From abuse to cohabitation: A way forward for positive migration governance in Libya

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ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

**DCIM** Department for the Combat of Illegal Migration  
**EU** European Union  
**EUDEL** Delegation of the European Union to Libya  
**EUTF** EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa  
**GDP** gross domestic product  
**GNA** Government of National Accord  
**INGO** international NGO  
**IOM** International Organization for Migration  
**LNA** Libyan National Army  
**LYD** Libyan dinar  
**MoFA** Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation  
**MoL** Ministry of Labour  
**MoLG** Ministry of Local Government  
**MSF** Médecins Sans Frontières  
**MTEI** Ministry of Trade, Economy and Industry  
**NGO** non-governmental organization  
**SLEIDSE** Support to Libya for Economic Integration, Diversification and Sustainable Development  
**UNDP** United Nations Development Programme  
**UNHCR** United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees  
**WHO** World Health Organization
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This report could not have been put together without the help of a number of people who graciously shared their time, expertise and networks.

The report is part of the research project 'Monitoring the Political Economy of Human Smuggling in Libya and the Greater Sahara’, which is funded under the North of Africa window of the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF). Thanks to the stakeholders at the European Commission for their facilitation, advice and support.

The authors are also grateful to Clingendael colleagues Fransje Molenaar, Al-Hamzeh al-Shadeedi, Mariska van Beijnum, Christopher Abinader and Jalel Harchaoui for their indispensable analytical input and research assistance. In addition, we would like to acknowledge the outstanding research assistance provided by Yasmin Abulkher (of the Netherlands Association for International Affairs), Tihomir Sabchev (Utrecht University) and Eleni Diker (Maastricht University) provided their expert input of best practices in migration governance. Research that examines Libyan local-governance dynamics cannot be carried out without access to Libyan municipalities and without capturing local perspectives and ideas. We owe a debt of gratitude to the group of Libyan researchers who conducted numerous interviews in Ghat, Bani Walid and Zawiya, often in very challenging circumstances. The researchers will remain anonymous for reasons of security – but your contribution is greatly appreciated. We also thank Mark Micallef (Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime) for kindly extending his field network in Libya to us.

Lastly, the report benefited from peer reviews by Timothy Eaton (Chatham House) and Arezo Malakooti (Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime). A third reviewer who asked not to be disclosed also provided excellent feedback. The authors emphasize that the contents of this report, and any errors or omissions, are the sole responsibility of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the European Union.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Libya has historically been a migrant-receiving country, and migrants form a significant portion of the Libyan workforce. Since the fall of Qaddafi in 2011, however, the situation facing migrants in Libya has deteriorated. Powerful human-smuggling networks have emerged that have taken the exploitation of migrants to gruelling new levels. In response to pressure from the European Union and individual European states to contain migration across the Mediterranean, Libyan armed actors are increasingly turning to migrant detention as their main business model. The situation for migrants in Libya continues to deteriorate and the abuses they suffer are rampant.

This study therefore investigates what can be done at the local level to promote positive migration governance in Libya. This research question is driven by humanitarian, economic and normative concerns. From a humanitarian point of view, the scale of abuse that migrants face in Libya today requires an urgent international response. From an economic point of view, migrants have historically contributed substantially to the Libyan economy and attempts to improve their position would be likely to result in economic gains for migrant and host communities alike. And from a normative point of view, the international community has a moral obligation to address the negative human-rights consequences of its migration policies.

To comprehensively assess what could be done to promote positive migration governance in Libya, this study analyzes migration management in the municipalities of Ghat, Bani Walid and Zawiya. These municipalities are selected as case studies because they are representative of the different types of communities that migrants may encounter in Libya as a whole. The border town of Ghat, in the south-west of Libya, is a transit town that has strong ties to ethnic communities across the border. Bani Walid is a transit town in the central north of the country that is notorious as a place where migrants held in detention ‘warehouses’ receive brutal abuse. And Zawiya is a coastal embarkation and disembarkation point in the north-west of the country. It is home to a formal (Department for the Combat of Illegal Migration – DCIM) detention facility, which is effectively controlled by the local Nasr Brigade. In all three localities, the study seeks to identify formal migration governance efforts, community efforts to improve the situation for migrants, as well as the role that migrants play in local economies.

The study finds no evidence of formal migration governance efforts – either at the national or the local level – that seek to improve the situation of migrants in Libya with the final objective of their normalization or integration in society. Libya’s national approach to migration governance is underdeveloped and mainly prosecutorial in nature – in other words, migration management equals detention and deportation. Libya’s municipalities are not officially mandated to develop or implement migration governance policies and they generally suffer from chronic underfunding, the ubiquitous involvement of central institutions at the local level as a consequence of how municipalities are structured, with non-state actors asserting their authority, high expectations placed on municipal councils by Libyan citizens and an unwillingness to improve migrants’ position in local host communities. Given that this lack of capacity is not a technical defect, but reflective of a larger, structural process of formal governance decay at the local level, it is unlikely that greater...
financial or technical support for local governments in Libya would automatically result in improvements in the situation for migrants.

The study examines some examples of civil-society organizations that have taken on a role in migration governance. In the case of Bani Walid, civil society has stepped in to take care of migrants who suffer from illness or injuries, and to recover the bodies of deceased migrants. In Zawiya, civil society works together with the local authorities to improve the circumstances for migrants within detention centres. These efforts are a first step towards improving the situation migrants endure in Libya, but are still very much tied to a general system of migration management that is abusive and focused on cordonning migrants off from society.

Whereas civil-society efforts in the three municipalities under study here are of a more reactive nature, the business community (driven by the economic prerogative in general) shows more promising signs of being able to become a driving force for positive migration governance. The key reason for this is that migrant labour has always been, and continues to be, crucial for the revival of the Libyan economy, where the livelihoods of Libyans have steadily declined with the disintegrating ability of the Libyan state to control oil rents after the 2011 revolution. For decades, the employment market for Libyans has been heavily skewed towards public-sector jobs in a rentier state that distributed oil profits among the Libyan population, who, for that reason did not have to work in low-paid jobs. As a result, the Libyan economy became reliant on the migrant labour force for private-sector development. With limited government revenues post-2011, liquidity became strained, as insufficient cash was available to pay out promised wages and subsidies (which are also particularly difficult to access in certain areas of the country). This increased the prices of goods and services, while constraining the cash available to citizens – both adversely affecting Libyan household incomes. With nearly a third of Libyans considered to be living below the poverty line (in a country that is, on paper, considered an upper-middle-income country), many have sought alternative sources of revenue. This has resulted in the proliferation of entrepreneurial efforts at the local level, ranging from construction activities to smaller-scale farming and light industries. These kinds of enterprises all depend to a substantial degree on migrant labour.

The increased relevance of migrant workers for the livelihoods of ordinary Libyans has allowed well-positioned migrant workers to negotiate better economic agency for themselves. Unskilled and semi-skilled migrants who stay longer in the country (because they are part of the stable migrant workforce) have seen an improvement in working conditions compared to less stable migrants, including an increase in wages up to the level of those earned by Libyan wages, as well as receiving wages in cash. This has been the case in Bani Walid and Zawiya in particular, which both attract a high calibre of economic migrants who work in the agriculture and industrial sectors. The reliance of these sectors on migrant labour has resulted in community pushes for local migrant registration schemes to ensure there is a supply of foreign labour to local businesses. These efforts could be further capitalized upon to improve positive migration governance in Libya.

This study provides some first pointers as to how positive migration governance in Libya could be promoted (see Table 1). When moving forward, however, it is key to keep in mind that the three municipalities under study here are characterized by unique local political economies, so a ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach to promoting positive
migration governance in Libya will not work. There are too many different actors involved in the provision of (migration) governance and not all of them are state entities. The state holds the mandate to formally address migration, and despite widely shared political, economic and social challenges in Libya, the needs of the people living in municipalities are intrinsically tied to local sensitivities and priorities. The responses and approaches to the presence and treatment of migrants in these municipalities should hence be tailored to local realities.

Bearing this in mind, we can nevertheless identify a number of broader recommendations that should be taken into account when developing specific programming that aims to support local initiatives to improve conditions for migrants and Libyans alike:

- Programming in support of local migration governance should be based on a solid understanding of the needs and ‘agendas’ of local stakeholders and migrants. Programming entities (like the EU) should invest in regular ‘deep-dives’ in local political economies, but as this will not always be feasible, the EU could explore including questions around social capital and social cohesion in the vulnerability and needs assessments as they are conducted by the humanitarian actors among migrants and host communities. This way, the outcomes of such assessments can serve as the basis for designing positive migration governance strategies.

- The EU should not only focus its attention on the municipalities’ capacities when aiming to promote legitimate and effective governance at the local level, but rather should approach local governance as an interplay of key local stakeholders, with a specific focus on civil society and private-sector actors. These interlocutors are ‘legitimate’ for the EU to work with, and, importantly, they are also legitimate actors in the view of Libyans, unlike many non-state armed groups.

- As the entry-point for governance programming will remain the municipalities, it is important to take into account how local-government actors can capitalize on the needs and priorities of the other stakeholders in order to strengthen their position – and ultimately to enhance their ability to design a positive migration governance structure. In the Libyan context, one clear opportunity lies in the possibility for local-government actors to capitalize on the need for, and the acceptance of, migrant labour – linked to an overall need to strengthen (inclusive) economic growth. Concrete actions in this regard could be to support local-government actors in setting up a chamber of commerce, to develop labour registration schemes, and to develop equal training and income opportunities in collaboration with, for example, a business council, which would cater to the needs of businesses and the (potential) workforce – both migrant and Libyan – at the same time.

- The one-stop-shop model that integrates all services for migrants (and preferably local residents as well) under one roof is a tested model that not only addresses the needs of migrants and host communities alike, but also provides an opportunity to stimulate cooperation between local government, civil society and private-sector actors. One concrete option to explore in this regard is to assess whether experiences with this model so far in certain Libyan municipalities could be shared through city-to-city exchanges and rolled out on a broader basis.

- For external actors, like the EU, recognition of the existing national framework and the formal division of responsibilities comes down to a question of ‘do no harm’: as the formal mandate for migration governance lies with the Ministry of Interior, municipal efforts to improve migration management may
not be automatically endorsed by national entities (the Ministry of Interior mainly), and bypassing the central sphere of government in support of local migration management is not advisable. However, the EU can support municipalities in developing practical pilot projects in migration governance. If the municipalities can demonstrate success here, this could serve as a basis for advocating for policy changes within the national framework for migration governance.

Table 1: Dynamics of migration governance in Ghat, Bani Walid and Zawiya

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Presence of formal institutions</th>
<th>Ghat</th>
<th>Bani Walid</th>
<th>Zawiya</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Formal government institutions are present but not functional (i.e. there is no governance). City is effectively cut off from receiving state resources.</td>
<td>Formal government institutions present and functioning but through arrangements with influential families and armed groups, which are largely autonomous. Relatively little central government influence.</td>
<td>Formal government institutions internally divided and restricted by presence and control of non-state armed groups.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Main governance and service provider | Tuareg tribe is the main governance provider and mediator, but is overburdened. | A mosaic of influential tribes of families, and a formal local-government structure – none of which have full control. | Municipal council reliant on local armed groups to channel resources to residents. |

| Migration management approach | No migration management system in place beyond border patrols. | Migration management approach decentralized (various formal and informal actors involved), but integrated (a degree of cooperation between them exists). | Migration management centred on the DCIM detention centre. Mechanism for migration management exists, but implementation is difficult due to influence of non-state groups involved in illicit activity/human smuggling. |

<p>| Community perceptions and involvement | A sense of ‘equal suffering’ between migrants and host community; interactions predominately friendly. Migrants are appreciated as a cheap source of labour. Civil society underdeveloped compared to other municipalities. Tensions between Libyan and non-Libyan Tuareg. | High level of involvement of local civil-society groups in migration management; international assistance for community-driven initiatives. Examples of migrant involvement in local civil-society initiatives. Relatively high tolerance of migrants; appreciation for their economic contribution. | Migration is securitized. Low levels of institutional and community support for migrant integration. Mixed attitudes towards migrants, ranging from pity and appreciation for their economic contribution to regarding them as a security and health threat. |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Resources</th>
<th>Ghat</th>
<th>Bani Walid</th>
<th>Zawiya</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Large agricultural land, strategic border position.</td>
<td>Wealth (accumulated pre-2011), entrepreneurship.</td>
<td>Location of key strategic assets, natural resources (mineral and non-mineral), trade connectivity.</td>
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</table>

| Post-2011 changes in the economy | Vital economic sectors largely died down owing to closure of border and regional conflict; especially high loss of purchasing power due to price increases in the south. | Economically isolated after 2011, creating fertile breeding ground for illicit activity. | Security situation breaks down local economy (liquidity, accessibility) and facilitates illicit activity. |

| Development of alternative economic activities | Illicit economy (e.g. smuggling) is a key source of income and sustenance livelihoods. | Economic ‘self-governance’ model, little economic regulation, new service providers (hospitals, schools). Nerve point for human smuggling, but link between smuggling and local economy is weak. | Most notable development of small entrepreneurial efforts; most households have taken up small-scale economic activities. Illicit economy (e.g. human and fuel smuggling) is source of wealth and power for militias. |

| Role of migrants in local economy | (Historically) high dependency on migrant labour for agriculture, but migrant numbers dwindled as a result of border security (on Algerian border) and lack of economic opportunities. Remote farms lost access to labour, but migrants still active in cleaning, construction and other forms of manual labour. Migrants have less secure working arrangements (e.g. wages paid daily). | Larger service providers require skilled migrant labour. Migrant labour force is structured; migrants have stable working arrangements (yearly contracts, housing and service/healthcare provision). | Small-scale entrepreneurial efforts create a demand for manual/low-skilled migrant labour. Migrants have less secure working arrangements (hourly/daily wages, limited benefits). |

<p>| Opportunities for international engagement and support | Concentrate on economic development, as it is intrinsically tied to migration management (economic growth will mitigate migrant vulnerability and likely improve their integration). In light of the current degree of neglect, encouragement of the state to distribute basic state services in Ghat would result in immediate economic growth. | Capitalize on Bani Walid’s increased national socio-political integration (due to its strategic importance for both conflict camps) to push for the abandonment of the cruellest activities happening in the city. | Foster economic contribution of migrants, encourage efforts of stakeholders to employ migrants in sectors with labour shortage on a supply-and-demand basis. This could be implemented through the support of the MoL, chamber of commerce and EU programme SLEIDSE. |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Opportunities for international engagement and support continued</th>
<th>Ghat</th>
<th>Bani Walid</th>
<th>Zawiya</th>
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<tr>
<td>One avenue would be to promote this within the Prime Minister’s Office (via EUDEL to MoFA) which will take it forward to the Ministry of Local Government and involve the Ministry of Labour (MoL) and Ministry of Trade, Economy and Industry (MTEI).</td>
<td>Recognize and support community-driven, bottom-up initiatives – civil society as a key actor with which to consult and cooperate. Community-driven initiatives are mostly initiated by unconnected groups and individuals, but identified civil-society actors include the Salam Foundation and Migrace Libya.</td>
<td>Extend existing successful women-and-children services model to migrant communities. Some actors involved in this are the DCIM, Red Crescent, STACO foundation, IOM, and UNHCR.</td>
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<td>In addition, facilitate exchange between civil-society stakeholders on best practices from community-driven responses to migration (city-to-city linkages to facilitate mutual learning and support). For example, UNDP is currently active in the Fezzan region through the stabilization facility with activities in Ubari and slowly extending to Ghat.</td>
<td>Integrate all services for migrants (and preferably local residents as well) in one location/under one roof (i.e. a one-stop-shop). This could be set up within the MoLG or Bani Walid’s local council.</td>
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<td>Promote people-to-people support mechanisms and social solidarity among inhabitants and migrants. This includes, for example, establishing community centres run by the Council of Tribes in coordination with the Local Council. Other actors that could play a role in such initiatives include the Red Crescent and the Libya Sons Foundation.</td>
<td>Set up ‘migrant desk’ to take stock of migrant needs at the old DCIM headquarters, the local council or through the Salam Foundation.</td>
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<td>Encourage consultations between local power holders (municipal council, Tuareg) and the community on local needs and priorities, including on migration. This could take the form of public local council meetings within municipalities that bring together members of the community with municipal council members and tribal authority figures.</td>
<td>Cultivate migrants’ (economic) agency by building small-scale coalitions of local actors (e.g. government, business, civil society) with which migrants could engage. The purpose of this is to build a direct communication line between migrants and actors that influence their legal, social and economic status.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ghat</td>
<td>Bani Walid</td>
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<td>Risk</td>
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<tr>
<td>Improved migration governance (notably better services for migrants) may open up social tensions around question of citizenship.</td>
<td>Civil society and private sector initiatives cannot, and should not, replace public institutions’ efforts for migrant management at the local level.</td>
<td>Presence of powerful and adverse smuggling-linked militias and Islamist militia factions means that any intervention could quickly become instrumentalized.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A holistic approach to economic revival is needed but requires long-term commitment and (foreign) investment in the region.</td>
<td>Lack of central framework for migration management and oversight of economy exposes migrants to exploitation.</td>
<td>Increase in migrant labour demands does not automatically mean decrease in discrimination of migrants.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Scalability of community initiatives may be problematic, as is creating incentive to maintain them in a context of low governmental efficiency.</td>
<td>Social tensions over labour market competition among migrant groups and between migrant groups and the host communities.</td>
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INTRODUCTION: THE COMPLEXITY OF SUPPORTING LOCAL MIGRATION GOVERNANCE IN LIBYA

After years of conflict, any earlier optimism about Libya’s trajectory out of its dictatorial regime seems to have faded. Today, the country suffers from a national political crisis; state institutions are critically weak; the formal economy has been severely damaged; and a plethora of non-state and various hybrid armed groups hold sway. What’s more, the escalation of violence in 2014 caused the country to split up between two military blocs and two administrations that refuse to acknowledge each other’s legitimacy. The military confrontation that is currently looming in and around the capital between forces loyal to Field Marshal Haftar and armed groups that are on the side of the UN-backed government further undermine the promise of creating a unified, legitimate and central government any time soon.

Against this conflictual backdrop, the situation for migrants in Libya deteriorated rapidly after 2011. Even though Libya has historically been a migrant-receiving country, and migrants make up a sizeable portion of the Libyan workforce – estimated at 2 million before the revolution – in more recent years, the country has become the North-African epicentre of an increasingly brutal human-smuggling industry. In an effort to address this, and taking into account the lack of a legitimate and capable central government, international attention has turned to supporting local (migration) governance arrangements – and logically so. However, the situation at this local level is arguably even more complicated than at the central level. Libya has become a patchwork of (micro) governance systems, run by a combination of political, social/ethnic and armed actors. A set of formal government institutions, militia groups, and influential families and tribes is involved in governance matters, ranging from the provision of much-needed basic services to the protection of citizens and migrants. Issues relating to local governance – and specifically the division of power – also remain a source of local conflict. Municipal councils – as the ‘natural’ counterparts for international engagement – are only one of many actors in this local power play, and they struggle with chronic underfunding, the ubiquitous involvement of central institutions at the local level as a consequence of how municipalities are structured and the high expectations placed on them by Libyan citizens. Moreover, even though municipalities along the migration routes have been faced with large influxes of migrants in recent years, the official mandate to address migration continues to rest with central governmental bodies.

It is precisely in this context of weak formal local government, and the involvement of informal groups in governance, that human-smuggling networks could proliferate and vastly expand their activities beyond the more traditional migration flows that have been part and parcel of Libya for many centuries. The influx of migrants, in combination with increasing pressure from the European Union (EU) and individual European states to contain migration across the Mediterranean, has meant that there have been large profits to be gained in the human-smuggling business. The territorial control by armed groups – including those that were previously marginalized – enabled their taxation of human smuggling (and fuel smuggling), which
contributed to the expansion and consolidation of their power. These groups would work with human smugglers by granting them passage and protection. At the same time, they carved out a role for themselves in the management of migration on behalf of the government in Tripoli, for example by guarding border posts and migrant detention centres. This way, the armed groups managed to consolidate their territorial control while legitimizing their existence.

More recently, we are seeing that the local armed groups are increasingly emphasizing the law-enforcement angle in their ‘business model’: they have replaced the business of offering protection to smugglers with a business of acting against the human-smuggling industry. And some actors seem to do both. Their reasons for this change in approach lie in a combination of changing off-shore and on-shore dynamics affecting Libya. At sea, the number of boat crossings from Libya to Europe has dwindled because of increased search-and-rescue capacity by the Libyan Coast Guard and receding rescue operations by humanitarian and military agencies off Libya’s coast. On land, growing intolerance of human smugglers’ activities among local Libyan communities and the ongoing complex power play between large militia groups around the capital have damaged the image of the human-smuggling business.

