

## SOLDERING THE LINK:

*The UN Global Focal Point for police, justice and corrections*

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## List of Abbreviations

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BCPR-RoL	Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery - Rule of Law
CIC	Center on International Cooperation
CivCap	Civilian Capacity in the Aftermath of Conflict
CLJAS	Criminal Law and Judicial Advisory Service
CRU	Conflict Research Unit (of the Clingendael Institute)
DCAF	Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of the Armed Forces
DfID	UK Department for International Development
DPA	UN Department of Political Affairs
DPKO	UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations
GFP	Global Focal Point
HQ	Headquarters
IMPP	Integrated Mission Planning Process
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OHCHR	UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
OLA	UN Office of Legal Affairs
ORoLSI	UN Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions
PBF	Peacebuilding Fund (UN)
PBSO	UN Peacebuilding Support Office
RoL	Rule of Law
RoLCRG	UN Rule of Law Coordination and Resource Group
SPF	State and Peace-Building Fund (World Bank)
SSR	Security Sector Reform
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
USIP	United States Institute of Peace
WDR 2011	World Development Report 2011



## Executive Summary

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### 1. Introduction

The interrelated roles and responsibilities of United Nations (UN) actors supporting the Rule of Law (RoL) and Security Sector Reform (SSR) need better articulation. Joined-up programming has been called for at the highest levels of the Organization, prompting a new response: the Global Focal Point on police, justice and corrections (GFP). The GFP focuses on providing UN field staff in conflict-affected settings and other offices with more efficient and better coordinated UN support in these three areas. This report aims to capture the latest debates and developments in relation to this collaborative UN support, particularly as they relate to the GFP.

The GFP, which brings together the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), among others, will support UN peacekeeping and special political missions in countries affected by conflict. It will also apply to non-mission territories, where UN assistance may be required in cases of crisis. The initiative aims to realise joint country-level assessments, planning, programming and resource mobilisation in the sectors of police, justice and corrections, which occupy an overlapping area of RoL promotion and SSR.

### 2. Emerging Clarity & Insight

#### *Co-location*

Co-location will involve staff from UNDP's Bureau of Crisis Prevention and Recovery – Rule of Law (BCPR-RoL), as well as staff from the DPKO Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions' (ORoLSI) Criminal Law and Judicial Advisory Service (CLJAS), and the Police Division. Besides enhancing visibility and demonstrating organisational support, co-location could help facilitate joint analyses and assessments for missions and Country Teams. This potential is noteworthy, yet success will depend on how the focal point will be staffed and managed.

#### *Policy guidance*

The establishment of several Inter-Agency Task Forces has contributed to developing joint guidance on RoL- and SSR-related topics with input from various agencies, including DPKO and UNDP. Yet the Task Forces were not designed, staffed nor mandated to provide field support.



The GFP, both in terms of mandate and approach, thus must solder the link. By giving field-oriented, operational guidance on the basis of existing tools and policies, and specifically those developed by the relevant Task Forces and the GFP partners themselves, the GFP can help translate generic guidance from Headquarters into operational approaches, enhancing both its clarity and applicability.

#### *Joint work plan*

Criticism often assails the lack of guidance from Headquarters on how analyses and policies are linked to each other, to contextual challenges or to broader UN goals. The GFP has the opportunity to strengthen such linkages by developing a joint work plan at the Headquarters level. Key elements will include GFP teams executing joint assessments (including field impact evaluations and monitoring) and providing joint reporting, allowing all relevant expertise to feed into the guidance channelled to missions and Country Teams.

#### *Client-oriented performance*

The GFP has the potential to make the relationship between Headquarters guidance and the field tighter and more grounded in the challenges faced by the missions and Country Teams. By cycling knowledge back to the UN Headquarters, entities developing guidance could be more informed of field experiences and (national) capacities, and more strongly driven by contextual needs. Having one single port of call for work on police, justice and corrections will also have potential advantages in improving a more client-oriented approach. Yet, it may be difficult to match GFP capacity to field demands. If the GFP is not able to meet the demands it receives, it could be sidelined, with missions and Country Teams returning to their various regular service providers.

### **3. Gorillas in the Room**

#### *Leadership & Decision-Making*

Each actor joining the GFP will arrive with its own management structure still intact. How the agencies negotiate their decision-making authority will be paramount in moving forward. Inevitably, there will be topics and areas within police, justice and corrections, in which several actors assert their competence. Within the GFP, mutual competency should prompt co-operation. This will require steady commitment and authority of management personnel to encourage staff to be receptive to and proactive in building synergies with their GFP co-workers. Encouragement and constructive monitoring from proponents and observers could be useful in strengthening this facet.

#### *Common Vision for Co-operation*

Before work begins, the GFP partners should develop a shared understanding of what their co-operation entails. A common theory of change, making explicit both joint objectives and the assumed strategies to achieve them, offers an optimal shared foundation. A joint theory of change can also guide an assessment of the resources and capacities needed, as well as various

actors' comparative advantages in providing those assets per given context. Short of strategic alignment, the GFP could establish co-operation primarily based on joint activities. A lesser degree of joint work is coordination, where actors each pursue their particular activities with efforts to reinforce, or avoid obstructing, the activities of others. Information sharing, lastly, would effect scant joint action.

#### *Definitions of Scope & Conceptual Debates*

The potential for conceptual quarrels between GFP partners should be mitigated. One debate within the GFP could be the scope of 'justice', an elastic term subject to concept creep. Stretching the ambit of the GFP too far could risk conceptual and even practical overreach in its nascent stages. Rather, GFP agencies should focus on clarifying how supporting criminal justice institutions contributes to stability and development in conflict-affected contexts. This could help found a common theory of change within the GFP and also provide relevant field guidance. For criminal justice support to be effectively flanked by and responsive to broader RoL promotion and SSR, inter-agency linkages and more widely embraced concepts must be developed and promoted. The GFP may prove well placed to contribute on this front.

#### *GFP & the UN Architecture*

The mandates of the Inter-Agency Task Forces, working groups and teams of experts all deal with coordination, mainstreaming, technical assistance, assessments and capacity building. The GFP will be challenged to contribute to reducing current fragmentation among actors. Whether the GFP's authority and resources will be sufficient for this undertaking is still unclear. It is thus up to the senior and line managers of DPKO, UNDP, UNODC and OHCHR to support and guide the potential of the GFP, operating through the Integrated Mission Planning Process where applicable. These observations suggest the need to work with the respective departments and organisational units within the relevant Task Forces and their secretariats. The GFP can help create clarity in roles and responsibilities of actors tackling criminal justice-related work at the various levels in the UN system.

## **4. Taking Current Momentum Forward**

#### *Field support*

Any assessment of the GFP's eventual success should consider its ability to promote better aligned work at the field level, in both mission and non-mission settings. Operational and context-specific advice should become the hallmarks of GFP support. Discussions of how to shift responsibilities as field contexts evolve would help advance thinking on how activities of different GFP entities respond to one another. The ultimate goal would be to conceptualise and support the implementation of country-specific strategies that progress along with the dynamics of field contexts.



### *Funding & budgeting*

The realisation of flexible funding arrangements at the Headquarters level may be essential for enhancing effective coordination. In the case of the GFP, flexibility requires maximising the use of both voluntary and assessed funds, ensuring speed, efficiency and appropriate risk taking. Establishing a new or separate fund for GFP could segregate the GFP's work on police, justice and corrections from broader work on RoL and SSR. Hence, discussions are focusing on existing instruments. Options include the Peacebuilding Fund, UNDP's Global Programme on RoL or Thematic Trust Fund for Crisis Prevention and Recovery, and the World Bank's State and Peace-Building Fund.

### *Staffing*

The staff in the GFP will be an important variable influencing its development. Clarity on the role and mandate of the GFP (both immediate and prospective) will be useful in assigning to staff the appropriate responsibilities and initial assignments. Staffing efforts should be devoted to ensuring a mixture of sector expertise and thematic knowledge. Open access to the expert rosters of various entities and increased mobility of staff between agencies within the GFP would support greater integration. The extent to which the actors recognise and make use of the skills and expertise of their GFP counterparts will be an important barometer of constructive collaboration. In the future, the GFP may do well to bring in additional staff and invest in personnel capacity building, if and when necessary. The incorporation of field experience into the GFP staff should also be considered.

### *Incentivising co-operation*

Defining and reinforcing incentives for collaboration will be crucial for keeping momentum propelled forward. Here donors and Member States may provide positive encouragement for joined-up work. This would require Member States to make explicit their expectations and later to assess those results. They should avoid or discontinue funding approaches that counter productively encourage disjointed work. On this point, backing from the UN Membership should be broadened, to facilitate its work moving forward. It is also anticipated that performance reviews and managers' compacts will take into consideration the GFP's achievements. It would be worthwhile for senior-level management to devote attention to developing adequate incentives for co-operation among staff.

### *Demonstrating success*

For pertinent indicators of joined-up approaches, observers could focus their attention on process results. Ideally, different actors would pursue their particular work with a common understanding of the wider collective goals and their unique role in achieving them. Guidance should demonstrate the use of joined-up and country-specific analysis. The idea of joint resource mobilisation at the Headquarters level would also be an encouraging sign of joint work, but would depend on donors' reaction to it. Field surveys, both in the run-up to, and a year after the establishment of the GFP could help determine the end-users' perspectives of the GFP's contribution.

## 5. Recommendations

### *Recommendations for Staffing:*

- GFP staffing should look to combine political and technical expertise with administration and programme design know-how.
- The leadership and management of the GFP should devise ways to incentivise co-operation among staff and mechanisms to bring field staff into the GFP.
- Existing rosters of experts should be made interoperable and more accessible.
- Initial staff within the GFP must become the drivers of change, bringing forth their enthusiasm for and experience in building strategic and constructive partnerships.

