest' in supporting an internal destabilisation campaign due to the limited occurrence of mineral

resources or other valuable natural resources on its territory; as well as difficulties in extracting mineral resources; and its limited geo-political strategic importance.<sup>48</sup>

The most important break on a resumption of conflict - as stated throughout this report - is that despite the fondness of certain political forces to invoke the spectre of war as an attempt to mobilise the broader population, there is very little interest among ordinary Mozambicans to enter another period of conflict. Mozambican society has in general been fairly successful in counteracting the country's inherent conflict potential and peace has been maintained. The question whether the Mozambicans have found an enduring coping formula is harder to answer. The current coping mechanisms are not the result of a linear development, nor is it the result of a range of installed, institutionalised mechanisms to ameliorate conflict. In fact at a formal level, institutional mechanisms are clearly under-performing. Instead it seems to reside in the broad understanding that exists at a grassroots level that common ground has to be found on how to co-exist together in peace and to heal the trauma and divisions caused by the war. Peace as a desirable value therefore seems to be enshrined in people's minds. The fact that traditional authorities, religious groups, civil society groups and NGO's actively advocate peace and reconciliation present a strong counter-balance to the drivers of conflict.<sup>49</sup>

This intangible value is also supported by the material reality that although economic living conditions are not improving in leaps and bounds, the possibility now exists - especially in the rural areas - to engage in small-scale agriculture without the constant threat of attack or dispossession. At a macro level, the involvement of larger and more inclusive groups in national development projects, such as the development of the Agenda 2025, seem to play a significant role in ameliorating grievances.

### **Closing Remarks: Policy Dilemmas**

Mozambique has received significant international attention over the last decade primarily because of its successful transition to peace combined with its high economic growth rate. Indeed the country has been described as a 'success story' by the United Nations, by international financial institutions such as the World Bank, the IMF and by various bilateral development cooperation agencies. However, the 'aura of success' seems to obscure a more realistic evaluation of the conflict dynamic inherent in society and the 'economic achievements' of the past decade. Many in Mozambique equated the advent of democracy with the prospect of an improvement in material conditions.<sup>50</sup> Instead only a small group is perceived by society to benefit from the fruits of peace. It presents the international community with a dilemma - for while the current government enjoys great sympathy for its human development efforts, it is clear that an important aspect of statehood and governance has been neglected, namely the consolidation of a truly participatory democracy. This is essential in a society with such a huge development deficit and that has inherited such far-reaching schisms as Mozambique. It requires a

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<sup>48</sup> This does not imply that there would not be a flurry of regional and international political initiatives to mediate if large-scale social instability occurs in Mozambique.

<sup>49</sup> Churches and religious organizations across the eucamenical divide have played an enormous role in bridging the gap between societies and former enemies. This has been pursued at a national level through conciliatory pastoral messages, civic education campaigns and projects such as 'Arms for Hoes'. At the local level they have been actively involved in supporting community development projects - mostly linked to education and healthcare.

<sup>50</sup> Naidu S (2001): 26.

sustained and conscious effort by government to ensure the greatest measure of consultation and participation from society - that goes beyond platitudes and symbolic gestures (though their importance is undeniable such as the adoption of a new national anthem this year).<sup>51</sup> There are, indeed, excellent examples of positive engagement by Mozambicans with the challenges facing their society such as the pre-1999 constitutional reform consultations.

At present, however, it is striking that a general national debate is absent, outside the parameters of political affiliation, about the enormous developmental and political challenges facing the country. The consolidation of a truly participatory democracy assumes that every citizen of Mozambique receives and experiences social justice, which builds trust in the institutions of democracy and the democratic process. It necessitates a much more generous approach than has been the experience so far to accommodate opposing political views and positions. One would hope that the development of the Agenda 2025 and the implementation of the PARPA would have a positive impact in this regard.

However, in a country such as Mozambique, with its lack of resources, low human development index, and great economic disparities, the role of government remains crucial in determining whether its adopted route will be marked with conflict or peace and progress - especially in the run-up to the elections. In this respect, the Mozambican government cannot afford to ignore the detrimental impact of the looming spectre of violence and instability on international and foreign investor confidence and engagement. The latter is crucial for the successful development of Mozambique.

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<sup>51</sup> These efforts to ensure greater cultural/national cohesion and consensus in society have not extended to some of the national days – with the exception of 4 October commemorating the peace agreement. Heroes Day for example is still highly divisive in Mozambican society and is commemorated to mainly acknowledge the past contribution of prominent Frelimo leaders and members.



## II Sources of Conflict and Capacities for Peace

### A. Basic Social and Economic Conditions

#### Factor # 1. Level of General Economic Development or Deterioration

*Are basic social and economic resources widely available or increasingly scarce?*

Access to basic social and economic resources in Mozambique is still very limited despite the fact that the country has enjoyed almost a decade of high economic growth that averaged 8.5% from 1995-1999. The Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of Mozambique is US\$3.9 billion and is higher than that of Namibia and its mineral-rich neighbour Zambia.<sup>52</sup> However, Mozambique still has the lowest human development indicators in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and on a global scale only Ethiopia, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Niger and Sierra Leone fare worse.<sup>53</sup>

In 1997 Mozambicans' life expectancy was 42.3 years in comparison with the average of 51 years in Sub-Saharan Africa and 62 years for developing countries in general<sup>54</sup>. Also below the average were adult literacy rates, school enrolments, as well as maternal and child health indicators. Almost 70% of the Mozambican population live in absolute poverty, on less than US\$1 a day. Rural areas present higher figures for poverty incidence (71,3%), than urban areas (62%).<sup>55</sup> A World Bank representative admitted that the high-growth rate economic strategy that has been pursued thus far in Mozambique has achieved very little success in changing the plight of those in absolute poverty.<sup>56</sup> Urban riots over food prices in Maputo took place in 1993 and 1995.

The Mozambican government has attracted considerable investment and praise for its fiscal and monetary policies in the last decade. The Centre for the Promotion of Investment (CPI) has approved more than 940 projects since 1995. Foreign direct investment amounted to US\$1.706 billion in 1999, while national direct investment amounted to US\$294 million. The positive macro-economic performance resulted in above 10% GDP annual growth rate and around 27% of GDP in investment for the period between 1996-1999.<sup>57</sup>

Inflation that averaged 75% in the 1980s (and 62% between 1987-1996)<sup>58</sup> was down to single digits in the 1990s and was estimated at 12.7% in 2000. However, this progress has come at a high

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<sup>52</sup> 'Peace and stability key to SADC economies', IRIN Report, 9 April 2002.

<sup>53</sup> *Human Development Report* (2001).

<sup>54</sup> According to the *Censo 97- II Recenseamento Geral da População e Habitação- Resultados Definitivos*- from INE.

<sup>55</sup> *Pobreza e Bem-Estar em Moçambique- Primeira Avaliação Nacional, 1996-1997*. Ministerio do Plano e Finanças (1998): 430; and *Mozambique Common Country Assessment*, United Nations System, (2000): 16.

<sup>56</sup> Interview in Maputo on 22 May 2002.

<sup>57</sup> *Action Plan for Reduction of Absolute Poverty 2001-2005* (PARPA): 27.

<sup>58</sup> Sulemane J. A (2001).

price. The average annual real GDP per capita is still only US\$198 - up from US\$144 in 1990<sup>59</sup>. Although Mozambique has a minimal industrial wage of Meticaís (MZM) 665.707 this translates into only US\$36 per month. The minimum agricultural wage is even lower at MZM 459.270 per month.<sup>60</sup> Dramatic erosion of the national minimum wage followed the introduction of the first Economic Recovery Programme (PRE) in 1987 causing severe hardship. A recovery to the 1987-wage levels in US\$-terms was only achieved for the first time in 1999.

The severe contraction in government expenditure has had a significant, negative impact on the public service – fuelling corruption at all levels of government to subsidise meagre state salaries. The low government salaries have contributed to the migration of skilled personnel to the small private sector and international donor agencies. The government has initiated public sector reforms in response to this situation to raise productivity, improve services to the general public and to provide more incentives for qualified civil servants to remain in the public service.<sup>61</sup>

Almost 45% of the population are economically active. Formal employment opportunities are severely limited and only 19% of the population are employed in the formal sector. About 72% of the population is reliant on smallholder agriculture for their survival.<sup>62</sup> This proportion is not entirely rurally based: a substantial number of ‘urban’ dwellers have small-scale agricultural holdings on the margins of cities. The profile of the unemployed looking for jobs shows that 90% have less than 9 years of schooling and more than half of the candidates have no previous employment experience. There is a general lack of opportunities and an excessive concentration of the qualified labour force in the urban areas, which aggravates the unemployment rate. The overall rates of unemployment vary between 30-50% and are expected to increase in accordance with the population growth.<sup>63</sup>

Employment and education are the main concerns of the young, given that employment rates in the formal sector are very low, especially in the rural areas. The outlook seems grim given the inadequacy of the education curriculum to provide practical skills appropriate for the difficult job market and the slow growth of employment opportunities in the formal sector.

A positive feature of the stringent economic policies of the Frelimo government has been the achievement of international debt relief under the Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) scheme. This has reduced Mozambique’s debt from US\$ 5bn to under US\$ 1bn. The Minister of Finance, Mrs Luisa Diogo, pointed out that a debt servicing level of US\$ 20 – 25m a year is sustainable. Under HIPC I (combined with various moratoria), debt servicing in 2000 was US\$ 26.9m. Without the HIPC scheme the burden would have been US\$ 94.1m of the annual budget. Under HIPC II the debt burden will be further reduced to US\$ 750m.

The economy remains very vulnerable to environmental disasters such as seasonal floods and droughts that affect especially southern Mozambique. The 2000 floods had a detrimental impact on the Mozambican economy, limiting economic growth to 1.6% for that year. After a recurrence of floods in

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<sup>59</sup> Please note data discrepancy. The National Institute of Statistics (INE) has a GDP per capita figure of US\$ 243 for 1999 and US\$ 225 for 2000.

<sup>60</sup> Centre for the Promotion of Investment (CPI) CD-ROM 2001.

<sup>61</sup> Although it is still too early to assess the impact of these reforms, the slow increase in salary levels does not bode well for their success. Other constraints related to career progression, such as the statutory requirement that promotion is only possible if sufficient funds are available, (irrespective of the candidate’s qualifications, experience and service record), does not encourage a more professional attitude and commitment.

<sup>62</sup> *Mozambique Agricultural Sector Memorandum*, World Bank, Report n° 16529 MOZ, Vol.2 (1997): 46.

<sup>63</sup> *Moçambique: Avaliação Conjunta do País*, op.cit.: 85-86.

2001 (in parts of central and southern Mozambique), the south is presently in the midst of a serious drought that is affecting maize production throughout SADC.

HIV/AIDS is expected to have a considerable impact on living conditions in Mozambique. The UN Common Country Assessment of Mozambique indicates a 25% prevalence rate among the adult population<sup>64</sup> and estimate point to an infection rate of 700 per day. There were about 100,000 deaths from AIDS-related illnesses in 2000. These estimates are projected to increase to 1.6m deaths by 2010. Life expectancy is expected to decrease by a third within the next ten years, from 43.5 years<sup>65</sup> to a projected 35.9 years in 2010. Income levels are expected to drop by 8 – 10% as a result of the pandemic<sup>66</sup>.

AIDS will thus have a serious impact on human development in Mozambique resulting in a general deterioration in living conditions and an increasing redirection of scarce resources towards medical support and AIDS orphans. The epidemic is present throughout the country, but the centre and the north have the highest infection rates, especially the provinces bordering on Zimbabwe and Malawi.