But despite the increase in incentives to act against the human-smuggling industry, it has not disappeared. Rather, it has adopted more clandestine ways of operating. As a result, the situation for migrants in Libya remains incredibly grim. Human-rights organizations have reported extensively on the nightmare that is migrant detention in Libya, and the extreme abuse and intolerance that migrants are exposed to. In addition, migrants are subjected to discrimination and xenophobia, as well as tensions with host communities, who perceive their presence as an additional burden on an already strained environment.

The EU is seeking to alleviate the situation of migrants and local communities by promoting legitimate and effective governance at the local level. Through the EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa, the EU is committed to improving living conditions for migrants and Libyans alike, by enhancing municipalities’ capacities to provide basic social services, offer licit economic opportunities and support the integration of migrants into local communities. Yet, these forms of much-needed support must also take into account the complexities of local governance structures, the alliances and networks that underpin them, their responsibilities, mandate and linkages with the central state, and the formal and informal actors involved.

Libya is essentially an accumulation of many political economies, each with specific geographical, socio-economic, cultural and ethnic features, and with distinct but fluid local power arrangements that represent the de facto reality of governance and authority. Hence, any policy and programming effort needs to take into account the formal and informal local power systems and existing connections between the local and national level, and find means of balancing them. Otherwise, support for local governance runs the risk of legitimizing and cementing the power of certain groups over others. In Libya, the ‘winner-loser’ logic can quickly turn into violent conflict, adding another layer of instability to an already challenged environment and severely limiting avenues to improve the living conditions for migrants and host communities.
Objective of this study and key research question

Taking the above into account, this study aims to provide insights into the political economy around local governance structures in Libya and their approach to the influx and presence of migrants, in an effort to ‘test’ the relevance of the EU’s approach to improving living conditions for migrants and local communities (and the assumptions underlying this approach). This study looks into migration management capacities and approaches at the local level. Migration management is defined as:

the combined frameworks of legal norms, laws and regulations, policies and traditions as well as organizational structures (sub-national, national, regional and international) and the relevant processes that shape and regulate States’ approaches with regard to migration in all its forms, addressing rights and responsibilities and promoting international cooperation.7

More particularly, this study understands migration management as the responses to the influx and presence of migrants at the municipal level by both formal and informal actors (beyond the system of detention, which is outside the scope of this analysis).

It is important to point out that, officially, Libyan municipalities do not bear the responsibility of addressing migration or the conditions of migrants. That mandate rests with central state entities (the relevant government ministries and the DCIM). However, the municipalities under study here have all been faced with an influx of migrants in recent years, which has had a direct impact on their communities and to which they have developed practical responses. The overall objective of this study is to understand the practical reality on the ground by analyzing the political economy around the approaches and stances towards migration at the municipal level in Libya with the aim of exploring how local migration policies and initiatives can improve conditions for migrants and Libyans alike.

It is also important to underline here that not everywhere in Libya is the situation equally alarming: examples of legitimate and meaningful local governance do exist, as well as community initiatives that aim to improve the living conditions of migrants. Bearing in mind that although municipal authorities are not part of the official Libyan framework for migration governance, we explore this area further by looking at what measures have been adopted at the municipal level to address migration and what opportunities exist for migrants to access government services and make use of economic opportunities. We also take stock of local narratives around migration, migrants and ways to address the issue, which are shaped and used by Libyan stakeholders and constituencies. Understanding local attitudes and popular perceptions about migration is important in the effort to help align international assistance with local priorities and to design interventions that resonate at the local context.

This study deliberately focuses on the benign face of responses to migration in Libya. Much of the international public and political debate is centred on the horrors of migrants’ circumstances in Libya (including their detention), the collusion between Libyan authorities and smuggling networks, and intolerant and
xenophobic popular discourses around migration in Libya in general. Although it is essential not lose sight of, or act against, the atrocities surrounding the treatment of migrants in Libya, there are two sides to the coin. When exploring local responses to migration and the formal and informal governance of migration, negative messages deserve to be countered by a different but underexposed paradigm, which shows that Libyans are not unequivocally opposed to migration, that migrants have more agency and there is greater tolerance for their contributions than is often thought, and that there are meaningful ways of integrating migrants at the local level despite all the challenges Libya faces today.

The central question for this study is therefore, what can be done at the local level to promote positive migration governance in Libya?

By the term ‘positive migration governance’, we refer to ‘the transformation of host communities’ negative socio-psychological attitudes and dispositions towards migrants as well as the restoration of migrants’ confidence and the increase of their trust with host communities to facilitate social cohesion.’8

This research question is driven by humanitarian, economic and normative concerns. From a humanitarian point of view, the level of abuse that migrants face in Libya today requires an urgent international response. From an economic point of view, migrants have historically contributed significantly to the Libyan economy, and attempts to improve their position would most likely result in economic gains for migrant and host communities alike. And from a normative point of view, the international community has a moral obligation to address the negative human-rights consequences of its migration policies.

Scope of the study

Because of the various different forms of governance dynamics that are found across Libya at the local level, and in light of migration patterns and smuggling dynamics, this study focuses on three Libyan municipalities: Ghat, Bani Walid and Zawiya.

Each municipality has seen distinctly different experiences with migration post-2011. Ghat is a border town and transit hub; Bani Walid is a transit hub and smuggling nerve point; Zawiya is a coastal border town and embarkation point. Each site has its own particular local governance arrangements, including formal ‘state’ actors and non-state groups, which, in turn, influence the ways in which migration is – and could be – addressed. In addition, the different municipalities’ proximity to (or distance from) national elites also has a direct impact on how migrants are treated in these locations (see Box 1).
Box 1:
Migration profiles of Ghat, Bani Walid and Zawiya

The municipalities of Ghat, Bani Walid and Zawiya have been affected by the fact that the years since the fall of Qaddafi have been marked by severely diminishing state control, a decline in licit economic opportunity, and plummeting levels of service provisions for citizens. Another thing they share in common is that all three municipalities have been exposed to migration flows, as well as the expansion and professionalization of the human-smuggling business. Their experience as hubs in the various stages of migrant journeys through Libya have not, however, resulted in a uniform response to migration in these sites. Due to differences in governance structures and capacities, geographic location, context-specific sources of instability, international support mechanisms and the impact of civil society, Ghat, Bani Walid and Zawiya have experienced different forms of local migration governance.
Zawiya, a city with an estimated population of around 200,000 – and about 38,000 migrants – has a local government that is challenged by the influence of non-state armed groups in parts of the city. It was considered one of the ‘headquarters’ of human (and oil) smuggling along the Libyan coast, with some of the undisputed kingpins in human smuggling – such as Abdulrahman Ali Milad, aka al-Bija – coming from the town. Intrinsic tribal and personal connections exist between human-smuggling networks and the groups that control Zawiya’s strategic assets (the port and the refinery). The collusion between smugglers operating from Zawiya and local authorities, including the Libyan Coast Guard, has also been well reported, notably against the backdrop of the EU support mission (Operation Sophia), meant to improve the capacities of the Libyan Coast Guard against smuggling. Because of its strategic importance, there is close coordination between the most influential smugglers and key GNA- (Government of National Accord) aligned militias in the capital that seek to keep the municipality closely tied to Tripoli. Zawiya has one migrant detention centre that is overseen by the DCIM, the Zawiya Shuhada al-Nasr centre, which is effectively managed by the Nasr Brigade and has a capacity of 15,000.

The municipality of Bani Walid, with a local population of 86,129 and around 1,600 migrants, is a tribal city but with a mix of formal and informal local-governance providers. The city has for years been an important nerve centre for northbound migration flows (and a key logistical hub for cross-country movement in general), with all routes from the south leading through the city. Some of Libya’s most notorious smugglers are from Bani Walid – most notably the Adyab brothers, who were able to expand their business thanks to strong political and tribal connections in the town. More recently, however, the smuggling industry in Bani Walid has declined owing to law-enforcement activities of other groups. The resulting decreasing ability of smugglers to relocate migrants is causing a change in the smuggling business model from monetizing the movement of migrants to monetizing their extortion and ransoming. The war in Sabratha in late 2017 compounded smuggling activity in the area, as many migrants used to move from Sabratha through Bani Walid to the coastal cities before the conflict erupted. The dwindling smuggling business in Bani Walid also had a clogging effect, with many migrants residing – or being stuck – in the city for considerably longer periods of time than in Ghat and Zawiya.

In contrast to Zawiya, the field presence of the DCIM in Bani Walid is limited. A migrant detention centre with DCIM oversight was closed in 2016, while there are reportedly 20 unlawful detention centres in operation. DCIM activities are therefore confined to the monitoring of migration and the prosecution of smugglers. Bani Walid has long remained isolated from the country’s national elites as result of its rejection of the revolution in 2011. Today, its fate is still largely influenced by that history. At the same time, the growing importance of Bani Walid to...
Both the GNA and the Libyan National Army (LNA) means that its socio-economic isolation is becoming somewhat mitigated.

The municipality of Ghat is part of the Fezzan, where the state collapse after the fall of Qaddafi was arguably most felt, leaving many in this region with no other option than to pursue illicit activities to sustain their livelihoods. Locals describe how youth from Ghat would either get involved in the smuggling trade or go and fight with militias elsewhere in the country. The city has a population of approximately 23,000, excluding a migrant population of 11,265. It is, ethnically, a relatively homogeneous tribal town governed by Tuareg tribal authorities.

It is known for being the prime transit point for migrants arriving from Niger and Mali via Algeria. Migrants would be collected in the Tuareg hub of Tamanrasset in Algeria, after which they headed to Ghat and eventually to Ubari. Several developments caused a decrease in the influx of migrants in the Ghat area. The war in Ubari (2014–2016) reduced the numbers of migrants passing through and prompted smugglers to change their routes. Tightened border security in Algeria coupled with anti-migration measures in Niger also restricted the movement of people (and goods) across Libya’s border with Algeria. Nowadays, the migration issue has become less pertinent to the community of Ghat, as the number of migrants has dwindled and migrants usually only pass through the area. Ghat has a detention centre, established in 2009, but not an operative DCIM branch. This reflects the large distance that has appeared between Ghat and national governing elites. The only local activities that would qualify as migration management are border patrol efforts and the securing of border crossings by local brigades.

The study focuses on the one hand on the formal and informal authorities present in each of these three municipalities, identifying the ways in which they are involved in the practical management of migration, the approaches they have adopted (if any) in this regard, and the inclusivity and objectives of their actions. On the other hand, it looks at the impact of (changes in) the structure of local economies on economic opportunity and agency of both migrants and Libyan nationals in these municipalities. In addition, the study analyzes how these governance and economic dimensions influence the relations between migrants and host communities, and what kinds of community initiatives are in place in terms of improving local opportunities for migrants.

It is important to note that the report does not purport to provide a full-blown political-economy analysis of the municipalities under study here. The complexity of the local political economies, which has increased in light of recent political-military developments, would require a more extensive follow-up study.
On the basis of the analysis provided for the three municipalities, the study will answer the central research question on what can be done at the local level to promote positive migration governance in Libya. The study provides key insights into what avenues exist to support and improve local migration management in the field of governance, economy and community. Even though recommendations stem from the particular contexts of Ghat, Bani Walid and Zawiya – and are therefore context-specific in nature – they do provide (through extrapolation) general insights into ways of supporting humane and effective migration governance elsewhere in Libya as well.

Methodology

The research methods used to develop this study include a mix of analysis of existing qualitative studies and quantitative data, as well as field-based structured interviewing and focus group discussions held in three municipalities in Libya. All analysis was conducted between December 2018 and April 2019. Data collection in the field took place in March 2019. It should be noted that the sample of interviewed respondents is relatively small (see Annex 1 for an overview) and in all likelihood provides only a snapshot of local perspectives.

Case studies: As described above, the municipalities of Ghat, Bani Walid and Zawiya were selected as case studies for the study. These localities are particularly relevant for the research topic for two reasons. Firstly, they represent different local-governance dynamics and provide insight into the types of formal, informal and hybrid governance arrangements that exist across Libya. Secondly, their geographical characteristics mean that they have experienced different aspects with the issue of migration.

Desk research: The desk research phase of this study focused on bringing together existing knowledge and information on governance arrangements, on the composition of local economies, and initiatives to manage migration in the three case study municipalities. The open source data was verified through targeted questions sent to our local Libyan networks – including the field network of the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime – and during a workshop organized in Tunis in February 2019. For each municipality, an extended ‘profile’ with an overview of the political situation, composition of the local economy and recent relevant developments was created as a foundation for the analysis presented in this report.

An overview of the actors involved in local (migration) governance was also produced for each municipality (summarized in Table 2). The desk research also benefited from the analysis of policy and programme documents and policy-related sources (including of previous EU-funded programmes on support for local governance and effective decentralization), and the insights of relevant stakeholders at EU HQ level and EUTF implementing partners. A literature review of best practices in migration management in other fragile settings, including Turkey, Greece, Italy, Poland and Morocco, provided the basis for the policy recommendations.

Field research: To ensure maximum accessibility in the field research phase (conducted in March 2019), a team consisting of three skilled local researchers was contracted for each of the case studies. The researchers each concentrated on one thematic strand analyzed in this report: local governance, local economy,
and local community and migration. To prepare for the field research, a training workshop was organized in Tunis in February 2019 with all local researchers and Clingendael staff. Each local researcher was asked to deliver transcripts of 25 structured qualitative interviews with local (formal and informal) authorities and key (economic and community) stakeholders in their municipality (lasting about an hour and a half each) for each thematic strand, adding up to 75 interviews per municipality and a total sample of 225 interviews (see Annex 1 for an overview of the interview data per municipality). In addition, in order to capture perspectives of the local community, in each municipality focus-group discussions were held with between five and ten participants (see Annex I). Although it proved sensitive to speak with migrants about their circumstances and migration management, the researchers managed to conduct several informal discussions with them as well.
1. STATE AND NON-STATE MIGRATION GOVERNANCE

This section concentrates on approaches to migration governance at the central- and local-government levels in Libya. It first examines formal migration governance, which can be defined as ‘the combined frameworks of legal norms, laws and regulations, policies and traditions as well as organizational structures (sub-national, national, regional and international) and the relevant processes that shape and regulate States’ approaches with regard to migration in all its forms, addressing rights and responsibilities and promoting international cooperation’. After an exploration of the national legal systems for migration governance, the analysis turns to how local government in Libya is organized and how it currently approaches migration governance. Importantly, building on the notion that governance in Libya is not only performed by state entities, this section also looks at what types of informal (i.e. non-state) migration governance exist in Ghat, Bani Walid and Zawiya. Understanding the full spectrum of state and non-state migration governance will serve our analysis of what can be done to promote positive migration governance later in this report.

1.1 FORMAL MIGRATION GOVERNANCE – THE STATE

Libya’s legal framework for dealing with migration is rather limited. The country is not a party to the 1951 Refugee Convention, and therefore does not legally recognize the status of asylum seekers and the obligation to provide protection to them, be it in the form of security or the provision of basic goods and services, irrespective of the situation in the country of origin. Rather, the majority of Libya’s migration-related laws and regulations are prosecutorial in nature. In addition, there are two (older) laws on migrant labour and registration that are relevant in this regard. As such, the legal framework on migration is composed of the following elements:

- Law 58/1970 (updated as law 12/2010), which regulates labour migration based on Libyan employer contracts (handled by the Ministry of Labour).
- Law 6/1978, which stipulates visa and residency criteria (handled by the Passports and Citizenship Authority, and local embassies).
- Law 19/2010 on combating illegal migration, which criminalizes the entry, facilitation of entry, sheltering and concealing of immigrants, as well as the provision of counterfeit documents.
- Decrees 165/2012 and 184/2012, which established a committee responsible for monitoring illegal migration, and supervising procedures for migrant detention and deportation.
- Decree 386/2014, which established the DCIM.

The majority of Libya’s migration-related laws and regulations are prosecutorial in nature.
The DCIM – headquartered in Tripoli – is a state security entity with a mandate that can be qualified as migration governance. It was established to oversee the country’s detention centres, and it is also formally in charge of gathering intelligence on human smuggling, setting up operations leading to the opening of criminal cases, and the arrest of human traffickers and migrant smugglers. In practice, however, due to lack of capacity and resources, the DCIM’s main activities are limited to the detention of migrants and the administration of the detention centres under its control.13

The DCIM falls under the Ministry of Interior, which has the responsibility ‘to handle passports, nationality, identification card and civil status affairs, in addition to processing residence permits for foreign nationals and control the incoming and outgoing movement of persons through the designated border crossing points’.34

Libya also has a Ministry for Migrants and Displaced People (usually referred to as the Ministry for Internally Displaced), but its mandate does not include foreign migrants.35

An analytical overview of all relevant outlets and updates of the Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Justice and the Prime Minister’s Office between 2014 and 2019 shows no new legislation that can be categorized as migration management. The only references to migration that come up discuss the mandate and activities of the DCIM, and migration detention in general.36 Similarly, an assessment of the same official outlets relating to the improvement of goods and service delivery to the community contains references to the need to improve public provisions for Libyans, but no reference is made to the extension of these provisions to migrant communities. Without exception, official releases and statements do not refer to migrants unless it is a reference specifically to illegal migration.37 Deportation or repatriation of migrants – and not their integration – seems to be the ultimate aim of all migration-related efforts of national-government stakeholders.

To date, formal migration governance in Libya has therefore been characterized by a predominant prosecutorial focus that seeks to contain illegal migration. One potential way forward to improve positive migration governance in Libya could be to push for the adoption of technical measures, such as those that would facilitate a standard model for migrant registration across Libyan municipalities and that would support the Ministry of Labour to develop its capacity to register migrant workers; develop standard operating ‘release for work’ procedures; and expand a model for (large) ‘guarantor’ companies that employ migrants.38 Even if the lack of legislative appetite to regulate migration along these lines could be overcome, such a strategy would nevertheless be implemented in a context of a frail national government that is losing its legitimacy fast. It is for this very reason that many in the international community now look to the local level to improve the situation of migrants.
1.2 FORMAL MIGRATION GOVERNANCE – THE MUNICIPALITY

Libyan municipalities are commonly regarded by the international community as potential entry points for interventions that seek to improve the lives of Libyans and migrants alike. The 2012 Local Administration Law (no. 59) was the first major attempt after the revolution to create a local governance system based on autonomous municipal institutions. It divided Libya into around a hundred municipalities (known as baladiyat) in response to the strong call from local communities and elites for more autonomy after decades of dictatorship. The decentralization process is unfinished business, however, because the 2014 deterioration of the political and security situation put a halt to the implementation of law 59. In a focus-group discussion with local residents in Zawiya, for example, when asked about what is the solution to improve the situation in the municipality, all respondents emphasized that law 59 is a crucial step.

Box 2: The Libyan municipal council

Every municipality in Libya consists of a municipal council of seven to nine members responsible for decision making within the municipality, and a municipal administration for implementation. Mayors and deputy mayors are elected from among the council members, while mokhtars (heads of the municipal administration) are then appointed by the mayor and the Ministry of Local Governance. Municipal councils usually employ a Shura council, made up of local notables and experts, in an advisory role. In addition, security directorates operate in Libyan municipalities as a local police force.

1.2a The Libyan municipality – overburdened and underfunded

Despite this push for greater municipal autonomy, the local governance system in Libya remains hostage to a high level of centralization. Municipalities are not mandated to collect taxes, so they are fully dependent on funding transfers from the central government for their budgets. In addition, they are sometimes restricted by a lack of jurisdiction to handle governance affairs in their area, including migration management. Municipalities across Libya also lack capacity and funding to meet the needs of their communities regarding rule of law, service delivery and security. For example, staff from the Public Cleaning Services have been demonstrating since April 2018 because their salaries had not been paid for six months. The resources needed to respond to emergencies, or to invest in long-term development and infrastructure projects are nearly always lacking.
As a consequence, the level of service delivery in many municipalities is abysmal. Basic services that are wanting in many municipalities include access to healthcare and education, reconstruction and the maintenance of public spaces, and water, sanitation and hygiene. Respondents in our study expressed how medical care is a particularly pressing concern for all who reside in their municipalities due to inadequate emergency services and shortages of medical supplies, equipment and staff, which have been severely affected by the country’s economic downfall and episodes of armed conflict. An interviewee from Ghat said: ‘My mother has been sick for a whole week. There is no healthcare, health centres or even private clinics to treat her.

Similarly, according to 2018 figures, an estimated 581,000 people in Libya are in need of shelter. Among them are internally displaced persons and migrants. Even though migration management in Libya often equals detention, deportation and repatriation, there are still migrants who voluntarily reside and work in Libya, and who seek housing, work (see below) and basic provisions. Municipalities are, however, unable to provide sufficient housing solutions to local residents, which creates additional challenges for migrants who seek to access housing because of their lack of a legal status and the discrimination they encounter. As a result of the inability of the municipality to provide public services, and because they have no formal responsibility to extend service provision to migrants, migrants often end up in overcrowded housing situations and refrain from seeking healthcare altogether.

