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ABSTRACT

Cultural diplomacy, a little studied tool of diplomacy, is generally regarded as just one of the components of public diplomacy. When better understood, however, it has the potential to become a much more powerful tool for improving a country's image and its relations with other countries. It may also contribute to domestic nation-building. This paper defines and updates the concept of cultural diplomacy and explores the possible roles it may play domestically and internationally. A case is made for governments to make better use of the practice of cultural diplomacy, given its effectiveness in reaching government and non-government audiences.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Simon Mark works for New Zealand Trade and Enterprise, New Zealand's economic development agency. His PhD research at the University of Auckland, completed in 2008, examined the cultural diplomacy of Canada, India and New Zealand (it is available at <http://researchspace.auckland.ac.nz/handle/2292/2943>). His career has included a short stint as New Zealand's trade commissioner in Fiji and involvement in cultural diplomacy programmes with New Zealand's Ministry for Culture and Heritage and the New Zealand High Commission in London.

A GREATER ROLE FOR CULTURAL DIPLOMACY

Simon Mark

Cultural diplomacy, the deployment of a state's culture in support of its foreign policy goals or diplomacy, is now frequently seen as a subset of the practice of public diplomacy, a government's communication with foreign audiences in order to positively influence them. Yet cultural diplomacy has the potential to contribute much more effectively to foreign policy goals, to diplomacy, and to governments' domestic objectives. To enable cultural diplomacy to reach its full potential, however, the practice needs to be understood better, particularly its contributions to national image, branding and social cohesion. In presenting a national image abroad, cultural diplomacy can overcome audience suspicion of official messages and serve to provide substance to national reputation. Domestically, it can contribute to national social cohesion, especially when targeted at minority ethnic groups.

This paper is divided into three parts. Part one explores the semantic muddle which surrounds cultural diplomacy and sets out the core elements of cultural diplomacy, including how it relates to other seemingly synonymous practices – public diplomacy, international cultural relations, and propaganda. Part two examines aspects of the practice that warrant explication – cultural diplomacy's role in presenting a national image, its connection to nation branding, and its contribution to national domestic objectives. The final part discusses the prerequisites for realising cultural diplomacy's full potential.

Cultural Diplomacy Conceptualised

Semantic quagmire

Cultural diplomacy has attracted little scholarly attention, despite the practice's intersection with a range of subjects (such as diplomacy, national identity, and the history of the Cold War), its long history and a substantial investment by some practitioners. The discipline of International Relations has almost entirely ignored cultural diplomacy and even studies on diplomacy have paid little attention to cultural diplomacy. General texts on diplomacy which might be assumed to include cultural diplomacy barely mention or discuss the practice. Three reasons may help explain the lack of scholarly attention accorded to cultural diplomacy.

First, politicians and diplomats, have, in the main, regarded cultural diplomacy as a lesser tool of diplomacy which in its turn is regarded by some as a lesser tool of foreign policy. Riordan notes that cultural promotion, as undertaken by practitioners of cultural diplomacy such as the British Council, the Goethe Institute and the (now defunct) United States Information Service, 'is not regarded as a serious part of diplomacy.'¹ However, the deployment of a state's culture in support of its foreign policy goals or diplomacy came very much into its own in the Cold War, at least for the war's two main antagonists. The American jazz broadcasts to the USSR, for instance, were effective in highlighting the power and attractiveness of American ideas and values in stark contrast to those of the USSR. However, once the Cold War ended, US support for cultural diplomacy declined: in the

1) Shaun Riordan, *The New Diplomacy, Themes for the 21st Century* (Cambridge: Polity, 2003), p. 121. Ninkovich notes that the United States Department of State's programmes in cultural relations 'have been a minor cog in the gearbox of foreign policy,' and despite a great increase in their size, have 'continued to occupy a lowly position in the diplomatic pecking order.' Frank Ninkovich, *The Diplomacy of Ideas: US Foreign Policy and Cultural Relations 1938-1950* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), p. 1.

period 1993-2003, overall funding for US government-sponsored cultural and educational programmes abroad fell by over one third despite calls for major increases in funding.² The UK, France and Germany have continued to support cultural diplomacy. It is significant, however, that by the early years of the 21st century, the head of the British Council in India described the Council's work as public diplomacy, and cultural diplomacy as only a small part of it.³ Many diplomats may support cultural diplomacy in principle, but in practice tend to place it at the lower end of their work priorities. In a world in which diplomatic services have to deal with a wider range of issues within a shorter timeframe and on tighter budgets, the human, time and financial resources which cultural diplomacy requires are often not available.

Second, the low priority accorded to cultural diplomacy is exacerbated by the difficulty in determining cultural diplomacy's long term impact on the behaviour of audiences. There have always been methods of measuring the success or otherwise of cultural diplomacy events and activity, such as the number of people who turned up to a concert, media coverage of a road opening, feedback from audiences at a bullfight, and comments by attendees of a ballet performance. But support for cultural diplomacy of those involved in securing funding for it - diplomats, politicians and treasury officials - has been dampened because of the lack of proof of the practice's impact on audiences over time. For instance, it will continue to remain difficult for New Zealand's Ministry for Culture and Heritage to set out with any certainty or precision the impact of the Cultural Diplomacy International Program (CDIP), New Zealand's cultural diplomacy initiative, on the behaviour of audiences who attended CDIP events. Have, in fact, some audience members changed their view of New Zealand? How have they

2) It must be noted that even with such a reduction, the work of the former United States Information Service (USIS), now subsumed into the Department of State, remains substantial.

3) Edmund Marsden, interview by the author, Delhi, 2003.

changed their view – do they now think the country is not just beautiful but a first world economy as well? Has this new attitude resulted in any actual changes in behaviour? Has cultural diplomacy persuaded some people to invest in New Zealand, send their children to New Zealand to be educated, or move there themselves? What precise part did the cultural diplomacy event have in this changed behaviour? Perhaps the change in behaviour would have happened anyway?

Finally, a lack of scholarly attention to cultural diplomacy may have its roots in the lack of clarity about what precisely the practice entails. There remain a wide range of definitions of cultural diplomacy. Fox suggests that much of the difficulty in defining what cultural diplomacy ‘is and should be lies in the terms “Diplomacy” and “Culture” and their semantic baggage.’⁴ Lending believes that the varying terminology used by countries undertaking cultural diplomacy reveals ‘major semantic differences.’⁵ Wyszomirski notes that in practice the French term ‘*diplomatie culturelle*’ equates to international cultural relations in Australia, Canada, Singapore and the UK, and international cultural policy in Austria, The Netherlands and Sweden.⁶ There is no general agreement among scholars about cultural diplomacy’s relationship to the practice of diplomacy, its objectives, practitioners, activities, timeframe, or whether the practice is reciprocal or not. Some regard cultural diplomacy as a synonym for public diplomacy,⁷ international cultural relations, or a state’s foreign cultural mission, and others regard these as distinct practices.⁸ Many scholars assume that cultural diplomacy is a subset

4) Robert Fox, *Cultural Diplomacy at the Crossroads. Cultural Relations in Europe and the Wider World* (London: The British Council, 1999), p. 2.

5) Mette Lending, *Change and Renewal. Norwegian Foreign Cultural Policy 2001-2005* (Oslo: Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2000).

6) Margaret Wyszomirski, *International Cultural Relations: A Multi-Country Comparison* (Washington, D.C.: Centre for Arts and Culture, 2003).

7) For instance Fox, although his is contextualised by a discussion on the confusion around terminology. Fox (1999), p. 3.

8) Kevin Mulcahy, for instance, notes that cultural programmes represent cultural diplomacy, whereas activities designed to explain and defend American political

of diplomacy, with little explanation provided as to why.

There is no agreement about the objectives of cultural diplomacy. Frequently cultural diplomacy is viewed as a practice which is undertaken in order to achieve normative, idealistic goals, usually couched in terms of 'mutual understanding,'⁹ but New Zealand's Ministry for Culture and Heritage focuses more on the practice's contribution to advancing national interests, rather than enhancing international mutual understanding.¹⁰ For some, such as Mitchell, it is the type of political entity undertaking cultural diplomacy which is important: independent agencies undertake international cultural relations, governments undertake cultural diplomacy.¹¹ Scholars such as Fox, Lending, Cummings and Mitchell set out a range of administrative mechanisms through which cultural diplomacy is delivered, including government ministries and departments, independent agencies, and private, not-for-profit foundations, but it is not always clear how the non-government entities contribute to a country's diplomacy.