## **Factor # 2. Resource Base and Structure of the Economy**

*Do the country and society in question have diverse and expanding, or limited economic production capacities?*

Opportunities for economic production are very limited and Mozambique has a very small industrial base. According to Businessmap South Africa, a business and investment rating agency, about 60% of the country's business turnover is still from state-owned companies, which includes telecommunications, the national airline, electricity, oil and gas. An indicator of the small size of the industrial base is the impact of one so-called 'mega-project' on the trade balance. Mozal, an aluminium smelter project at Beloluane on the outskirts of Maputo largely contributed to the success of the Maputo Corridor project and is the biggest single private sector investment ever in Mozambique. Exports grew 172%, almost entirely due to Mozal. Phase I contributed 7% to Mozambique's GDP in 2001.<sup>67</sup>

Other major capital-intensive projects, which could have a significant impact on the GDP, are the exploration of the heavy sand project in Gaza in the Chibuto district and the exploitation of the natural gas reserves in Pande and Temane in Inhambane province. Planned projects such as the construction of the Mepanda-Uncua dam on the Zambezi River and the rehabilitation of the Sena railway line to facilitate the exploitation of coal reserves and to foster agricultural development in the Zambezi valley, could provide a significant economic stimulus to the Mozambican economy while addressing internal regional inequalities.

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<sup>64</sup> *Moçambique: Avaliação Conjunta do País, op.cit:* 18. The UNDP HDR 1999 and 2000 contain different estimates with a projected increase of 15,4% infected adults between 15-49 years in 2000 to about 20% in 2010 (1999: 69). The latter is based on a MISAU-MPF-INE-CEP/UEM study on the Demographic Impact of HIV-AIDS in Mozambique, 2000.

<sup>65</sup> The INE Brochure 'Mozambique in Figures' based on data available until 21/05/2001, presents this figure as being 44.1 years.

<sup>66</sup> *Mozambique Human Development Report* (2000): 70-71.

<sup>67</sup> *Regional Investor Survey 2001: Opportunities in Waiting*, Businessmap South Africa, November 2001, p. 70.

An analysis of economic activity shows that the primary sector contributes between 25 - 30% of GDP (agriculture represents 95% of this sector); the secondary sector (manufacturing and construction) contributes about 24%; and the tertiary sector (commerce and transport/communications) about 48%. Within these broad parameters the contribution of agriculture has tended to diminish from 96.1% in 1997 to 94.6% in 1998; manufacturing has decreased from 48.4% to 38.6% and the transport and communications contributions have diminished from 24.3% to 21% signifying a contraction of the production sector. In contrast in the same period there has been a rise in construction from 29.9% to 32.9% and in commerce from 30.4% to 51.2%.<sup>68</sup> Employment per sector note 74.

Mozambique received foreign direct investment of US\$ 239.5m in 2000. Investments were concentrated in the construction industry, agriculture, agro-industries and financial institutions. The main investors were South Africa (due to Mozal), Portugal and Great Britain.

Historically, Mozambique has had a consistent trade deficit, with imports of US\$1.6 billion dwarfing exports of US\$645 million despite the fact that exports have grown by 14% between 1993-1997. The main exports include prawns, cotton, and cashew nuts, wood, sugar, tea and copra, whereas the main imports include machinery, electrical and transport equipment, mineral (petroleum products), metal products and cereals.<sup>69</sup> Exports demonstrate a lack of diversity and are dominated by marine products, mostly prawns, and agricultural goods.

However, it should be kept in mind that the Mozambican economy is characterised by a significant informal sector at the micro-level that remains largely uncaptured in formal data.<sup>70</sup> Thus figures about the level of employment are generally not available. In those cases where unemployment estimates are presented, these are only related to the small formal sector. According to the World Bank 2002 African Development Indicators, Mozambique's total labour force was 8.978 million in 1999. Yet the same source indicates that only 8% of the workforce was active in the industrial sector and only 9% in the services sector.<sup>71</sup> 83% of the labour force was employed in the agricultural sector in the form of small scale and subsistence agriculture managed by individual households.<sup>72</sup> As a result about 72% of the population is involved in agricultural economic activity at this level and the agricultural household sector represents the most significant coping and livelihood strategies for the majority of Mozambicans. The lack of formal employment and the low levels of education prevalent in Mozambique are the main drivers of the agricultural household sector. At the same time they are also the main reasons for the existence of the informal sector.

Mozambique's rate of adult literacy is estimated to be only 40% with huge disparities between urban and rural areas. In rural areas only 28% of Mozambicans are literate (44% of men and 15% of women), whereas 65% are literate in the urban areas (80% of men and 54% of women).

These disparities are also translated across regions, with only 14% of women and 44% of men literate in the north versus 77% of women and 93% of men living in Maputo City. In the south

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<sup>68</sup> *Mozambique Human Development Report* (1999): 38.

<sup>69</sup> INE, *Mozambique in figures*, 2000 and [www.ine.gov.mz](http://www.ine.gov.mz); see also CPI CD-ROM, 2002.

<sup>70</sup> The latest figures available stem from the 1980 census and are estimated at 94,825. *Europa Handbook* 2001: 2799.

<sup>71</sup> Please note that the figures quoted in the latest World Bank report refer to 1990. The 1997 census indicated that the service sector (including government) employed 15% of the work force while industry employed only 5%. See *Mozambique: World Bank Country Economic Memorandum - Growth Prospects and Reform Agenda*, February 7, 2001: 6.

<sup>72</sup> The Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) estimated in mid-1999 that a total of 8,069 million people were employed in the agriculture sector. See *Europa Yearbook* (2001).

(excluding Maputo City) literacy levels extend to 51% of women and 75% of men. In the central region 21% of women are literate versus 56% of men. A breakdown of education attendance rates shows a worrying trend. The 1997 census indicated a school attendance rate of 66.8% in primary education, 39.9% in secondary education and only 0.3% in higher education.

However, about 78% of all Mozambicans have not finished any education level and in 1997 only 1% of women and 3.1% of men had concluded their secondary education.<sup>73</sup> In the rural areas the rate of attendance at secondary education level was just 3.1% and in 1998, Mozambique had only 5,000 graduates with a tertiary education.<sup>74</sup> The fact that most students were in the past forced to complete their tertiary studies in Maputo City at the Eduardo Mondlane University due to the absence of any alternatives has been the cause of a major internal brain drain from the rural areas to the south. Nevertheless, there has been some positive progress with the establishment by 1999 of six recognised higher education institutions with a greater national spread<sup>75</sup>. The higher education sector is also currently undergoing reforms to create greater equity and to respond better to the demands of the formal market. Although there is a decline in the share of the informal economy, taxation is still problematic and the scope for illegal trade and money laundering is vast. This phenomenon is partially linked to weak government capacity, insufficient fiscal and monetary controls, corruption and the size of Mozambique's land and marine borders. The Mozambican government's limited capacity to monitor its porous borders and territory opens the door for illegal fishing by foreign trawlers in Mozambican waters, as well as smuggling across land and by sea.

### Factor # 3. Population Distribution

*Are population pressures exacerbating competition over resources?*

Mozambique has a landmass of 799,380 km<sup>2</sup> and extends over 2,515 km from the Rovuma River in the north on the Tanzanian border to Ponta do Ouro in the south. The 1997 census indicated that it had a population of 16.9m, which translates into a population density of 21 inhabitants per km<sup>2</sup>. The latest 2002 INE estimates indicate a total population of 18,082,523. Of this figure, 44.3% are below 15 years old, 53% are within the 15-64 age group, and 2.7% are over 65 years. The population is projected to grow to 27.9m by 2020<sup>76</sup>.

The 'youth bulge' as a percentage of population between 16-30 years is estimated to be around 34%,<sup>77</sup> thus 78% of the population is under 30 years old. Population growth is about 2.3%<sup>78</sup> although fertility rates vary starkly, with Maputo city and Maputo province having the lowest fertility rates in the country and while Niassa, Tete and Zambezia provinces have fertility rates of between 6.8 and 6.6 children per women.<sup>79</sup> There seems to be a correlation between education and youth pregnancies.

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<sup>73</sup> There is a lack of available data on the percentage of young people with secondary or higher education without employment.

<sup>74</sup> *Mozambique Human Development Report* (1999): 28 and 81 (respectively).

<sup>75</sup> *Mozambique Human Development Report* (2000): 54.

<sup>76</sup> INE, CENSO97- II *Recenseamento Geral da População e Habitação- Resultados Definitivos, Projeções Anuais da População por Provincias e Area de Residencia*, 1997-2010.

<sup>77</sup> *Ibid*: 11.

<sup>78</sup> The overall birth rate is estimated to be 45.2 per 1000.

<sup>79</sup> Even though it is difficult to have accurate data on the birth rate of different communal groups, it can be argued that there are some geographical differences on the levels of pregnancy and access to pre-natal assistance.

About 50% of female 19 year-olds without a formal education have children in comparison with 11% of those with a secondary or higher education.<sup>80</sup>

The 1997 national census shows that the Mozambican population is predominantly rural, with only 23% living in the urban areas (provincial capitals), and almost half of all urban nationals living in Maputo City.<sup>81</sup>

However, there are substantial differences in the population density between the various regions, as well as within them. Niassa province has the lowest population density, 7 inhabitants per km<sup>2</sup>. It is also the biggest province, with 16.1% of the landmass of Mozambique. Nampula province has the highest population density (with the exception of Maputo City), with 39 inhabitants per km<sup>2</sup>. So the north (Niassa, Cabo Delgado and Nampula) representing 36.7% of the landmass of Mozambique has both the highest and lowest populations densities per province with an average of 24 inhabitants per km<sup>2</sup>.

The south (Inhambane, Gaza, Maputo Province and Maputo City) representing 21.4% of the landmass of Mozambique has an average population density of 22 inhabitants per km<sup>2</sup> with the exclusion of Maputo City.<sup>82</sup>

The central region (Zambezia, Tete, Manica and Sofala) representing the biggest surface area of Mozambique (42%) has the lowest average population density of 20 inhabitants per km<sup>2</sup>, although the differences between Tete with a population density of 13 inhabitants per km<sup>2</sup> and Zambezia with a population density of 31 inhabitants per km<sup>2</sup> in the same region are huge.

Although Zambezia and Nampula are the most populous provinces they also have the lowest life expectancy at birth (42.5 years in Zambezia and 45.4 in Nampula, against 63.9 for Maputo City, 57.9 in Maputo-province and 53.4 in Inhambane).<sup>83</sup> The latter is largely the result of central government neglect due to the huge disparities between the public services provided in the different provinces.

The western parts of Gaza, Tete and Niassa provinces have traditionally had the lowest population density, a tendency that was aggravated by the war. Population migrations and settlements took place to the coastal areas, the urban centres and along protected corridors in an effort to escape the ravages of war.<sup>84</sup> After the peace agreement in 1992 refugees and internal displaced persons (IDPs) gradually returned to their former homesteads. Some resettlement occurred in already inhabited areas resulting in small-scale conflicts, which were resolved at a community level through traditional conflict resolution mechanisms. The result has been growing pressure on the natural woodlands in Mozambique. Though more than 75% of the country maintains its natural vegetation,<sup>85</sup> 7m hectares of forestland is currently used on a non-sustainable basis exacerbated by wide-scale illegal logging.

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For instance, the rate of pregnancy reaches 23% in Maputo City, but 54% in Cabo Delgado province. Overall 71% of women have pre-natal assistance at least once during their pregnancy period (96% in urban areas and 65% in rural areas). But there are still areas with low coverage such as Sofala and Zambezia provinces (low than 50%), and among youths and women without education.

<sup>80</sup> *Moçambique: Avaliação Conjunta do País, op.cit.*: 54.

<sup>81</sup> INE, *Caderno de Informação Rápida 2000*, Março 2001, p. 12.

<sup>82</sup> Maputo City, representing only 0.04% of the landmass of Mozambique has a population density of 3359 inhabitants per km<sup>2</sup>.

