

# Behind the Ballots and the Bluster

Decoding Votes on Ukraine  
Resolutions at the UN

Clingendael Report

Nienke Wessel  
Bob Deen



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# Executive summary

Four years after Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, an end to the war remains elusive. Ukraine is not only fighting Russia on the battlefield, but also in the diplomatic arena to secure international support. This report analyses the way this diplomatic war has unfolded by looking at two dimensions: votes in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) and attendance of the peace conference in Bürgenstock.

A closer look at voting patterns in the UNGA reveals a gradual decrease in support over the past few years. Immediately after the invasion, 141 states voted in favour of pro-Ukrainian resolutions; in December 2025, this number had dwindled to 79. Ukraine and its supporters in its diplomatic struggle against Russia could benefit from a careful analysis of the various reasons behind these shifting levels of support.

This report therefore presents a clustering of voting patterns, which can help identify both the nations that hold fixed positions and those who vary in their voting behaviour and stated positions. A better understanding of the motivations behind these positions is crucial for a diplomatic strategy that aims to convince them to support Ukraine.

The approach in this study is two-fold: it first discusses the narratives that have been promoted by both Russia and Ukraine and then analyses why these may or may not appeal to different states across the world. While Ukraine rightfully claims that the invasion is a violation of international law and posits itself as a democracy that has fallen victim to a brutal act of aggression, Russia instead promotes a narrative of defence against supposed threats by the West. While most countries around the world generally and rhetorically support international law, the narrative of the 'threatening West' also finds support across the world and particularly in the grouping of countries sometimes referred to as the 'Global South'.

However, the appeal of the Russian narrative is only part of the puzzle. Practical reasons are perhaps much more important to determine the level of support; many countries may have their own reasons to either support Russia or at least not jeopardize their relationship with Moscow. These include food security, maintaining trade relations with Russia, strategic voting considerations, or a preference for a multipolar world order.

For any diplomatic strategy to be effective in convincing countries to support Ukraine, it requires listening to their individual concerns and addressing those to the extent possible. Understanding does not imply agreement as not all arguments have moral equivalence and some may not be put forward in good faith, but the West should also be wary of its own biases.

A convincing argument should address both the narrative as well as the practical interests driving state positions. It should furthermore realise that there is no one-size-fits-all solution: while there are common patterns across the world, the different elements present themselves in different combinations for each individual nation. A convincing diplomatic strategy begins with listening.

# Introduction<sup>1</sup>

On Tuesday, the 24<sup>th</sup> of February 2026, world leaders will come together to once again discuss the situation in Ukraine in a plenary session of the UN General Assembly (UNGA).<sup>2</sup> The UNGA is more than just a platform for politicians to state their views on world affairs; it is also a key moment to gauge support for Ukraine. While all eyes were on Donald Trump and his hour-long speech about his peacemaking prowess in the September 2025 meeting, behind the scenes, diplomats from across the world frantically negotiated draft resolutions and searched for votes for various resolutions – including on condemning and ending Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine.<sup>3</sup> The war between Ukraine and Russia has not only been continuing on the front lines for nearly four years, it is also being fought in the diplomatic trenches. On both the military and diplomatic battlefields, the situation is far from encouraging for Ukraine and there is no clear end in sight.

From a European perspective, Russia’s aggression against Ukraine was clearly unprovoked. Russia should adhere to the UN Charter, respect Ukraine’s territorial integrity, withdraw from the occupied territories and be held accountable for its atrocity crimes. While most countries outside of Europe officially support this view, many countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America, sometimes loosely lumped together as ‘the Global South’<sup>4</sup>, remain ambivalent about who is to blame for the war and about how it should be resolved. While international law is quite clear on the situation and no country has recognized Russia’s territorial claims, many nations nonetheless have their own reasons for being less committal to any strict position. Ukraine could initially rely on a large majority in the UNGA to back

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- 1 The authors would particularly like to thank Frederiek Bax, Ruben Beltran, Jan-Hein Chrisstoffels, Ruhee Neog, Julia Soldatiuk-Westerveld, and Pieter van Vliet for their thoughtful comments on drafts of this paper. Needless to say, the arguments presented here do not necessarily reflect their views, and any mistakes are solely the authors’ responsibility.
  - 2 United Nations General Assembly, “[General Assembly Meetings](#),” accessed February 1, 2026.
  - 3 Alex Raufoglu, “[Trump Administration Pushes to Weaken Ukraine Resolution on Russian Occupation at UN, Sources Tell Kyiv Post](#),” Kyiv Post, November 11, 2025.
  - 4 The term “Global South” has become a catchphrase encompassing a wide variety of countries from outside Europe and North America. While the concept is contested and sometimes completely rejected as an unhelpful generalization, it is nonetheless widely in use and will therefore be used in this publication in inverted commas.

strongly worded resolutions, but this majority has dwindled over time and is now precarious. In fact, some of the most recent resolutions have seen more abstains and no-shows than 'yes'-votes, even if their texts have been watered down. This was a marked change from previous years when resolutions supporting Ukraine were supported by significant global majorities.

If Europe wants to garner and retain global support for the Ukrainian position, it is necessary to understand the motivations behind this ambivalence. This report therefore analyses state positions in a global context based on a mixed methodology of a literature review, UN voting patterns analysis, and discussions with experts from across the world. It concludes with policy recommendations for Ukraine's supporters in European capitals.

The report follows a five-step process. It first analyzes current state positions as expressed through their votes at the UN. States are then categorised into groups based on the level of support demonstrated so far in the UNGA, which leads to different strategies for approach.. This report then analyses how Russia and Ukraine have tried to convince others with their narratives of what happened in the war. After that, it covers the motivations of states to either support one side or remain ambivalent. Finally, insights from the literature are combined with input from international experts to come to policy recommendations.<sup>5</sup>

It should be noted that within this report, the use of the term 'Global South' might suggest that they are a monolithic and cohesive bloc. This is far from the truth. The different nations show vastly different trajectories, strengths, problems, and motivations, as well as different positions on the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Nonetheless, this report has mapped out what sort of motivations *can* play a role. They will not play a role in every nation and not always in the same way, but these motivations have been shown to be of importance. They can thus provide a starting point for understanding different positions.

