

Chapter 7

MULTINATIONAL PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS

Kees Homan*

1. INTRODUCTION

Since the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the subsequent end of the Cold War, there has been a marked increase in the attention paid to multinational peace support operations. Multinational operations refer to integrated operations by the armed forces of at least two nations. In principle, multinationality increases the legitimacy of participation in a military force as well as the solidarity between the participating nations (burden and risk sharing).

The international community has three choices for managing multinational operations: the United Nations (UN), a regional organization, or an *ad hoc* coalition. Whichever arrangement is chosen, it must provide an effective interface between the military commanders and the political leaders, including a mandate that defines the purpose, scope, and, possibly, the time-frame of the military operations.

The formation of European multinational forces is a result of the volume reductions made by most European countries in their armed forces, which have gone hand in hand with the search to optimise available resources, and the formation of multinational units presented itself as one of the best solutions.¹ This development is not, however, synonymous with the integration

* Maj. Gen. (ret.) (RNLMC, MA/LL M). Former director of the Netherlands Defence College and currently researcher at the Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael, The Hague, The Netherlands and regular commentator for Dutch and foreign public news services.

¹ See 'Multinational European forces', Assembly of Western European Union, The interim European security and Defence Assmbly, Document A/1804, 3 December 2005.

of those forces. They remain almost entirely under national command and their assignment is invariably the outcome of a sovereign policy decision, based on a nation's appraisal of the degree to which engagement is appropriate to its interests.

Multinational forces are also a source of difficulties for military planners, and using them for operations is often not an easy matter, not least because states themselves may intervene when it comes to assigning a national unit to one mission or another. It can create difficulties, for example, in a humanitarian or peacekeeping operation, which suddenly becomes a combat operation.

Recent developments have been both organisational, such as the restructuring of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the development of the EU's European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), and operational, for example the UN involvement in missions that threaten to escalate beyond peacekeeping into more military-demanding peace enforcement.² The two coalesce as the UN seeks to employ the resources of regional organizations, such as NATO and the EU, for these missions.

2. PRECONDITIONS

Various preconditions play a key role in the successful conduct of multinational operations. The Netherlands Defence Doctrine, published in October 2005, mentions the following preconditions:

- a. *Respect*. Mutual respect for the ideas, culture, religion and customs of partner nations helps to lay the foundations for cooperation and unity of effort. One way to achieve unity of effort is through joint doctrine.
- b. *Harmony*. Good personal relations.
- c. *Interoperability*. Use by the participating nations of a similar system of command and control and the availability at all command levels of communication systems which are compatible with each other and with those of relevant civil organisations both contribute significantly to the success of the operation.
- d. *Allocation of tasks*. A multinational force commander should give each individual international partner tasks which are in keeping with the ca-

² See D.A. Leurdijk, 'Robuuste "peacekeeping", VN bereid tot hardere aanpak bij vredesoperaties', Nederlands Instituut voor Internationale Betrekkingen 'Clingendael', February 2005.

pabilities of that nation's units and which do not conflict with national guidelines. He should take account of the views of the various multinational partners in his planning.

- e. *Management of assets.* Multinational partners can request help from one another in respect of logistic support. The more similar the logistic systems of the various partners, the greater the opportunity for support of this kind. Arrangements can be made for this prior to the operation and adjusted if necessary as the operation progresses.³

These preconditions are easily formulated, but meet substantial obstacles in practice.

3. MANDATE

Most multinational peace support operations are based on a mandate from the UN Security Council. The mandate guides the peace operation in terms of tasks, powers and restrictions.⁴

Members of the UN Security Council (SC) – its permanent members in particular – have to agree on the desired outcome of the operation, and ensure that it has a clear mandate. Members of the SC have to ensure that the mandate is achievable. Achievable means that one cannot say that the operation will protect thousands of civilians from slaughter, with only a lightly armed battalion on the ground. Achievable also means that one cannot authorise a mission with tens of thousands of troops if one knows that member states will not come forward with sufficiently trained and equipped troops (or will not agree to pay for them). Achievable also means not mandating a peacekeeping force when the environment requires a peace enforcement force.⁵ If there is one lesson that emerges very distinctly from the experiences of the Yugoslav and Somalia operations, it is the imperative need for the SC to carefully deliberate over decisions to set up peace operations. Because both operations were set up without adequate preparations and a frame-

³ *Netherlands Defence Doctrine*, pp. 60-61. Full text available at: <www.mindef.nl/organisatie/beleid/doctrine/index.aspx>.