In the three municipalities under study here, local state authorities and influential figures whom we spoke to therefore seemed unwilling to engage in positive migration governance. A Libya-centric, and sometimes outright xenophobic sentiment prevailed in various interviews. The dominant idea that came through the interviews is that migrants are a burden to municipalities in terms of resources and service delivery – which already is substandard – and that they are a health and security hazard to the community. Migration, it was felt, would therefore be best addressed by cornering off migrants in society and returning them to their countries of origin.

In light of these prevailing attitudes towards migrants, it should come as little surprise that formal migration governance in Ghat and Bani Walid is virtually non-existent; it is only in Zawiya that municipal (and national) authorities appear to engage more actively in migration governance (see the case studies).
Ghat

Support for foreign migrants by the municipal authorities was described by the majority of respondents in this study as ‘non-existent’ in Ghat. They claim there is no one who has the mandate to formulate and implement migration-related policies. Said one participant: ‘The municipality does not care about the migrant file. And they are too weak to enforce anything.’ And, according to another, ‘The municipality has no clear policies towards migrants.’

Instead, state authority emphasizes support for border control in Ghat. According to respondents, migration management is handled by the central authorities through the Border and Ports Patrol Unit, which falls under the Ministry of Interior. Reportedly, the border guards also often complain about lack of support and funding from the government. Ghat has one detention centre, which was established in 2009. However, it is largely inoperative as the DCIM has established no activities on the ground here and migrant arrests are not taking place because migrant traffic through the area is currently low.

Interestingly, migrants in Ghat say that the situation is as dire for the local community as it is for them, explaining how both groups are suffering from the economic crisis, a lack of goods and services, and the general environment of insecurity. As a migrant hairdresser told us: ‘My Libyan customers keep complaining that there is no money. I offer them services for 10 Libyan dinars (LYD), instead of the usual 30.’ It also likely explains why respondents from Ghat note that migrants tend not to stay in the town for long and that they soon generally make their way north. As one respondent said: ‘There is nothing to stay for. Ghat has become a transit point and is no longer a destination for migrants.’ Unlike the case in other migration hubs (e.g. those in Niger), in Ghat no local economy seems to have grown around the influx of migrants (with local residents selling water, food and shelter to migrants, for example), indicating the monopoly of the smuggling networks over the movement of migrants in this area. In this context, it is the smugglers who ‘provide’ for the migrants rather than government or community.

Bani Walid

According to state officials from Bani Walid, the municipality does not have a formal migration management structure in place. Given its central position on the migration route, they argue that the large number of migrants in Bani Walid would put too much of a burden on any formal capacity seeking to support them. In addition, they mentioned that the present-day challenges facing Libyan citizens, such as economic and healthcare constraints, are already
very high and that the municipality struggles to effectively address those concerns. The main role of the Municipal Council is, according to one of its members, to ‘raise awareness of the danger of migration to locals and detained migrants.

A labour registration scheme was set up in Bani Walid in 2014, which served to provide sufficient foreign labour to local businesses. The primary objective of this scheme, however, was to collect data on migrants in order to prevent foreign (migrant) Islamic State militants from gaining a foothold in Bani Walid. The scheme was abandoned in 2016 (the same year that Libyan forces defeated Islamic State in Sirte). In a stark contrast to Ghat, however, civil society in Bani Walid appears to have stepped in to fill part of the migration governance vacuum (see Table 2). Most likely because migrants tend to stay in Bani Walid for longer periods of time, and because of the reprehensible practices surrounding the treatment of migrants in Bani Walid at the hands of the smuggling networks and their accomplices, a set of needs-based provisions and relief initiatives for migrants has been established, largely by local civil-society actors with funding and support from international organizations and, in some instances, in coordination with local government. Local civil-society organizations were described by a municipal officer in Bani Walid as ‘crucial’ for taking stock of migrant circumstances and needs, and reporting these to the authorities.

Services as provided by civil society are focused on medical assistance and arrangements for dealing with deceased migrants, as well as registration of migrants in the municipality. Additionally, as explained by a civil-society representative in Bani Walid, an important function of civil society actors is to report to the authorities on migration dynamics, and the conditions and needs of migrants. They also put considerable pressure on political leaders to find a solution. An example of a community-driven initiative is the safe house established by a local NGO called Es Salam, a local partner of IOM and MSF, which operates a shelter for migrants (housing approximately 400) who suffer from illness and injuries. The Es Salam charity also recovers migrant bodies and provides assistance to the Bani Walid hospital. The hospital is a de facto sanctuary for fleeing and injured migrants. After receiving medical treatment, however, it is claimed that migrants are transferred to detention in Tripoli in coordination with the DCIM. This is another example of the securitized nature of migration governance and how civil-society efforts at the local level are restricted by dominant formal view towards migration management in Libya.
Zawiya

Compared to the other sites examined in this report, migration management measures in Zawiya are arguably the most developed and best known to constituents. Zawiya has one migrant detention centre – the Zawiya Shuhada Al-Nasr DC, which is run by the Nasr Brigade and nominally under the DCIM. By far most of the town’s migration management efforts are centred on this detention centre, which has been receiving international humanitarian assistance. Analysis of the detention system as part of Libya’s overall migration management approach is outside the scope of this report. However, there is reason to believe that migration management in Zawiya, as in Libya more broadly, largely equates to migration detention. Zawiya is thereby a clear example of how migration is consistently dealt with as a security issue by Libyan authorities.

Besides the DCIM’s role in overseeing migrant detention, respondents from Zawiya described the interference of the Ministry of Interior in migration-related issues as ‘minimal’. Migration-related measures in Zawiya are mostly described by respondents as being in the hands of a combination of local actors: the municipal council, the Security Directorate and civil-society groups (the latter often with the support of international organizations, such as IOM and the Zawiya branch of the Libyan Red Crescent). An official from the municipal council explained: ‘We, as the municipal council, are in constant contact with the Security Directorate, civil-society organizations and the Coast Guard. In my capacity as healthcare official, I visit the migrant shelters every month to check the conditions of migrants, and what their needs are in terms of health and medicines.

Policies that have been put in place in Zawiya by local authorities and civil-society groups include, as explained by a local official,

- an inventory of migrants through registration cards;
- a reporting and registration duty for anyone who rents houses to migrants and/or employs migrants;
- a responsibility on the part of the authorities to bury deceased immigrants without identification papers (or hand over the body to the relevant embassy in case identification papers are found);
- the establishment of immigrant shelters, so that migrants do not need to live in the open;
- periodic checks on the centres’ conditions and separating injured from non-injured immigrants;
- facilitation of migrants who wish to return voluntarily (and are willing to bear to the costs for it); and
- the investigation and arrest of human traffickers on charges of murder, exploitation and smuggling of people.
From the comments made by this respondent, however, the precise division of these responsibilities and tasks between local authorities and civil society, as well as the practical and security implications of some of these measures (such as data management and voluntary returns), remained opaque, indicating the lack of a clear authoritative structure behind migration management measures beyond the detention system. In addition, this set of policies implies that there are many migrants who remain outside of the detention centres, which will be discussed further below.

As was the case in Bani Walid, civil society is also actively involved in Zawiya in terms of providing support to migrants (with the support of international NGOs). In contrast to the situation in Bani Walid, however, these initiatives are mostly aimed at improving the circumstances of migrants within detention centres, ensuring basic health standards are met. Additional support is given to the transportation of migrants, either on their way from disembarkation to a detention centre or for the purpose of voluntary repatriation. Although these measures might improve the situation for detained migrants in the short term, and although they are indicative of a sentiment among at least part of the local communities that migrants should receive more humane treatment, they are unlikely to contribute to the improved position of migrants in Zawiya more generally.

1.2b The reality of local migration governance in Libya

From the above discussion, it has become clear that formal local migration governance is either absent or very much linked to the presence of detention centres. Local state authorities point to their lack of a mandate and constrained resources as primary reasons for their inability to improve the conditions for migrants. Given that municipal councils are not even able to meet basic service provision for their own constituents, they argue that it is unrealistic to expect them to improve the situation for migrants – particularly because it is not within their formal responsibility to do so.

“It has become clear that formal local migration governance is either absent or very much linked to the presence of detention centres.”

A much-used extension of this argument would be that the provision of more resources and technical support for service delivery at the local level would be a way forward to achieve more positive migration governance in Libya. The assumption underlying this strategy is that increased service delivery for host communities would also trickle down to the migrant population. Such a strategy overlooks, however, the fact that the capacity constraints experienced by Libyan municipalities are not mere technical defects that can
be overcome by allocating additional financial resources and capacity-building mechanisms. In the fragmented context that is Libya today, the municipal councils are only one part of the full picture of local governance provision. There is a wider range of informal governance providers that need to be reckoned with and that hold local power and often control resources.

Indeed, due to the deep fragmentation of the political and security landscape after 2011, Libya has become an accumulation of local political economies, essentially a collection of city-states, each with their own internal politics, sovereign areas and ‘militaries’. Amid the post-revolution turmoil, many micro governance systems have emerged in which both formal and informal actors play a role. These formal and informal power settlements – including a variety of local representatives, tribal elders, influential family heads and business elites, military councils, and militia leaders – compete and intertwine, and attempt to provide core functions that the missing state was supposed to assume, in what are extremely challenging circumstances.\textsuperscript{75}

Moreover, the boundaries between formal and informal actors involved in governance are not always clear-cut and the provision of services is often based on individual connections and personal networks that bypass formal structures. Governance in Libya is therefore best described as local, patterned and plural in nature – local because it is largely in the hands of local, as opposed to national, actors, and in many cases non-state groups; patterned because, across the country, a mix of militia rule, tribal authority and military governance combines into a layered, informal and network-based governance structure; and plural because a wide array of individuals, groups and coercive forces are involved in providing governance in their particular areas, and with differing motives and intentions.\textsuperscript{76} An understanding of these dynamics should shape any attempts to achieve more positive migration governance in the municipalities under study here.

The following case studies therefore outline the unique political economies and governance dynamics of Ghat Bani Walid and Zawiya, which have been shaped by their geographical location, historical affiliations, pre-existing and newly-shaped power arrangements, as well as by episodes of post-revolution conflict. Without purporting to provide a complete political-economic analysis of Bani Walid, Ghat and Zawiya – which, in light of recent developments would require far more in terms of scope, resources and access – taking stock of the governance dynamics in each municipality is nevertheless a useful building block for the formulation of measures that could contribute to more positive migration governance on the ground.

**Ghat**

The border town of Ghat, located in the south-western corner of Libya, is a relatively homogeneous town. It is inhabited by the Tuareg people (who form 98% of the town’s population).\textsuperscript{77} Ghat’s strategic location in southern Libya and its position as a transit point for trade caravans earned it the interest of the Ottoman imperialists (1551-1911) and the Italians (1911-1943). Later, with the consolidation of state borders after Libyan independence in 1947, Ghat became
marginalized. It was only in the 1990s that Qaddafi approached the Tuareg (and Tebu) communities of southern Libya as part of his pan-Africa strategy, promising the Tuareg people full citizenship rights in exchange for their loyalty to the regime.

Because many ethnic Tuareg were recruited into the security apparatus, they fought on the side of Qaddafi during the 2011 revolution. Ghat itself did not join the uprisings, but in the years that followed it paid the price of marginalization and neglect for its connection to the former regime. The city has been hit hard by the collapse of the state since 2011 and the subsequent state dysfunction, which effectively cut it off from receiving state revenues. The war in Ubari in 2014 to 2016, waged between Tebu and Tuareg forces, not only caused a high death toll, but also blockaded the only road to supply the city for more than a year.78

The need for the Tuareg to reposition themselves in post-Qaddafi Libya and to address the plunge into instability of the Fezzan post-2011, led to a series of reconfigurations of Tuareg politics. The three national Tuareg representative bodies that had existed before (the Supreme Council, the Social Council and the Advisory Council) united into the Supreme Social Tuareg Council (2017) as the most senior representation of the Tuareg people across the country. Mulay Eggedi, the former mayor of Ubari, was appointed head of the new body. He replaced Hussein al-Koni, until then president of the Social Council and protégé of the respected Tuareg leader, Ali Kanna, who served the previous regime and whose position had become untenable because of his baggage as a pro-Qaddafi figure and his inability to address the Tuareg people’s problems.79 At present, Ghat has no clear political affiliation with either the GNA in Tripoli or the Interim Government in Tobruk. The council and different tribal authorities receive resources from both governments in the east and west.80 Most respondents said they do not feel represented by a particular national political actor, or as one respondent tellingly stated: ‘Ghat will align itself with whatever side can provide for its community.’81

Ghat is governed by two of the Supreme Social Council’s regional divisions (Majlis al-Hukama or council of wisemen and Majlis al-Ayaan wa-al-Shuyukh, or council of elders). Although the council and its representative branches are not part of the state’s formal governance structure, and it only represents 60% to 70% of the Tuareg people,82 in Ghat the council is generally perceived (by Tuareg residents and a small non-Tuareg minority) as the official governance provider because it ‘foresees citizen’s needs [where the state does not]’ and ‘maintains a balance of power within the wider [Ghat] area’.83 The council is also praised locally for keeping armed conflict outside of the city despite flare-ups of tribal strife since 2011. As one respondent said: ‘Ghat is surrounded by difficulty. That keeps its people interdependent on one another. Whenever a problem comes up or conflict arrives, we count on the tribe to address it until it is resolved.’84

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Certain state institutions, like the Municipal Council and the Security Directorate, were not described as functioning or legitimate layers of government. In fact, respondents for this study describe Ghat as a context where there is 'no government' and an environment of 'state neglect', a void the tribe has largely filled. Moreover, the community expects its tribal representatives to bring their concerns and needs directly to the attention of state authorities, thereby effectively bypassing the municipal layer of government. Tuareg representatives themselves acknowledge that the lack of capacity in local government has increased their social and political influence. Contrary to what could be expected, however, tribal authorities interviewed for this study are unhappy with this situation: they feel strained, their resources are insufficient, and their workload has increased tremendously due to the absence of formal governance.

One might assume, then, that efforts to improve positive migration governance in Ghat should be coordinated with the Tuareg authorities with a view to improving the presence and legitimacy of formal government in the longer run. Such efforts should take stock, however, of the fact that the issue of migration management is more sensitive in the southern Fezzan region in general than elsewhere not only because of the general lack of service provision for host communities, but also because many Tuareg (and Tebu) do not enjoy the same opportunities and rights as Arab citizens. In the case of Ghat in particular, long-standing grievances exist between 'local' and 'foreign' Tuareg. Many 'foreign' Tuareg families have not been given full Libyan nationality (as opposed to Arab and long-standing Tuareg residents, even though their access to nationality is also problematic), meaning that they too do not possess the relevant Libyan documents required to access benefits and opportunities, including receiving state salaries.

Since 2011, there has been a further influx of Tuareg and Tebu families into Libya, which heightened their concerns and the perception of inequality. Tuareg residents fear that support for foreign migrants diverts attention away from their demands for equal rights. Arab citizens, in turn, are afraid that any measures aimed at helping migrants and regularizing their presence would attract migrants to the area and upset local demographics to their disadvantage. Respondents in this study described the relationship between migrants and local residents as predominantly friendly. In light of these local sensitivities, it is possible that this tolerance for migrants stems from the fact that regularization of migrants has not happened thus far.
Bani Walid

Bani Walid, located some 180 kilometres to the south-east of Tripoli, is the homeland of the Warfalla tribe, one of the larger and more influential groups in Libya, accounting for 1.5 million out of a total population of around 6 million Libyans, according to its elders. Although Bani Walid was not a unified bastion of loyalism to Qaddafi, the city made an effort to stay out of the revolution and it became one of the last cities to fall into the hands of the rebels, who inflicted a particularly harsh campaign on Bani Walid in late 2011. Another siege was imposed by Misrata, a revolutionary stronghold and age-old rival to Bani Walid, in October 2012. These incidents explain Bani Walid’s persistent resentment towards the communities in the coastal cities lying to its north. Because members of the Warfalla had been well represented in Qaddafi’s bureaucracy and security apparatus, Bani Walid was marginalized after the revolution.

As the ‘poor relation’ to the richer cities in the north, economic isolation gripped Bani Walid, which fostered a fertile environment for illicit activity. A particular feature of Bani Walid is the *modus vivendi* established between influential families and armed groups, allowing each to pursue their own interests. In this context of economic marginalization and a patchwork of local elites, the human-smuggling business was able to greatly expand and take on a more reprehensible face than elsewhere in the country.

A mix of tribal affiliations and old and new loyalties has also tainted the power constellation of Bani Walid in recent years. At present, political affiliations in the city remain a complex mix of Qaddafi adherents, revolutionary factions as well as supporters of Haftar and the LNA, against a backdrop that is historically tribal. As one respondent explained: ‘The municipality of Bani Walid is extremely divided even though it nominally follows the Government of National Accord. I’d say around 50% are still loyal to the previous regime.’ Another said, ‘The relationship between officials from Bani Walid and the Tripoli government differs from one official to the other. Some [officials] are at odds with the government even though administratively they fall under the GNA.’

Since October 2018, Bani Walid has had an elected municipal council (the 2014 elections did not take place for security reasons). Although *de jure* authority lies with the municipal council and the Security Directorate, *de facto* authority is more fragmented: ‘The official bodies involved in governance are the municipal council and the Security Directorate, but, honestly, non-official bodies, like the reconciliation committees [see below] and the business community, are as important,’ said a respondent. Bani Walid has been living under tribal rule since the Qaddafi days, and thus often resorts to civil social governance. The tribe
provides for all customary, political and social services. Local sources explained that the municipal council currently represents ‘just’ three tribes (with two large tribes not competing in the elections), and that the electoral support for the president largely came from his own family.

Influential informal entities in Bani Walid are the Social Council of the Warfalla tribe, which is made up of established elites and tribal elders, and reconciliation committees, which were established in Bani Walid, as well as in many other Libyan cities, to mediate community conflict that had erupted during the transition. Some argue that the municipal council is still waiting for the transfer of jurisdiction and resources from the ministries to the municipality, and that such a move will change the existing governance ambiguity. As one tribal sheikh and businessman from Bani Walid explained, however: ‘Real control in Bani Walid is exercised by the elders and the sheikhs. Administratively, the decision-makers from the municipal council are in charge … [But] the municipal council needs tribal elders to solve issues.’ For example, as a former minister and member of Bani Walid’s Shura Council pointed out that because of the liquidity issue, ‘the municipal council relies on tribal sheikhs to distribute funding. … The tribal sheikh receives the money in envelopes, and hands it to its local residents.’

Efforts to improve positive migration governance in Bani Walid could therefore capitalize on Bani Walid’s age-old tribal governance system, which is crucial for local residents in terms of social matters and protection. To date, this system has largely been inaccessible to migrants. The only real tribal effort at migration governance that we have come across is the Warfalla tribe’s condemnation of the practice of human smuggling, for example by granting human smugglers and the owners of hangars where migrants are being held a 15-day period to cease their activities before they would be raided by force. But, to date, this engagement does not seem to have translated into direct support for migrants. Sources argue that even though the Social Council of the Warfalla tribe has asserted its authority as a conflict mediator (in Bani Walid and elsewhere in the country), its power and interest do not reach far enough to put the issue of migrant ‘warehouses’ and migrant exploitation up for discussion, nor it is able to influence smuggling dynamics. Others claim that apparent lack of motivation on the part of Bani Walid’s tribes to exert a real effort to stop smuggling stems from political resentment over the outcomes of the 2011 revolution, as described above.
Zawiya

Much like the case of Bani Walid, Zawiya’s municipal council’s authority is also severely restricted by the presence and activities of non-state armed groups. The north-western city, situated on the Libyan coast approximately 45 kilometres west of Tripoli, is an arena of powerful but warring tribes. Because of its strategic location, being home to the country’s second largest oil refinery and on the road from Tripoli to Tunisia, Zawiya saw heavy fighting between regime forces and rebels during the uprising and it became the symbol of Qaddafi’s cling to power. But the revolution only paved the way for years of tribal and militia fighting after the removal of the regime, with flare-ups of violence between tribes in 2014 (leading to the shutdown of Zawiya’s oil facility), and in 2016, primarily over the town’s strategic and economic assets.