<sup>83</sup> INE, CENSO97.

<sup>84</sup> This resulted in increased pressure on the land for agricultural purposes and firewood especially in the new settlement areas and in the bigger urban centres such as Maputo, Beira and Nampula.

<sup>85</sup> INE, CENSO97: 80.

However, it is important to note that 45% of Mozambique's landmass is arable land suitable for agricultural production,<sup>86</sup> which exceeds the general average of many countries in Africa. In real terms, that percentage corresponds to 359,946 km<sup>2</sup>, which if distributed equally among the population would translate into 2 hectares per person. This means that there is a low propensity for conflict around land distribution. Minor conflicts arise mainly over the quality of land, proximity of stable water sources, and about local government mismanagement of land distribution.

Although there is no shortage of 'land' in Mozambique the agricultural yield quality varies substantially from region to region and there are important regional differences in land availability and use.<sup>87</sup> The south of Mozambique is periodically plagued by cycles of drought and seasonal floods with severe effects on agricultural production and a resultant vulnerability to seasonal environmental shocks.

Despite the fact that the provinces of Cabo Delgado, Niassa and Tete have the greatest amounts of land available, most of this land is far from the town centres, roads and infrastructure. Landmines are also a problem in most rural areas affecting every single province of Mozambique. The three southern provinces and Nampula province (with the highest population density) have unsustainable land use practices<sup>88</sup> that could lead to problems in the long run.<sup>89</sup>

Despite the importance of the agricultural sector<sup>90</sup> this has been neglected until relatively recently. The adoption of the Mozambique Action Program for the Reduction of Absolute Poverty (PARPA) was only formally adopted in 2001 and will attempt to reduce poverty levels by 20% by the year 2010. The program is based on the adoption of a pro-poor macroeconomic environment characterised by broad-based non-inflationary growth and the expansion of private sector activity - particularly in rural areas.<sup>91</sup> It involves trade liberalisation; taxation, customs and expenditure policy reform; infrastructure development and good governance; sector policies for key industries with growth potential, particularly in agriculture; enhanced economic management capacity and an understanding of poverty reducing activities; and reinforced mechanisms for greater transparency and participation. It will be integrated with a series of other national sector policies, such as the National Population Policy. All

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<sup>86</sup> *Moçambique: Avaliação Conjunta do País pelo Sistema das Nações Unidas*, Maputo (2000): 79.

<sup>87</sup> In terms of the appropriateness of the soil structure for agricultural purposes, argillaceous and sandy soils are predominant throughout the country. However, the soil composition of the southern region is less suitable for agriculture activities with the exception of the areas located in the Limpopo, Incomati and Umbeluzi river valleys. In the northern part of the country, the soil structure combination is such that the region is suitable for an expanded variety of agricultural crops. This is very apparent in the Niassa, Nampula, Zambézia and Cabo Delgado provinces.

<sup>88</sup> These unsustainable practices refer to: ground clearance by fire which becomes prejudicial to the land when it is used intensively and is more common in the central and northern parts of the country; itinerant subsistence agriculture that contributes to soil degradation because of the tendency by households to use the same plot of land for extended periods of time (more or less characteristic of both regions, but more noticeable in the northern part of the country); monoculture which entails the production of profitable crops (ex. cotton, tea, sugarcane, and citrons) but which leads to significant soil degradation over time. The impact is more severe in the southern provinces (with sugarcane, citrons) and in the north (with cotton, tobacco), and less so in the central provinces (with sugarcane, tea). The high population density in the South has also significantly increased the pressure on land in this part of the country.

<sup>89</sup> Mozambique Agricultural Sector Memorandum, *op.cit.*: 24-26.

<sup>90</sup> The agricultural sector contributes 27.9% of GDP, whereas trade constitutes 21.9%, industry constitutes 8.5% and the service sector 41.46%. However, small-scale agriculture is responsible for the livelihoods of 72% of Mozambicans. *Ibid.*: 46.

government ministries are responsible for the implementation and annual monitoring of broad policy guidelines, while the Ministry of Planning and Finances bears primary responsibility for the socio-economic programs.<sup>92</sup>

Internal and international migrations are factors that could lead to competition over economic resources. There was considerable population movement from the urban to the rural areas until 1997 as people left the cities for the rural areas at the end of the war due to better economic prospects in agriculture.<sup>93</sup> Nowadays the flux is mainly driven by economic and employment considerations and is mostly rural-urban and at lower levels, urban-urban and rural-rural - especially as a result of re-settlement after the floods.

With regard to international migration there was a considerable influx after the war and especially between 1992-1997. However, these figures have now stabilised. International emigration is also a factor, which is mostly motivated by better job opportunities in neighbouring countries, especially in South Africa. This results in an annual emigration figure of 50,000.<sup>94</sup>

Foreigners constitute 0.5% of the current Mozambican population, with South Africans representing the biggest group (43.4%), of which the majority (59.4%) is concentrated in the rural areas. Zimbabweans are the second largest group (12.7%) and the Portuguese are the third largest group (9.8%). (However, they are mostly urban-based with an inverse trend of 29.8% in the urban areas and 0.5% in the rural areas.)

Not surprisingly, immigrant groups in Mozambique have caused some debate at a national level in terms of population/land distribution and identity issues. Specifically, the South African farmers that were granted tenure for 50 years in Niassa Province. The discussion predominantly focused on the possible maltreatment of the Mozambican population by the newcomers, as it was believed that it could develop into a source of tension. It is interesting to note that most of the South African farmers have since withdrawn from the project citing many of the problems that Mozambican farmers raise regarding the lack of infrastructure and access to markets.<sup>95</sup> The Mozambican partners in the project also complained that they were not receiving enough government support, leaving them at an economic disadvantage in comparison with their South African partners. A similar situation has arisen with regard to some Zimbabwean farmers that have been given tenure in Manica province, with complaints arising about their land occupation and their higher competitiveness in comparison to national producers. These concerns have nevertheless been relegated in the public debate and seem to have a low priority on the state agenda.

#### **Factor # 4. Society's Cohesion or Division**

*What are the principle distinguishable groups in the society as defined by differences in social and cultural practices and institutions such as religion and language, economic circumstances, location,*

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<sup>91</sup> The National Agricultural Development Program, PROAGRI, under PARPA is supposed 'to transform subsistence agriculture where production, distribution and processing are increasingly integrated, tending to produce family sector surpluses for the market, and also to develop an efficient and competitive business sector.'

<sup>92</sup> Mozambique Common Country Assessment (2000).

<sup>93</sup> Censo 97.

<sup>94</sup> Mozambique Common Country Assessment, (2000):16.

<sup>95</sup> Interview at the SAHC, Maputo, 2001.



*and other non-political factors that have the potential to create political divisions? Are there many small groups or just two or three large groups?*

Mozambican society's cohesion and division derives from a series of crosscutting identity groups that characterise the diverse composition of its society. There are several indicators that are relevant, ranging from ethnicity to language, immigrant groups and religion to traditional power centres.

Mozambique has more than 17 ethnic or tribal groups.<sup>96</sup> They are broadly aligned around three dominant groups, namely the Tsonga, in the south; the Ndau-Sena, in the centre; and the Macau (Macua?), in the north. However, not one single group represents a majority in Mozambican society as reflected by mother tongue language usage. Emakhuwa is the most common mother tongue in Mozambique spoken by 26.4% of the population (although predominantly in the north), followed by Xichangana (11.4%) and Elomwe (7.9%). Although Portuguese is the official language of Mozambique only 39.6% of the population can understand and speak it. As a mother tongue language it is spoken by only 6.5% of the population<sup>97</sup>.

Mozambique's 17 ethnic groups are mainly of Bantu origin, and share tribal affiliations with ethnic groups in neighbouring countries. The Tsonga in the south share allegiances with the Swati and the Zulu in Swaziland and South Africa; the Shona from Manica province in the centre are related to the Shona in Zimbabwe; and the Maconde in the north of Cabo Delgado province are related to their counterparts in Tanzania. NB. What about Niassa and Malawi?

Despite the high prevalence of ethnic diversity, the conflict potential is low. Contributing to their peaceful coexistence are social bonds deriving from marriage ties, as well as the absence of ethnic or religious institutions that have historically or traditionally separated groups or spread discrimination.

Apart from the so-called 'pure indigenous groups' (of Bantu origin), Mozambican society also includes foreign secular communities, which are mainly of Indian and Portuguese heritage. This includes a new wave of immigrants stemming mostly from Pakistan and China that have settled following the reestablishment of peace and a new socio-economic, political order in Mozambique.

The above-mentioned groups are generally economically well placed in society, especially the Indian and Pakistani communities, who prosper from their commercial activities. For the Indian community their economic status has had a positive effect in terms of their integration into society. However, their wealth might develop into a source of insecurity for forthcoming generations considering that they constitute a well-defined business elite in an environment of increasing inequalities. As such the potential for them to be perceived as outsiders or 'foreigners' keen to achieve social status to assure their interests could result in conflict.<sup>98</sup>

Another visible division in socially mobile groups in Mozambique comprises the urban and rural elites. Rural elites throughout the country harbour a keen sense of economic and social exclusion and regard urban elites with suspicion. This perception is based on and sustained by the conviction that the development efforts of the Mozambican government are much more concentrated in the urban rather

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<sup>96</sup> The groups include the Tsonga, the Ronga, the Changane and the Bitonga in the south; the Tswa, the Ndau, the Shona, the Sena and the Podzo in the centre; and the Maganja, the Lomue, the Macua, the Nyanja, the Yao, the Maconda and the Swahili in the north.

<sup>97</sup> *Mozambique Human Development Report* (1999): 19.

<sup>98</sup> The first institutional sign of this type of tension was visible when Parliament discussed the redrafting of the new Mozambican constitution pre-1999, especially the discussion related to the requirements for citizenship.

than the rural areas. Rural elites expect more assistance from the Mozambican government to revitalise their economic activities.

In the urban domain, the unemployed comprises a large social pressure group.<sup>99</sup> They are predominantly low-skilled workers with basic literacy and are usually the first victims of privatisation and the restructuring of the economy. Although they are not organised into political pressure groups *per se*, they are aware of the impact that they could have on the country's social stability. They have largely aligned themselves with the emergence of unions that attempt to address the grievances and concerns of the lowly-skilled, such as SIMPOCAF, a committee syndicate for the railways sector; SINTEVEC, a national union for the textile sector and SINTIAB, a national union for food and beverage sector, among others. As such they represent potential activist group that could be publicly mobilised.

A special sub-group within this group are those that were previously employed in the ex-GDR.<sup>100</sup> They have resorted, like other unemployed groups, to peaceful demonstrations in an attempt to seek redress from the Mozambican government. Their defamatory accusations against the Head of State and the Prime Minister on 1 May 2002 resulted in the arrest of several of their members by a special unit of the rapid intervention police force. It is the most public show of discontent against the governing elite about accusations of corruption since 1994.

The unemployed have the potential to emerge as *a powerful target/active group* in the 2003 and 2004 elections and it is to be expected that several opposition parties will attempt to garner their support by focusing on their grievances.

Another crosscutting division relates to the religious diversity. Roman Catholicism represents the biggest share, with 23.8%; those without any religion (of which some probably profess to animist religions) are the second biggest group with 23.1%; Islam represents the third largest group with 17.8%; and the Zionists the fourth largest group with 17.5%. Catholics and Muslims are evenly represented in rural and urban areas, but Islam prevails in the north, especially in Cabo Delgado, Niassa and Nampula. The Zionists are predominant in the urban areas and 25.4% of the rural inhabitants pledge allegiance to no religion<sup>101</sup>.