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5 This report is based on the [MSc thesis of Nienke Wessel](#) and an analysis conducted by Bob Deen as part of the International Expert Group on Peace for Ukraine, coordinated by the Clingendael Institute. Several members of the group reviewed this report, but the positions expressed are solely those of the authors. More information on the working group is available on [the website](#).

# Support for Ukraine in the UN General Assembly and Bürgenstock summit

There are several possible ways to measure support for Ukraine, such as votes in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), send military or humanitarian aid, or attendance at peace summits. This chapter investigates two such indicators: votes and the Bürgenstock summit.

## United Nations General Assembly Votes

The United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) is the main deliberative, representative, and policy-making body of the United Nations. Each of the recognised member states has one vote, for a current total of 193 votes. Member states draft resolutions, which are then put to vote during the meetings. Since every country has a vote, it provides a good measure of global support for the resolution's content.<sup>6</sup> Since the full-scale invasion of February 2022, eleven resolutions supporting Ukraine's cause have been put to the vote by Ukraine and its partners.<sup>7</sup> The box below discusses the different UNGA votes.

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6 Note that UNGA votes are not necessarily indicative of whether a state will actively support Ukraine with money or weapons. One could, for example, also look at military aid or humanitarian aid to measure support levels. While both of these would also be interesting, there are practical difficulties in mapping out who sent what aid. Another interesting angle could be to look at the UN Security Council, but the Council unfortunately only contains part of the world's nations and was therefore not included in the present study. Nonetheless, the reader should keep in mind that UNGA votes only show part of the picture.

7 This concerns resolutions ES-11/1 to ES11/7, ES-11/9, 78/316, 79/184, and 80/223. We do not take resolution ES-11/8 into consideration, as Ukraine abstained from voting in that resolution, making it challenging to argue that the resolution is 'pro-Ukraine'. It was not put forward by Ukraine, but by the US.

#### **ES-11/1 on March 2nd, 2022**

This was the first vote, shortly after the invasion. This motion “deplores” Russian aggression, demands Russia to cease using force against Ukraine, and to return all territories to Ukraine, including the Donbas.

#### **ES-11/2 on March 24nd, 2022**

This resolution quickly followed the first resolution. It also calls upon Russia to “stop its military offensive” and to withdraw from Ukraine.

#### **ES-11/3 on April 7th, 2022**

ES 11/3 was adopted on April 7, 2022, and called for the suspension of Russia’s membership to the Human Rights Council, citing “reports of gross and systematic violations and abuses of human rights and violations of international humanitarian law committed by the Russian Federation during its aggression against Ukraine”. While this vote does not purely measure support for a side in the conflict directly, it nonetheless indicates a clear position and had practical consequences for a UN body. Compared to previous votes, fewer countries voted in favor, and more countries voted against.

#### **ES-11/4 on October 12th, 2022**

This resolution followed about half a year after the last. It mostly reiterates the contents from ES-11/1 and ES-11/2, and thus again urges Russia to give up the occupied territories.

#### **ES-11/5 on November 14th, 2022**

This resolution adds to previous resolutions that reparations should be paid to Ukraine for damages done. The added demand of reparations resulted in less support for this specific resolution.

#### **ES-11/6 on February 23rd, 2023**

This resolution was voted on about a year after the full-scale invasion. It reiterates the importance of coming to lasting peace, and again urges Russia to withdraw, among other things.

### **78/316 on July 11th, 2024**

Resolution 78/316 “Safety and security of nuclear facilities of Ukraine, including the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant” is a special resolution, in that it does not only reflect a country’s positions on Ukraine, but also concerns a nuclear power plant on Ukrainian territory. The resolution calls both for Russia to cease “its aggression against Ukraine”, but also calls for safety and security of the power plant specifically.

### **79/184 on December 17th, 2024**

Resolution 79/184, titled “Situation of human rights in the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine, including the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol”, is specifically concerned with the human rights situation in Russian occupied territories. It again opposes the Russian occupation and calls on Russia to at the least respect human rights in the temporarily occupied territories.

### **ES-11/7 on February 24th, 2025**

This is a more recent resolution, some three years after the start of the full-scale invasion. It mostly reiterates earlier resolutions, for example in urging Russia to leave Ukrainian territories.

### **ES-11/9 on December 3<sup>rd</sup>, 2025**

This resolution focused specifically on the return of Ukrainian children who were taken away from their families. The resolution does not discuss the war in any detail, except for mentioning that the abduction of children has happened during the war.

### **80/223 on December 18<sup>th</sup>, 2025**


This resolution is ‘like resolution 79/184’ titled “Situation of human rights in the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine, including the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol”. It contains many paragraphs that were copied from 79/184 and also lists largely similar concerns, such as condemning the occupation and war. In one small difference, all parties are called upon to uphold their obligations under international human rights law.<sup>8</sup>

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8 See point 8 in 80/223.


Figure 1 shows to what extent each nation has voted in favour or against the different resolutions. The first vote in early March after the invasion in February 2022 resulted in 141 votes in favour, but also 35 abstentions, 12 absences, and 5 votes against. The most recent vote from December last year resulted in 79 votes in favour, 73 abstentions, 25 absences, and 16 votes against. Over time, it seems like support for the Ukrainian position has been dwindling (see Figure 2).

Figure 1 Voting behaviour over eleven UNGA votes pertaining to Ukraine.<sup>9</sup>



9 The score is calculated by counting the 'yes' votes and then subtracting the 'no' votes. A positive value (blue) indicates that most votes have been aligned with Ukraine, and a negative value (red) that most votes have been aligned with Russia. Grey shows that most votes have been abstentions, or that the state was absent during the voting. All votes are listed in the appendix

Figure 2 Vote distribution over time



Two things are worthy of noting based on Figure 2. First of all, many early resolutions could rely on more support than later resolutions. The most notable jump is from February 2023 to July 2024. Second, some resolutions can be considered ‘controversial’ in the sense that they gathered less support than resolutions that were voted on around the same time, likely due to the topics they cover. Compare, for example, ES-11/3 and ES-11/5 to ES-11/4 in Figure 2. While all of these were voted on in a period of six months, ES-11/3 and ES-11/5 were clearly more controversial. As explained in the box, some resolutions cover more specific topics, such as removing Russia from the Human Rights Council (ES-11/3), reparations (ES-11/5), nuclear facilities (78/316), or human rights situations (79/184 and 80/223). The specificity of the topics likely impacted the voting results.

