MAY 2018

General Method
Global Security Pulse

This document presents the methodology underpinning the Global Security Pulse. The method is based on the one used for the Clingendael Radar and has been further developed in cooperation with the Hague Centre for Security (HCSS). A basic description of the methodology can be found in part 1. A codebook – detailing how to code developments – can be found in part 2.

Part 1: our method for horizon scanning

In order to keep track of new security challenges and opportunities, the Global Security Pulse is a continuous horizon-scanning capacity based on a structured manual method, combined with structured expert brainstorming to identify new developments and to validate the scanning results.[1]

What is horizon scanning?

Horizon scanning comes in many forms and can be executed for a range of topics. The Global Security Pulse is focused on identifying signals at the fringes of our thinking, as well as developments that may potentially impact Dutch or European security interests or the international order.

We use three techniques to identify truly novel developments. The first two techniques are desk-based: a manual scan of the available literature online, including a scan of recent and upcoming conferences organised by relevant (and validated) organisations, as well as a scan of important (and validated) experts' Twitter feeds. The third technique is crowd-based and involves an expert session (attended by the foresight team and internal experts from both the Clingendael Institute and the Hague Centre for Strategic Studies). The goal of this session is to validate the results and to reduce bias, although identifying new threats at the fringes or our thinking is also possible at this stage. Each technique is discussed in detail below. As a set, these techniques are used because they complement different moments in the horizon-scanning process.

The criteria to establish whether signals are 'new' are, on the one hand, whether they divert from the general trends in the field (the 'baseline') and, on the other, whether they were different from the thematic strategy that exists within the Dutch government. The impact was based on impact criteria for five security interests

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[1] This document is an abbreviated version of the Clingendael internal Horizon-Scanning Manual: De Bruijne, Héau and Meijnders. *Horizon-scanning at Clingendael: a methodology*, the Clingendael Institute (forthcoming).

(territorial, economic, societal, ecological and physical) and three criteria for the international order (conflict/cooperation, the main actors and role of the EU and the Netherlands).

Brief explanation of the three techniques

Desk-based research involved the scanning of websites, research programmes, recent publications, selected experts and conference agenda from one of the following sources. Every scan uses a different list of topic-tailored sources. This list is validated and prioritized by a group of experts. Generally five types of sources are consulted:

–   Foresight reports and organisations (e.g. Stratfor threat lens, Eurasia Group annual forecast);
–   Specialised press (e.g. The Diplomat, The Economist).
–   Specialised blogs (dependent on the topic of the scan)
–   Well-established generalist international think tanks and research centres (e.g. Chatham House, CSIS) and specialised think tanks and research centres related to one of the studied topics (e.g. Nuclear Threat Initiative, The Centre for Climate and Security);
–   International organisations working on at least one of the five studied topics (e.g. United Nations agencies, International Organisation for Migration, International Atomic Energy Agency, World Bank);

For our twitter and podcast scan we use two criteria. First we identify experts with active Twitter feeds within the organisations that are deemed to be relevant during the literature and conference scan. Second, we select other 'key experts' in the field. We carried out a simple network analysis (based on 'followers' – their number and quality, 'retweets') and made a keyword search on Twitter (e.g. 'migration', 'climate change') for active users.

The validation stage has two steps. During the first step, the results of the desk-based and the twitter scan are narrowed down from a long list into a medium list. This often involves reducing 100+ signals to roughly 15 signals. The criteria to determine the medium list are, on the one hand, those signals with the highest impact and, secondly, those that are novel (determined as underappreciated or not yet part of a generally known trend in this field). Specific criteria are in the codebook.

The medium list is then used in a meeting with a group of thematic experts. Each new threat or every new development in the international order on the medium lists results in a brief explanatory paragraph (10 lines). These paragraphs are subsequently discussed with a group of thematic experts. The goal of this (2-hour) meeting is to test the relevance of the identified threats and signals for the international order (are these really novel and potentially impactful?), to prioritize the findings, to determine additional information and, where possible, to signal new developments that were not previously identified. The prioritised list and potential updates then make their way into the final product.

