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Incoherent Agendas

Do European Union migration policies threaten regional integration in West Africa?

Introduction¹

European Union (EU) policies towards Africa have in the past years experienced a shift away from forging relations based on trade and development, to cooperation based on and measured by the successes of joint migration management. This shift has been producing often controversial outcomes for the EU, African countries and migrants themselves. Just under four years since the pivotal Valetta Summit on migration,² the evidence base of these policies' poor human rights record is growing, as is the evidence base on their localised adverse economic and societal impact.³

The impact of EU policies on the regional integration processes in Africa – once a pillar of the EU's Africa strategy – has, however, not yet been sufficiently documented. But the emerging evidence and policy analysis strongly suggest that the EU policies in West Africa have the power to create incentives and even localised policy outcomes that could in the medium term challenge

ECOWAS

The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) is one of the most advanced expressions of regionalism in Africa, particularly regarding the free movement of people. Established in 1975, ECOWAS has adopted a Protocol on the Free Movement of Persons, the Right of Residence and Establishment since 1979. ECOWAS citizens are entitled to visa-free entry in other member countries. An ECOWAS passport was devised in 2000, too. Today, visa-free entry and free circulation in Western African states are consolidated realities, reflecting a long tradition of seasonal and circular migration in the region.

Source: http://documentation.ecowas.int/download/en/legal_documents/protocols/PROTOCOL%20RELATING%20TO%20%20FREE%20MOVEMENT%20OF%20PERSONS.pdf

ECOWAS commitments to freedom of movement, and in that way also likely slow down the processes of regional economic and political integration.

Paradoxically, the EU policies aimed at curbing migration may thus also end up slowing down the development processes in West Africa that the EU perceives as

- 1 The author would like to thank Luca Barana of Istituto Affari Internazionali in Italy and Camille Le Coz of Migration Policy Institute's Europe office in Brussels for generously sharing their thoughts and contributing to the development of ideas presented in this brief.
- 2 For more on the summit, see the official page: <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/meetings/international-summit/2015/11/11-12/>
- 3 Examples will be given in detail further in the brief.

one of the key approaches to tackling the root causes of migration.⁴ It may also lead to a weakening of the existing economic coping mechanisms within these countries, and thereby potentially also to increased migratory pressures.

This policy brief looks at the emerging patchwork of evidence around the impact of EU migration policies on regional integration in West Africa, with a view to offering initial advice to policy-makers on how to prevent the outcomes that could slow down the economic development of the countries of West Africa, further weaken the EU's human rights record abroad and undermine the long-term goal of sustainably managing migratory pressures on the continent.

Paradigm Shift: from Cotonou to Valetta

For a period of over two decades, the relations between the EU and the countries of West Africa have been based on economic development, trade, and peace and security as the main pillars of cooperation. The main formal basis for this cooperation was the Cotonou Agreement between the countries of the European Union and the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States (ACP countries), first signed in 2000 and then updated in 2005 and 2010.⁵

The Cotonou agreement both recognised and encouraged the ongoing regional integration in West Africa and the ongoing cross-border economic ties in the region. The seminal 2017 OECD report on cross-border cooperation and policies in West Africa describes the extent of this integration – and also dwells on the nature and specifics of cross-border economic dependencies between local populations. Such economic dependencies include lively cross-border trade, seasonal migration and even a physical and governance infrastructure that supports cross-border economic activities. The report notes especially high cooperation and future potential for even more cross-border-driven economic development in the Sahel area.⁶

Intra-ECOWAS migration is an important element of these cross-border economic patterns, with some countries – specifically Senegal and Nigeria – standing out for their attractiveness as a destination for seasonal labour and a source of remittances for poorer West African countries, such as Cote d'Ivoire or the Gambia. In other countries, such as Mali or Niger, the economic model of many cattle-herding or cross-border trading communities is based on their mobility and low transactional costs of moving across the national borders.⁷

The updated 2010 agreement further strengthened the focus on economic development, specifically towards encouraging regional integration and improving trade conditions. The Cotonou Agreement shifted the dialogue between the ACP countries and the EU towards reciprocal trade relations and introduced the policy of

4 The relation between human mobility and development is currently a hotly debated policy issue – with recent research by for instance the Centre for Global Development questioning the linearity of this relation, (see: Clemens, M, Postel, H. 2018, Deterring Emigration with Foreign Aid: An Overview of Evidence from Low-Income Countries, available at: <https://www.cgdev.org/sites/default/files/deterring-emigration-foreign-aid-overview-evidence-low-income-countries.pdf>). Regardless of the outcomes of this debate, the EU has defined addressing the root causes of irregular migration as its priority at the Valetta Summit, and based a lot of its recent policies on the assumed causality between lack of development and irregular migration.