Even taking these ‘controversial’ resolutions out of the consideration, there seems to be a drop in support for the Ukrainian position. None of the votes in the past two years have reached the level of support of some of the early votes. In order to better understand this development, an analysis of country voting patterns was combined with an analysis of the contents of the resolutions. This resulted in nine different categories of voting countries. These categories could also serve as a

starting point for Ukraine and its supporters in identifying which states would prove the most promising for lobbying and convincing. States which always vote the same way are likely to be much more rigid in their position than states which have changed position over the past three and a half years, for example.

In analysing voting patterns, the following categories emerge<sup>10</sup>:

- **Always in favour of Ukraine (Cat. 1).** These are countries which have always voted in favour of Ukraine in past votes. This concerns most European countries, as well as Canada, Chile, Fiji, Guatemala, Japan, Myanmar, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, South Korea, and Uruguay. These are generally either Western countries or close partners.
- **US followers (Cat 2).** Resolution ES-11/7 was a special resolution in which several countries which had voted in favor up to that point, suddenly abstained, or even voted 'no'. This was the result of friction between president Trump and president Zelenskiy during and preceding the February 2025 assembly. In the end, the US drafted its own alternative resolution (ES-11/8), to which Ukraine abstained. The resolution supported by Ukraine received a 'no'-vote from the US, and some of its allies (Israel, Hungary, Marshall Islands, and Palau), and an abstention from many more. A possible explanation is that these countries followed the US, or at least did not want to pick sides between the US and Ukraine. It is, however, not possible to further discern the exact motivation of these states within the scope of this report.
- **In favour, unless (Cat. 3).** As argued above, we can identify certain 'controversial' resolutions. States in this category voted in favour of Ukraine in all resolutions, except one or multiple 'controversial' resolutions, where they abstained or were absent.<sup>11</sup> Based on voting data alone, these states can generally be expected to vote in favour of Ukraine in most future resolutions as well. This group is hard to pin down geographically as it includes countries from all over the world.
- **Signals of decreasing support (Cat. 4/5).** This concerns countries which voted in favour of Ukraine in most or all previous votes (sometimes excluding the 'controversial' votes), but abstained, or even voted against Ukraine, in

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10 The number after each category refers to the numbers in the appendix. Category 4 and 5 have been merged in the text because the differences between the two are quite granular and too detailed for most policy purposes.

11 With the exception of the Bahamas, which voted against resolution ES-11/5, and the Comoros, Somalia, Thailand, and Djibouti, which also abstained or were absent during a non-controversial vote.

recent votes. This concerns many Latin American, Middle Eastern, and African states. In general, this category of states is of particular interest, because they have shown movement away from the Western position towards a middle ground, or even a Russian position. Understanding their motivation might help them change their mind once again. Nonetheless, there is a lot of variety within this group, especially which votes states have abstained on and which they have voted 'yes' on. This suggests that an individual approach to each state is necessary.

- **Abstain/absent (Cat. 6).** This category concerns countries which always abstain or are absent. These states are deeply non-committal, and they are unlikely to change their position, unless something significant changes for them.
- **Abstain/absent, unless (Cat. 7).** This concerns countries which always abstained or were absent, except for one or multiple of the 'controversial' resolutions, where they voted 'no'. Based on voting data alone, we would expect these to abstain again in any future votes, unless some controversial element is part of the resolution.
- **Signals of increasing support for Russia (Cat. 8).** This concerns six African countries (Burkina Faso, Burundi, Central African Republic, Equatorial Guinea, Niger, Sudan) which generally abstained in the beginning, but have started voting 'no' in recent votes. This indicates that they have become more committed to the Russian position over time. It is interesting to investigate why these states have moved towards Russia, although it seems unlikely that one could ever convince them to vote in favour of Ukraine; the most likely scenario is to convince them to abstain or be absent again in the future.
- **Always in favour of Russia (Cat. 9).** This concerns five countries that enjoy close ties with Moscow and that have (almost) always voted together with Russia: Belarus, North Korea, Eritrea, Nicaragua, and Mali.<sup>12</sup>

The complete list of categories and countries can be found in the appendix. It should be noted that Syria was not placed in any of the categories due to its recent move from a pro-Russian position to a more neutral one. This was the result of the fall of the Assad regime. It is unique in its move from a pro-Russian stance to a neutral one.

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<sup>12</sup> Mali has also abstained in earlier votes, but voted 'no' in the seven most recent votes, and is therefore considered to have adopted a pro-Russian position more decidedly and earlier on than the countries in Category 8.

## How to interpret and measure global support?

The analysis above focused on support in individual states. This makes sense if one is interested in determining whether a resolution will pass in the UNGA, as all votes are equal. Nonetheless, since in world politics ‘all countries are equal but some are more equal than others’, to paraphrase George Orwell, it is important to look at the GDP and population represented by each vote.

As shown in Figure 3, the ‘yes’ camp initially represented some three quarters of the world GDP, except for ES-11/7, where it dropped to about half. One major reason for this is the change in the position of the United States, which shifted to ‘no’ on that vote. After the US switches back to voting ‘yes’, the ‘yes’-votes represent about 60% of the world GDP.

Figure 3 Vote distribution according to GDP over time





Figure 4 Vote distribution according to population over time



If, instead of GDP, we consider instead what percentage of the world population is represented by a vote (Figure 4), there never was a pro-Ukrainian majority. About half of the world population lives in states that abstained, including India and China. That is not to say that every individual in those countries agrees with their state position, especially since many of the states considered are not democratic, but it does put into question to what extent the Western perspective is a worldwide perspective on this issue. This is aggravated by the fact that Russia explicitly develops policy for a ‘World Majority’, which it defines as “as a community of non-Western countries that have no binding relationships with the United States and the organizations it patronizes.”<sup>13</sup>

13 Karaganov, Sergei A., Alexander M. Kramarenko, and Dmitry V. Trenin. [Russia’s Policy Towards World Majority](#). Moscow, 2023.