Part 2: Global Security Pulse Codebook[2]

	Possibilities	Explanation
Identifier	XX_XX_XX	Unique Number (VV for Vrede en Veiligheid, 04 for month 01 for no.)
Theme	1. Vrede en Veiligheid	One of the broad themes of the Global Security Pulse (2018).
	2. Horizontale en verticale maat-schappelijke spanningen	
	3. Open	
Sub-theme	One out of the pre-selected	Sub-theme as agreed upon by HCSS and Clingendael. April: Interstate military competition.
Month-year	MM-YYYY	Month and year in which publication appeared.
Description of signal	Open	Description of a specific and concrete incident/trend that is: a) forward looking and; b) potentially of relevance to Dutch security or the international order. Provide a description of about 4 to 5 sentences. In the description explain: a) the content; b) how the incident constitutes a future development; c) how it links to the sub-theme.
Part of the Scan	Threat	Indication of which part of the scan the incident refers to. Is the incident relevant for future threats, the international order/regime or both? Please note the effects for your impact assessment.
	International Order	
	Both	
Source	Open	Author name and article title.
Link	Open	Link to the online place of reference.
Signal Type	Existing trend or factor	Incident confirms observation of pre-existing main trend (defined as overall developments within the sub-theme) or factor (defined as constitutive parts of the main trend) as defined prior to the scan. *Note to coder: please attempt to limit these.*
	New manifestation of a trend or factor	New manifestation of existing trends or factors. Novelty is defined as altering the pace of the development (both increasing or decreasing speed); new appearance of the same trend (e.g. the inclusion of strategic rather than tactical nuclear weapons in a state's nuclear posture).
	New trend or factor	Incidents that may be (weak) signals of a new and potentially emerging trend or constitutive factor.
Underappreciated	Part of strategic documents	Incident in one form or another is mentioned in the GBVS (2018) or the DefensieNota (2018) of the Dutch Government and an expert assessment if this is included in other government documentation.
	Not part of strategic documents	The incident neither figures in strategic documents nor in policy discourse.
Opportunities	Open	Incident provides opportunities for the Dutch government either in terms of addressing security threats or improving the international order (defined as fostering cooperation). Description of a few sentences in length (where applicable).

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2   Developed by Kars de Bruijne, Minke Meijnders, Karlijn Jans and Tim Sweijs.

	Possibilities	Explanation
Threat impact 1 – Territorial Security (Infringement of territory or essential information infra-structures)	None (DEFAULT)	The effect of the worst-case vignette due to the incident in the coming 1 to 10 years is that Dutch territorial integrity (or that of its allies) and essential digital information systems (i.e. critical cyber infrastructure) will not be infringed.
	Low	The effect of the worst-case vignette due to the incident in the coming 1 to 10 years is that the Netherlands or its allies (defined as both EU and NATO members) will be threatened with an attack or a (terrorist) incident, or that some vital digital information systems will be infringed for a number of days.
	Medium	The effect of the worst-case vignette due to the incident in the coming 0.1 to 10 years is that the territories of Dutch allies (defined as both EU and NATO members) will experience an attack or a (terrorist) incident, or that multiple vital digital information systems of allies will be infringed for multiple weeks.
	High	The effect of the worst-case vignette due to the incident in the coming 1 to 10 years is that the Netherlands will experience an attack or a (terrorist) incident, or that multiple vital digital information systems will be infringed for multiple weeks.
Threat impact 2 – Physical Security (Health and well-being of people. Criteria are the number of deaths and those injured)	None (DEFAULT)	The effect of the worst-case vignette due to the incident in the coming 1 to 10 years is such that there will we be no deaths, seriously injured or chronical illnesses.
	Low	The effect of the worst-case vignette due to the incident in the coming 1 to 10 years is such that there will be, in at least one EU member state, deaths, seriously injured or chronical illnesses in the range of 10-1000 due to the incident.
	Medium	The effect of the worst-case vignette due to the incident in the coming 1 to 10 years is such that in the Netherlands there will be deaths, seriously injured or chronical illnesses in the range of 10-1000 due to the incident.
	High	The effect of the worst-case vignette due to the incident in the coming 1 to 10 years is such that in the Netherlands there will be deaths, seriously injured or chronical illnesses in the range of 1000-10000 due to the incident.
Threat impact 3 – Economic Security (Economic harm to the Dutch economy).	None (DEFAULT)	The effect of the worst-case vignette due to the incident in the coming 1 to 10 years is such that there will be no or very little economic harm to or infringements on the vitality of the Dutch economy.
	Low	The effect of the worst-case vignette due to the incident in the coming 1 to 10 years is such that one EU member state will experience significant economic harm (0.5 to 1% BNP), unemployment (10-25% rise in unemployment vis-à-vis 2017) or an increase in debt (3%).
	Medium	The effect of the worst-case vignette due to the incident in the coming 1 to 10 years is such that the Netherlands will experience significant economic harm (0.5 to 1% BNP), unemployment (10-25% rise in unemployment vis-à-vis 2017) or an increase in debt (2-3%).
	High	The effect of the worst-case vignette due to the incident in the coming 1 to 10 years is such that the Netherlands will experience significant economic harm (>1% BNP), unemployment (>25% rise in unemployment vis-à-vis 2017) or an increase in debt (>3%).