There is no agreement on what the word 'cultural' means, probably because 'culture' is such a difficult term to define. Traditionally, the 'cultural' part of cultural diplomacy meant 'high culture': visual arts, literature, theatre, dance (ballet and contemporary), and music; cultural expressions that have been the preserve of the intellectual elites. In recent years, this assumption has changed: cultural diplomacy now frequently includes 'popular culture', cultural activities that attract mass audiences. A recent exhibition funded by New Zealand's cultural diplomacy fund, for instance, was shown in shopping

objectives abroad represent 'informational diplomacy.' Kevin V. Mulcahy, 'Cultural Diplomacy and the Exchange Programs: 1938-1978,' *Journal of Arts Management, Law, and Society* 29, no. 1 (1999), 7-28. The issue of cultural diplomacy's synonyms is discussed briefly by Wyszomirski (2003).

- 9) For instance Milton C. Cummings, *Cultural Diplomacy and the United States Government: A Survey* (Washington, D.C.: Centre for Arts and Culture, 2003), p. 1.
- 10) Ministry for Culture and Heritage, *The Place of Culture in New Zealand's International Relations* (Wellington: Ministry for Culture and Heritage, 2000), p. 4. See also Juliete Sablosky, *Recent Trends in Department of State Support for Cultural Diplomacy: 1993-2002* (Washington D.C.: Centre for Arts and Culture, 2003), p. 2.
- 11) J. M. Mitchell, *International Cultural Relations* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1986), p. 5.

malls in China so as to reach some of the ever-growing Chinese middle class. Indeed, the type of cultural activity is sometimes used to distinguish cultural diplomacy from related practices: educational diplomacy involves education exchanges, art diplomacy involves art, and sports diplomacy involves sport. Invariably, little explanation is provided as to where the boundaries lie.

For some commentators, cultural diplomacy can be distinguished from other practices through the timeframe of its objectives. Leonard, for instance, sees cultural diplomacy as that part of public diplomacy that is concerned with the building of long-term relationships, a view shared by Sablosky.¹² For others, a key characteristic of the practice is that it occurs abroad. New Zealand's Ministry for Culture and Heritage, for instance, defines cultural diplomacy as 'the international presentation of cultural activities by a state to improve understanding of its cultural life and to create a favourable image in order to facilitate improved diplomatic and trade relationships.'¹³

The definition of cultural diplomacy used by the American scholar Milton Cummings brings together many of these components. Cummings defines cultural diplomacy as

the exchange of ideas, information, art and other aspects of culture among nations and their peoples in order to foster mutual understanding' which 'can also be more of a one-way street than a two-way exchange, as when one nation concentrates its efforts on promoting the national language, explaining its policies and point of view, or "telling its story" to the rest of the world.'¹⁴

Despite the increasing authority of Cummings' definition (it is used, for instance, by the United States Advisory Committee on Cultural Diplomacy, and those authors commissioned by the Centre for Arts and Culture, such as

12) Sablosky notes that 'cultural diplomacy's emphasis is on long-term interchange among nations.' Sablosky (2003), p. 2.

13) Ministry for Culture and Heritage (2000), p. 4.

14) Cummings (2003), p. 1.

Schneider), it nevertheless raises several questions. Where do the boundaries between cultural diplomacy and public diplomacy, and between cultural diplomacy and international cultural relations, lie? Does the term ‘nations and their peoples’ include or exclude parts of nation-states, or groups of nation-states? Does the type of agent define whether a certain practice is cultural diplomacy or some other practice? What ‘other aspects of culture’ does the definition refer to? And what is the status of ‘the fostering of mutual understanding’? Is it the only objective, or the main objective, or simply another objective such as national promotion, explanation, and ‘story telling’ to the outside world? Finally, Cummings’ definition also raises the issue of mutuality, but leaves its meaning unresolved. Does the absence of mutuality make cultural diplomacy something else?’

Core elements of cultural diplomacy

With these problems in mind, and recognising the difficulty in establishing an agreed-upon definition, it is nevertheless possible to suggest a way through the semantic quagmire. Simply put, cultural diplomacy is the ‘the deployment of a state’s culture in support of its foreign policy goals or diplomacy.’¹⁵ Aspects of this definition are explored in the following sections.

15) A less simple definition of the practice would include the negotiation and promulgation of cultural agreements, not simply those agreements entered into by authorities to regulate, encourage and facilitate cultural exchange (formerly an essential precursor to the establishment of cultural relations between states, now almost redundant) but also the newer form of cultural agreement which concerns how economic relations with a cultural aspect to them should be managed. Examples of these are film co-production agreements and those which seek to address the economic impacts of globalisation such as the UNESCO instrument on the protection of cultural diversity. Japan, for example, regards its cultural diplomacy as including diplomacy associated with the negotiation of international cultural agreements. See Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, ‘A New Look at Cultural Diplomacy: A Call to Japan’s Cultural Practitioners, speech by Minister of Foreign Affairs Taro Aso at Digital Hollywood University,’ news release, April 28, 2006.

Actors and government involvement

Cultural diplomacy is a diplomatic practice of governments – mostly single governments, but also groups of governments such as the European Union, and sub-national governments.¹⁶ In this respect, Fox's argument – that the term cultural diplomacy implies the involvement of government 'to whatever extent' in the business of projecting the nation's image abroad - is persuasive.¹⁷ Cultural diplomacy is carried out in support of a government's foreign policy goals or its diplomacy, or both. Because of its connection to foreign policy or diplomacy, cultural diplomacy usually involves directly or indirectly the government's foreign ministry, or at sub-national level, the ministry of international relations (as, for example, Quebec¹⁸). The recent cultural diplomacy of New Zealand, for instance, whilst administered by New Zealand's cultural ministry, nevertheless involves its foreign ministry, both in terms of setting cultural diplomacy policy and implementing activities arising out of that policy in accordance with New Zealand's foreign policy objectives.

16) States such as the provinces of Canada and Germany, and the states of the US and Australia, can be regarded as agents of diplomacy and as practitioners of cultural diplomacy. Wiseman notes that 'in the Westphalian sense, only states are thought to conduct diplomacy.' Sub-national polities, whilst lacking the full array of diplomatic recognition and privileges, do nevertheless sit comfortably within Wiseman's notion that diplomacy consists of 'certain norms and values (the desirability of continuous dialogue through mutual recognition and representation); certain institutions (foreign ministries, embassies); certain processes (accreditation, a written code of diplomatic communications); and certain individuals (foreign ministry officials, ambassadors, and other diplomats).' Geoffrey Wiseman, 'Pax Americana: Bumping into Diplomatic Culture,' *International Studies Perspectives*, no. 6 (2005), 409–430.

17) Fox (1999), p. 2.

18) Since 1985, Québec has operated its own diplomatic service with its own minister, international ministry, and network of foreign representatives and diplomatic missions - nearly thirty offices in eighteen countries in 2006. By the end of the twenty first century, the province had become the world's foremost proponent of sub-national government activity in the international sphere. Louis Balthazar, 'Québec's International Relations: A Response to Needs and Necessities,' in Brian Hocking (ed), *Foreign Relations and Federal States* (London: Leicester University Press, 1993), 140-152.

Objectives

Cultural diplomacy is undertaken for a range of purposes, although the purpose does not in itself serve to distinguish cultural diplomacy from contiguous practices. Traditionally, governments have said that they undertake cultural diplomacy to achieve idealistic purposes - to develop mutual understanding, combat ethnocentrism and stereotyping,¹⁹ and prevent conflicts.²⁰ These idealistic objectives frequently include the idea of a two-way relationship based on mutual exchange, although in practice cultural diplomacy has tended not to be nearly as reciprocal as its practitioners intended.

Cultural diplomacy's functional objectives also include advancing trade, political, diplomatic, and economic interests, developing bilateral relationships across the board, including economic, trade, political, cultural and diplomatic elements, connecting with groups abroad that are important to the cultural diplomacy practitioner (such as diasporas), and helping to maintain bilateral relationships in times of tension.²¹ Cultural diplomacy can also advance the interests of other countries, not just the interests of the country carrying out the diplomacy. The cultural diplomacy of India, for instance, with its heavy focus on providing scholarships to students from neighbouring countries to study in India, serves to advance India's interests and those of its neighbours, as well as the interests of the students themselves.

19) Mulcahy, 'Cultural Diplomacy in the Post-Cold War World,' p. 1.