Zawiya falls within the GNA’s administrative orbit, but recently Haftar has pursued a military takeover of Tripolitania, including by securing the support of some of Zawiya’s armed groups. The balance of power now seems to be tilted in favour of Haftar in this politically crucial and most populous part of the country, with powerful tribes like Awlad Buhmeira, Awlad Sagr and Kragla adopting pro-LNA stances, thereby assuring Haftar of a strategic presence on the western fringes of Tripoli. The shifting affiliations of Zawiya’s armed groups should be seen in light of the broader power complex in and around Tripoli, with militias positioning themselves against the backdrop of the GNA’s ever-waning power in Tripolitania and Haftar’s steady advance in the rest of the country. As a tribal elder from Zawiya explained: ‘Here, we belong to the forces of Marshal Khalifa Haftar … but, administratively and financially, we still follow the government of Tripoli’.

Zooming in on the distribution of power in Zawiya, it is apparent that the GNA has little influence and that formal governance structures in Zawiya are weak. Like Bani Walid, Zawiya elected its first municipal council in 2018, but rivalries exist within the council and the de facto governing entity within the municipality remains the Criminal Investigation Unit in West-Zawiya, which is run by the Madkhali Salafist, Mohammed Swissi. This is a non-state armed group that presents itself as an official body that follows the government and operates as a counterforce to the influence of militia in the southern and eastern parts of the city, and illicit networks more generally. The Anti-Crime Unit has made use of the chaos and proliferation of illicit activity (including overt human smuggling) in Zawiya in recent years to enforce its authority. The provision of law and order is seen as its core task, but the Anti-Crime Unit is allegedly also involved in providing administrative services to citizens and improving the city’s infrastructure in cooperation with the business community.

Connecting these local power and governance arrangements to migration management, respondents for this study readily pointed to who is supposed to be carrying out migration-related measures across the municipality – namely the local authorities (the municipal...
council, Security Directorate and DCIM branch) on behalf of the relevant ministries in cooperation with local civil society – but that these actors are unable to extend such services to all parts of Zawiya. Respondents acknowledged that, particularly in areas that are under militia control, ‘the municipalities’ capabilities are limited to cover the problems of migrants in terms of rescue, protection and other’ and ‘the policies [against smuggling networks] are weak because [the needs] are greater than the ability of the Security Directorate [to address those needs].’ An official from the municipal council explained how the limitations in migration management are closely linked to the influence of smuggling networks in the town:

The mechanism [for migration management] exists but the implementation is difficult in Zawiya. Armed groups are in control of everything and they see the migration file as a red line, a property of theirs. As a local official or police officer, you cannot arrest a smuggler because the reaction will be strong and dangerous. In the municipal council, we tried to meet with the Security Directorate, the Joint Security Room and the Ministry [of Interior] to put in place a mechanism to combat this dangerous issue, in other words organized crime, but all that we agreed upon is that it is a dream that no official body can implement."

In the case of Zawiya, efforts to improve positive migration management would hence be implemented in a setting that is characterized by a strong focus on migrant detention and the inability of local state authorities to address human smuggling. Zawiya has a civil-society community, but their efforts when it comes to migrants have been largely geared towards the detention centres as well.

1.3 CONCLUSION: HOW DO GOVERNANCE ARRANGEMENTS SHAPE LOCAL MIGRATION GOVERNANCE?

The insights of this section demonstrate that both state and non-state actors operate in the realm of local governance. Connecting this to the topic of migration management, it discussed both formal and informal migration-management efforts, arriving at the conclusion that all migration approaches are shaped by the local political economy and often are a combination of top-down (formal) and bottom-up (informal) efforts. Table 2 presents a summary overview of these dynamics for each of the municipalities under research.
### Table 2: Governance dynamics in Ghat, Bani Walid and Zawiya

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Presence of formal government institutions</th>
<th>Ghat</th>
<th>Bani Walid</th>
<th>Zawiya</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Formal government institutions are present but not functional. City is effectively cut off from receiving state resources.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Formal government institutions are present and functioning but in arrangements with influential families and armed groups, which are largely autonomous. Relatively little central government influence.</td>
<td>Formal government institutions internally divided and restricted by presence and control of non-state armed groups.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Main governance and service provider | Tuareg tribe main governance provider and mediator, but is overburdened. | A mosaic of influential tribes of families and a formal local government structure – none of which have full control. | Municipal council reliant on local armed groups to channel resources to residents (including West Zawiya Anti-Crime Unit for law and order). |

| Political affiliation | No clear political affiliation, open to any central government support. | City is politically divided; local actors prioritize their own interests and back or oppose national actors accordingly. | City in GNA orbit, but armed groups allied with Haftar. |

| Migration management | No migration management system in place (besides border control by Ghat-based brigades). | Various formal and informal actors involved, primarily initiated by civil-society groups. A degree of cooperation exists between formal government and civil society. | Migration management centred on the DCIM detention centre. Mechanism for migration management exists, but implementation is difficult due to influence of non-state groups involved in illicit activity/human smuggling. |
2. THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF MIGRANTS: BURDEN OR BENEFIT?

This section explores how economic structures impact the economic opportunity and agency of both migrants and Libyan residents and how economic dimensions influence the relations between migrants and host communities. The section first explores how the 2011 revolution has affected the Libyan economy and people's livelihoods, focusing on people's dependence on the public sector as a consequence of the rentier model followed by the Qaddafi regime. Subsequently, it analyzes the routes undertaken by people to improve their livelihoods – mostly through illicit trade, but also through increased efforts to revitalise the private sector. Finally, it explores the role that migrants have historically played in Libya's economy, and the opportunities that arise for them, particularly given the renewed focus on private-sector development.

By exploring how these components come together in Ghat, Bani Walid and Zawiya, we provide insights into how economic dimensions can provide entry points for promoting positive migration governance.

2.1 LIBYA’S ECONOMY AFTER 2011 – THE COLLAPSE OF STATE RENTIERISM

The 2011 revolution and the subsequent conflicts have had an impact on the Libyan economy. Libya is a hydrocarbon-dependent society, one of a small group of countries whose income comes mostly from petroleum. Hydrocarbons provide about 95% of Libyan export earnings, 65% of the country's GDP and 96% of government revenue. Although Libya has one of the highest GDP per capita ratios in Africa (its energy sector produces substantial revenue and its population is small), its high degree of dependency on hydrocarbons, with oil production and oil price movements driving the economy, makes for a fragile economic environment. Under Qaddafi’s rule, the government controlled all the oil revenues managed by the National Oil Corporation, allowing it to influence virtually all economic activity in the country. Qaddafi’s government followed a rentier model, building an economy reliant on redistribution of the revenues and rewards of state resources.

Following a rentier model has meant that the Libyan state has been the main provider of people’s livelihoods for many years. In terms of direct employment, in 2012, the vast majority (85%) of Libya’s relatively small national labour force was employed in the public sector. In addition, state funds were spent liberally on all kinds of subsidies (for instance, for energy, healthcare and housing) and living allowances. The government also imposed controls on many basic food products, as well as fuel. Total subsidies in 2010 amounted to 10% of GDP, covering fuel (7%), food (2%) and electricity (1%).
This has meant that, traditionally, there has been limited interest shown by Libyans to seek employment in the private sector. The private sector has been viewed as a means of supplementary income, whereas state employment was considered a ‘must’. Working in the public sector was considered to be relatively ‘easy’ money. The sector therefore is heavily affected by a phenomenon known as ‘welfare-employment’ or ‘ghost-workers’, whereby salaries are paid to workers who show no presence or productivity in the workplace.\(^{115}\) It is believed that 90% of Libyan citizens receive a direct salary from the state irrespective of whether they have a civil servant job or not.\(^{116}\) In addition, public-sector employment (and salaries) is coupled with favourable indirect workforce benefits, including job security guarantees, social-security programmes, relatively high wages, generous non-wage benefits (such as family allowances) and tough restrictions on dismissal.\(^{117}\)

These benefits offered by the public sector have inflated expectations of income and working conditions, disincentivizing many Libyans from seeking employment in the private sector.\(^{118}\) This has hindered the development of the private sector in Libya, but it has also meant that, traditionally, the country has been highly dependent on foreign (migrant) labour to keep its productive sectors operating (see Section 2.3 below).

The 2011 revolution affected the economy profoundly, most significantly as a result of the resultant decline in oil production and exports – the country’s main source of income. Oil production fell from 1.659 million barrels per day in 2010 to 479 000 barrels per day in 2011.\(^{119}\) Although there was some recovery in 2012, when the war ended, and oil production bounced back faster than expected, the economy has not yet reached a point of sustained, longer-term economic growth. With hydrocarbon still considered the cornerstone of the economy, the blockading of oil facilities and the worldwide drop in oil prices in 2014 created a prolonged economic paralysis. Government revenues have been further compromised as oil revenues have been funnelled to armed groups in the country. This affected both oil and non-oil GDP: total GDP fell by 62%, while the non-oil real GDP declined by 52% in 2014.\(^{120}\)

"Traditionally, the country has been highly dependent on foreign (migrant) labour to keep its productive sectors operating."

Notwithstanding the economic fragility of the system or declining government income, subsequent governments after 2011 continued Qaddafi’s rentier legacy – in other words, buying peace through subsidies and public wages as a strategy to suppress popular discontent. A large growth in public spending boosted household incomes and consumption, ballooning government expenditures. Subsidies (for fuel, food and electricity) were raised to 11% and 14% of GDP successively in 2012 and 2013.\(^{121}\) Similarly, public-sector wages and direct cash transfers increased by 30% following the revolution in 2011, to be followed by a 27% increase in 2012 and a 20% increase in 2013.\(^{122}\)
Figure 1: Libya’s GDP growth (annual %)

Source: World Bank Database

Figure 2: Food subsidies in Libya (Libyan dinars, millions)

With limited revenues to finance this growing government expenditure, the Libyan budget has suffered an increasing deficit since 2013. This is primarily caused by the blockade of hydrocarbon infrastructure spreading across the country and resulting in funnelling of revenues.\textsuperscript{123} As a result, liquidity became strained with insufficient cash to pay out promised wages and subsidies.\textsuperscript{124} While Libyans continue to receive public wages and direct cash transfers from the government, they are permitted to withdraw only a limited percentage of it each month.\textsuperscript{125} In real terms, this has strained household income and Libyans’ access to cash. Likewise, strains on food and fuel subsidies have led to a shortage of supply of services and basic commodities. The market disruption meant weighty increases in prices of goods and services, further constraining household purchasing power.

Cumulative inflation over the last four years has adversely affected Libyan households, which have lost almost 80% of their purchasing power.\textsuperscript{126} The inflation rate, which was 2.4% in 2014, reached 9.8% in 2015, and skyrocketed to 25.3% in 2016.\textsuperscript{127} This continues to affect people’s daily lives today. REACH’s joint monitoring initiative records an increase in price recorded at 20.6% for food items and 4.7% for non-food items since February 2018.\textsuperscript{128} Limited access to direct cash, coupled with more expensive living standards, has pushed more Libyans into poverty and hardship. Today, nearly a third of Libyans are considered to be living below the poverty line.\textsuperscript{129}

The following case studies look at the current micro-economic realities of the three study sites in an attempt to better understand the role of migrants within the local economy.

**Ghat**\textsuperscript{130}

Building on the distribution of water in accordance with strict regulations, oasis agriculture has been Ghat’s key economic activity for many years – a sector that has traditionally been highly dependent on foreign labour. Olives, cereals and vegetables are the main produce, along with livestock.\textsuperscript{131} In addition, many households rely on light manufacturing for their livelihoods, including the production of rugs, baskets and leather goods. Before 2011, tourism was another main source of income for Ghat.

The local economy in Ghat has shrunk considerably since the revolution in 2011 – and especially since the conflicts of 2014 – due to physical destruction and conflict; energy blackouts and fuel shortages; increases in the price of commodities (particularly after the war in Ubari); and the absence of state investment.\textsuperscript{132} The lack of economic opportunities and insecurity also resulted in the departure of skilled labour migrants.
When asked about the key economic challenges that have confronted Ghat since 2011, respondents said that large state-owned farms were forced to close because of the challenging operating environment and that the agriculture sector has lost its prominent status in the local economy. In addition, the black market has grown exponentially as the formal economy has shrunk, largely due to limited employment opportunities, an increase in commodity prices and the squeeze on public-sector payments. A respondent from Ghat said: “There is no comparison between the two [the formal and the informal economies]. The formal economy is almost dysfunctional.”

In recent years, the loss of purchasing power has been especially notable for households in Ghat, resulting in a large discrepancy between people’s incomes and the cost of living. In addition to the depreciation of the Libyan dinar and the very poor liquidity in banks, prices of basic necessities in Ghat are particularly high because of the high cost of transporting them through the desert or smuggling them across the mountainous borders.

Bani Walid

Like most cities across Libya, livelihoods in Bani Walid are derived largely from public-sector employment. Specifically, and as described in Section 1, the tribes and families in Bani Walid are considered to have a large advantage due to their close ties with Qaddafi. The former Libyan leader transferred ownership of state factories and farms to the local population, allowing accumulation of substantial private wealth among the community. Qaddafi’s heavy investment in the development of Bani Walid can be seen in the private sector today.

Bani Walid’s economy consists of traditional sectors, such as agriculture – with wheat and barley production – and a manufacturing sector that benefits from the presence of animal stocks (goats and camels). Another prominent sector within the city is the textile and embroidery industry.

After the isolation that Bani Walid was subjected to during the revolution as a consequence of the community’s loyalty to the Qaddafi regime, the economy was cut off from the rest of the country. Respondents noted that this has had important consequences for service provision and commodity supply in Bani Walid. The community addressed the sudden disappearance of formal state services by setting up their own systems of service provision – and this situation continues to prevail today. For example, there is limited licensing or regulation of industry and services, such as construction, healthcare and education; private schools follow their own
curricula; hospitals and clinics are established without regulatory quality standards and licensing; professionals practise without necessary accreditation, such as doctors, pharmacists, and others; food is manufactured and marketed without being subject to quality regulations or health standards. According to the head of the local economic regulation committee, ‘people sell fake products, expired goods, and low-quality food, which could be very hazardous in the long term.’ Bani Walid has thereby essentially adopted a model of self-governance.

The main challenges that respondents identified are the same infrastructural problems as faced by the rest of the country: electricity cuts, damaged networks and limited access to cash. One respondent said: ‘Sometimes the electricity is disconnected for security reasons and sometimes the network is damaged and there is no maintenance. Instability sometimes leads to power outages, making it difficult to market and trade goods.’

Zawiya

Zawiya’s economy, which was self-sufficient pre-2011, is the most diversified of the economies under study here. The city has access to key infrastructure, including one of the largest oil refineries in the country, a sea port, substantial groundwater resources and good accessibility. Zawiya’s economy consists of traditional sectors, such as agriculture and fishery, which capitalize on the region’s abundant natural resources, but is also heavily reliant on oil processing and refinery, as well as on other derivative industrial sectors. As a port city, and due to its strategic location on the key trade route between the capital, Tripoli, and the Tunisian border, Zawiya is also an important trade hub for neighbouring markets and towns. Because of the variety of economic activities in Zawiya, households derive their livelihoods from several sectors. The highly monopolized oil sector generates an estimated 30% of households’ income, while an estimated 50% of households depend on fishery and marine wealth for an income.

Respondents noted that, since 2011, Zawiya’s economy has faced substantial challenges due to the security situation. The city is highly reliant on trade, and the three-year blockade of its trade routes with the capital and southern regions of the country held back Zawiya’s productivity and growth. The blockade effectively shut down certain industries, such as steel and aluminium manufacturing. Banks in Zawiya faced more damaging cash-flow crises than those in other parts of the country as a result of the blockade. One respondent also noted how the fishery sector was challenged by its inability to acquire spare parts and keep up basic maintenance of the fleets.
2.2 FINDING ALTERNATIVE LIVELIHOODS

In the context of macro-economic breakdown, governmental decay and crippling local economies, many Libyans have sought alternative sources of income. Some opted for the private sector – some more successfully than others – which, as mentioned, had been largely defunct under the previous regime. Others benefited from the lack of law and order – and government oversight – to venture into illicit activity, which gave way to the development of a pervasive war economy.\textsuperscript{150}

“In the context of macro-economic breakdown, governmental decay and crippling local economies, many Libyans have sought alternative sources of income.”

Box 3: Smuggling and trafficking in Libya

Libya's war economy was able to flourish against a backdrop of dysfunctional government and the perpetuation of conflict after 2011. Porous borders have been used for smuggling of persons, goods and fuel. The smuggling of subsidized goods out of Libya grew to be considered a key economic component of Libya's economy in different parts of the country. It is estimated that between 2013 and 2016, as much as 85% of fuel was being diverted in some way;\textsuperscript{151} today, the figure is estimated at around a third.

But the most high-profile of these illicit trades is human trafficking, which proliferated in Libya. By 2016, Libya had become the main launching point for mixed migration to Europe along the so-called Central Mediterranean Route. The business is a lucrative one, worth an estimated $27.5 million to $350 million to Libya's coastal cities at its peak in 2016.\textsuperscript{152}

In addition, the proliferation of armed groups and militias enforced illicit control over several economic and service sectors. Whereas most armed groups are not directly involved in smuggling, they have been able to generate significant revenue from taxation of the movement of goods and people through territory under their control. According to a report by the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, militias typically charge traffickers a per-migrant fee ranging from $2 to $25.\textsuperscript{153} Similarly, the capture and control by force of key transport nodes, import and export nodes, and oil and gas infrastructure has ensured armed groups make considerable profits through extortion schemes and the establishment of rents.
With foreign investors still wary of returning to Libya, Libyan entrepreneurs have taken the initiative to promote the private sector in their country. This has been strongly incentivized by the failure of the rentier state to sustain livelihoods of citizens and a thwarting of access to illicit economic activities (smuggling) with the tightening of border controls. ‘We have to work for the first time. Anything would do,’ said a community member from Zawiya in a focus-group discussion.

The legacy of the Libyan rentier model has translated into a meagre formal private sector, which accounts for just 5% of GDP and 4% of employment. Under Qaddafi, who asserted total state control over the economy, the (non-oil) private sector stagnated because private-sector investment was limited and state resources allocated to the private sector were virtually non-existent for much of his administration (see below). In addition to lack of investment, geographical conditions affect entrepreneurship in the agriculture sector in particular, which suffers from poor quality of land, lack of water and harsh weather conditions. In the industrial sector, the manufacturing process is suppressed by limited access to raw materials, lack of a skilled labour force, a narrow local market and inability to process product. The industrial sector also consists mainly of industries closely connected with the oil industry, such as steel, iron and aluminium manufacturing.

From around 2000, acknowledging the limitations of an economy dependent on hydrocarbons, Qaddafi put a diversification plan in place to promote the agriculture and industry sectors. However, as Libya’s private sector has always been highly reliant on foreign labour for both high- and low-skilled jobs (especially in the oil industry), Qaddafi’s efforts to promote the private sector translated into an increased dependence on foreign labour to kick-start growth within the productive sectors.

**Figure 3:** Value added (% of Libyan GDP), 2008

![Pie chart showing value added (% of Libyan GDP), 2008](image_url)

Source: World Bank Database
With much of the (expert) labour force originating from outside the country, the development of skills and capacities of Libyans lagged behind. The result was a mismatch between the skills needed for private-sector development and the Libyan labour force: the lure of public-sector employment has encouraged educational credentials that meet the needs of state bureaucracies rather than those that meet the requirements of a modern market economy. Libyans usually sought higher degrees and certificates (in areas other than vocational educational training) to improve their chances of securing a public-sector job, paying little attention to the content and quality of education, or the requirements of the private labour market. This over-focus on public-sector employment has been the key driver of unemployment in Libya, which has high unemployment rates of 13.5%, and youth unemployment ranging between 25% and 30%. It is reported that 30% of firms established in Libya have difficulty recruiting qualified Libyan nationals. Companies recruit Libyan staff to meet labour regulation quotas (see Box 4) while hiring foreign workers of various skill levels to fill the actual labour needs.

Moreover, long-standing reliance on subsidies and a less demanding public sector has influenced Libyan attitudes towards labour, resulting in a negative disposition towards manual labour. Libyans, generally-speaking, are highly educated and reluctant to undertake tough, manual jobs that involve manual or low-skill labour. Consequently, employers in the private sector in Libya view Libyan workers as unreliable and poorly motivated, with a shortfall in cognitive and non-cognitive skills. In contrast, foreign workers are considered more reliable, with better skills and qualifications, more willing to accept flexibility in their working hours and lower hourly wages, and more trustworthy. ‘They [migrants] are blessed with physical strength and can do construction jobs we can’t do,’ said a councillor from Ghat.