The interaction between religious groups is best understood against the background of the co-operative roles pursued by the Roman Catholic Church and the Christian Council of Mozambique (CCM) during the 1992 peace negotiations.<sup>102</sup> The CCM has also encouraged representatives and leaders of different religious affinities to emphasise peace and reconciliation in their religious activities to further national reconciliation. Religious institutions have worked mostly towards healing

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<sup>99</sup> They result from the increasing number of industries that have been privatised or were declared bankrupt following the World Bank-IMF inspired economic liberalisation policies.

<sup>100</sup> On the basis of a bilateral labour agreement between the Mozambican government and the former Democratic Republic of Germany (during the Cold War) about 18,000 young people were gradually given employment in the DDR. According to one of the clauses of the agreement 40% of their salaries was to be sent on a monthly basis to Mozambique to be awarded at the time of their return as a form of social insurance. Following the end of the Cold War and the reunification of Germany these workers were sent back to Mozambique. However, their social security contributions have never been adequately paid to them.

<sup>101</sup> *II Recenseamento Geral da População e Habitação 1997, Indicadores Socio-Demográficos – País Total.*

<sup>102</sup> The law regulating political parties expressly forbids religious parties and parties from sponsoring religious propaganda. PIMO (the Independent Party of Mozambique), also unofficially known as the Islamic party of Mozambique, has argued the right of parties to base their activities on religious principles since 1998. PIMO has been tolerated by Frelimo, which itself has a substantial Muslim membership that is organised in a parliamentary

grievances in society, especially in rural areas where the involvement of state and private institutions has been rather limited. These efforts are considered to be the main reason for the cordial and healthy relationship among religious groups in Mozambique.<sup>103</sup>

## Factor # 5. History of Inter-Group Violent Conflict or Co-operation

*Have major groups engaged in violent conflict with or coercion of each other in the past, or have they lived more or less amicably?*

In the 18<sup>th</sup> and 19<sup>th</sup> century Mozambique did experience violent inter-group conflicts among indigenous and foreign ethnic groups, involving mainly the Zulu and the Shangaan (both in south of the country). However, these clashes have not created lasting large-scale animosities that have prevailed into present-day Mozambican society.

Mozambique's liberation struggle began in the 1960s by Frelimo against the Portuguese. It gained its independence in 1975, with the fall of the Salazar regime in Portugal. Power was handed over to Frelimo without any national elections. Mozambique enjoyed relative peace in the first couple of years of independence but its support of the Zimbabwean liberation forces led to a policy of internal destabilisation and aggression by the Rhodesian regime. It resulted in the establishment of Renamo with the assistance of the Rhodesian security forces in the late 1970s. Renamo found a rich support base in the central and northern rural areas that have borne the brunt of Frelimo's 'modernising policies' which attempted to force rural communities to abandon their agricultural practices in the interest of large-scale state farms and the disgrace of the *régulos* (traditional chiefs).

The granting of independence to Zimbabwe in 1980 left Renamo with a potential dilemma. However, further external support was rendered by the South African security forces concerned at the growing tide of newly independent black Marxist governments in the region. This assistance included both logistical and tactical support and active incursions by South African forces into Mozambique. The assistance continued well into the eighties even after the signature of a mutual peace agreement, the Nkomati Accord, in 1984.

However, the changes in policy of the Frelimo government in 1987 and the subsequent far-reaching political changes in South Africa since 1989 removed the *raison d'être* for the further destabilisation of Mozambique - eventually leading to the signing of the peace agreement in Rome in 1992.

There have been very few instances of violent conflict since the signing of the peace agreement - an indication of the broad-based support in Mozambican society for peace after 16 years of war. Also important was the rapid demobilisation of the Renamo forces (although there are still today many hidden arms caches throughout the country and an abundance of small weapons);<sup>104</sup> the reconciliation

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caucus group the Movimento Islamico. *Mozambique Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2000*, US Department of State at [www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2000/af/859.htm](http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2000/af/859.htm).

<sup>103</sup> Provision has also been made with some success under the auspices of the Ministry of Justice for an institutional forum to discuss and address differences arising among the religious groups.

<sup>104</sup> These small arms refer to those weapons that were not returned by soldiers from both Renamo and Frelimo during the process of demobilisation. Some of the weapons remained in caches in Renamo-controlled areas as an intended backstop should they face problems during the transition period. During demobilisation, soldiers from both sides usually only returned obsolete weapons, as operational weapons served as a means of subsistence - by renting them out, selling them or using them in criminal activities. Although ONUMUZ collected nearly 190,000

policies advocated by the churches; the relatively successful integration of returning refugees despite the poverty levels, pressure on land and the presence of landmines; and lastly the external pressure of the international community, especially on the leader of Renamo during the first election to participate and to abide by the outcome of the elections.

The most recent events of serious violent conflict emerged six years after the first general elections and are specifically linked to the outcome of the 1999 general elections, the current policy of exclusion of non-Frelimo supporters from the corridors of power, as well as growing frustration in society that the post-war government (essentially the same as the pre-war government) has not done enough to address the harmful colonial legacy of regional economic disparities between the north and the south.

### **Factor# 6. Distribution of Economic and Social Goods**

*What is the distribution of vital economic and productive resources and social goods among major groups?*

The distribution of vital economic resources and social goods among the major groups is very uneven, reinforcing huge discrepancies between the rural and urban areas, as well as between the northern, central and southern regions of the country.

Several reports have found that in 1997 more than 60% of the Mozambican population had a monthly income equal to or lower than MZM 225,500 or US\$20,00 (at the 1997 exchange rate).<sup>105</sup> A study by the INE, based on the National Household Survey on Living Standards (IAF96/97), presents the results in a more disaggregated way using rural/urban categories, and identifying some sources of income by macro-region (south, centre, and north).<sup>106</sup>

The average household monthly income in urban areas (MZM 993,780) is higher than those in the rural areas (MZM 523,444). The differences are ascribed by the INE to the structure of the labour force and their employment in different sectors. A greater proportion of workers in the urban areas are better educated and work in the secondary and tertiary sectors where salaries are higher than in the primary sector (mainly the agricultural sector).<sup>107</sup> In terms of the macro-regions, the average per capita

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weapons during its peacekeeping operation from 1993 - 1995, the Institute of Security Studies of South Africa estimates that between 0.5 - 6 million weapons had been imported during the civil war. A comprehensive joint operation between the South African and Mozambican police forces was launched on 11 August 1995 to locate and destroy hidden arms caches in Mozambique. 'Operation Rachel' as it became known is focused on intelligence gathering and a system of informers to locate and destroy caches. The operation has been highly successful and by 1999 more than 400 tons of firearms and more than four million rounds of ammunition had been destroyed. Civil society organisations such as the Christian Council of Mozambique (CCM) have launched several programmes such as 'weapons for hoes' which is focused on exchanging weapons for sowing machines, bicycles or agriculture equipment. These initiatives have achieved fairly good results. Interview with Reverend Dinis Matsolo, Secretary General, CCM on 22 May 2002 and Chachiuu (1999).

<sup>105</sup> Refer to the 1998 report entitled *Poverty and Well-being in Mozambique: A First National Assessment 1996-97* done by DPDS-UEM-IFPRI, certain studies from the Planning and Finance Ministry (1998), the *Mozambique Human Development Report* 1998 and 1999.

<sup>106</sup> The difficulty of obtaining a coherent picture of income levels in Mozambique, at both "macro" and "micro" levels, lies in the fact that only a few socio-economic surveys have been undertaken since the beginning of the 90s. Surveys that include data on income are rare. None of them, moreover, with the notable exception of the National Household Survey on Living Standards (IAF96/97), can claim to be nationally representative.

<sup>107</sup> *Mozambique Human Development Report* (1999): 51.

income in the south (MZM 180,137) is nearly twice as high as in the centre (MZM 100,980) and in the north (MZM 105,985)<sup>108</sup>.

The Human Development Index (HDI) of Maputo City shows that it is the only area in Mozambique with an HDI level above 0.500 - that puts it in the category of medium human development similar to Botswana, Egypt, Algeria and Swaziland. However this should be seen in context. The HDI of Maputo City is 1.8 times greater than the rest of the south, 2.3 times greater than the central region and 2.9 times higher than that of the north. The provinces of Zambezia, Nampula, Cabo Delgado, Niassa and Tete all have HDIs that could be classified with the least developed countries in the world.<sup>109</sup> Zambezia has the highest population density in Mozambique and the lowest human development indicators.

More worrying however are the huge disparities in the human poverty indices between the south and centre/north. The south has a 'limited' average human poverty index of 39.8%, whereas the centre and north have human poverty indices of 60% and 64.3%, respectively.

A closer analysis of absolute poverty in the individual provinces show that Sofala, Tete and Inhambane have levels of absolute poverty above 80% and that all the northern and central provinces with the exception of Cabo Delgado have indices of higher than 60%.<sup>110</sup>

In terms of income distribution there are serious challenges. According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the richest 5% of the population receives nearly 50% of the total income, whereas 65% of the remainder of all households have to share 25% of the total income.<sup>111</sup> The GDP per capita in Maputo City is six times higher than the national average and eleven times higher than the second largest and most populated province Zambezia.<sup>112</sup> In 1998, the south contributed 47.6% to the national GDP, the centre contributed 31.4% and the north 21%. Overall Maputo City contributed 34.3% of the 47.6% of the south, with about 70% of economic activities concentrated in services.<sup>113</sup>

Other indicators such as life expectancy and literacy show even greater disparities between the regions. Zambezia province has the lowest life expectancy in Mozambique with 38 years for women and 36.1 years for men. This is an average of 21 years less than Maputo City. Life expectancy at birth in the northern region is estimated at 41.1 years for women, 39.2 years for men; in the central region at 41.6 years for women and 38.8 years for men; in the south at 53.4 years for women and 46.5 for men and in Maputo City at 61.8 years for women and 55.1 years for men.<sup>114</sup>

About 39% of the population has access to health services, although there are significant variations. In 1996 there was an average of 24,561 inhabitants per health post, 76,338 inhabitants per health centre, and 667,961 inhabitants for each rural hospital. In terms of availability of health staff, it is estimated that in 1996 there was one health worker with higher training available for every 39,362 inhabitants, and one health worker with basic training for every 4,505 inhabitants.

In terms of accessibility to healthcare facilities 58% of the population has a medical post less than one hour from their homes, whereas 12% of the population has a post more than three hours away.<sup>115</sup>

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<sup>108</sup> *Ibid*: 51.

<sup>109</sup> *Ibid*: 23.

<sup>110</sup> *Ibid*: 32.

<sup>111</sup> IMF 1998, *Mozambique: Selected Issues*. IMF Staff Country Report n° 98/59. Washington, DC.

<sup>112</sup> *Mozambique Human Development Report* (2000).

<sup>113</sup> *Ibid*: 38-39.

<sup>114</sup> *Ibid*: 25.

<sup>115</sup> 75% of urban dwellers take less than one hour to arrive at a medical post against 53% in rural areas, mainly due to transport constraints.

Zambezia is the province with the worst access, while Niassa has the best access. There seems to be greater satisfaction with the level of service in the urban areas (53%) than in the rural areas (35.3%). However, the latter complain more about the unavailability of medicines and unsuccessful treatment.<sup>116</sup>

In terms of living conditions, current figures on housing indicate that 93.4% of the population own their own houses although the majority is built with non-conventional materials such as 'pau-maticado', 'adobe', reed, locally made bricks and grass. Only 25% of homes in urban areas and 2% in the countryside have electricity. However, this is a 21% improvement on the figures for 1980.

The majority of the population has regular access to water (86.9%), although this is better in the urban areas with 94.5% in comparison with 84.1% in rural areas.<sup>117</sup> However, health conditions are very precarious - 49% of the households are supplied with water from public wells, 30% from surface water sources, 20% have piped water supplies, and less than 1% use rain water. Only 20% of households have access to potable water and only 3% of households have access to appropriate waste disposal.