20) Lending notes that 'the idea that culture can function as a peace-making instrument has been strongly supported in Europe throughout the post-war era. Germany's and France's comprehensive exchange programmes...are a prime example of cultural co-operation based on the conviction that knowledge of tradition or potential enemies and their social life promotes international understanding, thereby preventing conflicts in the longer term.' See Lending (2000), p. 4.

21) See Kirsten Bound, Rachel Briggs, John Holden and Samuel Jones, *Cultural Diplomacy* (London: Demos, 2007), pp. 54-55, for examples of how this can work in practice.

Activities

Cultural diplomacy incorporates activities undertaken by, or involving, a wide range of participants such as artists, singers and so on, but also the manifestations of their artistry (such as a film), the promotion of aspects of the culture of a state (language, for instance), and the exchange of people, such as academics. Activities undertaken within cultural diplomacy's scope manifest an aspect of the culture of the polity the government represents. The range of activities is wide and is no longer limited to 'high culture'; cultural activity is viewed less as being produced for, and viewed by, elites. It now more often includes cultural activity targeted at the wider population. Examples of this broader scope of cultural diplomacy includes educational scholarships, visits of scholars, intellectuals, academics and artists both domestically and abroad, cultural group performances, artist performances and exhibitions, seminars and conferences, the operation of libraries, festivals abroad and support for festivals of other countries held domestically, establishing and maintaining professorships and chairs in universities abroad, the commissioning of busts, statues and portraits of national leaders, the presentation of books and musical instruments to visiting dignitaries and diplomatic missions abroad, an essay award and an annual lecture and sports. New Zealand's recent cultural diplomacy, which has included many of these activities, has also incorporated the production and screening abroad of a documentary series, the publication and dissemination of DVDs and compact discs, and the naming of a street in New Delhi after the great New Zealand explorer, Sir Edmund Hillary.²²

22) Sir Edmund Hillary and Tenzing Norgay were the first to climb Mt Everest, in 1953. Fifty years later, Sir Edmund, a former New Zealand High Commissioner to India, was in New Delhi to open the street on which the New Zealand high commission is located 'Sir Edmund Hillary Marg.' A co-joining street was named Tenzing Norgay Marg.

Audiences

In addition to targeting audiences in other countries with manifestations of the culture of the 'sending' state, cultural diplomacy also incorporates supporting manifestations of another country's cultural activity at home, as this may help advance the national interests of the sending state. Hence, for instance, the provision of support by the New Zealand government for performances in New Zealand of a Chinese cultural group clearly enhances New Zealand's bilateral relationship with China, but does not involve in any way New Zealand culture. Furthermore cultural diplomacy's audiences may include members of a national diaspora. Reaching India's sizeable diaspora has long been a focus of the work of the cultural centres operated by India's cultural agency, the India Council for Cultural Relations (ICCR).

Similar practices

The term cultural diplomacy is used interchangeably with other related and overlapping terms, particularly public diplomacy, international cultural relations and propaganda, but although cultural diplomacy is a subset of public diplomacy (a government's communication with foreign audiences), it is not synonymous with it, as there are instances of public diplomacy, such as keeping informed media organisations, which do not involve a state's culture. Nor is cultural diplomacy a synonym for international cultural relations: some of such relations do not involve government, or contribute to foreign policy goals or to diplomacy (a pre-requisite for cultural diplomacy). And whilst cultural diplomacy may on the face of it seem like a more benign form of governmental propaganda, the practice's commitment to engagement with its audiences, combined with the inherent honesty of culture, serve to distinguish it from propaganda. The differences amongst these respective terms are explicated in the following sections.

Public diplomacy

Cultural diplomacy is now considered to be both conceptually and practically a subset of public diplomacy, which can be defined as a government's communication with foreign audiences in order to positively influence them.²³ However, cultural diplomacy is not simply public diplomacy by another name. There are instances of public diplomacy, such as briefing foreign correspondents, which do not involve a state's culture.

Many foreign ministries, including those of New Zealand, Canada, the UK, Australia, and Japan,²⁴ now describe and carry out their cultural diplomacy activity within the remit of their public diplomacy work. The inclusion of cultural diplomacy within public diplomacy's remit represents a recent sea change in the way cultural diplomacy is regarded and practised. For many years cultural diplomacy was regarded mostly as a practice concerned with the implementation of cultural agreements, rather than a practice in any way connected to public diplomacy. Of course, this reflects public diplomacy's recent ascendancy: even the cultural diplomacy of those governments which have yet fully to embrace public diplomacy, such as India, now more frequently focus on reaching a wider set of audiences and showing their modern faces to the world, both hallmarks of current public diplomacy practice. The new emphasis by governments on communicating with foreign audiences such as members of the public and the media recognises that the

23) See Robin Higham, 'The World Needs More Canada. Canada Needs More Canada,' in Jean-Paul Baillargeon (ed), *The Handing Down of Culture, Smaller Societies, and Globalization* (Ontario: Grubstreet Editions, 2001), pp. 134-142; Edmund Marsden, interview by the author, Delhi, 2003; Mark Leonard, Catherine Stead and Conrad Smewing, *Public Diplomacy* (London: Foreign Policy Centre, 2002); United States Advisory Committee on Cultural Diplomacy, *Cultural Diplomacy. The Linchpin of Public Diplomacy. Report of the Advisory Committee on Cultural Diplomacy* (Washington D.C.: U.S. State Department, 2005); and Cynthia P. Schneider, 'Culture Communicates: US Diplomacy That Works,' in Jan Melissen (ed), *The New Public Diplomacy. Soft Power in International Relations* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2005), 147-168.

24) But not the foreign ministry of the Republic of Ireland, which continues to use the term cultural diplomacy.

attitude of these audiences plays a determining role in governments' ability to pursue their foreign policy objectives.

As with cultural diplomacy, there are varying definitions of public diplomacy. Leonard's articulation of the concept has been influential.²⁵ The concept of public diplomacy as articulated by Leonard sees cultural diplomacy as one of three tiers characterised by the timeframe of the relationship. The first tier, short term, reactive news management, takes hours and days. The next tier, medium term strategic communications, takes months. The third tier, cultural diplomacy, is about the development of long term relationships, and can take years. For Leonard, public diplomacy is a way to advance national interests in the new global environment of more democracies, new communication technologies, global media, and international networks. Two aspects are important: the audience you reach, and the message with which you reach them. Perceptions of countries influence how well they are able to advance their interests. A public's positive perceptions can help create a market for products and attract investment, students, and tourists,²⁶ while a public's negative perceptions can be extremely damaging to foreign policy goals, including economic interests.

One can indeed distinguish public diplomacy from cultural diplomacy in terms of the type of audience that each seeks to reach, but this distinction depends entirely on which definition of public diplomacy one uses. For some, public diplomacy's audiences are viewed as including both officials of another government (the traditional audiences of classical diplomacy) and the

25) Joseph Nye adopts Leonard's three-tiered conceptualisation of public diplomacy. See Joseph. S. Nye, *Soft Power. The Means to Success in World Politics* (New York: Public Affairs, 2004), p. 107. The British Government review of its public diplomacy, in 2002, cited Leonard's 'seminal' pamphlet, 'Britain TM.' See United Kingdom Foreign and Commonwealth Office, *Changing Perceptions. Review of Public Diplomacy* (London: Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 2002), and Mark Leonard, *Britain TM. Renewing Our Identity* (London: Demos, 1997).

26) Leonard, Stead, and Smewing (2002), p. 4.

public.²⁷ Some definitions of public diplomacy, however, imply that the practice's target audience excludes the usual official audiences of traditional diplomacy such as politicians, diplomats and other government officials. Tuch's definition of public diplomacy as 'a government's process of communicating with foreign publics in an attempt to bring about understanding for its nation's ideas and ideals, its institutions and culture, as well as its national goals and current policies'²⁸, sees the practice as entailing a government communicating with foreign publics, and therefore possibly by implication not with officials of another government.²⁹ By contrast, cultural diplomacy continues to include government officials as one of its important target audiences. They remain a core focus of cultural diplomacy because they remain important to the management of relations between states and because culture is a particularly powerful way of enhancing the sort of personal relationships which so frequently exist between diplomats. Diplomats have to get on with one another, and sharing cultural experiences makes this task easier.

When public diplomacy is defined in terms of the audience it seeks to reach, it can logically include within that term any number of entities able to deliver public diplomacy, regardless of the entity's connection to diplomacy or foreign policy goals, and can be undertaken by anyone or any organisation, including private sector companies.³⁰ When defined according to audience alone, public diplomacy becomes a type of communication used to reach a

27) The definition of public diplomacy set out in the 2005 UK review, for instance, includes all individuals and groups overseas, and this must be assumed to include government officials. United Kingdom Foreign and Commonwealth Office, *Public Diplomacy Review* (London: Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 2005).