### *Recommendations for Funding & Budgeting:*

- Approaches to funding and budgeting need to ensure that GFP knowledge and skills are not segregated or excluded from certain contexts according to the rules of funding streams.
- Member States could leverage some welcome influence by shifting voluntary funds into joint financing mechanisms that allow for flexibility.
- The Peacebuilding Fund is one option for supporting the GFP. PBSO staff inclusion in the new cooperative arrangements should be explored.
- The use of UNDP funds could also be explored, although pragmatic consideration should be given to a number of consequences.
- The State and Peace-Building Fund, perhaps in combination with the UN Peacebuilding Fund, is a noteworthy option for funding the GFP and strengthening strategic partnerships between the World Bank and the UN.

### *Recommendations for Joined-Up Work:*

- Arrangements for joined-up work should be embedded in the GFP set-up and general strategy, and included in its monitoring and evaluation protocol.
- Member States should encourage the GFP to demonstrate its joint approach, and where possible, apply their leverage to support strategic co-operation as opportunities arise.
- Member States are also able to lobby for the GFP to link with other relevant agencies, such as the ORoLSI SSR Unit, through organisational arrangements.
- Member States should strictly avoid funding approaches that perpetuate fragmentation.

### *Lessons to Learn From:*

- Avoiding fragmented policy and programming is entwined with acting on the linkages between various aspects of RoL and SSR.
- It will be important for the management of the GFP to avoid stretching its scope too far.
- GFP will be challenged to safeguard its focus and remain relevant to broader field needs.
- Development of joined-up approaches will require new insights on how to remain theme specific while contributing substantively to broader justice and security objectives.



- To mitigate the risk of relapsing into familiar yet fragmented ways of working, the GFP should establish a joint work plan quickly and collaboratively.

### *Managing Expectations, While Demanding Performance*

The GFP should not be seen as *the* solution, but an important part of a potential solution. As a result, observers should be realistic about what can be achieved in the short term. To avoid overwhelming the GFP, interested Member States representing a broad base of UN Membership could coordinate their messages collectively and form coalitions of support to see through progress. These would ideally consist of Member States from the North and the South.

It will be important to keep the management of the UN involved and make the GFP's success part of the evaluation of key management layers from within DPKO and UNDP. This will require reporting at timely intervals, and to individuals with the authority and capacity to make necessary strategic decisions at the political level. Finally, the GFP will only be successful in so far as it can deliver pertinent, coherent, and timely support to the field. This will be its added value and its defining feature.



## 1. Introduction

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Rule of Law (RoL) promotion and Security Sector Reform (SSR) are increasingly prioritised as activities in the context of UN peace-support around the world.<sup>1</sup> Yet, there remain issues in effectively linking the two concepts both doctrinally and operationally. A growing recognition has taken hold in policy communities of the need to articulate the interrelated roles and responsibilities of the various actors within the UN system dealing with justice and security. New developments seem to suggest that progress can be made, starting with a focus on security reform and rule of law promotion in field contexts. The recent establishment by the UN of a Global Focal Point on police, justice and corrections, in particular, focuses on providing field offices with more efficient and effective support in these three areas. It could become an example, or even a model, for innovative joined-up working, specifically in RoL promotion and SSR. The report aims to capture the latest debates, developments and approaches to collaborative UN support, and the Global Focal Point in particular. It also seeks to contextualise this landscape in relation to organisational aspects, processes of change, and lessons learned from earlier attempts.

This research has been taken up by the Clingendael Conflict Research Unit (CRU), as part of its broader work on articulating the challenges, and also the opportunities for and benefits of collaboration between RoL and SSR actors. The report is written as part of a subsidy agreement between CRU and the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs. However, the research and analysis, undertaken independently, is a reflection of solely the CRU authors' viewpoint. The paper begins with a brief sketch of the current context and an introduction of the Global Focal Point concept. It progresses with an analysis of the form and role of the focal point on police, justice and corrections, as anticipated in July 2012. It then moves to discuss areas and issues that require further clarification and attention in order to shore up the focal point's potential for success. Lastly, the authors provide suggestions for ways forward, directed toward the general UN community, specifically those engaged in the design and implementation of the Global Focal Point, including UN Member States.

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1 The report follows the definitions of the RoL and SSR concepts as contained in Report of the Secretary-General (2004) *The rule of law and transitional justice in conflict and post-conflict societies*, S/2004/616; and Report of the Secretary-General (2008) *Securing peace and development: the role of the United Nations in supporting security sector reform*, A/62/659-S/2008/39, respectively.



## 2. Landscape & Context

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Since the UN started its work on Rule of Law in the 1980s and 90s (with SSR joining the agenda this millennium), an expansive body of policies and guidance has been produced. An overview of all engagements shows that the breadth of the UN's Rule of Law related activities received a new level of attention in 2000, with the *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations*.<sup>2</sup> Following this, a wide range of guidance and arrangements mushroomed, aiming to solve the challenges of working towards a more unified approach to the Rule of Law.<sup>3</sup> These efforts, however, have not resulted in a coherent approach across the Organization.<sup>4</sup> In 2011, it was concluded that issues concerning co-operation, clarity of roles, and capacity to deliver, particularly in peacebuilding contexts, still require attention.<sup>5</sup>

At the same time, new research is emerging to galvanise attention for the synergies between RoL promotion and SSR.<sup>6</sup> Failure to appreciate the linkages between the paired concepts can confound the roles of actors, neglect opportunities to reinforce programmes, and generally hinder pragmatic delivery of RoL and SSR support. While there is an expressed desire for a more sensitive and precise treatment of RoL and SSR as terms, the need to avoid definitional quagmires or turf battles over terminology is also frequently emphasised.<sup>7</sup> This call for clarity is notably focused at the UN Headquarters level, where such debates are seen to distract the Secretariat and other RoL and SSR UN entities from pursuing a stronger, more joint focus on the needs and challenges of the field.

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2 Widely known as the “Brahimi Report”, the report (A/55/305-S/2000/809) called for an enhancement of system-wide capacities in the areas of civilian police, other Rule of Law institutions and human rights in post-conflict environments.

3 This wider goal of the Organization is, for example, stressed in Report of the Secretary-General (2012) *Delivering justice: programme of action to strengthen the rule of law at the national and international levels*, A/66/749, p.3, para.8 & 9, and p.18, para.57

4 Report of the Secretary-General (2006) *Uniting our strengths: Enhancing United Nations support for the rule of law*, A/61/636 – S/2006/980, p.10, para.28

5 Report of the Secretary-General (2011) *The rule of law and transitional justice in conflict and post-conflict societies*, S/2011/634, p.3, para.4

6 An entire issue of *Hague Journal on the Rule of Law* (Volume 4, 2012) is devoted to analysing RoL promotion and SSR, and the inherent benefits and challenges in supporting each and in relation to each other. See also Report of the Secretary-General (2006) A/61/636 – S/2006/980, p.12, para.37; Derks & Price (2012) *Rule of Law and Security Sector Reform: a pragmatic approach to addressing the justice and security spectrum*, Clingendael Institute, The Hague; see also Bleiker & Krupanski (2012) *The Rule of Law and Security Sector Reform: Conceptualising a Complex Relationship*, The Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of the Armed Forces (DCAF), Geneva

7 Report of the Secretary-General (2004) S/2004/616, p.4, para.5



A vanguard of this research has been *Shaky Foundations: An Assessment of the UN's Rule of Law Support Agenda*.<sup>8</sup> *Shaky Foundations* contributes to an increasingly open discourse on the UN system's management, organisational, conceptual and funding deficiencies that hamper effective RoL-related assistance in conflict and transitional settings. Broadly paraphrased, it argues that the current structures for guiding and implementing field support, for example designating lead agencies based on bureaucratic-level decisions, are without merit.<sup>9</sup> Rather, a cumbersome and open-to-interpretation Headquarters architecture has emerged and has been perpetuated to promote and protect domains of competency and funding streams in security and justice areas.<sup>10</sup> The assessment stresses, in particular, the need within the UN system for coherent understanding and a common approach toward RoL support, based on empirical analysis and strong monitoring and evaluation. A more thorough grounding in how (or if) UN RoL interventions contribute to broader political, developmental and security outcomes must undergird UN policy and guidance. This requires stronger context-analysis capacities to develop strategies and advice fit for particular locales and transition stages. Moreover, the report argues these theories must be more consistently followed up with sound evaluative assessments and adjusted as necessary.

An additional catalyst of these developments has been a handful of UN Member States. Particularly Member States providing various types of support to UN work on RoL and SSR, both at Headquarters and in conflict-affected settings, are seeking to enhance the effectiveness of UN work in these areas.<sup>11</sup> To warrant the efficacy and impacts of their public budgets spent on international assistance, for example through voluntary funds, some Member States are increasingly insisting on basic clarity around RoL and SSR complementarity, filling gaps, and better coordinated delivery on the ground.<sup>12</sup> To a certain extent, a coalition of the concerned (primarily representing Member States of the North) has been successful in pushing for increased co-operation between UN entities working on security and justice in post-conflict states. While the value of these well-placed efforts should not be undercut, broadening Member State engagement on the issue into a larger support base will likely be required. There is, concurrently, awareness among Member States that some of their approaches to voluntary funding have been part of the problem.<sup>13</sup> Many donors fund programmes or projects in a specific area with a designated UN partner, holding those agencies accountable to show their attributed results in increasingly specific terms.<sup>14</sup> This removes much of the incentive (or even creates a disincentive) for inter-agency collaboration, thus diminishing opportunities to align concepts, activities or strategies.