About 60% of the adult population of Mozambique is illiterate (44.6% male and 74.1% female),<sup>118</sup> with the rural areas accounting for 72.2% of illiteracy and the urban areas for 33.3%. This is due to the lack of schools, the population dispersion and the general economic conditions of the country.<sup>119</sup>

The economic disruption brought about by the war reduced the dependence on agriculture as the rural population's main source of income. This changed with the peace settlement. Today, land continues to be a critical source of income for many rural and urban households. Past strategies to tackle rural poverty predominantly focused on what is known as the 'smallholder' or 'family' sector, and attempted to ensure security of tenure and to increase agricultural productivity. However, there have been very few explicit policy interventions designed to maximise employment generation so as to contribute directly to poverty reduction, nor has there been an explicit policy focus on the integration of the poor into the formal economy.

Available data show that almost all rural households have access to at least a plot of farmland, compared to less than half of the urban households.<sup>120</sup> The DPDS-UEM-IFPRI (1998) studies found that from the perspective of per capita ownership of land, in the urban areas, non-poor households hold more land than the poor ones. In rural areas the poor and non-poor have roughly the same amount of land per household - an average of 0.4 hectares per capita for the poor, and an average of 0.6 hectares per capita for the non-poor.<sup>121</sup>

Unfortunately, the current economic environment is highly unfavourable towards investment in small household or medium-level agricultural projects. Commercial banks do not have a supportive institutional framework for credit to small-scale farmers. Banks are willing to grant credit only in the case of commercialisation, after the crop has been harvested or under very stringent conditions - namely with three months to repay loans at an interest rate of about 45%. NGOs like Associação

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<sup>116</sup> *Questionario de Indicadores Basicos de Bem-Estar (QUIBB) – Relatorio Final*, INE (2001): 38.

<sup>117</sup> *Ibid*: 59-62, 71.

<sup>118</sup> According to the Censo 97. The Common Country Assessment of the UN System from 2000 presents the illiteracy rate as 46,6% for male and 75,7% for female, *op.cit.*: 62.

<sup>119</sup> Access is difficult because schools are located where they can serve the largest number of localities, which implies long travelling distances for most pupils that discourages attendance.

<sup>120</sup> DPDS-UEM-IFPRI (1998): 76-77, Table 2.21.

<sup>121</sup> *Ibid*: 77, *Mozambique Human Development Report* (1998): 81.

Moçambicana de Desenvolvimento Rural (AMODER) are trying to support small-scale activities by granting credit for the acquisition of transport utensils and for commercialisation.<sup>122</sup>

The lack of road and transportation infrastructure complicates market access for agricultural products. Thus despite the fact that there has been a verifiable increase in production every year, peasant farmers have argued that they have not been able to bring their produce to markets because roads are non-existent, in a bad state or there is no transport. Neighbouring countries such as Malawi have stepped in to provide a market. In the district of Milange, Malawian traders have provided bicycles to peasant farmers to transport their maize for sale in Malawi. Local marketing agents have found it impossible to compete with the foreign competition. They also claim that cultural factors are at play. Peasant farmers in the area prefer to sell their production to Malawian buyers due to cross-border tribal identities, cultural proximity, old refugee networks and the fact that immediately after selling their produce, they have supermarkets at their disposal in Malawi with all the goods they need, namely salt, oil and clothing. However, the peasant farmers generally sell all their produce without keeping sufficient reserves, which leads to hunger emergencies later in the year.

It also means that the integration of the national economy is very weak. The circulation of national goods is very low, due to prohibitive transport costs. The result is an economy that is more integrated on a regional cross-border base than on a national level. This is not necessarily negative as long as both countries sell and buy. The Mozambican Chamber of Commerce complained that Zimbabwe is exceptionally reluctant to buy from Mozambican producers despite strong Mozambican support for Zimbabwean goods.<sup>123</sup>

Mozambique exports mostly primary goods. It imports value-added secondary goods – relegating Mozambique to a supplier of primary exports. This is one of the critical areas in Mozambique's economic development, which hampers its efforts to develop economic activities that are more economically beneficial to population's development.

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<sup>122</sup> In the past the state was the main buyer of agricultural products, especially of the staple food, maize. It maintained food reserves and exported the surplus production to earn foreign currency. As a result of the economic liberalisation policies the state no longer fulfils this role although the *Instituto de Cereais* is supposed to have taken on this function. However, this has not happened effectively due to the latter's financial limitations, the low prices it pays in comparison with regional/local markets and the lack of supportive measures to transport crops from the localities to the administrative centres.

<sup>123</sup> The Chamber also pointed out that the Mozambican economy is also very vulnerable to competition from the other regional economies – especially South Africa. However, more critical will be the implementation of the SADC trade protocol for the Mozambican economy and Mozambican industry and business have complained that the local industries are not sufficiently developed and self-sufficient to withstand the rigours of an open regional free trade market.

## B. Intermediating Structures, Processes and Policies

### Factor # 7. Group Political Mobilisation, Organisation and Strategies

*To what extent have various groups actually formed into exclusive cultural, social and political organisations, such as political movements, religious political movements, ethnic-based and nationalist political parties, that articulate the groups' interests and grievances, and pursue them collectively through political action, coercive or violent action?*

Group political mobilisation has been a growing phenomenon in Mozambican society since the introduction of multiparty democracy in 1991. Democratisation has created space for the emergence of socio-political organisations based on ethnic-linguistic values or identities. This should be understood as an attempt by individuals and communities to reaffirm their cultural values, as well as to find space to participate in and influence political processes and decision-making. Examples of these types of ethnic/linguistic associations include the NGUIANA (involving the Rongas), SOTEMAZA (involving the Senas from Sofala, Tete, Manica and Zambezia), ANAVO (involving people from Vilankulos, mainly the Bitongas) and ANAZA (involving people from Zavala, mainly the Chope).<sup>124</sup>

3 next para. unclear

Members of the ruling elite are members of these organisations, which implies that majority decisions within the ruling party do not necessarily accommodate all group expectations and interests.<sup>125</sup> This implies that the established party framework does not adequately address all the aspirations and expectations of party members - especially related to questions of cultural and social identity and local aspirations and expectations. These organisations represent a vehicle that allows party representatives to interact in a direct and unfettered manner with the cultural/social group with which he or she identifies, to express solidarity with the group and to use his/her local support base as a platform to advance the aspirations of the group within the broader framework of the party.

However, this has an unfortunate impact on the implementation of government policies. Whereas government policies should be applied equally throughout the country, implementation leads towards the well-connected. Unfortunately those who have suffered sustained neglect continue to be marginalised. These ethnic-linguistic organisations thus reflect a politicisation of ethnicity and provide marginalised ethnic groups within the ruling elite with a vehicle to jockey for social power<sup>126</sup> and vindication.

Another potential negative feature of these movements is that the organisations could be used to serve the interests of the political, economic and administrative elite exclusively. This could be reflected in a tendency to monopolise power, to peddle influence and to follow non-transparent methods of accumulation by favouring those that are perceived to be members of the social/cultural group or are part of the politician's 'entourage'. At a local level they exercise enormous influence over the application of the policies of local administration.

<sup>124</sup> Elaboration of acronyms: SOTEMAZA (Sofala Tete Manica Zambezia), ANAVO (Associação dos Naturais e Amigos de Vilanculos), and ANAZA (Associação dos Naturais e Amigos de Zavala).

<sup>125</sup> For example the confirmed presidential candidate of Frelimo for the next election, Armando Guebuza, is a member of NGUIANA.

<sup>126</sup> Social power is 'the capability of any identity group and its elites to contain the efforts for needs satisfaction within the framework of existing societal norms and structures'. See Nilsson (1999): 45.



Apart from the politicisation of ethnicity, Mozambique has experienced the politicisation of poverty. This refers to ‘a situation in which deprived people are led by political forces to believe, and others take for granted, that their material hardships derive from the negligence of the state/Government and that they are seen as not important for the state’s purposes’.<sup>127</sup> When this is coupled with a perceived relationship between poverty and ethnicity the potential for fissures and tensions are exacerbated.

This perception is clearly identifiable in the poorest parts of Mozambique, especially in the north. It resides in the decision of the first post-independence government to exclude traditional authorities from the exercise of power. Their deliberate exclusion from the decision-making process created a sense of marginalisation that has resonated into the present. The main reason for their exclusion was their connection and involvement with the colonial administrative apparatus. Frelimo believed that a new state could only be created with their exclusion.<sup>128</sup>

In the north this decision created huge dissatisfaction in view of the fact that the political discourse about ‘the tainted nature’ of the traditional authorities contrasted so clearly with the historical reality during the liberation war. Indeed, Frelimo actively mobilised traditional authorities to endorse their military campaign at the time. They not only assisted Frelimo in creating social linkages with the population, but also provided it with food supplies and conferred much-needed legitimacy through traditional ceremonies.

These negative experiences and sense of social exclusion have made these groups especially receptive to political manipulation. Renamo, today the official opposition, seized the opportunity during the war and gained supporters for its cause by embracing the so-called ‘informal chiefs’ and by extension their communities.

The ruling party, well aware of the dissatisfaction of this interest group, has attempted to mitigate the situation by granting limited powers to community authorities in local government through a decree by the Council of Ministers.<sup>129</sup>

However, it is worth noting that both the decree and the regulation contain omissions with regard to procedures, definitions and hierarchy. The classification of community authorities does not mention the old *régulos*<sup>130</sup> as a specific category and places them in a larger group that also includes the *secretarios do bairro*<sup>131</sup> who enjoy precedence. Nor does the regulation specify or differentiate between the functions, duties and the areas of responsibility of the traditional leaders and *secretarios*

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<sup>127</sup> *Ibid*: 31.

<sup>128</sup> Their exclusion eventually led to an increasing loss of legitimacy of Frelimo’s nation-building project.

<sup>129</sup> Decree 15/2000, 20 June 2000.

<sup>130</sup> A Régulo is a ‘traditional leader’ or ‘chief’. This person serves as the leader of a traditional community and succession is determined through lineage. The colonial era to a large extent distorted this role and it became a post designed by the colonial administration to ensure control of communities in rural areas. The Régulo who at this point was nominated by the colonial administration, became an informal focal point between the community and the colonial administration. His main duties were to guarantee the collection of taxes among the designated community and to maintain order and stability in that area. Part of his duties also included facilitating conscription, and in the southern part of the country, ensuring the availability of labor for South African mines. To a large extent the Régulo, willingly or unwillingly, became an informant for colonial intelligence about the daily life of his community.

<sup>131</sup> It was a post created by Frelimo primarily in the urban areas, after independence and during the socialist regime to guarantee the compliance of the population with administrative and political activities. The nominated person was a trusted cadre of the party called upon to perform as a co-ordinator of a specific area. With the advent of democracy and the multiparty system, they lost relevance and became another deprived group. Their inclusion in this legislation is an apparent effort to avoid the same mistake. However, the nature of the institutions is so completely different that this could lead to new conflict.

*do bairro*, preventing concrete attribution of tasks to each group within the so-called community authorities.

Moreover, questions are being raised about the manner in which the entire process was conducted and the institution that approved the decree. Many believe that the issue should have been debated and approved by parliament rather than the Council of Ministers, and that broader consultation should have taken place with both civil society and the different local community actors.

Local communities have responded cautiously, mainly due to their negative experiences during the civil war. Indeed, the *secretarios do bairro* and *régulos* were at different times persecuted and killed as collaborators by the Renamo and Frelimo forces during the course of the war. Thus it seems that traditional leaders and *régulos* are likely to defer and return their power to the *secretarios do bairro* for the sake of their safety.

Opposition parties and religious institutions have refused to give any credit to the process arguing that their advice was ignored. In addition, Renamo seems keen to mobilise traditional leaders against participation arguing that it was its idea in the first place and that Frelimo is trying to exploit the issue for its own political gain.