28) Quoted in Evan H. Potter, 'Canada and the New Public Diplomacy,' *Clingendael Discussion Paper in Diplomacy*, No. 81 (The Hague: Netherlands Institute of International Relations 'Clingendael', 2002), p. 3.

29) See Melissen (2005), p. 12.

30) Leonard, for instance, argues that three groups that can add to the effectiveness of public diplomacy are political parties, diasporas, and NGOs. Mark Leonard, 'Diplomacy by Other Means,' *Foreign Policy*, no. 132 (2002), pp. 48-56, at page 6.

wide set of audiences, government officials and the wider public, at home and abroad. However, in the context of the practice of diplomacy, it is more useful to view public diplomacy as a diplomatic practice, not a style of communication. It is worth noting in this context that the reaching of domestic audiences by a government to explain its foreign policy or seek input into that policy is seen by some as an aspect of public diplomacy, but others exclude this work from public diplomacy's remit.³¹ Domestic audiences have not traditionally been seen as those associated with cultural diplomacy's mandate, but as we shall see in part two, the practice does in fact seek to achieve domestic objectives (and hence have a domestic audience in mind), albeit within the broad aims of advancing foreign policy goals, or diplomacy, or both.

Cultural diplomacy is a subset of public diplomacy. Both are elements of soft power, 'the ability to get what you want by attracting and persuading others to adopt your goals' rather than the ability to use the carrots and sticks of economic and military might to make others follow your will, or hard power.³² Nonetheless the overlaps, public diplomacy incorporates a wider set of activities than cultural diplomacy, primarily those government media and public relations activities aimed at a foreign public in order to explain a course of action, or present a case. It is of course possible, drawing on a broad enough definition of culture, to include government information, media and public relations activities within the scope of cultural diplomacy, but their link with aspects of a state's culture can reasonably be viewed as too tenuous to constitute cultural diplomacy.

31) Potter thinks Canada's DFAIT is wrong for instance to include within its public diplomacy business line its work aimed at Canadian domestic audiences. Potter (2002).

32) As defined by Joseph Nye, the American academic who first articulated the concept. Joseph S. Nye, 'Propaganda Isn't the Way: Soft Power,' *The International Herald Tribune*, January 10 2003.

Certainly the boundaries between the terms are not always very clear, and as the two practices overlap, are becoming less clear. For instance, does the visit of a journalist to another country, funded by that other government as part of a media campaign, constitute public diplomacy, but not cultural diplomacy? Exchanges of academics, writers, students, artists and intellectuals have long been regarded as the bread and butter of cultural diplomacy, and journalists are no different to these people. Of relevance is Lending's comment that the traditional division between cultural and informational activities is being eradicated because cultural exchange concerns not only art and culture, but also communicating a state's thinking, research, journalism and national debate. Hence in his view the growth of public diplomacy becomes 'a reaction to the close connection between cultural, press and information activities, as a result of new social, economic and political realities.'³³

Notwithstanding Lending's point, there are instances of public diplomacy which do not involve a state's culture. Perhaps the most obvious is briefing foreign correspondents, and facilitating greater access for them to government officials, and work undertaken to explain to foreign audiences aspects of, and the reasons for, a state's foreign policy stance or behavior. The recent Australian internet-based campaign against Japanese whaling, which was targeted at Japanese children, is a good example of public diplomacy which falls outside the scope of cultural diplomacy.³⁴ Hence whilst cultural

33) Lending (2000), p. 3. This point is made also by Melissen, who believes that the overlap between what he terms cultural relations, and public diplomacy, will grow, in part because of the need for public diplomacy to focus less on 'messaging' and promotion campaigns and more on building relationships with civil society actors in other countries. Melissen (2005), p. 22.

34) *Reuters*, October 12, 2007. Bound, Briggs, Holden and Jones are of the opinion that because cultural diplomacy involves the use of a state's culture to achieve its objectives, it is much more implicated than public diplomacy in national identity. Bound, Briggs, Holden and Jones (2007), p. 17.

diplomacy is conceived as being a subset of public diplomacy, it is not simply public diplomacy by another name.

International cultural relations

The term international cultural relations is the term most frequently used synonymously with cultural diplomacy, but the two are not the same. Not all international cultural relations involve a government, nor do they contribute to foreign policy goals or to diplomacy. Every day, somewhere in the world, cultural relations such as tours of school choirs abroad and commercial international art exhibitions take place without any involvement of government. And those international cultural relations which do involve government, such as for instance government funded artists' performances, need not necessarily contribute to foreign policy goals or to diplomacy, either 'at home' through the foreign ministry, or abroad through the foreign ministry's network of embassies.³⁵ Robin Higham notes that

International Cultural Relations, as funded and encouraged by national governments at least, generally have a different objective, cultural development...that of building a country's competence and capacity for its own artistic expression through international exposure and collaborations abroad with other artistic or cultural professionals. The Alliance Française, the Goethe Institute, the British Council, the Japan Foundation and even Canada Council were founded in varying degrees on the cultural development/international cultural relations rationale and less as tools designed exclusively for cultural diplomacy.³⁶

Former British Council official, J. M. Mitchell, writing in the 1980s on the subject of international cultural relations, notes that whilst international cultural relations and cultural diplomacy apply to the 'practice followed by

35) "At home' is a useful way of describing cultural diplomacy activity that takes place in the country which is undertaking (and funding) it rather than abroad.

36) Higham (2001), p. 136.

modern states of interrelating through their cultures,' the difference between the two is fundamental, complex and subtle.³⁷ Governments carry out cultural diplomacy,³⁸ independent entities carry out international cultural relations, and the objectives for each differ. For Mitchell, cultural diplomacy has two levels of meaning: the making of cultural agreements between governments, and the execution of these agreements, and cultural relations flowing from them.³⁹ The execution is carried out by diplomats seeking to achieve political and economic aims closely aligned to official policy and national interest',⁴⁰ although this may or may not be perceptible depending on the 'tact and restraint with which it is executed.'⁴¹

By contrast, Mitchell thinks that international cultural relations go beyond the actions of governments and their agencies, and can be conducted on the initiative of public and private institutions. International cultural relations do not seek one-sided advantages. When cultural relations are at their most effective is when they achieve understanding and cooperation between national societies for mutual benefit. In Mitchell's view, they should do this not through selective self-projection, but through presenting an honest, rather than idealized, picture of each country. National problems should neither be concealed nor made a show of. Cultural relations 'neither pretend that warts are not there nor do they parade them to the repugnance of others.'⁴²

Mitchell sets out his hope that countries would handle their cultural relations 'objectively' and not link them 'inexorably' with national interest. The 'real' return on the investment by countries in international cultural relations is not short-term advantage, but long-term relationships. Because

37) Mitchell (1986), p. 2.

38) Mitchell says that cultural diplomacy '*is essentially the business of governments*' Mitchell (1986), p. 3.

39) Mitchell (1986), p. 3.

40) Mitchell (1986), p. 4.

41) Mitchell (1986), p. 4.

42) Mitchell (1986), p. 5.

such relationships can flourish only if they are 'not subject to politics,' the work of cultural relations is best done by organizations which enjoy an appropriate degree of independence of the state machinery. 'The concept of the cultural attaché slavishly scoring points for his political masters' is the very antithesis of 'right-minded cultural relations.'⁴³

Mitchell's conceptualization of the difference between cultural diplomacy and international cultural relations is ultimately unconvincing for several reasons. First, to suggest that international cultural relations has general and idealistic goals, but that cultural diplomacy does not fails to acknowledge that a state's foreign policy objectives, and its cultural diplomacy undertaken in support of these goals, may well include idealistic goals such as the achievement of understanding and cooperation between national societies for their mutual benefit. For instance, this is one of the objectives of India's cultural diplomacy agency, the Indian Council for Cultural Relations (ICCR). Second, to suggest that cultural diplomacy uses 'selective self-projection' whereas international cultural relations is more honest is to do cultural diplomacy an injustice. Much culture has an inherent honesty to it and cultural diplomacy has often presented abroad a state 'warts and all.' This is particularly true in its use of film: the New Zealand film *Once Were Warriors*, for instance, is brutally honest about modern New Zealand. Besides which, governments are more frequently recognising the importance of presenting an honest image of themselves through their public and cultural diplomacy. Doing otherwise runs the risk of losing credibility in an era in which there is significant access to alternative sources of information concerning what a country, and its government, are 'really' like.⁴⁴ Third, it is possible for a government to carry out its foreign policy and diplomatic objectives through an organisation which has a degree of administrative independence. Cultural

43) Mitchell (1986).

