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Concerns about foreign interference



The convoy of Turkish Minister Kaya being stopped in Rotterdam in 2017.
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The Netherlands faces a new security threat since the last few decades: Foreign Interference targeted at Dutch people with a migration background. The National Coordinator for Counterterrorism and Security (NCTV) and the General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD) warn of the growing danger of Foreign

Interference (FI) to Dutch society.¹ The NCTV classifies FI as one of the Netherlands' nine

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¹ Analistennetwerk Nationale Veiligheid (National Network of Safety and Security Analysts), *Geïntegreerde Risico-analyse Nationale veiligheid* <https://www.nctv.nl/documenten/publicaties/2019/6/07/geintegreerde-risicoanalyse-nationale-veiligheid> p. 12. Algemene Inlichtingen en Veiligheidsdienst (General Intelligence and Security Service), *AIVD Annual Report 2019*, <https://english.aivd.nl/publications/annual-report/2020/09/03/aivd-annual-report-2019>. For a brief summary see: [Algemeen Dagblad 21-6-2020](https://www.algemeen-dagblad.nl/2020/06/21/algemeen-dagblad-21-6-2020).

main security threats. A letter to parliament claims that FI leads to “tensions within and between population groups in the Netherlands” and hampers “bond[ing] with Dutch society”.²

Dutch people with a migration background are often exposed to influence from ‘their motherland’. Some influence is not problematic such as promoting investment in the country of origin. Dutch policy therefore focuses on foreign interference which is considered ‘undesirable’. For example, the Parliamentary Committee of Inquiry into the Undesirable Influence of Unfree Countries (POCOB) investigated how undesirable interference occurs and how to combat it.³ The Committee concludes that: “organisations and governments of unfree countries use visible and invisible means to try to enter the hearts and minds of our Muslim communities. This can give rise to parallel societies.”⁴ Foreign financing of mosques comes mainly from the Gulf States and Turkey.

But the interference of Dutch people with a migration background often has a non-religious motive. A recent Clingendael study shows that the Chinese government tries to gain control of Chinese students in the Netherlands, and seeks to influence research into China.⁵ The dictatorial regime

in Eritrea levies a ‘diaspora tax’ on Eritrean-Dutch citizens, on pain of intimidation and violence.⁶ Iran spies on and intimidates opponents, sometimes using violence. Even small countries such as Sierra Leone have try to exert influence in the Netherlands, for example calling on the police and government to teach regime opponent Adebayor a lesson.⁷ The best-known example is interference from Turkey. In each of the past two years the AIVD reported severe pressure on Turkish opposition supporters in the Netherlands.⁸ Turkish interference in the Netherlands, was brought to the attention of the general public by an attempted coup in Turkey (2016) and a subsequent referendum (2017).

Policymakers are well aware that foreign interference poses major challenges. But what do Dutch people think of these kinds of interference? What underpins their concerns about foreign interference? And to what extent do they support policy against foreign interference?


This Alert draws on data from the Clingendael Foreign Affairs Barometer to assess Dutch people’s views on undesirable foreign interference and policies that should be adopted. The Barometer is a large-scale survey of 23,000 respondents with more than 250 variables.⁹ It finds strong resistance to foreign interference and strong support for measures to combat foreign interference. To gain a better understanding, this Alert

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- 2 Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid (National Coordinator for Counterterrorism and Security), *Kamerbrief ongewenste buitenlandse inmenging*, 16 March 2018 <https://www.nctv.nl/documenten/kamerstukken/2018/03/16/kamerbrief-ongewenste-buitenlandse-inmenging>.
 - 3 Tweede Kamer der Staten Generaal (House of Representatives), *(On)zichtbare invloed: verslag parlementaire ondervragingscommissie naar ongewenste beïnvloeding uit onvrije landen* https://www.tweedekamer.nl/sites/default/files/atoms/files/verslag_pocob.pdf.
 - 4 Ibid. p. 8
 - 5 This was done by urging self-censorship, subject selection and restrictions in the conduct of the research. See the recent Clingendael policy brief by Ingrid D’Hooghe and Brigitte Dekker: *China’s Invloed op het Onderwijs in Nederland: een verkenning* <https://www.clingendael.org/publication/chinas-invloed-op-onderwijs-nederland>.