5 See: https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/cotonou-agreement-consolidated-version_en

6 The report specifically stresses the eastern tip of the Gambia, the border between Senegal and Guinea, borders of Cote d'Ivoire and Burkina Faso, Koury region of Mali, the eastern part of Niger/ Nigeria border.

7 For a granulated description of these patterns, see: Söderbaum, F. Taylor, I. Ed., 2007, *Micro-Regionalism in West Africa Evidence from Two Case Studies*, Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, Sweden, available at: <http://nai.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:240826/FULLTEXT01.pdf>

performance-based funding.⁸ At the same time, it recognized the importance of trade relationships between and inside specific regions within the ACP countries,⁹ including ECOWAS, and built a legal structure to support the mutually beneficial trade relations inside and between these regions.¹⁰

In the case of ECOWAS, the specifics of trade relations were worked out in the Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) between the EU and ECOWAS, striving to regulate the relations between ECOWAS countries and the EU as well as to support regional integration by obliging the ECOWAS countries to give each other the same trade benefits as they would give to the EU. The agreement, however, hasn't been ratified by all ECOWAS countries: Nigeria has thus far blocked the ratification of the regional EPA, driven by fears of weakening the manufacturing sector as a result of lowering the import tariffs on EU goods, and citing equity and industrialisation concerns as key motivations for not signing the agreement. Only two ECOWAS countries – Ghana and Cote d'Ivoire – have thus far signed modified bilateral "individual" versions of EPAs.¹¹

And while trade relations remained a point of often laborious negotiations and subject to temporary solutions, the development aid – allocated to ACP countries in five-year cycles under the Financial Protocol of the Cotonou Agreement – has been regularly released, based broadly speaking on the needs of the recipient countries, albeit with conditions, including those related to good governance. The key funding instrument was the EUR 22 billion-large European Development Fund (EDF), which has recently allocated the last funding under the final 5-year cycle, projected to end in 2020.

While there has been much criticism levelled at the Cotonou agreement and the EPAs, both among EU officials and the West African countries,¹² there was also recognition that the logic of this agreement was based on a negotiated understanding of common interests – and the West African countries' own understanding of their economic development priorities.

The 2015 Mediterranean crisis and its fallout in the national politics of the EU countries seem to have significantly affected this basis. From the Valetta Summit onwards, the relationship has been increasingly framed around what is perceived as an EU political priority: managing and cutting down migration flows from West Africa. The fifth paragraph of the summit's Political Declaration embodies this new openly asymmetric spirit, by stating that the signatories recognise "the high degree of interdependence" between Africa and Europe as they face "common challenges that have an impact on migration".¹³ The wording here is careful and precise – challenges that "have an impact on migration" may be common, but the migration itself has not been identified as a common problem. In fact, for many West African countries, migration is a precious

8 For a comprehensive analysis and examples of the early evolution, intents and instruments of the Cotonou Agreement, including performance-based funding, see Holden, P. 2009, *In Search of Structural Power: EU Aid Policy as a Global Political Instrument*, Routledge Press

9 The ACP countries are divided into African, Caribbean, Pacific, North Atlantic and South Atlantic regions, and within Africa region, ACP countries negotiate with the EU in five Economic Partnership Agreements groups: West Africa (coinciding with ECOWAS), The Economic Community of Central African States (CEMAC), Southern Africa Development Community, East African Community, Eastern, and Southern Africa.