44) This point is made by Lending (2000), p. 20.

diplomacy is a diplomatic practice of a government, but is not undertaken exclusively by diplomats working for a government's foreign ministry. The practice of cultural diplomacy is managed by or involves foreign ministries and stand-alone entities with varying degrees of governance links to foreign ministries.⁴⁵ Distinguishing cultural diplomacy from any other contiguous term on the basis of the degree of independence of the delivering agency not only misses the point about the linkage of cultural diplomacy to a government's foreign policy or diplomacy (a link which can be met through an independent agency), but also raises issues concerning the degree of independence of a delivering agency. Should this be determined on the basis of level and type of funding, or the degree of linkage to government, or some other test? A recent report by the UK think tank Demos suggests that it is possible to strengthen relations between a government and national cultural institutions without being directive.⁴⁶

Propaganda

Is cultural diplomacy as Higham suggests best understood as 'self-interested national-propaganda'?⁴⁷ Determining cultural diplomacy's relationship to propaganda depends on which definition of propaganda is used. If propaganda is defined, for instance, as 'information, ideas, opinions or images, often only giving one part of an argument, which are broadcast, published or in some other way spread with the intention of influencing

45) Such as for instance the UK's British Council, a body which fiercely protects its day-to-day operational independence but which nevertheless supports the goals and objectives of the UK government, receives close to two hundred million pounds annually of government funding, and has a board of trustees of which one member is nominated by the foreign secretary.

46) Demos, whilst acknowledging that 'the UK's independent model is admired the world over', suggests that the UK needs to 'let go of its hang-ups about the relationship between politics and culture,' and cites the hands-on approach of France, which 'highlights the benefits that can be gained when a government works more collaboratively and strategically with culture.' Bound, Briggs, Holden and Jones (2007), p. 63.

47) Higham (2001), p. 138.

people's opinions,'⁴⁸ then one could suggest a reasonably strong link with cultural diplomacy. The practice is used to counter negative impacts of contentious issues, or 'put the record straight' by attempting to counter prevailing stereotypes, and these objectives seem to suggest its role as a propaganda tool. But it is wrong simply to label the practice as another form of propaganda.

Melissen's approach to assessing public diplomacy's relationship to propaganda provides a valuable method of exploring this matter. Melissen situates public diplomacy and propaganda as being on a 'continuum ranging from crude and manipulative propaganda aiming at short-term political effects to two-way public diplomacy for the 'long haul' based on dialogue with foreign audiences.'⁴⁹ He sees public diplomacy differing from propaganda not because of a difference in objectives, but in a difference in the pattern of communication.⁵⁰ Propaganda, and the most base form of public diplomacy, involves the 'rather primitive business of peddling one's own views and narrowing other people's minds.'⁵¹ By contrast, modern public diplomacy has 'distinct basic characteristics': it is two way, involving engagement, dialogue and mutuality, and it recognises that there are domestic audiences which a foreign service can communicate with in order to 'get through to foreign audiences.'⁵² These comments concerning public diplomacy apply equally to cultural diplomacy. The deployment of aspects of a state's culture in support of its foreign policy goals or diplomacy may sometimes involve the peddling of the state's own views, but cultural diplomacy seldom seeks to narrow other

48) See *Cambridge Dictionary Online*, s.v "Propaganda," (<http://dictionary.cambridge.org/define.asp?key=63437&dict=CALD> (accessed 16 March, 2009))

49) Melissen (2006), p. 8.

50) Melissen (2005), p. 18.

51) Melissen (2006), p. 8.

52) Melissen (2006), p. 9.

people's minds,⁵³ and even if it did seek to achieve such an outcome, as noted previously, culture has an inherent honesty to it that could well thwart such efforts. Lending's suggestion that propaganda involves 'the dissemination of more or less doubtful truths for the purpose of influence and manipulation'⁵⁴ highlights the difficulty of establishing or denying cultural diplomacy's propaganda credentials: one government's cultural diplomacy 'truth' undertaken to influence could conceivably be another government's 'lies' for the purposes of manipulation. Notwithstanding this, cultural diplomacy is not simply a synonym of propaganda.

The Practice of Cultural Diplomacy

Cultural diplomacy and national image

Just as image has become an important aspect of public diplomacy, it has also gained importance in cultural diplomacy. In recent years there has been a greater emphasis on using cultural diplomacy to present a national image of the state: not simply showing aspects of a state's cultural face to the world (or, as Mitchell puts it, unfurling a nation's cultural achievements), but a more managed, considered and strategic presentation of national image. The new emphasis on national image within cultural diplomacy not only focuses on a state's cultural distinctiveness and vitality, but often also on its economic and technological achievements. In India, the recent activities of its cultural diplomacy agency, the ICCR, have sought to convey a contemporary image of India as an economic power and as a technology giant in the making. In

53) The cultural diplomacy of the Indian state of Gujarat following the communal carnage in the state in 2002 indicates that narrowing other people's minds which propaganda seeks to achieve can take the form of the glossing over of the 'truth,' making a much maligned (and to some a racist and violent state) seem appealing or normal through the attraction of culture.

54) Lending (2000), p. 19.

Australia, the International Cultural Council aims to project a positive image of Australia as a 'modern, prosperous, sophisticated and technologically advanced country with a rich and diverse culture,' as well as promoting an accurate image of Australia's indigenous people overseas. In Canada, despite recent cutbacks to the federal government's cultural diplomacy activities and a constant gap between the rhetoric of federal government support for cultural diplomacy and funding for it, there is now a greater emphasis on presenting Canada as a multicultural, modern, creative, innovative, technologically advanced and 'cutting-edge' nation, as well as a country of forests and lakes, and of 'mountains, moose and Mounties.'

Invariably, states use the presentation of a modern image of themselves to help advance their economic interests and to make themselves more attractive to foreign publics. But there are other reasons as well. When India sought to counter stereotypical perceptions of the country in its major cultural festivals programme of the 1980s and 1990s it was primarily a matter of pride. As a country with a great history and a promising future, India wanted to be recognised for both its former great achievements and its recent economic and scientific progress.

Cultural diplomacy's increased emphasis on national image, particularly showing a country's modern economic face, reflects the impact of globalisation on the manner in which countries engage internationally. Countries must compete - or at least feel as though they must - for foreign investment and for attracting skilled migrants, high-worth individuals, tourists, students and others. Countries have come to believe that their chances of competing successfully are enhanced by showing their national image to those investing, or moving, or studying, and this presentation abroad of a national image is now frequently managed by governments within a framework of a nation brand.

Despite increased attention on using nation branding to raise a country's profile and present its reputation internationally, the relationship

between cultural diplomacy and branding remains weak. This is partly because nation branding is a very new concept, and lacks cultural diplomacy's antecedence. Indeed some countries, such as for instance India, have only very recently turned their attention to their national brand and how this might be used advantageously. The weak relationship between cultural diplomacy and nation branding is also due to a lack of clarity about what a nation brand comprises, the process required to develop and implement a nation brand, and the difficulty in transposing a private sector concept to the public sector at a national level. Even when the concept is fully understood by policymakers, politicians and others, the task of developing and implementing a nation brand remains daunting.⁵⁵

In Anholt's view, there are two key benefits for countries applying private sector brand theory to their national reputations. The first is a greater awareness of the extraordinary value of a national reputation - in branding terminology, a country's brand equity. The second concerns the potential power of what is termed brand purpose. A brand purpose is the internal commitment - whether of a private sector company or a country's government, citizens and organisations - to the external brand. It involves both the development of a common long-term strategy for the country and its role in the world, and the coordination of a range of government and non-government messages such as public diplomacy, tourism promotion, investment promotion, cultural promotion, and export promotion, in order that these different forms of international promotion work with, rather than against, each other.