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- 6 DPS-groep & Tilburg University, *Niet is wat het lijkt: Eritrese organisaties en integratie* https://www.dsp-groep.nl/wp-content/uploads/16pverit_Niets_is_wat_het_lijkt-DSP_2016.pdf.
 - 7 <https://www.thesierraleonetelegraph.com/adebayor-hunted-for-alleged-incitement-of-violence-in-sierra-leone/>.
 - 8 Algemene Inlichtingen en Veiligheidsdienst (General Intelligence and Security Service), *AIVD Annual Report 2019*, <https://english.aivd.nl/publications/annual-report/2020/09/03/aivd-annual-report-2019>.
 - 9 For the objective and methodology of the Clingendael Foreign Affairs Barometer see https://www.clingendael.org/sites/default/files/2020-09/Buitenland_Barometer_Methodologie_sept2020.pdf.

analyses the precise reasons for the current resistance to undesirable foreign interference. It focuses on foreign interference from Turkey, which is one of the examples best known to the public because of extensive media coverage of related events.


The Netherlands should prevent foreign governments from influencing people who live in the Netherlands but come originally from another country



UFI policy and opinions in the Netherlands

The results of the Barometer reveal strong resistance to foreign influence on Dutch people with a migration background. No fewer than 85% of those surveyed consider that "the Netherlands should prevent foreign governments from influencing people who live in the Netherlands but come originally from another country". Only 4% disagree with this statement. The very high percentage of 'agree' and 'strongly agree' is surprising and raises questions as to why Dutch people so strongly oppose influence from abroad. At the same time, Dutch people's experience matches the findings of the intelligence services and the NCTV that interference threatens national security. In subsequent research and public discussions it is interesting to examine more closely which particular forms of influence are deemed undesirable.

The Netherlands should prevent foreign governments from influencing people who live in the Netherlands but come originally from another country




It is not surprising that policymakers are endeavouring to come up with a strong response in order to counter forms of undesirable interference. There are currently three main policy approaches: a) talking to foreign governments; b) increasing the resilience of Dutch people with a migration background and; c) actively disrupting interference.¹⁰

The disruption policy includes limits on financing from abroad. Previous governments allowed financing and only discouraged it if it was deemed harmful.¹¹ A tougher line has been adopted since 2016.¹² There appear to be restrictions on the foreign financing of mosques, followed by restrictions on the financing of political parties¹³, and investigations are taking place into the financing of “social and religious organisations”.¹⁴

There is extensive support for such a policy. The Clingendael Barometer shows that 72% agree with the statement that “the Netherlands should prohibit the foreign financing of mosques, churches and weekend schools”. Only 12% disagree. Limits on financing are supported to a greater or lesser extent across the entire political spectrum, from the PVV (93%) to – by a smaller margin but still a majority – D66/GroenLinks (58%).¹⁵ The work of the POCOB parliamentary committee of inquiry, however, shows policymakers coming up against legal and practical barriers in their efforts to intervene in financial flows.

The Netherlands should prohibit the foreign financing of mosques, churches and weekend schools (full sample)



In addition to a policy of disruption, a policy of resilience is being developed. In Utrecht, for example, experiments are being conducted with municipally financed weekend schools to pre-empt the activities of foreign governments. The national government justifies a ‘resilience policy’ on the grounds that “a strong bond with Dutch society reduces susceptibility to undesirable foreign interference”.¹⁶ The aim of a resilience policy is to enable Dutch

10 Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid (National Coordinator for Counterterrorism and Security), *Kamerbrief ongewenste buitenlandse inmenging*, 16 March 2018 <https://www.nctv.nl/documenten/kamerstukken/2018/03/16/kamerbrief-ongewenste-buitenlandse-inmenging>.

11 Overbeeke, A. (2018) *Het belemmeren van buitenlandse financiering van geloofsgemeenschappen: Een grondrechtenevoelige kwestie*. Tijdschrift voor Religie, Recht en Beleid, 9(3), pp. 62-79. https://www.bjutijdschriften.nl/tijdschrift/religierechtenbeleid/2018/3/TvRRB_1879-7784_2018_009_003_004.

12 The House of Representatives called for a halt to Turkish financing of social organisations. This policy was confirmed in the coalition agreement. <https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten/publicaties/2017/10/10/regeerakkoord-2017-vertouwen-in-de-toekomst>


13 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Kamerbrief Tussenrapportage geïntegreerde Buitenland en Veiligheidsstrategie*, 17 April 2020 <https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten/kamerstukken/2020/04/17/kamerbrief-tussenrapportage-geintegreerde-buitenland--en-veiligheidsstrategie>.