	Possibilities	Explanation
Threat impact 4 – Environmental Security (Damage to nature, the environment and the ecosystem)	None (DEFAULT)	The effect of the worst-case vignette due to the incident in the coming 1 to 10 years is such that there will be no damage to the environment or ecosystems.
	Low	The effect of the worst-case vignette due to the incident in the coming 1 to 10 years is such that in some European Member States there will be damage leading to a loss of 3 to 10% of the surface area.
	Medium	The effect of the worst-case vignette due to the incident in the coming 1 to 10 years is such that in the Netherlands there will be damage leading to a loss of 3 to 10% of the surface area.
	High	The effect of the worst-case vignette due to the incident in the coming 1 to 10 years is such that in the Netherlands there will be damage leading to a loss of more than 10% of the surface area.
Threat impact 5 – Societal Security (Violation of the democratic rule of law and core principles of society or large-scale social unrest)	None (DEFAULT)	The effect of the worst-case vignette due to the incident in the coming 1 to 10 years is such that there will be no or a very small impact on societal security.
	Low	The effect of the worst-case vignette due to the incident in the coming 1 to 10 years is such that in one or more European Member States there will be a significant infringement of democratic institutions and the rule of law (at least one from governance, the judiciary, representation, public order or vital values) or widespread societal fear, anger or resentment against other societal groups or companies.
	Medium	The effect of the worst-case vignette due to the incident in the coming 1 to 10 years is such that in the Netherlands there will be a significant infringement of democratic institutions and the rule of law (at least one from governance, the judiciary, representation, public order or vital values) or widespread societal fear, anger or resentment against other societal groups or companies.
	High	The effect of the worst-case vignette due to the incident in the coming 1 to 10 years is such that in the Netherlands there will be a significant infringement of democratic institutions and the rule of law (various among governance, the judiciary, representation, public order or vital values) and/or widespread societal actions (intimidation, violent incidents, formation of violent groups) against other societal groups or companies.
Order Impact 1 – Regime Formation	1	Incident is evidence of the non-existence of cooperation and actors' perception of the zero-sum character of international interactions in the regime. Specify regime.
	2	Incident is evidence of the disagreement over fundamental norms (defined as both positive and negative as to how actors ought to behave) in the regime. Specify regime.
	3	Incident is evidence of the disagreement over fundamental rules (standing procedures) in the regime. Specify regime.
	4	Incident is evidence of attempts to change and alter the norms and rules due to disagreement therewith or an example of non-compliance with existing norms or rules.
	5	Incident is evidence that actors generally agree with both norms and rules in the regime even though there are incidental non-compliance issues.
	6	Incident is evidence that actors agree with norms and rules, attempts to improve compliance or to set up new institutional structures to enable an improvement in interaction among regime participants ('positive sum').

	Possibilities	Explanation
Order Impact 2 – Actor Participation	Great Powers	Incident signals that important decisions and agenda-setting behaviour are driven by the great powers.
	States	Incident signals that important decisions and agenda-setting behaviour are driven by nation states.
	Hybrid (states dominate)	Incident signals that important decisions and agenda-setting behaviour are driven by both non-state actors and nation states but that states dominate.
	Hybrid (balanced)	Incident signals that important decisions and agenda-setting behaviour are driven by both non-state actors and nation states.
	Non-state actors	Incident signals that important decisions and agenda-setting behaviour are driven by non-state actors.
Order Impact 3 – Dutch Influence	positive	The (best-case) effect of the incident/observation is that either the ability of Dutch strategic partners to act is improved or that the ability of the Netherlands itself is significantly improved to produce "intended and foreseen effects on others" in the coming 1 to 10 years.
	None (DEFAULT)	There is no effect on the Dutch influence in the next 0.1 to 10 years.
	negative	The (worst-case) effect of the incident/observation is that the ability of the Dutch capacity to produce "intended and foreseen effects on others" will decrease in the coming 1 to 10 years.
Probability of worst-case impact assessment	1. Very Probable (75%)	Expresses the probability that the worst-case impact assessment will manifest itself in the coming 1 to 10 year. *Please consider not only the qualitative description but also the quantitative likelihood.*
	2. Probable (37.5%)	
	3. Mildly probable (5%)	
	4. Unlikely (1%)	
	5. Very unlikely (0.1%)	
Risk Appraisal	Open	Justify your impact assessment (on a general level). Justify at least the highest scoring category or noteworthy scores. Explain the chain of thought from the worst case to the potential impact.
Date	DD-MM-YYYY	Indicate the date on which the scan took place.

About the author

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