With such prevailing attitudes and labour market shortcomings, the Libyan private sector was stunted. In the post-2011 upheaval, the non-oil private sector in particular suffered major blows and, experiencing an estimated 50% contraction in economic activities. However, with the stabilization of (local) political security arrangements more recently, including opening up roads that had been previously shut down, a decrease in violent conflict (up until the recent incidents in March 2019), and stabilizing state revenues from oil, Libyans have sought to improve economic activity across a range of non-petroleum industries. After decades of state restrictions and the turmoil of the revolution, entrepreneurs became eager to capitalize on new economic and political opportunities. According to the OECD, 60% of Libya’s small and medium enterprises (SMEs) were created after February 2011. This phenomenon was incentivized by a recorded drop in smuggling activities and revenues as a result of tightened border controls. In addition, armed groups have started to use accumulated wealth from illicit activities as investment in several productive economic sectors.

A World Bank Enterprise survey reports that 13% of companies surveyed saw their sales grow after 2011. Large and medium-sized enterprises, which were most heavily affected by cuts in state subsidies and a drop in exports after 2011, recorded the highest losses. However, the majority of micro-enterprises – often trading and retail companies, food and beverage manufacturing firms, and the private healthcare industry
– experienced a higher growth percentage, because they often market locally and are less exposed to big contracts.\textsuperscript{169} The growth in the private sector is driven by consumption of segments with high disposable income, giving rise to a strong demand for consumable goods. At the same time, economic inequality among the Libyan population has risen.\textsuperscript{170}

The sectoral composition of Libya’s non-oil private sector today is as follows (see also Table 3):

- Trade is considered the largest component, representing 6\% of GDP and accounting for the largest number of enterprises.\textsuperscript{171} This sector has proven to be quite resilient in the years following the revolution, driving a significant part of economic growth.
- The private healthcare sector, private education and the catering services sectors remain comparatively small. Interviews conducted by the World Bank with the managers of private health centres led to estimates that the private healthcare sector grew by 60\% in 2012, 30\% in 2013, and about 5\% in 2014.\textsuperscript{172}
- Manufacturing of building materials (mainly ceramics and cement) is one of the two main industrial activities in Libya, along with food processing.\textsuperscript{173} Food manufacturing companies are composed of both large national firms and smaller businesses.
- The domestic construction sector has grown strongly, led by small-scale entrepreneurs centred on house construction and repairs.\textsuperscript{174}

Table 3: Libyan GDP by sector (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2012 \textsuperscript{175}</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil extraction</td>
<td>69.7</td>
<td>65.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufacturing</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electricity, gas and water</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wholesale and retail trade (including hotels and restaurants)</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport, storage and communication</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finance, real estate and business services</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public administration, (private) education, (private) healthcare and social work, community, social and personal services</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>14.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other services</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
These dynamics play out differently in the municipalities under study here, as discussed in the case studies below.

**Ghat**

Ghat is an example of a Libyan city where the large majority of the workforce are employed in the public sector. After 2011, the breakdown of vital economic sectors, combined with the high loss of purchasing power, drove many young people into illicit activities because state salaries could not compete with the profits from this lucrative criminal activities. Cross-border smuggling is considered low risk and provides quick returns in the form of direct cash in an economy that is troubled by liquidity issues and where public-sector wages are not always paid. Consequently, smuggling is considered a key economic lifeline for the local community and it has had a spillover effect on other sectors within the economy of Ghat. Smugglers have invested in local economic activities, which has resulted in certain services and other productive sectors being tightly connected to smuggling revenues. An example is smugglers in Ghat investing in local farmland. This has come about because local markets rely heavily on smuggling to either trade their local produce or to import basic goods and commodities in times of shortages. Today, human smuggling constitutes only a minor part of these activities, as the number of migrants passing through Ghat dropped dramatically after the region became cut off from the rest of the country in 2014.

In comparison to Bani Walid and Zawiya (see below), the respondents who were interviewed in Ghat were generally unable to identify new forms of economic development in the city. When asked about the main economic sectors, they identified the same ones that existed in the city before 2011 – namely, agriculture, light industry and crafts. In terms of the sectoral composition post-2011, it is estimated that trade in crafts and traditional clothing makes up 24% of the local economy; the livestock trade 70%; agriculture 5%; and cross-border smuggling 1%. One reason for this lack of economic diversification may be that Ghat continues to be subject to challenges that began in 2011, such as limited connectivity to the rest of the country, neglect by the central government, increased price of raw materials, and the lack of competitiveness of the trans-Saharan and Sahelian trade routes in the global trade environment more generally. Whereas respondents in other cities reported a slight improvement in the business environment, this seems not to be the case for Ghat.
Given the wealth of the community in Bani Walid (as explained above), combined with the presence of a relatively strong academic sector and a high-calibre labour force, the town has been able to successfully develop various private-sector services, such as healthcare, education, waste management and construction, and to generate economic opportunities for the community. Whereas before 2011, the public sector was a key source of employment – the result of the community’s close relationship to the Qaddafi regime – respondents noted that many civil servants in Bani Walid have now left the public sector. Many have ventured into entrepreneurial activities in the private sector, while others participated in illicit activities, including smuggling of humans and weapons, and militia activities. Many of the community members are still registered under the religious authority and receive state salaries, as per law No. 15.

Because of its political and economic marginalization in recent years, Bani Walid has been heading towards economic self-sufficiency. The private sector – which mainly operates in the informal sector – is growing and covers more than the needs of the market, meaning that Bani Walid has effectively become a trade economy as a result of the weakening state sector. According to a member of the Association of Businessmen, the community of Bani Walid has been witnessing ‘sustained economic growth, which has been (further) crystalized this year’. The community has transformed economic activities that were present before 2011, such as agriculture and light manufacturing, into a driver of private-sector development. A respondent said: ‘For more than seven years, there has been little mention of the formal economy, except for very few sectors that have a very limited effect. The informal economy, or what is called the private sector, is growing and covers more than the needs of the market.’ Despite many factories being hit by NATO strikes in 2011, there has been a growth in enterprises manufacturing leather, carpets, electronics, blankets and upholstery. In addition, Bani Walid manufacturers are believed to have ventured into the weapons and electronics. Agriculture and livestock trade, especially trade in sheep and camels, have also become an important economic activity for people’s livelihoods as well.

Despite these opportunities for licit economic activity, the central parts of the municipality are also considered a key hub for the smuggling of migrants, and the city has long been a primary transit station for northbound migration. However, unlike the southern regions of Ghat, or the coastal region of Zawiya, the link between smuggling and the wider local economy (and revenue generation) seems relatively weak. According to respondents in this study, smugglers in Bani Walid invest a comparatively lower share of their profits in the local community, and when they do, they essentially benefit the smugglers themselves and their family circles, creating a weaker link between the smuggling industry and society.
Zawiya

As described above, Zawiya has the most diversified economy of those under study here. Respondents acknowledge that Zawiya is in principle rich in opportunity, but this does not mean that the community has access to a wide range of economic opportunities. Sectors are structured on the basis of regional divides, meaning that local communities’ economic strategies are dependent on the presence of natural resources. Households have responded to economic adversity by engaging in economic activities. In practice, many depend on fishing, farming and small-scale manufacturing. There are factories that produce asphalt, electrical cables and machinery, and other light industries. The economy is also heavily reliant on retail and wholesale trading, and is believed to fund the whole western region of the country, as well as the Western Mountain region because of the city’s proximity to Tripoli. Residents in the Harsha area of western Zawiya, home to construction and steel enterprises, have also grown the scrap-metal trade and manufacturing of heavy machinery. The diversity of the economy within Zawiya has ensured that opportunity exists for all. According to one fisherman ‘Zawiya is rich in opportunity. Even if you take a fishing hook and catch some fish, you can easily make a living.’

Like Bani Walid, Zawiya is known for its central role in Libya’s human and fuel smuggling business. The region’s smuggling economy is facilitated by the presence of key infrastructure. Smuggling in the coastal region of Zawiya has also been enabled by the fragile security conditions created by competition between armed groups and militias in the context of the post-2014 political struggle. Smuggling has been used primarily as a means of empowering militiamen rather than benefiting the community. Therefore, the motive for becoming involved in migrant smuggling in this part of the country is less linked to uplifting the local population and more an economic incentive for militias to accumulate wealth quickly, taking advantage of the central government’s weak control in these areas. More recently, smugglers have been starting to use the wealth generated by illicit activities to set up legitimate businesses. Despite this being little more than an attempt to legitimize their illicit accumulation of wealth, it does, however, generate further economic opportunity for the community and better service provision.
2.3 THE MIGRANT LABOUR FORCE IN LIBYA: HIGH DEMAND, LIMITED SUPPLY

The Libyan economy today builds on a long history of labour migration. In the 1950s and 1960s, the discovery of oilfields in Libya attracted large numbers of migrant workers from across the Middle East, North Africa and sub-Saharan Africa to work in the resultant emerging economic hubs across the country. Between 1970 and 1982, the proportion of foreign workers in the total active labour force increased from 11% to 50%. Migrants came with various skill levels, working in oilfields, as well as the construction and agriculture sectors. In the 1990s, Qaddafi introduced visa-free travel for sub-Saharan migrants as a means to attract much-needed labour to the country. As a result, Libya became one of the main destinations for labour migration in Africa. The total number of foreign workers was estimated at 2 million before the revolution, mainly people from neighbouring African countries and a number of Asian and Eastern European countries.

Despite the ongoing economic crisis, migrants continue to form a significant part of Libya’s economy. Given the problematic economic situation in the country, including high inflation, weak infrastructure and limited accessibility to raw material and imports, the growth of the private sector has become necessarily labour-intensive. As a businessman from Bani Walid said, ‘My business relies on [the labour of] migrants; they are the only capital that exists in this country in the present dire circumstances.’ In addition, post-conflict reconstruction activities offer a major opportunity for migrant labourers, who have historically been the main source of labour in this sector. Indeed, a World Bank enterprise survey found that the growing construction and trade sectors reportedly use between 60% and 70% foreign workers, with Libyans filling only key positions, such as managers, accountants and engineers.

Box 4:

Labour policy on hiring migrants (extract from Labour Market and Employment Policy in Libya)

The Libyan government encouraged foreign labour migration during the late 1980s and the 1990s. However, once Libya had become an irregular migration hub, certain internal problems arose and the country found it lacked the legal instruments to deal with the situation. The Libyan government issued several new rulings to help better organize the labour market, but laws previously issued in the 1970s and 1980s were still in force, resulting in blockages in the system and discrepancies in Libyan legislation. Libyan legislative policy has
been reactive rather than strategic and this has had impacts on the labour market. Libyan laws restrict the employment of foreigners by setting numerical limits. The laws also provide that companies have the right to recruit non-Libyan nationals only for positions that cannot be filled by Libyan nationals. Under Libyan law, at least 20% of workers in foreign companies must be Libyan nationals, and organizations must also provide training to an additional number of Libyan citizens every year.204

However, in reality, companies are able to request permission to employ more foreign workers in any sector where they cannot find qualified Libyan workers and there are widespread reports of abuses in this system, as most employers tend to prefer foreign workers.205 The national legal framework does not allow for migrants who have entered the country without receipt of a valid entry/exit visa (i.e. ‘undocumented’ migrants) to register for work. Such migrants are criminalized by existing law. In reality, however, Libyan SMEs, micro-enterprises and individual employers have frequently used undocumented labour from before 2011 and this trend continues today.206

The profiles and nationalities of migrants in Libya have evolved over the past few years. Of the companies in the 2015 World Bank enterprise survey, 44% reported that the number of their employees decreased after the crisis, as many qualified foreigners left the country in July and August 2014.207 Migrants (as opposed to foreign labour in Libya pre-2011) are now predominantly young, single men with a low level of education. The vast majority of migrants (94%) originate from 31 African countries; the remaining 6% are from Asian and Middle Eastern countries. The top source countries are Niger (19%), Egypt (14%), Chad (14%), Sudan (12%) and Nigeria (10%) (see Figures 4 and 5).208

Given the declining numbers of migrants present in Libya since 2011, organizations employing foreign workers continue to experience labour shortages. This is the case because, with the change in the profile of migrants, the available skill sets have also changed.209

- Nationals from non-neighbouring Arab countries tend to be skilled and have a higher level of education. Syrian migrants in Libya, for example, have a high level of education and specialized skills. They work mostly in the trade and services sectors, particularly in the hospitality industry.
- Nationals of neighbouring countries (Niger, Chad, Sudan, Egypt, and Tunisia) often migrate temporarily and regularly. Chadians and Malians are mostly employed in agriculture, while Nigeriens tend to work in carpentry and security. Tunisians often work in jobs that require ‘patience’ (e.g. as barbers, butchers and carpenters).
- Nationals of West and Central African countries, such as Nigeria, Guinea, Côte d’Ivoire, Gambia, Senegal, Ghana, Mali and Cameroon, tend to be young and vulnerable to ill-treatment. West and Central African migrants are hired for work that requires heavy physical labour. Ghanaians are known for their skills in construction and real estate. Nigerians are preferred for car mechanics and maintenance. Guineans work in transport and waste collection.
Figure 4: Migrants in Libya by country of origin (2018)


Figure 5: Migrants in Libya by region of origin (2010 vs. 2018)

Refugees and migrants who came to Libya for work, and with no reported intention to travel on to Europe, mostly work in urban centres or areas known for agricultural production. The majority have been in Libya for over a year, and tend to have limited mobility and stay in one place. In practice, the informal labour market means that, particularly in the coastal cities, hundreds of migrants wait every day on the streets to be hired for daily labour. Respondents explained how such migrant workers aim to stay in their current location in an effort to minimize their exposure to risk. This entails finding work where the individual is paid regularly and building social networks to support them. Especially with refugees and migrants of sub-Saharan origin, staying for longer in one location reportedly allows individuals to build better relations with Libyans in the same area, to find better housing and employers who can protect them or pay their ransom if they are kidnapped. Therefore, when asked how their situation has changed since they first arrived in Libya, most reported that it had improved, as they had been able to build social relations and find more decent work, protecting them from exploitation and abuse.

Our interviews show that these strategies pay off for migrants. The increase in demand for migrant labour is reflected in reported migrant wages (see Figure 6). Respondents in the three municipalities under study here placed migrant and Libyan workers’ wages on the same scale. Business elites and authority figures in Bani Walid, Zawiya and Ghat also noted that migrant workers are in a stronger position today than at the beginning of the migration crisis to negotiate terms and types of employment.

Figure 6: Average minimum wage of migrant and Libyan workers (LYD)

Source: Respondents in the business communities of Zawiya and Bani Walid, 2019
Note: No data available for Ghat.
Although the liquidity crisis has made access to cash much more difficult for everyone in Libya, migrants continue to be paid in cash, indicating the sense of urgency among employers to hire migrant workers. They prioritize paying migrants in cash, as opposed to Libyans, who find it difficult to secure cash-based employment terms. Coupled with the interviewed employers who reported their continued need for migrant labour – and their preference for hiring a migrant worker as opposed to a Libyan – this illustrates how migrant labour in Libya is in high demand. Of the interviewed business respondents, 63% (90% in Bani Walid, 85% in Zawiya, and 16% in Ghat) said that migrants have a positive impact on the economy and its growth potential.

The migrant-labour economies in the three study sites are discussed in the following case studies.

**Ghat**

Businesspeople and state authorities linked to business-related departments highlighted the important role that skilled, documented migrant workers played in the local economy before the revolution. They also agreed, however, that Ghat no longer offers the lucrative working opportunity it once did for migrants. The fact that employers are no longer able to pay migrant workers regular wages because of the liquidity crisis has caused migrants to leave the area. As discussed in Section 1, transit migrants tend not to stay in Ghat for long.

Nevertheless, there is still a need for migrant workers, and respondents noted that migrants continue to work in cleaning companies, construction, industry and on farms. Migrant workers
who have remained in Ghat receive low wages and have short-term or irregular work contracts. The reason for this is that, in the words of an activist, ‘local people do not work as cleaners or such, so with the absence of migrants, it would become catastrophic.’ Migrants in Ghat are mostly from neighbouring countries, including Niger, Mali, Ghana, Nigeria and Cameroon. Respondents noted that migrants have limited job security, with work agreements expiring after the work assigned to them has been done. They tend to receive daily wages – which tend to be good and sometimes even better than the wages of citizens. Migrants have fixed the prices they will accept for daily work, confident in the knowledge that labour is in short supply.

Although tensions have been reported between Libyan and non-Libyan Tuareg communities in Ghat, our respondents noted that the integration of migrants in Ghat has not been a problem – especially for Tuareg migrants from Niger, who share a common language and culture with locals. According to one imam, ‘locals treat migrants like brothers and sisters.’ Marriages between migrants and locals are common too, with more than 400 cases of such marriages registered (out of a population of 22,000). Despite limited reported discrimination in service provision between migrants and citizens, migrants (as is the case for the host community) do not benefit from municipal services, as the municipality is currently barely functioning.

In addition, given the recent economic crisis in Ghat, migrants have become a burden to an already strained economic context, as reported by several respondents from Ghat.

“Given the recent economic crisis in Ghat, migrants have become a burden to an already strained economic context, as reported by several respondents from Ghat.”

Bani Walid

As is the case in Ghat, migrants are also considered a cornerstone of Bani Walid’s economy, especially those who arrive in search of employment there. As there is a mismatch between the high levels of education in Bani Walid and the demand for low- and medium-skilled workers, private sector growth has been conditioned by growth in the dependency on migrant workers. The demand for a migrant workforce in Bani Walid pre-dated the 2011 revolution, as many respondents stated, with a slight increase in recent years as a result of new private-sector ventures. According to a factory owner, ‘migrant employment opportunities didn’t change after 2011. It is the migrant workforce that changed, with a shift in migrants’ countries of origin. The “old” workforce left for security reasons and they were replaced by a new, mostly African, workforce.’
Today, migrants in Bani Walid come from Chad (25%), Niger (20%), Egypt (18%), Sudan (15%) – and the remaining 22% from other countries, including Ethiopia, Mali, Senegal, Somalia, Syria and Bangladesh.\textsuperscript{238}

Migrants are considered a strong workforce and they are seen as having the patience to work hard. They make up a big portion of purchasing power, as well as the labour force, in the city. Migrants are deemed especially important for their contribution to the agriculture sector and public services.\textsuperscript{229} Locals also need migrants to do other manual jobs:\textsuperscript{230} ‘They [migrants] organize themselves and their working arrangements on their own’;\textsuperscript{231} Africans run farming; Bangladeshis work in petrol stations; Egyptians in construction; Sudanese in markets and shops; Moroccans as butchers; Tunisians in hair salons; and Algerians in mechanic workshops. Migrants have become employed in almost every economic sector in Bani Walid, and, as the head of the Agricultural Office put it, ‘We almost work for them [migrants]; they are the entirety of the workforce in the private sector.’\textsuperscript{232}

Migrants are perceived in a positive light by our respondents in Bani Walid. As noted by a member of the municipal council: ‘There is a positive integration of migrants because they work in farms, trade, and were even used in the war against the Islamic State.’\textsuperscript{233} This sentiment is echoed by the mayor, who said the municipality employs migrants in work such as construction, house maintenance and in public services. ‘I deal with them in a way that satisfies our Lord, as our Islamic religion instructs us, in an easy-going, moderate and humane way.’\textsuperscript{234} Similarly, a focus-group respondent affirmed, ‘Migrants who work for me are considered part of my family. We work together, eat together and live together.’\textsuperscript{235} Many focus-group respondents confirmed that migrants’ Islamic culture has helped them to connect and integrate better within the Libyan community.

Although Bani Walid is generally known for grave abuse of migrants in informal detention, the migrants workers who were interviewed for this study in places of employment and in the public space generally noted that they enjoyed or had got used to living in the city of Bani Walid. They reported that locals coexist with migrants of different nationalities, and share Islamic practices with them. Some of the migrants, who had previously stayed in Ubari (southern Libya) and Zawiya, noted that the Bani Walid was safer for them and had better living conditions.\textsuperscript{236} They said that they are usually treated respectfully by their sponsors and employers, who bail them out if they are arrested.\textsuperscript{237} Migration to Europe through Bani Walid has decreased in recent years, with several migrants unwilling to make the sea journey any longer, as long as stability and opportunities exist in Bani Walid.\textsuperscript{238}
Zawiya

With its extensive smuggling network, there have always been high numbers of migrants arriving in and leaving Zawiya. Besides bringing financial benefits to smugglers, migrants have played a vital role in promoting economic diversification in the town, helping the development of various sectors. As one respondent put it: ‘This is the migrants’ second home. They own more of it [Zawiya] than we do.’

Migrants in Zawiya are believed to come mainly from Nigeria, Mali, Ghana and Burkina Faso, and there are an estimated 2,000 migrants in the town. They work in all Zawiya’s economic sectors but principally in construction, agriculture and cleaning. Respondents categorized migrants by the type of profession they occupy. For example, Ghanaians are said to work in construction; Nigerians in mechanic workshops; Chadians and Malians in agriculture; Nigerians in carpentry and security; Bangladeshis in petrol stations; and Burkinabe and Guineans in physically intensive work, such as waste collection. Syrians usually have a high level of education and special skills, and tend to work in desk jobs and in management.

