

Research and Seminar Report


The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation

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## Introduction

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The return to the stage of Russia as a superpower and the rise of China, culminating in an increasing amount of activities of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) were the reasons for me to propose a research project on the SCO. The research was carried out between April and September 2007. Martijn Beerthuisen has been an intern for this project in its final phase.

In addition to studying literature on this topic, the project also encompassed a fact-finding mission to China, of which the travel expenses were funded by Clingendael Asia Studies (CAS). The trip was organised with the support of the Defence Attaché of the People's Republic of China, Senior Colonel Zhang Jichun, and his deputy, Lieutenant-Colonel Jiang Qing-Shi. The journey to China, from 6 to 14 August 2007, was arranged by the China Institute for International Strategic Studies (CIISS) in Beijing. The visit started with a meeting at the CIISS, chaired by its Vice Chairman, Major General (ret) Yan Jiangfeng. I have presented lectures on 'NATO from Cold War to expeditionary force', 'European Security and Defence Policy', 'NATO-Russia cooperation: Political obstacles and military solutions' and 'NATO-Russia & energy security: Partners or opponents?'. In Shanghai, a meeting was organised with researchers of the Centre of Shanghai Cooperation Organisation Studies (COSCOS), of the Shanghai Academy of Social Studies. Prof. Pan Guang PhD, Director COSCOS, led this gathering. The discussions in Beijing and Shanghai were very fruitful and made a vital contribution to the research project. I am very grateful to all the institutions that have made this fact-finding mission to China possible.

The main objective of the research project on the SCO was to draft a paper on the security-related developments of this organisation. Dr Frans-Paul van der Putten, Research Fellow at the CAS on behalf of the Clingendael Security and Conflict Programme, was so kind to contribute to the paper with a chapter on 'China's interests and the possibility of a security role for the SCO outside Central Asia.' The Clingendael Security Paper No. 3, *The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation: Towards a full-grown security alliance?* was presented officially during the Clingendael Seminar 'The Shanghai Cooperation

Organisation', on 12 December 2007, at the Frederikkazerne in The Hague. The proceedings of that seminar form the principal part of this document. In addition to the publication of the Clingendael Security Paper No. 3, this research project – purposely coinciding with the SCO Summit in Kyrgyzstan and the SCO military exercises in China and Russia of August 2007 – also resulted in a number of articles, a paper for a foreign defence institute, and press, radio and television interviews by Dutch and international mass-media outlets.<sup>1</sup> The conclusions of the research were incorporated into a lecture, which is frequently presented to a diversity of domestic and foreign audiences.

Although this research project as such has come to an end, the Clingendael Institute will continue to focus on the development and activities of the SCO, which is likely to gain further importance as a key player in the international arena.

Marcel de Haas

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<sup>1</sup> See also 'Publications resulting from the SCO research project'.

## Seminar programme

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### Seminar “The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation”

Wednesday, 12 December 2007, Frederikkazerne, The Hague

- 13.30-14.00 : Coffee reception
- 14.00-14.05 : Introduction by *Dr. Edwin Bakker*, Director of the  
Clingendael Security and Conflict Programme
- 14.05-14.30 : Presentation of the Clingendael Security Paper  
The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation: Towards a full-  
grown security alliance?,  
by *Lieutenant Colonel Dr. Marcel de Haas*, Senior  
Research Fellow
- 14.30-15.00 : Short break
- 15.00-15.20 : Reply to the Clingendael Paper: ‘NATO’s view on the  
SCO’, by *Dr. Jamie Shea*, Director of Policy Planning,  
Office of the Secretary General of NATO<sup>2</sup>
- 15.20-15.40 : ‘China’s view on the SCO’, *Mr. Zhang Daxing*, Deputy  
Ambassador, Embassy of China
- 15.40-16.00 : ‘Russia’s view on the SCO’, by *Mr. Aleksandr Rilov*,  
Political Advisor, Embassy of the Russian Federation
- 16.00-16.10 : ‘Kazakhstan’s view on the SCO’, by *Mr. Aidar Shakenov*,  
Counsellor, Embassy of Kazakhstan
- 16.10-17.00 : Panel discussion

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<sup>2</sup> Dr. Jamie Shea addressed the audience without speaking notes, therefore his contribution could not be included in this paper.

## Presentation of the Clingendael paper by Lieutenant Colonel Dr. Marcel de Haas

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*Senior Research Fellow in the Clingendael Security and Conflict Programme<sup>3</sup>*

### **Introduction**

The SCO is a regional international organisation comprising China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan as member states and Mongolia, Iran, Pakistan and India as observer states. Encompassing a considerable territory in and around Central Asia, a large part of the world population, energy sources, nuclear arms and significant armed forces, the SCO in theory has a formidable economic, political and military potential. Recently some remarkable developments have taken place in the area of security policy of the SCO. In addition to military-political issues, energy security, which increasingly is identified as a vital element of security policy, is gaining weight in the SCO. The Clingendael paper analyses these current advances in and other aspects of SCO security policy and its possible implications. Should they be regarded as the onset of a movement of the SCO towards becoming a solid military-political alliance, or are these occurrences nothing more than ad-hoc events?

### **Closer military cooperation**

In spite of the frequent denials of the military nature of the SCO and the differences between members on military and security cooperation, five recent developments can be discerned which point in the direction of the SCO gradually moving towards a full-grown security organisation. These developments – most of which will be discussed later in detail – are the following:

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<sup>3</sup> The text of this presentation was derived from M. de Haas (Ed.), *The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation: Towards a full-grown security alliance?*, Clingendael CSCP Paper, No. 3, The Hague: Clingendael institute, November 2007.

### ***Combination of military and political events***

First of all, the features of military and political activities were combined. For the first time a political summit (Bishkek 2007) was amalgamated with war games ('Peace Mission 2007'). Moreover, until then, defence ministers were the highest ranking officials to watch SCO military exercises. The Heads of States' presence at the war games, for the first time in the history of the SCO, was probably to demonstrate the growing significance of the military component within the SCO, but also signalled their determination to be in 'command' of the security situation in this region.

### ***'Military assistance' concept***

Secondly, there is the phenomenon of 'military assistance' as a concept. Perhaps the most significant development with regards to the security policy aspects of 'Peace Mission 2007' was its scenario, in which military assistance played a central role. One of the vital ingredients of a mature security organisation, which also applies to the CSTO, is military assistance as one of its instruments. Although a development towards inclusion of such an article into the policy documents of the SCO cannot (yet) be discerned, the scenario of the 'Peace Mission 2007' unmistakably revealed a de-facto application of military assistance.