10 See Holden (2009)

11 For a detailed overview of the reasons behind the slow implementation of the EPA, see: Czermińska, M. Garlińska-Bielawska, J. (2017), *European Union-West Africa Trade Relations: With or Without Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA)*, *Annals of the Administration and Law* no. 17 (2), p. 103-120, Humanitas University, Poland

12 *Ibid.*

13 See: Valetta Summit, 11-12 November 2015 - Political Declaration, available at: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/21841/political_decl_en.pdf

economic and demographic safety valve and an important stable source of state income.¹⁴

Following the Valetta Summit, this new paradigm has been operationalized through the Migration Partnership Framework,¹⁵ which reframes the priorities identified in previous agreements around the single goal of migration management. Issues such as political, social and economic development of the partner countries become redefined as means of “addressing the root causes of irregular migration and forced displacement” rather than goals in their own right.

In the words of the European External Action Service (EEAS), the new approach also “establishes a results-oriented approach to mobilise and focus all EU and Member States’ tools and resources for that purpose”. One of the immediately available key resources were the reserves of the EDF, which have since 2016 been redirected towards the new funding instrument, the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa. The total initial transfer was EUR 3,8 billion¹⁶ or almost 90% of the EUTF’s total budget. The total transfer has now reached EUR 4,1 billion.¹⁷

And while the current EUTF’s funding cycle ends at the same time as the EDF’s funding cycle (i.e. in 2020), the failure to sign an EPA and the instruments and policies put in place since 2016 point at the migration-focused policy paradigm as the one most likely ones to dominate future EU policy-making towards West Africa. The follow-up negotiations with the ACP countries started in June 2018, with the EU announcing its goal to build a “*modern and dynamic partnership*” with the countries in the region and create “*a powerful tool to jointly tackle global challenges*”.¹⁸ With the Cotonou agreement significantly weakened as a relational paradigm, any such future policy framework on cooperation with the West African states is likely to be heavily influenced by or even built around the political conclusions of the Valetta Summit.¹⁹

The Unintended: Consequences of the new EU policies on regional dynamics in ECOWAS

The paradigm shift described above has already produced a number of unintended consequences in relation to the individual ECOWAS member states, ECOWAS as a project as well as EU/ECOWAS dynamics. These consequences can be grouped into three broad categories;

- Localised negative outcomes in specific countries and regions
- Creation of potentially negative policy incentives undermining regional integration in West Africa
- Loss of EU policy coherence

14 The literature on this topic is vast, but one of the most thorough recent overviews of the role of remittances in African economies can be found at: Mohapatra, S. Ratha, D. (2018) *Migrant Remittances in Africa: An Overview*, World Bank, available at: <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTDECPROSPECTS/Resources/476882-1157133580628/RemittanceMarketsInAfricaOverview.pdf>; for a recent treatment of the issue of migration as a safety valve, see: Kihato, C. (2018). *The ‘Containment Compact’: The EU Migration Crisis and African Complicity in Migration Management*, South African Institute of International Affairs

15 EU Factsheet on Migration Partnership Framework available at: https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/factsheet_ec_format_migration_partnership_framework_update_2.pdf

16 See: https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/factsheet_ec_format_migration_partnership_framework_update_2.pdf

17 See: https://ec.europa.eu/trustfundforafrica/sites/eueta/files/eu_emergency_trust_fund_for_africa_20-12-2018.pdf

18 See: https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/news-and-events/european-commission-ready-start-negotiations-new-ambitious-partnership-79-countries_en

19 Interviews with EU officials, Brussels, February 2019

1. Localised negative outcomes

While large-scale statistical data may still be lacking, there is a growing patchwork of evidence pointing at the series of localised negative outcomes that the EU migration management policies have had on local livelihoods in some countries of West Africa.

The research is still nascent, and much of it comes from the Clingendael Institute's own portfolio. Specifically, most of the field-based evidence comes from Niger, which has been the focus of EU migration management interventions in the Sahel, and the most cooperative of all ECOWAS countries. In the years following the implementation of the law criminalising human smugglers facilitating the migrant flow from the smuggling industry's hub of Agadez towards Libya and Algeria, the economic impact has been felt across the city's many communities. The migration industry, once counting 6000 people and bringing income to more than half of the Agadez households, providing work for numerous transport services and supporting local industries, has quickly dried out, without viable alternatives or replacements.²⁰ EU-supported migration policies have also pitted local authorities in Agadez against their populations – coordinated and implemented with authorities in Niger's capital, Niamey, rather than the region itself, they are being perceived as “serving the EU's interest”, not the population's.²¹

While the EUTF has committed around EUR 100 million to various livelihood projects in Niger²² – all of them including Agadez

– the impact of these projects has not yet been recognised in the mainstream political and economic discourse. There are many potential reasons for this – the impact of the projects may still need to be felt, or the projects have only limited impact. Another potential reason has to do with incentives – the local government may have a vested interest in maintaining the narrative of insufficient aid in order to maximize its access to various new funding streams.²³ All of these are indicative of the challenges to come, and the risks of using migration management as the main frame for discussing development.