⁴ *Peace Operations*, Royal Netherlands Army Doctrine Publication III, p. 122

⁵ P.R. Wilkinson, 'Peace Support under Fire: Lessons from Sierra Leone', ISIS Briefing on Humanitarian Intervention, No. 2, June 2000.

work for an agreed settlement, both suffered from what came to be known as ‘mission creep’.

4. COMMAND AND CONTROL

Command and control is the vital link between the leadership and the troops. It constitutes the analysis, planning, decision making, and communications necessary to direct military operations.⁶ The effectiveness of command and control is mainly a function of the quality and teamwork of the headquarters staff – and both of these are far more difficult to achieve when dealing with a collection of multinational forces. A unified effort should be the aim of the command and control arrangements, because without such a unified effort, the military operations are likely to be scattered and indecisive.

Achieving the right relationship between the levels of command is bedevilled by the tendency of superior headquarters to meddle in matters more properly the province of the subordinate headquarters, and by the desire of the political authorities to deal directly with the theatre. As a consequence, of significance are the division of responsibility for various aspects of the operation between national and international authorities, and the introduction into the command-and-control chain of a number of discrete national links with specific national responsibilities. These give governments the power to interfere at the operational and tactical levels and the opportunity to influence the international mission according to their own political agenda.

Where large numbers of countries take part in a multinational force, it is bound to be a fairly complicated undertaking and it would be true to say that a multinational force, particularly a land-based one, is of its nature less efficient than a national defence force. This is due to differences in languages, organisation and logistics.⁷ However, in practice, only Headquarters are truly multinational, while the units mostly remain national.

⁶ T. Durell-Young, ‘Command in Coalition Operations’, in T.J. Marshall (ed.) *Problems and Solutions in Future Coalition Operations* (U.S. Army College, December 1997) pp. 23-49.

⁷ See M. Codner, ‘Hanging Together, Military Interoperability in an Era of Technological Innovation’, Whitehall Paper 56, The Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies, 2003.

5. RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

Rules of engagement (ROE) are the rules for the application and use of force by military means established for a specific operation.⁸ The problems introduced by multinationality stem not only from the extra number of national authorities which must signify agreement to the proposed ROE, but also from the fact that each nation has a different ROE philosophy and interprets the relevant terms, such as 'hostile act' or 'hostile intent', in a different way. For some nations ROE are integral to crisis management, the objective being to avoid taking any action that might escalate the situation, and the firing of a weapon, even in self-defence, is very much an action of last resort. For others, conflict is a less complex affair and the threshold for aggressive reaction is much lower. Russian and US troops, on the one hand, and Canadian and Irish troops, on the other, faced with an identical situation and governed by identical ROE, would in all probability react in different ways. This is not a question of being 'trigger happy', or excessively nervous in the face of danger, but is rather the result of training in a different military culture.

6. INTELLIGENCE

Military operations are blind without timely and accurate information. Unfortunately, intelligence support has been a major weakness of most multinational military operations. There is an inherent reluctance to share intelligence because it originates from national organisations that go to great lengths to protect their information, their sources, and their methods.⁹ Agency infighting and diplomatic niceties are inevitable, and efforts to release information are often frustrated in the interest of preserving the intelligence regime. The supply of intelligence varies enormously in quality and quantity between the national formations in a multinational operation. In some cases, such as the US, intelligence is comprehensive and can be disseminated quickly to the appropriate commanders, while others have no real capability at all.

⁸ S. Nambiar, *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Problems and Prospects* (New Delhi, Embassy of India, 17 March 1999) p. 7.

⁹ J.M. Nomikos, 'Intelligence Requirements for Peacekeeping Operations', Research Institute for European and American Studies, February 2006, <www.rieas.gr/Papers.html>.

7. LOGISTICS

One of the most important problems facing a multinational operation is the way in which logistic support for the operation will be provided and maintained. In such operations, although logistics is a national responsibility, it has become a necessity to ensure maximum efficiency in the jointly conducted operations, to make efforts, in return, to take concerted action to ensure savings in the money spent and to share the logistic support.