New Zealand's Cultural Diplomacy International Programme (CDIP), established in 2004, sought to link cultural diplomacy to New Zealand's nation brand. It provides a good example of the difficulty of

55) See Simon Anholt, 'Place branding: is it marketing, or isn't it?', *Place Branding and Public Diplomacy*, 4 (2008), 1-6.

establishing such a linkage. One of the principles of the CDIP was that its 'messages' should 'not be inconsistent with the nation brand position of clean, green, innovative, creative and technologically advanced.' Some explanation of the relevance of these words is warranted. 'Clean and green' is shorthand for the general international perception of New Zealand, particularly amongst would-be tourists. That perception is in large part due to the work of New Zealand's tourism brand, managed by Tourism New Zealand, which seeks to brand New Zealand as a tourist destination that makes the organisation's key target market (termed interactive travellers) 'hanker' to visit New Zealand.⁵⁶ Much of the imagery used by Tourism New Zealand in its international promotions show a New Zealand that is both clean and green: a clean, unpolluted environment and pristine green landscapes. 'Innovative, creative and technologically advanced' refers to what are perceived of as the core elements of New Zealand's international business and investment brand, a brand known as 'New Zealand New Thinking.'⁵⁷ This brand has been developed by New Zealand's economic development agency, New Zealand Trade and Enterprise, to 'build awareness amongst investors, buyers, migrants and international media of New Zealand as a creative, innovative and technologically advanced country.'

With this background in mind, it is possible to view the term 'nation brand position' set out in the CDIP's founding document as an attempt by New Zealand bureaucrats in the Ministry responsible for the CDIP to merge New Zealand's two international brands, for tourism and business, so as to ensure that the activities of the new cultural diplomacy programme were at least conscious of these brands and their aims, and were aware of the government's desire to show a certain face of New Zealand abroad - a tourist destination with a modern economy and an exciting culture.

56) See Tourism New Zealand, *Statement of Intent 2008/09*, 2008.

57) New Zealand Trade & Enterprise, *New Zealand New Thinking*, 2009.

However, it was always going to be hard for any one of the CDIP's cultural events simultaneously to show a New Zealand as clean, green, innovative, creative and technologically advanced, all at the same time. One cultural event in the CDIP - the presentation of a sacred white horse to a shrine in Japan, funded under the CDIP – arguably failed to intersect with any one of these five catch words. Other events stressed one brand over another. A major event in the CDIP in the second year of its operation, an exhibition on New Zealand innovation developed by New Zealand's national museum, Te Papa Tongarewa, attempted to show aspects of New Zealand innovation, creativity and technological advancement. By contrast, the presentation to the Berlin Zoo of a corrugated iron kiwi made by a New Zealand artist showed New Zealand's artistry and creativity rather than its innovation. The CDIP also supported a number of tours overseas by Maori performing groups (known in New Zealand as 'kapa haka'), performances which emphasised the power and vitality of the culture of New Zealand's indigenous people, but which were less concerned with showing innovation or indeed the contemporary side of New Zealand.

Bureaucrats responsible for managing the CDIP sought to ensure that the initiative's cultural activity showed modern New Zealand as being 'innovative, creative and technologically advanced' by eschewing, if possible, reliance on a single cultural event. Rather, preference was given to funding a number of connected activities. Hence a core cultural event, such as a performance by a Maori cultural group, would be combined with a film festival, several seminars on aspects of the modern New Zealand economy, and a launch event, aimed in particular at the media. In this way New Zealand would be shown as more than 'clean and green', or more than distinguished by its Maori culture, but a country that was clean, green, culturally distinctive, and a first world economy to boot. This approach also had the effect of increasing the impact of a small cultural diplomacy programme by attempting to make the sum of the parts greater than the whole.

The multifaceted approach was evident in the New Zealand presence at the World Expo, at Aichi, in Japan, in 2005. The New Zealand government provided funding of NZ\$8.5 million for the construction of a pavilion at the expo. According to New Zealand Trade and Enterprise, the pavilion depicted New Zealand as a land of great natural beauty and New Zealanders as creative and technologically sophisticated people. The centrepiece of the pavilion was a giant piece of New Zealand greenstone. Each day, for the six months of the expo, a New Zealand kapa haka group performed twice near the New Zealand pavilion. The New Zealand national day at Aichi, on 3 June 2005, involved performances by New Zealand artists and art groups, singer Hayley Westenra, the fashion show World of Wearable Art, the New Zealand String Quartet, the dance company Black Grace, and singer Hinewehi Mohi. The government provided additional funding of NZ\$3.5 million for a programme of six projects which aimed to take advantage of the opportunities the New Zealand pavilion provided for advancing trade interests. Phil Goff, New Zealand's foreign minister, when announcing the additional funding, said that New Zealand's presence at Aichi was 'aimed at broadening the Japanese perception of New Zealand; to show there is more to us than just being "clean and green." It will also show we are creative, innovative and stylish in many areas of interest to discerning Japanese consumers.'⁵⁸

Such an approach, when judged by its ability to show to an audience a multifaceted image of a country, has a major limitation: audience participation. In practice, the only audience that is likely to intersect with all components of a multifaceted cultural diplomacy programme would be the media, and even then it is unlikely that each targeted media organisation visited the pavilion, watched a kapa haka performance and saw the New Zealand national day in its entirety. A single Japanese visitor to the New

58) Phil Goff, 'Budget 2004: New Funding to Capture Aichi Expo Opportunities,' news release, May 12, 2004.

Zealand pavilion may well have decided that New Zealand was more than clean and green, but a single member of the audience for a kapa haka performance (who had not visited the pavilion, or seen the national day) could well perceive New Zealand as being quite removed from being technologically sophisticated.

The insistence that the CDIP be consistent with New Zealand's two brands may have been difficult to comply with in practice, but it did have the effect of moving the cultural activities of the CDIP away from some cultural manifestations which could be deemed old fashioned, stereotypical or lacking cultural distinctiveness (such as pipe bands and exhibitions of quilts) to a wider range of contemporary cultural manifestations, and to those cultural manifestations with a focus on showing New Zealand's innovation and technological sophistication. Hence in this respect, although the attempted linkage to brand may not have been in accordance with an optimum private sector approach to managing a brand, it nevertheless served to make the 'look' of New Zealand abroad more contemporary than it would have appeared had no linkage been stipulated.⁵⁹

Pursuit of domestic objectives

When cultural diplomacy is discussed by the academy, few scholars pay much attention to the practice being undertaken to achieve national domestic objectives. Robin Higham, a former Canadian ambassador, is a notable exception. Higham has great hopes for the capacity of a well-funded 'national project of cultural diplomacy' to achieve a wide range of domestic objectives.⁶⁰ Writing about Canadian cultural diplomacy, he thinks these domestic

59) The CDIP and its activities are discussed at length in Mark (2008), chapter 4.

60) It is important to emphasise that Higham 'has great hopes' for cultural diplomacy to contribute to domestic objectives. Even before the most recent cuts to Canada's federal diplomacy, Higham was strongly critical of the lack of support provided to Canada's federal cultural diplomacy.

objectives include helping build an improved identity awareness within Canada, thus contributing to Canada's social cohesion, helping counter-balance the pressures of global homogenisation and making Canada interesting to Canadians by 'discovering what makes Canada interesting to others.' In addition, cultural diplomacy has a clear impact domestically through what he terms the phenomenon of the 'conditioning stereotype': 'cultural diplomacy can have an important impact on domestic policies by instigating national compliance with our own image abroad. It is more difficult to sin while you are claiming saintliness.'⁶¹

The cultural diplomacy of New Zealand supports Higham's view that cultural diplomacy plays a role in advancing domestic objectives. *Te Maori*, an exhibition of Maori artifacts which toured the US and New Zealand in the mid 1980s, was supported by the New Zealand government as a cultural diplomacy project not only because it would advance New Zealand's interests in the US, but also because it would advance Maori interests in New Zealand. This domestic objective was not merely a by-product of the exhibition's success, but a stated, intentional objective of the government.⁶² The New Zealand government's objectives for the exhibition's international tour were set out in the speech by the Minister of Maori Affairs, Koro Wetere, at the opening of *Te Maori* at the Metropolitan Museum. The two objectives with an international dimension were first to provide a 'soft-sell' approach to add a further dimension to Americans' awareness of New Zealand and more depth

61) Higham (2001), pp. 139-140.