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8 Kavanagh & Jones (2011) *Shaky Foundations: An Assessment of the UN's Rule of Law Support Agenda*, New York University-Center on International Cooperation (CIC), New York

9 *Ibid.*, p.61, para.122

10 This point was made, for example in, United Nations (2011) *Civilian Capacity in the Aftermath of Conflict: Independent report of the Senior Advisory Group*, United Nations, New York, p.19, para.35(e)

11 As one example, discussions are taking place within The Netherlands Ministry of Foreign affairs on how to support both DPKO and UNDP and their respective programmes, given both new emphasis on the linkages between development, rule of law and security, as well as changes within the UN system.

12 It should be noted, however, that the broader Member State community still lacks general consensus on the role of the UN in areas of domestic justice and security.

13 Report of the Secretary-General (2008) *Strengthening & coordinating United Nations rule of law activities*, A/63/226, p.17, para.67

14 DCAF & ORoLSI (2012) *Measuring the Impact of Peacekeeping Missions on Rule of Law and Security Institutions: Report of the Expert Workshop*, Permanent Mission of Switzerland to the UN, New York, p. 10

While not a silver bullet for effective UN assistance, much has been written on the rationale and benefits of joined-up programming, called for at the highest levels of the Organization.<sup>15</sup> Overall, one could say that “jointness” is on the rise in the UN system, including in the justice and security spheres. UNDP, in particular, has undertaken significant joint programming on the ground with, for instance UNODC, OHCHR, and DPKO.<sup>16</sup> Yet this way of working has fallen short of, for example, the “Delivering as One” initiative of the development, humanitarian assistance and environmental communities, which advocates establishing one leader, one budget, one programme and one office.<sup>17</sup> These issues notwithstanding, several UN agencies and actors have been pushed, pulled or, indeed, forged the way toward more united inter-agency programming. This and other developments have brought the UN to the verge of a new response: the Global Focal Point concept.

### *Global Focal Point for Police, Justice and Corrections*

On 6 June 2012, DPKO and UNDP announced that they would jointly establish and operate the new Global Focal Point for police, justice and corrections (here forward referred to as the GFP). In the designated areas, the GFP will be relevant to UN peacekeeping environments and in conflict-affected countries with active special political missions. It will also apply to certain territories without UN mission activities but where UN assistance in police, justice and corrections may be required. The initiative includes other UN entities engaged in RoL and SSR activities<sup>18</sup>, and aims to “foster joint country level assessments, planning, programming and joint resource mobilization”<sup>19</sup> in the so-called ‘triad’ of the criminal justice chain: police, justice and corrections. The criminal justice triad, notably, has long been understood to sit at the crux of RoL promotion and SSR overlap.<sup>20</sup> As a result, the GFP could bring greater exposure and possible additional support to the police, justice and corrections work, particularly in the context of peacekeeping operations and special political missions. In that sense, the announcement of the GFP was timely, anticipating the High-Level Meeting on the Rule of Law at the National and International Levels on 24 September 2012. Furthermore, early September will see a meeting of the Secretary-General’s Policy Committee, which is expected to have Rule of Law arrangements on its agenda. It is also pertinent to note that the Global Focal Point

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15 The call for joint programming, for example, is made in the Secretary-Generals’ respective Policy Committee Decisions on the RoL and SSR, namely Decision No. 2006/47 (24 November 2006) and Decision No. 2007/11 (16 February 2007), respectively. See also the Report of the Secretary-General (2011) *Strengthening and coordinating United Nations rule of law activities*, A/66/133, p.20, para.76(a); and Van de Goor & Major (2011) *How to make the comprehensive approach work*, Clingendael Institute, The Hague

16 See examples within UNDP (2011) *Global Programme on Strengthening the Rule of Law in Conflict and Post-Conflict Situations: Annual Report 2010*, United Nations, New York; also UNDP (2011b) *A UNDP global programme for justice and security (Phase II)*, United Nations, New York, p. 33

17 Report of the Secretary-General (2006) *Delivering as One, Report of the Secretary-General’s High-Level Panel on UN System-wide Coherence in the Areas of Development, Humanitarian Assistance, and the Environment*, A/61/583; and *Civilian Capacities in the Aftermath of Conflict* (2011), p.21, para.42

18 In addition to OHCHR and UNODC, these would include UNICEF, UN Women, UNHCHR, and notably DPA in regard to the numerous field missions that the Department leads.

19 “UNDP and DPKO establish global focal point for rule of law” on UN Intranet, 7 June 2012, New York

20 Groenewald & Peake (2004) *Police Reform through Community-Based Policing: Philosophy and Guidelines for Implementation*, International Peace Academy, New York, p.3; O’Neill (2005) *Police Reform in Post-conflict Societies: What We Know and What We Still Need to Know*, International Peace Academy, New York, p. 4; Derks & Price (2012) see Figure 1



concept may be replicated to some degree for other identified capacity gaps, namely, inclusive political processes, economic revitalisation and government functionality.<sup>21</sup>

Concepts embedded within the GFP can be traced to the *World Development Report 2011* (WDR 2011), and *Civilian Capacity in the Aftermath of Conflict: Independent Report of the Senior Advisory Group* (CivCap).<sup>22</sup> The former has been instrumental in prompting the UN and others to consider a cultural and organisational “refit”, focused on providing security, justice and jobs in fragile settings. The GFP corresponds to WDR 2011 recommendations for combined security-justice-development teams and programmes.<sup>23</sup> Also, the CivCap report has ignited a movement within the UN towards designating RoL and SSR roles based on actors’ comparative advantages and capacities to deliver results. It aims to develop new or more refined competences without the need for additional staff or for the General Assembly to overhaul legislation. A Steering Committee was formed within the UN to explore how the CivCap recommendations could be taken forward.<sup>24</sup> The GFP has been one outcome, addressing components of two priority capacity-deficit areas: basic security and safety, as well as justice.<sup>25</sup> It also represents efforts to respond to CivCap recommendations for enhanced culture of accountability, in terms of service provision, working collectively and mandate implementation.<sup>26</sup> Furthermore, the GFP would appear to follow from CivCap recommendations on matching capacities with field needs, as related to global service provider models.<sup>27</sup>

That the GFP brings together DPKO and UNDP is a major development. Collaboration between the two has been notoriously lacking in the areas of justice and security, certainly at the strategic level and also critically in the field.<sup>28</sup> Thus, the GFP represents a mechanism to link these natural RoL and SSR partners, for the benefit of their own work and more globally in support of others. In turn, OHCHR’s and UNODC’s inclusion would appear to underscore a sincere effort to bring other added-value capacities to bear, specifically those related to transitional justice, organised crime and trafficking, and promoting Human Rights. In this sense, one of the prospective outcomes of this GFP may be to bring better balance, in pragmatic terms, to RoL promotion and SSR programming.

21 *Rule of law global focal point arrangements* [agreed by Civcap Steering Committee, 4 June 2012].

22 World Bank (2011) *World Development Report 2011: Conflict Security and Development. The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development*, Washington D.C.; United Nations (2011) *Civilian Capacity in the Aftermath of Conflict: Independent report of the Senior Advisory Group*, United Nations, New York.

23 World Bank (2011), p.276

24 Report of the Secretary-General (2011) *Civilian capacity in the aftermath of conflict*, A/66/311-S/2011/527, p.3, para.3

25 *Civilian Capacity in the Aftermath of Conflict* (2011), p.20, Table 1; and Report of the Secretary-General (2011) A/66/311-S/2011/527, p.14, para.54

26 *Civilian Capacity in the Aftermath of Conflict* (2011), p.23, Recommendation 12; and Report of the Secretary-General (2011) A/66/311 – S/2011/527, pp.13-14, para.50 & 53

27 *Civilian Capacity in the Aftermath of Conflict* (2011), pp.20-21, para.36 & 38(c)

28 Bergling et. al. (2012) “Rule of Law and Security Sector Reform: Casual Assumptions, Unintended Risks and the Need for Norms” in *Hague Journal on the Rule of Law* (Volume 4), pp.113-114, 117; and Durch et. al. (2012) *Understanding the Impact of Police, Justice and Corrections Components in UN Peace Operations*, The Henry L. Stimson Center, Washington D.C., p.22

### 3. Emerging Clarity & Insight

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Interviews held in early July 2012 indicated that the global focal point concept is still a work in progress. Yet, a number of the approach's key elements have been developed. They include: co-location; policy guidance; joint work plans; and client orientation. These aspects are assessed in terms of the opportunity to improve joined-up working, with a view to more efficiency and effectiveness in supporting missions and Country Teams.

#### *Co-location*

One of the more interesting features of the GFP was the announcement that engaged agencies will be co-located in Headquarters offices. Co-location will involve staff from UNDP's Bureau of Crisis Prevention and Recovery – Rule of Law (BCPR-RoL), as well as staff from the DPKO Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions' (ORoLSI) Criminal Law and Judicial Advisory Service (CLJAS), and the Police Division. This suggests that a new phase of collaboration has been reached, exceeding a superficial approach to co-operation or just 'water-cooler conversations.' This is quite a significant change in a setting where contentious discussions on roles and responsibilities have troubled relations in the past. In doing so, the co-located GFP team will be in a position to send several clear messages, as well as improve effective and efficient working.

First, the co-located GFP will increase the external visibility of joined-up working in these three areas, thus declaring it an evident and institutional goal of the UN. Secondly, making staff available for the GFP signals that joined-up working is also an organisational objective, supported by the UN's leadership. Thirdly, the focal point has to become the centralised source of support, advice and resources for all UN actors working on police, justice and corrections at field level, including those outside of DPKO, UNDP, OHCHR and UNODC. The GFP could thus also work as a coordination mechanism for diverse field activities on the criminal justice triad. Fourthly, co-location could, and ideally should, more easily facilitate joint analyses and assessments for missions and Country Teams. In this regard, being co-located could contribute to overcoming cultural and institutional challenges, building trust among partners, improving consultation processes and establishing mechanisms for frequent and substantive co-operation.

