3D

'The Next Generation'

Lessons learned from Uruzgan for future operations

Jaïr van der Lijn

netherlands institute of international relations
clingendael

Cordaid

Contents

Abbreviations

3D	Defence, diplomacy and development
ANA	Afghan National Army
ANDS	Afghan National Development Strategy
ANP	Afghan National Police
ANDS	Afghan National Development Strategy
ANSF	Afghan National Security Forces
BG	Battle group
CIMIC	Civil-military cooperation
CivRep	Civil representative
COIN	Counterinsurgency
CSO	Civil society organisation
CulAd	Cultural advisor
DCU	Dutch Consortium for Uruzgan
EU	European Union
EUFOR	European Union Force
GIRoA	Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan
HGIS	Homogeneous Group International Cooperation
IED	Improvised Explosive Devices
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NGO	Non-governmental organisation
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OEF	Operation Enduring Freedom
OSAd	Development advisor
PolAd	Political advisor
PRT	Provincial Reconstruction Team
SUA	Smallest Unit of Action
SWOT	Strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, threats
TFU	Task Force Uruzgan
UN	United Nations
UNAMA	United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
WEWA	(Dutch) Afghan Economic Reconstruction Group

Executive summary

This report about the Dutch comprehensive approach is based on a study by Jaïr van der Lijn of the Clingendael Institute, commissioned by Cordaid. The views and analysis put forward are entirely those of the author in his private or professional capacity and should not be attributed to Cordaid, the involved research institutions or any agencies or people interviewed during the study.

The purpose of the report is to contribute to the debate about comprehensive approaches. It takes a look at the perceived *strengths, weaknesses, opportunities* and *threats* of the Dutch comprehensive approach and at what dilemmas play a role in it. To answer this question and arrive at policy recommendations for future operations, the study maps perceptions regarding the '3D approach' consisting of defence, diplomacy and development in the Dutch mission in Uruzgan province, Afghanistan. In addition to an extensive literature research, focus group meetings were held with NGO representatives, military personnel and diplomats (the latter working on political and development affairs). The author and Cordaid would like to thank all those involved in the project, in particular: representatives of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defence and the NGOs part of the Dutch Consortium for Uruzgan (DCU), as well as the interchurch organisation for development cooperation (ICCO) and Kerk in Actie, and Oxfam Novib; Christa Hijkoop and Lisette van der Ark who conducted the literature studies; everyone involved in organising the focus group meetings; and all those who commented on the draft text.

The report finds that, although different focus group participants have different ideas on the definition of the 3D approach and take different positions towards it, there is a general broad understanding of what it is, and a belief that coherence is in principle positive. The research shows how the concept of the 3D approach, pushed by Dutch the parliament in order to gain broad support for the mission, evolved on the ground and how it gradually increased the coherence of the policies and actions of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defence, and a number of NGOs. The year 2008, in particular, was a turning point following increased civilian presence in the field. The report attempts to map the type and degree of coherence between the different organisations and finds that, within the 'broader 3D approach', there were many different forms of interaction between a number of organisational units. Each interaction had its own distinct issues and its own level of coherence. Moreover, the level of coherence differed according to the level at which it took place – strategic or headquarters versus operational or field – and changed in most cases towards more cohesion during the mission.

The report shows that there were many coherence strengths in the mission in Uruzgan, but also that there is room for further improvement in future missions, and dilemmas and pitfalls to avoid. It is remarkable that, despite a relatively long list of weaknesses and threats, in the end general opinion is that the comprehensive approach has a future. This can partly be explained by the overriding importance attached to the strength

"The whole is more than the sum of its parts". Moreover, a significant number of weaknesses and threats in fact underline that further coherence is needed, and that the 3D approach as used in Uruzgan was not coherent enough. All these positive perceptions should not, however, bury a number of potential serious pitfalls to further coherence in a future Dutch comprehensive approach. Some of these pitfalls can be addressed and avoided. Others are unfortunately inherent to further coherence and remain dilemmas that have to be faced in the design and implementation of missions.

There are contradictions between certain characteristics of the 3D approach that are perceived to be both positive and negative, and which appear to be a dilemma. An example is that, on the one hand the 3D approach is broadly perceived to be directed towards local ownership while, on the other hand, some military personnel and NGO representatives argue that the initial military focus in a 3D approach decreased responsibility and ownership of the Afghans.

More fundamental dilemmas are:
- The more integration takes place at a national level in the countries providing troops, the more difficult integration and coordination between the different actors at the regional level in the host nation becomes. It points to a potential limitation of national coherence as it might affect international coherence between, for example, the different allies.
- The more coherence, the more coordination is needed, and therefore effort, time and funds. This is in fact a known dilemma in cooperation.
- The sustainability of the comprehensive approach, which is supposed to have a long time horizon, is dependent on short-term political will.

There are fundamental differences between the different approaches of diplomacy, development and defence that continued to pop up throughout this research and that make complete coherence next to impossible. The three 'Ds' have different time horizons, different capacities and speeds, different directions and so on and so forth. Most diplomats and military personnel view these differences as not necessarily negative, because they can also be complementary. However, they are only likely to fully cohere if they are part of a long-term grand strategy. For this reason, NGOs appear to have reached more or less their limits of coherence with government policy.

Finally, the report distils five factors that determine the success or failure of comprehensive approaches: business economy (cost-benefit factors); institutional factors (whether mandates, goals and objectives are complementary or shared), organisation cultural factors (whether those involved have common values and views); environmental factors (the context in which the conflict is taking place); and individual factors (the chemistry between the personnel involved). The more these factors are dealt with and the better they are lived up to the greater the chance of success.

We hope you enjoy reading the report and find it useful, and look forward to any comments or suggestions for follow-up.

Jaïr van der Lijn, jlijn@clingendael.nl
Netherland Institute of International Relations 'Clingendael'

Paul van den Berg, paul.van.den.berg@cordaid.nl
Cordaid

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Summary

In recent years, discussion among Dutch civil society organisations (CSOs) and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) about civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) in overseas missions has developed to include the '3D approach'. In this approach, *defence, diplomacy* and *development* – the three 'Ds' – are combined to tackle security, governance and development in target areas. The approach follows from the idea that security is complex and needs multidimensional answers. As with concepts such as 'whole of government', 'whole of system' and 'whole of nation', the 3D approach breathes life into the idea that separate actors working in fragile states or conflict areas (can) aim for the same goal. All the above concepts can be labelled as, or considered a subset of, integrated or comprehensive approaches and are defined as "action to ensure that international peace and stability operations are embedded in a system-wide strategic approach aimed at combining the broadest possible set of dimensions – typically including the security, governance, development and political dimensions."

Within the comprehensive approach, different actors strive for more coherence between their separate activities. Such *coherence* is "the effort to direct the wide range of activities undertaken in the political, development, governance and security dimensions of international peace and stability operations towards common strategic objectives." There are a number of options with regard to the degree or depth of coherence. At one end of the spectrum actors may choose to work together in a unified manner while at the other they may agree not to work together at all, with a whole range of options in between. The choices different actors make depend, among other things, on the character of their organisation and the nature of the mission.

Between 2006 and 2010, the Netherlands deployed its armed forces as part of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in southern Afghanistan, as part of the ISAF comprehensive approach for the whole of Afghanistan. During this mission, aimed at security, stability and reconstruction in Uruzgan, the Dutch strived for coherence in their policies and actions by applying the 3D approach. The mission ended on 31 July 2010, making the time ripe for reflection on what can be learned from its 3D approach for future Dutch comprehensive operations. Generally speaking, the Uruzgan mission is perceived to have been positive in terms of coherence. However, while there were many opportunities and benefits, there were also some limitations, problems and dilemmas for the various actors involved, raising a question for future comprehensive approaches: How should coherence in its broad sense – including between ministries other than Foreign Affairs and Defence, and civil society – be dealt with?

To answer the above question and arrive at policy recommendations for future operations, this study draws on lessons from the Dutch 3D approach in Uruzgan, mapping perceptions regarding its *strengths, weaknesses, opportunities* and *threats* and the dilemmas that played a role in it. First, it looks at how the character of cohesion evolved during the mission, and examines the learning curve that led to that change. Second, where possible, the study attempts to differentiate between coherence at the

strategic (headquarters, The Hague) level and the operational (field, Task Force Uruzgan (TFU)) level, the main focus being on cohesion in the field[a]. (Typically, the embassy lies between both levels, but in missions tends towards the strategic level.) Third, the study considers the role of NGOs in the Dutch 3D approach in Uruzgan.

Research question

The main research question of this study is:
What are the perceived *strengths, weaknesses, opportunities* and *threats* of the Dutch comprehensive approach and which dilemmas play a role?

This question is divided into five sub-questions:
- What are the '3D' and comprehensive approaches and how are they perceived?
- What are the perceived strengths and weaknesses of the 3D approach in Uruzgan?
- What are the perceived opportunities and threats of such a future comprehensive approach?
- What dilemmas play a role in a Dutch comprehensive approach?
- What are the factors for success and failure in a comprehensive approach?

It must be stressed that this study is not an *evaluation* of the Dutch mission or the Dutch 3D approach in Uruzgan. This would be impossible, for a number of reasons. First, it was not the aim of the study. Secondly, the actual achievements of the 3D approach on the ground, the dependent variable in any evaluation, have not been measured. Thirdly, the mission did not take place in a laboratory but in a complex environment, in which looking for the impact of a specific approach within a variety of variables is next to impossible. Moreover, it is not possible to make a comparison between the mission implemented with the 3D approach and what it would look like if it were implemented without it.

Methodology

In order to answer the research question, a two-track strategy was chosen. First, the study looked at coherence in the *comprehensive approach* in general. The comprehensive approach within this track was defined broadly and included coherence in such widely differing contexts as integrated United Nations (UN) missions and between institutions of the European Union (EU) with EU operations. Future Dutch operations are likely to take place in different contexts than Uruzgan and require different

a Throughout this report the terms 'field level' and 'operational level' are used interchangeably, as are 'strategic level' and 'headquarters level'. Within the Dutch military, three levels are used – the strategic, the operational and the tactical, with the TFU operating at the tactical level. In this report the TFU operates at the operational level, the ministries in The Hague at the strategic level and the embassy in Kabul sometimes at the strategic and sometimes at the operational level.

forms of coherence, as is the case with the Dutch contribution to the European Union Force (EUFOR) in Chad. The data on the comprehensive approach in general serve as further input and background, and are meant to support the applicability of lessons learned from Uruzgan to the comprehensive approach in future Dutch missions. The second track was directed specifically at the Dutch 3D approach in Uruzgan. The first track consisted of a literature study, while the second track consisted of a literature study and four focus group meetings. These were held to generate further information on the mission in Uruzgan and to provide input into lessons learned for the future. In the first three focus groups, NGO representatives, military personnel and diplomats (the latter working on political and development affairs) met separately. Representatives of all three groups took part in the fourth focus group meeting, with discussion based on input from the earlier meetings and the literature studies. Both tracks fed into the final drawing up of this report.

This report attempts to map perceptions and arguments with regard to the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats (SWOT) of a 3D approach within the Dutch context and to serve as the basis for further discussion and research on the topic. Although the study did not measure the results of the 3D approach in Uruzgan, there may be indirect indicators for such inferences. All participants in the focus group meetings and the authors of literature used in the review operated in, responded to or researched the dependent variable – the results of the mission. For this reason, the more support an argument receives in the SWOT analysis, the more likely it is that there is indeed some inference. Nonetheless, even if there is consensus on a topic, which could be considered a strong indicator, further research would be required as consensus does not equal evidence and 'group think' is possible.

It is unlikely that every ministry or every NGO will agree with all the findings presented in this report as they are reflections of the perceptions of participants from the different ministries to the mission, as well as NGOs. Total agreement could only be the case if there was complete coherence between the different 'Ds'. If there was no coherence at all, each 'D' would only agree to one third of the findings. In practice, the level of agreement and disagreement is most likely to be somewhere in between.

> ### What are the '3D' and comprehensive approaches and how are they perceived?

Although it is generally assumed that when the term '3D approach' is used its meaning is clear, in fact there are still different interpretations of what it means exactly and what its goals are. Actors involved understand intuitively 'what' can be achieved through the combination of defence, diplomacy and development, and have a feeling or idea of what the 3D approach entails. However, when asked to define it, they run into

problems and disagreements. Chapter 2 shows that there is no clear definition of the 3D approach. It is an approach in which the diplomatic, military and development spheres aim for coherence where their fields of activity overlap in their aim to address governance, security and development issues. The degree of coherence differs for the different organisations involved – in general there is more coherence within government than between the government and outside actors such as NGOs – and depends on the location of the interaction – the level of coherence may differ in the field compared to headquarters.

As a concept, the 3D approach is still vague. Between the different 'Ds', but also within them, there is disagreement about the (necessary) degree of coherence, the need to segregate the different approaches even if they strive for coherence, the need for a lead agency, and the direct aims and sequencing of these in the overall approach. In the diplomacy 'D' and the governmental part of the development 'D', two schools can be distinguished. The diplomatic integrationists argue that 3D means the actors in the approach strive for coherence in policy development, planning, implementation and evaluation at all levels from headquarters to the field. The diplomatic segregationist do not pursue such a high level of coherence as the first group. They view the 3D approach as a way to synchronise interrelated approaches. There are three different interpretations of the 3D approach within the Defence 'D'. The military integrationists describe the 3D approach as a single team of military personnel, diplomats and development workers, each playing a role in security, governance and development. The military segregationists maintain that each organisation should stick to its own core business, but may involve other organisations in doing so. The forced incrementalists argue that the military have no choice but to get involved in the other fields. With regard to the 3D approach, NGOs' positions follow three schools. The principled neutralists oppose 3D as they see it as a further blurring of the lines. The pragmatists balance their principles and fears against more functionalist and instrumentalist considerations. The supporters do not object to the 3D approach in principle.

The 3D approach as such appears to be a method without a particular short-term aim other than to strive for coherence in the field of security and for the long-term goals of all three 'Ds' to be achieved. For this reason, because of the absence of (short-term) aims, participants in the approach fill the gap with their own goals. As a result, in Uruzgan many military personnel at one end of the spectrum saw the 3D approach as part of their counterinsurgency (COIN), aimed to suppress the insurgence. From their perspective '3D' is not necessarily COIN, but a well-implemented COIN strategy is '3D', i.e. not implemented solely or primarily by the military. At the other end of the spectrum, many NGOs and most diplomats working around development see the approach as an organising principle for organisations aimed at security, good governance and development in order to create a secure enough climate for further development. In such a context, defeating insurgents is not a necessity and in some cases is perhaps even counterproductive. The rationale behind this position is that an insurgency may have its origins in a population that fights oppression, the very people they hope

to assist. NGOs try to contribute to development without opposing the insurgents. For an NGO, being part of a COIN strategy would be unacceptable as it would mean losing its neutrality. *Principled neutralists* at the far end of the spectrum therefore equal 3D to COIN. Diplomats from the political affairs side of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs generally take a position in the middle of this spectrum, between the military on the one hand and the principled neutralist NGOs on the other.

Looking at the coherence in the mission in Uruzgan, chapters 3 and 4 describe how great improvements were made. The drive for coherence was based on past experience and experience gained in Uruzgan, and it was pushed by the Dutch parliament in order to gain broad support for the mission. In a process of trial and error, the different 'Ds' learned to work together. The increased capacity of the civilians, the increased numbers of Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) and Australian forces and the improved security situation in Uruzgan helped further. As a result, the initially mainly, although not solely, military-dominated 3D approach increasingly managed to blossom into an approach in which all 'Ds' played an important part. This was stimulated as a result of the increased number of civilians inside the mission, the increased influence of the Civilian Representative (CivRep) position, and the ever-increasing number of NGOs in the province.

If one peers deeper into the broader 3D approach the conceptual framework of De Coning & Friis allows for differentiation between participating organisations and their varying forms and levels of interaction. It appears that within the broader 3D approach there were many different forms of interaction between a number of organisational units. Each interaction had its own distinct issues and its own level of coherence. Moreover, the level of coherence differed depending on the level at which the interaction took place – strategic or headquarters versus operational or field – and at what point in the mission it took place – in most cases it moved towards more cohesion. This is most apparent at the operational level in the TFU, which within the framework of De Coning and Friis was mainly *cooperation* before 2009 and became *integrated* after 2009. Coherence at the strategic level, in The Hague between the Ministries of Defence and Foreign Affairs, remained mainly *cooperation*, although some coordination bodies were established. Coherence between the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) and the battle group (BG) also remained mainly *cooperation*, including after the PRT came under civilian lead. Although at the strategic level coherence with ISAF and Regional Command South was mainly *integrated*, and on paper there appears to be a clear ISAF strategy and chain of command, at the operational level within taskforces and between PRTs, and between countries participating in ISAF, the interaction was mainly *cooperation* as countries to a large extent pursued their own goals in their own way. At the strategic level coherence between the NGOs in DCU and the Dutch government was mainly *coordination*. In The Hague NGOs, diplomats and military personnel met frequently and became used to each other. At the operational level the interaction was more *coexistence* as NGOs needed to show their independence and neutrality. It is very likely that these different types of coherence at the

different levels – strategic and operational – explain to a certain extent the variety of opinions within the different 'Ds' on the 3D approach.

What are the perceived strengths and weaknesses of the 3D approach in Uruzgan?

This question is looked at in Chapter 5. The most important perceived strength of the 3D approach is that: *The whole is more than the sum of its parts*. This is the overriding argument for coherence. Its importance is shown by the fact that it is perceived by many to outweigh all the weaknesses and threats. It is supported by almost all the 'Ds' except for a few principled neutralist NGO representatives. It is argued that the 3D approach acknowledges the complexity of operations such as those in Afghanistan. The other perceived strengths by the same group are that: *The 3D approach is an investment in trust, respect and understanding among the different (governmental) actors intervening in Afghanistan; As a result of the 3D approach the military, diplomats and development workers had to work together, listen to and as a result learn from each other; The 3D approach makes the different separate approaches of the military, diplomats and development workers more multidimensional; and The 3D approach produces an exchange in ownership over the mission between civilians and the military*. In addition, some military personnel perceive that: *The 3D approach is driven nationally which allows countries to focus effectively; and The 3D approach had human resource strengths*. These two strengths are, however, debatable, as shown below.

A number of weaknesses in the 3D approach find their origins in the idea that in Uruzgan the approach was not coherent enough and further integration was needed. As such they do not question the importance of coherence, but in fact stress it. These perceived weaknesses are: *The 3D approach does not have a single goal and is not a single strategy. It is a number of goals and strategies placed under the same header; The 3D approach was not 'comprehensive' enough; The implementation of the 3D approach was still too compartmentalised; There is no lead agency or 'unity of command'; and The 3D approach still allowed partners to believe that the other would or could solve a problem*. These weaknesses are particularly perceived by military and diplomatic integrationists. Both diplomats and military personnel also perceive some weaknesses in the implementation of the 3D approach, regardless of the question about whether there should be more coherence. They argue that: *Human resources were not adjusted to the 3D approach; and The different ministries have different and inflexible rules and procedures that conflict*. In addition, the military in particular point out that in their perception: *The relationship between the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defence was imbalanced*. In contrast to these latter resolvable weaknesses, there are four weaknesses in the 3D approach that are more difficult to deal with: The three 'Ds' have

different capacities and speeds; *The three 'Ds' have different time horizons; The development and defence approaches have different directions, one is top-down, the other is more bottom-up; and the more coherence, the more coordination is needed, and therefore more effort, time and funds*. These weaknesses will be further elaborated upon below within the context of the dilemmas. One thing stands out. Although there may be more weaknesses than strengths in this SWOT analysis, the overriding perception among diplomats, military personnel and most NGO representatives is that the strengths of the 3D approach outweigh the weaknesses by far, and that in fact a number of perceived weaknesses stress the need for further coherence.

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What are the perceived opportunities and threats of the 3D approach in Uruzgan and a future comprehensive approach?

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Chapter 5 elaborates on this question also. The opportunity of the 3D approach in relation to its environment is broadly perceived to be that: *The 3D approach is directed towards local ownership*. With regard to the future, there are five additional opportunities. The military and diplomatic integrationists, especially, perceived that: *The 3D approach in Uruzgan and its lessons learned may be the seed for a more comprehensive approach for the Netherlands; and The further development of the 3D approach at the international level may be possible*. Both these opportunities, again, underline the opportunities for further coherence. Furthermore, the diplomats and some military personnel in particular stress that in future operations: *A comprehensive approach provides more body to influence or force local actors to act or refrain*. It is broadly perceived that: *A comprehensive approach provides more legitimacy to military operations*, as they are framed to the Dutch public in a broader approach. Especially military personnel, but also diplomats found this important. Among NGO representatives this was, however, not necessarily seen as an added value. The perception that: *The surplus value of the comprehensive approach may generate more funds*, was widely supported, as both the ministries and the NGOs argue that the success may attract funding and the military presence in an area opens new budget lines for NGOs.

The military and diplomatic integrationists, especially, stress that there are no threats but only pitfalls for 3D or comprehensive approaches. NGO representatives do, however, perceive threats. Moreover, what the military and diplomatic integrationists describe as pitfalls are normally characterised as threats in a SWOT analysis. The fact that the number of threats is relatively large can partly be explained by the fact that they include a number of frustrations among participants about issues they had to struggle with on a daily basis. Such frustrations, however, do not question the approach fundamentally as a whole. Again, although the list of threats appears long, they do not outweigh, from the perspective of most military personnel and diplomats, the strengths and opportunities. Only among some NGOs are these threats raising more serious doubts with regard to the 3D approach.

There are six perceived negative opinions in relation to the environment of the 3D approach. From research it appears that: *Some short-term projects of the PRT had negative long-term consequences*. Furthermore, according to many military personnel and diplomats: *The role of parliament in determining what should and should not happen has at times expanded too much to the micro level*. Many of them also perceived that: *Strategic communication in the Netherlands was directed too much at the military part of the mission*. According to military personnel, diplomats and NGO representatives *Cooperation with NGOs remains difficult*, because they are by definition independent from the government. Both diplomats and military personnel argue that this has not affected their mission negatively, but it does mean that further coherence with NGOs within a comprehensive approach, according to NGO representatives especially, is almost impossible. In addition, according to research, *Working together with Afghan NGOs is complex*, because some NGOs do not achieve the necessary quality and are not always sufficiently rooted in society. Lastly, diplomats perceived that *National Afghan politics were at times a threat to the 3D approach*.

At least a further seven out of the 16 threats in the SWOT analysis are indeed pitfalls that, with the necessary attention, may be avoided. Across the board it is warned that: *The perceived success of the 3D approach may become a threat*. The military and diplomatic segregationists, in particular, warn that: *If coherence grows too deep, the individual components are no longer able to act separately*. Military personnel and diplomats also raise the problems that: *Working together on the same issue allows for tunnel vision*; and *A comprehensive approach may spread too thin and as a result become too fragmented*. NGO representatives, in particular, warn that although the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the PRT generally had a clear picture of the situation: *Development projects that are part of a 3D mission in insecure areas are more difficult to monitor and evaluate*. They also perceive, despite the fact that this is denied by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, that: *As a result of the military drive rather than the developmental drive most funds go to political stabilisation rather than development*. Last, according to some journalists, diplomats and military personnel: *Having one's own approach and also one's own terminology made the transfer to the succeeding Australians and Americans more difficult*.

Three threats are more fundamental: *The more integration takes place at a national level in the countries providing troops, the more difficult integration and coordination at the regional level in the host nation becomes; The initial military focus in a 3D approach decreases responsibility and ownership of the Afghans; and The sustainability of the comprehensive approach, which is supposed to have a long time horizon, is dependent on short-term political will*. These will also be dealt with below within the context of dilemmas.

What dilemmas play a role in a Dutch comprehensive approach?

There are three contradictions between certain characteristics of the 3D approach that are perceived to be both positive and negative, and appear to be a dilemma. The first is a dilemma of a lower order. Some military personnel argue that: *The 3D approach had human resource strengths*, while other military personnel, diplomats and NGO representatives argue that: *Human resources were not adjusted to the 3D approach*. The dilemma is that, on the one hand as a result of relatively short tours, especially of most military personnel, and the fact that these rotations were not simultaneous, fresh ideas were continuously introduced, although a certain extent of continuity existed because the composition of those involved in the mission was not changed completely when a unit rotated. On the other hand, because of the constant influx of new personnel they were in a continuous process of getting to know the situation, each other and the Afghan people they had to deal with. Consequently, once they were finally familiar with the situation and the Afghans got used to the new faces, they were rotated out again. This is a classic problem in peace and crisis management operations.

The second dilemma is that, on the one hand it is broadly perceived that: *The 3D approach is directed towards local ownership*, while on the other hand some military personnel and NGO representatives argue that: *The initial military focus in a 3D approach decreases responsibility and ownership of the Afghans*. A development, and in fact a peace process, does indeed always require local ownership. If the process is started by a military intervention from outside, the initial ownership by definition always lies more with the intervening actor. This is a classic dilemma in peace building and may very well be true for military interventions in general.

The third dilemma in this group is that, on the one hand: *The 3D approach is driven nationally which allows countries to focus effectively* while, on the other hand: *The more integration takes place at a national level in the countries providing troops, the more difficult integration and coordination at the regional level in the host nation becomes*. The first perception was held only among some military personnel, while the second perception receives much more support among the military, and also in broader literature, among the diplomats and NGO representatives. Because, within the ISAF mission, Afghanistan was carved up and responsibilities over provinces were divided, the implementation of a combined strategy was inherently more difficult. Also, for the Netherlands, both in public perception and in policy and implementation, Uruzgan was the main focus. To a certain extent the Dutch looked at it through a straw, excluding developments and needs in surrounding provinces and the whole country. This did mean, however, that the Netherlands as a whole had a focus.

The above dilemma is, however, more fundamental because if it is true that: The more integration takes place at a national level

in the countries providing troops, the more difficult integration and coordination at the regional level in the host nation becomes, it points to a potential limitation of national coherence as it might affect international coherence between, for example, the different allies. Similarly, both military personnel and diplomats perceived that: The more coherence, the more coordination is needed, and therefore effort, time and funds. This is in fact a known dilemma in cooperation. It appears again that there is a limit to the yields of coherence if it does not lead to further coherent or merged structures.

There is one more fundamental dilemma that is particularly relevant to comprehensive approaches in which military deployment is of overriding importance, such as in missions. It is perceived particularly among military personnel and NGO representatives and holds that: *The sustainability of the comprehensive approach, which is supposed to have a long time horizon, is dependent on short-term political will*. Development has a much longer time horizon than the presence of the military mission. If political will is only short term and follows the military presence, the later stages of the process and therefore its sustainability are under threat. According to this view if, a few years after the military presence in Uruzgan, development attention also shifts to a new area where the military are deployed, eventually the whole effort is under threat.

Last but not least, there are fundamental differences between the different approaches of diplomacy, development and defence that make complete coherence next to impossible. NGOs in particular point out that: *The three 'Ds' have different time horizons*. The military time horizon – by nature of their political masters, their tasks and their organisational structure – have a shorter time horizon than development, where the time horizon goes up to 20 to 50 years. The military are aware of this, however, and not only try to plan such long-term processes as well, but also actively look for advice. In addition: *The three 'Ds' have different capacities and speeds; and The development and defence approaches have different directions, one is top-down, the other is more bottom-up*. Most diplomats and military personnel view these differences, however, as not necessarily negative, because they can also be complementary. These three issues are exemplary for other differences between the different 'Ds' that continued to pop up throughout this research. Military personnel tend to think in terms of effects that have to be reached, while diplomats and development workers tend to think in terms of processes that have to be started and continued. When the military think about development they tend to think more in terms of projects, while development workers tend to think more in terms of programmes. The military tend to focus their attention on insecure areas, whereas development workers tend to focus on the more secure areas. The military tend to be directed at counterinsurgency, security and stability, while development workers are more directed at development. This last difference is part of the classic peacebuilding dilemma between security first or development first. Of course, the contrast is not that black or white and it is certainly not meant to stereotype or present a caricature of either strategy. In practice, across the spectrum there are military personnel who are very well able to think long-term

and in terms of process, and there are development workers who think in terms of short-term effects. In general, diplomats from the political affairs side of the Ministry of Foreign affairs can be positioned more in the middle of the spectrum.