14 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Kamerbrief Tussenrapportage geïntegreerde Buitenland en Veiligheidsstrategie*, 17 April 2020 <https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten/kamerstukken/2020/04/17/kamerbrief-tussenrapportage-geintegreerde-buitenland--en-veiligheidsstrategie>.

15 The strong support may be due in part to the fact that the survey was rolled out in parallel with the parliamentary inquiry.

16 Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid (National Coordinator for Counterterrorism and Security), *Kamerbrief ongewenste buitenlandse inmenging*, 16 March 2018 <https://www.nctv.nl/documenten/kamerstukken/2018/03/16/kamerbrief-ongewenste-buitenlandse-inmenging>, p. 6.

The Netherlands should prohibit foreign financing of mosques, churches and weekend schools (full sample)



people with a migration background to defend themselves against undesirable influence from their ‘motherlands’, but it also serves to gain greater control of the supply from foreign countries. Two recent letters to Parliament, for example, propose compulsory naturalisation for Turkish-Dutch people, encourage constraints on types of interference such as informal schooling and draw attention to the possibility of citizenship education.¹⁷ Local authorities are also being strengthened with a centrally

developed toolkit aimed at preventing undesirable influence.¹⁸

Fear of the long arm of Turkey?

Our data show strong resistance to Undesirable Foreign Interference and support for the disruption of interference from abroad. The question is what the reasons are for this resistance.

In order to analyse these attitudes it was decided to examine the fear of interference from Turkey. In addition to the warnings from the security services, a number of incidents

17 See Aanpak Turkse diasporapolitiek (10 June 2020) and Verkenning informele scholing (19 June 2020) House of Representatives, session year 2019-2020, 30 821 & 32 824, no. 114. https://www.tweedekamer.nl/kamerstukken/brieven_regering/detail?id=2020Z10627&did=2020D23040; Ministerie van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid, Kamerbrief Verkenning Informele Scholing, 19 June 2020 <https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten/kamerstukken/2020/06/19/kamerbrief-verkenning-informele-scholing>.

18 The government publicly emphasises its restrictive disruption policy while initiatives aimed at increasing resilience are kept more below the radar. Research into undesirable foreign financing indicates that the disruption policy is becoming more dominant. See: Overbeeke, A. (2018) *Het belemmeren van buitenlandse financiering van geloofsgemeenschappen: Een grondrechtgevoelige kwestie*. Tijdschrift voor Religie, Recht en Beleid, 9(3), pp. 62-79.


made the long arm of Ankara clearly visible to the Dutch population. For example, Turkish-Dutch people were intimidated on the street, in schools and mosques and in some cases even in their own home after a failed coup attempt in Turkey in 2016. In 2017 Turkish interference led to riots in a number of Dutch cities in the run-up to the Turkish referendum on issues including the reform of the presidential system. The long arm of Turkey often also operates in a more subtle way. For example, the POCOB report states that *Diyaret* has been gathering information for years on the political preferences of mosque-goers.¹⁹

In the public debate these manifestations of the long arm are often roundly attributed to Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the President of Turkey.²⁰ This personalised interpretation of the long arm is partly the result of Erdoğan's own deliberate policy of politicising the diaspora. Moreover, the Turkish president became the face of modern Turkish diaspora politics during the crisis of spring 2017, when Turkey's minister Kaya was denied entry to the Turkish consulate in Rotterdam. Partly due to the coincidence of the Dutch elections and the Turkish referendum, this incident led to a media battle between Prime Minister Rutte and President Erdoğan.

Against this background, the following statement was presented in the Barometer: "How likely do you think it is that the events below will occur in the next five years? – The influence of Turkish President Erdoğan on Turkish-Dutch people will disrupt Dutch

society". The Barometer shows that this strong statement is endorsed by more than a third of the Dutch population. 38% of those questioned think it likely or very likely that "the influence of Turkish President Erdoğan on Turkish-Dutch people will disrupt Dutch society". 38% think it unlikely and 24% are doubtful or undecided.

The influence of Turkish President Erdoğan will disrupt Dutch society in the next five years




Why is a substantial part of the Dutch population concerned about undesirable Turkish interference? Although hardly any research has been conducted on this issue, there are a number of likely hypotheses. It is likely, for example, that people who feel that their social model is under pressure, that what they value is threatened by decline (declinism), also feel threatened by the long arm of Turkey. It is also plausible that people who are strongly attached to 'Dutchness'²¹ (their identity and/or their own values and standards) perceive the threat of undesirable foreign interference more keenly.