Yet, there are also challenges embedded in co-location that still require attention. The formation of special, joint units and working groups is no panacea for dealing with interdepartmental strife or other tensions. Much will depend on how the focal point will be staffed and managed.



These questions call for – and will have – close attention from key players setting up the focal point.

### *Policy guidance*

This is not the first attempt to improve joined-up working in the areas of SSR and RoL. Here we can refer most notably to the establishment of several Inter-Agency Task Forces,<sup>29</sup> which have also shown successes. For instance, the Inter-Agency Task Force on SSR, established in 2007, has contributed to developing joint guidance on SSR and RoL related topics with input from various agencies, including DPKO and UNDP and under their joint chairmanship. It will be interesting to see how the work of the GFP could make similar inter-agency contributions in areas of police, justice and corrections, particularly as the co-chair of the SSR Task Force, DPKO's SSR Unit, is not currently foreseen as part of the GFP. The prospective inclusion of the SSR Task Force's work should be looked for in the future.

Along with its robust approach to joined-up work, focus on supporting the field level stands out as an important distinguishing feature of the GFP compared to the existing initiatives. The Inter-Agency Task Forces were not designed, staffed nor mandated to provide field support. The GFP, both in terms of mandate and approach, thus must solder the link. By giving field-oriented, operational guidance on the basis of existing tools and policies, both their own as well as those developed by the relevant Task Forces, the GFP can address a concern raised by field teams: translating generic guidance into more operational approaches, projects and programmes.<sup>30</sup> What is more, the GFP is expected to provide advice on a country-specific level, an aspect that has long been pushed for in research and policy communities. In taking this task on, the GFP will create an opportunity to enhance singular clarity and applicability in guidance from Headquarters, which has previously been marred by generic approaches, incoherence and fragmentation due to multiple agencies providing isolated support on similar or related issues.<sup>31</sup>

### *A joint work plan*

One of the challenges resulting from the current UN architecture, with its various arrangements, Task Forces and units, is coordination and coherence in programming. Criticism from UN field-based personnel often assails the lack of guidance from Headquarters on how analyses and policies are linked, not only to each other, but also to contextual challenges or to broader UN goals, such as economic development and political stability. The GFP has the opportunity to strengthen such linkages by defining a joint work plan (to be developed by UNDP and DPKO) at the Headquarters level. This work plan should describe the full cycle of field support provision, underscore a common and collaborative strategy from the basis of joint analyses and promote sustainable impact.

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29 These include Task Forces directly or tangentially related to RoL and SSR, such as the Task Force on Violence Against Women (2007) and one on Organized Crime and Trafficking (2010); see also footnote 50

30 Durch et. al. (2012), p.22; See also Tull (2012) "Effectiveness of recent UN peacekeeping" in *The EU, the UN, and Collective Security: Making multilateralism effective*. eds. J. Krause and N. Ronzitti. Routledge, New York, pp.132-134; United Nations (2009) *Enhancing UN System-Wide Coordination on Rule of Law: Meeting Summary*, 30 June 2009, New York, para.10-11; Similar feedback has also been heard by the authors during visits to countries and field missions for other projects.

31 Report of the Secretary-General (2008) A/63/226, p.17, para.67; Report of the Secretary-General (2012) A/66/749, p.16, para.49

Coherence throughout the entire cycle of field support, from initiation to evaluation and exiting, is a key part of the focal point's terms of reference. It will be important to take this responsibility seriously and demonstrate improved approaches to collective support. Coherence and effectiveness of programming, for example, should be assessed both in terms of outputs and sustainable outcomes, as well as in terms of resources (financial and staff). A key element for achieving these goals will be for GFP teams to execute the joint work plan in a way that allows all relevant expertise to feed into the advice channelled to missions and Country Teams. As *Shaky Foundations* concludes regarding the tools of the various UN entities: "...there does not appear to be any systematic understanding of *how* tools have been implemented and if they have been *effective* in helping member states or constituencies within member states achieve different goals".<sup>32</sup> Thus, in addition to developing more context-resonant guidance, the focal point would do well to develop joint monitoring and evaluation capacity, in terms of field impact.

#### *Client-oriented performance*

The GFP's direct link to the field opens the opportunity to directly absorb and provide feedback from local contexts. The GFP has the potential to make the relationship between Headquarters guidance and the field tighter and more grounded in the challenges faced by the missions and Country Teams. The GFP, in conjunction with field staff, could clarify what is needed, and what not.<sup>33</sup> By cycling this knowledge back to the UN entities developing such tools, guidance could be more informed of field experiences and (national) capacities, and more strongly driven by contextual needs.<sup>34</sup>

Having one single port of call for work on police, justice and corrections will also have potential key advantages in improving a more client-oriented approach. Yet, there are challenges in terms of being able to actually provide the services requested, and knowing when to defer to other agencies, such as the RoL Coordination and Resource Group (RoLCRG) or the Inter-Agency Task Force on SSR. The co-location of staff should help in terms of having knowledgeable and sufficient capacity at hand. Yet, it may be difficult to match capacity and demand, and this poses a real risk to the viability of the new initiative. If the GFP is not able to meet the demands it receives, it could be sidelined, with missions and Country Teams returning to their various regular service providers.

#### *A means to an end*

The above paragraphs outline aspects of the GFP that undergird the focal point's ability to make a difference. There is also great pressure for the success of the GFP, in particular from certain Member States, as it could set an example for a new approach to synergy, which some consider long overdue.

Yet, for the GFP to become successful, it first of all must be a collective means to a joint end. That is, for constructive change to be made and the GFP model to prove useful, joined-up work and

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32 Kavanagh & Jones (2011), p.61, para.121

33 Durch et. al. (2012) Section 3.2: Headquarters Knowledge Acquisition & Management, pp.20-24

34 Report of the Secretary-General (2011) A/66/311 - S/2011/527, p.6, para.17; Report of the Secretary-General (2009) *Peacebuilding in the immediate aftermath of conflict*, A/63/881 - S/2009/304, p.6, para.16



reporting should not become an end in itself. The plan is for the GFP to become active in a number of high-profile cases, responding to different settings and demands. As of July, the countries planned for support include: Liberia, Côte d'Ivoire and Timor-Leste.<sup>35</sup> These countries present quite different settings, challenges and missions. It is pertinent to observe to what degree wider programming, such as UNDP's Global Programme on Rule of Law, and traditional activities, like those of DPKO, will continue as per usual. The benefit of the GFP is that a pragmatic approach has been chosen; that is, to work on the specific areas of police, justice and corrections. These are areas where all organisations involved (DPKO, UNDP, UNODC and OHCHR) have something to gain from success, and where all rightly have a stake in contributing. If the objective is simply to be seen together, or to fulfil administrative obligations, there is a risk of the focal point quickly becoming marginalised. However, if success is defined in terms of service delivery and considered to be the success of all or none, there is adequate potential for the agencies to invest and balance their contributed capacities.

This places a premium on management's ability to create success at the field level. More specifically, it demands success that can be impartially attributed to the focal point's collective efforts and that promotes its way of operating as an example to be replicated. Experience shows that achieving change in the UN system may require attention to some persistent challenges, the 'gorillas in the room' perhaps, which will be addressed in the section below.

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35 Other candidates mentioned for GFP attention: Haiti, Yemen, Libya and the Democratic Republic of Congo.

## 4. Gorillas in the Room

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While the contours of the Global Focal Point have begun to come into focus, a few areas remain less defined. These points, discussed below, will be crucial to the formation and effective functioning of the GFP. They thus deserve particular attention during the development of this new UN approach to integrated working.

### *Leadership & Decision-Making*

Leadership of the senior staff within the GFP has the potential to make or break the new initiative. However, decision-making structures and practice are yet to be elaborated. Each actor joining the GFP will arrive with its own management structure still intact. How the agencies negotiate their decision-making authority will be paramount in moving forward.

Inevitably, there will be topics and areas within police, justice and corrections, in which several actors are likely to assert their competence; this fact bears the logic for joining the participating agencies under the GFP. However, it also touches precisely on prior sensitivities between the agencies.<sup>36</sup> If not addressed early, there are risks of creating internal divisions within the GFP, particularly between DPKO and UNDP, paradoxically creating two points of leadership within a single focal point. Whereas mutual competency previously fuelled competition, within the GFP it should prompt co-operation. This will require steady commitment and authority of leading management personnel to encourage working-level staff to be receptive to and proactive on building synergies with their GFP co-workers. The typical pattern of staff reporting back to senior-management superiors from meetings, seeking permission on whether and how to go forward, will not suffice. Executive authority to make decisions at working-level and senior management level must be actively and, more importantly, collectively engaged to move joint work forward. Encouragement and constructive monitoring from GFP proponents and observers could be useful in strengthening this crucial facet.

### *Common Vision for Co-operation*

Strong leadership from above should be rightly complemented by a common foundation below. Solidifying the structure from these two peripheries will help shape the substance of the GFP. Experience from attempts for joined-up approaches in the UN system, but also elsewhere, point to the importance of establishing common ground. There are a few possibilities to watch for.