### ***Cooperation between SCO and CSTO***

Thirdly, the intensifying relationship between the SCO and the Russian-led military alliance Collective Security Treaty Organisation of the CIS (CSTO) should be mentioned. Although China remains hesitant, as became clear in the consultations for 'Peace Mission 2007', a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between the SCO and the CSTO seems to be underway, which will open the door for military cooperation between the two organisations.<sup>4</sup> Such cooperation was actually already initiated by allowing CSTO observers at the latest SCO exercises (See Annex B: 'SCO military exercises 2002-2007'). Since the CSTO is a purely military alliance, this cooperation will undoubtedly reinforce the military component of the SCO.

### ***Maturing joint manoeuvres***

Fourthly, the military exercises of the SCO, since 2002, have become increasingly ambitious, developing from a bilateral or multilateral level to a joint all-SCO level, and including not only counterterrorism, but also external security policy connotations. Furthermore, prior to the 2007 Bishkek Summit, the SCO ministers of Defence in Bishkek on 27 June 2007 reached agreement on a structural arrangement for joint exercises. According to the Kyrgyz Defence minister, Ismail Isakov, this agreement would lay the long-term organisational and legal foundations for such activities in the future.

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<sup>4</sup> 'SCO and CSTO set to sign MoU', 1 August 2007, *SCO website*, <http://www.sectSCO.org/html/01592.html>; 'CSTO proposes to SCO joint effort on post-conflict Afghanistan', *RIA Novosti*, 31 July 2007.



***Security response mechanisms***

Fifthly, the 2006 Shanghai Summit affirmed that, in case of threats to regional peace, stability and security, SCO members will consult immediately on an effective response to the emergency. Furthermore, the intention was expressed of formulating a mechanism for measures in response to threats to regional peace, as well as a study on establishing a regional conflict prevention mechanism within the SCO framework. The projected drafting of such security mechanisms, which are also found in NATO, were repeated at the 2007 Bishkek Summit.

**Energy security as the new dimension of security policy**

In addition to military-political issues, energy security is gaining weight in the SCO. Increasingly, this element is identified as a vital component of security policy. In July 2007, the SCO 'Energy Club' was established, with which the SCO may aim for a common energy approach, above all in strengthening energy security. Thus, as with the military manoeuvres, bilateral or multilateral energy cooperation among SCO members is developing into a common SCO energy approach, although it is as yet unclear what this would entail. Western assessments sometimes view the SCO as increasingly becoming a mechanism to oust the USA and its Western allies from Central Asia, and thus to threaten Western security interests. The SCO Energy Club could be likewise perceived as a threat to Western (energy) security. Iran's proposal to set gas prices and determine its major flows together with Russia only has reinforced this fear, even though this proposal is to a large extent propaganda. However, SCO member countries that export oil and gas are not only partners, but also rivals on the promising markets in East and South Asia. China, for instance, is making efforts to get a foothold in the energy sectors of Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. The latter are beginning to threaten Russia's position in Central Asia based on a monopoly on export gas pipelines to Europe. Thus, there is much diversity among SCO members and observers on energy cooperation – as well as Western cooperation – instead of a simple unification on or against such issues. Whether a common SCO energy policy will change this diversity remains to be seen. Security organisations tend to become involved in energy security, in the sense that they realise that nowadays security not only entails military, but also energy issues. This applies to NATO, but also to the CSTO. The security of oil and gas pipelines against terrorist attacks has already become a task of the CSTO. Since 2004, the CSTO has been responsible for the protection of railway lines, which – just as energy – is also related to strategic economic interests. As to the guarding of energy installations, the Anti-Terrorist Centre of the CIS has conducted an antiterrorist exercise at a nuclear energy station in Armenia in September 2006, in which units of the CSTO participated. Earlier, in August 2005, this CIS Anti-Terrorist Centre had held an exercise around the Kazakh city of Aktau, while on the Caspian coast armed forces were to counteract terrorists that had seized an oil tanker. Furthermore, during the CSTO's joint military exercises in

June 2006 in Belarus, one of its objectives was the protection of gas and oil pipelines, which further confirmed the CSTO's conceptual development towards energy security tasking. So far the SCO does not have rapid reaction forces, and thus no specific joint military tasking. Nonetheless, in the light of the aforementioned steps of the SCO towards a mature security organisation, as well as the developing cooperation with the CSTO and the recently started 'SCO Energy Club', this situation might well change. Since the SCO states also have to cope with terror attacks, possibly also against their energy infrastructure, it is not unlikely that the SCO in the near future will create standing reaction forces with security of energy infrastructure and of transport routes as one of its tasks.

### **Operational cooperation between NATO and SCO**

Until now NATO has been reluctant to cooperate with the Russian-led CIS military alliance, Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO). However, in the case of the SCO, the organisation is not principally Russian-led, but it is also directed by China, which prevents it from being an instrument of Russian (anti-Western) security policy. Considering their geographical and military presence around Afghanistan and the threats which both organisations are confronted with – drugs trafficking and terrorism by Taliban and Al Qaida – joint activities are feasible. The CSTO has proposed joint action with the SCO in preventing the Taliban from returning to power in Afghanistan. China, who is usually disinclined to have closer ties with the CSTO, but being aware of the threats in the region, might consider cooperation between SCO and NATO a better way to deal with these problems. In November 2005, the SCO established a contact group with Afghanistan. At the Bishkek Summit, the SCO member states stated their concern about the destabilising situation in Afghanistan, which affects Central Asia. Since the SCO and NATO clearly share an interest in improving security and stability in Afghanistan, it would be wise to combine efforts and forces. Furthermore, it is doubtful if the Central Asian states – although stressing their self-determination in regional security – would be able to counter threats as those of the Taliban and Al Qaida by themselves. SCO states could join NATO with contingents in ISAF in Afghanistan. Thus, SCO armies would be incorporated in an experienced military-operational infrastructure to fight mutual threats. Such an effort would be beneficial in two ways. First, it would strengthen the capabilities of ISAF in the war against the Taliban. Thus, this would promote stability in Afghanistan and subsequently also elsewhere in Central Asia, as desired by the SCO states. Secondly, operational cooperation between SCO and NATO would also improve the political relationship between both organisations. In addition to participating in a NATO-led operation, the SCO could also join NATO in exercises, which would also contribute to operational experience as well as political relations. In cooperating in such ways, SCO and NATO can reduce their mutual suspicion and distrust, but also work together to improve stability in the Central Asian region. This will not mean that divergent views will cease to exist, in particular when it comes to human rights and promotion of

democracy, but these issues can also be openly discussed in a cooperation platform. Such an approach is better than maintaining the current wait-and-see policy of NATO and SCO.