Conducting operations in far-flung theatres requires deployable logistics. The bulk of Europe's logistic capabilities, however, having been designed to support Europe's defence against a Warsaw Pact invasion, are not able to get to or to operate in distant or austere environments.

8. COORDINATION WITH AID AGENCIES

Multinational peace support operations envisage, among other functions, assistance in the provision of humanitarian aid. As aid agencies are concerned, it is essential that their efforts be coordinated, both in terms of aid effort, as well as the assistance desired from the military. However, most non-governmental organisations (NGOs) appear to have an agenda of their own and are reluctant to subordinate themselves to any other organisation, their argument being that they have to show results to those who fund their activities, and whose aims and purposes may not totally coincide with those of the international community.

9. RAPID DEPLOYMENT

One of the fundamental problems for the UN in peace support operations is that a long period of time is often needed to deploy a multinational force. It is often the case that a conflict has already escalated too far by the time the first troops arrive.

The time it takes to deploy forces must be shortened if there is to be maximum success at minimum cost. A fundamental and recurring problem in multilateral operations has been the proclivity of states to delay action. This delay has occurred for many reasons, such as ambivalence about interfering in the internal matters of a sovereign state, the lack of political will, uncer-

tainty about public opinion, and the questions whether the crisis at hand poses a direct or sufficient threat to national interests.

10. ARTICLE 43 OF THE CHARTER

Article 43 of the Charter provides that the member states shall conclude agreements with the Security Council in which forces would be made available to the UN on a permanent basis. In fact, these agreements were never concluded as a result of the East-West confrontation. The Military Staff Committee provided for in the UN Charter, which was to prepare and lead actions of the UN forces, was also condemned to become inactive as a result of the Cold War. The end of the East-West confrontation did not change this situation. Over the years, the lack of an independent UN military force led to a series of proposals to resolve this gap (although on a more modest basis). The first UN Secretary-General, Trygve Lie, launched his idea for a police force as long ago as 1948 and suggested the establishment of a so-called UN legion in 1952. His successor, Dag Hammerskjöld, made several different suggestions for a UN military force in emergency situations. Following the establishment of the UN peacekeeping force for the Middle East (UNEF) in 1956, and the intervention in the Belgian Congo, the ideas about a permanent UN military force were rather forgotten. Up to 1989 the most that could be achieved were the operations of blue helmets in which the permanent members of the Security Council did not participate themselves.

In conclusion, the achievement of Article 43 of the UN Charter as envisaged by the founders of the UN did not seem to be very realistic. After all, no country would be prepared to sign a blank cheque in advance, entailing the risk that its troops would risk their lives in a controversial UN operation.

11. UN BRIGADE

In November 1994, the Dutch Minister for Foreign Affairs, Hans van Mierlo, and his Canadian colleague, André Ouellet, once again emphasized the importance of rapidly deployable forces in the 49th General Assembly of the UN. Van Mierlo presented the idea of a UN brigade which would be available to the Security Council. This would have to be a 'full-time professional, at all times available and rapidly deployable UN Brigade to enable the UN to

save lives in situations such as Rwanda'.¹⁰ Soon afterwards the Secretary-General of the UN came up with the idea of a rapidly employable military force in his 'Supplement to an Agenda for Peace' in January 1995.¹¹ This would have to be composed of units from the member states which would be trained and equipped in accordance with equal standards, amongst other things. On the whole the response of the international community was rather lukewarm. For many people, making a military force subject to permanent international authority was still a bridge too far. The sovereignty of the UN member states and the related lack of willingness to accept the authority of another state above them will continue to be the main obstacles for the time being to the establishment of a UN Stand-by Force.

12. UNSAS

In order to speed up the deployment of units, another initiative that has been put forward is the UN Stand-by Arrangement System (UNSAS), which was developed in January 1993. The system is based on national promises of units which can be deployed within a short period of time for peacekeeping operations in a UN context. Within a year and a half approximately 50 countries had made promises, so that in principle more than 70,000 troops were available to the UN. However, the system came up against a number of problems, such as the moderate level of preparation for specific military tasks, the lack of interoperability and the fact that the deployment of these units was always subject to national decision making. Thus in May 1994, the Security Council decided to extend the UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR), but none of the nineteen countries which had appointed UNSAS units at that time were prepared to make a contribution.