These two strategies may or may not be complementary; they are only likely to fully cohere if they are part of a long-term grand strategy. In the absence of a grand strategy in the US, the military have become dominant, which may influence the long-term outcomes. As such, the question of grand strategy is closely related to lead agency. In the Dutch mission in Uruzgan, at the start defence was often perceived to be in the lead, but increasingly it became a common effort of both the Ministries of Defence and Foreign Affairs. There is no clear answer to the question whether there always needs to be a lead agency and if so which ministry this should be. A lead is not always needed and depending on the context a different ministry may be in a better position. Although particularly to military integrationists a lead agency is a necessity, it is not always achievable. The NGOs appear to have reached more or less their limits of coherence with government policy. Nonetheless, in the Netherlands it is not unlikely that the government will search for further coherence in its comprehensive approach, further stressing the importance of a grand strategy. In order to guarantee the long-term and broad perspective of such a grand strategy, it would be best positioned either within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or the Ministry of General Affairs.

What are the factors for success and failure in a comprehensive approach?

Chapter 6 deals with this question. It shows that the military strongly believe that any future operation should be approached from a comprehensive perspective. To them the factors of success and failure determine the likelihood of success. The more factors are dealt with and the better they are lived up to, the larger the chance of success of a comprehensive approach. Diplomats generally perceive these factors in a similar fashion. They stress, however, that other factors determine the choice of a comprehensive approach – the context of an operation, its mandate and aims, and its relation to the local population. NGOs perceive these factors not so much as success factors, but as factors that determine their choice whether to seek coherence with a mission or not.

Business economy: Pure cost-benefit reasoning explains part of the chances for success or failure of coherence. Coherence may lead to more efficiency and therefore more success. It has its limits, however. The more autonomous organisations cooperate, the more they need to coordinate. As a result, there is a moment when the gains of cooperating more are lost to the extra costs of coordination. In addition, organisations are only likely to strive for coherence if their cost-benefit calculation is advantageous to themselves.

Institutional factors: Similar organisations with similar mandates, goals and common objectives are generally more likely to benefit from coherence than very different organisations. The more they train and work together, the more interdependent the organisations are, and the more common leadership and communication they have, the larger the chance for success. Institutionalisation makes coherence easier by providing a structure, rules and even planning. Institutionalisation may enhance (the amount of) communication, by enhancing trust. It can also lower the transaction costs of interaction by – for example – providing easy access to the other actors.

Organisation cultural factors: In general, coherence is more likely to succeed if the organisations striving for it have common values and views. Generally there are large differences in organisational culture and training between military and civilian organisations, as described above. In order to be successful, both worlds need to further open up to each other. Every once in a while, the differences lead to misunderstanding between the different actors: Is the other's approach really efficient and effective? What are their results or outputs?

Environmental factors: The possibilities for coherence between military and civilian actors are to a certain extent also determined by the environment, the context in which the conflict is taking place. In theory, in more insecure environments where levels of violence are higher, coherence is likely to generate more results, because working together around security allows for more efficiency. If insecurity becomes overriding and the military strategy starts to dominate, however, NGOs in particular but also other civilian actors feel they should stay away as coherence is less likely to succeed. Also, in practical terms, in insecure environments much of the military capacity is allocated to kinetic activities. This does not, however, mean that an integrated approach is not possible. In insecure situations civilians and their advice are also an added value. Another factor, which is especially important to NGOs, is the perception of the local population. If governmental organisations (military, diplomats, etc.) are perceived to be doing good by the population, if the population is receptive, NGOs are more likely to seek coherence. The inclusion of local civil society in an intervention also stimulates them to become a partner. NGOs are not likely to join a struggle to go after terrorists or insurgents. On the whole they determine whether to strive for coherence based on the opinion of their local partners. For the coherence of a mission as a whole, however, support of the local population is not sufficient. In the end, support at the home front is also essential, such as approval rates from the population and also support from parliament.

Individual factors: At an individual level, the character of individuals and the personal chemistry between them are also very important, especially in the absence of a common plan, and common organisational and institutional structure. The fewer representatives of an organisation are working together, the more this coherence depends on personalities. If large organisations integrate, different people and structures are involved. In smaller units such as a PRT, with only a handful of civilians, individual factors start to dominate.

1

Introduction

In recent years, discussion among Dutch civil society organisations (CSOs) and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) about civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) in overseas missions has developed to include the '3D approach'. In this approach, *defence, diplomacy and development* – the three 'Ds' – are combined to tackle security, governance and development in target areas. The approach follows from the idea that security is complex and needs multidimensional answers. As with concepts such as 'whole of government', 'whole of system' and 'whole of nation', the 3D approach breathes life into the idea that separate actors working in fragile states or conflict areas (can) aim for the same goal. All the above concepts can be labelled as, or considered a subset of, integrated or comprehensive approaches (hereafter called *comprehensive approaches*) and are defined as "action to ensure that international peace and stability operations are embedded in a system-wide strategic approach aimed at combining the broadest possible set of dimensions – typically including the security, governance, development and political dimensions."[1]

Within the comprehensive approach, different actors strive for more coherence between their separate activities. Such *coherence* is "the effort to direct the wide range of activities undertaken in the political, development, governance and security dimensions of international peace and stability operations towards common strategic objectives."[2] There are a number of options with regard to the degree or depth of coherence. At one end of the spectrum actors may choose to work together in a unified manner while at the other they may agree not to work together at all, with a whole range of options in between. The choices different actors make depend, among other things, on the character of their organisation and the nature of the mission.

Between 2006 and 2010, the Netherlands deployed its armed forces as part of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in southern Afghanistan, as part of the ISAF comprehensive

approach for the whole of Afghanistan. During this mission, aimed at security, stability and reconstruction in Uruzgan[3], the Dutch strived for coherence in their policies and actions by applying the 3D approach. The mission ended on 31 July 2010, making the time ripe for reflection on what can be learned from its 3D approach for future Dutch comprehensive operations. Generally speaking, the Uruzgan mission is perceived to have been positive in terms of coherence. However, while there were many opportunities and benefits, there were also some limitations, problems and dilemmas for the various actors involved, raising a question for future comprehensive approaches: How should coherence in its broad sense – including between ministries other than Foreign Affairs and Defence, and civil society – be dealt with?

To answer the above question and arrive at policy recommendations for future operations, this study draws on lessons from the Dutch 3D approach in Uruzgan, mapping perceptions regarding its *strengths, weaknesses, opportunities* and *threats* and the dilemmas that played a role in it. First, it looks at how the character of cohesion evolved during the mission, and examines the learning curve that led to that change. Second, where possible, the study attempts to differentiate between coherence at the strategic (headquarters, The Hague) level and the operational (field, Task Force Uruzgan (TFU)) level, the main focus being on cohesion in the field[b]. (Typically, the embassy lies between both levels, but in missions tends towards the strategic level.) Third, the study considers the role of NGOs in the Dutch 3D approach in Uruzgan.

Future Dutch operations are likely to take place in different contexts than Uruzgan and require different forms of coherence, as is the case with the Dutch contribution to the European Union Force (EUFOR) in Chad. For this reason, part of this research has a broader scope so that the analysis of Uruzgan can be placed in a wider perspective. It includes a broader analysis of the comprehensive approach in general, which serves as background to this study. The aim was to contribute to knowledge on the factors for success and failure for coherence in such comprehensive approaches. These data served as further input and are meant to support the applicability of lessons learned from Uruzgan to the comprehensive approach in future Dutch missions.

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Chicken trader at Tarin Kowt bazaar

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Research question

The main research question of this study is:
What are the perceived *strengths, weaknesses, opportunities* and *threats* of the Dutch comprehensive approach and which dilemmas play a role?

This question is divided into five sub-questions:
- What are the '3D' and comprehensive approaches and how are they perceived?
- What are the perceived strengths and weaknesses of the 3D approach in Uruzgan?
- What are the perceived opportunities and threats of such a future comprehensive approach?
- What dilemmas play a role in a Dutch comprehensive approach?
- What are the factors for success and failure in a comprehensive approach?

It must be stressed that this study is not an evaluation of the Dutch mission or the Dutch 3D approach in Uruzgan. This would be impossible, for a number of reasons. First, it was not the aim of the study. Secondly, the actual achievements of the 3D approach on the ground, the dependent variable in any evaluation, have not been measured. Thirdly, the mission did not take place in a laboratory but in a complex environment, in which looking for the impact of a specific approach within a variety of variables is next to impossible. Moreover, it is not possible to make a comparison between the mission implemented with the 3D approach and what it would look like if it were implemented without it.

This report attempts to map perceptions and arguments with regard to the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats (SWOT) of a 3D approach within the Dutch context and to serve as the basis for further discussion and research on the topic. This distance is illustrated in the working definition of success used in the study. Coherence was deemed to have been successful if the different participating organisations perceived their separate operational goals to have been better achieved through the comprehensive approach than they would have been had they operated separately. Although the study did not measure the results of the 3D approach in Uruzgan, there may be indirect indicators for such inferences. All participants in the focus group meetings and the authors of literature used in the review operated in, responded to or researched the dependent variable – the results of the mission. For this reason, the more support an argument receives in the SWOT analysis, the more likely it is

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b Throughout this report the terms 'field level' and 'operational level' are used interchangeably, as are 'strategic level' and 'headquarters level'. Within the Dutch military, three levels are used – the strategic, the operational and the tactical, with the TFU operating at the tactical level. In this report the TFU operates at the operational level, the ministries in The Hague at the strategic level and the embassy in Kabul sometimes at the strategic and sometimes at the operational level.

that there is indeed some inference. Nonetheless, even if there is consensus on a topic, which could be considered a strong indicator, further research would be required as consensus does not equal evidence and 'group think' is possible.

It is unlikely that every ministry or every NGO will agree with all the findings presented in this report as they are reflections of the perceptions of participants from the different ministries to the mission, as well as NGOs. Total agreement could only be the case if there was complete coherence between the different 'Ds'. If there was no coherence at all, each 'D' would only agree to one third of the findings. In practice, the level of agreement and disagreement is most likely to be somewhere in between.

Methodology

In order to answer the research question, a two-track strategy was chosen. First, the study looked at *coherence* in the *comprehensive approach* in general. The comprehensive approach within this track was defined broadly and included coherence in such widely differing contexts as integrated United Nations (UN) missions and between institutions of the European Union (EU) with EU operations. This track aimed to answer the question:

What are the perceived *strengths, weaknesses, opportunities* and *threats* of the comprehensive approach in general and which dilemmas play a role?

The first track served as background for the second track, which was directed specifically at the Dutch 3D approach in Uruzgan. This second track aimed to address the question:

What are the perceived *strengths, weaknesses, opportunities* and *threats* of the Dutch 3D approach in Uruzgan and which dilemmas played a role?

The first track consisted of a literature study, while the second track consisted of a literature study and four focus group meetings. Both tracks fed into the final drawing up of this report.

Figure 1: Research outline

What are the perceived Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats of the Dutch comprehensive approach and which dilemmas play a role	
Uruzgan	**Comprehensive approach model in general**
Literature	Literature research
Focus Group Meetings	

Literature studies

The two literature studies were conducted to substantiate this report and serve as background to this report. The first was into current thinking on the comprehensive approach in general and consisted of a SWOT analysis on the basis of existing literature and theory on the different forms of coherence in missions. This information was structured along the different degrees of integration and different sorts of coherence (between organisations, within organisations, etc) as set out in the matrix developed by De Coning and Friis (see below)[4]. It provided the background necessary to research coherence in the Uruzgan mission and also served as the basis for the short analysis of the 3D approach. In addition, it developed the foundation for the success and failure factors further elaborated upon in this study. The literature study on the 3D approach in the Dutch mission in Uruzgan consisted of a SWOT analysis of the different levels of the mission, but also provided material on the history of the mission.

The findings of the literature study on the comprehensive approach in general show that little has been published on intra-agency coherence or on coherence between intervening actors and the local actors they aim to influence. The great bulk of literature covers inter-agency interaction, although some work has been done on whole-of-government coherence. Most attention goes to coherence at a policy level, much of it focusing on CIMIC and civil-military relations. The role of NGOs in operations is one of the main focus areas of the literature on comprehensive approaches. Furthermore, literature typically neglects 'non-Western' perspectives – those of the subjects/objects of the interventions and those of regional peace and security bodies, such as the African Union and the Commonwealth of Independent States. Finally, as generally speaking both practitioners and academics believe that coherence is positive, a vast number of the publications on interaction in the comprehensive approach in general focus on how to establish stronger and better coherence.

The literature study with regard to coherence in Uruzgan shows that most literature dealing with that mission relates to how the different organisations interact with and within the TFU, at field or operational level. A lot less has been written about coherence at the headquarters or strategic level. Moreover, much of the literature deals with the mission from a military perspective, although other governmental views were also found. Literature on NGO involvement in Uruzgan, the 'rules of the game', relating to Dutch NGOs relationship to local Afghan NGOs, and relations with partners is scarce and focuses on broad, ethical discussions rather than on sharing practical experiences and findings from the field. Little can be found about the interaction between Dutch and Afghan NGOs, cooperation in the Dutch Consortium for Uruzgan (DCU) or about interaction with the Afghan Economic Reconstruction Working Group (WEWA). Also, intra-agency coherence, between different units of the same organisation, is barely touched on. Military actors have debated the interaction within their own organisation, especially between the battle

group (BG) and Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT). Other organisations do not provide such insights. Furthermore, no literature was found on interaction with the insurgents/Taliban, from neither a TFU nor NGO point of view. Last but not least, in general most literature is written by non-Afghans, especially with regard to coherence inside the mission. As a result, sources, as with most literature on comprehensive approaches in general, are often a one-sided reflection on coherence.

Focus groups

The four focus group meetings were held to generate further information on the mission in Uruzgan and to provide input into lessons learned for the future. Focus group meetings are defined as:

"a form of group interview that capitalises on communication between research participants in order to generate data. Although group interviews are often used simply as a quick and convenient way to collect data from several people simultaneously, focus groups explicitly use group interaction as part of the method. This means that instead of the researcher asking each person to respond to a question in turn, people are encouraged to talk to one another: asking questions, exchanging anecdotes and commenting on each other's experiences and points of view. The method is particularly useful for exploring people's knowledge and experiences and can be used to examine not only what people think but how they think and why they think that way."[5]

In the first three focus groups, NGO representatives, military personnel and diplomats (the latter working on political and development affairs) met separately. It was decided to hold separate meetings before organising a common meeting to allow as free as possible an environment for participants to reflect on the topic. Representatives of all three groups took part in the fourth focus group meeting, with discussion based on input from the earlier meetings and the literature studies.

Participation in the focus group meetings reflected, and was therefore limited by, the availability and rotations of representatives of the different 'Ds' in Uruzgan. Nonetheless, the sample was broad and differentiated enough. The NGOs were selected either because they participated in the DCU or had played a major role in discussions about the 3D approach. The diplomats were selected by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the military personnel by the Ministry of Defence to cover different periods in the mission and the different functions in the TFU (development and diplomacy for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, BG and PRT for the Ministry of Defence). Both ministries were cooperative, even to the extent of sending representatives currently stationed in Brussels and Germany.

Only a free and interactive discussion could generate the needed input for an analysis of the many pros and cons of a comprehensive approach such as the 3D approach in Uruzgan. In order to allow such discussion, it was agreed beforehand that participation in the focus groups would be strictly anonymous and that none of the statements would be able to be traced to participants. All participants' statements and opinions were given on a personal basis and should in not be seen as representing the policy of the Dutch government, its armed forces or of any NGO.

Each of the first three focus group meetings was structured around the questions: What is the 3D approach? How did the 3D approach in the mission in Uruzgan develop? What is the SWOT analysis of the 3D approach? What are the factors for success and failure? What are the lessons learned for comprehensive approaches in future Dutch operations? In the military focus group, each participant also made a quick individual SWOT analysis on paper which was then discussed in the group. The diplomats' focus group brainstormed as a group on the SWOT analysis and shared the results on a whiteboard.

The fourth common focus group was structured in three parts. During the first part, important dilemmas, discussions and disagreements distilled from literature and the earlier sessions were presented as thesis statements and debated in the group. This was followed by a breakout session in which mixed groups of all three 'Ds' were asked to jointly answer the following questions on the 3D approach in Uruzgan: What were the two most important added values? What were the two most important negative consequences? What were the two most important lessons? Lastly, the group as a whole was asked to reflect on lessons from the 3D approach in Uruzgan for a fictive future operation.

The report

This report was subject to extensive review. Sections of the draft based on the focus group discussions were sent to group participants for review. As well as functioning as a last chance for them to check their anonymity and comment on factual mistakes, it also generated additional comments that strengthened the analysis and addressed misinterpretations. These comments were collected at a feedback meeting. Last but not least, the report was peer reviewed by (academic) experts on the topic[c].

Arguments generated by the focus group meetings and originating from literature with regard to the SWOT analysis were only included if they received wider support. Individual opinions were left out of the analysis to ensure that arguments based on weak indicators of inferences between the 3D approach and its results or outlying opinions did not gain undesired significance. In addition, in order to further prevent less well-founded arguments

gaining too much importance, discussions and debates in both the literature and focus group meetings are presented as such along with the counter arguments. In the SWOT analysis, this can mean that in *extremis* an item may appear as both a strength and a weakness. Such tensions between opposites in the SWOT analysis – the strengths and opportunities versus the weaknesses and threats – or between the different items on one side of the SWOT analysis – within the strengths and opportunities or the weaknesses and threats – are some of the dilemmas for comprehensive approaches.

Report outline

Chapters 2 to 4 cover the first sub-question: What are the '3D' and comprehensive approaches and how are they perceived?

Chapter 2 – *'3D' and integrated approaches* – attempts to answer the question from a theoretical perspective. It finds that the different focus group participants have different ideas on its definition and take different positions towards it. At the same time, there is a general broad understanding of what the 3D approach is, and a belief that coherence is in principle positive. From theory on comprehensive approaches it borrows the framework on coherence developed by De Coning and Friis, which enables a degree of coherence between different units (between and within organisations, etc) to be mapped.

Chapter 3 – *A short history of the Dutch 3D mission in Uruzgan and its evolution* – shows how the concept of the 3D approach evolved on the ground and gradually increased the coherence of the policies and actions of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defence, and also a number of NGOs. The year 2008, in particular, was a turning point following increased civilian presence in the field. This chapter provides the context for the further analysis of the 3D approach in Uruzgan.

Chapter 4 – 3D: *differences in coherence* – delves deeper into what coherence within the 3D approach entails practically on the ground. It looks at relations between: the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defence; civilians and military personnel in the mission; the PRT and BG; the field and headquarters; the Dutch and their allies; and the Dutch government and NGOs. Using the framework of De Coning and Friis, it tries to map the type and degree of coherence between these different organisations within the broader 3D approach.

Chapter 5 – *Strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats analysis of the 3D approach in Uruzgan* – gives an overview of the perceived strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats of the coherence in a 3D approach as gathered from literature and the focus group meetings. As such, it answers the second and third sub-questions. It shows that there were many coherence strengths in the mission in Uruzgan, but also that there is

room for further improvement in future missions, as well as dilemmas and pitfalls to avoid.

Chapter 6 – *Factors for success and failure* – answers the fifth sub-question as it distils, on the basis of the literature on comprehensive approaches in general and experiences from Uruzgan, five factors for success and failure of comprehensive approaches. The more factors are dealt with and the better they are lived up to, the larger the chance of success.

Finally, Chapter 7 – *Conclusions: lessons learned for future operations* – deals with the fourth sub-question: dilemmas of the comprehensive approach for the Netherlands; the tensions between opposites in the SWOT analysis – the strengths and opportunities versus the weaknesses and threats; and lessons and recommendations for future Dutch operations.

2

3D and integrated approaches

There are numerous conceptual ways of looking at the 3D approach. This chapter first gives a short overview of comprehensive approaches in general and their origins. This is followed by two analytical perspectives – organisational and thematic – as well as some official government reflections on the Dutch 3D approach in particular. The views of Dutch diplomats, military and NGO representatives on the subject are then looked at. Finally, a conceptual framework for analysis is presented that is used in this study to further analyse the mission in Uruzgan.

Comprehensive approaches and coherence in missions

Historically, the UN, regional security coalitions and national armies have been the main actors involved in peace and crisis management operations, each with different agendas, jurisdictions, aims and approaches. In today's operations, however, more than ever direct relationships are important between the military, local populations and humanitarian agencies[6]. Governments and organisations such as the UN, the EU and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) realise that most conflicts are complex and that a one-dimensional military approach does not suffice. Challenges and threats cannot be addressed by the military or civilians exclusively and each crisis situation requires an individual, tailored and comprehensive response[7]. Research also finds that peacebuilding operations are more likely to be successful if they address the causes of the conflict and if the (military) mission is embedded in the approaches of, and cooperates with, other actors such as the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the World Bank, etc[8]. Moreover, governments and missions have increasingly come to rely on NGOs for the delivery of services. As a result, the number of different actors involved in missions has increased, as have the different forms of interaction between them[9].

The UN was perhaps the first organisation to realise the importance of coherence when, at the start of the 1990s, it became involved in large-scale multidimensional peacekeeping operations. Such operations not only dealt with the military aspects of a conflict, but also organised elections, repatriated refugees and provided humanitarian assistance. This culminated in the concept of integrated missions as set out in the Brahimi report in which other parts of the UN system were integrated in peacekeeping operations to guarantee better coherence[10]. Such an approach in which different types of actors strive for different levels of coherence has subsequently been applied by other organisations as well. NATO and the EU generally label it as the 'comprehensive approach'.

At a national level, within states where different ministries strive for coherence generally, the term 'whole-of-government' is used. The concept 'whole-of-nation' is applied if civil society organisations and business are also included. Originally a Canadian concept, the 3D approach is a whole-of-government or even whole-of-nation strategy in which defence, diplomacy and development are used as different tools in a single approach. In general, defence relates to the Ministry of Defence, diplomacy to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and development to the ministry or agency involved in development cooperation. In recent years in most countries other ministries such as economic affairs, (security and) justice, and internal affairs have become active in missions. This leads to a first point of criticism with regard to the term '3D approach', because, as a result of the above, it is increasingly seen as too narrow. For this reason, the Dutch government, for example, also uses other terms such as the 'coherent approach'[11]. Further, the concept is rather vague. Reflecting on the term from a Canadian context, Travers and Owen write:

"Canada's definition of 3D policy is exceptionally broad. It currently encompasses a wide range of security, governance, and development tasks, with little direction on specifically how these are to be integrated. Thus while the appeal of the approach is obvious, determining exactly what it entails in practice is another matter."[12]

The same holds for the Dutch situation.

Last but not least, greater coherence is increasingly seen as the way forward, with the result that potential negative consequences of the concept are often ignored. Most criticism of this kind originates from NGOs that fear for their humanitarian space and independence. In extremis, coherence sometimes appears to become an end in itself rather than a means[13]. In the Netherlands, the coalition agreement of the current cabinet, for example, states: "The 3D approach will be continued and interdepartmental policy will be stimulated especially in the areas of security, environment, health care, energy, water and agricultural production."[14]

Dutch conceptual approaches to the 3D approach

There are two conceptual approaches to the 3D approach – thematic and organisational. From a thematic point of view, there were three foci in Uruzgan: diplomacy, focusing on governance; defence, focusing on security; and development. From this perspective, where these three foci overlapped, organisations looked for more coherence through a 3D approach.

Figure 2: Three foci in a 3D approach

From an organisational perspective, the 3D approach is an approach in which a number of actors strive for a more coherent intervention. The Dutch government adopts this approach in the Netherlands, where diplomacy and development are already integrated in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and where coherence is sought between the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defence. Within the context of the Dutch mission in Uruzgan, where the Dutch 3D approach was further developed, however, involvement was broader. Some Dutch NGOs that were part of the DCU feel that, to a certain extent but at a different level of coherence, they were part of the 'broader 3D approach' for Uruzgan[15]. Similarly, parts of the Dutch business sector, the Afghan Economic Reconstruction Group (WEWA), were to a certain degree part of this broader 3D approach. Likewise international (partner) organisations and partner countries involved in Uruzgan played a role in the approach. All of these organisations had their own partners in the Afghan environment, ranging from the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) to Afghan CSOs. Figure 2 portrays these organisational relations. It does not describe the degree or nature of the coherence.

Figure 3: Organisations involved in the 'broader 3D approach'

In spite of the above two perspectives, it remains difficult to define what the Dutch 3D approach in Uruzgan entailed. One reason is that the aim of the mission was not framed in clear terms by the Dutch government. From its letter informing parliament at the onset of the operation, it can be concluded that the mission aimed to contribute to security and stability, and to reconstruction in Uruzgan[16]. During the mission this was also the dividing line between, at one end of the spectrum, those who perceived the mission to be a reconstruction operation and those at the other end who saw it as an operation aimed at security and stability, a counterinsurgency part of the global war on terror. Development workers and those on the left of the political spectrum tend to be part of the first group, while the military and those to the right of the political spectrum are more often part of the second group. Both sides see security, stability and development as very much related, even inseparable, but opinion divided over the main aims of the mission and the sequencing of development and security. The way in which the Dutch embraced the vagueness of the 3D approach may also be explained by the fact that it was politically convenient not to make a choice between reconstruction and defence and security, since that would guarantee support across the political spectrum. In addition, it allowed the different actors to take part in the mission while still continuing to work for their own goals. In other words, it allowed the separate goals of the different parties and organisations to be added up and combined in an overall 3D goal, which was then embraced by all. As a result, however, critics say that the goal at the start of the mission was broad and vague or that there was no common overall goal.

The Netherlands government is aware of what it calls "the confusion surrounding the term 'coherent approach' – starting with its definition – which enables the various actors to give their own meanings to the term." It argues that the complex problems of fragile states cannot be addressed effectively by a single ministry approach. This awareness would be the first step towards what it calls a "joint approach in which each ministry's added value is consolidated in a detailed strategy". It did not concur with the conclusion of the Advisory Council on International Affairs that sometimes the objectives of the different ministries may be 'incompatible': "We concede that it is a major challenge to achieve consistency in the way objectives, which may indeed be widely divergent, are pursued […] However, we do not see this as a reason for lowering our sights, but rather for stepping up our efforts so that we may learn from actual experience in striving for greater and better coherence." For this reason, the government in its response emphasises the need for joint analysis to establish common long-term objectives, strategy and priorities. Moreover, the different ministries – including others than the '3Ds' – would not always contribute to the 'coherent approach' to the same degree. This would depend on the local context and which phase the intervention was at. During the conflict management phase, there would be less room for a broad approach. In its response to the advice of the Advisory Council on International Affairs the government underlines that the coherent approach should never be an end in itself.[17]

A 3D look at the 3D approach

Implementation of the 3D approach evolved during the course of the mission in Uruzgan. However, at the end of the mission the concept of a 3D approach had still not been defined, even though when the term is used its meaning is generally assumed to be clear. In fact, there are different interpretations of what it means and what its goals are. Actors involved intuitively understand what can be achieved through a combination of defence, diplomacy and development, and have a sense of what 3D entails, but asked to define it, they run into problems and disagreements. Even within the 'Ds' there is no general agreement on what the 3D approach precisely embodies and what its purpose is. It is therefore useful to first look at perceptions from the different 'Ds'.