19 House of Representatives, 35 228 no. 4 Eindverslag Parlementaire Commissie naar Ongewenste Buitenlandse financiering, 14. https://www.tweedekamer.nl/sites/default/files/atoms/files/eindverslag_pocob.pdf. See also: House of Representatives, session year 2015-2016, 32 824, no. 194.

20 See inter alia the following newspaper headlines: <https://www.volkskrant.nl/nieuws-achtergrond/de-onzichtbare-lange-arm-van-erdogan~b710c1c0/>; <https://www.ewmagazine.nl/nederland/achtergrond/2018/08/dit-is-de-lange-arm-van-erdogan-146367w/>; <https://www.telegraaf.nl/nieuws/1734134/hoer-ver-reikt-lange-arm-van-erdogan>.

21 'Dutchness' is based on the following items in the regression tables: Nativism, Core political values, Protection of Dutch culture.

The influence of Turkish president Erdoğan will disrupt Dutch society in the next five years



We also expect that people who have a negative attitude towards migration also have greater fear of foreign interference in Dutch society. This may be linked to an expectation that people who think that elites and politicians do not represent them sufficiently will be more concerned about the long arm. We also expect that the long arm problem has been politicised, in the sense that there are differences in the threat perception among people with different party preferences.

Finally, we wanted to assess whether concerns about the influence of the NATO member Turkey decrease if people see Russia as more of a threat. Finally, we assessed whether the concentration of Turkish and other migrant communities in the immediate vicinity affects the perceived threat from the long arm of Turkey. In addition to those substantive statements, we verified the sociodemographic characteristics such as education level, age and gender.

Explanation of concerns about interference

After verification for the substantive statements, sociodemographic characteristics were found to have no effect on concerns about Turkish interference. Most other factors do play a role, but not to an equal extent (see regression table 1).²² Our analysis shows that what people perceive to be threat in a cultural sense (namely a feeling of general social decline, the perceived threat to Dutch identity) is most relevant.

²² The variables in the first four blocks (up to and including 'socioeconomic links') are responsible for all the explained variation in the model (see table of adjusted R square in regression table 1). The variables below them are therefore clearly less relevant.

Fear of the long arm of Turkey is very closely associated with a widespread feeling of declinism: the feeling that everything of value in society is declining. This includes feelings of national decline (such as increasing inequality in the Netherlands and terrorist attacks in the Netherlands) and international decline (such as the risk of war around Europe and new financial crises).²³ People who perceive social decline are particularly fearful of the long arm of Turkey.

Views on 'Dutchness' also play a major role. This particularly concerns views on Dutch core political values (such as respect for sexual diversity).²⁴ People with more demanding views on what is necessary to fit in well in Dutch society believe the threat of the long arm of Turkey is more likely. Smaller effects can be observed among people who mistrust the 'elite' and have a negative attitude towards migration. Both groups are more anxious about interference from Turkey.

It is notable that statements connected with directly experienced problems are not in any way borne out. The data do not support the hypothesis that people who fear Russia will be less concerned about influence exerted by the NATO member Turkey.²⁵ It might also be expected that people who directly experience the consequences of Turkish influence in their own city will have greater fear of the long arm. That effect is not borne out.

In other words, the critical attitude towards the long arm of Turkey is part of a widespread feeling of cultural malaise: everything of value in society (nationally and internationally) risks being lost, Dutch identity and/or core values are under pressure. The relevance of cultural malaise can be seen if we link the threat perception to party preference: this malaise plays a role in all party electorates. Regression table 2 shows the effects of the sample, excluding the major political opponents of the long arm (namely: PVV/FvD/SGP/50Plus). In this model we still see cultural statements playing a major role. Among supporters of parties such as GroenLinks, PvdA, CDA and VVD too, the resistance to Turkish interference is driven particularly by a feeling of decline and undermining of Dutch identity.

23 A full overview of the declinism scale can be found [here](#).

24 This also applies to a lesser extent to having Dutch ancestors ('nativism')

25 There is a minor effect, but it adds hardly anything to the strength of the model. This applies equally to respondents who believe that more should be invested in defence.

What do Dutch citizens with a migration background think themselves?

A factor that is often neglected in the debate on undesirable foreign interference is that Dutch citizens with a migration background suffer from undesirable foreign interference. It is the Turkish, Iranian, Eritrean and Chinese Dutch who are forced to pay taxes and/or are intimidated, spied on and threatened by their country of origin, in some cases with the aid of sections of their own diaspora community in the Netherlands. In order to formulate policy, it is therefore important to gain a picture of the divisions in the communities with a non-Western migration background.