In 2017, with the reopening of trade routes and the stabilization of the security situation in the north, Zawiya’s economy began to flourish again. The large migrant labour force residing in Zawiya’s detention centre and other urban hubs have been a key central input into the revival of Zawiya’s economy. Migrants interviewed in the detention centre recounted how they leave the centre to work during the day – in principle, they are allowed to keep their wages. However, all migrant work in Zawiya – unlike in Bani Walid and Ghat – is believed to be formalized (i.e. migrants need authorization to work).
As infrastructure remains severely damaged by the conflict and lack of maintenance, especially waters wells and fishing infrastructure, Zawiya’s only hope is labour-intensive growth. The emphasis on growing the local economy through private-sector development lies in the agriculture and manufacturing sectors, and the rehabilitation of services (including hospitals and education facilities). Private-sector initiatives include small-scale enterprises as well as larger-scale investments – the latter notably by armed groups that have accumulated wealth from smuggling activities. Researchers from Zawiya referred to examples of smugglers providing services to citizens – such as electricity, water and waste collection.\(^\text{245}\) With smuggling activities declining, several actors have begun to diversify their revenue streams by investing in manufacturing and agriculture. In its infant stages of recovery, the private sector in Zawiya employs migrants on a temporary basis operating from day to day (including fishing, agriculture and light home-based industries). This allows for shorter-term employment of migrants and less stable arrangements (including limited access to the kinds of basic services provided by employers that offer longer-term arrangements).

Historically, the relationship between Libyans in Zawiya and migrants has been close, with migrants working as labourers in farming, seaports, fishing, trade and security or providing manual labour in people’s homes. The conflicts and crises after 2011 didn’t change that relationship.\(^\text{246}\) On the contrary, youth in Zawiya left their jobs in the public sector to join militias or smuggle fuel, food commodities and migrants across the sea. Migrants are perceived as useful in filling the gap in the labour market for the private sector.\(^\text{247}\) ‘Many shops, commercial businesses, farms, companies and factories hire only migrant workers as employees. As a result, employers’ relationships with migrants have grown stronger over the years, and they rely heavily on the migrant labour force.’\(^\text{248}\)

The majority of migrants interviewed in Zawiya seemed content with how they are treated by their employers (and landlords), and claimed that they are treated like family members. Migrants said that Zawiya is safe, wages are relatively good and the cost of living is cheap. On occasion, migrants that do not hold legal residence status are caught by the authorities, but are bailed out by their employers and sponsors.\(^\text{249}\)

Nevertheless, most migrant workers in Zawiya have only temporary employment arrangements, as it is still considered a transit point to Europe. Most are content to be in the region and gain work experience, but the majority wish to travel to Europe if they had the opportunity, although they are afraid to go by sea because of the inherent danger.
2.4 CONCLUSION: HOW DO ECONOMIC STRUCTURES IMPACT ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY AND AGENCY?

The insights of this section demonstrate that, overall, the Libyan economy is struggling to recover from the impact of the 2011 revolution and the subsequent conflicts. Interestingly, the context of macro-economic breakdown, governmental decay and crippled local economies has provided opportunities for migrants to strengthen their economic agency, given Libya’s dependence on its migrant workforce. This is caused by increased demand for migrant workers at a time of shortage of a reliable migrant labour force. Specifically, with austerity measures and limited revenues, Libyan’s livelihoods depend on their ability to capitalize on migrant human capital to pursue private-sector opportunities. This is reflected in the positive attitude shown towards migrant workers in the business sector in municipalities that have begun to pursue growth opportunities (Bani Walid and Zawiya), the good wage they receive (paid in cash), compared to wages paid to Libyans, and good migrant–employer relations in instances of longer-term employment. In conclusion the findings make it clear that the economic situation in Libya potentially provides opportunities for positive migration governance.

“The context of macro-economic breakdown, governmental decay and crippled local economies has provided opportunities for migrants to strengthen their economic agency, given Libya’s dependence on its migrant workforce.”

Table 4 presents an overview of the economic dynamics, and the roles played by migrants, in each of the municipalities under research, while Table 5 summarizes employment conditions for migrants.

Table 4: Economic dynamics in Ghat, Bani Walid and Zawiya

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Ghat</th>
<th>Bani Walid</th>
<th>Zawiya</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Resources</td>
<td>Major agricultural area; strategic border position.</td>
<td>Wealth (accumulated pre-2011); entrepreneurship.</td>
<td>Location of key strategic assets, natural resources (mineral and non-mineral), trade connectivity.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-2011 changes</td>
<td>Vital economic sectors largely died down due to closure of border and regional conflict; especially high loss of purchasing power due to price increases in the south.</td>
<td>Economically isolated after 2011, creating fertile breeding ground for illicit activity.</td>
<td>Security situation broke down local economy (liquidity, accessibility) and facilitated illicit activity.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Development of alternative economic activities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Ghat</th>
<th>Bani Walid</th>
<th>Zawiya</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Illicit economy (smuggling)</td>
<td>is an important source of income and sustenance livelihoods.</td>
<td>Economic ‘self-governance’ model; little economic regulation; new service providers (e.g. hospitals, schools).</td>
<td>Most notable development of small entrepreneurial efforts; most households took up small economic activities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nerve point for human smuggling, but link between smuggling and local economy is weak.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Illicit economy (human and fuel smuggling) source of wealth and power for militia.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Role of migrants in local economy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Ghat</th>
<th>Bani Walid</th>
<th>Zawiya</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Historically) high dependence on migrant labour for agriculture but migrant numbers dwindled due to border security (Algeria) and lack of economic opportunities.</td>
<td>Larger service providers require skilled migrant labour.</td>
<td>Small-scale entrepreneurial efforts create a demand for manual/low-skilled migrant labour.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remote farms lost access to labour; migrants are still active in cleaning, construction and other forms of manual labour. Migrants have less secure working arrangements (with daily wages).</td>
<td>Migrant labour force is structured; migrants have stable working arrangements (e.g. yearly contracts, housing and service/healthcare provision).</td>
<td>Migrants have less secure working arrangements (e.g. hourly/daily wages, limited benefits).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 5: Migrant employment conditions in Ghat, Bani Walid and Zawiya

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Migrants’ countries of origin</th>
<th>Sector of employment</th>
<th>Type of employment</th>
<th>Wages</th>
<th>Access to services</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ghat</strong></td>
<td>Niger, Mali, Ghana, Nigeria and Cameroon</td>
<td>Cleaning companies, farms, construction and industry (labour work)</td>
<td>Short-term or irregular (limited job security)</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>No access</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Zawiya</strong></td>
<td>Nigeria, Mali, Ghana and Burkina Faso</td>
<td>Construction, agriculture and cleaning</td>
<td>Temporary employment arrangements</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Limited access</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Bani Walid</strong></td>
<td>Chad, Niger, Egypt and Sudan</td>
<td>Agriculture, public services and construction</td>
<td>Regular (one-year contracts)</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Full access</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3. A WAY FORWARD FOR POSITIVE LOCAL MIGRATION GOVERNANCE IN LIBYA

This section concludes the analysis presented above of local governance structures, localized migration management efforts and the (potential) role of migrants in the local economies of Ghat, Bani Walid and Zawiya with a set of key insights that should underpin a path forward for positive migration management in Libya. Based on this understanding, as well as best practices in migration governance taken from other (non-Libyan) contexts, a set of recommendations is identified for reality-driven and meaningful migration governance that can improve the situation of migrants and host communities alike.

3.1 OVERALL CONCLUSIONS

Because of the national legal framework, and because migration is intrinsically linked to issues of territorial control and citizenship, migration governance is the central purview of the state. By extension, migration governance is often regarded as:

the combined frameworks of legal norms, laws and regulations, policies and traditions as well as organisational structures (sub-national, national, regional and international) and the relevant processes that shape and regulate States’ approaches with regard to migration in all its forms, addressing rights and responsibilities and promoting international cooperation.250

As this study has shown, however, such a state-centric approach to migration governance quickly runs into obstacles in the Libyan context.

"The existing legislative framework is mainly of a prosecutorial nature, meaning that it focuses on combating illegal migration."

First, due to the fragmentation of authority and security, as well as the ongoing armed conflict, there is no unified Libyan state. Libya’s formal approach to migration governance is underdeveloped and, as the section on local (migration) governance has shown, the relevant ministries do not appear to have a strong appetite to invest in the development of national migration policies.251 The existing legislative framework is mainly of a prosecutorial nature, meaning that it focuses on combating illegal migration. With a frail national government that is losing legitimacy fast, it is unlikely that an effective central approach to (positive) migration management can be rolled out any time soon.
Secondly, in part because they bear no official responsibility to address migration, local state structures suffer from a similar lack of capacity and willingness to improve the situation of migrants in Libya. In terms of capacity, municipal councils are overburdened and underfunded. Municipal governments struggle to provide for their citizens in the fields of security, basic service provision and rule of law – let alone being able to support migrants. These capacity concerns are not mere technical defects that could be addressed through the rerouting of financial resources, capacity-building measures and support for service delivery at the municipal level. Instead, the municipalities’ lack of capacity is a symptom of a larger, structural process of formal governance decay at the local level caused by internal divisions among ruling families and tribes, as well as the power of non-state armed groups that block the flow of resources to the municipality.

In light of these local complexities, this study has found that the municipal management of migration – that is, formal and local management – is virtually non-existent beyond matters of detention and control. In all three case study sites, it is clear that at the level of local-government authorities, migration tends to be dealt with as a security file, which reflects the way migration management is dealt with by Libyan law. The dominant notion that comes through in the participant interviews is that migrants are a burden to municipalities in terms of resources and service delivery – which are already substandard – and that they are a health and security hazard to the community. Migration, it is often felt, would therefore be best addressed by cornering off migrants in society and returning them to their countries of origin. With such prevailing attitudes towards migrants, and in the absence of a mandate to manage migration, it is unlikely that more support for local governments would improve the situation of migrants in Libya.

This is not to say that the picture is completely bleak, as governance in Libya is not the sole purview of the state. Next to formal government actors, governance can be performed by actors such as influential families or tribes, armed groups, companies, civil-society organizations and (I)NGOs. These non-state actors have proven to play an important role in positive migration governance in a range of fragile and non-fragile settings. The reason for this is that they are generally well positioned to fill gaps in state responses and to form bridges between migrant and host communities.

Section 1 has provided some examples of existing and reliable civil-society organizations that have taken on a role in practical migration governance. In the case of Bani Walid, civil society has stepped in to take care of migrants who suffer from illness and injuries, and to recover the bodies of deceased migrants. In Zawiya, civil society works together with the local authorities to improve the circumstances for migrants within the detention centre. These efforts are a first step towards improving the situation of migrants in Libya, but are still very much tied to a general system of migration management that is abusive and focused on cordon-offing migrants off from society. In addition, one should be careful not to ‘over-glorify’ the role of civil society, as there are no ‘neutral’ actors in Libya and civil-society groups also have their own interests and agendas. Although we did not come across examples of unreliable civil-society initiatives in this study, it is a risk that certain civil-society actors take advantage of the situation, and of the international community’s willingness to engage, to their own benefit.
Whereas civil-society efforts in the three municipalities under study here are still of a more reactive nature, the business community shows more promising signs of being able to become a driving force for positive migration governance. The key reason for this is that migrant labour has become a crucial economic factor for many Libyans, whose livelihoods have steadily declined with the decreasing effectiveness of the Libyan rentier state after the 2011 revolution. With limited government revenues, liquidity became strained, as insufficient cash was available to cover wages and subsidies. This increased the prices of goods and services while restricting the cash available to citizens – adversely affecting Libyan household incomes. With nearly a third of Libyans considered to be living below the poverty line, many have sought alternate sources of revenue.

Section 2 has shown that this state economic decline resulted in the proliferation of new types of economic activities. On the illicit side, smuggling activities flourished – including the smuggling of persons. With recent stabilization efforts, many Libyans also tried to pursue new economic ventures within the private sector. The majority of these are considered micro-enterprises, often trading and retail companies, that usually cater for a local market. This has allowed well-positioned migrant workers to negotiate better economic agency for themselves – reflecting the high dependency of the business community on the migrant labour force.

Indeed, in the three municipalities under study here, we find that migrants that stay longer in the country (i.e. that are part of the stable migrant workforce) have seen an improvement in working conditions, including an increase in wages up to the level of those earned by Libyans and better relations with employers. For example, they receive their payments in cash, which is indicative of their preferential treatment in a context market by liquidity problems. Furthermore, employers were said to be the key protection providers for many migrants interviewed. The important economic contribution of migrants is particularly visible in Bani Walid and Zawiya, areas that both attract a high calibre of economic migrants to the agriculture and industrial sectors amid growing opportunity for private-sector development. The reliance of these sectors on migrant labour has resulted in community pushes for local migrant registration schemes to facilitate foreign labour for local businesses. These efforts could be further capitalized upon to improve positive migration governance in Libya.

The important role that migrants play in the development of economic diversification strategies in Libya explains the large discrepancies that we find in the local communities’ opinions on migrants. As is the case in most migrant host communities around the world, many respondents argue that migrants pose a threat to security and public order, that they carry infectious diseases, that they are criminals and that they don’t respect local customs, laws, and traditions. At the same time, however, migrants are generally perceived as having a positive impact on the country’s economy. This perception is probably the most important entry point for policies seeking to promote positive migration governance in Libya today.
3.2 RECOMMENDATIONS PER MUNICIPALITY

Given the diversity of local experiences and the distinct nature of the political economies found in the three municipalities under study here, a ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach to improving the quality and effectiveness of local government in Libya will not work. There are too many actors involved in the local system of governance, and not all of them are state entities. In addition, despite widely shared political, economic and social challenges in Libya, the needs of municipalities – and those of the people who live in them – are intrinsically tied to local sensitivities and priorities. The same degree of diversity holds true for migration management approaches at the municipal level, and the ability to promote positive migration governance at this level. Even though various municipalities said that their communities and economies have been impacted by irregular migration in recent years, and that local government lacks authority and resources to address the migration issue, responses and approaches to the presence and treatment of migrants are not easily comparable because of specific features and dynamics in each locality.

We therefore propose specially tailored ‘ways forward’ to promote positive migration governance for the three municipalities under study here.

Ghat

As described above, Ghat is far removed from the power play between competing political camps in the north, but it has been hit hard by the collapse of the state since 2011, which effectively cut it off from state revenues. Episodes of conflict have similarly crippled the local economy and propelled many citizens into the illicit sphere to sustain their livelihoods. For migrants, Ghat is no longer the lucrative working environment it once was. There are government institutions, but locals and migrants alike describe the area as a ‘formal governance void’. The Tuareg tribe stepped in to fill this void, but although it has maintained relative calm in the city, it is also overburdened and its resources to provide for citizens are strained. Top-down migration management consists mainly of border-control initiatives; bottom-up migration management is underdeveloped because relevant civil-society initiatives are non-existent. Interactions between migrants and the local community are predominantly friendly, because locals acknowledge the economic contribution of labour migration, and because a sense of ‘equal suffering’ prevails.

In Ghat, the image emerges that (future) positive migration government is intrinsically tied to the revival of the local economy. It is likely that support for economic development will go hand-in-hand with creating more prospects for migrants in this area (as has historically been the case), and consequently improve their overall integration into society. Local-government actors could capitalize on the need for, and community’s acceptance of, foreign labour by using the regularization of migrant labour as an effective migration management tool. Sustainable economic growth will also be necessary to provide alternatives to the smuggling business as a livelihood strategy, especially in light of international efforts to stop cross-border smuggling, a move that currently removes economic opportunity without providing alternatives.
Clearly, economic revival does not happen overnight: it requires, over time, durable support mechanisms, the return of (foreign) investment in the region and concerted efforts to overcome over-reliance on the hydrocarbon sector that has prevailed in Libya (the rentier model). That, in turn, can only happen as the outcome of high-level political decision-making, in Libya and internationally, and a long-term commitment to help the Fezzan overcome neglect and instability. A practical first step would be to encourage political elites in the coastal region to distribute basic state services, such as healthcare, to Ghat, and address cash liquidity and state-owned salaries. Such elites can be reached via collaboration directly with the Prime Minister’s Office and concerned ministries, including the Ministry of Local Government (MoLG) and the Ministry of Interior (the latter through its involvement in transporting resources to Ghat).

The Delegation of the European Union to Libya (EUDEL) could provide a channel for such coordination, as meetings and correspondences would have to be formally established (for example, through notes verbales to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation (MoFA)). This would help economic activity to gain traction. Next, it would be necessary to acquire a better understanding of the avenues for supporting Ghat’s local economy, for example by identifying the (non-hydrocarbon) economic sectors that can be supported in the short term and to assess the local interest in private-sector development. The EU could commission a mapping exercise for this. Some of the actors that could make this possible include the Ministry of Planning, the MTEI and the MoL. For Ghat, the local council could play a role in the mapping of business actors. Ideally, EU economic support in Ghat would follow a stratified approach: support for local projects (for example, infrastructure projects) creates jobs for local residents as well as migrants, but the outcomes of such projects (i.e. better infrastructure), in turn, contributes to a stronger local economy. The UNDP’s stabilization facility for Libya is about to commence projects in Ghat. To date, it is considered the only non-relief (developmental) international organization working in Ghat – and could act as a potential partner for EU activities in support of the local economy.

Localized and small-scale initiatives to support economic development can eventually help the build-up of migration-governance efforts, but they are not sufficient. A programmatic approach to improving social cohesion is also required. An example in this regard is Gaziantep, a Turkish city on the border with Syria, which evolved into a receiving hub for Syrian refugees from 2011. The city gained considerable international attention for mainstreaming its social and government services to migrants (refugees) and in ensuring common welfare for migrants and host communities. The municipality established a non-governmental organization (the Refugees and Asylum Seekers Assistance and Solidarity Association, also known as the Refugees Association) tasked with implementing a coherent response to an increasingly diverse population. For example, it...
generated equal training and income opportunities for migrants and local residents by providing vocational training and life-skill workshops. As a result, Gaziantep became one of the few Turkish cities that could address the labour shortages in certain sectors by deploying a migrant (Syrian) workforce. This helped the local community to view the presence of migrants from a cost-opportunity perspective rather than as victims dependent on aid, which consequently helped the local government to extend provisions to migrants without considerable resistance from the host communities.

Such lessons can be transferred to the situation in Ghat. Without existing civil-society organizations to take on the task, the municipality should be incentivized – with the support of international assistance organizations, as has been the case in Gaziantep – to take the lead on economic integration and social cohesion efforts. UNICEF could support social cohesion efforts, while the UNDP can support economic integration efforts. Locally, social cohesion could be supported by the Social Council of Tribes, the Red Crescent, the Youth Council and the charity Libya Sons Foundation. The local council in Ghat could support economic integration, given the absence of other relevant actors.

In a context of weak local-government capabilities, as is the case in Ghat, it is also recommendable that the EU considers a temporary placement of an external advisor within the local government structure. Acknowledging that current security challenges may prevent such a short-term deployment in the Ghat area, the presence of external advisors could help the municipal council to build capacity, organize community-building exercises and development of social solidarity projects. In addition, this approach would allow the EU to better understand the local context and therefore choose interventions that are flexible and tailored to local realities. Finally, it can mitigate as much as possible the potential for corruption or misuse of international funds because it allows for constant oversight of locally invested resources.