62) The artifacts in *Te Maori* were drawn from museum collections throughout New Zealand. The exhibition opened its international tour at the Metropolitan Museum of Art, New York, on 10 September 1984, was shown at three other museums in the United States, and following the United States tour, in the four major cities of New Zealand. At each venue, the exhibition was opened with a dawn ceremony, and included traditional cultural performances. The exhibition 'showcased traditional Maori material culture,' although it did not include women's arts, for which it was criticised. Bernie Kernot, 'Te Maori Te Hokinga Mai: Some Reflections,' *AGMANZ Journal* 18, no. 2 (1987), 3-7, at page 4.

to their understanding of it,⁶³ and second to further wider interests, including trade, investment and tourism.⁶⁴ The extraordinary success of *Te Maori* provided ‘considerable scope’ for extending its impact to counter the impact in the US of the New Zealand government’s ban on visits to New Zealand waters by nuclear-armed and nuclear-powered ships.⁶⁵ The exhibition’s domestic objective sought to enhance Maori mana:

it is our hope that [Te Maori will] increase the mana of the Maori people...Te Maori shows that the Maori culture is a living one and that the Maori people are alive, vibrant and creative...The Maori are proud members of that country: proud of the contribution we make to the wealth of the country...: proud of the history and culture that we give and participate in: proud of the contribution that we make to the shaping of a distinct New Zealand society and nation...the Maori people retain their separate identity, culture and language...All this is underpinned by a strong resurgence of and identification with Maori culture and history.⁶⁶

This aim, emphasized by Wetere, was noted in less emphatic terms by New Zealand’s foreign ministry early in the exhibition’s planning. The ministry anticipated that the exhibition would increase public consciousness of the value of the exhibition’s artifacts and lead to improved care of them in New Zealand. Co-curator Hirini Moko Mead shared the government’s view that the exhibition would enhance Maori mana and Maori art would be seen in a new light. Its customary placement in museums in New Zealand alongside

63) Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, draft memorandum for Cabinet, 4 March 1981 (ABHS 950. W4627. Box 1865. 71/4/4. Part 1. Te Maori), Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Archives New Zealand.

64) M Norrish to the Director-General of the New Zealand Forest Service, 19 December 1985 (ABHS 950. W4627. Box 1866. 71/4/4. Part 7. Te Maori), Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Archives New Zealand.

65) M. Norrish to acting Minister of Foreign Affairs, 1 March, 1985 (ABHS 950. W4627. Box 1868. 71/4/4. Part 16. Te Maori). Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Archives New Zealand.

66) Koro Wetere, speech notes at the opening of *Te Maori* at the Metropolitan Museum, 5 May 1984 (ABHS 950. W4627. Box 1865. 71/4/4. Part 1. Te Maori), Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Archives New Zealand. The Maori word ‘mana’ means prestige, authority, control, power, influence, status, spiritual power, charisma. See *Maori Dictionary Online*, s.v “Mana,” <http://www.maoridictionary.co.nz/index.cfm> (accessed October 9, 2008).

‘stuffed animals, birds, insects and fishes’ would no longer be acceptable once the same artifacts were shown as art objects in the very highest altar of institutional art, ‘The Met.’ Mead thought the exhibition was

a good public relations exercise which might do us a lot of good at a time when we are calling for a greater measure of autonomy for the Maori in New Zealand and when we want our Treaty of Waitangi recognised internationally as the instrument which permits us to demand limited autonomy. It would make Pakeha more aware of the value of Maori culture, through international recognition, and Maori more proud of their culture and more aware of it, for the same reason.⁶⁷

There have been other instances of the cultural diplomacy of New Zealand seeking to achieve domestic objectives. The Cultural Exchange Programme of the 1970s had the domestic objective of supporting New Zealand’s cultural development, a type of nation-building project, and the Asia: New Zealand Foundation sought to enhance national social cohesion by contributing to a greater acceptance of New Zealand’s Asian population (particularly new immigrants from Asia), in part by bringing Asian culture to New Zealand.

In addition to the deliberate pursuit of domestic objectives, cultural diplomacy sometimes has an unplanned and hence unexpected impact, what might be termed the ‘feel good’ effect. The domestic impact of positive international recognition for a state’s culture and its cultural success can contribute to a state’s sense of itself, its sense of being a distinctive national community.⁶⁸ The exhibition *Te Maori* had this impact: following the international success of *Te Maori*, New Zealand had a better sense that it was a country that was unique, an imagined community in which its citizens saw themselves as members of a distinct community that was in part defined by

67) Hirini Moko Mead, Letter to Wilder Green, 23 February 1981 (ABHS 950. W4627. Box 1865. 71/4/4. Part 1. Te Maori), Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Archives New Zealand.

68) See Benedict R. O. Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, 2nd ed. (London: Verso, 1991).

Maori culture. The same was true with the national reaction in New Zealand to the success of *The Lord of the Rings* film trilogy (with which government-funded cultural diplomacy was associated). National reaction to international cultural success (mostly commercial in nature, sometimes made possible through cultural diplomacy) can be viewed as an addition to the menu of activity which enables a disparate group of people to feel connected to one another. It is worth noting that the degree of domestic impacts of national reaction to international cultural success will be limited by the extent of media coverage: the greater the media coverage, the greater the 'feel good' factor. The 'feel good' factor contributes to a state's confidence. In New Zealand, this has become an important component of its national economic agenda, and nation-building. In recent years the New Zealand government has consciously sought to use the resources of the state to engender a greater confidence in New Zealanders, on the basis that a confident New Zealand is better able to meet a range of national objectives. Other domestic impacts of cultural diplomacy aside from the 'feel good' impact include changing attitudes about the importance of cultural preservation, to the value of culture, and museum practices.⁶⁹

The Potential of Cultural Diplomacy

Cultural diplomacy can seemingly provide a powerful range of benefits to a government and a country. It can raise a state's profile, contribute to nation branding, advance core interests, connect with elite, mass and diaspora audiences, provide powerful opportunities for racial minorities, religious groups, and linguistic groups to show their culture, and can benefit students

69) It is worth noting that there can also be discerned what might be termed an evangelical motivation for the support for cultural diplomacy by politicians, a desire to show each state to the world, regardless of whether this would advance national interests, or achieve domestic impacts. A state should show itself to the world because the world deserves to know about the state, because the state has a special-ness that can only be admired.

and others studying overseas.

For cultural diplomacy to reach its full potential, however, a change in how the practice is conceived and implemented is required. Political control over cultural content should be removed, cultural diplomacy's role in nation branding should be expanded, and cultural diplomacy should be regarded as a tool for achieving national domestic objectives, especially those associated with national social cohesion. These are discussed in turn.

First, cultural diplomacy of the type practiced by official entities usually reflects official policy and presents an image of a state which meets government policy objectives. Certainly, cultural diplomacy as constructed by an official entity tends to emphasize the positive. Politicians invariably regard cultural diplomacy to be at its best when showing the positive aspects of a state. They and the population at large like to see a state's finest cultural achievements shown abroad- its best orchestras, ballets, and bullfights. Politicians in particular are less likely to view the practice as an opportunity to show the state 'warts and all', and in particular to show cultural manifestations which run counter to, or are critical of, official government policy. As always, it is not completely clear-cut: countries frequently undertake cultural diplomacy activities (with the support of politicians) which provide insights into a country's politics or society which may not necessarily be welcomed or applauded by either audiences or politicians. Many countries, for example, stage film festivals abroad, and it is usual for these government-sponsored festivals to incorporate films dealing with problematic aspects of society.

Given this inherent impetus to show through cultural diplomacy positive aspects of a state and eschew content critical of official government policy, should responsibility for cultural diplomacy be transferred to independent entities in order to allow full and 'honest' cultural expression? Cultural diplomacy when delivered through an independent entity is more likely to incorporate aspects of a state's culture opposed to, or critical of, a

government, its policies or its performance. The UK's British Council is a well known example of this type of delivery, albeit one which seems to place more value on its independence and less on its contribution to the UK government's broad foreign policy goals. As a recent report by the UK think-tank Demos argues, it is feasible for the Council to have a closer relationship with UK diplomacy and its diplomatic missions than it has had without losing its independence.⁷⁰ An alternative model to the British Council is to establish an independent entity within a foreign service. It should be accountable to an independent board. The latter should be accountable not to politicians, but to Parliament (or its equivalent). The agency's objectives could include raising the country's profile, showing the very best culture abroad and facilitating cultural exchanges and scholarships, and it would be free to choose whatever cultural manifestations it thought would best meet these objectives, including those manifestations with which the government may not agree.