Figure 5 GDP per category





Figure 6 Population represented by each category



Looking at the categories assigned to each country in this chapter rather than individual votes, we see similar patterns (Figures 5 and 6). The vast majority of the world's GDP is produced in countries which are likely to vote in favour of resolutions in favour of Ukraine (the first three categories). Looking at population, however, we see that less than half of the world is represented by nations which have voted in favour of Ukraine at least once.

## Attendance of the Peace Summit at Bürgenstock


Besides the UNGA, there have also been several peace summits throughout the years. To further identify states which could be convinced to take more action, one particularly high-profile event is analysed in depth: the 2024 Peace Summit in Bürgenstock. This summit is one of multiple meetings and summits that took place, but is useful for analysis because it resulted in a declaration that was signed by some but not all attendees. This was widely seen as a pivotal moment and a test of which countries supported Ukraine's vision for peace, as articulated in the Peace Formula that President Zelensky presented at the UN General Assembly in September 2022. The Peace Formula explicitly included issue areas of significant concern to the 'Global South', including food, energy and nuclear security.<sup>14</sup> It was initially very successful in garnering global support, including in several meetings of National Security Advisers in Jeddah, Copenhagen, Malta, and Davos. The Bürgenstock summit was the culmination of this process and Ukraine and its allies invested significant diplomatic effort to convince countries to attend. Russia vociferously boycotted the summit and organised its own counter-campaign, with the aid of China. 'Bürgenstock' thus became a diplomatic tug-of-war which yielded mixed results for Ukraine. The Joint Communiqué on a Peace Framework reaffirmed Ukraine's territorial integrity and built on UNGA resolutions ES-11/1 and ES-11/6, (see textbox in previous section) but otherwise used relatively non-controversial language focusing on food security, nuclear issues and the return of prisoners of war and deported children. It was nonetheless not signed by all participants. Global players and prominent 'middle powers' such as Brazil, India, Indonesia, South Africa, Mexico and several Gulf states attended but did not sign the final communiqué (see Figure 7). Some countries signed it later, bringing the total to 89 signatories – not

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14 Brzozowski, Alexandra. "Ukraine 'peace Formula' Talks Attract More Non-Western States." Euractiv, January 15, 2024.

even half of the total number of UN states, approximately 64% of global GDP and representative of 22% of the world's population. Some cited Russia's absence or Israel's participation as reasons for their refusal to sign the communiqué.<sup>15</sup> While it was a snapshot of support at the time and was heavily influenced by the events in Israel of October 7<sup>th</sup> and their aftermath, the list of 'Bürgenstock abstentions' is nonetheless a helpful proxy to identify populous countries that deliberately remained non-committal between Ukraine and Russia. Some of these countries could prove to be crucial 'swing states' in the future.

Figure 7 Participation in the Bürgenstock summit. Blue signed the declaration, purple attended but did not sign, and orange did not attend.



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15 Al Jazeera Staff. "Ukraine Peace Summit: Why Some Countries Refused to Sign the Plan." Al Jazeera, June 17, 2024.

# Understanding motivations

There are two interacting explanatory factors that explain the vastly different positions states have taken. First of all, there is **the appeal of the Russian narrative**. Second, there are, in all cases, very **practical reasons** to support or at least not to alienate Russia. It is the combination of these two that makes for varying degrees of Russian support. Practical concerns drive decisions, but states refer to narratives to justify a decision towards their constituencies or other states.

## Narratives

One piece of the puzzle is therefore understanding that Russia and Ukraine have disseminated different narratives of the war, and that those resonate to a larger or lesser degree with states and individuals within those states. The focus is on state narratives, i.e. those narratives promoted by the state. These narratives are most prominently pushed in the international arena towards other states to garner support. Narratives are essentially stories that states use both to make sense of the world and to win over others to their cause.<sup>16</sup> They are therefore inherently subjective and often selectively use or abuse facts to promote narrative cohesion. Narratives should therefore always be approached with a critical stance. They are mentioned here not because they are 'true', but because they resonate in parts of the world; their inclusion does not mean that the authors endorse their content.

The Ukrainian narrative emphasises Ukraine's own national identity and traditions. It emphasises the Russian threat to Ukraine's existence as a historic struggle for sovereignty and independence against an imperial aggressor from Moscow that far predates 2022. This also includes the Soviet Union and the Russian Empire – which Ukraine perceives and presents as a colonial power. The focus in this narrative is on the democratic and liberal foundation of the Ukrainian

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16 See for more general information about narratives and their use e.g.: Roselle, Laura, Alister Miskimmon, and Ben O'Loughlin. '[Strategic Narrative: A New Means to Understand Soft Power](#)'. *Media, War & Conflict* 7, no. 1 (2014): 70–84.

nation and how Russia is trying to undermine or destroy it. Ties to Europe and periods of shared historic development are also emphasised.<sup>17</sup> In this narrative, Ukrainians have chosen democratic freedom in the 2014 “Revolution of Dignity”, which Russia is unwilling to respect. Furthermore, this narrative emphasises how Russia violated international law and Ukrainian territorial integrity, deported children and threatened global food security and nuclear safety. Zelensky, in his speeches, also emphasises Ukraine’s innocence in the war and Russia’s aggression as unprovoked.<sup>18</sup>

The various Russian narratives that Russia uses to justify its aggression and garner global support contain a few recurring elements that have also evolved over time and are adjusted to their target audiences, often with the use of disinformation techniques.<sup>19</sup> First, Moscow increasingly emphasises the supposedly inseparable connection between Ukraine and Russia.<sup>20</sup> In his speeches, Putin highlights the historical periods when the Ukrainian territories were part of the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union. This narrative also claims that the Ukrainian (and Belarusian) people are ethnically indistinguishable from the Russian people, with a shared religion and related (or even “the same”) languages. Russia thereby disputes Ukraine’s right to national sovereignty and self-determination. In Russia’s narrative the Ukrainian people are led by a “corrupt, illegitimate government with Nazi sympathies that also suppresses Russian-speaking and other minorities”. A second key strain in the Russian narrative focuses on the position of Russia in relation to the world. Putin argues that ‘the Western world’ is a threat to Russia, and that “Ukraine was dragged into a dangerous geopolitical game aimed at turning Ukraine into a barrier between Europe and Russia, a springboard against Russia”. This strand of the narrative contains both classic sphere-of-influence thinking and references Russian ‘legitimate security concerns’ – and builds on anti-Western and anti-NATO

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17 Kordan, Bohdan. “[Russia’s War against Ukraine: Historical Narratives, Geopolitics, and Peace.](#)” Canadian Slavonic Papers 64, nos. 2–3 (2022): 162–72.