Similar challenges arise for the governance structures in other ECOWAS countries, for instance Senegal, where cooperation with the EU on some aspects of migration management, such as returns, due to the importance of diaspora and remittances in the country's development model, would be a risky and potentially delegitimizing move for any of the countries' governments.²⁴

Equally importantly, the migration partnership agreements have created incentives and a political climate that is conducive to large-scale human rights violations across the ECOWAS countries and in their North African neighbours. North African countries that have signed their own partnership agreements with the EU and taken on the commitment to prevent irregular migration towards Europe, have increasingly started deporting sub-Saharan migrants, irregular as well as those with legal right to stay. While the levels of migrant abuse in Libya are common knowledge by now, less well publicised are the deportations

20 Molenaar F. et al (2018) A Line in the Sand Roadmap for sustainable migration management in Agadez, available at: https://www.clingendael.org/sites/default/files/2017-10/Roadmap_for_sustainable_migration_management_Agadez.pdf

21 Molenaar, F. (2017) Roadmap for sustainable migration management in the Sahel: lessons from Agadez, available at: https://www.kpsrl.org/sites/default/files/2018-08/PB_Roadmap_for_sustainable_migration_management.pdf

22 Information on funding available at the EUTF official website: https://ec.europa.eu/trustfundforafrica/region/sahel-lake-chad/niger/agadez_en

23 For a more detailed discussion on the funding and the impact, see Molenaar, F., Tubiana, J., Warin, C. 2018. Caught in the Middle: A human rights and peace-building approach to migration governance in the Sahel, Clingendael Institute

24 Uzelac, A. (2018) Their country's global citizens: Political and economic agency of Senegalese diaspora, available at: <https://spectator.clingendael.org/pub/2018/4/the-diaspora-influence/>

from Morocco²⁵ and particularly abusive deportations from Algeria that took place in the course of 2018, with thousands of West African migrants being forcibly returned in conditions that regularly caused unjustified suffering and even death.²⁶ Other than further degrading the overall human rights standards across the region, this behavior also has the potential to undermine the coping strategies of many vulnerable communities within ECOWAS, which looked to intra-African migration as a source of remittances.

The human rights impact was also felt in countries such as Niger or Mali, both heavily affected by European migration policies, and both members of ECOWAS that host important regional cross-border migration corridors.²⁷ The EU policy of strengthening the border controls of individual ECOWAS states has heavily impacted the intra-African seasonal or circular migration across these borders, in contravention of the ECOWAS Protocol on free movement, often also fueling abuse and extortions by border guards, specifically aimed at vulnerable participants of cross-border economies.²⁸

2. Creation of potentially negative incentives

Many of the localized outcomes described above are indicative of the negative incentives being created by the new EU policy focus on ECOWAS countries. With

a lot of immediate benefits stemming from complying with the EU migration management policy designs, some of the West African countries have found themselves in a position where implementing the ECOWAS policies on the freedom of movement may result in forgoing some of the potential economic benefits offered by a parallel EU instrument. That said, the size of the EUTF has so far not been comparable to the EDF budget, so the real challenges lie ahead, as the EU decides on the size and incentives behind its future policy instruments past the 2020 mark.

But the case of EDF does offer a valuable lesson in terms of mechanisms for incentive creation: part of the reasons why – despite the insistence of the EU – the EPAs have not yet been signed and ratified, lies also in their unclear added value when compared to development aid being channeled through EDF, bilateral agreements, and other available financial instruments.²⁹ In a similar way, economic incentives could be inadvertently created that would generate long-term preference for border strengthening and further undermine the efforts towards regional integration – and these would be much along the lines of some of the flagship EUTF “regional” projects currently being implemented, which a focus on border strengthening and security.³⁰

Freedom of movement is not a silver-bullet solution for ECOWAS’ economic woes – with ongoing trade tariffs between the countries, poor infrastructure, a low level of industrialisation and considerable wealth differences inside and between individual ECOWAS countries, the region is struggling with a myriad of issues that pose major structural challenges to development.