In terms of social cohesion, there is an opportunity to build on the tolerance for migrants that already exists in Ghat. Because local residents generally express appreciation for migrants’ economic contribution, and find a sense of equality in everyday hardship for local communities and migrants alike, people-to-people support mechanisms that are known to have had a positive contribution in other contexts may bear fruit in Ghat as well. Social solidarity projects, for example for the sharing of subsidized goods, can be encouraged to address the material needs of migrants. In other contexts, needs-based civil-society organizations are often the driving force behind such initiatives, whereas in Ghat relevant civil society is largely lacking. Therefore, city-to-city exchanges – perhaps facilitated by international municipal associations – between different Libyan civil-society stakeholders (and by extension, local government) can serve to share best practices from community-driven responses to migration and create knowledge, benefit from mutual experience, and incentivize local civil society to set up similar projects. As an example, the Moroccan port city of Tangier has sought such cooperation (within the framework of a transnational city network) to learn from other migration-governance strategies. It also hosted a conference on the issue of local migration governance, which brought together a number of Moroccan cities, international organizations and city networks working in the field of migration. These enhanced connections have served as a channel for transferring innovative ideas and best practices.
Approaches that seek to link economic development to improving opportunities for migrants should be cognisant, however, of local tensions around citizenship rights, identity and entitlement. In the context of Ghat, any effort to improve migrants’ positions might be interpreted by other groups as an undermining of their demands for equal rights. Biased narratives about migrants being awarded excessive rights by governments are common in many contexts that have had to manage large influxes of migrants. Experiences from other contexts where rising tensions between migrant and host communities needed to be mitigated can proof useful in this regard. In addition, regular consultations between the municipal council, the Tuareg Social Council and the local population can be encouraged so that local power holders remain ‘tuned in’ to local concerns and needs, and so that the local population are aware of how the local power holders are addressing migration while taking into account the host community’s interests.258

Table 6: Recommendations for positive migration governance in Ghat

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recommendation</th>
<th>Required action</th>
<th>Potential change agents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Support sustainable economic growth</strong></td>
<td>• Encourage coastal elites to distribute basic state services to Ghat</td>
<td>• Municipal council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Research on / mapping of sector(s) that can be supported, local interest in</td>
<td>• International assistance (UN agencies, like UNDP, UNICEF, INGOs)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>private sector</td>
<td>• International business and investment community (e.g. through the International</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Vocational training for local residents and migrants</td>
<td>Finance Corporation of the World Bank)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Promote (foreign) investment in region</td>
<td>• Civil society (supported through INGOs), Red Crescent, Libya Sons Foundation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• External advisors (e.g. through EU or UN rosters)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>**Collect best practices from community-driven</td>
<td>• Facilitate city-to-city exchanges</td>
<td>• Municipal council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>responses to migration</td>
<td>• Organize learning facility (e.g. conference on effective migration management)</td>
<td>• Tuareg Social Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Encourage consultations between the municipal council, Tuareg representatives</td>
<td>• International assistance (UN agencies, like UNDP, International municipal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>and the local population</td>
<td>associations)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Promote people-to-people support mechanisms</strong></td>
<td>• Establish community centre</td>
<td>• Civil society (supported through INGOs), Red Crescent, Libya Sons Foundation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Set up social solidarity projects</td>
<td>• External advisors (e.g. through EU or UN rosters)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Facilitate life skill trainings</td>
<td>• Needs-based civil-society groups (supported through INGOs)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Red Crescent, Libya Sons Foundation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Local government / municipal council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Tuareg Social Council, Youth Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• External advisors (e.g. through EU or UN rosters)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Zawiya

Zawiya, as mentioned, is home to several competing tribes and non-state armed groups that control parts of the city and leave local government struggling to assert authority to fulfil the needs of citizens. Human smuggling in this part of Libya has been a means for local militia to swiftly acquire wealth and control. Zawiya is described as rich in economic opportunity but dependent on trade, which is heavily hindered by episodes of conflict. In Zawiya, migration management largely equals migrant detention. The city has one formal (DCIM-run) migrant detention centre that is under the oversight of local militia. Support for migrants initiated by local civil society (and international relief agencies) exists, but it is concentrated on alleviating the situation of migrants in the detention centre, and their voluntary repatriation. The absence of substantial migration management efforts beyond migrant detention seems to be the result of the inability of local authorities to organize such efforts, the power complex of the city, which prevents local government from enforcing anything on non-state (armed) groups, and the absence of a civil society structure that is willing or capable to engage beyond the detention system.

There is an incentive, however, to foster the economic contribution of migrants, especially in the developing private sector. The town's economic composition has historically allowed for a significant volume of expatriate labour, but instability in the past years has heavily affected economic sectors in which migrants work. As the study has shown, Zawiyan respondents consider the presence of migrants an economic asset but at the same time a security threat to their community. However, an awareness seems to prevail that migrant labour is needed to bring licit economic sectors back to life and to further develop the private sector. For migrants, Zawiya (and Tripolitania more broadly) is relatively rich in opportunity. Hence, there is room to bring together supply and demand, and employ migrants in sectors that are hampered by a labour shortage.  

Similar to what is recommended for Ghat, and learning from experience in other contexts, for example the city of Gaziantep in Turkey, an important first step is to identify sectors, companies and occupations that are in high demand of labour. This could be done by surveying economic activities and labour shortages, carried out by actors such as the Ministry of Labour, and the Chamber of Commerce, Industry and Agriculture. Based on that, vocational training for both migrants and host communities may be helpful to bring together supply and demand. This approach will not only strengthen the formal economy and make migrants more economically self-reliant, but it can also be a way to enhance migration management beyond the detention system. Nevertheless, and given the presence of powerful and adverse smuggling-linked militias and Islamist militia factions, it should be recognized that any intervention could quickly become instrumentalized by conflict actors. As experiences in other contexts have shown, such a strategy would require a concerted effort by stakeholders – in local government, the business community and civil society – to reach migrants and make the right connections. Particularly in a municipality like Zawiya, where no single group has full control and local government is comparatively weak, such ‘horizontal coalitions’ can potentially initiate various (small-scale) migration-management measures, such as labour registration, housing solutions and healthcare. Moreover, even when clear-cut legal competencies in the field of migration management are
missing, and even when local government perceptions are generally dismissive of migration, experiences from other contexts shows that local government can still take the lead in establishing such collaborations and shaping local policies. In the case of Gdansk (Poland), for example, the need for migrant support was initially covered by the non-governmental sector but later picked up and developed into a comprehensive strategy for migrant integration by the local government – an experience to note, given the fact that in Poland negative stereotypes and xenophobia are relatively widespread.  

Table 7: Recommendations for positive migration management in Zawiya

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recommendation</th>
<th>Required action</th>
<th>Potential change agents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **Foster economic contribution of migrants** | • Research/mapping to identify sectors with labour shortage, where migrants could (further) contribute  
• Bring together supply and demand  
• Provide vocational training | • Business community  
• Chamber of Commerce  
• Municipal council  
• International Assistance (UN agencies, like UNDP and International Labour Organization, World Bank, INGOs) |
| **Enhance social cohesion**         | • Extend and coordinate existing social-service models run by multiplicity of actors (e.g. to migrant women and children) | • DCIM  
• Red Crescent, STACO Foundation  
• Civil-society groups  
• Municipal council  
• International assistance (IOM, International Medical Corps, UNHCR, UNICEF) |

Bani Walid

Bani Walid has been largely isolated from central government influence since the revolution in Libya, which has left the town politically divided and characterized by a modus vivendi between powerful tribes, families and armed groups, each pursuing their own independent interests. Post-revolution dynamics brought political and economic isolation to Bani Walid, which created a fertile environment for the human-smuggling industry and gave way to the reprehensible treatment of migrants. Despite the town’s central position in human-smuggling networks, the profits of this industry generally benefit only the actors involved, and the link between smuggling and the local community is weak in comparison to, for example, a context like Ghat. Given Bani Walid’s increased national socio-political integration (due to its current strategic importance for both conflict camps), national governance elites might be amenable in helping to push for the abandonment of the cruelest activities happening in the city.

Bani Walid’s migration management response is best described as decentralized but integrated. Civil-society groups, in cooperation with local government institutions, have established a set of community-driven relief efforts to alleviate migrant suffering. The involvement of civil society in migration management in Bani Walid is relatively developed in comparison to the other cases examined in this report. The case of
Bani Walid shows that civil society is a key actor to consult and cooperate with for positive migration governance at the local level. In Bani Walid, community-driven, bottom-up initiatives to improve the situation of migrants have been established in an environment engulfed by hardship. These deserve recognition and support. Because a migrant shelter has been established by locals and members of the Salam Charity Organisation in Bani Walid, there is an opportunity to learn from experience from other contexts where more services for migrants have been integrated.267

The one-stop-shop model is based on the idea that migrants can access a variety of relevant public services in one place, and have a ‘go-to’ location where they can voice their needs and seek support. One-stop-shops provide ‘navigation’ for newly arrived migrants, but also established migrants who need, but are not always aware of, the available, locally provided services. The model usually involves creating a physical hub, like a community centre, where all or most of the relevant state or non-state institutions a migrant needs to engage with are accessible in one location. Services provided to migrants in such a centre might include healthcare, psychosocial support, legal counselling, vocational training, work permit counselling, licensing, etc. Depending on the size and location of the centre, it could also function as a shelter for the most vulnerable groups, like migrant women and children. Employing socio-cultural mediators representing migrant communities in these centres helps to overcome linguistic and cultural barriers, and to build trust.268 As is recommended for the municipality of Ghat, one-stop-shops can also benefit from temporarily placed external advisors to build capacity and get the facility up and running. The integrative approach that a one-stop-shop model offers is a format successfully tested by the European Commission’s Common Agenda for Integration in the Portuguese context in 2004. IOM’s comprehensive evaluation of the one-stop-shops in Portugal endorses the replicability of the model by taking into account distinct contextual aspects of each locality. With the necessary support, the already existing migrant shelter in Bani Walid can improve both the quality and the quantity of services it provides to migrants, and effectively play the role of a local one-stop-shop.

One limitation of the one-stop-shop model, however, is the potential creation of tensions between host communities and migrants, based on the idea that migrants are being granted excessive rights, in case the services are not equally accessible by citizens from the area. In order to overcome such misconceptions, ‘general’ one-stop shops can be established for both citizens and migrants – which can also be more cost-effective and sustainable in comparison to standalone one-stop shops for migrants.269 Introducing inclusive methods in the delivery of public services in one location can moreover combat the negative attitude of host communities towards migrants. It can help shift the perception of migrants as a strain on public services towards the idea that the presence of migrants in the municipality can also have positive outcomes, as migration pushes the local government to take new and innovative measures in order to facilitate access to services for all.

It is equally important to note that any bottom-up, civil-society-initiated projects cannot and should not replace public institutions’ efforts to develop a formal migration management framework at the local level.270 In the same vein, in a context of weak local governance – as experienced in Libya – the scalability of community
initiatives is problematic, and so is the incentive to maintain these initiatives in a context of low governmental efficiency. As such, migration-management efforts should try to involve a coalition of local government, private actors and civil society.

Table 8: Recommendations for positive migration governance in Bani Walid

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Recommendation</th>
<th>Required action</th>
<th>Potential change agents</th>
</tr>
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</table>
| Support community-driven initiatives and reliable civil-society groups | • Research/mapping to identify existing bottom-up initiatives, and their successes (and practices to avoid) | • (Existing) civil-society groups  
• INGOs                                               |
| Integrate services for migrants                      | • Set up migrant desk to take stock of needs  
• Establish one-stop-shop model in physical hub (e.g. existing migrant centre) | • Municipal council  
• Civil-society groups  
• External advisors (e.g. through EU or UN rosters) |
| Build local coalitions in support of migrant economic agency | • Facilitate regular meetings between local government, business community and civil society (e.g. in the physical setting of a migrant community centre) | • Business community  
• Economic institutions (e.g. Chamber of Commerce)  
• Municipal council  
• Civil society groups                                 |

3.3 OVERALL RECOMMENDATIONS

Bearing in mind the limitations for support and acknowledging that a tailor-made approach is required to effectively support positive migration governance at the local level in Libya (given local differences), we can identify a number of broader principles that should be taken into account when developing specific programming that aims to support local initiatives to improve conditions for migrants and Libyans alike. Although this study has concentrated on three municipalities, the recommendations below can underpin migration governance efforts in Libya more broadly.

The EU’s programming seeks to alleviate the situation experienced by migrants and local communities by promoting legitimate and effective governance at the local level. As such, the programming is aimed at enhancing municipalities’ capacity to provide basic social services, encourage licit economic opportunity and support the integration of migrants into local communities.  

This study has underlined how programming in support of local migration governance should be based on a solid understanding of the needs and ‘agendas’ of local stakeholders and migrants alike – what are the entry points for engaging migrants in the economy and what would be compelling arguments to get them
to join in activities? Ideally, and as a matter of principle, programming entities (like the EU) should invest in regular ‘deep-dives’ in local political economies, not only to understand influential actors, shifting interests, new power constellations and relevant developments in the field of migration and politics, but also to understand the needs and priorities of local stakeholders and migrants in a particular context. However, in reality this will not always be feasible. One concrete option to explore is to include questions on social capital and social cohesion in the vulnerability and needs assessments as they are conducted by the humanitarian actors among migrants and host communities, so that the outcomes of such assessments can serve as the basis for designing positive migration governance strategies.272

As this study has also underlined, governance at the local level is not solely made up by municipalities, and formal governance actors generally follow a securitized approach to migration management. Hence, the EU should as a matter of principle not only focus its attention on the municipalities’ capacities when aiming to promote legitimate and effective governance at the local level, but rather should approach local governance as an interplay of key local stakeholders, with a specific focus on civil-society and private-sector actors (as interlocutors that are ‘legitimate’ for the EU to work with, and – importantly – also legitimate actors in the view of Libyans, as opposed to many non-state armed groups). Governance programming should in other words focus on the combination of these three stakeholders. It is recommendable to engage, at least at first, with existing and reliable groups – such as community-driven civil-society groups, preferably with a proven and positive track record – because all stakeholders will bring implicit and explicit agendas that can restrict the room for manoeuvring and influence the outcomes of the action.

"In the Libyan context, one clear opportunity lies in the possibility for local government actors to capitalize on the need for, and the acceptance of, migrant labour."

It is also important to keep in mind that the entry-point for governance programming will ultimately remain the municipalities – in other words, it is important to think how local government actors can capitalize on the needs and priorities of the other stakeholders in order to strengthen their position – and ultimately to enhance their ability to design a positive migration-governance structure. In the Libyan context, one clear opportunity lies in the possibility for local government actors to capitalize on the need for, and the acceptance of, migrant labour – linked to an overall need to strengthen (inclusive) economic growth. Concrete actions in this regard would be to support local-government actors in setting up a chamber of commerce (which would cater to the needs of the business community), develop labour registration schemes (learning from lessons of previous attempts at local labour registration), and develop equal training and income opportunities in collaboration with, for example, a business council, which would cater to the needs of businesses and the (potential) workforce – both migrant and Libyan – at the same time.
The one-stop-shop model described above is a tested model that not only addresses the needs of migrants and host communities alike, but also provides an opportunity to stimulate cooperation between local government, civil society and private-sector actors. One concrete option to explore in this regard is to see if experiences with this model so far in specific Libyan municipalities can be shared through city-to-city exchanges, to see if it could be rolled out on a broader basis.

Such initiatives allow local governments to address migration in their municipality in a practical way within the limitations of a national framework where the formal mandate for migration governance lies with the Ministry of Interior. For external actors like the EU, recognition of the existing national framework, and the formal division of responsibilities, is also a matter of ‘do no harm’: municipal efforts to improve migration management may not be automatically endorsed by national entities (the Ministry of Interior mainly) and ‘bypassing’ the central level in support of local migration management is not advisable. However, if municipalities can demonstrate successful and practicable pilot projects in migration governance, they could take a more proactive approach in advocating for policy changes within the national framework for migration governance.
### ANNEX: OVERVIEW OF INTERVIEW AND FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSION DATA, BY MUNICIPALITY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interview data</th>
<th>Bani Walid</th>
<th>Zawiya</th>
<th>Ghat</th>
<th>Ubari</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Traditional leaders</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Businesspeople</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
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<tr>
<td>Official authorities</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Civil society</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other (academia, media, armed groups)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>49</strong></td>
<td><strong>53</strong></td>
<td><strong>19</strong></td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Focus-group discussion data</th>
<th>Bani Walid</th>
<th>Zawiya</th>
<th>Ghat</th>
<th>Ubari</th>
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<td>3 (mixed)</td>
<td>3 (youth, women, elderly)</td>
<td>3 (youth, women, elderly)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
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<td><strong>3</strong></td>
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NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. Positive migration governance is the transformation of host communities’ negative socio-psychological attitudes and dispositions towards migrants as well as the restoration of migrants’ confidence and the increase of their trust in host communities to facilitate social cohesion – see J Tarusarira, Development education and the psychosocial dynamics of migration, Policy & Practice: A Development Education Review, 24, 2017, 88–103.

2. Migration management is defined as the combined frameworks of legal norms, laws and regulations, policies and traditions as well as organizational structures (sub-national, national, regional and international) and the relevant processes that shape and regulate States’ approaches with regard to migration in all its forms, addressing rights and responsibilities and promoting international cooperation! This definition is taken from the IOM Glossary on Migration, 3rd Edition, 2018 – forthcoming. This study also conceptualizes migration management as the combination of formal and informal responses to the influx and presence of migrants at the municipal level in Libya (leaving the system of detention outside the scope of analysis).


9. Exact population numbers are difficult to find. Estimates vary between 200 000 and 235 000 inhabitants; see http://worldpopulationreview.com/countries/libya-population/cities/.


17. In contrast to Bani Walid, respondents from Ghat and Zawiya claim that migrants no longer wish to stay in their areas, due to, respectively, a lack of opportunity and the unstable security situation. (From focus group discussions conducted with migrants in Zawiya and Bani Walid, March 2019.)


19. As explained by a DCIM officer in Bani Walid, March 2019.


23. In consultation with Clingendael staff, the local researchers chose to cluster the questionnaires for the three thematic strands, meaning that one respondent was usually interviewed on governance, economy and migration/community. For that reason, the numbers in Annex I are lower than the total number of interviews given in the methodology (as one delivered transcript included three separate interviews).

24. The focus-group discussions with community members were held at central community locations such as a university, café or training centre. The informal discussions with migrants were held at workplaces (in construction, agriculture, cleaning, etc.), as well as at migrant compounds.


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36. For example, in March 2019, the Ministry of Interior and the DCIM met with Médécins Sans Frontières (MSF) and the EU delegation to discuss the provision of healthcare and general conditions in detention centres, respectively, http://moi.gov.ly/2019/03/03/.
38. UNDP, Migrant registration in Libya: Contributing to resilience and recovery, March 2018 (draft).
41. Sources explain how municipal councils are sometimes ‘bypassed’ when citizens seek support directly from the relevant ministry; news expressed in internal meeting with Clingendael researchers, December 2018.
44. UNDP, Rapid diagnostic on the situation of local governance and local development in Libya, 2015, https://undp.org/content/dam/ld/docs/Africa/Libya_2015.pdf.
45. As one public official in Bani Walid stated: ‘I don’t think there is anyone who would accept normalization in this municipality.’ As a municipal council member, I argue it is best to assemble [migrants] in one part of the municipality and put a responsible party to control them’, interview with municipal council member, Zawiya, March 2019.
46. WHO, Service availability and readiness assessment – Libya, 2017; a local source from Ghat explained how, in practice, this meant that for weeks she was unable to find medical care in the municipality for a family member who fell ill; workshop with local researchers from Ghat, February 2019.
47. Commander of the Ubari Rebels Battalion, 11 March 2019.
50. As one public official in Bani Walid stated: ‘I don’t think there is anyone who would accept normalization in this municipality.’ As a municipal council member, I argue it is best to assemble [migrants] in one part of the municipality and put a responsible party to control them’, interview with municipal council member, Zawiya, March 2019.
51. Interview with the Dean of Scientific Affairs, Ghat, 13 March 2019.
52. Interview with a civil-society representative and women’s rights activist, Ghat, 18 March 2019.
53. Focus-group discussion with migrants in Ghat area, March 2019.
54. Focus-group discussion with Migrants in Ubari, 19 March 2019.
56. The only thing that we came across is a number of individual efforts to shelter and protect migrant communities.
57. Interview with tourism bureau, Bani Walid, March 2019.
58. According to a member of the municipal council, Bani Walid, March 2019.
60. See International Committee of the Red Cross, IOM and MSF.
61. Interview with director of Bani Walid passport office, March 2019.
62. Interview, scout member, Bani Walid, March 2019.
63. UNDP, Migrant registration in Libya: Contributing to resilience and recovery, March 2018 (draft).
64. Afrigatenews, December 2018, https://www.afrigatenews.net/article/
65. The hospital continuously complains about the lack of governmental support to take care of all who come in, and to store the bodies of deceased migrants, https://twitter.com/LibyasChannel/status/1020641818273370112.
66. A study on the political economy of migrant detention centres is currently being conducted by the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime as part of the EUTF research project Monitoring the political economy of human smuggling in Libya and the Greater Sahara (forthcoming).
67. The respondent spoke of ‘shelters’ (in Arabic, marakiz al-iwa). The interview transcript makes clear that he is referring to formal DCIM detention centers, and not a different type of migrant centre.
68. Other relevant national actors mentioned by local respondents are the Ministry of Health, which has taken measures to medically examine migrants, and the Ministry of Passports and Immigration, which, as explained by local officials, was instructed by the Health Ministry to return migrants who carry infectious diseases to their home countries – interviews with a member of the Supreme Council of the State, member of the National Conference of the Municipality of Zawiya and member of the Party for Change in the municipality, Zawiya, 6 March 2019.
69. The management of mortal remains of migrants is for ethical and technical reasons a highly important, but under-researched, issue that is tied to the organization of local governance. Because of the many structural and cultural complications in the identification, transportation and burial of deceased migrants, it is kept outside the scope of this report.
70. The respondent spoke of ‘shelters’ (in Arabic, marakiz al-iwa) but the interview transcript makes clear that she is referring to formal DCIM detention centers, and not a different type of migrant centre.
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October 2019

114. See Atlantic Council, The Libyan economy after the revolution: Still no clear vision, 2013.

Petrol prices in Libya were among the lowest in the world, averaging $0.15 per litre; only Iran and Saudi Arabia had lower prices.