13. SHIRBRIG

On a Danish initiative, in 1996, the UN Stand-By Forces High Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG) was established. This is a multinational non-standing

¹⁰ See H.P. Langille, 'Renewing Partnerships for the Prevention of Armed Conflict: Options to Enhance Rapid Deployment and Initiate a UN Standing Emergency Capability', A Policy Option Paper Prepared for the Canadian Centre for Foreign Policy Development, Global Human Security Ideas and Initiatives, see <www.worldfederalistscanada.org/langille1.pdf>.

¹¹ UN Doc. A/50/60/-S/1995/1, 3 January 1995.

brigade with a response time of fifteen to thirty days, whose deployment is limited to *peacekeeping* under chapter VI of the Charter, including humanitarian operations.¹² By putting together units provided for UNSAS by 16 countries, the response time of the UN was increased. Elements of SHIRBRIG were deployed for the first time in the UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) in 2000. SHIRBRIG forces will deploy for a maximum of six months, following which the deployment is either terminated or they will be replaced by non-SHIRBRIG forces.

As a matter of fact, for the time being, the UN will not be able to lead any peace enforcement operations. Since the mid-1990s it has become established practice that these are contracted out to regional organizations or ‘coalitions of the willing’ under the leadership of a state, the ‘lead nation’.

14. NATO RESPONSE FORCE

In this respect, an important feature in the field of peace enforcement operations is the establishment of the NATO Response Force (NRF).¹³ This multinational force is a rapid reaction force intended to be capable of deploying swiftly (in between five and thirty days) in response to any crisis – it is NATO’s ‘first in, first out’ force. The NRF is a standing force made up, in advance, of units which have been made available by member states and which will undergo specialised training to ensure that they are capable of fighting together effectively on short notice. The aim of rapid deployability (a reconnaissance unit within five days, NRF within thirty days) means that decision-making will take place under pressure, but it will be possible to complete the process more quickly because the force has already been constituted in advance. The NRF is to be a 21,000-strong force, with ground, air, and maritime components, to perform high-end missions. It is constituted by countries making units available for a period of six months on a rotational system.

¹² *Peace Operations*, *supra* n. 4, p. 123.

¹³ ‘The Netherlands and Crisis Management, Three Issues of Current Interests’, Advisory Council on International Affairs, No. 34, March 2004, pp. 29-30.

15. EU BATTLE GROUPS

A recent development which is most relevant for the UN has been the initiative of the European Union with regard to the establishment of European rapidly deployable military forces (Battle Groups).¹⁴ These will make it possible to fulfil the UN's needs with regard to the rapid deployment of troops more quickly in the future, under Chapter VII of the Charter. A unit comprises about 1,500 military troops with the necessary support, and can be deployed after between five and twenty days for crisis management operations. After a maximum of 120 days they are replaced by a regular peacekeeping force. With the creation of the EU Battle Groups initiative, unit response times can be significantly reduced and the crisis management capacity of the EU and the UN can be significantly increased. Operation Artemis in the Congo in 2003 served as a model for this initiative, in which an EU peacekeeping force served to pave the way for a UN operation. Blue helmets had been stationed in the Democratic Republic of the Congo as part of a UN mission since 1999. Following a serious deterioration in the security and humanitarian situation in the region of Ituri, the Security Council authorized the UN to deploy an interim military force as an emergency measure. This military operation on the African continent made it possible to stabilize the situation in the Bunia region and provided support for a UN observers' mission, the UN Organization Mission, in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC). The mandate that had been given under SC Resolution 1484 (2003) to an EU response force consisting of 1,500 troops under French command came to an end on 1 September 2003. A strengthened MONUC then took over the peacekeeping operation.

The concept of the EU Battle Groups is reminiscent of the idea of 'peace enforcement units' (PEUs) which Boutros Boutros-Ghali put forward in his 'Agenda for Peace' in 1992.¹⁵ The PEUs would be deployed for restoring and maintaining a ceasefire. Under pressure from the Security Council, which considered that these units went too far, Boutros-Ghali subsequently abandoned this idea.

¹⁴ See G. Quille, "'Battle Groups" to Strengthen EU Military Crisis Management?', *European Security Review* (April 2004) pp. 1-2.

¹⁵ UN Doc. A/47/277-S/24111, 17 June 1992.