A genuinely independent model such as that of the British Council would, in the case of the cultural diplomacy of India, for instance, enable its cultural diplomacy to be freed from the clutches of the ICCR, which has made the cultural diplomacy of India look rather staid and dull, despite the many opportunities available to practice a lively cultural diplomacy. These opportunities include political support for the role that cultural diplomacy can play and for the provision of extra funds, the extraordinary range of cultural forms and expressions in India, comprising its civilisational heritage, popular culture, and range of world class contemporary art practices, and the willingness of the Indian diaspora to contribute to cultural diplomacy. New Zealand's cultural diplomacy would also best be located within an independent agency similar to the British Council, rather than within an independent entity located within the Foreign Service. Its politicians in

70) This is discussed in the Demos report on cultural diplomacy of 2007. See Bound, Briggs, Holden and Jones (2007), pp. 62-64.

general love to micro-manage, its diplomats on the whole tend to be too risk averse and too certain of their cultural tastes to stray from the tried and true, and the populist publicity-seeking politicians which New Zealand throws up regularly simply cannot resist the temptation to make political mileage out of criticising art forms they regard as elitist or incomprehensible. Creative New Zealand, the national arts development agency, seemingly an ideal place from which to deliver New Zealand's cultural diplomacy outside of government, may itself be too closely administratively connected to government to be able to resist political interference, despite having had to do so in recent years. Whilst the organisation knows its culture, it knows far less about diplomacy or foreign policy (as can only be expected given its work in arts development in New Zealand and occasionally overseas) and it lacks the intellectual or management capability of New Zealand's Foreign Service.

Second, for cultural diplomacy to reach its full potential it would benefit from a better understanding of its place within nation branding. Anholt's approach to nation branding provides a valid framework. Two aspects are important: a common purpose, and coordination of branding strands. Anholt believes that an effective nation brand is a way of encapsulating the fundamental common purpose of a country, and thus trying to achieve some forward momentum and some effective common behavior. A nation brand must involve a plan setting out how a country can position itself in the world, and those policies, innovations and investments the country needs to undertake to earn the image it feels it wants and desires.⁷¹ This is the hard part of nation branding, and resembles Higham's 'phenomenon of the 'conditioning stereotype' in which cultural diplomacy brings about domestic national compliance with a country's image abroad: a country becomes what it claims to be, because it wants to ensure that its image is based on facts

71) Council on Foreign Relations, *Anholt: Countries Must Earn Better Images through Smart Policy*, 2008, p. 2.

rather than illusion. It wants to deserve its reputation, and 'walk the talk'. Ensuring better alignment between cultural diplomacy and branding requires coordination of a number of parallel nation branding strands: tourism, business, investment, public diplomacy and culture. Cultural diplomacy should do what it does best – show a country's culture and society, the best sort of cultural activity: the 'noisy, unleashed, unexpected, often shocking or outrageous'.⁷² Let a country's tourism brand show abroad a country's reputation as a tourism destination; let its business brand to show a country's business and economic reputation, but let cultural diplomacy show a country in all its brilliance, vitality and madness. This should include culture which is political and provocative. This in turn will indicate that a country is confident enough to show itself 'warts and all.' And rather than resisting the use of indigenous culture, because such culture may look old-fashioned and lacking in sophistication, the culture of indigenous people should be celebrated and form an important element of a balanced cultural diplomacy programme.

Third, as shown, cultural diplomacy can work towards achieving national domestic goals, and the practice should be used more effectively for this purpose. Cultural diplomacy can contribute to improving the esteem of minority groups and enhance national confidence and national social cohesion. By way of example, it may well be that New Zealand's cultural diplomacy could be used to improve the sense of inclusion that Chinese New Zealanders have in New Zealand society, by including more artists with Chinese ancestry, several of whom have international reputations. A greater focus on pursuing national domestic goals should go hand in hand with publicising the performances of these artists abroad, not just in the mainstream media, but in media targeted specifically at ethnic and minority

72) Saul, John Ralston, 'Culture and Foreign Policy,' in *Canada's Foreign Policy: Position Papers, Report Of the Special Joint Committee of the Senate and the House of Commons Reviewing Canadian Foreign Policy* (Canadian Communication Group Publishing, Public Works and Government Services Canada: Ottawa, 1994), 83-118, at page 98.

communities. The impact of the exhibition *Te Maori* on Maori self-esteem and on a generally improved acceptance and understanding of Maoridom by non-Maori in New Zealand society shows that cultural diplomacy can, and should be, used in this manner.

Conclusion

Cultural diplomacy has the potential to become a more valuable tool for states in future, and a more valued and significant component of the practice of public diplomacy. If cultural diplomacy's potential to contribute to a government's foreign policy and its diplomacy is to be fully realised, however, governments need to better understand the practice's possibilities, provide more funding for it, and think about how best to deliver it.

Cultural diplomacy's potential power rests on its intersection with national culture, national values, national identity, and national pride. Culture can show a state's personality in a way that connects with people and benefits both the practitioner and the receiver; it can show the 'true' nature of a state and its people. The national image presented abroad through cultural diplomacy need not be a set of facts and figures, or postcards, or sound-bites, or a tourist promotion slogan. The power of a cultural performance, or a film, or a scholarship to connect should not be underestimated. In a modern world in which the messages of states disseminated through public diplomacy are sometimes viewed with suspicion, and the declared values and ideas of state frequently bear little resemblance to state's foreign policy actions, cultural diplomacy can help overcome the gap. For example, the public diplomacy of the US in the early years of the 21st century has a very difficult task persuading people in other countries that the US means what it says when it talks of its commitment to democracy and freedom. For many millions of people around the world, US foreign policy in action just does not

match the country's lofty ideals. But in the past, US cultural diplomacy has shown itself to be an extraordinarily powerful diplomatic tool. In the Cold War, cultural diplomacy showed in a tangible way the US's commitment to the right of freedom of speech. The US government was able to exert a powerful influence on people in the USSR by using aspects of American culture - particularly jazz and visual art - which seemingly could only be produced by artists who were free to express themselves. Jazz almost *sounded like* freedom. US artists touring eastern European states and the erstwhile USSR were seen saying what they wanted, when they wanted, about any subject they chose. Countries such as New Zealand, India and Canada have extraordinary cultures on which to draw when interacting with other countries and their peoples, and they should use these extraordinary cultural assets to their fullest.

Cultural diplomacy needs more advocates, more funding, and it needs to be delivered in such a way as to minimise the sometimes negative impact that officialdom has on the practice. Greater advocacy for the practice by politicians, bureaucrats, artists and others will be made easier if these groups better recognise the practice's potential. Cultural diplomacy can give substance to public diplomacy at a time when that practice has a large task ahead of it. When recognised as one of a number of branding strands and used in this way, cultural diplomacy can enhance national reputation abroad by adding an extra dimension to parallel business, tourism and public diplomacy branding strands. And cultural diplomacy can give substance to efforts by politicians and others to improve national social cohesion. This is an important undertaking, and is likely to become more so in years to come. The modern world is one of mass migrations and movements, and competing claims to loyalty. A wide range of ethnicities and races now more often strive to live together under a common identity whilst retaining their cultural and linguistic distinctiveness. In such circumstances, all possible tools to help the cause of social cohesion and inclusiveness, and the recognition of cultural

diversity, should be used. Cultural diplomacy can do this: a state's citizens can take pride in the recognition afforded to the state through international cultural achievements, achievements of all members of society. In this respect, Canada's commitment to forging a multi-cultural polity is a beacon, but that country's failure to adequately fund cultural diplomacy in support of this goal is a disappointment.

But cultural diplomacy requires funding. France has always led the way in supporting cultural diplomacy, and Germany and the UK has had a long history of support for the practice. Norway has recently announced a further increase in its funding for cultural diplomacy and public diplomacy, which the foreign ministry says brings the total increase in funding for cultural activities abroad since 2005 to close to 40 per cent.⁷³ Other countries have been far more parsimonious in providing public funds for cultural diplomacy. The history of New Zealand cultural diplomacy over the last four decades has been that of inadequate funding and noble effort. India's cultural diplomacy could lead the world, and that country's politicians have indicated that funds could be made available for this, but this has been thwarted by the torpor of India's foreign ministry. The sending of arts companies, exhibitions and symphonies abroad, the production of documentaries and DVDs, and other activities of the practice is an expensive undertaking, as is the setting up of standalone entities through which to deliver cultural diplomacy. But the gains are worth the investment. Cultural diplomacy may be a sub category of the conventional practice of diplomacy, and a component of public diplomacy, but it is a practice that reflects the excitement, the power, the importance, and the pleasure of culture, enriching all parties that engage in it.

73) Norway Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 'Boost for Norwegian culture abroad,' press release, 2007.

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 - 2 Melissen (2005), p. 24.
 - 3 H. Butterfield, 'Diplomacy New and Historical', in H. Butterfield and M. Wight, *Diplomatic Investigations*, (London: Allen and Unwin, 1966) pp. 150-2.
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 - 5 Dominic Kelly, 'Rice, Oil and the Atom: A Study of the Role of Key Material Resources in the Security and Development of Japan', *Government and Opposition*, Vol. 40, No 2 (2005), pp. 278-327.
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