Almost 80% are opposed to foreign powers exerting influence on 'their' community in the Netherlands (for the population as a whole the figure is 85%). Among DENK voters, who might be seen as less opposed to influence from Turkey, fully 39% are against interference.²⁶ The question of whether financing should be prohibited, for example, shows that almost 60% of respondents favour a ban on financing, whereas 26% are opposed.²⁷

With regard to fear of the influence of President Erdoğan in the Netherlands, Dutch citizens with a non-Western background are divided. 30% consider believe his influence will disrupt society, while 46.8% think it unlikely.

A separate analysis for communities with a non-Western migration background shows that the feeling of decline still plays a substantial role, but that Dutchness is also important. Among Dutch people with a non-Western migration background, feelings of strong attachment to Dutch core political values and a desire to set conditions for inclusion in Dutch society have a much greater effect on resistance to the long arm than in the sample as a whole (see regression table 3).²⁸ These latter findings should be interpreted with caution, since Dutch people with a non-Western background are underrepresented and highly educated second and third generations are overrepresented.²⁹

The diversity in communities with a non-Western migration background is a key issue. They appear divided on the best way to shape diaspora policy. That diversity requires a differentiated policy that properly serves the interests of the various subgroups in the communities with a non-Western migration background. It is therefore essential to have a better understanding of the concerns and dividing lines in these communities. Immense care must also be taken to ensure that the UFI policy does not actually alienate these citizens from Dutch society.


26 The political variables (PVV/FvD and DENK) also add a lot more explained variation than in the model for the Dutch population as a whole. That indicates the extent to which the long arm issue has been politicised in the non-Western diaspora communities.

27 A respondent is considered part of the non-Western diaspora if he/she (1) has a non-Western background or (2) has at least one non-Western parent. This survey uses the same definition of 'non-Western' as Statistics Netherlands (CBS).


28 The sample of Dutch citizens with a migration background is indicative and incomplete, but still substantial in number (N=2129). The support for 'nativism' raises questions.

29 Research by RadarAdvies into Turkish informal schools encountered problems of "low participation" and a "lack of trust in the government's objectivity". Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment, *Nieuwsbericht Verkenning Informele Scholing*, 19 June 2020 <https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/actueel/nieuws/2020/06/19/grote-varieteit-binnen-informele-scholing>.

The Netherlands should prohibit foreign financing of mosques, churches and weekend schools (only Dutch people with a non-Western migration background)



The Netherlands should prevent foreign governments from influencing people who live in the Netherlands but come originally from another country (only Dutch people with a non-Western migration background)



Conclusion

It is not only the security services that consider Undesirable Foreign Interference (UFI) among Dutch people with a non-Western background to be a problem. Practically everyone in the Netherlands (85%) agrees that the Dutch government should take action, that "the Netherlands should prevent foreign governments from influencing people who live in the Netherlands but come originally from another country". Only one in 10 people in the Netherlands doubt the need for such a policy.

The POCOB report refers to covert financing from 'unfree countries'. Although the Committee makes no policy recommendations, our data show a large majority in favour of a firm policy: a majority of people in the Netherlands (72%) believe foreign financing of mosques and weekend schools should be prohibited.

The fear of interference is seldom explained. A case study into the long arm of Turkey shows that two factors are crucial: social malaise (or: declinism) and a strong feeling of 'Dutchness'. Fear of the long arm is part of a feeling of loss of control, the idea that everything of value in society is being threatened. The long arm involves a threat from another country, a threat that people believe will be detrimental to the national identity and the core values of Dutch society. Finally, it is striking to note that people who directly experience the consequences of Turkish influence in their own city are no more fearful of the long arm.

Regression table 1
Reasons for fear of the long arm of Erdoğan

| Variable | β | SE | Sig. |
|--|---------|------|------|
| Constant | -2,587 | .12 | 0 |
| Declinism | .449 | .001 | 0 |
| Populism | .045 | .002 | 0 |
| Negative attitude towards migration | .053 | .001 | 0 |
| Nativism | .036 | .013 | 0 |
| Core political values | .095 | .007 | 0 |
| Protection of Dutch culture | .058 | .008 | 0 |
| Russia threat | .03 | .009 | 0 |
| China threat | .074 | .009 | 0 |
| US threat | -.015 | .008 | .026 |
| PVV/FvD | .061 | .024 | 0 |
| Socioeconomic links | -.049 | .002 | 0 |
| Support for defence | -.04 | .003 | 0 |
| Cities having 20% Dutch citizens with a non-Western background | -.013 | .003 | .04 |
| Age | -.001 | 0 | .826 |
| Education | .068 | .01 | 0 |
| Gender (Female) | .001 | .015 | .935 |

Dependent variable: How likely do you think it is that the events below will occur in the next five years? – The influence of Turkish President Erdoğan on Turkish-Dutch people will disrupt Dutch society (scale 1-5).