The diplomacy 'D'

In the diplomacy 'D' and the governmental part of the development 'D', two schools can be distinguished. The dividing lines appear to be location – between field or TFU level and embassy and headquarters level – and between the political and development cooperation sides of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The distinction is not clear cut, but those deployed in the TFU or from the political side of the ministry tend to be in the first group, while those at the headquarters level or on the development cooperation side of the ministry tend to be in the second. The first group, the diplomatic integrationists, argues that 3D means the actors in the approach strive for coherence in policy development, planning, implementation and evaluation at all levels from headquarters to the field. At the very least this means that in areas where different actors deploy their activities they coordinate their efforts, but it may also mean further integration. A truly 3D approach would be to bring all activities under one single approach. In practice in Uruzgan, this would mean that diplomats could contribute to governance, as well as to security and development, while the other actors could be active in the other fields. For example, a Political Advisor (PolAd) could advise on kinetic operations, while a PRT mission team, as well as assisting development and good governance, could also be involved in talking to police commanders and tribal leaders, or a battle group (BG) could protect development workers. From this point of view, it would be a misconception that kinetic operations should be strictly reserved for the military, and that civilian 'Ds' could only be involved in non-kinetic activities. All these activities could take place simultaneously in geographically close locations. In other words, at the same time in the same location, reconstruction may be going on while around the corner there is heavy fighting. From this perspective, a temporal order, like 'shape, clear, hold build', as is sometimes used in military counterinsurgency operations, is denied. The NGOs would be partly involved in the approach, but mainly at the level of implementation, not planning, and mainly in the field of development and governance.

The second group, the diplomatic segregationist, does not pursue such a high level of coherence as the first group. Although there would be a common goal "creating a stable environment conducive to social-economic development and proper service delivery by the Afghan government"[18], they view the 3D approach as a way to synchronise interrelated approaches. Planning, for example, would remain unintegrated and throughout the implementation the different 'Ds' would remain segregated. From this perspective, for example, diplomats would not be involved in security. Also, as CIMIC would not be part of development, a PRT would only be involved in the military approach. This group sees the experience in Uruzgan as interaction between the different 'Ds', not as integration. Similarly, NGOs would not have been integrated in a 3D approach, merely independent partners in development[19]. In general, diplomats are more aware than most military personnel that NGOs do not always want to participate in a common approach. Nonetheless, according to some diplomats deployed in the TFU in Uruzgan, NGOs often exchanged information, held coordination meetings and were willing to support the mission in public opinion debates in the Netherlands. In addition, at the TFU level NGOs were often seen as important to developing local governance and in implementing projects where the PRT was not able to go. With its coordinating mandate, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) would also have been marginally part of the 3D approach and was a more natural point of contact for NGOs than ISAF. As such it was an important element in the Dutch strategy. Moreover, most diplomats saw the use of the ink spot strategy as an attempt by the '3Ds' to get the local population in these regions to seek help from its own government rather than as a military strategy to prevent overstretch and to focus capacities on certain regions. The 3D approach would be a tool to help the local government stand on its own feet and therefore the local population had to be convinced that their own government was not that 'bad'.[20]

The defence 'D'

There are three different interpretations of the 3D approach within the Defence 'D'. The first school, the military integrationists, describes the 3D approach as a single team of military personnel, diplomats and development workers, each playing a game on different chess boards – security, governance and development. All three can play on all different boards, so military personnel may be active in the field of development, but a development worker may also work in security. This would mean that the lead, for example in the field of development, does not necessarily have to be in the hands of development workers. This view suggests a high level of coherence in the approach. The second school, the military segregationists, maintains that each

organisation should stick to its own core business, but may involve other organisations in doing so. This does not necessarily mean a lower level of coherence, but it does stress a more segregated implementation. The third school, the forced incrementalists, argues that the military have no choice but to get involved in the other fields. If the security situation does not allow other actors to become involved, the military is sucked into the terrain of the other 'Ds', whether they want it or not. The idea is that, while it is not a soldier's job, sometimes only a soldier can do it. All three schools realise that, from the perspective of the local population, these different roles are not easily distinguishable: the military may provide security and also livelihoods. Within the defence 'D', NGOs are seen preferably as 'enablers' and ideally as the actors that start reconstruction once the building phase is reached within the commonly used 'shape, clear, hold, build' approach of counterinsurgency. During the mission in Uruzgan, however, most military personnel became increasingly aware that cooperation with NGOs on such terms is difficult and that NGOs cannot be moulded into a military approach.[21]

The development 'D'

In general, NGO perceptions of the 3D approach follow the categorisation of civil-military relations developed by Frerks et. al. They have internalised this categorisation and apply the same terminology to 3D. In this typology on civil-military relations there are three groups, the first being the principled neutralists. These agencies or actors want to stay independent, avoid contact with the military as a matter of principle and do not seek coherence with the mission. Their motivation stems from their desire to preserve their humanitarian principles. They fear politicisation of aid and subordination to military logic, and want to prevent adverse security effects. Such actors and organisations are generally those with more resources, a strict relief mandate, and are deployed mainly in the capital rather than in rural areas. In general they are working at headquarters rather than in the field. Although the second group, the pragmatists, have the same fears as the principled neutralists, they balance their principles against more functionalist and instrumentalist considerations. They weigh the pros and cons of cooperation and decide whether to cooperate with the military depending on the context. They are thus more flexible. The third group, the supporters, do not object to military action in principle and see it as necessary. They collaborate with and provide support to the military. These organisations are often small, local NGOs with few resources, which are active in rural areas and which have diffuse mandates that include development. This view is more often taken by field staff than those at headquarters. For supporters, the debate with regard to civil-military relations is of little relevance. From their point of view, cooperating with the military or blurring the lines does not increase their insecurity. They mainly blame the war itself for this. Although the supporters also refer to most of the concerns of the principled neutralists,

like the pragmatists they attach a different weight to them and therefore have diverging policy positions. This categorisation is therefore more of a continuum. The position organisations and individuals take depends on the context, the sort of organisation (its mandate, resources, whether it is local or international) and the person within the organisation (whether they are based at headquarters or in the field, or have a pragmatic or principled personality)[22]. With regard to the 3D approach, NGOs' positions follow the same categorisation as the above on civil-military relations. The principled neutralists oppose 3D as they see it as a further blurring of the lines. They fear the politicisation of aid, subordination to military logic and adverse security effects. The pragmatists balance their principles and fears against more functionalist and instrumentalist considerations. The supporters do not object to the 3D approach in principle. In fact, they see it as useful for creating security and see little relevance in debate on the issue. The coherence of NGOs in the 3D approach follows the same lines[13].

It would appear, therefore, that the 3D approach is a concept without a particular short-term aim, except to strive for coherence in the security field, and that, in the long term, the goals of all three 'Ds' need to be reached. For this reason, participants in the approach align the (short-term) aims of the approach with their own goals. In Uruzgan, the military saw it as part of their counterinsurgency (COIN) operation: "the set of political, economic, social, military, law enforcement, civil and psychological activities that aim to defeat the insurgency and address any core grievances"[24]. From their perspective, 3D is not necessarily COIN, but a well-implemented COIN strategy is 3D, i.e. not implemented primarily by the military[25]. At the other end of the spectrum, many NGOs and most diplomats working around development see the approach as an organising principle for organisations aimed at security, good governance and development in order to create a secure enough climate for further development. In such a context, defeating insurgents is not a necessity and in some cases even counterproductive. The rationale behind this position is that an insurgency may have its roots in a population that fights oppression, the very people they hope to assist. NGOs try

Drug store at provincial hospital Tarin Kowt

to contribute to development without opposing the insurgents. For an NGO, being part of a COIN strategy would be unacceptable as it would mean losing its neutrality. Principled neutralists at the far end of the spectrum therefore equate '3D' with COIN. Diplomats from the political affairs side of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs generally take a position in the middle of this spectrum, between the military on the one hand and the principled neutralist NGOs on the other[26].

Conceptual framework for analysis

There are different ideas about what the 3D approach entails, but basically it strives for greater coherence in the different approaches of different organisations, in particular between the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defence. The level of coherence differs for the organisations involved. Generally there is more coherence within government than between the government and outside actors such as NGOs - and on the location of the interaction - The level of coherence also depends on the location of the interaction. For example, it may be different in the field than at headquarters. In order to be able to analyse coherence in the 3D approach, this report uses a framework developed by De Coning and Friis, within which they distinguish six degrees of coherence and the four types of organisational interaction. The levels of coherence are a continuum of integration ranging from unity, integration, cooperation, coordination and coexistence to competition. The four different types of organisational interaction are intra-agency, whole-of-government, inter-agency, and internal-external[27]. This framework is useful because it allows a more precise description and mapping of the different forms of coherence within missions, making them more comparable. Furthermore, the framework embraces the fact that today's comprehensive (peace) operations have a multilevel and multi-actor character of interaction[28]. Last but not least, the framework is purely an instrument to structure the analysis and has no normative intentions. For example, it does not argue that more or less coherence would be better. As such it allows for an objective SWOT analysis.

In their framework, De Coning and Friis differentiate between six levels of coherence, ranging from unity to competition. When actors are united, they voluntarily agree to establish a unified structure and undertake joint action under a unified leadership and command arrangement. This requires an agreed strategic vision and specific aims and objectives. In practice, such a high level of coherence between independent actors rarely occurs and probably only in certain unique circumstances. It cannot be sustained for long as situations continuously change. When actors are integrated, they seek to integrate their approaches and activities without giving up their individual identities or their power to take independent decisions about resource allocation. They use their own resources and organisational means. The UN applies this model in its integrated approach. Actors cooperate

if they have complementary and/or overlapping mandates allowing them to decide to undertake joint or collaborative action for instrumental and pragmatic reasons. Such initiatives tend to be ad hoc, temporary and context-specific, and to be renegotiated case by case. When actors coordinate, they try to prevent friction, duplication or overlap. They aim to ensure greater overall coherence between different activities by sharing information and acting on that information. This model allows for maximum independence and voluntary participation. While cooperation results in joint action, coordination results in independent or separate action. If actors merely coexist, they are forced to interact, but have minimal interest in coordinating their activities with those of other actors. When actors compete, they have opposing values, visions and strategies. The levels of coherence are elaborated on in detail in Figure 5. In practice, organisational coherence never fits completely in one single level. The level of coherence is therefore determined by the emphasis of the interaction between different actors.

The framework describes the different types of organisational coherence as follows. Coherence is regarded as intra-agency when it deals with the policies and actions of a single agency and the internal consistency of a particular policy or programme. Whole-of-government coherence is consistency among the policies and actions of different ministries and agencies within the same national government. Inter-agency coherence describes consistency between the policies and actions of the various international actors, ranging from international organisations to national governments and NGOs. Internal-external coherence is about consistency between the policies and actions of the various international actors on the one hand and the various local actors on the other[29].

These different levels and forms of coherence can be projected in a matrix (see Figure 4). Actors tend to interact in all four forms of coherence at the same time with different organisations. The types of interaction and many other factors, such as the particular context of the intervention, influence the degree of coherence that is pursued[30].

Figure 4: Coherence matrix

	Intra-agency	Whole-of-government	Inter-agency	Internal-External
Actors are united				
Actors are integrated				
Actors cooperate				
Actors coordinate				
Actors coexist				
Actors compete				

See: Coning, C. de & Friis, K. (2011), "Coherence and Coordination: The Limits of the Comprehensive Approach", Journal of International Peacekeeping, 15 (1/2), pp. 243–272.
In Chapter 4, this framework is used to map and analyse coherence between the different actors in the 'broad 3D approach' in Uruzgan. First, however, the next chapter gives a short overview of the history of the Dutch mission in Uruzgan and how its 3D approach developed.

Figure 5: Different levels of coherence in a comprehensive approach

	United	Integrated	Cooperate	Coordinate	Coexist	Compete	Levels
Organisational structure	Unified	Joint or collaborative	Independent	Independent	Independent	Independent	Strategic and operational
Actions	Joint	Joint or collaborative	Ad hoc joint or collaborative	Independent or separate, while avoiding conflict, duplications and overlap	Ad hoc pragmatic and opportunistic cooperation, but may resist activities that threaten or interfere	Competing	Operational
Interests, visions, aims and objectives	Agreed	Some degree of agreement	Complementing and overlapping	Some similarity	Separate	Competing	Strategic and operational
Mandate	Agreed	Some degree of agreed	Complementing and overlapping	Different	Different	Competing	Strategic
Campaign plan	Agreed	Some degree of agreed	Complementing and overlapping	Different	Different	Competing	Operational
Leadership and command	Unified	Joint or collaborative	Different	Different	Different	Different	Strategic and operational
Planning	Joint	Joint	Ad hoc joint or collaborative	Independent or separate, while avoiding conflict, duplications and overlap	Separate	Separate	Strategic and operational
Assessments	Joint	Joint	Ad hoc joint or collaborative	Individual	Separate	Separate	Strategic and operational
Implementation	Joint	Some degree of joint	Ad hoc joint or collaborative	Individual	Separate	Competing	Operational
Monitoring and evaluation	Joint	Some degree of joint	Ad hoc joint or collaborative	Individual	Separate	Separate	Strategic and operational
Identities	Joint	Individual	Individual	Individual	Separate	Competing	Strategic and operational
Decisions on resources and organisation means	Joint	Independent	Independent	Independent	Independent	Independent	Strategic and operational
Information	Joint gathering	Sharing	Sharing	Sharing	Certain amount of sharing and deconflicting may take place	No sharing or even spreading of disinformation	Strategic and operational

3

A short history of the Dutch '3D' mission in Uruzgan and its evolution

The Dutch strategy

The long-term aim of the ISAF mission in Afghanistan, as part of a broader international strategy, is to enable the Afghan government to guarantee security and stability within its own borders, allowing reconstruction to take place. Its mission statement reads:

"ISAF, in support of GIRoA [Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan], conducts operations in Afghanistan to reduce the capability and the will of the insurgency, support the growth in capacity and capability of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), and facilitate improvements in governance and socio-economic development, in order to provide a secure environment for sustainable stability that is observable to the population."[31]

After its efforts in Baghlan province ended, the Netherlands decided to join the expansion of international deployment to south Afghanistan. The government underlined that "it is of crucial importance that the military in south Afghanistan do not limit themselves only to the improvement of security and stability. They will also be involved in the establishment of the requirements for governance and economic construction." In accordance with the ISAF mandate, the Dutch aimed to achieve this goal by increasing the local population's support for the Afghan authorities in order to take support away from the Taliban and other insurgency groups. This meant that, although offensive actions might be needed to allow the Afghan authorities and PRT access to certain regions, the most important functions of the mission were to improve the efficiency of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), stimulate good governance and the rule of law, and implement CIMIC projects and reconstruction activities (by the Dutch or others)[32].

Police training in Tarin Kowt

The Dutch military approach in Uruzgan has been captured in a number of catch phrases. It was "as civilian as possible and as military as needed". It had a dual character, in which the insurgents were repressed by force, while their network and breeding ground was demolished by other – political and socio-economic – means[33]. The idea was not necessarily to fight the Taliban, but to make them "irrelevant" by "winning the hearts and minds of the population", as a result of which the Taliban would lose its constituency. For this purpose, the Dutch directed themselves at both short-term small-scale projects, such as water pumps, and larger more long-term programmes, such as capacity building for the government. The wishes and needs of the Afghan partners would be paramount. The Afghan population had to be convinced that insurgents and insurgency was no alternative to a properly functioning government[24]. The Dutch development strategy was, to a much greater extent than the military strategy, directed at long-term economic development and the establishment of governance in Uruzgan province and the country as a whole[35].

In this strategy the political means, socio-economic measures and use of force were combined in a comprehensive approach – coined the 3D approach (defence, development and diplomacy) – a term initially not widely used, but which gained popularity during 2007–2008[36]. The military worked with other government departments, and also with NGOs and a broad range of other partners. Thinking in terms of a 3D approach had been on the rise in the Dutch departments of Defence and Foreign Affairs before the Uruzgan mission[37]. As noted before, the notion of 3D was not a Dutch invention, and it could not be called a 'Dutch approach'. It built on concepts of integrated missions, such as those in the UN, and comprehensive approaches, such as in the EU and NATO, which became the leading frame for the ISAF operation in Afghanistan[38]. As a result, similar approaches were taking root among other allies, such as the USA, UK and Canada[39].

A push or a curse from parliament

The growing awareness of the need to work more comprehensively received a great push from the Dutch political realm[40]. The ISAF strategy was one of counterinsurgency, although at that time it did not use this term. In order to gain broad support in the Dutch parliament, the Netherlands' mission was framed as a stabilisation and especially (re)construction mission, while the terms counterinsurgency and war were avoided. This was necessary to get the more left-wing parties on board. As an indirect consequence, attention to development assistance and the civil character of the mission intensified. Also, NGO involvement was pushed by parliament. As a result, as well as requirements from the field, party politics gave the 3D approach a head start and may have given it a dynamic it would otherwise not have gained so quickly[41].

At the same time, party politics resulted in micromanagement from parliament and made the mission less agile. Dutch politics influenced the mission continuously until its termination, sometimes for good, sometimes for bad[42]. At times parliament chose to sit in the driver's seat, but it could only do so because ministers allowed it in order to gain broad parliamentary support. According to Dutch law they needed only to inform parliament[43]. One example where the role of parliament is subject to discussion is the decision not to work with Matiullah Khan, who was seen as a warlord and war criminal. He was, however, one of the most important informal powerbrokers in the province, in control of many security organisations as well as the highway, and an important player in the US and Australian approach. Although agreements were sometimes reached with Matiullah Khan in the field, the incompatibility of the Dutch parliamentary decision and the position of the allies frustrated a common international approach to governance in the province. Another example of the debatable role of parliament, but where it is less clear, is the requirement from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, strongly supported by parliament, that at the time of Dutch deployment the late Jan Mohammed Khan be replaced as provincial governor of Uruzgan. Subsequently he received a powerful position in Kabul and, although Maulavi Abdul Hakim Munib became the new provincial governor, Mohammed Khan remained the most important informal powerbroker, the 'man behind the scenes'. Moreover, Munib had been a former Taliban minister and was accused by the United States Special Forces of playing a double role[44]. There is disagreement on what the better strategy would have been but, unlike the Americans, the Dutch did not focus on the strongest group, the Populzai, and tried to even-handedly balance all tribes[45].

Parliamentary discussions and the actual situation in the field were at times miles apart. Particularly, parliamentary discussion about reconstruction versus fighting was generally perceived as irrelevant by those deployed in the field. The latter saw the mission as a very complex operation, with both fighting and reconstruction taking place simultaneously at different locations and with the temporal dimension also playing a role. For example, in some cases fighting is needed to generate reconstruction results in the long term. For that reason it was also regarded as unreasonable that within six months of the start of the mission politicians and journalists were talking about the failure of reconstruction and therefore the mission. Moreover, in addition to the more idealistic goals, the mission also served Dutch political interests. Fighting terrorism and protecting Dutch or alliance interests were kept off the agenda by most politicians in order to maintain public support. However, most politicians were very well aware that the mission was not only a reconstruction operation[46].

The mission set up

From the start, all three ministers – Defence, Foreign Affairs and Development Cooperation – were actively involved in the mission[47]. The Task Force Uruzgan's (TFU) primary components were a Dutch battle group (BG), Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) and Logistic Support Detachment, and an Australian Mentoring and Reconstruction Task Force. The BG was a reinforced infantry battalion. The TFU included engineers, artillery, medical platoons and a bomb disposal squad. It was responsible for stabilising Uruzgan and securing military bases and TFU personnel[48]. The PRT is a relatively new concept, initiated by the United States' Operation Enduring Freedom at the end of 2001, beginning of 2002, and adapted soon after by ISAF. It was further developed during the ISAF operation in the south of Afghanistan. As was the case for all NATO participants, the development of the Dutch PRT in Uruzgan was a process of trial and error, in which new discoveries were made and successful ideas were copied from allies. The PRT in Uruzgan was based on the structure of the Dutch PRT in Baghlan province (2004–2006) and the lessons learned from this experience. Visits to the UK, US and German PRTs, as well as Dutch experiences in Bosnia Herzegovina, laid the foundation for the Baghlan concept[49]. In Uruzgan, the most important change to the concept was that, in addition to about 35 military PRT staff, the number of civilians increased. While the PRT in Baghlan had only one political advisor (PolAd), from the start in Uruzgan there was a development advisor (OsAd) and a cultural advisor (CulAd) as well as a PolAd[50]. In addition, interpreters were essential in supporting the TFU, and they also knew how to approach the different powerbrokers[51]. Later, a Dutch PolAd was added to the ISAF staff of Regional Command South[52]. In addition, the Netherlands armed forces were able to draw PRT personnel from the 1st CIMIC Battalion. This battalion includes military actors from different defence organisations and about 500 reserve officers, who are active as functional specialists[53]. These functional specialists took part in the PRT's mission teams and performed tasks within their field of expertise, ranging from administrational affairs, infrastructure, economy and employment, humanitarian aid, and education and cultural affairs to the process of starting small and medium-sized companies[54]. PRT staff maintained contact with civil actors and advised and supported their (reconstruction) activities. PRT staff got involved in projects aimed at winning the hearts and minds of Afghan citizens[55]. Despite the increase of civilians in numerical terms, the military remained by far the most dominant component throughout the mission.

In addition to the Dutch government, Dutch NGOs and the Dutch private sector also began activities in Uruzgan province. In 2006, before the start of the operation, Dutch NGOs were called together to see what and how they could contribute[56]. The Dutch Consortium for Uruzgan (DCU) was established in 2006 as an umbrella organisation for initially three and later five Dutch NGOs – Save the Children, Cordaid, Healthnet-TPO, the Dutch Committee for Afghanistan and ZOA Refugee Care. The latter two joined in 2008. In addition to the Dutch NGOs, 12

Afghan partner NGOs that implemented projects in the field also joined the DCU[57]. The Dutch NGOs in the DCU participated mainly for four reasons. First, some of them had already been working with partners in Uruzgan before the Dutch mission started there. Second, participation in the DCU meant less perceived pressure from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and parliamentarians. However, despite initial pressure, non-participating Dutch NGOs argue they did not suffer any negative effects[58]. Third, taking part in the DCU meant funds were opened up that otherwise would not have been available to Dutch NGOs. This was especially relevant for smaller NGOs dependent on government funding[59]. Fourth, as a result of increased attention on the work of NGOs in 'our province', NGOs stood more in the spotlight and arguably gained political influence, more access to politicians and increased media attention[60]. Projects were funded from the Dutch development cooperation budget and started in a broad range of sectors, such as education, infrastructure, media and health[61]. The Dutch private sector would later also contribute to the reconstruction process by assisting Afghans to start businesses. Some expenses were covered by funds from the Dutch government, while companies were allowed to make a profit[62]. The companies involved joined the (Dutch) Afghan Economic Reconstruction Working Group (WEWA)[63].

The start of the mission 2006–2007

In 2006, strategic planning of operations was integrated only to a certain extent. Each player – the Ministries of Defence and Foreign Affairs – made their own separate plans, although they were partly synchronised, there was no interdepartmental mission design. In the field, the TFU tried to integrate the small number of diplomats as much as possible. Nonetheless, both ministries each gave their own instructions to their own personnel[64]. The mission was a new experience and the political goal was not all that clear. The military struggled with the discussion about whether it was a mission for fighting or for reconstruction because they faced both challenges and were not allowed to use the term COIN. On this occasion, the army was not an impartial third party deployed with the consent of all parties, but a force that actively took sides in a conflict. This meant that although 'counter insurgency' doctrine was well known, many procedures on the battlefield had to be '(re)discovered'[65]. The military reconnaissance mission presented a grim picture of the province. Looking back, military personnel argue that the BG especially started off with a combat mind-set, directed at what was called a 'focus on security'. As a result, they were less actively looking for solutions outside their military domain and were more directed at fighting the Taliban[66]. According to military personnel in the first TFU, as in other missions, the planning only became concrete when they were in the field. There the different players met and had to further compare plans and strive for more coherence[67]. Colonel Vleugels, the first commander of the TFU, developed a plan in which three pillars – governance and justice,

security and stability, and economic development – were combined[68]. The Dutch followed the so-called 'ink spot strategy', introduced by ISAF commander General Richards, in which step by step the territory under control was to be enlarged and authorities transferred to the ANSF. Initially the ink spot focus was on Tarin Kowt and Deh Rawod, where most of the population was concentrated. The plan was to expand beyond these towns once capacity would allow a 'sustainable footprint'[69]. The ink spots later became the Afghan Development Zones.

The operation started in 2006 with about 1,450 military personnel and three Dutch civilian staff from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The (formal) local government institutions were largely dysfunctional and there were barely any Afghan National Army (ANA) or Afghan National Police (ANP). The military perceived themselves to be clearly in the lead while, at the same time, acknowledging that the Minister of Development Cooperation decided on development funds[70]. The OsAds operated under their own mandates and were free to find their own partner organisations[71]. Although there had been a joint planning process under TNO in Delft, and information exchange and synergy were sought after[72], a number of the military felt that in the end there was no real complementarity, rather separate approaches[73]. Initially diplomats and development workers in the field suffered as a result of low capacity. Development cooperation nowadays means supporting local partners in the field who are better equipped to generate development. For this reason, the Netherlands has no field agency for development. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs does not 'do development work' itself. For this reason, among others, it was only able to deploy a small number of personnel[74]. At times this was frustrating for the military in the field. Some even question the willingness of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and some of its diplomats because they believe the Ministry could have sent more OsAds and that the mind-set of some diplomats would not have been directed at cooperating with the military[75]. In addition, although many diplomats and development workers were willing to think along with the military, they were not in a position to fund military projects[76]. In the four years of the mission, the PRT would spend €4 million, while the Ministry of Foreign Affairs spent €126 million[77]. In spite of these figures, most military personnel deployed in the PRT felt that they had to take on the tasks of governance and development in the field, especially at the start of the mission when there were not enough field diplomats. These were tasks they felt they struggled with as they had to learn how to achieve results in a non-kinetic manner and Afghan government and security forces were largely absent. This was complicated further by a number of issues. First, there was a struggle over resources between the PRT and the BG. If the PRT wanted to visit projects it needed force protection, a capacity the BG needed for securing and (where necessary) clearing or enlarging the ink spot. Second, the relation between the PRT and the BG in the first rotation was further affected by the fact that the military working in both units still had to get used to their different roles[78]. At the lower and more local level, in Deh Rawood for example, the military felt the differences between the BG and the PRT were overcome more quickly[79]. Last but not least, the military felt they continuously had to keep in mind what their political masters and the public

in Netherlands might think of their approach. After all, although the situation on the ground did not always lend itself to (re)construction, the Ministry of Defence wanted to avoid public perception that the mission was a 'fighting mission'[80]. The military felt they were unjustly blamed when criticism that the mission would be a 'fighting mission' rather than a '(re)construction mission' increased in the Netherlands, partly because the fields of governance and development lagged behind[81].

In spite of the above issues, during the initial months of the mission, cooperation between the military and civilians improved. This was a process of trial and error. Especially at the beginning, the 'others' were a bit unsettling, but slowly each got used to the other's different habits and adjusted expectations. Meetings also became increasingly productive[82].

In 2007 the TFU focused on attracting former Taliban supporters to the provincial government led by Governor Munib to a much greater extent than fighting or (re)constructing. Munib himself was a former Talib and so it was hoped he would prove attractive. He was also paralysed politically and spent a lot of time travelling outside the province[83]. With the arrival of 300 Australian Special Forces, ISAF became better able to operate actively and assertively in order to disrupt and irritate the insurgents and to increase the presence of forces among the population. Lieutenant-Colonel Querido called such an approach earlier the 'amoeba model', after the one-cell organism that is continuously moving and changing its shape[84].