18 Chiluiwa, Innocent, and Jurate Ruzaitė. “[Analysing the Language of Political Conflict: A Study of War Rhetoric of Vladimir Putin and Volodymyr Zelensky.](#)” Critical Discourse Studies, 2024, 1–17.

19 Josip Mandić and Darijo Klarić, “[Case Study of the Russian Disinformation Campaign during the War in Ukraine – Propaganda Narratives, Goals, and Impacts.](#)” National Security and the Future 24, no. 2 (2023): 97–140.

20 Drost, Niels. [Tsar-Struck: How Vladimir Putin Uses the History of the Russian Empire.](#) Clingendael Policy Brief. 2022.

Putin, Vladimir. “[Article by Vladimir Putin “On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians.”](#)” President of Russia, July 19, 2021.

sentiment. Rather than Russia acting as an imperialist power, the EU and US are accused of imperialism and hostility *against Russia*. Especially the latter element has resonated internationally, including within BRICS countries.<sup>21</sup>

## Drivers of support for Russia

Understanding narratives is one part of the puzzle. While Ukraine's narrative initially garnered a global majority, Russia's narratives nonetheless resonate with various subsets of the populations of European countries but are also widely picked up outside Europe. This section will therefore focus on the reasons why countries from the 'Global South' are sympathetic to elements of Russia's narratives, or willing to support Russia despite believing the Ukrainian narrative. While there are different reasons for individual countries, they can largely be grouped together in several clusters.

### Anticolonial and/or anti-Western sentiments

Many states, especially in Africa, but not exclusively, harbour resentment towards the idea of Western dominance and arrogance, especially in countries with colonial and neocolonial experiences. A narrative about Western imperialism resonates with their past experiences with the US, EU, and NATO. For example, some African states feel that they have been politically and economically marginalized (e.g. through IMF policies) and that their inhabitants experience racism at the hands of Westerners.<sup>22</sup> An investigation in which African government officials were interviewed, found that the officials in some African states likened the Russian ethnic situation to their own, with artificial borders crossing ethnic lines.<sup>23</sup> The officials then repeated Russian narratives that Russia was provoked by the hostile attitude of the Ukrainian government towards the Russian-speaking minority. They also repeated the Russian narrative that NATO is 'encroaching' on Central and Eastern Europe, even though it 'promised' that

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21 Appel, Hilary. "[Competing Narratives of the Russia–Ukraine War: Why the West Hasn't Convinced the Rest.](#)" *Global Policy* 15, no. 4 (2024): 559–69.

22 Gopaldas, Ronak. "[Will the Invasion of Ukraine Change Russia-Africa Relations?](#)" Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, April 26, 2023.

23 Mitrache, Marius-Mircea, and Sergiu Miscoiu. "[My Enemy's Enemy Is \(Likely to Become\) My Friend: Perceptions of the Russian War in Ukraine in Sub-Saharan Africa.](#)" In *The War in Ukraine and Its Impact on Global Politics and Security*, edited by Cristina Matiuta and Raluca Viman-Miller. Presa Universitară Clujeană, 2023.

it would not do so after the Cold War. Some interviewees took it even further and argued that the West deliberately provoked the war in order to test and sell Western weapons.

While not as extreme, certain Latin American societies have also aired sentiments that Western sanctions have served mostly to promote Western hegemony and values, rather than a more equal international world order.<sup>24</sup> Sanctions imply an unequal footing where one state can 'punish' another, something undesirable in the eyes of many states around the world.

In general, the 'Global South' identity has resulted in countries seeking out each other and developing South-South relations, with BRICS being the most famous example. Countries with similar but sometimes also vastly different historical experiences find each other in their disadvantaged position in the international arena and work together. Russia, which is typically considered to be part of the 'Global North', has managed to position itself as part of the 'Global South' by promoting a narrative of shared experiences.

### **Food security**

Despite the power of narratives and past experiences, the practical problems faced in some countries should not be discounted. The war in Ukraine initially caused a worldwide shortage of wheat and fertilizers. Especially the African continent, which is highly reliant on exports of Russian and Ukrainian grain, suffered effects on its food supply chains and rising prices.<sup>25</sup> The African Union has repeatedly stressed that the effects of the war on the African continent should be recognized, while taking a non-aligned stance towards the conflict itself.<sup>26</sup> In the words of Africa scholar Nkala: "The imposition of unilateral sanctions on Russia by the West had a negative impact on development in the 'Global South', where countries were understandably more worried about the global food and energy inflation than the violation of the territorial integrity of

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24 Rodriguez, J. Luis. "[International Order and Latin American Reticent Support for Ukraine](#)." *Bulletin of Latin American Research* 43, no. 4 (2024): 292–95.

25 Nkala, Sizo. "[No Dog in This Fight: Interrogating Ethiopia's Calculated Neutrality towards the Russia-Ukraine War](#)." *Contemporary Security Policy* 45, no. 4 (2024): 657–69.