## **Factor # 8. Openness of the Formal Political and Governing Institutions**

*Does the country in question have an open or closed political system?*

Multiparty democracy was established for the first time in 1991 in Mozambique with the introduction of a new constitution. Most popularly elected institutions are thus still fairly young - less than a decade. National elections (parliamentary and presidential) took place in 1994 for the first time (two years later than the initially envisaged time-frame). The country's second general elections were held in 1999. The next national elections are due in 2004. The voter turnout for both national elections was high, indicating positive support for the electoral process.

Mozambique has 28 parties - many are a result of the generous donor and state sponsored electoral support trust fund and enjoy limited popular support.<sup>132</sup> Political life is dominated by two main parties, Frelimo the ruling party with 133 seats (in comparison with 129 in the last legislature) and Renamo-UE - the official opposition who is presently in a coalition with 10 smaller parties, with

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<sup>132</sup> The current registered parties are Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (FRELIMO), Movimento de Resistência Nacional (RENAMO), Partido Social Liberal e Democrático (SOL), Frente Democrático Unida (UDF - UE), Partido Liberal e Democrático de Moçambique (PALMO), Uniao Nacional Moçambicana (UNAMO - UE), Frente de Acção Patriótica (FAP - UE), Partido para o Progresso de Povo de Moçambique (PPPM - UE), Partido Trabalhista (PT), Partido de Unidade Nacional de Moçambique (PUN - UE), Frente Unida de Moçambique (FUMO - UE), Movimento Nacional de Moçambique (MONAMO - UE), Partido de Convergência Nacional (PCN - UE), Aliança Independente de Moçambique (ALIMO - UE), Partido Democrático para a Reconciliação em Moçambique (PAMOMO), Partido do Congresso Democrático (PACODE), Partido da Juventude p/ Restauração da Democracia (MJRD), Partido Democrático de Moçambique (PADEMO), Partido Independente de Moçambique (PIMO), Partido Democrático p/ Libertação de Moçambique (PADELIMO), Partido Nacional Democrático (PANADE), Partido p/ a Ampliação de Moçambique (PASOMO), Partido Nacional de Moçambique (PANAMO), Partido Nacional dos Operários Camponeses (PANAOC), PPLM, Partido Ecologista Movimento da Terra (PEC-MT), Partido Renovador Democrático (PRD) and Congresso dos Democratas Unidos (CDU). The 'UE' refers to those parties that have entered into an electoral union with RENAMO.

117 seats. (Renamo had 112 seats in the last legislature and stood alone without coalition partners.)<sup>133</sup> Parliament is thus dominated by the two main parties, although the fact that Renamo has entered into a coalition with ten of the smaller parties has resulted in more diverse party representation in parliament.

Representation in parliament is of great importance as Mozambique has a strongly centralised, unitary system. Whereas parliament is the highest legislative authority, the President has wide-ranging powers. The president has the power to appoint the 10 provincial governors (essentially representing the second tier of government) and chose to appoint all the provincial governors from the ranks of Frelimo. The provinces are dependent on central government for their budgets and are reliant on government for administrative direction and policy. Decentralisation, described as 'deconcentration' in Mozambique, has been introduced for the first time in 1998 in a limited number of only 33 municipalities. This select group of 33 municipalities enjoys a minimal devolution of power, the remaining 104 district administrators are all appointed by the ruling party.

Despite the positive step to begin a process of greater devolution of power through the introduction of a local tier of government - the first limited municipal elections have unfortunately not resulted in greater political pluralism and representation. The local elections that were initially earmarked for 1997 took place after several postponements in June 1998 in a total of 33 local administrative areas consisting of 21 municipalities and 12 cities. This was the first time that a local tier of government had been elected through popular participation in Mozambique. However, the decision by Renamo and a range of smaller political parties to boycott the local elections led to very low voter turnout. The reasons for the boycott were a lack of electoral transparency (both in terms of the registration of voters and the institutions responsible for the conduct of the elections; unhappiness with the limited powers extended to local government structures; and although not vocalised a lack of campaign funds. Scarcely 15% of the population voted - in some areas a voter turnout of less than 6% was registered.<sup>134</sup> Frelimo stood unopposed in 81% of the municipal assembly races and 58% of the mayoral races. Thus despite the opportunity for greater political pluralism, this has not happened.<sup>135</sup>

The freedom of the media is enshrined in the 1991 Press Law and the constitution. The state-owned media, as reflected by *Domingos*, and *Noticios* owned by *Noticias Limited*, and the national broadcasting association (specifically television) is distinctly pro-government and tends to reflect the views of the ruling party. However, there are smaller independent news services, which signify a diversified media ownership. They include the weekly *Savana*, *Mozambiquefile* and *Mediafax* (a fax service). A 1999 UNESCO media project found that 34% of the country's media were public, 36% were private commercial and 28% were private non-profit (mostly religious).<sup>136</sup>

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<sup>133</sup> Only three parties managed to cross the 5% voter support threshold during the 1994 general elections by forming a joint coalition, however, they did not receive sufficient electoral support during the 1999 elections to regain their seats.

<sup>134</sup> The slim 15% threshold proved ironic as Chissano himself noted that the local election results would be discredited if only Frelimo candidates are fielded and if there is a very low voter turnout. Many in Frelimo were disquieted by the low turnout interpreting the disappointing results as an indication of the level of disaffection with government policies. See Boycott response, *Mozambique Peace Process Bulletin*, Issue 20, 18 March 1998: 2.

<sup>135</sup> Renamo's self-exclusion meant that it excluded itself from any real opportunity to wield power, to gain firsthand experience of political and administrative management and to provide job opportunities to party members. A decision that it has subsequently come to regret as there is wide agreement that it probably stood a good chance to have won some of the municipalities.

<sup>136</sup> *Mozambique Country Report on Human Rights 2000*, US State Department: 8.

The media fulfils an important and critical watchdog role in society, however, the murder of Carlos Cardoso in 2000 (the editor of the news fax agency Metical) and the subsequent slashing of the tongue of a radio journalist in Beira, as well as other less severe incidents of media intimidation have had a significant impact on press freedom and journalists' ability to report on high-level corruption in society. Nevertheless, the public debate stimulated by the media on government policies, the opposition and socio-economic issues is significant. However, it should be kept in mind that only a small minority of the population has access to the printed media due to the high illiteracy rates in the country and the fact that they are published in Portuguese.

Radio is the most important disseminator of information in Mozambique due to the high levels of illiteracy and language diversity. The role played by Radio Mozambique is generally considered as very positive and unbiased.<sup>137</sup> Radio also plays an important role in ensuring broader political debate by broadcasting the parliamentary debates while parliament is in session.

### **Factor # 9. Exclusive or Accommodative Governing Institutions and Decision-Making Processes**

*What is the actual distribution of political participation and power among major groups that are or could be parties to conflict?*

The state of Mozambique's fledgling democracy and its institutions has been described as the 'entrenchment of democratic minimalism'.<sup>138</sup> There are no visible signs of power sharing in Mozambique, and Renamo and its electoral opposition partners have been effectively excluded from all levels of government. This is a result of the 'winner-takes-all' electoral principle, which is the keystone of the Mozambican democratic system, as well as the unfortunate chosen route of self-exclusion adopted by Renamo and its partners during the local elections. It implies that the victorious party has a free hand in the appointment of all government and public service positions on the basis of its small majority gained during elections. Therefore the organised interests that drive decision-making predominantly represent the convictions of the ruling party. The concepts of a government of national unity and power sharing are rarely mentioned or discussed given that it was never considered as an option when the 1992 peace agreement was signed.

A survey conducted by the Centre for Population Studies at Eduardo Mondlane University (UEM) about the openness of the political system indicates that there is a growing perception among ordinary Mozambicans of increasing levels of intolerance towards those who do not support the government and by extension the political system. This phenomenon is reminiscent of the levels of political intolerance during the period of one party rule, where all who were outside the party were considered enemies of the state.<sup>139</sup> A substantial group that was surveyed believes that non-supporters of the government or the ruling party should be excluded and not be given access to any positions in the state apparatus or in government. These levels of intolerance could be a powerful incentive for conflict if those that are excluded are politically mobilised.

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<sup>137</sup> This opinion was confirmed by numerous interviewees who pointed out that Radio Mozambique broadcasts in more than 18 languages, has a strong informative/educational bent, as well as providing analysis and opinion and is widely listened to, respected and trusted as a reliable source of information.

<sup>138</sup> Ostheimer (2001).

<sup>139</sup> *Inquérito Nacional de Opinião Pública 2001*, CEP/UEM, (2002): 33.

However, as noted before the high voter turnout in 1994 and 1999 is generally perceived as a positive indicator that Mozambicans are keen to influence the political process. That is why the low voter turnout during the limited municipal elections<sup>140</sup> is such a concern. An opinion poll following the municipal elections showed that apart from the previously mentioned reasons for the low voter turnout, there was also the conviction that voters believed that it was useless to vote as the winner (Frelimo) was already decided.

It is clear that democracy in Mozambique is mostly confined to those political parties that have representatives in its almost two-party parliament. This situation underlines the need for the creation of more inclusive political institutions and comprehensive constitutional reform.

It is extremely difficult to find information on ethnic/group representation in the army, the police and the civil service due to shortcomings in the 1997 national census, as well as the absence of specific databases reflecting this information. The military recruitment law itself is not sufficient to achieve proportional representation through the normal renewal and increase of the permanent cadres of the armed forces. It is more focused on enlisting appropriate candidates according to the specialised services required.

For example, Nampula province with the second highest population density has far fewer conscripts than other regions. This is partly due to the lack of infrastructure in the country, prohibiting active nation-wide drafting procedures due to the financial cost, as well as inappropriate qualifications for some of the specialised positions of the Mozambican Defence Force (FADM).

#### **Factor # 10. Group Participation in Non-Official and Informal Processes and Institutions**

*To what extent are non-governmental institutions in the wider society, including informal ones such as the economic markets and traditional dispute resolution mechanisms, providing valued social goods to a wide range of groups and helping to resolve or absorb the conflicts of interest?*

Following the peace agreement, the country has seen the emergence and proliferation of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and associations dealing with socio-economic and political issues. NGOs have attempted to address the gap that has been left by the breakdown of state capacity to deliver social services at a community level.<sup>141</sup> They have made a notable contribution to minimise the social impact of the economic structural adjustment programme, privatisation and to absorb conflicting interests. At a social level, associations such as 'Amigos e Naturais', 'Deficientes Militares' and 'Luta contra HIV/SIDA' have created avenues for people to express their dissatisfaction with government policies and to demand action from the government.

However, despite their influence in remote areas at a local level a national opinion poll found that NGOs rarely consult with communities. Communities in Manica, Zambezia and the Nampula province demonstrated an above the national average knowledge about NGOs. However, of these, only half of those in Nampula province who indicated that they were aware of NGOs expressed a high level of trust in them.<sup>142</sup>

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<sup>140</sup> There are presently not enough resources or appropriate institutional conditions to create municipalities all over the country. The idea is to develop an incremental approach towards the establishment of local government.

<sup>141</sup> The state has traditionally had a weak presence in the rural areas due to historical and political reasons. The limited human, financial and material resources have further reduced state capacity to manage local problems.

<sup>142</sup> *Inquérito Nacional de Opinião Pública 2001*, CEP/UEM, (2002): 16-18,42.