Ready to take the initiative 2007–2008

A turning point came in June 2007 with the battle of Chora[85]. Chora was seen as a useful enlargement of the ink spot as it was in a strategic position in the Baluchi Valley, an important route to the south for insurgents as well as a busy drugs route. Insurgents attacked the village in one of the larger offensives in Afghanistan that year, but it was held by ISAF, although it was a close call. ISAF fought side by side with the Afghans, which resulted in improved relations and increased points of contact[86]. The battle showed that, in addition to the Gilzai and Popolzai, other population groups could work with ISAF[87]. After the battle and subsequent permanent presence in Chora, substantial extension of the ink spot ended[88]. As the ANSF was not strong enough, the ink spot could not be filled and therefore further enlargement was no longer an option[89]. Nonetheless, attempts were still made in the Mirabad Valley as well as 'under the radar' elsewhere and very slowly more control was established over the whole Baluchi Valley[90].

In September 2007 Governor Munib was replaced by Assadulah Hamdam. Some diplomats in the field felt they could cooperate better with him than with his predecessor[91]. As insurgents continuously re-infiltrated the Baluchi Valley, it had to be cleared

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again in operation Spin Ghar (October 2007). In addition, operations Kapcha As (January 2008) and Patan Ghar (February 2008) aimed to clear the region around Deh Rawod[92]. The winter of 2007–2008, however, saw a clear change in the strategy of insurgent forces. Before that winter, insurgents were capable of fighting large-scale battles, especially after the opium harvest and before weather made operations more difficult. After that winter, insurgents were no longer able or willing to seek large-scale confrontations and directed their efforts towards asymmetric attacks by small groups, individuals and through the use of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs). Their aim became to create terror and chaos through attacks on the TFU and local representatives of the Afghan government and security forces. At the same time, the TFU shifted from a reactive modus directed at responding to the insurgents' seasonal pattern to a proactive strategy directed at disrupting the insurgents' infrastructure and networks. This may have contributed, among other things, to the TFU being able to start operation Tura Ghar in the Baluchi valley in January 2009, during a season in which insurgents had before felt safe enough to recuperate[93]. The three ink spots became increasingly less insecure and the population more often approached ISAF with requests for assistance which, of course, also meant initial increased hostility from opponents[94].

Although development projects were included in the ink spot strategy, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the embassy's development strategy did not stick to it exclusively. They picked the whole province of Uruzgan as a starting point, but also spent about 50 per cent of their funds nationally, to a large extent on the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund and the Law and Order Trust Fund. Expenses for the latter were mainly for police salaries. The choice not to stick to the ink spot was made because, although many, especially in the military, assume that security is needed for development, many of those involved in development cooperation believe that development projects can function under the radar in insecure environments. Moreover, the development 'D' was also active outside the ink spot in order to guarantee that marginalised people would not feel left out[95]. In fact, most development projects were implemented outside

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the PRT and without Dutch NGOs. The embassy supported local NGOs directly, although it consulted the PRT in the process and sometimes the Dutch NGOs if there was likely to be overlap. It learned a lot from the latter[96]. Personnel at the TFU level often saw NGOs as a way to ensure that the population could start to do things itself. It was hoped that by attracting more NGOs, a dynamic would develop[97].

After the extension: more civilian, more Afghan 2008–2009

In December 2007 the Dutch government decided to extend the Dutch presence in Uruzgan. In its letter to parliament it wrote that the main aims of the operation would be: "the establishment by the Afghan National Army and the Afghan National Police of effective control over the most important inhabited areas and roads." It was anticipated that "in spring 2010 the responsibility for security in the inhabited areas in Uruzgan can be gradually transferred to the Afghan National Security Forces."[98] The parliamentary discussion on the extension of the Dutch presence in November–December 2007 had a great influence on the development of the civil character of the mission and the 3D approach. The (re)construction element in the mission was pushed forward strongly[99]. This was, however, also the result of learning processes in the mission, the embassy, and the Ministries of Defence and Foreign Affairs. For the diplomats and development

workers it became increasingly clear that in order to be more effective, more civilian people and capacity were needed. In addition, the field of operations became increasingly receptive to civilian implementation as security increased[100]. Last but not least, and again as a result of an internal learning curve, defence became better able to operate in a more 3D manner through the acquirement of equipment such as the Bushmaster vehicle[101].

With the decision to extend the mission and increase its civilian character, it became clear to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that the Netherlands would remain involved in Afghanistan for a much longer period. As a result, it would need more capacity in the embassy, which increased in staff[102]. In the TFU, the number of PolAds, OsAds and CulAds increased. At the end of the Dutch mission in Uruzgan there were 12 civilians rather than three, increasing the civilian influence drastically[103] – something the military had actively pursued. An important reason for this was that it would free military personnel capacity for other activities[104]. With increased numbers in the TFU, civilians were able to become actively involved in planning activities and, as a result, political aspects were taken more into account[105]. Although a civilian was not always available at a particular point in the planning process, it meant that each planning process leading towards an order had had a civil element looking at it[106]. As a result of the ever increasing number of civilians in the PRT, a learning process was created in which all involved partners learned to think more 3D[107]. In March 2008, the PRT came under the leadership of a Civil Representative (CivRep). In March 2009, the TFU was placed under a dual-headed civilian and military leadership[108]. Like the PolAds in the past, the CivRep worked closely with the commander of the TFU. Integration of tasks was promoted by creating a joint TFU Commander-CIVREP office. This office was meant to ensure that the commander and CIVREP spoke to each other daily and took joint decisions[109]. It meant that every military order was signed by both the military commander and the CivRep[110]. The first CivRep also decided to support the Afghan National Development Strategy (ANDS)[111]. Most potentially conflicting issues were dealt with in Tarin Kowt. Only in the rare cases where no agreement was possible did The Hague have to decide[112].

As well as requiring much greater capacity of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the increased civilian emphasis also called for a much more Afghan involvement. While in 2006 there was barely any ANA or ANP presence in Uruzgan, in 2007–2008 operations were increasingly planned and implemented together. From the end of 2008 and during 2009, almost all operations were conducted together with Afghan partners – sometimes at the risk of leaking intelligence to the enemy. At the end of the mission, many operations were in fact Afghan led. This 'Afghanisation' was an important factor to gain the support of the population[113]. Also this "Putting an Afghan face on everything" and later "Afghan responsibility, ownership and accountability" resulted partly from the parliament's requirement to increase Afghan ownership[114].

Together with the further integration of the TFU, its commander was upgraded to the level of brigadier-general. In 2009 the

number of deployed military personnel would reach its maximum with 2000 troops. In addition to the Uruzgan Campaign Plan, during the command of Brigadier-General T.A. Middendorp, an Uruzgan Security Plan was developed with and signed by the Afghan partners. This plan was developed to transition responsibilities for security during the 2009 presidential elections to the Afghan authorities. Increasingly the military and diplomatic timelines were better aligned, and military personnel received briefings on governance and development. As a result of this increased institutional integration, the increased capacities and the overall improved security situation, most diplomats felt the military view became less kinetic and the overall 3D approach further improved. These ideas had already existed for many military personnel, but now the experience and capacities were there to actually implement them[115]. The military and civilian approaches started to converge[116].

NGOs were already active inside and outside the ink spot, but their numbers increased further once defence started to portray the area as relatively secure. Moreover, the fact that Afghan NGOs could work in Uruzgan and that funding was available further increased their numbers. The presence of so many NGOs in Uruzgan embarrassed UNAMA, because it was still claiming the province was too insecure. However, with UNAMA's arrival in Uruzgan in May 2009, the number of NGOs increased even further. Many NGOs argued that, if the UN could go to the province, they could as well. The presence of more NGOs in turn increased their security. When few NGOs are present, they and the population are more easily intimidated. When there are more, they become less anonymous and, as a result, less threatened[117]. In 2006, two national ministerial programmes, one international company, one donor organisation (USAID), two UN organisations and four Afghan NGOs had been involved in activities in Uruzgan. Of these actors, none were Dutch. In 2009, this number had grown to 54 actors, including five national ministerial programmes, three international companies, six donor organisations, six UN organisations and 22 Afghan NGOs[118]. For security reasons, the UN was initially hesitant to deploy to Uruzgan[119]. UNAMA had been an essential element in developing the 3D approach as it was hoped an office with sufficient staff would attract even more NGOs to the province. This hope, however, was short lived. After the October 2009 attack on the UN in Kabul, UNAMA withdrew a large part of its personnel from Uruzgan. Although their office remained open, it faced subsequent capacity problems. In spite of this, a weekly meeting with ISAF and NGOs was held by the TFU in the UNAMA compound[120].

During 2008–2009 the ink spot was further enlarged in the direction of Deh Rashan and Mirabad[121]. Uruzgan became an exceptional province in southern Afghanistan. While other provinces saw increasing levels of violence, Uruzgan saw a stabilisation or even decline in the number of violent incidents. In addition, reconstruction and development made great progress, and the Afghan government was increasing its governance[122]. Until 2008–2009, the Dutch faced international criticism because the TFU did not engage enough with the Taliban[123]. In 2008–2009, international recognition for the Dutch effort increased[124].

Towards a 2010 closure

During the last TFU, most military personnel in the PRT came from the CIMIC battalion. Despite this, there were still occasional frictions within the cultural mind-set. During this period, as a result of a change of personnel, briefings on aspects of governance and development for the military were not as good as in 2009[125]. In addition, in 2009 the Royal Netherlands Marine Corps replaced one of the Royal Netherlands Army infantry BG companies. The marines had not yet gone through the learning curve regarding the 3D approach. Initially this resulted in a number of renewed clashes between civilians and the military. The army had gained experience in counter-insurgency in Uruzgan and information and experiences were passed down from colleague to colleague. The marines were, however, outside this system[126].

Towards the end of the mission, the preparational phase of diplomats in the TFU had improved, along with the military's, although some diplomats felt they still had to learn most things on the spot[127]. The strategy continued to attract as many NGOs to the region as possible. The more NGOs were present, the more civil the face of the operation became. For this reason the TFU continued to do its utmost to support NGOs, by providing information or security and by facilitating them[128].

When the military withdrew from Uruzgan, two CulAds, an OsAd and two interpreters remained. Some attempts were made to keep more civilians (OsAds and PolAds) after the departure of the military, but eventually without effect. The last OsAd will leave at the end of December 2012. The long-term development programmes do, however, continue until 2013. In the end the Dutch diplomacy and development pillars of the 3D approach became less prominent in the mission after the Dutch military left[129].

To conclude

Looking at coherence, great improvement had been made during the course of the mission. The drive for coherence was based on past experience and experience gained in Uruzgan, and it was pushed by the Dutch parliament in order to gain broad support for the mission. In a process of trial and error the different 'Ds' learned to work together. The increased capacity of the civilians, the increased numbers of ANSF and Australian forces, and the security situation in Uruzgan helped. As a result, what was initially mainly, but not exclusively, a military-dominated 3D approach managed to blossom into a fully-fledged one with the help of increased civilian capacity, the creation of the CivRep position and the involvement of NGOs.

4

3D: differences in coherence

This chapter delves deeper into coherence between: the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defence; the civilians and military in the mission; the PRT and the battle group (BG); the field and headquarters; the Dutch and their allies; and the Dutch government and NGOs. It sets out to establish the levels of coherence between these different organisations within the broader 3D approach.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Defence

The mission to Uruzgan was a joint effort by the Ministries of Defence and Foreign Affairs. The three ministers of Defence, Foreign Affairs, and Development Cooperation were therefore actively involved. In practice, this meant that officials cooperated 'intensively' on a daily basis, and that all letters to parliament were sent jointly[130]. The interaction also became visible in joint ministerial visits to Afghanistan, the first of which was organised shortly after the new Dutch government came into power in 2006[131]. There was disagreement among participants in focus group meetings over the extent to which the joint planning took place in The Hague, Kabul and Tarin Kowt. Some argue it did, while others argue that planning remained separate and unintegrated. This may be explained by their different expectations of joint planning[132].

Several structures were established during the mission to improve cooperation between both ministries. First, the Department of Foreign Affairs added a military advisor to its staff, while the Department of Defence received a development

Farmers pop corn in village just outside Tarin Kowt

advisor. Second, coordination groups were created. The Chief of Defence Staff and the Director-General Political Affairs of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs meet in the *Stuurgroep Militaire Operaties* (Steering group Military Operations), which coordinates military operations. Activities in the light of Security Sector Reform, such as the training of the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP), are coordinated in the *Stuurgroep Veiligheidssamenwerking en Wederopbouw* (Steering group Security and Reconstruction cooperation)[133]. In addition, the *Stuurgroep Civiele Missies* was established in 2010, which is presided over by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and also includes the Ministries of Defence, General Affairs, Security and Justice, Interior and Kingdom Relations, Finance, and Economic Affairs, Agriculture and Innovation. It is a sort of '3D plus' steering group, which is a step further towards broader integration[134].

Financially, the *Homogene Groep Internationale Samenwerking* (Homogeneous Group International Cooperation, HGIS) originates from 1997. This part of the national budget relates to the total financial flows used for foreign policy, thereby providing an overview of the policy of all involved ministries. All extra mission-related expenditures of both ministries for developmental, diplomatic and military involvement in Afghanistan are included in the HGIS note[135]. The costs for crisis prevention in Afghanistan are included in the 'non-Official Development Assistance (non-ODA) spending'[136]. The Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund and the Law and Order Trust Fund Afghanistan are supported financially by the Netherlands and are therefore included in HGIS. Some of the funds were channelled directly to the Afghan Department of Finance and earmarked for activities in Uruzgan[137]. Although the HGIS note seems to integrate financial sources, formally it is not an independent 'budget' but combines the financial inputs of all ministries involved in foreign policy. After that, the finances are redistributed according to the tasks of different ministries. According to the Dutch government, the HGIS is an important instrument for the integration and coherence of foreign policy[138].

Although coherence in The Hague increased with the creation of a number of structures, the 3D approach at the headquarters strategic level remained largely a matter of coordination[139]. Most daily coordination was on an ad hoc basis and was not institutionalised. The ministries have their own identities, resources and organisational means, an independent organisational structure and different leadership. HGIS is regarded as a way of coordinating financial flows, but all ministries remain responsible for their own budget. A diplomat argued that "clear mandates of the '3Ds', joint planning and synchronisation of the effort" lay "at the root of the success in Uruzgan"[140]. Within the framework of De Coning and Friis (see Chapter 2), coherence at the strategic level, between the Ministries of Defence and Foreign Affairs in The Hague, can be described as mainly *cooperation*.

Civilians and military in the mission

At the operational level, until March 2009 actors in the TFU interacted in the same cooperating way as their mother departments. Civilians worked under a different chain of command and only had a functional relationship with their military colleagues. Looking back, some diplomats argue that during the first TFUs the time was not ripe for a civilian lead as the environment was still too violent. According to them, a larger civilian presence and joint command between a military commander and civilian representative (CivRep) would have been an option[141].

In the field, there was a policy of speaking with one voice. This meant that internal differences in the TFU had to be resolved before further communication could take place with the embassy in Kabul, headquarters in The Hague, and also with allies[142]. In general the cooperation was harmonious. Those discussions between civilians and the military that took place were often about long-term stabilisation and reconstruction versus short-term security. Generally, though not always, civilians were more focused on the long term, and the military more on the short term. Likewise, the military were more geared towards infrastructural projects, and sometimes needed to direct their attention to concrete short-term projects such as building a particular bridge. Civilians in general were aiming more at building capacity, such as training the ANSF, and longer-term development programmes. This was embodied in dilemmas such as building a school versus training teachers. Discussions took place over time estimates – what is more important in the long run – but also over resources[143]. The long-term stabilisation versus short term-security discussion also influenced views on which powerbroker should be dealt with and which not[144]. It is not unlikely that institutional political conflicts of interest were generated because, as described by some military personnel, the military were sometimes implementing civilian tasks[145]. Lastly, a source of occasional friction was the availability of force protection. The military sometimes had different priorities than civilians. Military personnel thought civilians found it difficult to accept 'no' for an answer, while civilians felt the military gave less relevant issues more priority. During the mission these priorities, however, grew increasingly towards each other and cooperation in the field improved further[146].

After March 2009, the structure of the PRT changed, combining both civilians and military actors under a single chain of (joint) command (see also Chapter 3). The three pillars of the 3D approach – defence, development, and diplomacy – were all included within the PRT, but maintained – even from 2009 onwards – their individual identities. Planning, assessing, implementing, monitoring and evaluating were done jointly. However, this development did not take place at the strategic level in The Hague, where cooperation structures remained the same and interaction remained mostly ad hoc[147]. This created a gap between the strategic and operational levels, which was partly solved through daily meetings at the Kabul level. An additional disconnect was the fact that the CivRep was not directly part of the military ISAF structure. The diplomats, however, did not perceive this to be problematic for the local command and control[148].

Within the framework of De Coning and Friis, coherence at the operational level – in the TFU, between civilians and the military – can be described as mainly *cooperation* before 2009 and as *integrated* after 2009.

PRT and battle group

The aim of the PRT was to maximise the long-term stabilisation and reconstruction effort. At the same time, the battle group (BG) was aimed more at increasing short-term security. The capacity of the BG, however, was limited. The same BG had to provide both force protection for the PRT and secure the ink spot. Frictions between the PRT and the BG have for this reason often been described as a discussion on how to divide capacities. This friction overlapped with the tension between whether to deepen the ink spot or expand it[149]. The BG, however, did not have the mandate or the capacity to clear the whole province. It was therefore mainly directed at defending the effort. The role of the BG was consequently mainly to support the PRT rather than the other way round, i.e. the PRT was not set up to support the kinetic actions of the BG[150]. Although formally the PRT was in the lead, especially at the start of the mission and at the edges of the ink spot, quite a number of military personnel in the BG felt that the insecurity forced them to aim their actions at short-term kinetics rather than focusing on long-term reconstruction efforts[151]. At the end of 2009, with the "PRT in the lead" operational plan, the PRT increasingly became the lead in practice[152].

Once outside the well-protected walls of the camp, the PRT's mission teams and the BG's infantry companies cooperated in the 'Smallest Unit of Action' (SUA), later known as Combined Arms Teams (CATs)[153]. In such a unit, personnel of both the PRT and the BG, but also medics and engineers among others, were 'mixed and matched' to generate the optimal expertise for a given purpose. Upon return on base, the different members returned to their own units[154]. While, according to research, some PRTs and BGs interacted smoothly, this was not always the case. The start of the mission was the most challenging period for cooperation, because members of the BG and PRT were not yet completely familiar with each other's skills and objectives, or the environment in which they had to operate. In addition, sometimes the characters of PRT and BG commanders were not compatible. Furthermore, both units had separate rotation schemes as a result of which the composition of the TFU changed continuously. Consequently, members were less able to become familiar with each other and did not have the same experiences during the mission[155].

A number of studies show that functional specialists felt they needed to adapt their visits to the others' missions, and that the BG had the upper hand in the relationship because they could decide who could join their patrols within the context of their Normal Framework Operations[156]. From the perspective of the BG, however, although it sometimes went wrong, in general it worked out fine and in fact they gave priority to the functional specialist because of their limited presence in the field[157].

Views on who was responsible for interaction with the local population during an operation also differed. From the PRT perspective, the BG was responsible merely for the security of SUA members, and the PRT was mainly responsible for interaction with the local population[158]. Van der Sar, the commander of the BG during TFU 1, on the other hand, argues that the BG's platoon commander was the most important mediator with local people, because of his visibility to the villagers – something the PRT would have less of[159]. If the PRT did not have the capacity or had different priorities, the company or platoon commanders as 'ground owner' would talk to the local population[160]. Research published in 2008 found that members of the BG were, in general, positive about cooperation with the PRT, but the exact feedback depended particularly on the PRT they worked with. They focused, however, more on the differences and referred to the SUA as a 'temporary' unit. PRT members were far more positive about the team spirit in the SUA than members of the BG. According to the research, PRT members felt group dynamics improved on patrol, because BG members started to understand the work of the PRT[161]. Over time the relationship between the military in the BG and PRT improved and most BG commanders in later TFUs do not recognise themselves in the above findings[162].

Within the framework of De Coning and Friis, coherence between the PRT and the BG in the SUA can be described as mainly *co-operating*, because the different actors within the units were working together on an ad hoc basis, with ad hoc joint planning, implementation and evaluation, but with independent organisational means and leadership. This remained the same when the PRT came under a civilian lead. While steps were taken to institutionalise civil-military relationships within the PRT, these actions were not completely extended to cooperation between the BG and PRT within the SUAs.

Field and headquarters

Headquarters gave staff in the field a lot of space for manoeuvre. Broad strategy was decided in The Hague, but its actual implementation was left very much to the field and, as a result, was field driven. The military received the building blocks for their strategy explicitly from the Ministry of Defence. The aim was not to fight the Taliban, but to assist development of the region. At the same time, the military received the freedom to implement this idea in the field and to adjust it to local conditions.

As a result, the influence of individual commanders on operational policy was large. From the start, the field worked on preparing and implementing a counterinsurgency. The more individual commanders read on counterinsurgency, the more this approach was applied in the field. Perception from the field is that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in The Hague also provided enough space for policy development in the field, with technical implementation of the operation directed mainly from the field. As a result, there was room to develop the mission pragmatically. In fact, according to most diplomats deployed in the field, success depended much more on capacity on the ground, and this was more limited[163].

To a certain extent, as in any mission, there was the usual friction between the field and headquarters, between the strategic and the operational levels of the Ministries of Defence and Foreign Affairs. In comparison to the field, headquarters always move slower and based more on principles than pragmatism[164]. Some field personnel complained about six issues. The first issue is that at times there was a perceived misunderstanding between the field and The Hague about the aim of the mission. Especially at the start, partly out of fear for parliament, the military perspective was not included at The Hague, and policies were all directed at reconstruction. As a result, the disconnect between the field and The Hague was perceived to be very large during this period in the mission. In the field, some argued that The Hague did not understand what was going on[165]. At The Hague level, military plans made in the field were sometimes seen as too concrete, too kinetic or too counterinsurgency driven. According to military personnel deployed in the field, The Hague was afraid that if plans from the field came out in the open, difficult questions might arise[166]. On the other hand, a diplomat working at the strategic level felt that the short-term staff in Uruzgan did not always focus enough on the bigger picture and hoped to reach outcomes within their tour, while the Ministry of Foreign Affairs focused more on long-term sustainable development[167]. The second issue is speed. According to one diplomat, decision-making in the field could be fast because the different actors were physically close to each other. Decisions could also be made at high speed at the highest level in The Hague because the actual decision-makers were located there and the lines of communication between them were shorter. According to the same diplomat, decision-making at the middle level of officials was much slower[168]. Nonetheless, with regard to making speedy decisions on funding, in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, for example, special procedures were developed to accelerate the financial procedures for making CIMIC funds available to the PRT[169]. The third issue is control. According to a number of military personnel, an approach that was too top down was dangerous and there was a perception among those military that The Hague was micromanaging. Similarly, it was felt that the Tarin Kowt level should not determine everything in the field as teams at the lowest level needed some freedom to implement. At the same time, asked what he or she was doing, a soldier in the field would not recognise a 3D approach and think first of his or her own 'D'. It was often only at the Tarin Kowt level, and sometimes lower, that the '3Ds' actually merged[170]. Similarly, according to the military, the decision to target an opponent kinetically

needed to be made in the mission and not at The Hague level as they were too far away from the situation to make a detailed judgement[171]. In practice, some decisions were delegated, while others were not. This depended on the region of Uruzgan, and also on the period, because combat requires that decisions are made at a lower level[172]. The fourth issue is the fact that The Hague needed continuous tours through the mission area. Public image and transparency are important, and in fact necessary in order to give politicians a better understanding of what is really going on. However, according to some deployed in the field, because many issues are kept under the radar or not easily visible, arranging tours for politicians and others is not very helpful as they require a lot of local capacity of the mission[173]. A fifth source of friction between the field and The Hague was that, as of 2009, integration in The Hague lagged behind that in the field[174]. Integration was to a large extent driven from the field and grew in the field. In The Hague, the integration did not reach the same level[175]. In the field, for example, the OsAds and PolAds were included in a joint planning process[176]. Typically, in spite of the fact that there was a gap between the field and The Hague, if there was an irreconcilable difference of opinion in the field, The Hague was asked to solve it[177]. Sixth, some frictions also existed between the field and the embassy. The embassy was especially important in getting the right people appointed to the right positions. For this reason, they were essential in the planning as they were the ones to exert pressure. Their importance lay not only in the field of governance, but also in a whole range of different projects they had to manage. Sometimes the embassy and the field had different priorities. To the field it appeared at times that the embassy paid too little attention to Uruzgan[178]. The view from the embassy was that the field sometimes wanted to go too fast, forgetting the importance of longer-term sustainability[179].

The Dutch and their allies

Up to 2007–2008, the ISAF mission as a whole was rather one dimensional: i.e., military. It was only in 2007–2008 that ISAF started to pay more attention to the fields of governance and development[180]. In addition, because lead nations are each responsible for their own province, ISAF is very fragmented in character. The fact that the three provinces of Uruzgan, Kandahar and Helmand are commonly referred to as Uruzdam, Canadahar and Helmandshire shows the perceived influence of the lead nation and the limited central direction. Within ISAF there was sufficient reporting and information exchange but, especially at the start of the mission, no real common strategy that was also commonly implemented[181]. As described above, the Dutch 3D approach was not very different from the approaches of the other allies, only the operationalisation was different. Initially frictions between the Dutch and other allies developed as the Dutch were perceived as not aggressive enough. Those who held this view felt it was supported by the fact that at the start of the mission the Dutch suffered only a few casualties. In addition, the TFU had to

consult The Hague about larger operations and, in a number of cases, were subsequently not allowed to participate. This was relatively difficult to explain to the allies. At the same time, the Dutch portrayed a picture of a 'Dutch approach', which was more successful than that of the others[182], and which the Ministry of Defence had already used before to describe the approach in the earlier deployment in Al Muthanna, Iraq[183]. Also within the province of Uruzgan, Dutch PolAds needed to invest a lot of time in coordinating approaches with the allies to ensure, as much as possible, a single approach between the Dutch, Americans and Australians. Again this improved during the mission[184].

The United States (US) was deployed in Uruzgan in the context of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). They operated mostly outside the scope or at the border of the ink spot, in locations where insurgents were still present. Nonetheless, their actions did have spill over effects on Deh Rawood and Chora. Moreover, the OEF and ISAF operations were often dependent on each other[185]. The US' aim was to drive out the Taliban and, in order to reach that goal some development projects were needed[186]. For that purpose they were able to involve all the necessary agencies, including USAID[187]. The Dutch approach was to a certain extent the other way around. There is some overlap, but every once in a while there were disagreements in the grey areas[188]. The Dutch diplomats tried to act as a single team with defence, and used the embassy to strengthen local governance and to ensure the support of the population. The Americans did not always agree with these outcomes. At the start of the mission, especially, this led to some confrontations. For example, sometimes the Americans arrested a powerbroker perceived to be an interlocutor by the Dutch, and the other way around[189]. These different strategies allowed the informal powerbrokers to shop around[190]. Another example is aid. Throughout the mission, relations between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and USAID were good. With the civilian surge at the end of the mission, however, the US' aid funds became immense compared to those of the Dutch and consequently they could push aside the smaller Dutch projects[191]. However, providing funds does not always increase the capacity of organisations. Moreover, USAID may have contributed to a further local government brain drain as, according to one Dutch diplomat, it integrated well-trained Afghans into its own organisation[192]. An additional issue was poppy eradication, which is a challenging topic because it is very difficult to find alternative crops for those farmers involved. Small farmers may lose important income, but going for bigger farmers is more difficult because they are generally more powerful. At times the US supported poppy eradication, even though this was not supported by the local population. Initially there appeared to be conflict between the Dutch on the one side and the Afghan government and the Americans on the other. Eventually, however, this conflict was solved by working together on the drug lords' major suppliers[193]. One example of how conflicts were dealt with was the police mission. This field was very fragmented because not only the Dutch, but also contractors, the US and the local authorities were involved. By using an American in the negotiations with the Afghan government, a number of pieces of the puzzle fell into the right place[194]. The Americans were physically based at the same camp in Tarin Kowt, albeit in their own separate section, and coordinated

and exchanged information with the TFU. However, depending on personal relations, when views really differed, coherence remained difficult. Moreover, while coordination on a macro level was possible, often more specific operational information was not shared with the Dutch[195]. Although the Dutch mission increasingly thought along the lines of counterinsurgency, under Commander McChrystal, the Americans also started to think more along the Dutch lines[196].