### **Outlook on the SCO**

Until recently, the nature of the organisation was mainly political and economic. However, the aforementioned developments indicate a closer cooperation in the field of security. The SCO still lacks a considerable number of essential elements which NATO, as a mature security organisation, has: an integrated military-political structure with permanent operational headquarters, a rapid reaction force, and continuous political deliberations. Moreover, SCO member states and observers cooperate in many areas, but also illustrate large differences, such as contradictory political and economic interests. An essential difference between the organisational development of the SCO and NATO remains the fact that NATO is aimed primarily at external security risks, whereas the SCO concentrates strongly on security within the territory covered by its member states. Especially China seems committed for the time being to maintaining this situation. However, in spite of these shortcomings and inward-looking focus, the intensification of the SCO security policy is to such an extent that a cautious development towards a genuine security organisation can no longer be excluded. If this is the desire of the SCO member states, such a development will still take a considerable number of years before the SCO can truly be described as the 'NATO of the East'.

## A Chinese Perspective on the SCO by Mr. Zhang Daxing

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*Deputy ambassador, Embassy of the People's Republic of China*

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) covers an area of over 30 million square kilometres, or about three fifths of Eurasia, with a population of 1.51 billion, about a quarter of the world's total. The overall border-line China shares with Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan is 7,500 kilometres (4,300 kilometres with Russia, 1,700 kilometres with Kazakhstan, 1,100 kilometres with Kyrgyzstan and 400 kilometres with Tajikistan).

What role has the SCO been playing and what about its future? Will the SCO remain a constructive regional player or become a military organization, a challenge to NATO, to world peace, or stability of the region? And what role does China play within the framework of the SCO? This paper is trying to address these questions.

### **Why was the SCO set up?**

#### ***Background of the SCO***

The SCO was set up in Shanghai on 15 June 2001, comprising China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. It originated from 'Shanghai Five', which was founded in 1996 in Shanghai in a bid to strengthen confidence-building, disarmament and to build up mutual trust in the border regions between China and the neighbouring countries. Uzbekistan was not a member of the Shanghai Five. Its President attended the Shanghai Five Summit in 2000 as an observer. From 1997-2000 heads of member states of the Shanghai Five met in Moscow, Almaty, Bishkek and Dushanbe in succession and achieved great success in its goals.

The post-Cold War world was characterized by extensive regional cooperation among countries that wanted to seize the historic opportunities to develop themselves and raise people's standards of living in a rapidly-changing international and regional situation. Countries in and around Central Asia were no exception to the trend of economic globalization and political multi-

polarization. In the meantime, 'the three forces' of terrorism, separatism and extremism or radicalism were on the rise in the region, posing increasingly dangerous threats to regional peace, stability and development. In Afghanistan, first there was Civil War and then the long war against terrorists and local rebels. In Russia, the Chechnya War posed a severe drain to national development. In China's Xinjiang Autonomous Region and in the Central and South Asia regions, terrorists were active and IED attacks, weapon and drug smuggling took place frequently. In fact, some countries became breeding grounds for terrorists or a source of threat to regional and world security. Against this background, the six countries realized the pressing need to strengthen the good- good-neighbourliness and cooperative relationship in order to more effectively protect their national interest and to achieve their goal of common security and development. At China's initiative the SCO was set up on the basis of the Shanghai Five mechanism on the Shanghai Five's fifth anniversary. In July 2005, when the fifth SCO Summit was held in Astana, Pakistan, India and Iran were accepted as observers.

### ***Organizational Structure***

The SCO is a regional intergovernmental organization. Its institutions consist of two parts: the meeting mechanism and the permanent organs. The highest SCO organ is the Council of Heads of State. Regular sessions of the Council of Heads of State are held once a year in member states alternately according to the Russian alphabetical order of the country names. The host country of the session of the Council of Heads of State assumes the rotating presidency of the organization.

The SCO institutions also include the Council of Heads of Government, the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, the Conference of Heads of Agencies, the Council of National Coordinators, the Secretariat in Beijing and the Regional Anti-terrorism Structure in Tashkent, a coordination agency to address the security challenges in the region.

### ***Objectives and Principles***

The SCO covers wide-ranging areas, with security and economic cooperation being the present priorities. According to the SCO Charter and the Declaration on the Establishment of the SCO, **its main objectives are:**

- To strengthen mutual trust, good-neighbourliness and friendship among member states;
- To develop effective cooperation in political affairs, economy, trade, science and technology, culture, education, energy, transportation, communication, environmental protection and other fields;
- To work together to maintain regional peace, security and stability;
- To promote the creation of a new international political and economic order featuring democracy, justice and rationality.

The SCO abides by the **basic principles featuring the Shanghai Spirit**. Its essence is: mutual trust and benefits, equality, consultation, respect to diversified civilization and aspiration towards common development. Its external policy is conducted in accordance with the principles of non-alignment, non-targeting at any country or organization and openness. It means a new concept of security, a new mode of state-to-state relations and regional cooperation.

- With **the new concept of security**, the Shanghai Spirit seeks to solve bilateral and multilateral differences and disputes in peaceful ways without using or threatening to use force. It seeks to promote mutual trust and understanding through dialogues and consultation. It stands for extensive bilateral and multilateral cooperation and exchange of ideas to put peace and security on a more solid foundation.
- With **the new mode of state-to-state relations**, the Shanghai Spirit speaks for mutual respect and seeking common points while reserving differences, which have been proven to be the most realistic choices for countries of different civilization backgrounds and cultural traditions to attain peaceful co-existence.
- **The new mode of regional cooperation** represented by the Shanghai Spirit is a partnership, not an alliance. It is an open mechanism not targeting any third party. In dealing with state-to-state relations, it demands due respect to the interests of the other side while seeking one's own strategic interests. It advocates the principle of equality and mutual benefits for the sake of win-win results and mutual development.
- It will neither dominate nor be dominated by other states or organizations. Just as no country can live totally on its own in the world, the SCO as a regional organization needs to cooperate in the Shanghai Spirit with the UN and other international or regional organizations on matters of common concern. At the same time, it also needs understanding, support and cooperation from the world community and other international and regional organizations.

### **What has the SCO achieved?**

Since its establishment six years ago, the SCO has become an effective mechanism of maintaining the common interest and enhancing the mutually beneficial cooperation among its member states and a major force for lasting peace and common development. The member states of the organization have further expanded cooperation and partnership. The foundation of the long-term and stable development of the SCO has been consolidated.

### ***Achievements***

**(1) Mechanisms of dialogue at different levels are in place.** A solid legal foundation has been laid. The signing of treaties and agreements, especially The Treaty on Long-term Good-neighbourly Relations, Friendship and Cooperation, signed in August 2007, was a milestone in the history of the organization and will surely inject dynamism into the growth of the organization.

**Border disputes left over by history between China, Russia and the other SCO member countries have been finally put to an end,** creating favourable conditions for close cooperation. The progress that was made in this respect would have been unthinkable even in the early 1990s.

**Confidence building measures, troop reduction and disarmament along the common borders have been progressing well,** representing another most positive development in the region. Border areas where there used to be stationed heavy troops and confrontation frequently occurred, have now become thriving business centres or friendly passes, crowded with businessmen and tourists.