25 Alami. A. 2018, *Morocco Unleashes a Harsh Crackdown on Sub-Saharan Migrants*, *New York Times*, available at: <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/22/world/africa/morocco-crackdown-sub-saharan-migrants-spain.html>

26 HRW (2018) *Algeria: Inhumane Treatment of Migrants*, available at: <https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/06/28/algeria-inhumane-treatment-migrants>; also, CRU’s own field research, north of Mali, October–November 2018

27 See Söderbaum and Taylor, 2007

28 Bergmann, J. Lehmann, J. Munsch T., Powell, W. (2018) *Protection Fallout: How Increasing Capacity for Border Management Affects Migrants’ Vulnerabilities in Niger and Mali*

29 Czermi ska, M. Garli ska-Bielawska, J. (2017), *European Union–West Africa Trade Relations: With or Without Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA)*, *Annals of the Administration and Law* no. 17 (2), p. 103–120, Humanitas University, Poland

30 For an overview of EUTF regional projects, see: <https://ec.europa.eu/trustfundforafrica/region/sahel-lake-chad/regional>

But the open borders and cross-border trade, as well as internal migration, have always been important elements of ECOWAS' economic functioning and the West African political identity – and have often served as important economic coping mechanisms for many of its communities. Creating further incentives for perpetuating this kind of behavior may lead to these communities seeking out more permanent coping mechanisms beyond their own borders, including overseas migration – effectively undermining the EU original intent behind these policies.

3. EU Policy Coherence

Policy coherence is an EU principle enshrined in some of its most important policy documents, including the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.³¹ It was defined and listed as a guiding principle in the European Consensus on Development, which has committed the EU to strengthening “policy coherence for development (PCD) procedures, instruments and mechanisms at all levels,” and securing adequate resources to see this policy objective through. The importance of PCD was also confirmed in the new European Consensus on Development, adopted in 2017, as a “fundamental part of the EU’s contribution to achieving the SDGs.”³² The Consensus again committed the EU and its Member States to “apply the principle PCD,” and to “take into account the objectives of development cooperation in all external and internal policies which they implement and which are likely to affect developing countries.”

Coherence was also envisaged as the key tool for successfully deploying the EU’s “soft

power” – achieving the desired impact of its external policies by means of converging the EU and the bilateral aid of individual member states around the same policy goals.

Regional integration in Africa has long been identified as one of these strategic goals, shared by both the EU and African states, with a special mention in the Cotonou Agreement. The EU has reiterated its commitment to regionalism as a development strategy also in its agenda with the African Union.³³ More importantly, African countries themselves have long endorsed regional integration as a development strategy – albeit it with significant hurdles along the way and inconsistent commitments by individual member states. Within ECOWAS, trade integration has been particularly difficult to implement, and the implementation of the free movement commitment has also faced its fair share of challenges.³⁴

African states and European donors have in the past decades been moving in the general direction of improved regional integration. This, however, may no longer be the case – especially not from the EU side, where regional integration discourse and the development-based paradigm have given way to discourse and policies centred around migration management, especially in the ECOWAS' Sahel area.

A good example of this loss of coherence is the largest “regional” project in the Sahel area implemented with EUTF funds, which aims at the stabilization of target countries through “more effective control of borders”.³⁵ At the same time, under the 10th EDF, the EU has financed a large-scale ILO-led

31 Lisbon Treaty, Article 208, para 1: “Union policy in the field of development cooperation shall be conducted within the framework of the principles and objectives of the Union’s external action. The Union’s development cooperation policy and that of the Member States complement and reinforce each other.”