Explained variation

| Model | Adjusted R2 |
|--|-------------|
| 1 (Declinism) | .367 |
| 2 (Populism) | .377 |
| 3 (Negative attitude towards migration) | .396 |
| 4 (Dutchness) | .412 |
| 5 (Perceived threat of major powers) | .418 |
| 6 (Party preference & political attitude) | .421 |
| 7 (Support for defence) | .423 |
| 8 (Cities having 20% Dutch citizens with a non-Western background) | .423 |
| 9 (Backgrounds) | .427 |

Regression table 2
Reasons for fear of long arm of Erdoğan (excluding PVV/FvD/SGP/50Plus)

| Variable | β | SE | Sig. |
|--|---------|------|------|
| Constant | -3,383 | .173 | 0 |
| Declinism | .43 | .001 | 0 |
| Populism | .072 | .002 | 0 |
| Negative attitude towards migration | .035 | .001 | .001 |
| Nativism | .044 | .019 | 0 |
| Core political values | .113 | .007 | 0 |
| Protection of Dutch culture | .056 | .01 | 0 |
| Russia threat | .035 | .011 | 0 |
| China threat | .044 | .012 | 0 |
| US threat | .032 | .01 | 0 |
| Socioeconomic links | -.059 | .003 | 0 |
| Support for defence | -.055 | .003 | 0 |
| Cities having 20% Dutch citizens with a non-Western background | -.014 | .021 | .08 |
| Age | .001 | .001 | .888 |
| Education | -.003 | .012 | .702 |
| Gender (Female) | -.015 | .018 | .063 |

Dependent variable: How likely do you think it is that the events below will occur in the next five years? – The influence of Turkish President Erdoğan on Turkish-Dutch people will disrupt Dutch society (scale 1-5).

Explained variation

| Model | Adjusted R2 |
|--|-------------|
| 1 (Declinism) | .267 |
| 2 (Populism) | .274 |
| 3 (Negative attitude towards migration) | .287 |
| 4 (Dutchness) | .305 |
| 5 (Perceived threat of major powers) | .31 |
| 6 (Party preference & political attitude) | .312 |
| 7 (Support for defence) | .314 |
| 8 (Cities having 20% Dutch citizens with a non-Western background) | .314 |
| 9 (Backgrounds) | .314 |

Regression table 3
Reasons for fear of long arm of Erdoğan
(non-Western background)

| Variable | β | SE | Sig. |
|--|---------|------|------|
| Constant | -.124 | .003 | .832 |
| Declinism | .33 | .003 | 0 |
| Negative attitude towards migration | -.07 | .002 | .01 |
| Populism | -.06 | .007 | .037 |
| Nativism | .163 | .066 | 0 |
| Core political values | .139 | .021 | 0 |
| Protection of Dutch culture | .158 | .031 | 0 |
| Russia threat | -.01 | .011 | .711 |
| China threat | .103 | .032 | 0 |
| US threat | -.077 | .029 | .002 |
| PVV/FvD | .112 | .14 | 0 |
| DENK | -.296 | .101 | 0 |
| Socioeconomic left-wing | -.172 | .009 | 0 |
| Support for defence | -.233 | .011 | 0 |
| Cities having 20% Dutch citizens with a non-Western background | -.017 | .056 | .446 |
| Age | -.062 | .002 | .009 |
| Education | .02 | .002 | .361 |
| Gender (Female) | -.033 | .059 | .153 |

Dependent variable: How likely do you think it is that the events below will occur in the next five years? – The influence of Turkish President Erdoğan on Turkish-Dutch people will disrupt Dutch society (scale 1-5).

Explained variation

| Model | Adjusted R2 |
|--|-------------|
| 1 (Declinism) | .196 |
| 2 (Populism) | .205 |
| 3 (Negative attitude towards migration) | .215 |
| 4 (Dutchness) | .323 |
| 5 (Perceived threat of major powers) | .361 |
| 6 (Party preference & political attitude) | .464 |
| 7 (Support for defence) | .502 |
| 8 (Cities having 20% Dutch citizens with a non-Western background) | .501 |
| 9 (Backgrounds) | .504 |

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