**Security cooperation has been strengthened.** A range of agreements on security cooperation have been reached, including the agreement on fighting narcotics trafficking, the establishment of the Regional Anti-terrorist Structure in Tashkent, the agreement on the procedure of organizing joint anti-terrorism exercises in the region, and the agreement on identifying and severing infiltrating channels of people engaged in terrorism. These documents provide important guidance to the member states in their efforts to enhance counter-terrorism cooperation. Five joint anti-terrorist exercises have been conducted so far with satisfactory results.

**The scope of cooperation among the SCO member states has expanded rapidly in economy, technology, transportation, energy, culture, and education in the region.** During the Beijing meeting in 2003, the Prime Ministers of six member states adopted the 'Programme of Multilateral Trade and Economic Cooperation of SCO Member States', determined by the long-term goals of economic cooperation within the SCO framework and step-by-step objectives and stages of their realization, proposed the idea of achieving within the next 20 years free movement of goods, capital, technologies and services in the region. The Bishkek meeting of the Council of Heads of Government in 2004 approved the Action Plan on Implementation of the Program of Multilateral Trade and Economic Cooperation and confirmed 127 concrete projects of cooperation covering energy, transport, telecommunications, ecology, agriculture, scientific research, as well as their target dates. The establishment of the SCO Entrepreneurs Committee, the SCO Business Forum and the SCO Inter-bank Consortium has paved the way

for better cooperation in business sectors. Projects proposed by Chinese President, Mr Hu Jintao, at last year's SCO Summit, especially those on energy, transport and communication, have received enthusiastic support. Some have already started and others are either about to start or under active consideration.

**A new mode of nation-to-nation relations, which is different from confrontational alliance between the powers in the Cold War era, has been formed** as the SCO members deepen their cooperation in line with the Shanghai Spirit. There has been a continuing expansion of the SCO's international ties and growth of the Organization's world prestige as a whole. Collaboration with the SCO observer states Mongolia, Pakistan, Iran and India as well as with Afghanistan within the SCO-Afghanistan Contact Group has been intensified. The presence of the President of Turkmenistan as a guest of honour of the host state at the 2007 SCO Summit is another mark of progress. Relations with the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the Eurasian Economic Community and UN agencies have been forged. Contacts with EU, OSCE (Organization for Security & Co-operation in Europe) have been established. Hundreds of international delegations have visited the Secretariat, including a delegation from the Dutch United Nations Student Association of the University of Leiden on 7 November 2007.

### ***Enlightenment***

How can the SCO achieve so much in a few years? The reasons are believed as follows:

- A firm adherence to the "Shanghai Spirit". The SCO member states have managed to join forces, because the common interest they share overruns the differences that exist in geo-policy, development and other aspects; they maintained their unity all along because they have enjoyed the fruits of close cooperation and they have realized that it is solidarity that enabled them to have stood the tests created by different changes in the world and in the region during the years; and they keep attracting the attention of an increasing number of neighbouring states, because the Shanghai Cooperation Organization has played the role of a geopolitical magnetic field. All the countries located in this magnetic field can enjoy a climate of healthy, friendly relations, and at the same time feel their moral responsibility. Only through a strict adherence to the "Shanghai Spirit" can further progress of the SCO cause be secured.
- A firm adherence to the foreign policy of peace and cooperation. The understanding of peace is to follow the path towards peaceful development, not to pursue a policy of alignment, not to lead to a confrontation of blocs, and not to be directed against any state or international organization. The understanding of cooperation is to maintain a position based on openness and constructivism, not on isolation



or exclusion, through developing an equal, mutually beneficial, friendly cooperation with states and international organizations of this and other regions to make decisions on the issues of mutual benefit so as to achieve common security, development and prosperity. We highlight the importance of this policy, not just because it is based on the historical experience of the Eurasian region, but also because there are still some doubts on part of the international community as to the nature and future directions of the SCO.

- A firm adherence to the leading ideas of aspiration towards pragmatic cooperation. The modern international activity cannot deal without a huge amount of documents and numerous meetings – it is one of the distinctive features of multilateral diplomacy. At the end of the initial stage of the SCO, realizing such kind of danger and, in particular, learning from the bitter experience of some organizations, which have eventually turned into a discussion club, the member states demanded the development of a practical cooperation, which became the highlight of the Tashkent Summit in 2004. Since then the idea of practical cooperation was accentuated and reiterated several times at different meetings and conferences within the SCO framework, and started to be considered as a universal aspiration and a principal understanding by all the member states, in particular, by the states of Central Asia.

UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan hailed in a message to the SCO's sixth summit in June 2006 the close contacts the SCO has established with ESCAP, UNDP and other UN agencies and the growing regional role of the SCO:

*SCO member states have demonstrated, in concrete terms, their commitment to strengthening dialogue, cooperation and mutual understanding, and have developed mechanisms and institutions to achieve these objectives.*

UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon's message to the seventh SCO summit in August 2007:

*The SCO has been at the forefront of efforts to strengthen mutual trust, dialogue, and cooperation in a large part of Asia...The SCO is helping nearly 1.5 billion people further realize their potential, foster peaceful growth and development, and counter the negative trends of separatism and extremism.*

### **What Is the Role of China in the SCO?**

As a co-founder and a major participant of the SCO, China believes in the Shanghai Spirit and therefore is dedicated to its cause. While recognizing and respecting the special relationship between Russia and the other SCO member states, China treats every member state with equality and fully appreciates their contributions. Faced with the enormous challenges posed by the complex international and regional situation, China strongly feels the pressing need for the SCO member countries to forge mutually beneficial cooperation and

achieve common development. To that end China has been doing its best to work hand-in-hand with the other SCO member states on the following:

**First, consolidating the political foundation of the long-term growth of the SCO** by adhering to its Charter and the Treaty on Long-term Good Neighbourly Friendship and Cooperation. The biggest challenge the member states of the SCO are facing has been and will be whether they can effectively maintain their sovereignty, security and development interests. To meet the challenge with success, timely communication, and efficient policy coordination based on mutual respect, trust, and sincerity at state and government levels are of crucial importance. Chinese state and government leaders have maintained regular and frequent meetings, bilateral and multilateral, with their counterparts of the other SCO member states to keep increasing mutual understanding and trust.

**Second, strengthening the economic foundation of the SCO** by promoting common development and enhancing mutually beneficial and win-win regional economic cooperation. The SCO countries are close in geography and complementary in economy. But due to various reasons, the economy in the Central Asia Regions is far behind the developed world. There is the pressing need to expand regional and international cooperation in economic, technological and other sectors. China has been expanding its economic relations with the other SCO countries and will do more to push forward regional cooperation of the organization with tangible steps. China's trade with the other member states reached \$45.2 billion in 2006, an increase of 273% compared with 5 years earlier. China's decision to provide other member states with \$900 million of preferential export buyer's credit has been implemented. China will continue as before to provide necessary credit and financing support for the key multilateral and bilateral programs of the organization in such priority areas as transport, communication and energy.