32 Sustainable Development Goals (<https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/?menu=1300>)

33 See: https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/57879/federica-mogherini-african-union-summit-holds-bilateral-meetings-addis-ababa-ethiopia_en

34 For a very detailed recent analysis of these challenges, see Okundae, K., Ogunnubi, O. (2018) A “Schengen” Agreement in Africa? African Agency and the ECOWAS Protocol on Free Movement, A “Schengen” Agreement in Africa? African Agency and the ECOWAS Protocol on Free Movement, Journal of Borderlands Studies

35 <https://ec.europa.eu/trustfundforafrica/node/30>

consortium with a specific goal to “maximize the development potential of free movement of persons and migration in West Africa”, specifically by supporting the effective implementation of the ECOWAS Free Movement of Persons’ Protocols.³⁶

Such a breach in policy coherence has the potential to – already in the short term – undermine the effectiveness of the policies and interventions in the Sahel and eventually fail to deliver both on development and on migration management.

Conclusions

While EU officials may privately recognize the internally contradictory character of the Union’s recent interventions in West Africa, the EU’s migration management agenda appears to trump more nuanced considerations of its localized or longer-term impacts.

This could, in turn, lead to a weakening of the overall regional integration project – which seems to be losing priority in the EU’s eyes. Paradoxically the EU policies aimed at curbing migration may slow down the development processes that the EU perceives as one of the root causes of migration (whether this is true or not). It may also lead to a weakening of economic coping mechanisms within these countries, leading to increased potential migratory pressures.

Therefore, a regional framework for human mobility in Africa is needed that would allow for the development of sustainable European migration management policies across the region. Such policies would serve not just the EU’s but also the region’s needs and be attuned to its patterns of mobility and economic coping mechanisms. These policies should also be conflict-sensitive and based on a thorough understanding of their short/mid/long-term consequences on the full range of political and economic

issues of importance to the region – from affecting livelihood patterns to human rights fallout to possible long-term macroeconomic consequences. For this reason, it is important to also maintain and strengthen the existing monitoring mechanisms across West Africa and to encourage an informed policy debate, both in the EU and in ECOWAS, on issues of such pivotal importance to both regions.

Some EUTF projects do try to retain a degree of coherence with more traditional development cooperation approaches. But as already discussed, the mere existence of regional initiatives on migration does not mean that the free movement of people is safeguarded. Projects financed by the EUTF can have cross-border objectives, but for the most part, they are deeply rooted in the security-driven approach privileged by the current EU political debate.

In order to avoid distortions in policy incentives for African countries and, at the same time, preserve real policy coherence for development, the EU should integrate its current drive towards the reduction of migratory flows with transnational agreements already on the ground. One solution could be to provide decisive support for the ECOWAS Common Approach on Migration, adopted in 2008. Its declared objective is to establish a link between migration and development, ostensibly the same purpose of EU’s policies, at least on paper.

What is also essential, is to ensure that mobility is addressed in the coming negotiations for the post-Cotonou Agreement framework in ways that serve both the EU and the ECOWAS countries, taking into consideration the wider African push towards increasing freedom of movement across the continent.³⁷ This would preferably

36 See: https://www.ilo.org/global/topics/labour-migration/projects/WCMS_350339/lang--en/index.htm

37 The African Union is currently in the process of ratifying the African Continental Free Trade Area agreement, whose main objectives also include a “single continental market for goods and services, with free movement of business persons and investments.” (See: <https://au.int/en/ti/cfta/about>) This ratification process is, at least in theory, supported by the EU.

mean looking beyond anxieties about the management of migration flows towards Europe and addressing and facilitating development opportunities deriving from intraregional mobility. The risk is that a short-term political contradiction would continue to block efforts to establish concrete European policies that support regional integration and mobility, and inadvertently also undermine the EU's migration policies goal.

In these future negotiations, it is good to bear in mind that economic development and good governance are goods in their own right – with multiple beneficial consequences for the people in Africa and beyond that

no one can easily predict. Migration management is a tactical EU policy goal that – due to a series of unfortunate events – has grown out to become a new paradigm replacing a decades-long development one. Therefore, the advice is not simply about returning to policy coherence, but also about revisiting the prioritisation of these two policy goals, both strategically and situationally. Ideally, cooperation with ECOWAS should be based on a positive proposition of creating a region characterised by good governance and free movement of people, goods and service – responding not just to the EU's needs, but also to West Africa's own tradition and understanding of intraregional mobility.

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