26 Staeger, Ueli. "[The War in Ukraine, the African Union, and African Agency](#)." *African Affairs* 122, no. 489 (2023): 559–86.

a faraway country”.<sup>27</sup> Whereas the African continent has been most effected, other states have also faced issues. India suspended wheat exports shortly after the start of the war to ensure national food security.<sup>28</sup> Even though EU sanctions on Russia specifically exempted agricultural exports, Russia has actively used this in its strategic communication towards Africa, Latin America and Asia.<sup>29</sup> This has led to friction between the West, which demands adherence to its sanctions policy from the ‘Global South’, and some ‘GS’ countries themselves, which feel that the West is insufficiently aware of or sympathetic to the effects the war has on them.

## Historical ties

Data analysis shows that there is a strong correlation between historical relations in GS countries and support for Russia vis-à-vis the Western position.<sup>30</sup> Different types of ties exist, e.g., economic ties such as trade or aid, military ties such as sending paramilitary groups, personal ties or a track record of support in the past.

There are several reasons to believe that historical ties play an important role. The Gallup world poll shows that Russian leadership had high approval ratings in certain regions in Africa before the invasion, especially in regions where Russian mercenaries were employed to replace French forces, and regions where Russia sent wheat, oil or gas.<sup>31</sup> These correlate with voting behaviour.

For decades Russia has actively built relations with many African and Asian nations, making use of diplomatic and personal contacts built up during the Soviet period. It has also invested in different states around the world, but some African states most prominently, such as Egypt.<sup>32</sup> Russia has furthermore

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27 Nkala, Sizo. “[No Dog in This Fight: Interrogating Ethiopia’s Calculated Neutrality towards the Russia-Ukraine War.](#)” *Contemporary Security Policy* 45, no. 4 (2024): 664.

28 Ben Hassen, Tarek, and Hamid El Bilali. “[Impacts of the Russia-Ukraine War on Global Food Security: Towards More Sustainable and Resilient Food Systems?](#)” *Foods* 11, no. 15 (2022): 2301.

29 See for example: Roscongress Foundation. “[Sanctions against Russia Threaten Food Security around the World.](#)” 2023.

30 Wessel, Nienke. “[Power, politics, and paramilitaries; why nations stand with Russia or Ukraine.](#)” MSc Thesis. 2025.

31 Bikus, Zach. “[Africans Divided on Russia’s Leadership Before Ukraine War.](#)” Gallup.Com, April 13, 2022.

32 Ragab, Eman. “[Egypt’s Position in the Russia-Ukraine War.](#)” *Global Policy* 15, no. 4 (2024): 762–67.

deployed mercenaries in countries around the world,<sup>33</sup> and there are many countries worldwide which receive weapons supplies from Russia, such as Vietnam, India, Algeria, Egypt, Sudan, and Angola.<sup>34</sup> Ukraine, which had to set up its diplomatic service from scratch after its independence, has been at a relative disadvantage compared to the much larger and well established Russian diplomatic and intelligence networks across the globe.

Furthermore, Russia has historically provided more ideological leeway, sympathy or outright support to states than the West has. In the Ethiopian civil war with the Tigray People's Liberation Front, the West criticized Ethiopia for how it was handling the conflict, while Russia and China allowed the government to deal with it as they saw fit.<sup>35</sup> This made Ethiopia less willing to support the US and EU when they were mobilizing support for Ukraine. Added to that, Russia has supplied the arms the government has needed in order to fight in this civil war.

Serbia has a similar story. While nominally pursuing European integration and therefore alignment with EU foreign policy, Serbia has strong historical ties with Russia and harbours grudges towards NATO due to the 1999 bombings and the US and European recognition of Kosovo in 2008.<sup>36</sup> Serbia often votes together with the EU, but refuses to impose sanctions on Russia. For many more countries, the historical ties informed by colonialism, as mentioned above, also inform current relations.

In a few extreme cases, historical experiences and/or strong dependencies on Russia can lead states to always vote with Russia. This holds true for e.g. Belarus,

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33 Miller, Greg, and Robyn Dixon. "[Wagner Group Surges in Africa as U.S. Influence Fades, Leak Reveals.](#)" The Washington Post, April 23, 2023.

34 Aidi, Hisham. The Russia-Ukraine War: Implications for Africa. Policy Brief No. 22/22. Policy Center for the New South, 2022.

Cuong, Nguyen Anh. "[Perspectives on Russia, the USA, and the EU's Power Struggle in the Ukraine Crisis and Vietnam's Neutrality.](#)" Pacific Focus 38, no. 2 (2023): 257–87.

Tellis, Ashley J. "[What Is in Our Interest: India and the Ukraine War.](#)" Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, April 2022.

35 Nkala, Sizo. "[No Dog in This Fight: Interrogating Ethiopia's Calculated Neutrality towards the Russia-Ukraine War.](#)" Contemporary Security Policy 45, no. 4 (2024): 664

36 Dufalla, Jacqueline, and Asya Metodieva. "[From Affect to Strategy: Serbia's Diplomatic Balance during the Russia-Ukraine War.](#)" Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, November 2024, 1–20.

which by now has nearly entirely subordinated its foreign policy to Moscow.<sup>37</sup> Lukashenko in particular relies on Putin's support,<sup>38</sup> but the Belarusian economy is also intertwined with the Russian one.<sup>39</sup> Until the fall of the Assad regime, Syria was also a case where close historical ties and military support for the Assad regime led to the regime voting in line with Russia's preferences.

### **Preserving strategic trade relations with Russia and the fear of Russian (counter-)sanctions**

Trade forms a specific form of historical ties. Trading considerations are prominent around the world. This can concern the trade in food, fertilizers, weapons, or other forms of trade. It was already mentioned that Russia supplies weapons to many states, which are often needed for internal security. Many EU neighbourhood states specifically feared Russian counter-sanctions and thus did not implement sanctions against Russia, even when that would have put them in a favourable light in Europe.<sup>40</sup> It differs per country and region which form of trade matters the most, but this is a consideration which can be found across the world.

Take the example of fertilizer trade. The war triggered a significant increase in fertilizer prices, as Russia (and Belarus) held huge portions of the worldwide fertilizer trade: Russia held 14% in urea, and 11% of the trade in phosphate in 2020; Russia and Belarus together held 41% of the trade in potash.<sup>41</sup> Many non-EU countries relied for close to 100% on imports for these products, and some of these relied mostly on Russia and Belarus, like Mongolia, Azerbaijan or Kazakhstan. Some of these countries managed to obtain their imports from

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37 Pucek, Kaspar. [The Crisis of Belarusian Sovereignty: The EU Needs to Look for Opportunities for Pragmatic Engagement with Minsk](#). Clingendael Policy Brief. 2025..