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36 Kavanagh & Jones (2011), p.62, para.127



To start with, it will be important to have clarity on how the collective agencies envision co-operation. Full commitment to the joint approach demands that working relations are initiated before the actual work begins. Once responsibilities and commitments to the joint work plan have been established, discussions can move forward on programming objectives and how to reach those objectives in particular contexts. A common *theory of change* would offer the optimal shared foundation. This involves not only defining the goal, but also clarifying the assumed route to that desired end state. Such a planning exercise can unite actors around a common understanding of their joint endeavour, both the ends and the means. A jointly developed and supported theory of change for a particular country programme can also guide an assessment of the resources and capacities needed, as well as various actors' comparative advantages in providing those assets per given context.<sup>37</sup> Developing and agreeing upon a common goal and approach to realising it can be challenging, but it can also be the backbone of a successful joint approach. With substantial dedication from all involved, including insights from the field, such an approach can cultivate meaningful co-operation. Ultimately, it lays the foundation for strategic alignment, the most robust form of co-operation.<sup>38</sup>

Short of strategic alignment, the GFP could focus on defining co-operation through joint activities. Collectively defining and undertaking tasks such as context analysis, programming advice and evaluation, for example, cements the groundwork for general collaboration. As the common ground becomes more tenuous, however, co-operation may weaken. A lesser degree of joint work is coordination, based on an agreement of agencies' designated roles or a division on labour. In such a scenario, GFP actors would each pursue their particular activities with efforts to reinforce, or at least avoid duplicating or obstructing the activities of others. For example, GFP partners may refer in their planning documents to the related activities of others and, at best, describe how these activities respond to one another. The goal of coordination, to enhance efficiency and avoid overlap, is creditable and would signal an improvement upon current practice. However, it is less ambitious than applying joint strategies and operating under common frameworks.<sup>39</sup> Finally, the most anodyne form of joint work is information sharing,<sup>40</sup> a mutual responsibility to stay abreast of others' data or activities and to disseminate one's own. Information sharing within GFP would require scant common ground between agencies. Consequently, it often garners anaemic commitment and effects little joint action. Should the GFP simply become a platform for this type of exchange, very little could be realistically expected by way of enhanced policy and field support.

### *Definitions of Scope & Conceptual Debates*

Strong leadership and common ground are essential to the GFP's success, given the overlap of agencies' work in the realms of police, justice and corrections.<sup>41</sup> As the GFP actors begin to negotiate their newly shared space, the risk for conceptual quarrels to continue, or even intensify, should be mitigated.

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37 Similar suggestions are made in Report of the Secretary General (2011) A/66/311 – S2011/527, p.17, para.65

38 This has been the experience of attempts at improved joined-up working in the UK between the Foreign Commonwealth Office, DfID, the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Justice and of Home Affairs.

39 As are called for in Report of the Secretary-General (2008) A/63/226, pp.13-14, para.49-50

40 Report of the Secretary-General (2004) S/2004/616, p.20, para.59

41 Derks & Price (2012); Kavanagh & Jones (2011), para.123 & 127

One debate anticipated to emerge early on within the GFP (indeed, rumbling among staff of the betrothed agencies) will be the scope of 'justice'. Initial plans have delimited 'justice' to the judiciary and informal dispute resolution.<sup>42</sup> However, given the elasticity of the term, it would be prudent to watch for concept creep.<sup>43</sup> Stretching the ambit of the GFP too far too soon could compromise its specific focus, risking conceptual and even practical overreach in its nascent stages. Asserting a so-termed "thick"<sup>44</sup> interpretation of justice within the GFP may quickly lead this initiative back into the turbulent and hostile definitional waters that it intends to navigate away from. Such discussions would likely be to the detriment of meaningful impact and practical initiatives in the field.<sup>45</sup> This is a particular risk if agencies continue to view police, justice and corrections as distinct territories to define and dominate, rather than as integrated areas requiring various skill sets. Here, again, a common theory of change based on a joint country analysis could help to guide the collective efforts of diverse actors toward integrated goals, common objectives and clarified roles. It is essential that the strategy be guided by the local context and priorities, and in step with a country's transition. In addition, it highlights the need for UN management to think through the overall concept of global focal points, and the greater goal of facilitating joined-up approaches. Mindful of the need to avoid stove-piped approaches, it will be important to consider how possible future focal point arrangements may link up with and have an added value compared to existing ones.<sup>46</sup> Furthermore, thought should be given to which other areas may require a facility for joined-up work, be it a new global focal point or a different mechanism. In the end, enhanced co-operation and more coherence is the goal, not the propagation of focal points.

Eventually, closer interaction between DPKO and UNDP, as well as others within the GFP, could help to smooth over their previously carved out niches and deescalate the conceptual debates as proxy turf battles. Rather, GFP agencies are expected to more constructively focus on clarifying their shared strategic objective: how supporting police, justice and corrections contributes to stability and development in crisis or post-conflict contexts. This could offer the double benefit of founding a common theory of change within the GFP and providing relevant guidance to field teams.

Strengthening the conceptual coherence around police, justice and corrections in support of pragmatic outputs and outcomes is no small task. Yet, it can plough inroads to linking these three areas to broader RoL and SSR policies, activities and actors.<sup>47</sup> For example, in societies recently emerging from conflict, the military may dominate the law enforcement role of the police, requiring expertise in defence sector reform initiatives within broader SSR. Or, on the other hand, by devoting attention to the challenges of elites capturing or manipulating the

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42 *Rule of law global focal point arrangements* [agreed by Civcap Steering Committee, 4 June 2012] p.1, footnote 1

43 Kavanagh & Jones (2011), p.56, para.107

44 This interpretation of justice encompasses not only civil and criminal law, but also social-economic justice, international standards of Human Rights and broader aspects of the term.; See Kleinfeld (2005) *Competing Definitions of the Rule of Law: Implications for Practitioners*. Carnegie Endowment, Washington D.C.; Also Samuels, K. (2006) *Rule of Law Reform in Post-Conflict Countries*, The World Bank, Washington D.C.

45 *Civilian Capacity in the Aftermath of Conflict* (2011), p.6-7; Kavanagh & Jones (2011), p.60, para.116

46 Again, related to the potential for concept creep, several aspects of the "thick" approach to RoL, such as constitutional processes, are expected to be dealt with in a future global focal point arrangement on inclusive political processes.

47 For examples of such linkages, see Derks & Price (2012)



police and other security forces, the GFP could contribute to the broader analysis of a critical RoL threat. For police, justice, and corrections support to be effectively flanked by and responsive to broader justice and security reform, stronger inter-agency linkages and more widely embraced concepts must be developed and promoted.<sup>48</sup> The GFP may prove well placed to contribute on this front.

### *GFP & the UN Architecture*

It is important to recall that the GFP will not exist in a vacuum and will operate, where applicable, through the Integrated Mission Planning Process (IMPP). The role the GFP ultimately plays may, indeed, have as much to do with the performance of other entities as its own. When the Secretary-General established the Rule of Law Coordination and Resource Group (RoLCRG) in 2006, the body was meant to “act as headquarters focal point for coordinating system wide attention on rule of law so as to ensure quality, policy coherence and coordination”.<sup>49</sup> The RoLCRG obviously has a coordination mandate, and maintains a focus on wider RoL activities, including and extending well beyond police, justice, and corrections. Its main tasks consist of policy coordination at Headquarters, and therefore dealing with the lead entities in the UN. These main entities are, notably, the GFP participating actors DPKO, UNDP, UNODC, OHCHR as well as DPA, UN Women, UNHCR, UNICEF and OLA. However, whereas the RoLCRG has focused on coordination of actors at Headquarters level, the GFP is poised to complement these alignment efforts with a sole focus on ground support.

As mentioned above, in addition to the RoLCRG, the UN has also established several Inter-Agency Task Forces and other teams relevant for work on police, justice and corrections in conflict-affected contexts. Various Task Forces host the same members as those in the RoLCRG; yet, the RoLCRG, as such, is not related directly to the Task Forces. The GFP will need to function within this institutional setting and look to fill the relevant field-support gaps in relation to police, justice and corrections. The GFP could also be tasked to identify and confront emerging challenges for criminal justice reform, feeding those findings back through the IMPP into the Task Force architecture for strategic discussions and responses. In this way, the GFP can offer field-sourced input to other working-level entities without duplicating their work. Coordinated resource mobilisation at Headquarters level is also an anticipated task for the GFP. Whether the GFP will be effective, or its authority and resources sufficient to execute these tasks, is still unclear. This should be on the mind of the UN management currently setting up the new focal point.

Looking at the mandates of all the Task Forces, working groups and teams of experts,<sup>50</sup> it can be noted that they all deal with issues such as coordination, mainstreaming, technical assistance, assessments and capacity building. The GFP will be challenged to contribute at its level to reducing the current fragmentation and the tendency of various departments and agencies to

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48 Report of the Secretary-General (2004) S/2004/616, p.9-10, para.23-24 & 28; see also, Derks & Price (2012)

49 Report of the Secretary-General (2006) S/2006/980, para.38

50 Key groups include: UN Counter-Terrorism Integrated Task Force (2005); Humanitarian Rule of Law & Justice Sub-Working Group – Protection Cluster (2006); UN Inter-Agency Security Sector Reform Task Force (2007); UN Inter-Agency Task Force on Violence Against Women (2009); UN SC Resolution 1888 Team of Experts (2011); and UN Task Force on Transnational Organized Crime and Trafficking (2011).

territorially guard their mandated roles and designated budgets. It is thus up to the senior and line managers of the key four (DPKO, UNDP, UNODC and OHCHR) to support the potential of the GFP's success. These observations suggest that a pragmatic approach will be required from the GFP. In practice, this implies the need to work through the respective departments and other organisational units within the relevant Task Forces and their secretariats. Moreover, it will be important for the GFP to help create clarity as regards roles and responsibilities at the various levels in the UN system tackling criminal justice-related work. Previous discussion in Section III, on the GFP translating existing and new Headquarters policies into workable field-ready tools, presents a potential way of clarifying and aligning roles. Developing guidance manuals and policies would therefore not be an assignment for the GFP. But the GFP could feed relevant field-based information and needs to the Task Forces responsible for developing guidance. However, these suggested options represent just that; the links between the Task Forces and GFP must be clarified in practice, with input from all interested parties.