Another important community level player is traditional authorities. The recognition by the government of traditional chiefs within the ‘deconcentration’ process is an indicator of their importance as traditional conflict resolution institutions at a local level. Indeed, in remote rural areas in cases of minor robberies, offences and disputes, people prefer to resort to the traditional chief instead of going to the Police.<sup>143</sup>

The impact of traditional conflict resolution mechanisms is important not only for their impact at local level, but due to their nation-wide multiplier effect across society. Their impact is also present across borders where territorial disputes arising about land use and grazing and are dealt with at a local level with central government support.<sup>144</sup>

However, there are also contradictions and paradoxes. A national opinion poll established that generally traditional chiefs do not consult with their communities. People in Zambezia and Nampula provinces produced the highest level of negative feedback stating that the traditional chiefs never consult them, whereas Manica province had the highest number of positive respondents.<sup>145</sup> Nevertheless, most respondents believed that traditional chiefs have a role in local governance, even if it is a limited one. Quite a considerable number believed that they should be given more comprehensive powers (Niassa and Tete provinces), and only Gaza believed that they should maintain a low profile.<sup>146</sup>

It is also important to note that the extent to which local administrations consult with communities differs quite substantially. In the provinces of Niassa and Inhambane, as well as Maputo City, a majority stated that they were not consulted, whereas in the provinces of Tete, Zambezia, Manica and Gaza respondents indicated that consultation was sporadic. In Cabo Delgado and Nampula

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<sup>143</sup> The Mitande Chief of Police (an administrative post of Niassa Province, district of Mandimba) pointed out that he did not have any means of transport to patrol his area. He added that many people would initiate formal complaint processes with the Police only to later withdraw the accusations, allegedly because of the long lag time before a judicial decision or because they found better redress through mediation by the traditional chief. His coping strategy was to establish a good rapport with the traditional chief in the interest of better coordination and he appealed to the community to turn to him only as a last resort and when there is a serious intent to proceed with a formal complaint and not just as a means to intimidate the accused (due to the costs that accrue to the state with the initiation of a formal judicial process). Personal interview, Mitande, January 2000.

<sup>144</sup> For example, there have been reports that the Mozambican/Malawian border has been consistently violated (Parliament raised and discussed this issue) by Malawians who were extending their *machambas* into Mozambique, as the borders are not clearly demarcated. At Mambucha (Milange district, Zambezia Province) the *regulo* pointed out that he was acquainted with his Malawian counterpart and that he would propose the planting of a row of trees to demarcate the colonial borders. The municipal and district government representatives supported the proposal stating that the state did not have the funds to construct a barbed wire fence - such an act would have been interpreted negatively by both communities in view of the fact that they cohabited in a mutually supportive manner. A dialogue was initiated at a regional level and continued at a central level between the two countries and the *regulo*’s solution was proposed and accepted. Interview, Mitande, January 2000.

<sup>145</sup> Communities in the provinces of Maputo and Manica provinces did not respond to this question.

<sup>146</sup> In the south of Mozambique - especially in the Gaza province - traditional authorities have a less central role regarding special duties in local government, in stark contrast to their growing prominence in the north - such as in Niassa province. This contrast represents a different understanding among communities of their closeness to the centre of decision-making and of ease of access to higher-level state institutions that could deal with local concerns. People based in the north have subsequently developed a strong and deep sense of exclusion and distance from the centres of decision-making, which are perceived to be located in Maputo City, in the ‘south’ and the provincial capitals. Indeed there are limited signs in the north of direct and effective engagement of national state institutions and social organisations with conflict resolution at a local level - especially dealing with major concerns arising from daily life.

provinces there was a regular level of consultation.<sup>147</sup> Although the survey does not offer any reasons for the divergence in community consultation one could infer that the higher level of consultation in the North might be related to the fact that communities in this part of Mozambique are a great deal more reliant on the services of the local administration than in the South/Centre because of the distance from Maputo City.

The introduction of economic liberation since 1987 has resulted in the emergence of numerous micro, small and medium-sized private enterprises that have developed from individual, family and/or group initiatives. Many of these initiatives have been promoted by members of the ruling elite,<sup>148</sup> with the view to ensure their own future economic security and accommodation after leaving the state service. It is even rumoured that members of the ruling elite are engaging in private ventures with Renamo members, preparing the foundation for an inclusive elitist economic accommodation of interests. Although this might augur well for the future political and economic stability of the country in the case of a change of government it does signify neglect of the general welfare of society in the interest of the elite.

The protection of the economic interests of certain elites (both in Frelimo and some Renamo members) have not filtered down enough to the lower echelons of the parties, such as for example, ex-combatants and demobilised soldiers. NGOs were mostly tasked to assist these groups to become self-sufficient through self-employment. However, many complain that the projects that were initiated were entirely dislocated from the new local realities that faced the demobilised soldiers in the rural areas. When these initiatives did not succeed 'they were left to their own devices'.<sup>149</sup>

### **Factor # 11. Efficacy of Political Elites and Leaders**

*Do political leaders engage in ongoing rule-governed negotiations and decision-making in order to transact common public business and is the state actually able to produce desired public policies and public resource distributions?*

Mozambican state capacity to provide security and social justice to its citizens is hampered by institutional weaknesses and constraints, bureaucratic ineptitude, and pervasive corruption.

Important factors relating to the efficacy and dominance by the executive of the assembly relates partly to tradition (past practices that have not been overhauled) and partly to privileged access to information and technical expertise, especially related to the preparation and approval of the budget. Members of parliament (MPs) have widely divergent levels of parliamentary experience and education. Their capacity to absorb, use and transfer complex information on social and economic issues into legislation is still very limited.<sup>150</sup> Many of the MPs chosen by their parties have very little or no contact with their constituencies resulting in a lack of credibility.<sup>151</sup> Although more than 60% of respondents in Cabo Delgado and Inhambane provinces believe that MPs are concerned with the

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<sup>147</sup> *Inquérito Nacional de Opinião Pública 2001*, CEP/UEM, (2002).

<sup>148</sup> See mediaFAX, *Ex-ministros e generais viram empresários*, nº1960, 17 February 2000: 1-2.

<sup>149</sup> Situation described in collective meetings held with old-combatants and demobilised both in Mandimba-Niassa (January, 2000) and Milange-Zambezia (May, 2002). Also with Propaz, 9 May 2002.

<sup>150</sup> It has been calculated that on average only 30% of MPs are familiar with parliamentary procedures impacting negatively on the effectiveness of their leadership.

<sup>151</sup> A lack of resources is cited as the main reason for the irregularity of visits.

interests of common citizens, more than 55% of respondents in Niassa, Gaza and Maputo provinces believe that MPs work only towards attaining their own interests<sup>152</sup>.

There is also an absence of an appropriate legal framework for direct and effective involvement of those opposition parties lacking representation in the parliament. The absence of practical avenues to involve opposing political forces and the broader civil society in direct discussions with the government still prevails. However, there have been positive examples of successful broad-based consultation such as the pre-1999 constitutional revision, the land tenure and land access legislation, the prohibition of children in nightclubs and the revision of the electoral law, demonstrating the value of improved collaboration between parliament, civil society and senior representatives of opposition parties outside parliament.

President Chissano has consistently indicated his willingness to discuss openly any issue directly related to the stability and development of the country with any political leader. Some opposition leaders have taken up this offer in a positive fashion and that has contributed to his relatively positive image, as corroborated by the population's level of confidence in the head of state.<sup>153</sup>

Public confidence in state and government institutions shows that although the Parliament received a positive endorsement it was not higher than 27.4%. Other state institutions that have merited trust are the National Electoral Commission, whereas the population seems to be uninformed about the role of the Supreme Court.<sup>154</sup>

The efficacy of the opposition coalition in Parliament is generally hamstrung by its lack of organizational coherence and is also dependent on the government's willingness to allow for greater input by the opposition. However, it also seems that Renamos' marginalisation in parliament is linked to a lack of ability to act with political acumen and to seize the moment.<sup>155</sup>

However, the ruling party is aware of the importance of building political alliances and partnerships involving the main social groups, civil society and the media. The most prominent example of this approach is the 2025 development agenda that is presently being funded by the UNDP. The purpose is to develop a consensual, national, and long-term strategic vision for the country. This top-down approach<sup>156</sup> transcends party political lines. The main drivers of the initiative are widely respected representatives from the intellectual elite with an in-depth knowledge of the specifics of each region, the needs and priorities of the population in the different social strata, and it has enough legitimacy and clout to foster a common vision in society. This is enforced by the consultative manner in which the 2025 development agenda is being arrived and includes wide-ranging consultations with civil society and the public at all levels of society throughout the country.

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<sup>152</sup> *Inquerito Nacional de Opiniao Publica 2001*, UEM-CEP (2002): 24-25.

<sup>153</sup> *Ibid*: 15.

<sup>154</sup> *Ibid*: 10.

<sup>155</sup> Multiparty democracy entails a certain amount of political sophistication which is information and knowledge-driven and which entails detailed knowledge of how the system could be effectively utilised to serve the interest of the greater community.

<sup>156</sup> Abrahamsson H. (1997): 42.



## Factor # 12. Efficacy of Security Forces and Violations of Human Rights

*To what extent are disputes solved without the use of force? Is violence politically inspired?*

Insecurity is assuming new dimensions in the Mozambican society, despite the absence of proliferation of illegal paramilitary groups and persecution of specific groups. The internal security apparatus is composed of the Mozambican National Police (PRM), the Rapid Reaction Police (PIR), the Criminal Investigation Police (PIC), the State Information and Security Service (SISE) that reports directly to the President and the Presidential Guard. The Armed Forces are responsible for external security.<sup>157</sup>

A major challenge has been the extension of the reach of the limited Police force throughout the country after the end of the war.<sup>158</sup> Poor wages have made the Police vulnerable to corruption and corruption extends throughout the ranks. Reports of police extortion and bribes being solicited from ordinary citizens,<sup>159</sup> as well as involvement with major criminal networks are common. In 2001 the Attorney General published a report denouncing corruption not only within the criminal justice system but also the Police.

Attempts by the Government to deal with the general lack of institutional capacity to maintain public order and security within a context of democratic governance, have focused on readjusting operational police procedures, retraining of staff, human rights training for police officers, re-equipping the police and rehabilitating and extending infrastructure.<sup>160</sup> A Police Academy was established and the Michafutene Police training centre in Maputo City was rehabilitated. Efforts have been made to instil greater discipline and to hold officers accountable.<sup>161</sup>

Despite the fact that Mozambique is a signatory to the UN Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment and has abolished the death penalty incidences of human rights violations by the police are rife. However, there has been a slight improvement in its human rights record since 1996 and 1997.<sup>162</sup> Still, the human rights situation deteriorated sharply following the increase in political tension after the 1999 elections – leading to arbitrary arrest, detention without trial<sup>163</sup> and in some cases to extra-judiciary killings.<sup>164</sup> It culminated in the tragic

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<sup>157</sup> *Mozambique Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2000*, US State Department: 1.

<sup>158</sup> The Police force was previously mainly confined to the cities.

<sup>159</sup> Reports about the Mozambican Police soliciting 'additional payments' from unsuspecting tourists are frequently reported in the South African media. 'Tourists ripped off by fraudsters', *The Saturday Star*, 25 May 2002.

<sup>160</sup> These activities have been evolving with support from bilateral partners such as Spain, Portugal, Netherlands, Ireland, Germany, and Egypt and multilateral as UNDP. *Democratic Governance in Mozambique: Priorities for the Second Generation 2002-2006*. Occasional Papers 2, UNDP (2000): 23.

<sup>161</sup> Several officers were dismissed in 2000 and 2001 for misconduct and abuses of power. Amnesty International Annual Reports, Mozambique January-December 1999.

<sup>162</sup> *Amnesty International Annual Reports*, Mozambique January-December 1999.