**Third, consolidating the social foundation of lasting friendship among the member states** by promoting cultural exchanges. The Central Asia Region is mixed with different civilizations. China recognizes, respects and appreciates the value of these cultures and civilizations. In fact, China has a lot in common with the other SCO members in culture and religion, especially in her western regions. Therefore, China strongly advocates that SCO member states learn from each other to realize common progress, launch cooperation and exchanges in various fields including science and technology, culture, education, sport, and health and put special emphasis on creating conditions for the exchanges of youth. China has decided to establish scholarships for the overseas students from the SCO members studying in China. Besides bilateral arrangements, China will take 20 students on scholarship from each member state, with a total number of 100 a year. It has also suggested that the member states hold in turn exchange camp activities for young students, and for a start, China will invite 50 university students from the SCO countries to attend a winter camp on Hainan Island in 2008. Facilitation of language training for the

other member states is also recommended. Meanwhile, China welcomes people from the SCO member states to come to China to participate in related cultural activities within the framework of the Olympic Games.

**Fourth, creating a sound external environment for the growth of the organization** by expanding and strengthening cooperation with other countries and international organizations. China itself has enjoyed the benefits of its open policy and believes in cooperation with the international community. To maintain world peace and push forward the international order in a more fair and rational direction, China supports the SCO in launching pragmatic cooperation with the observer countries, conducting dialogue, exchanges and cooperation in various forms with all the countries and international organizations which agree on the objectives and principles of the organization.

Mr Hu Jintao, China's President, reiterated at the 2007 SCO Summit that to develop good-neighbourly friendship and cooperation with the SCO member states is a priority of the Chinese people. China is ready to carry on the Shanghai Spirit with all parties concerned, faithfully implement the Treaty on Long-term Good Neighbourly Friendship and Cooperation and make relentless efforts to realize lasting peace and promote common development.

### **Where Will the SCO Go?**

We have observed the SCO's objectives, principles, mechanism, policy making procedures and the achievements or positive developments the SCO has made so far. Above all we have observed a spirit—the Shanghai Spirit, that has been guiding the performance of the SCO. This spirit has been fully recognized and accepted not only by China, but also by all the member states. It has proven its vitality since the Shanghai Five was set up in 1996 and will guide the SCO for its future development.

A basic reason for the SCO's vitality is that its principles conform to the fundamental interests of all member states, which have the common goals of developing good-neighbourly and friendly relations, strengthening cooperation in various fields, fighting 'the three forces', and promoting the establishment of a just, fair and democratic world order.

Peace and development have become the common aspiration of the majority of countries and people. There may be priorities at different times and at different circumstances, but neither of the two should be neglected or exploited at the expense of the other. To obtain real peace and development, an integrated approach must be adopted; and solid and effective measures and actions must be taken to explore new ways of regional cooperation in a creative manner. This is what the SCO has been doing and this is what the SCO has proclaimed to do in the future.

The SCO is a young regional organization and is still in the early stage of development. It is noticed that the member states are well aware of the common challenges they have to face: security and development. It is hard to

predict everything in the future. But based on its spirit, mechanism, principles, objectives and actual performances, the SCO has been and will be a constructive player in regional development, instead of being a new Warsaw Pact or a rivalry in any form to NATO. And it should be encouraged to do so.

A strong, stable and prosperous SCO is not only in the interest of the region, but also the rest of the world. In the words of Gudrun Wacker, head of the Research Group for Asia at SWP: “To bring economic prosperity to the region is seen as a means to fight non-traditional security threats. If one root cause of terrorism and extremism is poverty, fighting poverty will also remove the breeding ground for the ‘three forces’.” It is strongly believed that with joint efforts of all the Member States, the SCO will help to create a safer and better region.

## A Russian perspective on the SCO by Mr. Aleksandr Rilov

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*Political Advisor, Embassy of the Russian Federation*

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) is an international organization which was formed on the basis of 'consolidation of confidence' conventions in the military aspect and of the mutual reduction of armed forces at the borders between Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, China, Russia and Tajikistan. The organization basically operates on the 15 June 2001 Declaration, signed in Shanghai during the meeting of the six presidents from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, China, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Its activities are regulated by three basic documents:

The Shanghai Convention concerning the struggle against terrorism, separatism and extremism (2001);

The SCO Charter (2002) – a basic document with the tasks, goals and foundations of the organization, its structure and basic direction;

The Agreement on Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS) (2002).

Mongolia, India, Iran and Pakistan joined the SCO as observer states. The organization itself is an observer in the General Assembly of the United Nations.

The total area covered by the SCO member states is about 30 million kilometres or three fifth of the territory of Eurasia. 1.4 billion people, in other words a quarter of the world population, are living there.

Consequently, the SCO is in the present tense an organization of multidisciplinary cooperation in the region based on an effort to maintain peace, security and stability in the world, the assistance in constructing new democracies, fair and rational political and economic international order, good tempered economic growth, and social and cultural development within the member states. All decisions in the organization, with the exception of abidance and stopping membership, are reached by consensus. The presidency of the SCO is transmitted yearly from one member to other.

Currently, the presidency is held by Kyrgyzstan, in 2008 Tajikistan will hold the presidency (with a summit in Dushanbe) and in 2009 Russia (with a summit in Yekaterinburg).

During the 7th SCO Summit in Bishkek in August 2007 the long-term Treaty of Friendship, Neighbourliness and Cooperation was signed. In the communiqué listing the results of the Summit, the central message was the necessity of cooperation between the member States. The SCO leaders emphasized to implement preventive measures to tackle instability in the SCO region, the necessity of cooperation in the struggle against unduly drug spread, psychotropic agents and counteraction against undocumented migration. The SCO leaders decided to help China in conducting the Olympic Summer Games in 2008 and welcomed the Olympic Winter Games in 2014 in Sochi. SCO leaders noted that the Olympic Summer Games in Beijing in 2008 will have a great importance in showing friendship and they stated to help China in the course of its realization. The practical coordination between the SCO, CIS, EAEC, ASEAN in accordance with the memorandum of understanding was noted. In the framework of security coordination the question regarding the development of the relations between the SCO and the Collective Security Treaty Organization was discussed within the Summit. The documents, which were signed in the Bishkek Summit, strengthen the organization's base of law and show its institutional formation.

Russian President Vladimir Putin declared that the joint struggle against terrorism is the most important task for SCO. "Terror today, in its own trans-boundary and organized form, is a common threat for our states, and the SCO will withstand to it in the framework of mechanisms which were created in The Organization".