The Australian forces in Uruzgan were partly deployed as part of ISAF and integrated in the TFU, but their Special Forces were deployed as part of Operation Enduring Freedom and therefore not part of the mission. Coordination with the Australians, especially at the Kabul level, was relatively easy as their diplomats, AUSAID, their Mentoring and Reconstruction Task Force, and their Operational Mentoring and Liaison Team followed a similar approach to the Dutch. Their Special Forces, however, took a very different path[197], which the Dutch, especially initially, found difficult to coordinate with. Sometimes they undertook operations within the ink spot which the TFU was not informed of[198]. Australia's views with regard to the informal powerbrokers were also different. Australian forces dealt, like the Americans, with Matiullah Khan, with whom the Dutch were not allowed to work[199]. Furthermore, their reconstruction effort was directed more at short-term infrastructural rather than long-term development projects. They did, however, invest in training[200]. Additionally, the Australians had the second largest intelligence capacity in Uruzgan after the Dutch. They relied a lot on a smaller group of higher placed informants. Their human intelligence capacity was, however, smaller and they did also not have a CulAd[201]. At the same time, unlike the Dutch, the Australians had access to more actionable intelligence through the American, British, Canadian and Australian '4 eyes community'[202]. According to a Dutch diplomat, this difference in access to intelligence explains most of the differences of opinion[203]. Similar to coherence with the US, coherence with the Australians was good when their strategies overlapped with the Dutch, but led to the usual discussions and disagreements when they did not[204]. Again, however, such frictions were generally solved relatively easily. One example is the Australian plan to introduce a weapons registration programme in Chora. They wanted to start with the District Governor and his tribe. To the Dutch, this would have had negative results as they wanted to keep him in his position. Therefore the programme would be counterproductive. After talks with the Australians it was decided to make it a provincial programme, led by the Provincial Governor, avoiding problems for the District Governor[205].

For the Dutch, the way to deal with fragmentation was to first strive for national coherence, than to discuss this line with the allies[206]. At the end of the mission, however, awareness grew that the causes of instability were so deep, an international approach was required. Therefore the PRT sought cooperation with USAID and AUSAID[207]. Moreover, as the Dutch presence was nearing its end, more cooperation was needed in order to allow a smooth transition[208].

Although, within the framework of De Coning and Friis, coherence with ISAF and Regional Command South at the strategic level may be described as mainly integrated, at the operational level within and between PRTs and taskforces, countries participating in ISAF mainly cooperate. The level of coherence between PRTs is even less than between different troop-contributing countries operating in the same province. Although NATO focuses on unity of effort and tries to implement the same way of working at lower operational level, PRTs are more likely to follow national goals and provincial responsibilities. Part of the explanation is that all national taskforces have agreed to be under direct ISAF command, but do not have this relation to other nations' PRTs and taskforces since all nations are 'sovereign' and therefore, at least to some extent, 'equal' to each other. Another reason is that NATO is an institution, in which member states have clear roles and rules. Institutionalisation is a precondition for integration, because this relationship is all about joint or collaborative structures. The coherence between PRTs was less institutionalised.

The Dutch government and NGOs

For the first time in history, the Dutch government organised meetings with development organisations, like Cordaid, Healthnet TPO, and ICCO and Kerk in Actie, to prepare the intervention using the experience available within these organisations. When the Dutch NGOs were subsequently confronted with the invitation to go to Uruzgan, they each had their independent considerations of whether to go or not. Those NGOs that decided to join DCU argue that they never really had a common goal[209]. Many of their local partners were pragmatic as they operated in a 'survival modus'. Although many claim they are not working with ISAF, in practice they do. Those Afghan NGOs active in the humanitarian field were much more cautious about working, or being seen to work, with ISAF. The positions of partner organisations also differed in different regions, often dependent on the security situation[210].

ICCO and Kerk in Actie decided not to join DCU, since it had no partners in the region and its Afghani partners had no intentions to establish themselves there. At the same time it also had severe doubts about the extent to which the deployment was for reconstruction purposes and the extent to which the needs of the local population were really central to the mission. Oxfam Novib did have a partner in Uruzgan, but has strict international guidelines which it decided to follow: visible and strict physical separation from the military, while communicating and exchanging information with regard to security. Since 2003, also Cordaid had a partner already active in Uruzgan: AHDS. It made joining DCU dependent on the perception of its partners. Security was an important criterion in this choice, but there was also a great fear of blurring lines between civilians and the military. The choice of Cordaid to join the DCU was never based on principles,

but rather on the question of what is possible under which conditions. Healthnet TPO had a more fluid approach. On the one hand in debates in the Netherlands it took a principled position. In fact its director Willem van der Put was one of the most vocal voices arguing that the presence of the Dutch military had a negative influence on development and security in Uruzgan. On the other hand, in practice it was much more pragmatist and did accept funds related to the context of the mission by joining DCU. Therefore it is not a neutralist organisation, such as MSF Netherlands, because Healthnet TPO views neutrality as a luxury that only larger richer organisations can enjoy. Nonetheless, it did not believe in the reciprocity of security and development either. It argued that development and governance is needed for security, and that it is therefore impossible to create security through military means. Save the Children took the presence of the mission as a fact, but was not sure whether it could work in such conditions. It decided to start and find out, as in a pilot, whether it was workable, e.g. whether it was secure enough for its local partner to operate. As a small organisation, the Dutch Committee for Afghanistan (DCA) has little manoeuvring space. It wants to establish a private veterinary network in Afghanistan and needs all the funds it can get to do that. DCU offered a possibility to extend the veterinary network in Uruzgan, a province not covered by DCA-VET before[211]. Those NGOs that were part of DCU were heavily criticised by those NGOs that were not. The more 'principled humanitarians', like MSF Netherlands for example, were vocal. Such attacks were sometimes quite offensive. The constituencies of the member organisations of DCU were, however, not very critical. In fact, organisations that did not join were more heavily criticised by their constituencies and especially by politicians because they did not go while 'our boys and girls do go there'[212].

A number of years before the start of the Uruzgan mission, the military and NGOs in the Netherlands had started to engage with, meet with and talk to each other. Their increasing coherence therefore cannot be related directly to the Uruzgan mission. The operation did, however, strengthen this development[213]. Initially most NGOs and military personnel stood with their backs to each other. Especially at the start of the mission some NGO staff had a lot of distrust and, in some cases in fact, a principled aversion to the military[214]. DCU decided to pursue a strict policy of separation from the military. It stated that no overlap exists between them and the ISAF mission. It argued that its presence was mandated by the local citizens, with the goal of establishing development in cooperation with local aid organisations. According to DCU, there was no direct cooperation with military actors, except for the exchange of information needed to implement the projects in an effective way[215]. During this period the embassy was an essential intermediary between the military and the NGOs[216].

The main issue of discussion between NGOs and the mission was the humanitarian space. Two questions lay at the heart of this discussion.

First, does military involvement in reconstruction and development issues have a negative impact on the neutral identity of

NGOs? A study by Azarbaijani-Moghaddam, Wardak, Zaman and Taylor found that the local population could not remember who is involved in what project, and would therefore mix up involved organisations, such as NGOs, PRTs and the government. In addition, the Taliban would communicate about all foreign actors as 'Americans'[217]. Looking back, Dutch diplomats draw a different conclusion. They argue that development workers and diplomats in Uruzgan were not identified with the military mission[218]. Afghans perceived the diplomats and development workers as civilians, separate from the military mission[219]. In addition, they argue, local insurgent commanders would know who was doing what and they would base their actions on that knowledge[220].

Secondly, does the presence of the military have an impact on security issues for NGOs? This question is often related to the first one. Military actors often argue that humanitarian activities by NGOs are not possible in an insecure environment[221]. Moreover, they argue that NGO involvement in insecure areas is less effective, because they would not be able to monitor the outcomes, thereby increasing the chance of corruption[222]. According to almost all NGOs' line of thinking, conflict has its origins in underdevelopment, social exclusion by those in power, and lack of confidence in government. They aim to assist in development to address the root causes of conflict and fear that military reconstruction tasks endanger their independent and neutral position. They also claim that, in order to assist, they do not need military protection. Their neutrality is their armour and is proven by the fact that they were already involved in (the dangerous areas of) Afghanistan before the arrival of the military. In fact, they claim the military presence only complicated the situation. Some NGOs, for example, blame the military for the growing rate of abduction of their Afghan and international staff members. This may, however, also be the result of their increased numbers[223]. At the same time, the number of local NGOs and the aid budget have grown with the arrival of ISAF. Moreover, most aid organisations chose to work within the ink spot where the Dutch were deployed[224].

In discussion about humanitarian space, the Dutch Advisory Council on International Affairs concluded that the government should ensure that the tasks of the military are not confused with those of independent Dutch development organisations. The Council argues that it is important to distinguish situations of emergency – in which military means (logistics and support) may be used for civilian means – and situations of reconstruction – in which the military should stick to ensuring security[225]. Increasingly, the whole discussion is viewed by military, diplomats and NGOs alike as a discussion about principles, which may have relevance at the strategic level, but in the field are a lot less relevant. Information exchange is fine, but working together appears to be difficult and context specific[226].

For many NGOs, what is most important is the position of their local partners. If a local partner chooses to cooperate with the mission, the Dutch NGO generally follows. From The Hague it is difficult to make a good judgement on the situation on the ground. There have been cases in which NGOs became a target because they cooperated with the military. The local NGO is

in the best position to judge. AHDS, a partner organisation of Cordaid, for example, did not become a target because it cooperated with the Dutch military. It was very able to maintain its neutrality[227]. Nonetheless, certain NGOs in Uruzgan became a target because of their cooperation with the Dutch military. In order to prevent this, the Dutch tried to provide as much information as possible and hoped to keep the division between the military and NGOs as clear as possible. For example, the AHDS services were kept far away from the military. The Dutch military supported this strategy[228].

Initially contact between the mission and NGOs in the field was limited because of the risk of intimidation and violence being directed at NGOs. The contacts took place at the Kabul level, with the embassy. The mission viewed the exchange of information regarding the security situation as 'successful'[229]. During the mission, direct contacts and coordination grew, as well as a less strict implementation of the DCU policy of separation. Slowly the prejudices and initial distrust between the military and NGOs disappeared, although some still remained. They became able to "look each other in the eyes", relations improved and information was freely exchanged[230]. After 2008, relations at TFU level became more intense as the role of civilians in the mission grew, especially once the PRT was civilian led[231]. Another important reason for the increasing openness of Dutch NGOs in DCU was that, although some local partner organisations stuck to a principled line, more and more local partner organisations started to visit the camp[232]. Also, from the defence perspective, relations with local NGOs improved[233]. Initially they could not appreciate that some NGOs started negotiations with Taliban commanders to ensure that children could go to school and teachers did not have to fear for their lives. Later in the mission, defence became more open to such a long-term approach. In addition, they started to no longer see the NGOs as 'enablers'[234]. Also, the role of Dutch NGOs in pre-deployment training for the military improved[235].

None of the NGOs in DCU felt in the end that they had become an integral part of the governmental 3D approach. Although the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the embassy had an interest in 'selling' the presence of NGOs in Uruzgan as a result of the 3D approach, it was never seen as such by the NGOs. Although there clearly is a relationship between the Dutch military presence in Uruzgan and the establishment of DCU, and the Dutch government provided funding, from the perspective of DCU it never became a subcontractor[236]. To NGOs that were members of DCU, therefore, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' presentation of DCU as part of its '3D effort' and in fact one of its successes, felt a bit uncomfortable, even though this was not meant to suggest that the NGOs were an institutional part of it[237]. From the perception of a number of diplomats deployed in the TFU, particularly those holding diplomatic integrationist views, the NGOs were part of the governmental approach based on the idea that, during the mission, the governmental actors lay the foundations for development, on the basis of which NGOs continue to build. There would also be funding for this purpose from the embassy and from the national Afghan budget[238]. The boundaries of coherence were made clear when in 2009 the PRT and

a number of OsAds requested several NGOs to start projects in Deh Rafshan which had recently been cleared and secured and from an integrated policy perspective needed signs of progress for the population. These NGOs asked their local partners how they viewed the proposal and the response was that it was too premature. As a result the NGOs declined[239]. The Ministry in The Hague and the embassy supported the NGOs in their concerns[240]. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs never again came with such a request and the NGOs never felt pressured to implement certain projects[241]. Nonetheless, according to a military officer, at the end of the mission one could argue that NGOs united in DCU were to a certain extent involved, and in some cases instrumental, in the mission as they did take funds to achieve common goals[242]. In fact, next to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Afghan government, the Ministry of Defence became one of the larger donors to Afghan NGOs[243].

Currently it appears that relations between NGOs and the military have reached a status quo in which the NGOs await what is coming next. Further policy coherence requires joint planning – a step that, at least for the moment, seems to be a step too far for both the NGOs and the Ministries of Defence and Foreign Affairs[244]. Moreover, although most Dutch military personnel understand the humanitarian aspects of NGOs, this is not always the case with the allies. According to an NGO representative, the Americans especially would endanger civilians because, despite their good intentions, they would overstep the boundaries between the military and NGOs[245]. In comparison to other coalition partners, the relationship between the Dutch 'Ds' and the Dutch NGOs is relatively good[246].

Within the framework of De Coning and Friis, at the strategic level the coherence between the NGOs in DCU and the Dutch government can be described as mainly coordination, because information was shared and some of the goals were partly the same, but approaches and identities remain different. At the same time, at the operational level DCU underlined the separate identities and actions, and coherence was more *coexistence*. This difference between the strategic and the operational levels grew wider during the mission, because at the strategic level DCU and the Dutch government grew closer over time.

Many layers of coherence

What follows from this chapter is that within the 'broader 3D approach' there were many different forms of interaction between a number of organisational units. Each interaction had its own distinct issues and its own level of coherence. Moreover, the level of coherence differed according to the level at which it took place – strategic or headquarters versus operational or field, and, as also seen in the previous chapter, changed in most cases towards more cohesion during the mission. This becomes most apparent at the operational level in the TFU which, within the

framework of De Coning and Friis, was mainly *cooperation* before 2009 and became *integrated* after 2009. Coherence at the strategic level, in The Hague, between the Ministries of Defence and Foreign Affairs remained mainly *cooperation*. Coherence between the PRT and the BG in the Smallest Unit of Action remained mainly *cooperating*, also after the PRT came under civilian lead. Although at the strategic level coherence with ISAF and Regional Command South was mainly *integrated*, at the operational level within and between PRTs and between countries participating in ISAF it was mainly *cooperation*. At the strategic level, coherence between NGOs in DCU and the Dutch government was mainly *coordination*, while at the operational level it was more *coexistence*. These relations and the changes during the mission appear in Figure 6, which provides a quick overview of coherence in the 'broader 3D approach'.

Figure 6: Overview of coherence in the 'broader 3D approach'

Six types of relationships	Four levels of coherence							
	Internal-external		Inter-agency		Whole-of-government		Intra-agency	
	Strategic	Operational	Strategic	Operational	Strategic	Operational	Strategic	Operational
United								
Integrated			NATO – Dutch state actors			Different actors (civil/ military) involved in Dutch PRT since 2009		BG – PRT
Cooperating	Afghan national government – Dutch government.	Afghan local government – Dutch state actors Afghan NGOs – Dutch state actors Dutch NGOs (DCU) Afghan business organisations – WEWA	DCU – its members (Dutch NGOs)	Dutch PRT – allies in other provinces Dutch – allies in Uruzgan	Involved Dutch Departments	Organisations involved in Dutch PRT until 2009		
Coordinating			WEWA – its members (business organisations) Dutch government – Dutch NGOs (DCU)	UN organisations – Dutch state actors / TFU – certain Afghan NGOs				
Coexisting				Dutch NGOs (DCU) – Dutch state actors.				
Competing								

5

Strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats analysis of the 3D approach in Uruzgan

This chapter gives an overview of perceptions of the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats of coherence in a 3D approach as gathered from literature and focus group meetings held to generate further information on the Dutch mission in Uruzgan. It has to be stressed that the elements of this SWOT analysis are consequently subjective. The more general support they get, the more likely it is that they have a broader validity. In this analysis, outlying opinions have not been included. Strengths and weaknesses are respectively the positive or negative perceptions of internal factors influencing the results of coherence. Opportunities and threats are respectively the positive and negative perceptions of external factors influencing coherence or factors that may influence such a comprehensive approach by the Netherlands in the future[247].

Figure 7: SWOT analysis including example questions

	Positive opinion	Negative opinion
Within relationship	Strengths • Which unique or distinct advantage or value does the coherence have; a product or service that cannot be offered without coherence? • Does coherence increase efficiency?	Weaknesses • Which unique or distinct disadvantage does the coherence have; a product or service to be avoided? • Does coherence decrease efficiency?
External factors	Opportunities • Are there any changes in the environment that make coherence more productive? • What may be a future contribution of coherence?	Threats • Are there any changes in the environment that make coherence less productive? • What may be a future negative contribution of coherence?

Strengths

The whole is more than the sum of its parts.
This is the most important and in fact the overriding argument for coherence. Its importance is shown by the fact that many perceive it to outweigh all the other weaknesses and threats. It is supported by almost all the 'Ds' except for a few 'principled neutralist' NGO representatives. It is argued that the 3D approach acknowledges the complexity of operations such as those in Afghanistan[248]. The civil assessment showed that conflict finds its roots in tribal fault lines, personal conflicts, army and police actions, and conflicts over water, land and food, etc. As a result, the solution to such complex conflicts cannot be found in a single 'D' approach. In the end, no conflict can be solved

by military means alone[249]. In the 3D approach, problems were often commonly analysed in order to find the best instrument(s) for solving them. By integrating the different approaches, more answers were generated, because the different expertise and inputs of a wide variety of actors were shared. Taken together, all had a better overview of the different aspects and root causes of conflict[250]. Also, lessons could be learned and shared in a broader community[251]. In addition, through more and better coordination, the 3D approach related the operations of the different actors to those of others, as a result of which they could reinforce each other. At the same time, the approach aimed to prevent counterproductive operations[252]. The different timelines of the different approaches could also be better adjusted to each other[253]. Additionally, it allowed decision-making in the field to become faster since all the actors were close to each other[254]. Furthermore, it gave the opportunity to balance the interdependence between civil and military actors[255]. As a result of all these advantages, the approach is argued to be more cost effective[256]. Such benefits are often described in catchwords such as 'synchronisation', 'synergy' and 'coherence', or catchphrases such as 'the whole is more than the sum of its parts', 'harmonisation of plans', 'unity of effort' and 'grand strategy'[257].

This advantage of coherence is considered to be very large. These benefits result not only as a result of increased coherence among the different ministries and within the government, but also when NGOs are included. During the mission, the military and some NGOs became increasingly aware of these advantages and liaised more closely during the policy phase[258]. DCU followed the device "wel communiceren, niet samenwerken", meaning yes to communication, but no to cooperation. Moreover, from the perspective of some NGO representatives, the ink spot made it easier for NGOs to work because there was more room for NGOs to start activities in these difficult areas[259].

The 3D approach is an investment in trust, respect and understanding among the different (governmental) actors intervening in Afghanistan.
As a result of the improved cooperation, mutual trust grew[260]. The military and diplomats learned to interact on a regular basis and this working relationship increased understanding of each other's views and roles. This did not take place only in the field, but also at departments in The Hague[261]. Furthermore, NGOs were also no longer seen as the strange outsiders. For example, there was, according to most NGO representatives, a cultural change among military personnel, who increasingly came to understand the role of NGOs and the fact that NGOs cannot be directed or controlled. Initially the perception of most military personnel was that NGOs were sluggish. Later they recognised that NGOs first need to consult their partners. This understanding among the actors in the field grew, especially once the civilian presence inside the PRT became larger. According to most NGO representatives, appreciation of the NGOs' long-term approach increased with this civilian presence. It meant that NGOs needed to make less effort to make their work understood and access to the military camp became easier[262]. The relative distance between the NGOs and the ministries in The Hague also decreased. At the Afghanistan Platform both groups met, numerous issues

were discussed critically, and in an open and constructive dialogue that was not possible before the Afghanistan mission[263]. Some argue, however, that this increased understanding could also have been reached without a 3D approach[264].

As a result of the 3D approach military, diplomats and development workers had to work together, listen to and as a result learn from each other.
Each single pillar within the approach tried to get its own strategy rubber stamped as '3D' and therefore had to convince the other 'Ds'[265]. This discussion between a pluriformity of ideas and diversity of perspectives provided different insights to the different actors, which they would not have achieved alone. As a result it stimulated out-of-the-box thinking[266]. Again, it also increased military awareness of the knowledge and expertise of NGOs[267]. The approach ensured that a common picture evolved, a common understanding in which more aspects and perspectives were included than if the approach were a single 'D'[268]. The different backgrounds and roles of actors within the PRT were often regarded as important to the approach. Therefore, from a military point of view, the actors also needed to maintain their own characteristics, but should learn each other's language (terminology and discourse)[269]. As such the 3D approach gave segregationists room for 'everyone to his or her own trade'. For example, OsAds were integrated in the mission and therefore the military did not necessarily have to implement tasks they are not trained for. Even if the military forced incrementalists perceived they had to, because other actors were thought to be unable, at least they received feedback from the OsAds and NGOs[270]. As such it allowed the combination of different approaches to reach the same aim[271].

The 3D approach makes the separate approaches of the military, diplomats and development workers more multidimensional.
Related closely to the above strength, the different approaches were affected by each other and as a result became less 'sharp'. It is broadly perceived that the military, and security policy as a whole, became more directed at the long-term and more structural goals, aimed at tackling the root causes of conflict. The process-driven inputs from civilian actors made most military less focused on short-term results, which in turn made the military effort more sustainable. They became more directed at addressing the causes of the conflict rather than what civilian actors perceive to be the symptoms and consequences, violence and the insurgents. Increasingly kinetic solutions became second choice as questions were asked such as: "Do we really understand the situation?" "Are we being used?" As such, it made most military personnel more open-minded to non-kinetic, alternative solutions. For example, in a number of cases the CulAd was able to avoid violent engagements because he was better positioned to understand that the request for assistance from the Afghan government was in fact a fight between local leaders. According to civilians the approach also introduced, even more than before, women and gender sensitivity into the military process. Additionally, the military also became more aware of the importance of local ownership. They were said to have realised that only handing out assistance was not improving the situation and that providing well-intentioned, but

ill-coordinated medcap or vetcap could in fact have frustrating effects on others' programmes[272]. At the same time, the 3D approach also introduced more result-directed thinking among the civilian 'Ds', which had traditionally been more directed at processes. According to both the military and diplomats, at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs awareness grew that some processes had to be accelerated, because the military effort needed more speed[273]. Consequently, the mission became more versatile, because it obtained not only a military, but also a civilian face and therefore implementation of non-kinetic instruments could be increased. The combination of a focus on both process and results appeared to be healthy[274].

The 3D approach is driven nationally, which allows countries to focus effectively.
According to some military personnel, by integrating security (stability), development and good governance into one single approach through a mix of policy instruments, an intervening country can focus on one single region and, as a result, be involved in a less diverse and widespread manner. For example, the Netherlands as a whole focused all its attention on Uruzgan[275].

The 3D approach produces an exchange in ownership over the mission between civilians and the military.
The network of organisations involved in a mission is larger. As a result the responsibility for a mission is shared by more than one ministry or minister. In the field, however, decision-making gained more legitimacy and support as a result of the 3D approach[276].

The 3D approach had human resource strengths.
According to some military personnel, the continuous arrival of new rotations in Uruzgan brought new inputs. Consequently, there would be a constant influx of fresh people with a fresh drive[277]. With regard to the civilian input, diplomats reflect that although they remained important throughout the mission, the CulAds, CIMIC officers and functional specialists were particularly important at the start of the process[278].

Weaknesses

The 3D approach does not have a single goal and is not a single strategy.
It has a number of goals and strategies placed under the same header. The importance of the strength "the whole is more than the sum of its parts" is underlined by the first weakness of the 3D approach in Uruzgan. According to some military and diplomatic integrationists particularly, the approach was still not integrated enough. Each 'D' still had its own goals, approaches and timelines, and these would be combined in at best two or three mostly complementary strategies. An actual fusion of the different approaches did not really take place. For example,

according to them, development cooperation focused on developing the 'good guys', while defence, and diplomacy, to a certain extent, focused on combating and controlling the 'bad guys'. In practices, the Dutch government had a double goal: nation building and development on the one hand, and countering terrorism and insurgency on the other. Only in the distant future would both strategies perhaps really meet, but for the moment each 'D' would have its own focus within this double goal. Most military focused more on short-term effects, while the other two 'Ds' were directed more at long-term processes of sometimes up to 30 years. In development, this long-term approach is the result of lessons learned from many years of experience. For military deployments, short-term goals are required and such an approach would be politically impossible. As a consequence, however, an overarching or integral (national) strategy, goal, doctrine, concept, vision and grand strategy was absent. Such a plan of what, why and how the intervention was going to be carried out, on the other hand, was not likely to find wide acceptance in Dutch politics because political parties recognised themselves more in one of the two goals[279].

The 3D approach was not 'comprehensive' enough.

Along the same line of thinking as military and diplomatic integrationists, the Dutch strategy to Afghanistan was mainly implemented by the Ministries of Defence and Foreign Affairs. In order to be really 'comprehensive', other Ministries such as Security and Justice, Interior and Kingdom Relations, Finance, and Economic Affairs, Agriculture and Innovation needed to be more involved. Only then could the 3D approach become the multidimensional approach that was needed[280].

The implementation of the 3D approach was still too compartmentalised.

From the perception of many military integrationists, as long as the different ministries and participating organisations still held to their own separate interests, there would not be an integral, national and integrated implementation of the 3D approach. They described this as a lack of so-called "unity of effort" or "unity of action"[281]. The 3D approach in Uruzgan was most integrated in the field, at the operational TFU level, not at the headquarters strategic level in The Hague. According to these military integrationists, partners cooperated, but their common integrated planning was weak[282]. Some blame the compartmentalised planning on a lack of structural information sharing. Information on current and past projects was, for example, not shared between civilians and the military[283]. Even within the defence 'D', such compartmentalisation was sometimes felt during the period that the PRT and the battle group were under military command. Some military argue that had trust and cooperation between the PRT and infantry been enhanced, the PRT would have been even better able to join operations in more dangerous areas[284]. Further improvements were regarded to be possible through the better involvement of functional specialists[285]. Moreover, according to many in the military, the lessons learned in these fields were not anchored in the organisations[286]. The Dutch Defence Staff described this lack of 'unity of action' as a result of the absence of a lead organisation or 'unity of command' (see also below). Until 2009, civilians were not directly

under the command of the TFU because it had a military command. Civilians were directly responsible to the Department of Foreign Affairs and therefore, could not be 'controlled'[287]. For such 'unity of command' to happen, agreement was also needed at the strategic level: agreement about "mandate, character and structure of the organisation, the period of the mission, the structure of command and the effects that should be reached, the goals of the mission and the end state"[288]. After 2009, interaction between the actors within the PRT became more integrated and 'unity of command' was created by joining the two lines of command. In spite of this, according to mainly military integrationists, it remained difficult to integrate further and implementation remained compartmentalised[289].

There is no lead agency or 'unity of command'.