Pucek, Kaspar, and Bob Deen. [Belarus on Thin Ice: Future Scenarios and European Policy Dilemmas](#). Clingendael Report. 2025.

38 Zogg, Benno. "[Minsk's Signals: Belarus and the War in Ukraine](#)." CSS Policy Perspectives 10, no. 14 (2022): 1–4.

39 Sahm, Manfred, and Astrid Huterer. "[Belarus: Sovereignty under Threat](#)." SWP Comment 2024, no. 22 (June 2024).

40 Hellquist, Elin. "[Either with Us or against Us? Third-Country Alignment with EU Sanctions against Russia/Ukraine](#)." Cambridge Review of International Affairs 29, no. 3 (2016): 997–1021.

41 Hebebrand, Charlotte, and Joseph W. Glauber. "[The Russia-Ukraine War after a Year: Impacts on Fertilizer Production, Prices, and Trade Flows](#)." In *The Russia-Ukraine Conflict and Global Food Security*, edited by Joseph W. Glauber and David Laborde Debucquet. International Food Policy Research Institute, 2023.

elsewhere, such as Brazil which turned to Canada but still relies at least partially on Russian fertilizers and diesel. Others did not manage to do so, especially smaller African states. Because of their reliance, countries can be hesitant to admonish Russia in fear of losing access to fertilizers.

Energy trade is also an important factor for countries relying on Russia's coal, oil and gas.<sup>42</sup> While India is the most often cited case and has faced the brunt of Trump's ire for its imports of Russian oil, there are many others which are dependent on Russian fossil fuel exports.<sup>43</sup> Turkey, for example, also relies for about one third on Russian gas,<sup>44</sup> and has thus been wary of imposing sanctions on Russia.<sup>45</sup> Maintaining access to energy sources remains an important motivation for many countries to avoid breaking off relations with Russia.

### Strategic voting

Besides reservations about angering Russia in this particular case, some states have been shown to vote strategically in some other sense. For example, Palau and the Marshall Islands generally vote the same as the US, with them being 3<sup>rd</sup> and 6<sup>th</sup> in the list of countries with most similar votes to the US (excluding absences).<sup>46</sup> Besides this, some countries generally prefer to stay out of most international affairs and abstain more on principle than because of considerations specific to this case. Kiribati, Dominica, and South Sudan have been absent for more than half of the votes since their respective ascensions to the UNGA.<sup>47</sup> If we also look at abstentions, then also Nauru, South Africa, Equatorial Guinea, and the Seychelles have voted to 'abstain' or were absent during at least half of the votes.

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42 Szalai, Máté. [Between Hedging and Bandwagoning - Interpreting the Reactions of Middle Eastern and North African States to the Russian-Ukrainian War](#). Euromesco No. 123. Euromesco. 2023.

43 For a good overview of coal, crude oil, LNG, pipeline gas and oil products, see Petras Katinas, ['August 2025 — Monthly analysis of Russian fossil fuel exports and sanctions'](#), CREA, 10 September 2025.

44 Lesage, Dries, Emin Daskin, and Hasan Yar. "The War in Ukraine and Turkey's Hedging Strategy between the West and Russia." GIES Occasional Paper 1 (2022): 55–62.

45 Cheterian, Vicken. ["Friend and Foe: Russia–Turkey Relations before and after the War in Ukraine."](#) *Small Wars & Insurgencies* 34, no. 7 (2023): 1271–94.

46 United Nations Digital Library. ["United Nations General Assembly Voting Data: Resolutions 1 \(11 December 1946\) to 79/278 \(25 March 2025\)."](#) UN, 2025.

47 United Nations Digital Library. ["United Nations General Assembly Voting Data: Resolutions 1 \(11 December 1946\) to 79/278 \(25 March 2025\)."](#) UN, 2025.

## Preference for a multipolar world order and/or non-alignment

Related to problems of (neo)colonialism, economic (in)dependence, and power relations, most states outside Europe prefer a multipolar world order. This can hold true for both smaller states (which try to hedge and appeal to larger powers, but do not want to submit to any one of them, such as Egypt<sup>48</sup>) as well as larger states which either already have or aspire to middle power or great power status in a multipolar world order (such as China, India and Brazil,<sup>49</sup> or Saudi Arabia).<sup>50</sup> Their preference is therefore not for Russia to win, but also not for the West to decisively prevail and impose its will on Russia. Many are using a language similar to that of the non-aligned movement during the Cold War and do not want to be forced to choose sides. The states that attended the Bürgenstock summit but refused to sign the communiqué – many of whom are members of the BRICS – are good examples of countries that pursue a strategy of non-alignment. As part of this strategy, they can either seek rapprochement to Russia and China to ‘balance’ against the United States, to ‘play both sides’, or to pursue a strict strategy of neutrality and abstention – or a combination of these strategies.<sup>51</sup>

## Regime change

It should be noted that voting behaviour can change radically with the change of government or depending on specific circumstances. The most prominent example is perhaps the United States, which was staunchly pro-Ukraine under Biden but once suddenly voted against its own UNGA resolution under the new Trump administration. Countries such as Myanmar<sup>52</sup> and Syria have also seen changes in their voting behaviour coinciding with regime changes.

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48 Ragab, Eman. “[Egypt’s Position in the Russia–Ukraine War.](#)” *Global Policy* 15, no. 4 (2024): 762–67.

49 Krause, Felipe. “[Explaining Brazil’s Stance on the Ukraine War.](#)” *Bulletin of Latin American Research* 43, no. 4 (2024): 326–29.

50 Heibach, Jens. “[The Benefits of Neutrality: Saudi Foreign Policy in the Wake of the Ukraine War.](#)” *Global Policy* *Global Policy*, no. 00 (2024): 1–5.