In addition to counterterrorist activities, economic co-operation is one of the important directions for the SCO. This point was stressed in the final documents of the Tashkent Summit (1-2 November 2007). The main subject was the realization of the Russian proposal for creating an "Energy Club". The main goal of this initiative is to set up safe energy supplies for the economy and population of the SCO member states under any condition, including emergency situations. The 'Energy Club' will also guarantee equal benefits for energy supplies to both internal and external markets. This implies a unification of tariff policy and transition into a single tariff for energy supplies in the future.

There is no sense in covering the problems between individual states within The Organization, for example competition and crossing interests.

An outstanding question is a possible widening of the SCO member states. Some of observer states, particularly Iran and Pakistan, have been showing for a long time the desire to become full members of The Organization. This desire has the support of some member states. However, all member states came to the common understanding that today, it is proper to keep a moratorium on the

widening of the SCO. I will not further elaborate on the technical aspects for admittance of new members.

At the same time The Organization is not going to be "closed club" and cooperation with observer states advances in a versatile format. The SCO is ready to develop open partnerships on equal bases with other organizations and states.

Thank you for your attention.

## A Kazakh perspective on the SCO by Mr. Aidar Shakenov

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*Counsellor, Embassy of Kazakhstan*

Ladies and Gentlemen,

During the six-year period since its founding, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation has proven itself to be an effective platform for equal and mutually beneficial cooperation among the six states united by the common aspiration towards maintaining peace, stability and prosperity in the region.

With the further evolving process of globalization and the growing need to build a new architecture of international security, issues of increasing multilateral cooperation based on the principles of equality and mutual respect for national interests are coming to the forefront.

To effectively counteract modern challenges and threats, countries need to unite their efforts on the basis of agreed principles and in the framework of multilateral mechanisms. This is the main mission of the Organisation, which brings together the vast region of Eurasia in political, economic and cultural dimensions. Immense human and natural resources, impressive industrial, agricultural, scientific, and technological potential, high educational level of the population, as well as firm historical ties of good-neighbourliness and friendship among the peoples of six SCO member states allow us to make an optimistic assessment of the prospects of political and economic integration in the region.

Alongside the struggle against the three evil forces, terrorism, separatism and extremism, our Organisation is putting much greater focus on ensuring a steady and balanced economic growth, social and cultural development in the region on the basis of equal partnership.

At the same time, the SCO member states consistently follow the principle of respect for each country's right to choose its own way of development in different areas based on its historical experience and national features, which is written down in all the basic documents of our Organisation, including the SCO Charter and the Treaty on long-term good-neighbourliness, friendship and cooperation signed at the Bishkek summit on 16 August 2007. The leaders of states set a task to put greater effort into the implementation of important regional projects in priority sectors of economy, creation of



favourable conditions for trade and investment, modernization of existing infrastructure, settlement of employment issues.

In this context further expansion and deepening of trade, economic, and social cooperation among the member states of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, facilitation of economic growth and improvement in people's living standard constitutes the basis for everyday activity of the Secretariat, as well as the other permanent bodies and working institutions of the SCO.

To establish economic cooperation, the necessary legal framework and organisational mechanisms were formed. More than 30 major documents on cooperation were signed, including those of far-reaching significance, such as the Programme for Multilateral Trade and Economic Cooperation and its Action Plan. A significant amount of work to fulfil the adopted decisions is being conducted in the framework of 15 special expert groups in various fields.

Pilot projects, which bear special importance for our integration, are being carried out in the fields of energy, transportation and communications, including building of motorways, development of transportation routes, arrangement of multimodal transportation and cross-border interaction, and the creation of SCO's information superhighway.

Energy cooperation has been gained momentum of late; pilot projects in energy sector proposed by the six states are currently at a negotiating stage. At this point, the main target is to unite the efforts of the states with the aim to set up a reliable and effective system of energy supplies based on the balance of interests among energy-producing, transit, and consumer states.

There is a common understanding within the Organisation that the formation of an energy component, as well as other sectors of economic cooperation should proceed from the principle of openness for all interested states, which share the goals and tasks of the SCO, including, of course, the observer states – India, Iran, Mongolia, Pakistan and our partner Afghanistan.

The SCO has been developing contacts in the economic field with the relevant international organisations, sometimes through the sharing of experience and information, as well as implementation of joint projects and programmes. Respective agreements with regard to these areas were signed with the EurAsEC, UNESCAP, Asia Development Bank, ASEAN, UNDP and others.

The SCO member states are going to continue to develop cooperation in industrial sector and agriculture, as well as in finance, energy, transportation, science, technology, innovation, information, telecommunications, and other areas of common interest.

We have every reason to believe that the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation will in effect live up to the expectations and become a significant element in ensuring security and stability and harmonising integration processes in Eurasia.

In conclusion, let me thank you for your attention!

## Panel Discussion

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With Lt-Col Dr. Marcel de Haas, Dr. Jamie Shae, Mr. Zhang Daxing, Mr. Aleksandr Rilov and Mr. Aidar Shakenov

### **Question One: How would you answer the subtitle of the paper?**

*Reply Dr. Marcel de Haas:* ‘As I made clear in my presentation I see a number of indications that, well I mean the SCO is moving ahead in a number of fields, but we specifically chose security, since we are a program on security and conflict and conflicts to deal with that. And, of course, not only with military security, but also with energy security. And in both fields, I would say, I should not repeat the indications I mentioned, that I see the SCO moving ahead. Which is not a strange nor a negative approach. I mean, NATO has taken, let's say fifty years, to become the full-fledged security organisation that it is, that will take some time. But that does not mean that the SCO would only be focused on security and not on all the other economic, cultural and educational aspects. We specifically chose to pick this. There have been other publications that have facilitated a broader view on things.’

### **Question Two: How important is the settling of border disputes within the SCO?**

*Reply Mr. Aleksandr Rilov (in Dutch):* ‘Ja natuurlijk, dat is een belangrijk aspect geweest, maar dat is meer een militair aspect. Deze organisatie is niet zozeer militair, maar gaat vooral over economische en andere aspecten. Niet puur militair, maar wel het aspect van de strijd tegen terrorisme. NATO is meer een militair-politieke organisatie. De SCO is geen militaire organisatie. Het is niet gericht op het vormen van een nieuw Warschaupact.’

*Summary Mr. Rilov's words by Marcel de Haas:* ‘Mr. Rilov repeats that the SCO is not a military organisation, that military activities are only a part of it. That actually military and security aspects could be dealt with by the OSCE, that is more something for the OSCE... There is another regional security organization available to deal with that. So again, the main point of Mr. Rilov is to stress that the SCO is not a military organization. And if there are military aspects, these are not considered to be the most important ones.’