<sup>163</sup> Under the Constitution the duration of preventative imprisonment is set by law as a maximum of 48 hours during which time a detainee has the right to have his case reviewed by the judiciary and after which he could be detained for another 60 days while the case is investigated by the PIC. In cases of serious crime that could result in a sentence of more than 8 years the person could be detained for 84 days without being charged. If the court approves such detainees can be held for two more periods of 84 days each after, which they should be released if no charges are brought. In many instances detainees are not aware of these rights and are not informed by the authorities of these rights leading to indefinite and prolonged periods of detention without trial.

death due to asphyxiation of 119 detainees in an overcrowded police cell intended for 10 occupants in Montepuez in Cabo Delgado province following nationwide demonstrations by Renamo supporters in November 2000.<sup>165</sup>

A further 80 demonstrators, mostly Renamo supporters, were detained in connection with the mass action campaign and some later arrested and sentenced for theft, civil unrest and disobedience.<sup>166</sup> It is quite striking that the trials were conducted and concluded by December 2000 and January 2001 in contrast with the general practice of long waiting periods due to the overburdened and notoriously corrupt criminal justice system.<sup>167</sup>

Other reports of more recent human rights abuses by the police include the manhandling and beatings of the former Mozambican GDR-workers by the Rapid Intervention Police following a demonstration outside the Ministry of Labour to demand payment of outstanding remuneration owed by the state.

The poor state of the judiciary has replaced abuses by the police force as the main concern of human rights organisations in Mozambique.<sup>168</sup> The weakness of the judicial system is exacerbated by a lack of licensed attorneys. There are only an estimated 200 attorneys in Mozambique – most of who are based in Maputo City, whereas overall there is only 160 qualified judges nationwide. The Chief Justice complained in 1998 about the number of judges that were taking bribes, absenteeism, unequal treatment and deliberate delays. Over 24 judges have been expelled for corruption since 1995 of which 17 were removed since 1998. Allegations of fraud led to the dismissal of the previous Attorney General and six members of his senior legal staff.<sup>169</sup>

There has been a substantial rise in urban crime over the last decade. The high crime rate is associated with rapid urbanisation, uncontrolled small arms proliferation and the dramatic gap in socio-economic income levels in the urban centres.

Mozambique is also a transit route for trans-national crime - especially drug trafficking, weapon smuggling and stolen vehicles. The country's size, the length of its unprotected borders and its proximity to South Africa, which offers a large narcotics market and trafficking centre has increased local challenges to the authorities and has fuelled regional police co-operation. This is mainly conducted through the Inter-state Defence and Security Committee of SADC and through SARPPCO, a bilateral Mozambican/South African initiative which establishes a cooperation framework to counter the proliferation of small arms<sup>170</sup> and to halt the trade in stolen vehicles.

The Mozambican Defence Force (FADM) was created within the framework of the General Peace Agreement (Protocol IV). Under the agreement both the former government forces (FAM) and the Renamo forces were demobilised. A 'new' defence force of 30,000 combatants was supposed to be

<sup>164</sup> *Mozambique Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2000*

<sup>165</sup> Two police officers were detained in July 2001 in connection with the incident and charges against a further three others were withdrawn. This incident situation reveals not only a great deal about prison conditions in Mozambique, but also about the professional negligence of the Police.

<sup>166</sup> *Amnesty International Annual Reports*, Mozambique January-December 1999.

<sup>167</sup> In 2000, 106,251 criminal cases were carried over from the previous year. In the civil courts, the backlog of cases brought into the year 2000 was 30,359, with 6,433 new cases and a conclusion of only of 5,430. See Ostheimer A, *op.cit.*

<sup>168</sup> Interviews with the Mozambican Human Rights League (LDH) and Association of Human Rights and Development (DHD), May 2002.

<sup>169</sup> *Mozambique Country Report on Human Rights Practices 2000*.

<sup>170</sup> Operation Rachel has been launched as a very successful joint police initiative between South Africa and Mozambique to find and destroy stored arm caches.

created from volunteers of both ex-forces with equal representation on the basis of political neutrality, non-discrimination, professionalism and competency.<sup>171</sup>

However, by 1995 the FADM had only 12 195 members, 8 533 from the FAM and 3 662 from RENAMO.<sup>172</sup> Most skilled and trained personnel had left in search of better salaries and working conditions. Whereas the FAM forces had at least some past training and a sense of professionalism, the Renamo forces had none. This impacted very negatively on the operational capability of the branches. The FADM was also created with an inverted pyramid management structure with more officers than soldiers, resulting in inefficient task performance with not enough lower rank soldiers to perform lower rank activities.

The defence budget has been severely constrained as a result of the impact of the economic restructuring programme on government expenditure in favour of the health and education sectors in addition to its inheritance of 'run down and obsolete equipment',<sup>173</sup> This has led to a lack of funds to ensure an effective restructuring of the FADM within the context of a peace dividend. The government has unfortunately adopted an attitude of complacency that has led to the neglect and marginalisation of the FADM on the government reform agenda.<sup>174</sup>

These shortcomings have impacted on the operational capacity of the FADM. It has been unable to perform traditional duties such as the defence of the inviolability of national territory and the protection of the natural resources of the country.<sup>175</sup> The recent floods in 2000 and 2001 highlighted the severe operational constraints of the FADM. The fact that only one helicopter and a few rubber boats were available for the rescue efforts - necessitating external assistance - caused a huge public outcry.<sup>176</sup>

One very positive achievement of the FADM, is the example it has set in national reconciliation. The hierarchical and disciplined nature of the armed forces assisted in countering various attempts by political parties to politicise the force and it has remained faithful to its constitutional brief of non-partisanship.

More recently there have been various efforts underway to deal with the inverted management problem. The new law on conscription allows recruitment of about 1,000 recruits a year. Many question the effectiveness of this measure, as the recruitment process is conducted on the basis of a

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<sup>171</sup> *General Peace Agreement of Mozambique*, 1992. African European Institute Publication, Protocol IV/ Ii, 2.b).

<sup>172</sup> Young O (1996).

<sup>173</sup> Macaringue P (1998).

<sup>174</sup> Illustrative of this is the fact that the FADM is not mentioned in the government's major orientation document, namely the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PARPA). For more on convergent interests between the International community and the government with regard to the armed forces, see Lalá A (2001).

<sup>175</sup> Nor have they been able to perform the development role that is stipulated in the defence legislation, namely to support reconstruction, to contribute to the satisfaction of the population's basic needs and to intervene in cases of natural disasters or calamity. See *Lei da Política de Defesa e Segurança*, Boletim da Republica 40, Ia Serie. 3o Suplemento. 07/10/97, art3.

<sup>176</sup> The President made a public statement clarifying that any significant reinforcement could hardly come from internal resources due to the constraints imposed by the economic restructuring process on government expenditure and government budget dependence on external contributions. Many of the country's partners were not yet ready to see their contributions channelled towards military ends. He pointed out that although it is recognised that the armed forces do not have enough equipment, this was not because of a lack of political support. 'After the 1992 peace agreement "certain members of the international community" refused to finance equipment for the military, just as they had been reluctant to finance the training and equipping of the police', President Joaquim Chissano, Press Conference, Maputo, 08 March 2000, in MediaFax, n°1975, 9 March 2000.

population census involving high costs. However, military service has been instrumental in creating a sense of national unity and patriotism - assisting to transcend ethnic and identity differentiations.<sup>177</sup>

Regional defence cooperation has developed under the auspices of the ISDSC, through the SADC defence committees and the FADM has participated in various regional peacekeeping exercises such as Operation Hungwe and Operation Blue Crane. It also has an observer mission in the DRC and in the Comoros. Mozambique has also deployed a small observer mission at the level of the UN peacekeeping missions to East Timor.

### **Factor # 13. International Engagement**

*How engaged in the course of domestic affairs are international bodies offering significant specific incentives and opportunities?*

Mozambique is a member of numerous international organizations and participates actively in the main multilateral *fora*. These organisations include the UN and its major agencies, as well as the International Labour Organisation (ILO), the Organisation of Islamic Conference (OIC), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Worldbank (WB), the World Trade Organisation (WTO), G-77, ACP, the Commonwealth, the Organisation of Lusophone Countries (CPLP), the African Union (AU) – previously the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC).

The key regional organisation for Mozambique is the SADC. Mozambique has been actively involved in the inception of its predecessors - first the Frontline States followed by the SADCC. It played an important role in conceptualising SADC's institutional architecture. In the most recent restructuring (which is still being completed) Mozambique also played a pivotal role together with South Africa, in shaping the organisation to take account of its new regional challenges related to good governance and economic development and regional integration. Mozambique's approach is one based on the need for diplomatic avenues to address such challenges as the country is unavoidably linked with its neighbours both developmentally and economically. Landlocked countries such as Zimbabwe, Zambia Malawi depend on Mozambique for access to the sea. In addition the country's major development projects are the result of bilateral relationships – the Maputo, Beira and Nacala corridors. These development projects seek to improve the region's transport and communications infrastructure.

In terms of its regional role within SADC Mozambique punches well above its weight and currently fills the position of Chair of the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security (OPDS) of SADC. It has played an important role as a past chair and co-chair of SADC.

Mozambique also played an important role in the increasing focus on human rights and accountable political leadership in SADC and formed part of the senior SADC delegation that consulted with President Mugabe and the Zimbabwean opposition in September 2001 about the Zimbabwean crisis prior to the election.

Observers outside Mozambique tend to group Mozambique's political leadership with the new more progressive group of SADC leaders (in view of President Chissano's decision not to stand for a

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<sup>177</sup> Another measure which is presently being considered by the government is the establishment of a Military Academy, which will confer university qualifications on the next generation of officers. Short training courses in areas related to peacekeeping, conflict-resolution, human rights, and international law are already taking place with support from international multilateral organisations, such as the UN and the OAU.

third term) and as reflected by Mozambique's general position in SADC. However, in most quarters in Mozambique, President Chissano himself is perceived as being firmly aligned with the 'old guard' of liberation leaders - namely Sam Nujoma (Namibia), Robert Mugabe (Zimbabwe) and Eduardo dos Santos (Angola).

However, it is clear that Mozambique has managed to gain wide-scale international and regional support for its endeavours. This is generally attributed to the role of President Chissano himself. Mozambique also has a powerful regional ally in South Africa and is considered by South Africa as not only one of its most important partners in the region, but also on the continent - especially within the context of the New Partnership Africa's Development (NEPAD).

Apart from the UN's obvious importance, membership of the World Bank and the IMF has been crucial in determining the country's economic policies. Its laudable macro-economic performance has brought welcome debt relief under HIPC. Donor countries such as Italy and Great Britain have written off their debts, reducing the extent of its annual debt servicing as a proportion of the budget. This has allowed for more state resources to be allocated to socio-economic resources. However, some of the structural adjustments have been severe with an increase in the gaps between rich and poor, the neglect of the agricultural sector and the undermining of vulnerable national industries due to increased foreign competition. World Bank policies on de-industrialisation of the cashew nuts and the sugar industry, has also not lead to the desired results requiring some adjustment.<sup>178</sup>

With regard to trade, Mozambique's membership of the Cotonou partnership with the EU has been beneficial in terms of market access. Indeed Mozambique's main trade partners outside the region are among the OECD countries (Spain, USA, Portugal and Japan).

Membership of the Commonwealth was achieved on a 'technicality' as Mozambique is strictly speaking not an ex-British colony. However, membership of the Commonwealth in a region that is dominated by Commonwealth members and English-speaking nations were deemed important. This has provided a further networking opportunity for Mozambique and it has participated in the Commonwealth initiative in Zimbabwe prior to and after the 2002 elections.

Links with to OIC were essentially developed to diversify its international foreign policy and to open avenues with mainly Muslim countries, in particular with the Middle Eastern countries. This co-operation has allowed the country to make use of loan facilities available to poor countries under the OIC, increases investments (there is already a hotel in Pemba belonging to an Arab consortium) and created scope for development projects in those areas of Mozambique where the majority of the Muslim population resides (the north).

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<sup>178</sup> Hanlon J, 'Mozambique wins long battles over cashew nuts and sugar', 30 January 2001, <http://www.africapolicy.org>.

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