Another argument, again especially from the perspective of the military integrationists, was that there was no lead in the 3D approach in Uruzgan and therefore not enough coherence[290]. The role of the Ministry of General Affairs, which they view as the centre of gravity of an integrated approach, for example, was weak[291]. In addition, international coherence was weak as, apart from the Dutch, there were many more actors in Uruzgan. Whichever country was the lead nation in the province, other nations and organisations would still follow their own approaches[292]. The topic of 'unity of command' has been studied regularly and debated within military literature on Dutch involvement in Uruzgan, and became increasingly topical when the number of civilians – who were not included in the military chain of command – increased. Although the structure of the TFU was changed in 2009, the debate continued. Some argued that a double-headed command would cause ambiguity, a less clear chain of command and, as such, was a threat to the 3D approach. Others argued that the double-headed command would solve the 'unity of command' issues, because it would provide 'unity of purpose'. Essentially the discussion was about whether the structure of the decision-making process was more important than the more common outcomes it may generate[293].

The 3D approach still allowed partners to believe that the other would or could solve a problem.

Once again from the perspective of the military integrationists that the 3D approach was not coherent enough, military personnel argued that the lack of capacity or commitment from other departments and actors, especially at the start of the mission, meant many issues were primarily a military 'problem'. Without the necessary civilian input and presence, the military had the tendency, or felt forced to, jump in, fill the gaps and take over the other Ds' fields without the necessary knowledge and expertise. They recognise that in turn this caused frictions and a lack of coordination. For example, most military personnel expected the diplomats to solve problems with regard to governance. However, from the start, in the absence of diplomatic capacity, the military entered the realm of governance using their own approaches[294].

Human resources were not adjusted to the 3D approach.

There was no integral preparation for military, diplomatic and development workers. As a result, according to a number of the

military, they were generally not very familiar with each other's ways of thinking, and did not fully have a common understanding of the situation, especially at the start of the mission. According to them, both ministries would still not feel enough urgency to prepare their personnel sufficiently for their 3D deployment[295]. In addition, according to a wide variety of military and diplomatic staff, rotations were too short. Military personnel, OsAds and PolAds stayed at most for half a year. Only embassy personnel and CulAds stayed for two years or longer. Local leaders and NGOs often did not like the fact that relationships were ended prematurely and they had to start from scratch every time. Rotations were not simultaneous either. According to a wide range of military and diplomatic staff, although this created some continuity, all partners would be in a continuous process of getting used to and getting to know each other. Also the necessary overlap for transferring tasks and experience was often too short. Moreover, as they would all need time to grow into their positions and, during the latter part of their tour, needed to prepare for the transfer to their successor, the time they were really effective was even more limited. This was further reinforced by the fact that each new person would have different approaches and strategies[296]. Some argue that in order to score successes and because of their short rotations, commanders opted for short-term results. They also needed their own 'battle' or 'operation'[297]. Next, towards the end of the mission when the number of civilians had increased, diplomats argued that some functional specialists became superfluous[298]. Last but not least, the number of women deployed was, according to most diplomats, too few. Not only could they have addressed more women-related issues in a conservative country such as Afghanistan, they would also have been a healthy influence on the mainly male group dynamics[299].

The different ministries have different and inflexible rules and procedures that conflict.

The procedures and processes of the Netherlands government and NGOs are not used to an integrated approach[300]. Each ministry has its own rules and procedures and sometimes the differences were difficult to overcome. For example, the PRT in Uruzgan worked with a fixed list of criteria for hiring a contractor, such as a financial offer, planning, quality and manageability. The exact criteria depended on the funding organisation. The Ministry of Defence and Ministry of Foreign Affairs each had different budgeting rules and the PRT had to adapt according to each ministry's role in a project[301]. Contracting-out and monitoring processes were considered too time-consuming from a military and TFU point of view, particularly with larger projects[302]. Ways had to be found to free funds quickly without following tendering procedures (see below)[303]. At a higher level, financial cooperation between the Dutch ministries in the HGIS was, according to some military personnel, still limited in its flexibility. Funds for crisis management responses were still channelled through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and therefore not directly available to the Dutch military organisation. In addition, many of these funds went directly to the Afghan government. As a result, funds for the PRT often only became available following a request to either the Dutch embassy or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Ministries of Defence and PRTs of other countries often have

Nut store at bazaar of Tarin Kowt

larger budgets, which allow them to respond faster[304]. On the other hand, from a civilian perspective, civilian control over development funds was not necessarily perceived as a weakness and was often seen as an advantage. Civilians argue that, while remaining sufficiently flexible, transparent and sound rules were applied and that these were needed to prevent funds from disappearing or being wasted, as was the case for the United States[305].

The relationship between the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defence was imbalanced.

The military, especially, perceive an imbalance between the number of personnel deployed in Afghanistan by the Ministries of Defence and Foreign Affairs and the control they had over funds. More than 99 per cent of deployed personnel were employed by the Ministry of Defence, while less than 1 per cent was sent by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. With regard to finances it was, however, the other way around. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs had decided to channel its funds through Afghan partners, sectoral programmes, UN agencies and so forth. Funds for projects and programmes were therefore 99 per cent for development cooperation, channelled through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, while only 1 per cent was security and defence related, originating from the Ministry of Defence. Although this inconsistency originated at the strategic level, at the operational level the military in the PRT consequently had limits to their spending[306]. On the other hand, Afghan NGOs particularly argued that the large number of military personnel in the field gave the military a large influence over the whole approach of the Dutch and as such militarised it[307]. Both sides agree that the civilian presence in the TFU, especially at the beginning of the mission, was too limited[308].

The three 'Ds' have different capacities and speeds.

All three 'Ds' were limited in their capacity. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs had a limited capacity to deploy personnel in the field, while the Ministry of Defence had a limited capacity to provide the PRT with force protection. The military were also

less capable of providing physical security outside the ink spot. Moreover, the PRT created a variety of dynamic projects at high speed, but the capacity of the battle group to secure these was limited when kinetic operations were also needed. According to some, expanding the ink spot through larger military operations in the Baluchi and Mirabad valleys may not always have been as effective, because the capacity to support the PRT to substantially develop, secure or 'build' on the 'cleared' areas was limited. There was tension between whether to widen or deepen the ink spot. Although, according to some, some areas were perhaps integrated into the ink spot too quickly, on the other hand others wondered what should otherwise have been done with these areas. Should they have been left alone[309]?

At times the speed of the different 'Ds' was also different. Diplomacy and development cannot follow a military planning framework because, unlike the military, they continuously have to consult with local stakeholders and depend on local (absorption) capacity[310]. To many military personnel, civilians and NGOs therefore operate too slowly. A lot of time would be needed to come to an agreement and they would operate in a less coordinated fashion[311]. As an example of this slowness, in the case of larger contracts the development 'D' had to follow EU tendering rules through the Central Tender Committee. Normal procedures for development assistance in cases where tendering was required would have been slower than PRT operations in the field allowed. During the mission, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Tender Board in view of security arguments sometimes waived the regular tender procedures, or was able to accelerate procurement processes[312].

The three 'Ds' have different time horizons.
The NGOs, especially, point out that although military personnel try to think long term, their time horizons are inherently more limited towards periods of six months to two years. They are often aware of the long-term needs, but their operational structures, as well as political decisions made with regard to them, push them towards more short-term planning. Although from a military or mission perspective four years would be long term, from a development perspective this would still be short term. NGOs and development workers work with a time horizon of 20 to 50 years. Initially the development effort was also directed at the short term, but relatively quickly the emphases shifted in partnership with the Afghan government towards long-term capacity building, through training, etc. Moreover, aware of the structural problems in Afghanistan, the Dutch Ministry of Defence used advisors to assist the military[313].

The problem is related to the different strategies of the different 'Ds'. From a military perspective, sometimes short-term activities are needed to allow long-term improvements to take place. For example, sometimes it is needed to clear an area, militarily or preferably through talks, in order to allow development projects and the establishment of governance to take place[314]. Additionally, the military themselves feel they focus on the requirements and needs of the population and according to them these would be short term. Without short-term security, long-term development would become more difficult[315]. Moreover, the

long term is a much longer period than the political commitment for military deployments allows. The political decision-making process can end missions long before they can work on long-term issues[316].

From a development perspective, conflicts are the result of underlying deeper development issues. The military would address short-term symptoms, but only development would resolve conflict in the long run. Moreover, even when development workers try to look at it from a military perspective, they argue that the Afghan population also wants to see progress. It does not make sense to NGOs to decrease investment in areas where the situation is improving, because stabilisation would have been reached. More investment would be needed to show progress and to prevent a relapse[317]. Similarly, they would expect the military to have the capacity to stay in cleared areas, because if not there may not be sufficient security for development projects[318]. As a result of these different time horizons, an integrated approach appears difficult.

Many diplomats and military personnel perceive short and long term as a complementary rather than contradictory. One should not focus on one, but do both at the same time[319]. As such, increasing coherence in the 3D approach would have overcome this perceived weakness to a certain extent. The more coherent the approach became, the more capacity could be generated from the Afghan government in Kabul, ISAF in Kandahar and Kabul, and the embassy in Kabul for governance and development in cleared areas[320].

The development and defence approaches have different directions, one is top-down, the other is more bottom-up.
From a classical diplomacy and development perspective, '3D' is a top-down process in which the international agenda resulting from the Bonn Process and the London Afghanistan Compact is followed. These are national approaches to Afghanistan[321]. When the PRT was under military command, the embassy ensured the projects were in line with the Afghan National Development Strategy (ANDS). Under the first CivRep, the TFU also started to actively support the ANDS[322]. In addition, national development assistance programmes were the priority of Dutch development cooperation, because those would result in the best outcomes. More than half the development assistance went to the national level[323]. Nonetheless, Dutch development cooperation also supported bottom-up projects aimed at improving Afghanistan at operational level. Examples of such bottom-up projects were enhancing infrastructure and the health sector, and establishing schools, both by direct funding and through cooperation with DCU[324]. The military on the other hand, starting from the concept of 'shape, clear, hold, build', have a bottom-up approach in which the starting point is the area to be cleared and providing security to communities. Both strategies are, to many, at best complementary. Looking back, both military personnel and diplomats argue that the military approach attempts to establish preconditions that are needed for effective top-down development policy. None of the approaches would in fact take priority for the Netherlands, because the approaches were believed to affect each other positively[325].

The more coherence, the more coordination is needed, and therefore more effort, time and funds.
According to many military personnel and some diplomats, the more coherent an approach between different actors is, and the more actors are involved in it, the more effort is required for its coordination. When integrating there is always a pluriformity of opinions and ideas, and actors have different interests and aims that have to be satisfied. Also, the cultural differences between the different organisations have to be overcome. In addition, not all people are able to work well together. Moreover, in order to keep all the different actors on board, the integrated 'polder' plan could become vague and weak. According to them, suboptimalisation was sometimes the result as, in order to get all the actors on board, some parts of a strategy that would be effective but disliked by some would have to be dropped. As a result, in an approach in which different actors work together, the chance of having to sacrifice some effects of the effort would be likely. Furthermore, all actors within the approach would generate information that had to be transmitted and followed up on. The result may be that coordination results in extra work and endless discussions. A negative effect of the need to convince partners and for a coordinated approach was that it took time, funds and capacity, which sometimes would not be available. A speedy decision-making process is, in fact, essential in military operations. As a comprehensive approach also depends very much on the cooperative capacities and willingness of the different organisations, according to some military personnel, in case of conflicts within the mission it may even become a plaything of the conflicting organisations. If actors really want to work towards coherence, they need to step back every once in a while. From this military perspective, if only one organisation implements an activity, coordinating different interests and agendas is less problematic. Therefore intra-agency is less difficult than inter-agency. Moreover, an international approach would be even more difficult as it needs a lot of additional international coordination. Thus, in the end, depending on the conditions in which a mission is deployed, sometimes a single D approach would be more cost effective and faster[326].

Integration leads to conflict.
Increased integration and striving towards coherence, according to some military personnel, also leads at least in three ways to increasing conflict between the different parts constituting the approach. First, the cultural differences between the different actors, if not overcome, may lead to conflicts[327]. Second, institutions may also try to demarcate their boundaries in institutional turf battles[328]. Third, especially in times of budget cuts, institutional and financial interests of the different actors may determine more of the outcomes. Instead of what is needed for the situation, the need to survive and to gain funds could determine the aims[329]. All these three issues at times caused minor frictions within the 3D approach in Uruzgan.

Opportunities

The 3D approach in Uruzgan and its lessons learned may be the seed for a more comprehensive approach for the Netherlands.
Especially among the military, but also among diplomatic integrationists, there is the hope that the knowledge and experience gained in Uruzgan can function as a basis for further development of the approach in future operations. The military integrationists, particularly, hope that this may lead to a more integrated and comprehensive national approach to security issues and crises, slowly growing into a plan encompassing the aims and responsibilities of different organisations, and ultimately a national grand strategy. It may also lead to further institutionalisation of the comprehensive approach at the national level because, according to them, now is the moment one can strike while the iron is hot. Broadening the institutional framework would mean that other ministries would also become more actively involved. It may mean further involving the private sector, NGOs and others into missions. Nonetheless, there would also be room for further deepening the approach through further integration at The Hague level. Among other issues, this would strengthen command and control over the mission, as well as the communication to the broad public. The continued development of a more comprehensive and more institutionalised approach would enable missions and security policy to be more successful in the long term, focusing more on root causes than on symptoms. Such a mixture of process- and result-driven approaches would lead to more sustainability in a complex environment[330].

The further development of the 3D approach at the international level may be possible.
Both military personnel and diplomats think other countries may benefit from the Dutch experience and lessons learned in Uruzgan. They could copy (parts of) the approach. Further international institutionalisation would also be possible, for example within the context of the European Union[331].

A comprehensive approach provides more body to influence or force local actors to act or refrain[332].
According to diplomats, Dutch influence on the central government of the host nation would be larger with a broad integrated approach than if the approach were only military. This is helpful because many of the problems are national rather than local. For example, in order to stimulate infrastructural works or to ensure that police salaries are increased to a sufficient level for them to no longer moonlight in poppy cultivation, national policies had to be addressed[333]. In addition, according to the military, a comprehensive approach would give a clearer and more coherent signal of our intentions to the local population and government[334].

The 3D approach is directed towards local ownership.
Military and diplomats point out that the bottom-up approach, in which a comprehensive plan is designed in the field with the contribution of local stakeholders, increases local ownership

and cooperation. Moreover, the presence of Dutch personnel and resources in the field would afford better assistance to the local government and enable local needs to be addressed. This in turn would ensure that the Dutch contribution entails more than the presence of its military, and also increases the visibility of the local government[335]. In Uruzgan, the mission also managed to address concerns of the local population. For example, when local commanders and people in the Baluchi valley complained about repression and aggression by Pakistani Taliban, they provided intelligence and assisted in the removal of the Taliban. In other cases, diplomats were able to mediate in land and water conflicts[336]. In addition, according to most military personnel, 'cash for work' projects offered a temporary job to tens or hundreds of employees, while at the same time providing an alternative to 'day fighters' in the insurgency. Such contracting out to the local community would have been successful, because it provided opportunities for the marginalised population[337].

A comprehensive approach provides more legitimacy to military operations.
It is broadly perceived that the comprehensive approach frames military operations within a broader perspective to the general public. Combining a military approach with a civilian diplomatic and development approach in a comprehensive approach would make it easier for the government to sell its mission to the public at large. As such, for example the Uruzgan mission was perceived less as an 'aggressive invasion' and more as having a 'civilian face'. Moreover, the fact that Uruzgan was perceived as a Dutch province also made the mission more visible to the Dutch population. From the perspective of the Dutch public, therefore, it would appear that in a comprehensive approach the whole Dutch government unites to support the host nation. It can, however, be debated whether this is an added value to all three actors, as some NGOs did not see it as necessarily positive[338].

Community midwife training at Tarin Kowt provincial hospital.

The surplus value of the comprehensive approach may generate more funds.
Most diplomats, especially, and some NGO representatives argued that as a result of the increased success of a comprehensive approach, headquarters and the national government would be more willing to contribute funds and capacity to such comprehensive interventions. It would also mean that other budget lines are opened in addition to defence. The military presence would also increase funding and attention for development projects and NGOs[339].

Threats

The perceived success of the 3D approach may become a threat.
It is broadly warned that too much attention may go to the means of the 3D approach rather than to its aims. As a consequence, the method could increasingly become an aim in itself, without looking at the aims and the context of new missions. What may have worked well in Uruzgan should not be picked-up as a one-size-fits-all blue print that can be applied to all other failed states. It should not become the format generals use to fight their last war. The next mission and the context in which it takes place may be very different and may require a different formula. Sometimes, for example, a single D approach, whether military, diplomatic or development cooperation would perform better[340]. Or, in Uruzgan the 3D approach could have been implemented at the lowest operational level, whereas in the next mission this is not possible. In addition, a next mission may require a more kinetic approach before development assistance can play a role[341]. '3D' also risks becoming a buzzword, an empty shell[342]. Moreover, there is a fear among many in the military that high hopes for integrated approaches may not live up to expectations. They warn that the first steps towards integration have been set, but that it takes time to change the mind-set of actors and to create the needed institutional setting. In the coming years, the approach is expected to still have teething troubles and further adjustments would likely be needed[343].

If coherence grows too deep, the individual components are no longer able to act separately.
As elaborated upon before, military and diplomatic segregationists in particular point out that there is a risk that if coherence goes too deep, the armed forces can no longer deploy without the involvement of other ministries, or that development agencies lack the independence and flexibility needed for effective programmes with local communities[344].

Working together on the same issue allows tunnel vision.
Different simultaneous approaches may at first sight appear uncoordinated and not contributing to the greater goal. Long-term processes, however, cannot be predicted and complex situations such as the conflict in Afghanistan cannot be fully understood. Therefore, according to some military personnel

and diplomats, only betting on a single horse, focusing on a single approach and not thinking out of the box may in fact in the end produce fewer results. In diversity of different approaches lies a strength, which is thrown overboard if the coherence in a comprehensive approach grows too deep. In fact, in complex conflicts such as Afghanistan, a versatile approach is required. This is also where the strength of NGOs lies. Independently they seek the gaps in the governmental approach and would lose this quality were they to be incorporated in the mission[345].

A comprehensive approach may spread too thin and as a result become too fragmented.

According to some military personnel, especially, with more actors involved, and the integration of all their aims, the ambitions for a mission may increase towards a level where they become too high. Too much effort may have to be put into too many issues and as a result the mission's focus may be lost. In addition, these extra efforts would not always be supported by the additional resources needed. Moreover, if the approach was not well structured, coordinated and organised, the mission could run the risk of fragmentation and become the plaything of the conflicting parties[346]. According to a number of diplomats the 3D approach in Uruzgan fragmentised attention. So many issues had to be addressed that to a certain extent focus was lost[347]. Moreover, according to a member of the military it becomes increasingly complex to structure all the information generated when working together in a comprehensive approach[348].

Development projects that are part of a 3D mission in insecure areas are more difficult to monitor and evaluate.

As development projects within the context of the 3D approach generally take place in an insecure environment, it is more difficult to monitor and evaluate their results. For NGOs, the reporting requirements remained the same, but the environment in which to do so was less friendly. As a result many projects were monitored and evaluated from a distance. NGOs requested some leniency from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and their evaluations were accepted on the basis of a limited number of sources. Although the OsAds and embassy were also limited in their movement, they did have a good sense of most NGO projects[349]. PRT staff were generally able to visit its projects and report on them, especially towards the end of the mission[350]. According to De Boer, the embassy was well able to monitor the implementation of projects through, among other means, phone calls and asking partners for information[351]. However, according to most NGO representatives, monitoring and evaluation received less priority from both the NGOs and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs[352]. This is denied by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs[353]. Moreover, because of a lack of technical knowledge, the PRT sometimes had difficulties controlling the quality of projects. In some cases, it cooperated with the Infra Support Detachment (ISD) to solve this problem[354].

The suboptimal implementation of some CIMIC projects had as a side-effect that these projects, designed to win the *hearts and minds* of the population of Uruzgan, did not achieve their goals of building trust and credibility[355]. At the same time, the more that parliament requires measurable effects, the more missions direct their attention to such measurable effects. However, the 3D approach is in principle directed at processes rather than quick effects. Moreover, in a multilateral operation it is difficult to single out what the particular results of the Dutch presence are. As a consequence, it is difficult to monitor and evaluate the results and the requirement to generate measurable effects creates a tendency to nationalise the approach[356].

The more integration takes place at a national level in the countries providing troops, the more difficult integration and coordination at the regional level in the host nation becomes.

In spite of the overall nationwide ISAF strategy, and the integration at the Kabul and Regional Command South strategic level, the international effort for Afghanistan fragmentised at the operational level. The ISAF approach in southern Afghanistan was different in each province. The 26 PRTs in Afghanistan were led by 14 different lead nations, each with their own goals and shortcomings, and which interacted only in a cooperative way at the operational level[357]. Each ally had its own comprehensive approach and its own PRT, each different and unique. This should, however, not be exaggerated because many PRTs copied strategies and lessons learned from each other. For example, the Dutch PRT built a lot on the Canadian experience in Kandahar. As a result, none of the approaches was radically different from the others. All allies followed to a certain extent some form of 3D approach. They were all directed at counterinsurgency, followed more or less the pattern of 'shape, clear, hold, build', and all were geared towards Afghan ownership. They all directed a lot of attention to civil-military relations, intelligence gathering and training in cultural awareness and understanding. Moreover, the clustering of provinces in regional commands was a way of addressing this problem. To a certain extent Regional Command South coordinated the different strategies in southern Afghanistan[358]. To a certain extent, especially within parliament, the Dutch looked at Afghanistan through a straw and saw only their own province. It was as if they only looked at Uruzgan and discarded the region the province was located in[359].

As a result, six negative effects can be distinguished. First, although the ISAF chain of command became increasingly comprehensive, it only included the military, which meant that military employees of a PRT were acting under NATO command, while civil actors were under the guidance of their national governments. The increasing role of civilians, therefore, also meant growing national differentiation in the PRT policies and actions[360]. Second, at the military level, cooperation between the different provinces within ISAF was suboptimal and once in a while coordination could have been better. This had a negative impact on the counterinsurgency strategy. An opponent could make use of the provincial structures of ISAF, hide in the corners of provinces where ISAF was not deployed, or cross the border to a different province. Moreover, if something happened in Helmand or Kandahar province, this could be felt in Uruzgan and the other way around[361]. Third, in development the challenges do not stop at the border either. As a result of the approach and the fact that to a certain extent the development strategy was connected to the military deployment, development approaches and funds were also limited to the Uruzgan region. For example,

with regard to health care education, Uruzgan cooperated with Kandahar Hospital. Funding for such cross-regional cooperation was, however, limited because there were no Dutch government funds for it[362]. Moreover, according to an NGO representative, as the development funds followed the military operation, Dutch development cooperation had fewer funds available to support the vulnerable population outside Uruzgan province[363]. For example, according to a diplomat, in NGO project proposals, if there were no partners for a project in Uruzgan or if a proposal was not directed at Uruzgan, a way was sought to make it applicable to Uruzgan[364]. The NGOs argue that they pursued a regional development programme, but were not able to reach this goal because lead nations were tied to the provincial borders[365]. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, however, does not agree because it argues that the Uruzgan development programme included activities in adjacent Nesh district, Daikundi province, and field studies were carried out in Zabul and Ghazni provinces to understand conflict dynamics[366]. Fourth, at the time of deployment, Uruzgan was the second poorest province of Afghanistan. During the Dutch presence, although other provinces received more funds, Uruzgan developed faster than the national average. If a peripheral province such as Uruzgan develops much faster in comparison to more central provinces, according to a number of diplomats this may result in problems. This is especially true if this is the result of the fact that it is a Dutch priority province[367]. Fifth, the fragmentation resulted in a number of international frictions, among others with the British over operations in Kandahar. For example, the Dutch were bottom-up in their military approach in comparison to the others who were more top-down. In addition, the Dutch 3D approach was perceived to be too passive, especially at the onset of the mission. It was argued that the Dutch were drinking tea while the other allies were doing the brunt of the fighting. This negative perception of the Dutch was strengthened further because the Netherlands initially labelled their approach the 'Dutch approach' and stressed its uniqueness and success. Internationally this was perceived as arrogance and, for this reason, towards the end of the mission the Dutch strived for more modesty[368]. Sixth, the 3D approach did not stimulate public perception of a common international effort, but more of a separate national effort for Uruzgan. As a result public opinion and the media focused on the Dutch institutions involved, while international and regional organisations and other partners received less attention[369]. Former Secretary-General of NATO, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, openly questioned the fragmented ISAF approach when he argued that it splintered coalition efforts[370]. If an international approach for a region had been followed instead of a national approach per province, southern Afghanistan may have been in a better position[371].

Having one's own approach and also one's own terminology made the transfer to the succeeding Australians and Americans more difficult.
During the process of handover the Ministry of Defence emphasised the extensive experience of both allies in Uruzgan and was convinced that they would continue the process started by the Netherlands[372]. Nonetheless, according to Van den Berg, a representative of Cordaid and the DCU, the protection of Dutch NGOs would not be continued by US and Australian forces[373].

Van der Put, the director of HealthNet/TPO, was also not convinced. He argued that the allies would not take over all Dutch projects. Moreover, they would not have the trust of the local population, would work with other informal powerbrokers, and would abandon those supported by the Dutch. As a consequence, he argued, the process of reconstruction the Dutch had implemented would be stopped[374]. Indeed, the Americans and Australians had observed the Dutch and their typical approach with some reservations, and were not very keen to include all the Dutch ideas in their own approaches[375]. As a result, after the Dutch left, although they included some things, such as having a civilian director of the PRT, they continued with their own strategy which paid lip service to the Dutch, but was different in many aspects[376].

The initial military focus in a 3D approach decreases responsibility and ownership of the Afghans.
Development cooperation tries to adhere to the principle of local ownership. However, because the military are dominant during the initial stages of the deployment, the 3D approach is initiated from a military perspective. They are aware that in principle their operations are initially driven by the intervening party from abroad, and not by local ownership. This is supposed to be gained during the mission, as was the case in Uruzgan. The military led both the planning and start of implementation of the operation, and were the initial face of the 3D approach. As a result, to some extent the long-term development cooperation that is supposed to build on military achievements was founded in the short-term military planning, which, according to some military personnel and NGO representatives, would not include as much local ownership. Nonetheless, as soon and as much as possible, ownership was shifted back to the Afghans. In Deh Rawood, the Transfer of Local Security Responsibility was implemented on a small scale during the Dutch presence[377].

As a result of the military drive rather than the developmental drive, most funds go to political stabilisation rather than development.
This perception is held by some NGOs and diplomats, but is considered factually incorrect by others[378]. In 2005 the government stated that initially the focus of the mission would be on smaller reconstruction projects for the short term. The official government evaluation of the mission holds that "in time the combination of the military intervention and the quick and visible projects (QVPs) would lead to more possibilities to move towards long-term development projects."[379] Nonetheless, those who have this perception argue that by directing most attention to short-term security, most effort would be put into maintaining the power balance and keeping all the parties satisfied. Measuring effects would be done by counting schools, NGOs, etc, but not by the long-term changes to structural problems[380]. As a consequence of the emphasis on short-term stability through CIMIC and QVP activities, in spite of the fact that development projects started simultaneously, development would not get off the ground. They point out that from a development perspective the attention should be shifted from handing out, to enabling the locals to do it themselves[381]. Also diplomats perceive a gap between CIMIC and QVPs on the one

hand and development assistance on the other[382]. The perspective from a local religious leader was that the TFU should stick to providing security, because the PRT's CIMIC projects would be violated by insurgents anyway[383]. Moreover, according to some NGO representatives, most attention is given to insecure areas, with more secure areas receiving less attention. Within the context of CIMIC projects, most attention would be given to areas where there is most resistance. It is there that most of 'hearts and minds' would have to be won. If an area stabilises, the available CIMIC resources would decrease because they are needed to secure other areas. The consequence of this would be that insecurity rather than stability was rewarded. In fact, according to them there are stories of warlords who created trouble in order to attract more funds to their regions. Some argue that as a result the bad guys were rewarded and the good guys not[384]. In order to prevent this from happening, the Dutch military strived for a permanent presence after the cleaning of an area in order to allow building to take place[385].