**Question Three: What is the necessary requirement to develop a dialogue with NATO?**

*Reply Dr. Jamie Shea:* 'I think, obviously, there has to be a signal of interests from both sides to develop a dialogue. And we haven't yet received a request of the SCO to open up a dialogue. And I wanted, obviously, to leave the future open, because as I mentioned at the beginning we set up dialogues with plenty of other international organisations. I do not exclude that in the future we will be talking to the SCO. I think it helps, frankly, in terms of creating the trust and confidence that other speakers have referred to, that NATO is able to develop strong relations individually with the SCO member states. And that is what I stressed in my talk. And I do believe that that process is now ongoing. With China, obviously the interest arose when NATO went to Afghanistan, because I think then China thought for the first time: 'well this is interesting, NATO comes to the region: what is its intention?' And we had from the Chinese side a lot of interest back in 2003 when we first went with the ISAF mission to Afghanistan. And lots of contacts, which were basically designed to, let me be frank, reassure China of why we were there and what we were intending to do. My sense is that China was reassured and then the level of interest went down a little bit. Because they said: 'well okay fine, this is not something that we have to watch too closely.' But then I think also that the Chinese understood that NATO was not just doing Afghanistan, but was increasingly getting involved in a number of broader global security challenges; terrorism, proliferation, just to name the most obvious ones. And perhaps China worried that we were developing partnerships with the so-called contact countries in the Asia-Pacific area, notably Japan. I mentioned that the Secretary General is, for the second time in his term of office, in Tokyo at this moment. But also, I mentioned Korea, we had Ban Ki-Moon, who came to talk to the North Atlantic Council, before he became Secretary General of the United Nations, he was still Foreign Minister at that time. And obviously Australia and New Zealand, because they are participating. So China has not said, 'we would like to be a contact country of NATO' and, again, that is not something that is in any way ruled out. But I think not just Afghanistan, but seeing NATO developing this network, the Chinese have thought: 'well we would also like to have a dialogue with NATO. To present our views, to find out exactly what NATO is doing.' And I mentioned the fact that from now on, once every year we are going to have these STAR talks, which will involve a team of Chinese officials coming to Brussels or a team of NATO officials going to Beijing. And if this develops into something which is truly productive for both sides it could easily become six monthly or three monthly STAR talks, but we will have to wait and see. The fact is we started the dialogue. And I mentioned too that the Chinese side has been open to public diplomacy activities in terms of cooperating in seminars and meetings with people like you, sir, who obviously represent the intellectual think-tank policy community. That is for us as important as also talking to government officials.'

So my sense is that there is probably quite a good basis to start on for the time being to reinforce the strong bilateral ties. We will see later if a dialogue with the SCO beyond the individual bilateral relations with the member states provides added value for both sides. If it does provide that added value, there is a chance, I can't predict... I really can't... at the moment... I'm really speculating, but there is always the possibility with an institutional dialogue. But the point I would like to stress is that this institutional dialogue won't work unless there is also this strong bilateral link with the individual member states. And I think, given that everybody is very busy these days, the last thing any minister wants is having another international meeting. I'm sure the Chinese foreign minister, and I know minister Lavrov or the foreign minister of Kazakhstan feel that as much as NATO foreign ministers, that there are so many international meetings, you know, there is so much networking now that there has to be this sense that there is not just a good symbol, but a demonstrable practical added value to going to that bilateral institutional level. But I don't rule it out.'

#### **Question Four: What is the relevance of the military aspect within the SCO?**

*Reply Mr. Aleksandr Rilov (in Dutch):* 'Ik kan nog een keer herhalen dat het militaire aspect van deze organisatie alleen gericht is tegen het terrorisme. En deze richtlijn blijft van kracht. Na 2001 is er aandacht gekomen voor andere ontwikkelingen wat betreft economische aspecten, etc. De in 2002 gestichte overeenkomst inzake een regionaal antiterrorisme structuur blijft één van de taken. Het gaat bij de SCO niet om bredere militaire taken, zoals bijvoorbeeld in het kader van de NAVO, een organisatie met een breed pakket van militaire aspecten, het stichten van een snelle reactiemacht, etcetera etcetera. Dat gaat bij de SCO niet op, het gaat alleen over de algemene strijd tegen het terrorisme. Omdat terrorisme, zoals we weten, internationaal is, en geen grenzen heeft.'

*Summary Mr. Rilov's words by Marcel de Haas:* 'Again, Mr Rilov stresses that if there are security aspects in the SCO, than they are mainly in the anti-terrorism fight. That is the main point. And that is only one of the aspects of the organization.'

*Reply Mr. Zhang Daxing:* 'The first I think is, that in contrast to the UN and the European Union, the SCO was not created on the basis of some kind careful contested model. But instead appeared as the result of a natural evolution of a political process at the end of the Cold War. And is closely connected to the development (inaudible).'

*Reply Mr. Aidar Shakenov:* 'The meaning of the SCO is just the opposite. It might be seen as an anti-military organization, because we are trying to secure our borders. And other states to reduce in this regard on don't think that this military that prevails, no I think it's not. We also have RATS in Tashkent, it's a anti terrorist organization ... No one can say that the SCO is a military

organization like that. It is a comprehensive organisation that deals with economy, energy and other issues, because it's (inaudible).'

Question Five: What is the relevance of the SCO in the field of poverty alleviation in the member states?

*Reply Mr. Aidar Shakenov:* 'The alleviation of poverty is very important for SCO member states. You can understand all countries of the SCO, the population of all member states is, I think, one half billion, and that's why it is very important to struggle poverty. To struggle poverty is one of the components of sustainable development. Without that, the SCO cannot succeed. This is one of the very important directions of the SCO to fight poverty and to increase the well-being of people. I think this is a new challenge of the world and without decreasing poverty it's impossible to fight the roots of terrorism. Because terrorists are mainly in poor countries. That's why it is one of the main goals to raise the prosperity of the population. To have equal economic development. This is one of the main tasks of the SCO.'

*Reply Mr. Aleksandr Rilov (in Dutch):* 'Ik heb ongeveer hetzelfde verhaal. Het is het belangrijkste doel van deze organisatie... dat is de bevordering van de gebalanceerde ontwikkeling van de landen van deze organisatie. Samen met de economische groei ook het bevorderen van de sociale en culturele ontwikkeling van de landen. Natuurlijk ligt in deze aspecten ook de armoedebestrijding, dat één van de belangrijkste taken van deze organisatie is. De regeringsleiders van de SCO discussiëren ook over de mogelijke bevordering van de rechten van de mens.'

*Summary Mr. Rilov's words by Marcel de Haas:* 'So yes, the fight against poverty is an important aspect of the SCO. As is a whole comprehensive approach to development of the countries and the populations of the SCO. For instance also economic growth is very important and human rights. So it's an important part of the policies of the SCO.'

Question Six, Seven and Eight: Is the SCO a collective defence organization? Secondly, confidence and security building measures – are they there and are they also applicable to outsiders? if they are there and if they are also applicable to outsiders? Thirdly, the diversity of populations and what this implies for the rights of minorities?