16. PEACEKEEPERS INC.

The idea of military provider firms replacing blue helmet troops is one of the most controversial proposals to emerge from the growth of private military firms.¹⁶ Proponents believe that such outsourcing will increase both the effectiveness and efficiency of peace operations.

There are three potential scenarios for the privatization of peacekeeping forces.

The first is privatized protection. The problem of security for relief operations is widespread and pervasive. In fact, this scenario is not all that unlikely, given that several UN agencies already use such firms to provide security for their own offices.

The second possibility is hired units constituted as a 'Rapid Reaction Force' within an overall peacekeeping operation. Wherever recalcitrant local parties break peace agreements or threaten the operation, military firms would be hired to offer the muscle that blue helmets are unable or unwilling to provide. Paid firms might thus provide the short-term coercion necessary at critical junctures in the operation.

The third, and most contentious, scenario is the complete outsourcing of the operation. When a genocide or humanitarian crisis occurs and no state is willing to step forward to send its own troops, the intervention itself might be turned over to regular troops. Upon their hire (by the UN or anyone else willing to pay), the firm would deploy to a new area, defeat any local opposition, set up infrastructures for protecting and supporting refugees, and then, once the situation has stabilized, potentially hand over to regular troops. This idea may sound quite incredible but actually was an option considered by policymakers behind closed doors during the refugee crisis that took place in Eastern Zaire in 1996. Both the UK Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the US National Security Council discussed the idea that, in lieu of UN peacekeepers, a private firm be hired to create a humanitarian corridor. The plan was dismissed when the question of who would actually foot the bill was raised.

¹⁶ P.W. Singer, 'Peacekeepers, Inc.', 119 *Policy Review* (June-July 2003), <www.policyreview.org/jun03/>.

17. COMMON FUNDING

One of the problems within NATO, as well as in the EU, is the funding of the peace support operations.¹⁷ Member states that for obvious reasons cannot make a reasonable military contribution should compensate for this financially as a gesture of solidarity and joint responsibility. Thus, by analogy with the UN system, NATO and the EU should also proceed to draw up a distribution code involving the costs of peace operations to be borne by the member states. Countries actively participating in peace operations would be compensated from this common fund. After all, it is clear that NATO's main task today is no longer the collective defence of the Alliance's territory, but rather to contribute to global collective security. The current 'common funding' system consequently needs to be revised.¹⁸ The fact that NATO and the EU have developed from regional to global players entails consequences for funding military operations. By maintaining the current principle – that is, only participant countries foot the bill – one runs the risks of dealing with gradually diminishing willingness among countries, small countries in particular, to participate in military operations. Past experience teaches us that some countries are more willing to make a military contribution in return for financial compensation.

It is important that NATO and the EU apply a system similar to that commonly used at the UN, where additional costs are paid out of a common fund that is financed by contributions from all the member states, in accordance with their financial strength. This would ensure that there are no 'free riders' in those organisations, sharing the burden of operations equitably between those which contribute forces and those which do not. Such an approach underscores collective solidarity, which is the necessary cement, as it were, for international security organizations to realize their objectives.

18. CULTURAL INTEROPERABILITY

In any kind of multinational operation, with forces drawn from a variety of societies and thus from a range of different strategic, doctrinal and military

¹⁷ M.A. Flournoy and J. Smith, *European Defense Integration, Bridging the Gap Between Strategy and Capabilities* (Washington: Center for Strategic and International Studies, October 2005) p. 51.

cultures, one of the conditions for success will be the meshing of these cultures into a coherent whole.¹⁸ This entails ensuring that any serious problems of 'cultural interoperability' are overcome. They have less to do with weapons systems and platforms and more with the frames of meaning that armed forces bring to bear on the problems they want to resolve, including military doctrine and culture, training and exercises, and the concepts that underpin their intelligence and logistic systems.

In general, commanders and staff officials will therefore come from different countries, which can have repercussions for such aspects as command methods, discipline, etiquette, equipment maintenance, ideas about the deployment of female military personnel and so on.

The maintenance of cohesion in heterogeneous multinational coalitions often requires a considerable degree of tolerance for diversity. This results in lower military efficiency, as well as an understanding of the different cultures, interests and policies, which is sometimes foreign to the traditional military logic and ethics.