Whether working in such a way is supported by the current set-up is not yet clear. It is generally acknowledged that successful integration necessitates conscientious structural changes, including the shifting of staff, funding and management arrangements. It will therefore be important that the GFP leads take note of these issues and address them in the implementation plan. Responding to these issues will also be a test of the engaged agencies' willingness to overcome previous territorial tendencies. Working in this way will furthermore provide an important signal to those Member States financially and politically supporting the UN's police, justice and corrections work in terms of what they can expect from more efficient and potentially effective work in these areas.



## 5. Taking Current Momentum Forward

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Keeping in mind both the foreseeable facets and challenges of bringing it into being, we turn now to the areas that will be key in propelling forward the GFP's potential. These represent issues and aspects for which GFP proponents could apply tempered leverage to reinforce sustained progress.

### *Field support*

Any assessment of the Global Focal Point's eventual success should consider its ability to promote better aligned work at the field level, both in and between police, justice and corrections programmes. Operational and context-specific advice and support should be the hallmarks of GFP support. There is a valuable opportunity for the new initiative to cut through the rhetorical bombast of supporting the field, and actually work exhaustively to deliver on such claims. To realise this potential, the GFP should make its debut as a new approach to field support. Here, we examine critical avenues for capitalising on this potential.

Current information suggests that the GFP actors are accountable for responding to field requests for assistance.<sup>51</sup> Demands are likely to become extensive. A focused and responsive surge of operational and country-specific support to the field can demonstrate the value of the GFP's integrated approach to working. However, this apparent way forward sets a premium on the ability of the GFP to get up and running quickly, establishing its reputation early by providing more coherent and more field-relevant assistance to colleagues on the ground. This may prove challenging with heavy logistical and organisational demands looming on the horizon. Setting up the day-to-day functioning of the new arrangements will consume considerable resources. The lower these start-up costs can be held, with front-end planning, sufficient resource dedication, and strong leadership, the more hours and energy will be available for addressing field needs.

There has been much stock put in the expectation that the new initiative will lead by example, encouraging field offices to reciprocate with their own arrangements to enhance co-operation.<sup>52</sup> In this regard, the GFP could also present the first successful instance of the field and

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51 "DPKO and UNDP elements will be responsible and accountable for responding to country-level requests, channelled through UN entities on the ground, with timely and quality police, justice and corrections assistance in terms of global knowledge, people, and advice on assessments, planning, funding and partnerships. They will also commit to transparent country-driven measurement of this service." In *Rule of law global focal point arrangements* (2012), p.1

52 "HQ co-location is, wherever possible, to be mirrored by co-location in the field". *Ibid.*



Headquarters' organisational set-ups corresponding. Such mirrored arrangements could also benefit the relationships between UN missions and Country Teams. Even in the case of integrated missions, where alignment, coordination and collaboration have increased, the GFP approach could provide additional support. For example, a particularly useful form of assistance would be in planning for the transition from missions' peacekeeping and stabilisation activities to the longer-term peacebuilding and subsequent support of development led by Country Teams.<sup>53</sup> More generally, in mission as well as non-mission settings, focused discussions of how to shift responsibilities as field contexts evolve, with actors fading in and out as the context requires, would help advance thinking on how different GFP entities' activities respond to one another.<sup>54</sup> The ultimate goal would be to conceptualise and support the implementation of country-specific strategies that progress with the dynamics of field contexts, from "boots on the ground" stabilisation toward comprehensive development and reform.

Clear focus has been placed on field contexts where both DPKO and UNDP are currently working; that is, in mission settings. Another important and potentially groundbreaking avenue the GFP opens is the possibility to dedicate its broad range of expertise in both mission and non-mission countries. The degree to which these UN players are able to bring their comparative advantages together in either setting could be improved by the GFP approach. In many mission settings, DPKO currently tends to assume the lead role on police, corrections and also certain aspects of justice, while UNDP and other agencies and programmes are often responsible for continuing RoL- and SSR-related work after missions' withdrawal. Through the GFP, UNDP's early inclusion in strategy development and planning could offer significant dividends throughout the entire mission cycle. On the other hand, political sensitivities, funding regulations, and human resource constraints can restrict DPKO from fully contributing its expertise to non-mission countries, regardless of potential positive contributions.<sup>55</sup> The ability to utilise a police advisor through the GFP may provide new opportunities to use available expertise more efficiently and effectively. By de-coupling individual capabilities or lead roles from particular departments, the GFP could provide expertise according to the needs and partnerships of a particular setting and stage of transition, rather than matched to fit the particular UN set-up on the ground. However, this will raise questions of funding in relation to where capacity is allowed to operate under current rules and policies.

### *Funding & Budgeting*

Flexible funding will be essential for the focal point's success in enhancing effective coordination.<sup>56</sup> This refers to options for financing the work of the GFP staff quickly and allowing for both appropriate risk taking, and whole-of-UN coherence from all relevant actors in all settings. In the case of the GFP, where entities working with assessed and those working with voluntary funds have to co-operate, such flexibility requires maximising the use of these two separate resource streams. This requires explicit consensus on the acceptable levels of risk taking, and also compliance in fiduciary regulations and efficient administrative and reporting practices across both funds. If innovative funding solutions are not developed, the GFP may run

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53 As reflected upon in Report of the Secretary-General (2011) A/66/311 – S/2011/527, p.5, para.14-15; For example, DPKO has developed *The Contribution of United Nations Peacekeeping to Early Peacebuilding* (2011)

54 Derks & Price (2012)

55 World Bank (2011), p.200

56 *Civilian Capacity in the Aftermath of Conflict* (2011), p.27, para.57

up against obstacles regarding the options to apply its expertise in different settings. As alluded to above, the implication of staff from assessed funds working on non-mission contexts, the rapid deployment of capacity in the case of voluntary funds, and the acceptance and management of risk in either case, are issues that deserve further scrutiny and reasoned discussion.

Here, lessons could be learned from discussions on – and solutions for – ODA and non-ODA funding.<sup>57</sup> While these issues cannot be considered identical, the crux of the matter in both discussions is that specific funds on their own are too limited in scope. Rather, different lines must be available for activities and capacities that may be required for adequate functioning. Canada, the UK and The Netherlands, for example, have made clear that flexible financing instruments can address these challenges more pragmatically. They also highlight the availability of good practices, which could be emulated within the UN. What is most important is the need for funds supporting the GFP to facilitate support for various activities and agencies, as well as short-term projects and long-term programmes in conflict-affected contexts.

Currently, there is not much appetite for establishing a new or separate fund for the GFP. Such a fund could segregate the GFP on police, justice and corrections from broader work on RoL and SSR. The GFP ultimately addresses only part of the security and justice spectrum. This suggests the need to first clarify how broader SSR and RoL activities will be dealt with in conjunction with GFP activities. Hence, for now, discussions and ideas on funding are focusing on the use of existing instruments, such as the Peacebuilding Fund (PBF). All four of the GFP contributing organisations have a Memorandum of Understanding with the Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO).<sup>58</sup> Hence, they can apply to the PBF, ideally with joint proposals from the GFP. Another option, especially for this focal point, could be to look for collaboration with the World Bank. The WDR 2011's focus on security, justice and jobs portend a good match with the GFP, as the first two issues clearly align with the work of the focal point. This could, for instance, mean access to support from the State and Peace-Building Fund (SPF), which is particularly applied for scaling up international engagement in conflict-afflicted contexts and fostering strategic partnerships.<sup>59</sup> There is also the UNDP's Global Programme (Phase II). Similarly, consideration should be given to exploring UNDP's Trust Fund for Crisis Prevention and Recovery. This fund is managed by BCPR and was created for adjustable and rapid funding in response to evolving crisis contexts. However, using either the Global Programme or the Crisis Prevention and Recovery funds may also raise questions regarding which entity finally decides on the funds' distribution and for what reasons. What is more, these are voluntary funds that may be earmarked for specific activities. This option, thus, seems to suggest the need to clarify roles and to make funds a key aspect of discussions on the GFP.

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57 See Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs and OECD (2008) *Chair's Summary of Meeting on Whole-of-Government Approaches to Security System Reform*, April 2008, pp.7-8

58 Most recently DPKO, which signed a Memorandum of Understanding in late 2011 with the Multi-Partner Trust Fund Office (of UNDP), the administrator of the PBF.

59 World Bank (2011) *The State and Peace-Building Fund: addressing the unique challenges of fragility and conflict*, The World Bank, Washington D.C.  
[http://info.worldbank.org/etools/fragilityandconflict/database\\_external.asp](http://info.worldbank.org/etools/fragilityandconflict/database_external.asp)



### *Staffing the Global Focal Point*

The staff in the GFP, and staffing more generally, will be an important variable influencing its development. Fresh recruitment is expected to be limited; for the most part, incoming staff to the GFP is already fixed upon the existing staff of the contributing units and their current capacities. Bringing together staff from the UN contributing actors holds the potential to be greater than the sum of its parts. Clarity on the role and mandate of the GFP (both immediate and prospective) will be useful in assigning to staff the appropriate responsibilities and initial assignments.

In the future, staffing and recruitment efforts should be devoted to ensuring a mixture of sector expertise and thematic knowledge. It will be important to balance technical and political expertise for dealing with security and justice work, or to have change management expertise in addition to operational experience. Such combinations will, for example, be key for fielding joint assessment missions through the GFP. Staff and expertise from the different departments and agencies could thus contribute to a more nuanced and shared analysis of field contexts. This way, existing expertise in the UN system can be used more efficiently and effectively, whilst also increasing the buy-in for the GFP. Finally, there will also be a need for expertise in monitoring and evaluation, as this is a form of support commonly requested by field staff. Where gaps can be foreseen, training and capacity building for existing staff, as well as additional recruitment in the future, could help ensure that the GFP is prepared to step up to its envisioned role.