Some short term projects of the PRT had negative long term consequences.
There are at least three ways in which the PRT in the 3D approach in Uruzgan may have had negative long-term effects. First, cash for work projects were short-term stabilisation projects in which local people were given temporary employment in public projects, such as repairing roads. Although these projects were often considered an asset, in Uruzgan they sometimes stimulated income polarisation as a negative impact. In addition,

they may have resulted in inflation during the mission, because prices for a days' work increased from US$2 between 2001 and 2003 to over $6 later during the mission[386]. Second, according to some military personnel and diplomats, because the PRT had relatively large funds to spend on reconstruction, and it became responsible for so many different issues, it became more influential in the province than the local government. If a PRT becomes too successful the local population would turn to it for assistance rather than to the government. This in turn may have allowed the local government to evade its responsibility[387]. Third, some smaller and local NGOs acted pragmatically and tended to 'follow the money'. Those NGOs preferred to work for the PRT, because it was known to have more funds available and was less strict in reporting and monitoring procedures than the Dutch NGOs who have a more long-term commitment[388].

The sustainability of the comprehensive approach, which is supposed to have a long time horizon, is dependent on short-term political will.
The military and the NGO representatives, especially, noticed that political ambitions with regard to a mission may not be backed up by the political will to provide the necessary (military) resources. In failed states a comprehensive approach requires a long-term perspective and sustained military deployment for 10 to 20 years. It is questionable whether politics and the broader public have enough patience or are willing to invest that much in such a country. The whole approach, including development, would, however, be at risk if it depends too heavily on the

Children play at courtyard of women's wing of Tarin Kowt provincial hospital

military presence and as a result on the political dimension in the Netherlands. If parliament decides to end the military mission, the rest of the mission, including development, is also at risk. It is not realistic to expect beforehand the 20 year commitment needed for the development 'D' either. As a result, according to most NGO representatives, this mean that the military idea of 'shape, clear, hold, build' is built on shaky ground if, when the 'build' phase is reached and the military are withdrawn, the development assistance is also drawn down. Since the political dimension is more influential on development projects inside the 3D approach than outside it, this would make NGOs that are part of a 3D approach more vulnerable to political fads[389]. In the case of Uruzgan, after the military mission ended a CulAd stayed with the Australians and a number of development projects remained under the guidance of the embassy. Development assistance is not directly tied to the political timelines and restriction of military operations. There is a long-term development strategy for Afghanistan which is not only national, but in part also directed at Uruzgan. Moreover, the programmes of the DCU are funded until the end of 2013, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has stated that the end of the military mission does not mean the end of development assistance to the province. On the other hand, the Netherlands cannot continue to treat Uruzgan as a special province for very long, especially now that attention is shifting to Kunduz. It would mean that the Dutch are dependent on the decisions and strategy of its allies, both of which have a different approach than the Dutch. In addition, both allies have been less able to continue the civil projects of the PRT. Many projects would have suffered as a result of the transfer to the allies. Australia has, however, stated it is thinking of financing a structure similar to the DCU[390].

The role of parliament in determining what should and should not happen has at times expanded too much to the micro level.
According to a wide range of diplomats and military personnel, the role of parliament in missions has shifted from controlling to policy making. To them, such micromanagement meant that as a consequence the 3D approach sometimes came under threat of political interference. The blame should, however, not only be placed on parliament. Ministers allow such micromanagement from parliament to take place and they in turn are very much dependent on the officials and military making and implementing policies[391].

Cooperation with NGOs remains difficult.
At The Hague and embassy level, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs perceived the relationship with NGOs to have been good from the start. From its perspective, the NGOs were very useful because their projects helped to address the causes of the conflict and insecurity as well as improving stability[392]. NGOs, however, argue they have only been involved in the 3D approach in Uruzgan from the side-lines, as they were not really integrated. They therefore wonder whether their projects were of real use to the mission and the military approach[393]. At the TFU level, numerous NGOs were not willing to talk to the military. At the same time, the view among the military and diplomats is that this has not influenced the mission negatively[394]. Moreover, during the mission cooperation at TFU level improved, because relations

normalised, cooperation structures and national policy plans were established, and because of the presence of UNAMA[395]. Both the military and representatives of DCU hoped that UNAMA could have an intermediary and therefore coordinating role between NGO and military actors[396]. Coordination of the development effort, including the NGOs, was weak. Also UNAMA, when it was deployed, could not fully play this role. It did, however, improve relations between the mission and NGOs[397]. In fact, the willingness to cooperate among most NGOs changed to the extent that at the end of the mission, NGOs complained that the exchange of information about the withdrawal of troops was too limited[398].

Active cooperation remains difficult and is not possible for many NGOs for at least three reasons[399]. First, NGOs have pointed out they have some difficulties with the 3D approach in Uruzgan at the strategic level. Van der Laar explains, from a humanitarian point of view, integrated policy would lead to polarisation or non-neutral situations, which human aid organisations try to avoid in their activities. In addition, according to him, the Dutch government had two goals for its 3D approach in Uruzgan: on the one hand state-building and a humanitarian aim, while on the other creating a more stable Afghanistan in the fight against terrorism. As long as the government was not clear which goal prevailed, if aid organisations would cohere with the government, they would participate in both goals, which is difficult to match with the mandate of many aid organisations[400]. Second, many NGOs perceive the 3D approach as a threat to their image. The perception of many NGOs outside the DCU was that participating in it meant becoming part of the system, like selling one's sole to the devil. Also, international sister organisations observed developments in the Netherlands with suspicion. Many sister organisations did, however, facilitate the projects of their Dutch partners and are currently thinking of similar constructions with their own governments. Also NGOs joining DCU initially feared becoming instrumentalised as part of a military mission, but did not perceive this in practice. The NGOs that participated clearly set their boundaries and these were respected by the Ministries of Defence and Foreign Affairs[401]. Third, according to some military, NGOs may also have institutional interests as a result of which an integrated approach may be seen as a competitor[402].

At the same time many military view NGO involvement as an exit strategy. They facilitated external parties in (the preparation for) their reconstruction and rebuilding task, because this could attract civilian actors to get involved in Afghanistan. In addition to providing security, the TFU provided transport and other support, and more than 50 per cent of the funds for reconstruction were spent by NGOs. The idea was that NGOs would take over the military's reconstruction projects[403]. However, the NGOs were often not interested to take over these projects[404].

National Afghan politics were at times a threat to the 3D approach.
Local governance was essential to the 3D approach, but this had difficulties during the processes of policy-making, planning and implementation. It was important to have the right people in the right positions. Karzai, however, appointed friends and

family, who were often neither the right persons, nor in the right position. In addition, unclear responsibilities, widespread corruption and a shortage of funds lowered the capacity of the local government. This became worse as a result of a brain drain. Last but not least, Uruzgan civilians had a low level of trust in their government[405]. From a military perspective, joint planning was further complicated by the serious risk of infiltration by insurgents. Sometimes the TFU regarded the plans of local actors as suboptimal compared to their own. It was often attempted to ensure that the Afghans used the Dutch plans. Sometimes, however, the inclusion of local actors meant plans had to be implemented that from the perspective of the intervening actor were suboptimal[406].

Working together with Afghan NGOs is complex.

Stefan van Laar argues that cooperation with Afghan organisations is sometimes difficult. They are often focused on the delivery of products whose quality would sometimes be questionable. Afghan aid organisations would not always familiar with being involved in complex tasks and would not have an active role within civil society. Nonetheless, even though it was difficult at times, (I)NGOs focused on cooperation with the Afghans[407]. These attempts were to a certain extent successful. According to one of the Shura members in Uruzgan, NGOs were very visible in the community and easy to get into contact with, while "we cannot even reach the gates of the PRT, let alone demand something from them."[408] The population also experienced the activities of Afghan NGOs as positive, because they proved to be involved for the long term[409].

Strategic communication in the Netherlands was directed too much at the military part of the mission.

According to many military personnel and diplomats, the Netherlands government's strategic communications with regard to the mission were difficult. The 3D approach was associated with counterinsurgency and therefore had a negative connotation for some parts of the population. In practice, the 3D approach and strategic communications about it made the military more visible, because they were mainly in the hands of the Ministry of Defence. The other 'Ds' were not so much in the picture, which would have stressed the military focus of the mission. Only towards the end of the mission did the Ministry of Foreign Affairs actively start its own campaign[410].

sum of its parts." Moreover, the length of the list of weaknesses and threats distorts the picture to a certain extent, because a significant number of them in fact underline that further coherence is needed, and that the 3D approach as used in Uruzgan was in fact not coherent enough. All these positive perceptions should not, however, bury a number of potential serious pitfalls to further coherence in a future Dutch comprehensive approach. Some of these pitfalls can be addressed and avoided. Others are unfortunately inherent to further coherence and remain dilemmas that have to be faced in the design and implementation of missions. A quick overview of the SWOT analysis is given in Figure 8. This figure is a quick summary and cannot be read as stand-alone without the deeper analysis in this report.

The SWOT analysis

The above SWOT analysis shows a whole range of strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats. These are perceptions and certainly not necessarily objective. It is, however, remarkable that despite a relatively long list of weaknesses and threats, in the end general opinion is that the comprehensive approach has a future. This can partly be explained by the overriding importance attached to the strength "The whole is more than the

Figure 8: a summary of the SWOT analysis

Strengths
- The whole is more than the sum of its parts.
- The 3D approach is an investment in trust, respect and understanding among the different (governmental) actors intervening in Afghanistan.
- As a result of the 3D approach, the military, diplomats and development workers had to work together, listen to and as a result learn from each other.
- The 3D approach makes the different separate approaches of the military, diplomats and development workers more multidimensional.
- The 3D approach is driven nationally which allows countries to focus effectively.
- The 3D approach produces an exchange in ownership over the mission between civilians and the military.
- The 3D approach had human resource strengths.

Weaknesses
- The 3D approach does not have a single goal and is not a single strategy. It is a number of goals and strategies placed under the same header.
- The 3D approach was not 'comprehensive' enough.
- The implementation of the 3D approach was still too compartmentalised.
- There is no lead agency or 'unity of command'.
- The 3D approach still allowed partners to believe that the other would or could solve a problem.
- Human resources were not adjusted to the 3D approach.
- The different ministries have different and inflexible rules and procedures that conflict.
- The relationship between the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defence was imbalanced.
- The three 'Ds' have different capacities and speeds.
- The three 'Ds' have different time horizons.
- The development and defence approaches have different directions, one is top-down, the other is more bottom-up.
- The more coherence, the more coordination is needed, and therefore more effort, time and funds.
- Integration leads to conflict.

Opportunities
- The 3D approach in Uruzgan and its lessons learned may be the seed for a more comprehensive approach for the Netherlands.
- The further development of the 3D approach at the international level may be possible.
- A comprehensive approach provides more body to influence or force local actors to act or refrain.
- The 3D approach is directed towards local ownership.
- A comprehensive approach provides more legitimacy to military operations.
- The surplus value of the comprehensive approach may generate more funds.

Threats
- The perceived success of the 3D approach may become a threat.
- If coherence grows too deep, the individual components are no longer able to act separately.
- Working together on the same issue allows for tunnel vision.
- A comprehensive approach may spread too thin and as a result become too fragmented.
- Development projects that are part of a 3D mission in insecure areas are more difficult to monitor and evaluate.
- The more integration takes place at a national level in the countries providing troops, the more difficult integration and coordination at the regional level in the host nation becomes.
- Having one's own approach and also one's own terminology made the transfer to the succeeding Australians and Americans more difficult.
- The initial military focus in a 3D approach decreases responsibility and ownership of the Afghans.
- As a result of the military drive rather than the developmental drive most funds go to political stabilisation rather than development.
- Some short-term projects of the PRT had negative long-term consequences.
- The sustainability of the comprehensive approach, which is supposed to have a long time horizon, is dependent on short-term political will.
- The role of parliament in determining what should happen and what should not happen has at times expanded too much to the micro level.
- Cooperation with NGOs remains difficult.
- National Afghan politics were at times a threat to the 3D approach.
- Working together with Afghan NGOs is complex.
- Strategic communication in the Netherlands was directed too much at the military part of the mission.

6

Factors for success and failure

Bazaar of Tarin Kowt

The perception, especially among the military, is that any future operation should be approached from a comprehensive perspective. The factors for success and failure below determine the likelihood of success, and are based on the literature study on comprehensive approaches in general. Further elaboration on these factors is based on input from the focus group meetings and the literature study on Uruzgan. The more factors are dealt with and the better they are lived up to, the greater the chance of success of a comprehensive approach. Most diplomats perceive these factors in a similar fashion, but they stress that other factors determine whether actors in an operation choose to strive for coherence. The diplomats refer to the context, mandate and aims of an operation and whether these aims also attempt to influence the local population[411]. To NGOs the factors below not only influence the potential outcome – success or failure – but also the choice whether to seek coherence with the mission or not.

Business economy:

Pure cost-benefit reasoning explains part of the chances of success or failure of coherence. Coherence may lead to more efficiency and therefore more success. It has its limits, however. The more autonomous organisations cooperate, the more they need to coordinate. As a result, there is a moment when the gains of cooperating more are lost to the extra costs of coordination[412]. In addition, organisations are only likely to strive for coherence if their cost-benefit calculation is advantageous to themselves[413]. If coherence means that funding is redistributed, this may have perverse effects. It may mean organisational infighting over who gets the funds[314]. For example, from the perspective of some military personnel, the NGOs were sometimes hostile towards the military because they perceived them as a competitor for funds[315].

At the same time, funding played a very large role in the decision of Dutch NGOs to join DCU. Larger NGOs that are not so dependent on government funding, but either receive a large part of their funds from private donations or are part of a strong international network, have more space to manoeuvre and make their own independent decisions. MSF Netherlands, for example, has a strong, private support base. Oxfam Novib gains strength from its international Oxfam network. Smaller NGOs such as Healthnet TPO and especially the Dutch Committee for Afghanistan Veterinary Programmes (DCA) have to rely on available funds from international donors. Cordaid is also looking for alternative funding because regular government funding is decreasing. Nonetheless, organisations such as Cordaid are much more free to decide whether to strive for coherence with a mission or to opt for projects that are not part of a mission or outside the area of deployment, because of its non-governmental funding[416].

Institutional factors:

Similar organisations with similar mandates, goals and common objectives are generally more likely to benefit from coherence than very different organisations. The more they train and work together, the more interdependent organisations are, and the more common their leadership and communication, the greater the chance of success. Institutionalisation makes coherence easier by providing a structure, rules and even planning. Institutionalisation may enhance (the amount of) communication, by enhancing trust. It can also lower the transaction costs of interaction by, for example, providing easy access to the other actors[417]. Policy planning and development, the front end of the policy chain, takes place in The Hague. The fact that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is an integrated department that includes both diplomacy and development cooperation means that these two 'Ds' are already rather integrated in their approach. In addition, institutionalisation in the context of the *Stuurgroep Militaire Operaties*, in which the highest officials of the Ministries of Defence, Foreign Affairs and General Affairs are represented, contributes to policy coherence at the highest governmental level. There was also a lot of policy coordination, discussion and fine tuning at lower departmental levels. This trickled down to the operational level where, especially during the later TFUs, civilians were involved in the planning process from start to finish. However, in order to be successful, capacity, personnel and resources, and sustainability are needed. Lack of capacity of one of the actors hampers coherence. During the first TFUs, especially, the number of civilians was limited and therefore civilians could not be consulted over many military decisions. As a result a PolAd was involved in a broad range of issues, but barely at all in the planning process. Even at the end of the Dutch mission in Uruzgan, a few civilians faced thousands of military[418], although there were 12 civilians rather than 3, which made a sizeable difference[419]. Institutional and administrative commitment is also essential for coherence to work effectively[420]. At least this commitment existed within the government. For NGOs directed at development it was a lot more difficult to strive for coherence in a situation where they did not want to join a struggle against 'terrorism' or insurgents[421]. Most coherence in the case of Uruzgan, especially at the middle and lower levels, was case

specific and was not supported by structural institutionalisation. Until interaction is institutionalised, all cohesion remains 'ad hoc', because it is focused on a single case. Moreover, the ministries still have their own identities, resources and organisational means, an independent organisational structure and different leadership.

Organisation cultural factors:
In general, coherence is more likely to succeed if the organisations striving for it have common values and views. Generally there are large differences in organisational cultures and in training between military and civilian organisations. In order to be successful, both worlds need to open up to each other. The military have a six-month time horizon and have particular short-term, often geographical, targets or effects they want to achieve and plan for in a more detailed manner. Civilians are more directed at reaching long-term goals and processes, and manage more on the basis of budgets. In some ways they embrace uncertainty and their plans are less detailed. The military tend to believe more in a 'makeable society', while civilians lean towards the view that improving a chaotic situation is already an enormous achievement and that the military approach does not take into account all the complexities and complicating factors. The military are also more directed at what civilians see as the symptom of conflict, the fighting, whereas diplomats and development workers direct most attention to solving what they see as its causes. This leads every once in a while to misunderstanding between the different actors: Is the other's approach really efficient and effective? What are their results or outputs[422]? In addition, military personnel are more sensitive to hierarchy. The fact that in the later TFUs the commander and CivRep both signed a decision and operated and lived like Siamese twins, even sleeping in the same container, sent a message to the lower ranks that the military and civilians were in the project together. The fact that CivReps looked back at the planning process and made adaptations gave most military personnel more insight and understanding of civilian approaches, and supported coherence[423].

Environmental factors:
To a certain extent the possibilities for coherence between military and civilian actors are determined by the environment, the context in which the conflict is taking place. In theory, in more insecure environments where levels of violence are higher, coherence is likely to generate more results because working together in the field of security allows for more efficiency. If insecurity becomes overriding and the military strategy starts to dominate, however, NGOs especially, but also other civilian actors, feel they should stay away as coherence is less likely to succeed[424]. In practical terms, in insecure environments a lot of the military capacity is allocated to kinetic activities. As a consequence, there is little capacity to escort civil members of a mission and Ministry of Foreign Affairs personnel can barely leave the compound. This does not, however, mean that an integrated approach is impossible. It depends on the risks the civilians are willing to take. Moreover, in insecure situations civilians and their advice are an added value[425]. Another factor that is especially important to NGOs is the perception of the population. If

governmental organisations (military, diplomats, etc.) are perceived to be doing good by the population, if the population is receptive, NGOs are more likely to seek coherence. The inclusion of local civil society in an intervention also stimulates them to become partners. NGOs are not likely to join a struggle to go after terrorists or insurgents. Their choices about whether they strive for coherence are largely determined by the opinions of their local partners[426]. However, the support of the local population is not sufficient. In the end, support at the home front, such as high public approval ratings and support from parliament, is also essential for coherence of the mission as a whole[427].

Individual factors:
The character of individual personnel and the personal chemistry between them are also very important, especially in the absence of a common plan and common organisational and institutional structure. The fewer representatives of an organisation are working together, the more this coherence depends on personalities. When large organisations integrate, different people and different structures are involved. In smaller units such as a PRT with only a handful of civilians, individual factors start to dominate[428]. Does the CivRep 'click' personally with representatives of the NGOs? Does the commander view NGOs as relevant or as a nuisance[429]? Does the OsAd stick to the methods and ideas that worked during his or her long career in development, or does he or she adapt to the context of a military operation? Some personalities appear unable to function very well outside their own world and comfort zones, whether they are military or civilian[430]. If the CivRep and the commander manage to collaborate well, they can balance and complement each other[431].

7

Conclusions and recommendations for future operations

This chapter draws conclusions on the research question of the report by attempting to answer its five sub-questions. Subsequently, it reflects on the limitations of the research, and makes a number of recommendations directed at different levels. In doing so it aims to answer the question: What are the perceived *strengths, weaknesses, opportunities* and *threats* of the Dutch comprehensive approach and what are its dilemmas?

What are the '3D' and comprehensive approaches and how are they perceived?

Chapter 2 shows that there is no clear definition of the 3D approach. It is an approach in which the diplomatic, military and development spheres aim for coherence where their fields of activity overlap in their aim to address governance, security and development issues. The degree of coherence differs for the different organisations involved – in general there is more coherence within government than between the government and outside actors such as NGOs – and depends on the location of the interaction – the level of coherence may differ in the field compared to headquarters. As a concept, the 3D approach is still vague. Between the different 'Ds', but also within them, there is disagreement about the (necessary) degree of coherence, the need to segregate the different approaches even if they strive for coherence, the need for a lead agency, and the direct aims and sequencing of these in the overall approach. The 3D approach as such appears to be a method without a particular short-term aim other than to strive for coherence in the field of security and for the long-term goals of all three 'Ds' to be achieved. For this reason, because of the absence of (short-term) aims, participants in the approach fill the gap with their own goals. As a result, in Uruzgan many military personnel at one end of the spectrum

Farmers in a village just outside Tarin Kowt

saw the 3D approach as part of their counterinsurgency (COIN), aimed to suppress the insurgence. From their perspective '3D' is not necessarily COIN, but a well-implemented COIN strategy is '3D', i.e. not implemented solely or primarily by the military. At the other end of the spectrum, many NGOs and most diplomats focused on development see the approach as an organising principle for organisations aimed at security, good governance and development in order to create a secure enough climate for further development. In such a context, defeating insurgents is not a necessity and in some cases is perhaps even counterproductive. The rationale behind this position is that an insurgency may have its origins in a population that fights oppression, the very people they hope to assist. NGOs try to contribute to development without opposing the insurgents. For an NGO, being part of a COIN strategy would be unacceptable as it would mean losing its neutrality. *Principled neutralists* at the far end of the spectrum therefore equal 3D to COIN. Diplomats from the political affairs side of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs generally take a position in the middle of this spectrum, between the military on the one hand and the principled neutralist NGOs on the other.

The 3D approach in Uruzgan evolved during the mission. However, after the end of the mission, the concept is still not easily defined. Although it is generally assumed that when the term '3D approach' is used its meaning is clear, in fact there are still different interpretations of what it means exactly and what its goals are. Actors involved understand intuitively 'what' can be achieved through the combination of defence, diplomacy and development, and have a feeling or idea of what the 3D approach entails. However, when asked to define it, they run into problems and disagreements. Despite all this conceptual confusion, participants in the focus group meetings argued that striving towards more cohesion is positive. Only the principled neutralists oppose this trend.

Looking at the coherence in the mission in Uruzgan, chapters 3 and 4 describe how great improvements were made. The drive for coherence was based on past experience and experience gained in Uruzgan, and it was pushed by the Dutch parliament in order to gain broad support for the mission. In a process of trial and error, the different 'Ds' learned to work together. The increased capacity of the civilians, the increased numbers of ANSF and Australian forces and the improved security situation in Uruzgan helped further. As a result, the initially mainly, although not solely, military-dominated 3D approach increasingly managed to blossom into an approach in which all 'Ds' played an important part. This was stimulated as a result of the increased number of civilians inside the mission, the increased influence of the CivRep position, and the ever-increasing number of NGOs in the province.

If one peers deeper into the broader 3D approach the conceptual framework of De Coning & Friis allows for differentiation between participating organisations and their varying forms and levels of interaction. It appears that within the broader 3D approach there were many different forms of interaction between a number of organisational units. Each interaction had its own distinct issues and its own level of coherence. Moreover, the level

of coherence differed depending on the level at which the interaction took place – strategic or headquarters versus operational or field – and at what point in the mission it took place – in most cases it moved towards more cohesion. This is most apparent at the operational level in the TFU, which within the framework of De Coning and Friis was mainly *cooperation* before 2009 and became integrated after 2009. Coherence at the strategic level, in The Hague between the Ministries of Defence and Foreign Affairs, remained mainly *cooperation*, although some coordination bodies were established. Coherence between the PRT and the battle group (BG) also remained mainly *cooperation*, including after the PRT came under civilian lead. Although at the strategic level coherence with ISAF and Regional Command South was mainly *integrated*, and on paper there appears to be a clear ISAF strategy and chain of command, at the operational level within taskforces and between PRTs, and between countries participating in ISAF, the interaction was mainly *cooperation* as countries to a large extent pursued their own goals in their own way. At the strategic level coherence between the NGOs in DCU and the Dutch government was mainly *coordination*. In The Hague NGOs, diplomats and military personnel met frequently and became used to each other. At the operational level the interaction was more *coexistence* as NGOs needed to show their independence and neutrality. It is very likely that these different types of coherence at the different levels – strategic and operational – explain to a certain extent the variety of opinions within the different 'Ds' on the 3D approach.

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What are the perceived strengths and weaknesses of the 3D approach in Uruzgan?

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This question was looked at in Chapter 5. The most important perceived strength of the 3D approach is that: *The whole is more than the sum of its parts*. This is the overriding argument for coherence. Its importance is shown by the fact that it is perceived by many to outweigh all the weaknesses and threats. It is supported by almost all the 'Ds' except for a few principled neutralist NGO representatives. It is argued that the 3D approach acknowledges the complexity of operations such as those in Afghanistan. The other perceived strengths by the same group are that: *The 3D approach is an investment in trust, respect and understanding among the different (governmental) actors intervening in Afghanistan; As a result of the 3D approach the military, diplomats and development workers had to work together, listen to and as a result learn from each other; The 3D approach makes the different separate approaches of the military, diplomats and development workers more multidimensional;* and *The 3D approach produces an exchange in ownership over the mission between civilians and the military*. In addition, some military personnel perceive that: *The 3D approach is driven nationally which allows countries to focus effectively;* and *The 3D approach had human resource strengths*. These two strengths are, however, debatable, as shown below.

A number of weaknesses in the 3D approach find their origins in the idea that in Uruzgan the approach was not coherent enough and further integration was needed. As such they do not question the importance of coherence, but in fact stress it. These perceived weaknesses are: *The 3D approach does not have a single goal and is not a single strategy. It is a number of goals and strategies placed under the same header; The 3D approach was not 'comprehensive' enough; The implementation of the 3D approach was still too compartmentalised; There is no lead agency or 'unity of command';* and *The 3D approach still allowed partners to believe that the other would or could solve a problem*. These weaknesses are particularly perceived by military and diplomatic integrationists. Both diplomats and military personnel also perceive some weaknesses in the implementation of the 3D approach, regardless of the question about whether there should be more coherence. They argue that: *Human resources were not adjusted to the 3D approach;* and *The different ministries have different and inflexible rules and procedures that conflict*. In addition, the military in particular point out that in their perception: *The relationship between the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defence was imbalanced*. In contrast to these latter resolvable weaknesses, there are four weaknesses in the 3D approach that are more difficult to deal with: *The three 'Ds' have different capacities and speeds; The three 'Ds' have different time horizons; The development and defence approaches have different directions, one is top-down, the other is more bottom-up;* and *the more coherence, the more coordination is needed, and therefore more effort, time and funds*. These weaknesses will be further elaborated upon below within the context of the dilemmas. One thing stands out. Although there may be more weaknesses than strengths in this SWOT analysis, the overriding perception among diplomats, military personnel and most NGO representatives is that the strengths of the 3D approach outweigh the weaknesses by far, and that in fact a number of perceived weaknesses stress the need for further coherence.

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What are the perceived opportunities and threats of the 3D approach in Uruzgan and a future comprehensive approach?

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Chapter 5 elaborates on this question also. The opportunity of the 3D approach in relation to its environment is broadly perceived to be that: *The 3D approach is directed towards local ownership*. With regard to the future, there are five additional opportunities. The military and diplomatic integrationists, especially, perceived that: *The 3D approach in Uruzgan and its lessons learned may be the seed for a more comprehensive approach for the Netherlands;* and *The further development of the 3D approach at the international level may be possible*. Both these opportunities, again, underline the opportunities for further coherence. Furthermore, the diplomats and some military personnel in particular stress that in future operations: *A comprehensive approach provides more body to influence or force local actors to*

act or refrain. It is broadly perceived that: *A comprehensive approach provides more legitimacy to military operations*, as they are framed to the Dutch public in a broader approach. Especially military personnel, but also diplomats found this important. Among NGO representatives this was, however, not necessarily seen as an added value. The perception that: *The surplus value of the comprehensive approach may generate more funds*, was widely supported, as both the ministries and the NGOs argue that the success may attract funding and the military presence in an area opens new budget lines for NGOs.