World Bank, Labor market dynamics in Libya: Reintegration for recovery, 2015. The rate for women is even higher, at 93%.


Interview with officer in charge of social affairs, Zawiya municipality, March 2019.

Interview with official from the Zawiya municipality, March 2019.

Tribal leader from Zawiya, March 2019.

‘The dominant force in the municipality is the Criminal Investigation Unit in West-Zawiya, which imposed itself on the municipality in 2010. See Atlantic Council, The Libyan economy after the revolution: Still no clear vision, 2013.

Reflections of a local researcher in Zawiya, February 2019.

Interview with humanitarian actor, May 2019.

Interview with representative of Municipal Relations Office of Bani Walid, March 2019.

Interview with representative of Tuareg Social Council, 24 February 2019.

Views expressed by Tuareg residents from Ghat and Ubari, February 2019.

Local researcher from Ghat, February 2019.

Interview with a tribal leader from Owaynat, 15 March 2019.

According to our sources, the High Tuareg Council does not receive state funding. According to a local researcher, ‘The council operates more like an NGO’ (May 2019).

Interview with local DCIM branches to facilitate repatriation. Migrants from Ghat and Ubari are usually brought to Tripoli. Relocation seems to be a pertinent issue, though, as a reported lack of vehicles usually requires the involvement of other actors, such as the Libyan Red Crescent, to assist in the transportation process; see https://www.facebook.com/STACOLIBYA/?_tn__=kC-R6ide=ARPDLCoBPoCpOqMwAaVEyLVRd2tU8pWLP53G-MOG-07M1D1D-247 VogdWk8ZjzPZs6bSv587uvRmpvxi&IC_ref=ARGC_LkZvB2zLMJH1bU1j99hUkUn98kV0WkPrRsJTPV1S_BKnoXBOothZD3V5SIA&IRef=1F, https://www.facebook.com/2181news/video/?video=eyjyc97pmvpydGyibk09aV1j0j01wbfHwWkOlY3JXYRbqs25fdGJwZwlf5nYJncjwOwrl1exjKzJdByEFwicPlccxWfMjxS0CoxXCismFzcxKcnN0YU021vbnReoWfXdpFwMiwBioCo5xKXfzcxKcnX0YU021vbnRoWfXdpFwMiwBioCo5xKXfzcxKcnN0YU021vbnReoWfXdpFwMiwBioCo5xKXfzcxKcnX0YU021vbnReoWfXdpFwMiwBioCo5xKXfzcxKcnN0YU021vbnReoWfXdpFwMiwBioC


UNDP July 2018 report on local economy and migrant registration (draft).

UNDP Libya July 2018 report on local economy and migrant registration (draft).

Ibid.


UNDP, Migration registration in Libya: Contributing to resilience and recovery, March 2018 (draft).

Interview with representative of Municipal Relations Office of Bani Walid, March 2019.

Interview with charity organization from Bani Walid, March 2019.

Interview with representative of Municipal Relations Office of Bani Walid, March 2019.


‘When Law 59 of the Municipal Councils is implemented by the Ministry of Local Government in Bani Walid, the competencies will be moved to the municipal council and (then) it can start providing for its citizens.’ Interview with representative of Municipal Relations Office of Bani Walid, March 2019.

Interview with representative of Tuareg Social Council, 24 February 2019.

Interview with the district chief of Owaynat, 15 March 2019.


‘The dominant force in the municipality is the Criminal Investigation Unit in West-Zawiya, which imposed itself on the municipality in 2010. See Atlantic Council, The Libyan economy after the revolution: Still no clear vision, 2013.

Reflections of a local researcher in Zawiya, February 2019.

Interview with humanitarian actor, May 2019.

This view was expressed by a local researcher, May 2019.

‘The dominant force in the municipality is the Criminal Investigation Unit in West-Zawiya, which imposed itself on the municipality in 2010. See Atlantic Council, The Libyan economy after the revolution: Still no clear vision, 2013.

Reflections of a local researcher in Zawiya, February 2019.

Interview with tribal leader from Zawiya, March 2019.

Interview with official from the Zawiya municipality, March 2019.

Interview with officer in charge of social affairs, Zawiya municipality, March 2019.

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Interview with representative of Municipal Relations Office of Bani Walid, March 2019.

116. Information from Libyan field researcher based in Gharyan working for Clingendael. Libyan government officials estimate that at least one-third of the 200,000 primary-school teachers and 30,000 nurses on government payrolls are inactive but continue to receive monthly salaries; see European Training Foundation, Labour market and employment policy in Libya, 2014.

117. Ibid.


125. Researchers from Bani Walid, Ghat and Zawiya during training with Clingendael, Tunis, February 2019.


128. REACH, Libya Joint Monitoring Initiative (JMMI) – 1–8 June 2018.


130. This section relies on interviews conducted in Ghat with authority figures, business elites and influential civil-society actors.

131. Interview with a member of the Council of Elders, 13 November 2018.

132. Under Qaddafi's long-term plans, 22% percent of government resources were earmarked for agriculture; Ghat was one of the recipients of these resources; see Fanack.com, Economy of Libya, 2009.

133. Sources explained that farms closed as a result of theft of copper cables supplying electricity to the pumps and lack of resources for security forces to protect the area. View expressed by local researcher, May 2019.

134. 'Currently, the informal economy is more prevalent in the region because of several challenges, for example there is no liquidity and cash in the banks. People have to buy goods with certified checks, and, of course, informal traders make these things easier.' (Commander of the Rebel Reinion Battalion).

135. Interview with the district chief of Owaynat, 15 March 2019.

136. This section has benefited from input interviews with business leaders (including businessmen, union members, tax officers and other business regulatory offices).

137. Ibid.

138. Interview with member of the municipal council, cultural office, Bani Walid, March 2019.

139. Interview with member of the Association of Businessmen, Bani Walid, March 2019.

140. Interview with Mayor of Bani Walid, March 2019.

141. Interview with member of a civil-society organization in Bani Walid, March 2019.

142. Interview with head of economic regulation committee in Bani Walid, March 2019.

143. Interview with businesswoman in Bani Walid, March 2019.

144. Interview with businesswoman in Bani Walid, March 2019.

145. This section has benefited from input interviews with business elites (including businessmen, union members, staff of tax offices and other business regulatory offices).

146. Agricultural land covers an estimated 45% of the total territory. Interview with respondent in charge of social affairs in the municipality on behalf of the central government.

147. Interview with chairman of the Liquidity Committee, March 2019.

148. As one respondent put it: ‘Zawiya is rich in opportunity. Even if you take a fishing hook and catch some fish or sell some vegetables and fruits in the market, you can easily make a living for yourself and your family.’ Interview with Director of Ports and Marine Resources Department, March 2019.

149. Mercy Corps, Libya's shadow economy, 2017. Consequently, cash from the central bank and commercial banks in Tripoli was transported to the city by helicopter, causing additional costs and delays. Then, after a military helicopter was shot down in a politically motivated attack in October 2015, banks stopped using air transport on this particular route. After the coastal road reopened in 2016, several incidents have occurred in which armoured vehicles of the National Commercial Bank have been subject to attacks and hijacks.


151. Ibid.


155. Food and Agriculture Organization, Resources and challenges in the context of climate change, 2008.

156. Emad Ammar, An examination of Libya's business sector in the midst of political tension and economic reforms, 2015.

157. In Qaddafi's early long-range plans, 22% of government resources were earmarked for agriculture. In addition, extensive investments in port and onshore infrastructure and services were initiated to improve the fishery sector. See Fanack.com, Economy of Libya, 2009.

158. Making Libya’s economy work again, Brookings Institute, 2016; World Bank, Labour market dynamics in Libya, 2015. Before the revolution, nearly 50% of the active labour force were foreign.

162. Interview with the head of the social council in Bani Walid, March 2019.
164. Ibid.
165. Interview with the secretary of the People’s Committee for the Awainat Conference, 28 March 2019.
166. It is important to note that new laws introduced in 2013 to regulate businesses were more restrictive than encouraging. For example, the Companies Law had serious implications for joint-venture partnerships, as the permitted shareholdings to foreign companies could no longer exceed 49%. In addition, the government imposed a new minimum capital requirement of LYD1 million – a significant outlay for most companies, in particular SMEs. Clyde & Co LLP, FDI in Libya. The way forward, 2013.
169. For example, 18% of micro-enterprises reported recruiting at least one additional employee after 2011.
173. Ibid.
174. Enterprises in the construction and real-estate sectors suffered the greatest losses from material damages due to the physical assets prone to material damage (e.g. buildings and construction sites). The sector used to be the second biggest in the country before many projects were abandoned following the fall of the Qaddafi regime. See World Bank, Simplified enterprise survey and private sector mapping, 2015.
175. More recent figures are not available.
176. This section relies on interviews conducted in Ghat with authority figures, business elites and influential civil-society actors. Focus-group discussion data, which captures the perspectives of local community members, are still expected to come in (see disclaimer in the Methodology).
177. Focus-group discussion with youth respondents in Ghat. Employment in the black market is believed to be more widespread among Tebu and Tuareg residents than among Arab residents. This is partly because of the conflict over citizenship, meaning that a proportion of the Tebu/Tuareg population in the area without Libyan documentation cannot access public-sector jobs or legal employment.
178. Interview with member of the Council of Elders 30 March 2019, Ghat; this interviewee referred to smuggling as ‘informal trade’.
181. Interviews with the Mayor of Ghat, 28 March 2019.
182. This section has been informed by input interviews with business elites (including businessmen, union members, tax offices and other business regulatory offices).
183. According to the head of the social council, Bani Walid, 2019, ‘Most of the educated individuals from Bani Walid live abroad and work in the ministries, embassies and government agencies. The residents of Bani Walid have middle-school education, or degrees from vocational colleges.’
184. This occurred because of low wages or because they were in search of quick profits (i.e. direct cash) by working for in armed battalions or in human trafficking; interview with Chief of the Agricultural Police Service, Bani Walid, 2019. Nonetheless, Bani Walid is still represented in senior state structures, including in embassies around the world, state offices and ministries, interview with head of the social council, Bani Walid, March 2019.
185. Interview with employee in the social security office and head of the Social Council in Bani Walid, March 2019.
186. Interview with head of the social council, Bani Walid, March 2019.
187. Interview with member of the Association of Businessmen, Bani Walid, March 2019.
188. Ibid.
189. Interview with member of the Association of Businessmen, Bani Walid, March 2019.
190. Interview with member of previous local council, Bani Walid, March 2019.
193. This section has benefited from input interviews with business elites (including businessmen, union members, tax offices and other business regulatory offices).
194. Interview with head of planning department, Zawiya, March 2019.
195. Interview with businesswoman, Zawiya, March 2019, who said: ‘All economic sectors are considered local and vital because different communities rely on different economic sectors – be it agriculture, manufacturing, trade or services.’
196. Received from Clingendael’s network of informants in Zawiya, February 2019.
197. Interview with an official in social affairs, Zawiya, 2019.
201. ETF, Labour market and employment policy in Libya. In 2011, the IOM estimated the total number of foreign nationals living in Libya before the crisis at 2.5 million, including 1 million Egyptians, 80,000 Pakistanis, 59,000 Sudanese, 63,000 Bangladeshis, 26,000 Filipinos, 10,500 Vietnamese and a large population of sub-Saharan Africans, mainly from Niger, Chad, Mali, Nigeria and Ghana – see Libyan crisis: One month into IOM’s response, IOM, 2011.
204. ETF, Labour market and employment policy in Libya, 2014.
This is also found in the form of the Kafala system (informal labour sponsorship), which is present elsewhere in the Middle East and North Africa. The system gives sponsoring employers substantial control over workers’ conditions and movement inside the country.

Migrant registration in Libya: Contributing to resilience and recovery, UNDP, March 2018 (draft).


UNHCR, Mixed migration trends in Libya: Changing dynamics and protection challenges, 2017; interviews with business elites, including businessmen, heads of a social and community facility, social council members, construction enterprises, municipal members, heads of unions and others, Zawiya and Bani Walid, 2019.

Limited mobility is also adopted as a strategy, as travel is dangerous (because of the deteriorated security situation, lack of residency permits, fear of police checkpoints along the roads and militia groups).


Central Mediterranean Route situation, UNHCR, 2018.

Interviews with migrants in Bani Walid and Zawiya, 2019.

Official wages in Libya’s public sector are low compared to average living expenses. The Qaddafi government raised the minimum wage repeatedly in the period just before the revolution in a bid to ease unrest. In mid-2012, the average public-sector salary was a minimum of LYD500 per month (US$400), and a new minimum wage of LYD450 was established for all sectors in 2009; although the average wage earned is far higher for both Libyans and migrants.

Interviews with business elites and authority figures in Bani Walid, Zawiya and Ghat.

In Tripoli, the Abuselim branch of the Tripoli Public Works companies will accept migrant workers as long as they have a valid passport, even if they are not in possession of a Libyan visa. The municipality ensures the payment of foreign workers by informing security actors in advance of when there is enough liquidity in the banks; foreign workers are given priority over local residents when withdrawing their salaries. See UNHCR, Access to cash and the impact of the liquidity crisis on refugees and migrants in Libya, 2018.

This section relies on interviews conducted in Ghat with authority figures, business elites and influential civil-society actors, 2019.

Interview with civil-society activist, Ghat, 2019.

Information from Clingendael’s network of local informants in Ghat, February 2019.

Migrant registration in Libya: Contributing to resilience and recovery, UNDP, March 2018 (draft).

Interview with an imam from Ghat, 30 March 2019.

Interview with secretary of border control with Algeria, 1 April 2019.

There are no problems worthy of mention because of the peaceful coexistence between citizens and migrants. The trend has not changed since before 2011.” Interview with the district chief of Owaynat, 15 March 2019.

This section has benefited from input interviews with business elites (including businesspeople, union members, tax offices and other business regulatory offices), notable figures in the community (tribal leaders, civil-society organizations and activists, and others), and members involved in migration management (municipal members, international organizations and charities).

Interview with head of security directorate in Bani Walid, March 2019.

Interview with member of the Association of Businessmen, Bani Walid, March 2019.

Interview with factory owner, Bani Walid, March 2019.

Information from Clingendael’s network of local informants in Bani Walid, February 2019.

I swear they are a blessing to businessmen, especially owners of farms’ (member of the Municipal Council on Food Control, Bani Walid, 2019). ‘We need them to graze sheep and camels as well as employ them in public services’ (member of the former local council, Bani Walid, 2019). Migrants have a positive impact on the economy but also destabilize the security situation; the positives are their participation in formal and non-formal service work (views of a respondent from the passport office of Bani Walid, 2019).

Interview with the Director of Projects Management in the municipality of Bani Walid, 2019.

Interview with member of the municipal council cultural office in Bani Walid, March 2019.

Interview with head of the agricultural office in Bani Walid, March 2019.

Interview with member of the municipal council, Bani Walid, 2019.

Interview with the mayor of the municipality of Bani Walid, 2019.

Focus-group discussion with host community members, Bani Walid, March 2019.

Some claim that if they had the opportunity to leave for Europe safely, they would do so, but none of them wish to go by sea because the crossing is expensive and dangerous.

Focus-group discussions with migrants in Bani Walid, 26 March 2019.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Focus-group discussion with host community members, Bani Walid, March 2019.

This section is based on input Interviews with business elites (including businesspeople, union members, tax offices and other business regulatory offices), notable figures in the community (e.g. tribal leaders, civil-society organizations and activists, and others), and members involved in migration management (municipal members, international organizations and charities).

Interview with Dean of the Faculty of Economics, Al-Zawiya University, March 2019.

Information from Clingendael’s network of local informants in Zawiya, February 2019.

Ibid.

This is seen as an effort to increase the legitimacy of some of these figures and exert a more positive influence over the community, with political interests as the objective. Workshop in Tunis, February 2019 with researchers working in Zawiya.

Interviews with the president of Friends Without Borders, member of the Committee in the Defense of Abused Women and member of the Senate Committee on Reconciliation in Western Zawiya, 2019.

Ibid.
As one respondent noted, ‘The employer regards the migrant worker as a son or daughter, and is responsible for him. If a migrant considers getting married, the employer provides the necessary arrangements. He is also responsible for the food, clothing and treatment of the migrant.’ (Interview with member of the Supreme Council of the State – also a member of the National Conference of the Municipality of Zawiya and of the Party for Change in the municipality), 6 March 2019.

Focus-group discussions with migrants in Zawiya, 28 March 2019.


250. As indicated in the section on local (migration) governance, such measures should entail facilitating a standard model for migrant registration across Libyan municipalities; supporting the Ministry of Labour to develop its capacity to register migrant workers; develop standard operating release for work procedures; and expanding a model for [large] ‘guarantor’ companies that employ migrants. See UNDP, Migrant registration in Libya: Contributing to resilience and recovery, March 2018 (draft).


252. The MoI has recently ordered the surveying of economic activities by its branches last November, see http://labourgov.vy/2018/11/18/


254. M Erdoğan and C Unver, The perspectives, expectations and suggestions of the Turkish business sector on Syrians in Turkey, Turkish Confederation of Employer Associations, 30 December 2015, Publication No: 353.

255. In the town of İzmir (Turkey), first a transit hub and after 2016 a key destination point for Syrian refugees, local authorities were slow to catch up with the permanence of the migrant community. Migrants moreover were faced with a high level of hostility from the host community. It is in this context that the city witnessed a growing number of local civil-society organizations that fill the vacuum of assistance left by local authorities and work on improving community coherence, including through social solidarity projects. An example is the sharing of milk for young children between Turkish and Syrian families, when the municipality refused to distribute milk to Syrian refugees. See International Crisis Group, Turkey’s Syrian refugees: Defusing metropolitan tensions, Europe Report No. 248, 29 January 2018; H MacKreath and Y Sağnıç, Syrian refugees and civil society, Citizens Assembly – Turkey, 2017.

256. A successful ‘women and children’ healthcare model was developed in Zawiya. Extending this to migrants may be a practical


258. For such activities, it is worth deliberating with contacts there, including the WHO and central bodies, such as the MoL and MoI, that can start this initiative. This would necessitate surveying Ghat’s service needs, livelihood basics and business opportunities.

259. It is worth noting that bringing together supply and demand does not automatically mitigate discrimination and exploitation. What is more, it can potentially open up labour market competition not only between host communities and migrant groups, but also within migrant groups.

260. The EU funds the SLEIDSE programme via EUDEL (a four-year programme – the Support to Libya for Economic Integration, Diversification and Sustainable Development), which engages with the chambers of commerce. Through SLEIDSE, for example, the EU could fund and train the chambers to identify and survey business needs.

261. Currently, SLEIDSE supports some initiatives fostering Libyan entrepreneurs and women in technology (no activities were encountered in Zawiya). Under better economic circumstances and acceptance, SLEIDSE could move on to providing vocational training for migrants and host communities. See https://www.eunighbours.eu/en/south/eu-in-action/stories/she-codes-european-union-empowers-libyan-women-through-technology and https://www.facebook.com/pg/TweetResearch-160834826094061/about/?ref=page_internal


263. EE Korkmaz, Now is the time for a strategy to employ Syrian refugees in Turkey, International Migration Institute, University of Oxford, Fair Wear Foundation Report, 2018.

264. A successful women and children’s health care model was developed in Zawiya. Extending this to migrants may be a practical next step in this regard.


266. Locally, the DCIM is a main actor, as it is responsible for running the detention centres and granting access to supplies and services. Zawiya Red Crescent provides relief and some services (sometimes they provide phone calls and transportation for migrants). The STACO Foundation is a prominent Zawiyan charity organization and a main partner to IOM for migrant relief and services. Zawiya Red Crescent provides relief and some services (sometimes they provide phone calls and transportation for migrants). It is worth noting that bringing together supply and demand does not automatically mitigate discrimination and exploitation. What is more, it can potentially open up labour market competition not only between host communities and migrant groups, but also within migrant groups.

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270. EE Korkmaz, Now is the time for a strategy to employ Syrian refugees in Turkey, International Migration Institute, University of Oxford, Fair Wear Foundation Report, 2018.

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274. Salam Charity is the only encountered, local relief organization in Bani Walid, and is a partner of IOM and MSF. See https://www.libyaakhbar.com/libya-news/S19855.html.


From abuse to cohabitation: A way forward for positive migration governance in Libya

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This publication was produced with the financial support of the European Union. Its contents are the sole responsibility of the Clingendael Institute and do not necessarily reflect the views of the European Union.