The intercultural aspects of international cooperation are most relevant in UN (mandated) operations, as both Western and non-Western nations participate in these operations.¹⁹ In the Gulf War, for example, the most celebrated concern was whether women should be allowed in the theatre of operations, and if so, in what roles. Women have been integrated into most Western forces and are employed in most roles, including combat roles such as air crew. But in Muslim states women are excluded from such activity and there are strict rules governing their mode of living. Such fundamental cultural nervousness can undermine the cohesion of a multinational force, and the need for tolerance and understanding must be emphasized.

Some countries also enter situations with special conditions attached because of domestic considerations. For example, Hindu troops sent in an Indian contingent to Somalia came with the proviso from their government that they might not engage Muslims – for the very understandable reason that such a development might incite difficulties at home.

Another lesson is that the lower the intensity of the operations, the more demanding the maintenance of cohesion.

¹⁸ R.H. Palin, 'Multinational Military Forces: Problems and Prospects', ADELPHI Paper 294, The International Institute for Strategic Studies 1995, p. 49.

¹⁹ A. Ryan, *Multinational Forces and United Nations Operations* (Land Warfare Studies Centre, ACT) pp. 5-6.

Media commentators in the field of battle in Iraq noticed differences in behaviour between British and American troops in their contact with Iraqi civilians.²⁰ British soldiers and marines seemed to be prepared to mingle with the crowd and to talk affably. American troops rarely seemed to behave in this way. They were more likely to remain within the protection armoured vehicles. When they were on foot in the vicinity of civilians, their posture was more confrontational, which was also apparent in multinational operations in the former Yugoslavia, in Bosnia and Kosovo.

19. LANGUAGE

Linguistic communication within an international force is also a major problem that increases as more nations, particularly those previously under the sway of the former Soviet Union, participate in multinational operations. In multinational force operations a common language is essential in the decision-making chain where tasking is concerned. A further aspect is the vocabulary that needs to be taught and learned. Just as important as the ability to converse colloquially with military partners on a day-to-day basis is the need to be able to speak a military-technical language and to appreciate the military message implicit in an instruction or order. Another difficulty frequently encountered by non-native speakers of English on peace-support operations is that posed by the strong regional accents of many of the native speakers with whom they work.²¹ Indeed, many report experiencing greater problems understanding the English of native speakers, complaining that native speakers are never trained to modify their speech when talking with their non-native peers. In other words, native speakers rarely recognise that the common working language in peace-support operations is international English, as opposed to their own version of the language.

20. FINAL THOUGHTS

A number of conclusions can be drawn which are applicable to any multinational force, whether brought together within an alliance or in a coalition.

²⁰ M. Codner, 'An Initial Assessment of the Combat Phase', in J. Eyal, *War in Iraq, Combat and Consequence* (London: The Royal United Services Institute 2003) p. 20.

²¹ M. Crossey, 'Improving linguistic interoperability', *NATO Review* (Special Issue, Winter 2005) p. 36.

Predominant is that multinational forces cannot be divorced from either the domestic or the international political incentive. Because each nation works to a different agenda reflecting national military and political cultures, and functions within a dynamic geostrategic environment, the political context in which multinational forces are fashioned or have to operate is unusually complex. The predominance of political factors over the more purely military requirements exacerbates the difficulties of welding disparate national units together. These problems should be recognized at the outset, and special measures adopted, both political and military, to produce a coherent and effective military force.

Whether a multinational military force is established for broad political reasons or for a specific military purpose, the authorities must be prepared to pay the price, both politically and financially.²²

First, in an alliance context, nations should fulfil their obligations to the multinational formations to which they have committed units. The deeper the levels of multinational integration, the more critical this is. A failure to meet any obligation, be it for constitutional, budgetary or political reasons, undermines the utility of the whole formation.

Second, once nations are committed to a multinational operation they must subordinate themselves to the multinational endeavour and stay the course. Unilateral decision making, and above all unilateral withdrawal, not only reduces the operational capability of the force, but also damages the credibility of the international action.

Third, nations should restrict dealings with their forces in theatre to their direct responsibilities for deployment, discipline, administrative and logistic support, and these should preferably be conducted through an officially accredited national military representative at the operational level headquarters.

Fourth, nations must be prepared to grant the multinational commander more authority in areas of training, exercising and inspection, doctrine and logistics.

Fifth and last, nations should face the inevitable commercial and industrial consequences of adopting a more multinational force structure.

²² Ibid. *supra* n. 15, pp. 76-77.