The GFP partner entities' diverse areas of knowledge, experience and skill sets will come to the fore once the agencies move into their new focal point set-up. To a large extent, it is clear that DPKO provides, for example, the primary police and prison thematic experience. UNDP, for its part, has recognised competency in police and justice, as well as organisational, programme management and administrative capacities. In turn, essential knowledge and skill is expected from OHCHR and UNODC in key areas, such as state connections to, or role in combating, organised crime and Human Rights violations. Moreover, it is fair to conclude that there is overlap of some capabilities of each partner. This will be exposed, on one level, through the overlap of each partner's expert rosters. With this in mind, open access to the expert rosters of various entities and increased mobility of staff between agencies within the GFP would concretely support greater integration. Roster management, or at least clarifying expert profiles to better facilitate searches, could thus be one of the key tasks of the new focal point.<sup>60</sup> Overall, the extent to which the actors recognise and make use of the skills and expertise of their GFP counterparts will be an important barometer of substantive collaboration. This will require a notable shift away from agencies' tendency to promote their own strengths, and toward identifying agencies' added value in collectively answering field-level needs.

Staffing arrangements will also need to anticipate mid-term and longer-term needs. This could be based on an analysis of likely trends in requests from the field during the first six to twelve months, with the consideration that requests may expand as the GFP proves its efficacy. Thus it is reasonable to suggest that the GFP would do well to express some flexibility in bringing in extra staff, or investing in training and capacity building, if and when necessary.

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<sup>60</sup> The focal point could also consider using the experiences of other rosters (such as the SSR rosters of the SSR Task Force or DPA). The UN Department of Management has been tasked with taking an inventory of existing rosters and describing options for better roster management across the UN system. A report is due in 2012.

One crucial area where the GFP may benefit from additional preparation or staff is in providing advice and assistance on “reform” or change management. This may require a different specialisation than the sector expertise readily available within the UN system, which is traditionally used for addressing pressing issues rather than gradual change and resilience to backsliding. It is also generally noted that many criminal justice advisors are not familiar with reform and change management.<sup>61</sup> In addition to skills and competencies, consideration should be given to dedicating staff with previous and positive experiences in inter-agency work. Individuals who are likely to commit to and drive forward co-operation should be seen as having added value within the GFP, particularly in its nascent stages. This, of course, will also be needed from management personnel. Lastly, in the future and in view of providing better field support, GFP advice and assistance would benefit from finding ways to incorporate personnel with recent field experience in its staff pool.

### *Incentivising co-operation*

There are sure to be “transaction costs” involved in assembling and starting up the GFP, training and recruiting staff, learning to work in a more joined-up manner, and responding effectively to field requests. Thus, there must be comparably strong incentives, at all levels, to ensure these necessary investments are made. Defining and reinforcing these incentives will be crucial for keeping momentum propelled forward.

Here donors and Member States may also play a role in providing positive encouragement for joined-up work. This would require Member States to, first, make explicit their realistic expectations for the GFP’s demonstrated success, and then to have the wherewithal to follow up and assess those results. Donors could also offer their support for joint funding approaches discussed above. At the very least, they should avoid or discontinue funding approaches that counter-productively encourage disjointed work.

At the level of senior and middle management, it is anticipated that performance reviews and managers’ compacts will take into consideration the GFP’s achievements.<sup>62</sup> As the GFP matures, evolving managerial responsibilities may need to be reflected in updated organisational arrangements and revised terms of references for senior leaders and key managers. This is a clear and concrete reason for managing actors to dedicate their energies to shoring up the initiative’s success. It is currently less clear if this motivation is expected to trickle down to working staff, or what other incentives they may be given. Evident improvement in support to the field, or a felt sense of increased efficacy among GFP staff, may bolster commitment to the new approach. These hopeful suggestions notwithstanding, it would be worthwhile for senior-level management to devote attention to developing incentives for their staff, based on demonstrated success of the GFP.

### *Demonstrating success*

This brings us to the question of how such improvements could be made evident. It is important to understand that many of the benefits of the GFP, as mentioned in the section on emerging

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61 UNODC & USIP (2011) *Criminal Justice Reform in Post-Conflict States: a guide for practitioners*, United Nations, New York, p.6 &26

62 Report of the Secretary-General (2011) A/66/311 – S2011/527, p.13, para.50



clarity, will be intangible. But there is both a need and a way to observe changes in different areas.

For pertinent indicators of joined-up approaches, observers could focus their attention on process results. For example, jointly developed country strategy frameworks, or joint analysis of the state of criminal justice institutions in a given country, would demonstrate substantive co-operation among the GFP actors. Reports such as these represent important and concrete outputs; however they should not be the primary yardstick of success. Rather, demonstrating the subsequent outcomes of GFP support to the field should be emphasised.<sup>63</sup>

Whether joint analyses go on to foment sector-wide approaches in the GFP's field assistance would be crucial for evincing the outcome of improved coordination. Should resources be made available, it would be useful to conduct surveys among field agencies both in the run-up to, and a year after the establishment of the GFP. Such surveys would need to focus on the end-users' (field personnel) perspectives regarding the consistency, coherence and applicability or relevance of advice coming from Headquarters. Similar surveys, perhaps in a three-year review, could further evaluate field impact, incidence of overlap or strategic alignment, coordination costs, and other aspects of the GFP's approach to field support.

As previously referred to, a common theory of change is both a significant indicator of strategic alignment as well as an important process result that can reinforce further joint work. For example, once a common theory of change is established, GFP actors can use it to draw up either joint or integrated proposals, confident in their contribution to a larger and broadly supported strategy. This is not to say that all activities of the GFP actors must be joint endeavours; that would disregard the comparative advantages of each. Rather, and ideally, different actors would be able to pursue their particular work with a common understanding of the wider collective goals and their unique role in achieving them. What is more, this would allow divisions of labour among agencies to be assessed based on a specific country strategy, rather than by staff availability or a generic blueprint approach.<sup>64</sup> This could be demonstrated through reviewing project proposals from different agencies to evaluate whether significant reference is made to a common strategy or the complementary activities and expertise of other agencies. The idea of coordinated resource mobilisation at the Headquarters level is possibly the most pioneering and encouraging sign of joint work. However, the success of such an endeavour would also depend, to a great extent, on donors' reaction to it.

Lastly, there is the question of demonstrating increased co-operation among field staff and agencies. While interviewees often referred to this as the crux of UN coordination, there is reason to question whether the GFP approach is a viable solution. Firstly, it is not yet clear what influence the GFP will be able to exert over field offices in encouraging ground coordination.<sup>65</sup> Secondly, the decentralised nature of field offices, and particularly those of UNDP, can have certain strategic advantages, such as their nimbleness to respond to local context dynamics. The extent to which stronger coordination from above comes at the expense of greater dexterity in

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63 See insights from DCAF & ORoLSI (2012) *Measuring the Impact of Peacekeeping Missions on Rule of Law and Security Institutions: Report of the Expert Workshop*, Permanent Mission of Switzerland to the UN, New York

64 This is furthermore supported by Report of the Secretary-General (2011) A/66/311 – S/2011/527, pp.14-15, para.55 (a-f)

65 Challenges of and deficiencies in field-HQ communication have been noted before. See Report of the Secretary-General (2006) A/61/636 – S/2006/980, p.12, para.34-36



the field should be examined closely. Nevertheless, impetus for coordination may indeed come from below, and signals of improved co-operation among field teams would be enthusiastically welcomed by most. Similar to the Headquarters' level, process results provide good indicators. Shared working documents, joint projects, or even shared staff (given reasonable workloads and dossiers) are just a few examples of demonstrated co-operation outputs. Furthermore, efforts should be made to collect evidence of broader outcomes and impacts at the field level, potentially through the use of field-level surveys.



## 6. Conclusions & Recommendations

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The Global Focal Point for police, justice and corrections represents another opportunity and a practical way forward in syncing the UN's technical, political and developmental capacities and approaches to justice and security in fragile states. Its potential contribution to supporting the field level is bold given the UN's history of attempts at joined-up working. But from the field perspective, it is also quite necessary. The concept of the GFP, at least in the form as currently proposed, therefore deserves and requires dedicated support from the UN management and agencies, as well as from Member States. Experience – be it within the UN or in the context of Member States – suggests that without the proper or sufficient monitoring, resource commitments or organisational backing, the potential of the GFP may not be realised. In this light, and given the sensitivities of the areas covered by this GFP, there is a clear need to garner stronger support from a broader contingent of UN agencies as well as from within the UN Membership. Lessons can be learned from the “friends of” approach, as was the case with SSR. It suggests that with adequate political footwork from supportive Member States as well as early and evident achievements from the GFP itself, the concept can give a new impulse to joined-up working and more practical field-oriented support. With its focus set on peacekeeping operations, special political missions and selected non-mission countries, the GFP will have the opportunity to prove its added value in a diverse range of high-profile settings. If the GFP can demonstrate success as a mechanism to facilitate co-operation of key agencies, thereby providing valuable advice, knowledge and experts to field contexts, it will have fulfilled a significant role indeed.

Such grand expectations, however, come with a number of challenges that will require swift and innovative responses. These responses will be sought primarily from the GFP's guiding management, but additional support throughout the UN system, including existing agencies and units as well as Member States and donors, must be brought to bear. One challenge will be ensuring that capacities and skills of staff within the GFP are organised and managed to match the dynamic needs and requests of the field.