The military and diplomatic integrationists, especially, stress that there are no threats but only pitfalls for 3D or comprehensive approaches. NGO representatives do, however, perceive threats. Moreover, what the military and diplomatic integrationists describe as pitfalls are normally characterised as threats in a SWOT analysis. The fact that the number of threats is relatively large can partly be explained by the fact that they include a number of frustrations among participants about issues they had to struggle with on a daily basis. Such frustrations, however, do not question the approach fundamentally as a whole. Again, although the list of threats appears long, they do not outweigh, from the perspective of most military personnel and diplomats, the strengths and opportunities. Only among some NGOs are these threats raising more serious doubts with regard to the 3D approach.

There are six perceived negative opinions in relation to the environment of the 3D approach. From research it appears that: *Some short-term projects of the PRT had negative long-term consequences*. Furthermore, according to many military personnel and diplomats: *The role of parliament in determining what should and should not happen has at times expanded too much to the micro level*. Many of them also perceived that: *Strategic communication in the Netherlands was directed too much at the military part of the mission*. According to military personnel, diplomats and NGO representatives *Cooperation with NGOs remains difficult*, because they are by definition independent from the government. Both diplomats and military personnel argue that this has not affected their mission negatively, but it does mean that further coherence with NGOs within a comprehensive approach, according to NGO representatives especially, is almost impossible. In addition, according to research, *Working together with Afghan NGOs is complex*, because some NGOs do not achieve the necessary quality and are not always sufficiently rooted in society. Lastly, diplomats perceived that *National Afghan politics were at times a threat to the 3D approach*.

At least a further seven out of the 16 threats in the SWOT analysis are indeed pitfalls that, with the necessary attention, may be avoided. Across the board it is warned that: *The perceived success of the 3D approach may become a threat*. The military and diplomatic segregationists, in particular, warn that: *If coherence grows too deep, the individual components are no longer able to act separately*. Military personnel and diplomats also raise the problems that: *Working together on the same issue allows for tunnel vision;* and *A comprehensive approach may spread too thin and as a result become too fragmented*. NGO

representatives, in particular, warn that although the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the PRT generally had a clear picture of the situation: *Development projects that are part of a 3D mission in insecure areas are more difficult to monitor and evaluate*. They also perceive, despite the fact that this is denied by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, that: *As a result of the military drive rather than the developmental drive most funds go to political stabilisation rather than development*. Last, according to some journalists, diplomats and military personnel: *Having one's own approach and also one's own terminology made the transfer to the succeeding Australians and Americans more difficult*.

Three threats are more fundamental: The more integration takes place at a national level in the countries providing troops, the more difficult integration and coordination at the regional level in the host nation becomes; The initial military focus in a 3D approach decreases responsibility and ownership of the Afghans; and The sustainability of the comprehensive approach, which is supposed to have a long time horizon, is dependent on short-term political will. These will also be dealt with below within the context of dilemmas.

There are three contradictions between certain characteristics of the 3D approach that are perceived to be both positive and negative, and appear to be a dilemma. The first is a dilemma of a lower order. Some military personnel argue that: *The 3D approach had human resource strengths*, while other military personnel, diplomats and NGO representatives argue that: *Human resources were not adjusted to the 3D approach*. The dilemma is that, on the one hand as a result of relatively short tours, especially of most military personnel, and the fact that these rotations were not simultaneous, fresh ideas were continuously introduced, although a certain extent of continuity existed because the composition of those involved in the mission was not changed completely when a unit rotated. On the other hand, because of the constant influx of new personnel they were in a continuous process of getting to know the situation, each other and the Afghan people they had to deal with. Consequently, once they were finally familiar with the situation and the Afghans got used to the new faces, they were rotated out again. This is a classic problem in peace and crisis management operations.

The second dilemma is that, on the one hand it is broadly perceived that: *The 3D approach is directed towards local ownership*, while on the other hand some military personnel and NGO representatives argue that: *The initial military focus in a 3D approach decreases responsibility and ownership of the Afghans*. A development, and in fact a peace process, does indeed always require local ownership. If the process is started by a military intervention from outside, the initial ownership by definition

always lies more with the intervening actor. This is a classic dilemma in peace building and may very well be true for military interventions in general.

The third dilemma in this group is that, on the one hand: *The 3D approach is driven nationally which allows countries to focus effectively while*, on the other hand: *The more integration takes place at a national level in the countries providing troops, the more difficult integration and coordination at the regional level in the host nation becomes*. The first perception was held only among some military personnel, while the second perception receives much more support among the military, and also in broader literature, among the diplomats and NGO representatives. Because, within the ISAF mission, Afghanistan was carved up and responsibilities over provinces were divided, the implementation of a combined strategy was inherently more difficult. Also, for the Netherlands, both in public perception and in policy and implementation, Uruzgan was the main focus. To a certain extent the Dutch looked at it through a straw, excluding developments and needs in surrounding provinces and the whole country. This did mean, however, that the Netherlands as a whole had a focus.

The above dilemma is, however, more fundamental because if it is true that: *The more integration takes place at a national level in the countries providing troops, the more difficult integration and coordination at the regional level in the host nation becomes*, it points to a potential limitation of national coherence as it might affect international coherence between, for example, the different allies. Similarly, both military personnel and diplomats perceived that: *The more coherence, the more coordination is needed, and therefore effort, time and funds*. This is in fact a known dilemma in cooperation. It appears again that there is a limit to the yields of coherence if it does not lead to further coherent or merged structures.

There is one more fundamental dilemma that is particularly relevant to comprehensive approaches in which military deployment is of overriding importance, such as in missions. It is perceived particularly among military personnel and NGO representatives and holds that: *The sustainability of the comprehensive approach, which is supposed to have a long time horizon, is dependent on short-term political will*. Development has a much longer time horizon than the presence of the military mission. If political will is only short term and follows the military presence, the later stages of the process and therefore its sustainability are under threat. According to this view if, a few years after the military presence in Uruzgan, development attention also shifts to a new area where the military are deployed, eventually the whole effort is under threat.

Last but not least, there are fundamental differences between the different approaches of diplomacy, development and defence that make complete coherence next to impossible. NGOs in particular point out that: *The three 'Ds' have different time horizons*. The military time horizon – by nature of their political masters, their tasks and their organisational structure – have a shorter time horizon than development, where the time horizon goes up to 20 to 50 years. The military are aware of this, however, and not only try to plan such long-term processes as well, but also actively look for advice. In addition: *The three 'Ds' have different capacities and speeds;* and *The development and defence approaches have different directions, one is top-down, the other is more bottom-up*. Most diplomats and military personnel view these differences, however, as not necessarily negative, because they can also be complementary. These three issues are exemplary for other differences between the different 'Ds' that continued to pop up throughout this research. Military personnel tend to think in terms of effects that have to be reached, while diplomats and development workers tend to think in terms of processes that have to be started and continued. When the military think about development they tend to think more in terms of projects, while development workers tend to think more in terms of programmes. The military tend to focus their attention on insecure areas, whereas development workers tend to focus on the more secure areas. The military tend to be directed at counterinsurgency, security and stability, while development workers are more directed at development. This last difference is part of the classic peacebuilding dilemma between security first or development first. Figure 9 gives a quick overview of the differences between the two strategies. Of course, the contrast is not that black or white and it is certainly not meant to stereotype or present a caricature of either of them. In practice, across the spectrum there are military personnel who are very well able to think long-term and in terms of process, and there are development workers who think in terms of short-term effects. In general, diplomats from the political affairs side of the Ministry of Foreign affairs can be positioned more in the middle of the spectrum.

Figure 9: A spectrum of tendencies among military personnel and development workers

Military personnel	Development workers
Main focus on counterinsurgency, security and stability (consequences)	Main focus on development (causes)
Attention on insecure areas and the bad guys	Attention on less insecure areas and the good guys
Shorter term (6 months to 2 years)	Longer term (20 to 50 years)
Detailed planning	Embracing uncertainty
Bottom up (shape, clear, hold, build)	Top down (national programmes)
Aiming for effects	Aiming for processes
Greater belief in a 'makeable' society	Aiming to improving chaotic situations
Projects	Programmes
Initial ownership with intervening actor	Ownership with local population
Dependent on short-term political will	Long-term commitments

These two strategies may or may not be complementary; they are only likely to fully cohere if they are part of a long-term grand strategy. In the absence of a grand strategy in the US, the military have become dominant, which may influence the long-term outcomes. As such, the question of grand strategy is closely related to lead agency. In the Dutch mission in Uruzgan, at the start defence was often perceived to be in the lead, but increasingly it became a common effort of both the Ministries of Defence and Foreign Affairs. There is no clear answer to the question whether there always needs to be a lead agency and if so which ministry this should be. A lead is not always needed and depending on the context a different ministry may be in a better position. Although particularly to military integrationists a lead agency is a necessity, it is not always achievable. The NGOs appear to have reached more or less their limits of coherence with government policy. Nonetheless, in the Netherlands it is not unlikely that the government will search for further coherence in its comprehensive approach, further stressing the importance of a grand strategy. In order to guarantee the long-term and broad perspective of such a grand strategy, it would be best positioned either within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or the Ministry of General Affairs.

What are the factors for success and failure in a comprehensive approach?

Chapter 6 dealt with this question. It shows that the military strongly believe that any future operation should be approached from a comprehensive perspective. To them the factors of success and failure determine the likelihood of success. The more factors are dealt with and the better they are lived up to, the larger the chance of success of a comprehensive approach. Diplomats generally perceive these factors in a similar fashion. They stress, however, that other factors determine the choice of a comprehensive approach – the context of an operation, its mandate and aims, and its relation to the local population. NGOs perceive these factors not so much as success factors, but as factors that determine their choice whether to seek coherence with a mission or not.

Business economy:
Pure cost-benefit reasoning explains part of the chances for success or failure of coherence. Coherence may lead to more efficiency and therefore more success. It has its limits, however. The more autonomous organisations cooperate, the more they need to coordinate. As a result, there is a moment when the gains of cooperating more are lost to the extra costs of coordination. In addition, organisations are only likely to strive for coherence if their cost-benefit calculation is advantageous to themselves. If coherence means that funding is redistributed, this may actually have perverse effects. It may lead to organisational fighting over who gets the funds. From the perspective of some military personnel, the NGOs, for example, were sometimes hostile towards the military because they perceived them as a competitor for funds. At the same time, funding played a very large role in the decision of Dutch NGOs to join DCU. Larger NGOs that are not so dependent on government funding, receiving a large part of their funds from private donations or being are part of a strong international network, have more space to manoeuvre and make their own independent decisions.

Institutional factors:
Similar organisations with similar mandates, goals and common objectives are generally more likely to benefit from coherence than very different organisations. The more they train and work together, the more interdependent the organisations are, and the more common leadership and communication they have, the larger the chance for success. Institutionalisation makes coherence easier by providing a structure, rules and even planning. Institutionalisation may enhance (the amount of) communication, by enhancing trust. It can also lower the transaction costs of interaction by – for example – providing easy access to the other actors.

Organisation cultural factors:
In general, coherence is more likely to succeed if the organisations striving for it have common values and views. Generally there are large differences in organisational culture and training between military and civilian organisations, as described above. In order to be successful, both worlds need to further open up to each other. Every once in a while, the differences lead to misunderstanding between the different actors: Is the other's approach really efficient and effective? What are their results or outputs? The fact that CivReps looked back at the military planning process and made adaptations gave most military personnel more insight into and understanding of civilian approaches, and therefore supported coherence.

Environmental factors:
The possibilities for coherence between military and civilian actors are to a certain extent also determined by the environment, the context in which the conflict is taking place. In theory, in more insecure environments where levels of violence are higher, coherence is likely to generate more results, because working together around security allows for more efficiency. If insecurity becomes overriding and the military strategy starts to dominate, however, NGOs in particular but also other civilian actors feel they should stay away as coherence is less likely to succeed. Also, in practical terms, in insecure environments much of the military capacity is allocated to kinetic activities. This does not, however, mean that an integrated approach is not possible. In insecure situations civilians and their advice are also an added value. Another factor, which is especially important to NGOs, is the perception of the local population. If governmental organisations (military, diplomats, etc.) are perceived to be doing good by the population, if the population is receptive, NGOs are more likely to seek coherence. The inclusion of local civil society in an intervention also stimulates them to become a partner. NGOs are not likely to join a struggle to go after terrorists or insurgents. On the whole they determine whether to strive for coherence based on the opinion of their local partners. For the coherence

of a mission as a whole, however, support of the local population is not sufficient. In the end, support at the home front is also essential, such as approval rates from the population and also support from parliament.

Individual factors:
At an individual level, the character of individuals and the personal chemistry between them are also very important, especially in the absence of a common plan, and common organisational and institutional structure. The fewer representatives of an organisation are working together, the more this coherence depends on personalities. If large organisations integrate, different people and structures are involved. In smaller units such as a PRT, with only a handful of civilians, individual factors start to dominate.

When looking at the many issues not dealt with in this study, it appears there is still much to be researched into relating to this mission. First of all, it would be useful to further research whether the wide range of perceptions presented in this report are based on reality. Second, a further comparison with coalition partners would be a useful benchmark for what the Dutch have been doing. Third, a whole range of topics with regard to the Dutch mission in Uruzgan have not yet been studied. These include coherence: at intra-agency level; between the local actors, including the Taliban, and the mission; between the ministries in The Hague; between the WEWA and other actors; and in the DCU. In addition, as is often the case, Afghan perspectives, especially with regard to coherence inside the mission, are not covered. Last but least, research on NGO involvement in Uruzgan, and their interaction with partners and the Taliban, is scarce. It focuses on broad and ethnical discussions, rather than on sharing practical experiences and findings in the field.

Limitations of this research and important questions for the future

It is unlikely that every ministry or every NGO will agree with all the findings presented in this report as they are reflections of the perceptions of participants from the different ministries in the mission, as well as NGO representatives. Total agreement could only be the case if there was complete coherence between the different 'Ds' and within the different 'Ds'. If there was no coherence at all, each 'D' would only agree to one third of the findings at best. In practice, the level of agreement and disagreement is most likely to be somewhere in between.

As stressed in the introduction, this study is not an *evaluation* of the Dutch mission or the Dutch 3D approach in Uruzgan. This was not the aim of the study, but neither was it possible within the scope of this research. This report attempted to map perceptions and arguments with regard to the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats (SWOT) of a 3D and comprehensive approach within the Dutch context and to serve as the basis for further discussion and research on the topic.

Like the Dutch mission, to a certain extent this study focused on the Dutch contribution to the ISAF mission in Afghanistan. It largely excluded the coherence with this higher level, which is a pity as coherence was also sought after at that level, which in turn interfered with the Dutch approach. Furthermore, a large part of the explanation of the different views within the different 'Ds' with regard to the 3D approach in Uruzgan is likely to be explained by the fact that participants in the focus group meetings worked at different levels in the mission – in the ministries in The Hague, the embassy in Kabul, the TFU in Tarin Kowt, and also at the lower levels in the field. Relations between these levels lie behind many differences. This study did not delve into this topic, but further research is likely to clarify many of the issues dealt with in this report.

Lessons and recommendations

General issues

Any Dutch contribution to large-scale operations should be an exercise in humility, especially in a counterinsurgency. Even if a comprehensive approach was implemented in a perfect manner, it is only one part of a bigger process. The result can only be a small step on a long-term road. Instant successes should not be expected.

The operation in Uruzgan has shown that a more comprehensive approach is possible. Relations between the different ministries and also the NGOs have improved drastically. This expertise in the comprehensive approach, and the networks that were built

Meeting of staff Dutch Consortium Uruzgan

for the 3D approach in Uruzgan, needs to be maintained for other operations. For example, as a spin-off from Uruzgan the expertise and networks have already been useful for the humanitarian relief operation in Haiti.

There is no blue print for comprehensive missions. Operations generally require different approaches depending on the context, the aims and the requirements. Therefore, blindly copying the experiences from Uruzgan should be avoided. This means that in a new operation concepts such as PRTs may not be useful.

As with any military operation a comprehensive operation also needs a clear and achievable political goal. What is the mission aiming to achieve and how much time has it got to achieve it?

For the military to be effective they need to think in a comprehensive manner. Armed forces are only one of the many tools in operations that should be governed by a grand strategy that includes a wide variety of other tools. Whether in wars of attrition, counterinsurgencies, or peace operations, the military tool is not sufficient to solve the problem. For this reason, looking across the civil-military boundary is essential, and civilian input in military planning processes is one of the ways to overcome these problems.

A comprehensive approach is much broader than the '3Ds'. In Uruzgan there were political, development and cultural advisors. However, diplomats were responsible for issues related to the police, although this is outside their field of expertise. In future operations, police advisors, agricultural advisors, and so forth within the context of broader cooperation with other ministries such as Economic Affairs, Agriculture and Innovation, and Security and Justice would be a great asset, depending on the mission.

Not every mission seems to lend itself to comprehensive implementation. This does not, however, mean that at the initial stage of assessment and policy planning a comprehensive approach should not be followed. If it then follows that the implementation should be a single 'D', this is at least done within the context of a broader grand strategy.

In order to have a truly comprehensive mission it needs to be integrated from start to end, from the assessment, planning, training and implementation stages to the evaluation. Currently the different actors plan separately, after which they start to look for cooperation and synergy. Already at the planning stage analysis of the problem needs to be common, otherwise the views of the different actors become overriding. This means that at the earliest planning stage a team should be established to develop a common assessment, plan and strategy. The minimum should be a synchronisation of efforts. In addition, all the different actors in the comprehensive approach should be represented in the reconnaissance mission to the operation area. Otherwise, such as in the case of the Uruzgan mission, the different 'Ds' can grow towards each other, but valuable time is lost at the start of the operation.

Make use of external, academic or other sorts of, expertise in assessments for greater depth and a broader perspective.

Military have the tendency to face up to the challenge when no one else does, or can do it. As a result especially the start of an operation is inherently military heavy. Some restraint among the military to force other actors to respond faster, and additional capacity on the civilian side to actually be able to do so, would be useful.

Eventually the most important focus should be on supporting legitimate and good governance, and the trust of the local population in these governance structures, as this is the key to long-term stability. This limits the space for short-term deals to ensure stabilisation with informal powerbrokers.

Establish a joint database in which information about current and past CIMIC projects can be found in order to establish an information-sharing structure.

A CivRep in command, also when combined with a military commander, strengthens civilian influence and involvement in the mission.

More structural in-depth, in-mission lessons learned are needed and should be followed up.

In addition to current internal evaluations and the joint Defence-Foreign Affairs evaluation, an independent integrated evaluation is needed in order to prevent any suggestion of a politically driven or subjective process.

International cooperation

Arrogance with regard to a 'Dutch approach' should be avoided. The Dutch operate in an international setting in which everybody struggles with similar problems and their solutions are not drastically different. In such a context, a feeling of superiority is not appreciated.

Due to the size of US aid funds, more humility is needed. It is more useful to influence the Americans than to fight them. Carving up a mission by giving participating countries responsibility over their own province, such as in Afghanistan, should be avoided in the future or at least needs to be better institutionalised to strengthen coherence. A better-combined, international structure and hierarchy for the mission as a whole would be useful. Arrangements have to be made beforehand to guarantee better cooperation in order to avoid troop-contributing countries operating, like the PRTs in Afghanistan, with insufficient coherence.

The role of NGOs

If NGOs want to join the planning process of military operations and be involved from the start, they can influence the operation and, for example, the development projects that are part

of it. Some within the Dutch government would favour such a model in which integration continues further. After all, only then would the approach become really comprehensive. Although this seems like a good idea on first sight, there are a number of issues that need to be considered. First, does the government really want to have the NGO perspective on the inside? After all they do have differences. Second, do NGOs really want to be on the inside because it would mean they also become responsible for government policy? Third, if there is only one common approach, would such a model not lose the NGO advantage of being the niche strategy that prevents tunnel vision? Fourth, NGOs' integration in the strategy should not be at the cost of the sustainability of the development processes they try to assist?

The governmental development assistance implementation agency, NLAID, does not contribute to the better implementation of the long-term goals of a mission. Such organisations are too linked to the duration of the military mission. Consequently the long-term development of the host area is lost out of sight. National programmes of the Afghan government, the private sector and NGOs can and will continue after the military presence has ended.

In the preparation and training of military personnel and diplomats, NGOs are often asked to contribute their views and contacts. Upon their return, however, there is generally little reporting back. In order to come full circle, both the military and officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs should give more attention to feedback and reporting back. However, ways have to be found to ensure that this information is protected in order to avoid access to it by insurgents.

Human Resources

A team that has to work together in the implementation phase of the mission should have already met and trained together before deployment. It is not enough to get to know each other in the field, because teambuilding is needed and is essential at the start of each rotation.

Personnel of the different departments need to be familiarised more with their counterparts. This can be achieved in a structural manner by increasing the number of postings at different ministries. Also, in the pre-deployment phase, exchanging postings of personnel would enable them better to better understand the cultures of their counterparts. In addition, ways must be found to institutionalise the maintenance of knowledge and expertise.

Those who will be deployed together should work together before the start of the operation and be physically located in the same room, so that they can get to know each other. This should preferably be done between the different ministries as well as within ministries, in order to stimulate familiarisation with each other and exchange information.

The continuity of personnel has to be improved. The advantages are many. It allows the build-up and maintenance of knowledge,

expertise and networks in the area of deployment; it increases the international standing of the people involved; and it ensures more continuity in the strategy followed. There are two ways to address this. First, tours need to become longer. This would prevent the current situation where people spend most of their time developing knowledge and networks and, by the time they have got that right, they are already preparing to leave. The linkage with information networks in The Hague should be maintained through more feedback moments and for the continuous exchange of information. Second, a longer period of transfer is needed, with more overlap between predecessors and successors. This would minimise the need to 'reinvent the wheel' and would increase the transfer of information.

Functional specialists are needed for longer periods than the current two months, which is too short a period to contribute to the build-up of, for example, the rule of law.

The Ministry of Defence has a relatively strong human resources policy in which postings are related to each other. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs should also increase its efforts and allow institutional adjustments to better maintain and cherish its institutional memory. This might entail a package postings in which sequential positions follow each other, e.g. a placement sequence of a posting in a mission is followed by a posting at the embassy of the host nation, followed by a position related to that host nation in the Ministry itself. In this way more knowledge is kept available and there is more exchange of expertise and experiences between the field, the embassy and headquarters.

In addition to the Ministry of Defence the other ministries also need a much larger capacity to deploy advisors to the field. Their numbers do not need to be comparable to the military, but substantially larger than the current group. In addition, the quality and seniority of these officials need the utmost attention.

Media

An active media and visiting policy, in fact an integrated strategic communication plan, is needed. In order to overcome the difference in perceptions between the field and The Hague, politics and the general public, an integrated public affairs strategy should be further developed. It is difficult to overcome the media's focus on negative issues such as corruption and civilian casualties. Negative topics score ratings while attention to positive achievements is difficult to generate. Currently defence is the most active actor in this field; the Ministry of Foreign Affairs lags behind. Defence is more 'sexy' and the Ministry of Foreign affairs is less proactive.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs should invest more attention and personnel in public affairs and allow the CivRep to face the media at an earlier stage in missions. Such a strategy should be integrated. In addition, despite the fact that field tours are an important manner in which to bridge gaps between the field and other levels, such as the media and politicians, ways have to be found to ensure that accommodating these tours does not become the most important activity of staff.

Drug store at provincial hospital Tarin Kowt

The role of parliament

Parliament needs to better inform itself about practice on the ground. For the mission in Uruzgan, it has played an important role in the design of and actual implementation of the mission through the 'Article 100 procedure': sometimes for good, sometimes for bad. Without parliament, the 3D approach in Uruzgan would not have gained the same momentum as it did. At the same time, parliament has also micromanaged issues without the necessary situational awareness. The reality in The Hague and the situation on the ground were at times miles apart. For example, parliament's decision not to cooperate with the US and a number of informal powerbrokers was seen as counterproductive by many in the field. One way to create better awareness may be through parliamentary hearings with, among others the Chief of Defence Staff, similar to congressional hearings in the US.

Ministers, and the officials informing them, should also take on the responsibility of explaining to parliament when unrealistic requirements cannot be met as a result of the situation on the ground.

Institutional reform

In order to improve policy coherence between the different departments involved in military operations, many who were involved in Uruzgan would like to see further institutional integration. Ideas for structures such as the British Stabilisation Unit at the implementation level or the American model of an advisory council like the National Security Council at the strategic level are often mentioned.

In order to anchor the comprehensive approach in the Dutch system, some sort of institutional structure is needed. Such a structure may be placed under the lead of the Ministry of General Affairs. The existing *Stuurgroep Militaire Operaties* (Steering group Military Operations) is regarded to be insufficient. What the feasibility is of importing institutional solutions from abroad within the Dutch context should, however, be researched further.

In order to avoid organisational fights over funds, further ways of integrating funding should be considered.

Gender

In cultures where men cannot talk to women, such as in many parts of Afghanistan, it is essential that the mission has enough female personnel, especially interpreters and PRT staff. In the defence organisation, about one out of four to five people was female, although concentrated in particular sectors, particularly medics. The other two 'Ds' lagged behind, which meant that almost half the population was not reached. Although gender is a sensitive issue in societies such as Afghanistan, low profile projects at the level of individual women can make a large contribution.

Fine tuning development assistance to military mission contexts

A new category of development projects is needed. The small projects are currently funded as part of CIMIC and the large projects through the embassy. It is difficult to find funds for the medium-sized projects, because these are too large for CIMIC and not relevant or structural enough for the embassy. One solution could be to provide the CivRep with the necessary funds to manage such projects.

In operations such as in Uruzgan, the mission can be divided into phases. Initially most projects are small scale, but as the mission develops, the size of the projects and the focus of the mission itself shift towards larger development projects. The dynamics of the mission change and the planning, resources and staffing of the other ministries should be accordingly.

List of participants in the focus group meetings

Military

Brig Theo Vleugels C-TFU 1
Col Piet van der Sar C-BG 1
Col Nico Tak C-PRT 1
Col Sybren van Klaarbergen CS TFU 1
Col Hans van Griensven C-TFU 2
Col Tim Luiten C-BG 2
Col Gerard Koot C-PRT 2
Col Nico Geerts C-TFU 3
Col Michiel Dulfer G5 TFU 5
Lt Col Roland de Jong CS TFU 6
Lt Col Jos Brouns G2 TFU 6
Lt Colmarns Frans van Gool CS TFU 7
Lt Col Albert Grubben G3 TFU 7
Lt Col Joost Doense G3 TFU 1 and C-BG 10
Lt Col Marcel Buis G5 TFU 8
Lt Col Ernst Lobbezo C-PRT 9
Lt Col Gert-Jan Kooij G3 TFU 2
Col Hans Stumpers
KLTZ Henk Monderen

NGO representatives

Stefan van Laar	HealthNet TPO
Marjolein Munsterman	Dutch Committee for Afghanistan - Veterinary Programmes
Bert van Ruitenbeek	Save the Children
Goossen Hoenders	Save the Children
Manon Wolfkamp	ICCO and Kerk in Actie
Evert van Bodegom	ICCO and Kerk in Actie
Jeroen Jurriens	ICCO and Kerk in Actie
Paul van den Berg	Cordaid
Annick van Lookeren Campagne	Oxfam Novib
Jogien Bakker	Oxfam Novib

Diplomats

Patty Zandstra
Hester Jonkman
Marten de Boer
Christoffer Jonker
Alex Oosterwijk
Said Fazili
Johan Verboom
Brecht Paardekooper
Sebastian Messerschmidt

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