*Reply Mr. Aleksandr Rilov (in Dutch):* 'Betreffende het aspect van zelfverdediging: In het kader van de SCO is daar geen sprake van. Met betrekking tot zelfverdediging: dat is een zaak van ieder land afzonderlijk. In het kader van de SCO bestaat geen bijstandsclausule, zoals bijvoorbeeld bij de NAVO. Wit-Rusland, Kazachstan, Rusland, Armenië, Kirgizië, Tadzjikistan en

Oezbekistan vormen een organisatie met een overeenkomst die dat wel kan doen, het verdedigen van de grenzen.<sup>5</sup>

*Summary Mr. Rilov's words by Marcel de Haas:* 'SCO does not have any aspects of self-defence, that is not included. Nor is included a military assistance article such as the article 5 of the NATO treaty. However, the countries of the CSTO share a military assistance arrangement. And minority rights?'

*Reply Mr. Aleksandr Rilov (in Dutch):* 'Wat minderheden betreft is dit geen zaak van de SCO maar van de nationale wetgeving van de lidstaten.'

*Summary Mr. Rilov's words by Marcel de Haas:* 'So Mr. Rilov says this applies to domestic national legislation, so not SCO legislation.'

*Reply Mr. Zhang Daxing:* 'First I have to say that the SCO is not a military organization ...' (inaudible)

Question nine: SCO considers itself a key player in regional security. Why don't they play a bigger role in Afghanistan?

*Reply Mr. Aleksandr Rilov (in Dutch):* 'Wie heeft gezegd dat de SCO een rol moet gaan spelen in Afghanistan? Niemand. Het is niet de taak van de SCO. Ten eerste is Afghanistan geen lid van de organisatie. Ten tweede gaat de SCO over de strijd tegen de verspreiding van het internationale terrorisme. Ten derde de verspreiding van drugs vanuit Afghanistan. Op die aspecten zijn wij bereid samen te werken met andere organisaties die deelnemen aan het optreden in Afghanistan. Maar wat betreft de rol die de SCO kan spelen in Afghanistan, dat is niet de taak van de organisatie, dat is ten eerste de verdediging van de eigen grenzen.'

*Summary Mr. Rilov's words by Marcel de Haas:* 'So solving the conflict in Afghanistan is not a task of the SCO. However, if I understand it well, if it comes to the aspects of international terrorism and the fight against narcotics, drugs, that are elements of the policy of the SCO. So, if I understand it well from mister Rilov, those are policy aspects that the SCO could apply in coordination with other actors that are already involved in Afghanistan.'

End of panel discussion

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<sup>5</sup> The Collective Security Treaty Organisation, CSTO (Editor)

## List of participants

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1. Ahmad, Mr. A.	Minister Counsellor, Embassy of Malaysia
2. Bakker, Dr. E.	Head, Clingendael Security and Conflict Programme
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5. Berlin, Mrs. P.	Intern, Clingendael Security and Conflict Programme
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8. Brückler, Lt Col A.	Defence Attaché, Austria
9. Burema, Mr. L.	Hague Centre for Strategic Studies (HCSS)
10. Chrysogelos, Mr. A.	Intern, Clingendael Diplomatic Studies Programme
11. Decker, Mr. K. de	Royal High Institute for Defence, Belgium
12. Duyck, Mr. B.	Royal High Institute for Defence, Belgium
13. Engels, Mr. R.	Student, University of Nijmegen
14. Haas, Lt-Col Dr. M. de	Senior Fellow, Clingendael Security and Conflict Programme
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16. Hassanvandi, Colonel G.	Embassy of Iran, Military Attaché
17. Huysman, 2 <sup>nd</sup> Lt W.P.	Ministry of Defence
18. Jiang, Lieutenant Colonel Q.	Deputy Defence Attaché of China
19. Kara, Mr. M.	Embassy of Turkey, Military Attaché
20. Karasi ski, Mr. M.	Embassy of Poland, Second Secretary
21. Kershof, Mw. N.	
22. Kramer, Mr. M.	Fellow, Clingendael Security and Conflict Programme
23. Kuijk, Mrs. L.	Journalist Dagblad <i>Trouw</i>
24. Kvas, Mr. I.	Counsellor, Embassy of Ukraine
25. Kwaasteniet, M. Mrs.	Ministry of foreign Affairs
26. Lagrange, Mr. T.	University of Gent
27. Legendre, Mr. T.	Policy Advisor, Policy Planning Unit, Office of the Secretary General of NATO

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|------------------------------|--|
| 28. Majid, Mr. K.            | Embassy of Pakistan, First Secretary   |
| 29. Meer, Mr. S. van der     | Fellow, Clingendael Security and Conflict Programme  |
| 30. Nuta, Colonel D.         | Defence Attaché of Romania   |
| 31. Putten, Dr. F.P. van der | Fellow at the Clingendael Asian Studies on behalf of the Clingendael Security and Conflict Programme |
| 32. Rafi, Mr. R.             | Embassy of Pakistan, Counsellor  |
| 33. Ramakrishnan, Lt.Col. S. | Defence Attaché of India   |
| 34. Rilov, Mr. A.            | Political Advisor, Embassy of Russia   |
| 35. Schofer, A.              | US Embassy, Political Counsellor   |
| 36. Shakenov, Mr. A.         | Counsellor, Embassy of Kazakhstan  |
| 37. Shea, Dr. J.             | Director, Policy Planning Unit, Office of the Secretary General of NATO                              |
| 38. Sheikh, Mr. K.           | ABN/AMRO SVP of Global Economic & Political Strategies   |
| 39. Sinkeler, Ms. L.         | HCSS   |
| 40. Sitar, Colonel J.        | Defence Attaché of the Czech Republic  |
| 41. Sivov, Colonel A.        | Defence Attaché, Russian Embassy   |
| 42. Smeenk, Mr. T.           | Clingendael International Energy Programme   |
| 43. Smit, J.L.               | Policy advisor Ministry of Foreign Affairs   |
| 44. Splint, E.E.R.           | Student, The Hague College   |
| 45. Swank, Mrs. G.           | Journalist, <i>De Pers</i>   |
| 46. Taniguchi, Mr. N.        | Journalist, Japanese Magazine  |
| 47. Tromp, Mr. D.            | Journalist, <i>Reformatorisch Dagblad</i>  |
| 48. Versteden, Mr. M.        | Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Senior Policy Officer   |
| 49. Yoshino, Colonel S.      | Defence Attache, Embassy of Japan  |
| 50. Zhang, Mr. D.            | Deputy Ambassador, Embassy of China  |
| 51. Zhang, Senior Colonel J. | Defence Attaché of China   |
| 52. Zheng, Mrs. Y.           | Research Fellow at IIAS  |



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