### *Recommendations for Staffing:*

Capacity sought of the GFP is likely to be both broad in its scope as well as specific in its application. Thus a deliberate combination of political and technical expertise, with programme administration and design know-how, from planning to implementation to evaluation, will likely prove essential. The work involved with supporting the field should be expected to evolve in the months and years to come. There should be no doubt that the success of the GFP will be



proportional to the human resources invested. Managers will also need to accept that different types of expertise will have added value at different times and in different contexts. In particular, it would be recommendable for the GFP management to give attention to devising ways to bring field staff into the GFP. These could include, for example, staff coming off a recent reform initiative in the field who can upload their insights into the GFP. This may prove essential to ensuring that realistic perceptions of field contexts are present within the global focal point, as well as to build confidence in the kind of services to be expected from the GFP from a field perspective. Considering the GFP's focus on specific countries, the insights of host country nationals and experts would also be a strong asset.

It will be essential for the GFP management to find ways to use expertise available within the UN (in particular DPKO, UNDP, UNODC and OHCHR) in a swift and flexible way. Ways should be found to make existing rosters of experts interoperable as well as more accessible.<sup>66</sup> This would enable the collective GFP to draw effectively on the broadest possible range of essential expertise. One way to do this would be to think in terms of a staff surge capacity. This staff would have to be quickly available and would be identified for such tasks beforehand. Such cross-accessibility and transference between the agencies of the GFP will not only build synergy between actors, but could also open up new areas to assert capacities. It should be noted that successful co-operation, in this way, may lead to increased resource demands to support more comprehensive programmes. Given current practice, this could present a challenge both in terms of human and financial resources.

Finally, it is a rarely acknowledged truth that personalities and attitudes can be as influential as skills and knowledge or the speed of staffing and training. Therefore, initial staff within the GFP should see themselves as drivers of change, individuals with the enthusiasm for and the experience in building strategic and constructive partnerships across different fields and levels of expertise.

#### *Recommendations for Funding:*

To provide the quality of capacity described above, funding will need to balance risk against programme demands,<sup>67</sup> be sufficient and flexible. The current funding arrangements and regulations, to a large degree, restrain staff from bringing their knowledge to a variety of settings. Fresh approaches are needed here to ensure that the GFP's cumulative knowledge and skills are not segregated or excluded from certain contexts according to the rules of funding streams.

Member States could leverage some welcome influence here, by shifting voluntary funds into joint financing mechanisms that allow for flexibility and manage shared risk. However, the challenges of using voluntary funds for specific activities, sometimes in urgent situations without time for re-negotiation, should not be underestimated. With this in mind, Member States that are willing to provide such funds may need to assess their role in setting a good example. Besides dedicating funds directly, Member States could also weigh in on the advantages or risks of using existing funding mechanisms for the GFP.

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<sup>66</sup> This has also been recognised explicitly in Report of the Secretary-General (2001) A/66/311 – S/2011/527, p.11, para.40

<sup>67</sup> OECD (2011) *Aid Risks in Fragile and Transitional Contexts: improving donor behaviour*, OECD, Paris

The Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) stands as one option. This would best be pursued by assigning a justice and security adviser to PBSO – as has been done in the past – or seconding a PBSO adviser to the GFP. This could potentially broaden the focus of initial PBF support from infrastructure and training to also include governance, institutional transitioning, reform and change management. In this way, activities could set their sights on outcomes and impacts, rather than tallying up outputs. This would require a more advanced set of guidelines for proposals, which PBSO, incidentally, is currently developing. These guidelines could also benefit from ideas, and at a later stage experiences, of the GFP. To capitalise on this opportunity, advice from the GFP or its individual agencies could help to generate theories of change that could guide funding. It should also be noted that the UN and the World Bank are currently hosting discussions on how to strengthen co-operation between the State and Peace-Building Fund and the Peacebuilding Fund, based on the comparative advantages of each. Thus linking these two funds to support the GFP could be an innovative and timely option.

Another option under consideration is the use of UNDP funds, specifically the Global Programme on strengthening Rule of Law in conflict and post-conflict situations, or the BCPR Trust Fund for Crisis Prevention and Recovery. But pragmatic consideration should be given to a number of consequences. The affect this would have on ongoing work is not clear. The voluntary funding base of the Global Programme may not be assured to allow for the necessary flexibility. The Crisis Prevention and Recovery Fund promotes the agility of unearmarked voluntary funding to quickly respond to emerging needs.<sup>68</sup> However, this represents only a portion of its resources. Also, there would be need for realistic and honest deliberation on how such an arrangement would affect the balance of authority and co-operation among the main four GFP actors, as the funds – and final decisions on their use – would come from one agency in particular. Here lessons may be learned from previous experiences, both within the UN and in Member States.

#### *Recommendations for Joined-Up Work:*

Joined-up work will be either the ascension or the downfall of the GFP. Thus, arrangements to strengthen it should be embedded in its set-up and general strategy, and included in its protocol for monitoring and evaluation. Co-operation, moreover, should be based on a mutually agreed theory of change per context, and ideally would be extended to include Mission and Country Team representatives. A more prominent role for field actors in defining what is needed and how support can best be delivered holds great potential for making the GFP more field-oriented. If the co-operative and responsive elements of the GFP's work are not actualised, it will be hard to argue for its added value or justify its transaction costs.

Member States should encourage the GFP to demonstrate its joint approach, and where possible, apply their leverage to support strategic co-operation as opportunities arise. Voluntary donor funding could thus be dedicated to bringing in partners and evaluated, in part, by the degree to which co-operation and collaboration with others took place.<sup>69</sup> Member States, especially those providing voluntary funds, are well positioned to demand more comprehensive and relevant assistance to the field, rather than incentivising agencies to focus on promoting

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68 BCPR (2012) *Preventing Crisis Enabling Recovery: Annual Report 2011 Crisis Prevention and Recovery Thematic Trust Fund*, BCPR-UNDP, New York, p.65

69 Similar suggestions are found within Report of the Secretary-General (2012) A/66/749, p.17, para.50



their strengths. Member States are also able to lobby for the GFP to link with other relevant agencies, such as the ORoLSI SSR Unit, through organisational arrangements. Here one could think in terms of options such as proximate location, as well as programming endeavours, such as conducting joint assessments or piloting joint projects. Overall, linking up will be crucial for working against the stove-piped approaches that have undercut impact in the past.

### *Learning from Previous Lessons*

Avoiding fragmented policy and programming is entwined with one of the main lessons of previous years: to act on the linkages between various aspects of Rule of Law and Security Sector Reform. While the GFP will, at least initially, dedicate its attention primarily to criminal justice, comprehensive reform of courts, prisons and police will require much more. Should personnel in the field begin to request assistance on broader yet related endeavours, such as witness protection, border management, transitional justice or defence sector reform, the GFP will be challenged to safeguard its focus and still remain relevant to field needs.

This suggests close monitoring of the GFP as a concept and guidance on how to take it further based on its lessons. It will be important for the management of the GFP to avoid a situation or process that would lead to overloading this GFP, thereby endangering a pragmatic approach. However, stove-piped approaches or new compartmentalisation are real and present risks. If the GFP concept is going to lead to the establishment of similar approaches in other areas, this risk must be well managed. Hence, further development of the concept will require new insights on how to remain theme specific while contributing substantively to broader justice and security objectives. This could suggest a close examination of the potential role of the GFP to provide theme-specific guidance to Integrated Mission Task Forces, supporting their broader security and justice objectives.

Another lesson to reflect on is that old habits die hard. That is, the risk of agencies and field teams relapsing into old ways of working, sticking to comfortable or familiar routines and communication styles, poses a clear threat to the new approach of the GFP. To mitigate this risk, the GFP will have to establish its joint modus operandi as quickly and as collaboratively as possible. Gaining buy-in from all agencies involved, as well as reducing the bottlenecks and frustrations of the transition, will both be essential in getting the GFP off on the right foot. The issue of maintaining or increasing buy-in for the GFP will, to a large extent, depend on staff and synergies that provide the kind of improved effectiveness that is relevant for all.

### *Managing Expectations, While Demanding Performance*

It is important to keep in mind in the coming months that the GFP is not an end; it is a means. It is the platform from which solutions for joint approaches can be proposed and launched. Concerned observers, those involved from the beginning as well as newly interested parties, should be realistic about what can be achieved in the short term. However, a watchful eye and an astute monitoring system can keep the momentum moving forward and the staff focused on success. Thus, organisations and Member States supporting the initiative, as well as the wider Member State community, should make clear their expectations, and also be able to assess those results. To avoid overwhelming the GFP, interested Member States could coordinate their messages collectively and form coalitions of support to see through progress. These would ideally consist of Member States from both the North and the South, in order to ensure the

appropriate breadth of Member State support. This could also involve Member State assistance in monitoring and evaluating the GFP's performance. As important as external monitoring can be, there are also internal requirements that call for attention. In particular, it will indeed be important to keep the management of the UN involved and make the GFP's success part of the evaluation of key management layers from within DPKO and UNDP. Reporting at timely intervals, and to individuals with the authority and capacity to make necessary strategic decisions at the political level, is yet another element of the GFP's structural design that can help garner the effort and attention needed.

Lastly, it is important to bear in mind that, ultimately, the GFP will only be successful in so far as it can deliver pertinent, coherent, and timely support to the field. This will be its added value and its defining feature. Points and recommendations made throughout this paper are to be understood as means toward that end. Checking off the appropriate number and balance of staff, scheduling and holding regular meetings, and lining up flexible funding structures are all key elements. But they do not individually, nor collectively, constitute success. They are simply the cogs needed to achieve the greater goal: responding to the needs of field programmes and the people they ultimately serve.