51 Cuong, Nguyen Anh. “Perspectives on Russia, the USA, and the EU’s Power Struggle in the Ukraine Crisis and Vietnam’s Neutrality.” *Pacific Focus* 38, no. 2 (2023): 257–87.

Ragab, Eman. “[Egypt’s Position in the Russia–Ukraine War.](#)” *Global Policy* 15, no. 4 (2024): 762–67.

52 Mahmud, Kawsar Uddin, and Nasrin Jabin. “[Responses of Bangladesh and Myanmar to the Ukraine Crisis: A Comparative Analysis from a Neo-Classical Realist Perspective.](#)” *Southeast Asia: A Multidisciplinary Journal* 22, no. 2 (2022): 86–106. world.

# Persuading requires understanding

In order to better understand the results of the voting analysis and literature study above, Clingendael has discussed the topic in discussions with several regional experts. Both the literature and expert interviews show that each state has its own particular mix of motivations, grounded in specific national interests and specific historical experiences. Diplomats who aim to win over specific countries to Ukraine's cause should therefore invest in understanding each state on its own. A lack of Western acknowledgement of the effect of the war on the rest of the world and a lack of willingness in considering other positions has led to frustration in certain countries. The following arguments and frustrations are repeatedly brought up:

- “The West has double standards but does not acknowledge or recognize them.”
- “How can a lasting peace agreement be reached without talking to Russia?”<sup>53</sup>
- “This is your (European) regional war, why is it framed as a worldwide challenge while our regional wars are not?”
- “Is Putin not to a certain extent right about fearing NATO enlargement? Is there not a security dilemma for Russia?”
- “Why should we bear the costs for your war? Why should we deal with food shortages or energy problems?”
- “Why do we keep being accused of having fallen for Russian disinformation when we try to indicate our concerns to the West?”

Here we see how narratives on the one hand, and practical concerns based on specific national interests on the other, come together to form an argument of convenience or a genuine point of frustration. In most of these cases, endless discussions can be held on whether these arguments ‘hold water’, but that may well be counterproductive for at least some of them. The main point is that these

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53 This was also cited as a reason not to sign the Bürgenstock Summit declaration: Al Jazeera Staff. [“Ukraine Peace Summit: Why Some Countries Refused to Sign the Plan.”](#) Al Jazeera, June 17, 2024.

narratives and arguments are recognizable across the world, whether because of past (colonial) experiences or because of current national interests. It therefore resonates.

This point of view has recently become more popular within Dutch policy circles as well. The recent advice by the Dutch Adviesraad Internationale Vraagstukken (Advisory Council on International Affairs)<sup>54</sup>, which requests the Netherlands and Europe to recognize their own double standards. It also asks for increasing knowledge on partners in the 'Global South', as an investment in diplomacy. This is also necessary to be able to tailor an approach to each individual state. These advices are in line with the points brought up by the interviewees.

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54 Adviesraad Internationale Vraagstukken. [The Netherlands, Europe and the Global South in a Changing World Order](#). 2025.

# Conclusions and recommendations

The gradually diminishing diplomatic support for Ukraine on the global stage, including within the UNGA, is a cause for concern for Ukraine and its supporters. For multiple reasons, Russia's various narratives resonate widely in Africa, Asia and Latin America. The most recent UNGAs and the voting patterns over the last 3 years have shown a growing frustration both within the 'West' and within the 'Global South' – two contested terms representing large geographical clusters of very different countries with their own motivations. The 'West' feels that its arguments fall on deaf ears and is exasperated by countries that are not more forthcoming in condemning Russia or putting pressure on Putin. The 'Global South' feels misunderstood, neglected or forced to take sides in a war that is not theirs, but that nonetheless has a negative impact on their economies and societies. It may prove difficult to fundamentally change these dynamics, but in order to increase the chances of swaying states to share and support their worldview, the Netherlands and other European countries could consider the following.

- **It is necessary but not sufficient to only try to put forward a more convincing narrative.** It is also not particularly helpful to attribute a lack of 'Global South' support to Russian disinformation or to just repeat the same arguments about the international rules-based order more loudly and more frequently; this merely prompts more resentment about perceived 'double standards' of the West towards Russia and Israel, or the Western colonial past.
- **Develop a more granular approach.** It may not be doable for European diplomats to target each country individually with a tailor-made narrative, but as with all forms of communication, understanding one's target audience is key in order to convince them. Looking at past voting patterns can help to identify states that might be more open to different arguments or other incentives.
- **Learn how to listen,** difficult as it may be, especially if certain arguments may not be put forward in good faith and are only used as window-dressing for economic interests. Listening is not the same as agreeing; not all arguments have moral equivalence, but at least they give insight in what a particular country chooses to prioritize in its own narrative.

- Instead, the West could **invest time and effort in recognizing and mitigating the impact of the war on the ‘Global South’** such as food, energy and nuclear security. These topics were carefully chosen by President Zelensky as part of the Ukrainian Peace Formula exactly *because* they resonate with the ‘Global South’, but if they are not backed up by concrete actions, these words ring hollow. The EU’s exemption of agricultural exports from sanctions on Russia and NATO’s efforts to help promote Ukrainian grain exports through the Black Sea are good examples of steps that have really mattered to prevent a global food crisis.
- **Gathering support for Ukraine in UNGA requires taking each individual nation and its concerns seriously.** While one might not agree with a certain interpretation of events, it is often complicated to point out what is true and what is not. Acknowledging concerns about “double standards”, the unintended effects on secondary nations, and the way the West is perceived worldwide will be key to preserving or strengthening diplomatic support for Ukraine’s cause.

# Appendix

	2022 Mar (ES-11/1)	2022 Mar (ES-11/2)	2022 Apr (ES-11/3)	2022 Oct (ES-11/4)	2022 Nov (ES-11/5)	2023 Feb (ES-11/6)	2024 Jul (78/316)	2024 Dec (79/184)	2025 Feb (ES-11/7)	2025 Dec (ES-11/9)	2025 Dec (80/223)	Bürgerstock	Category
<b>Syria</b>	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	M	A	M	M	Absent	X
<b>Albania</b>	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Signed	1
<b>Andorra</b>	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Signed	1
<b>Australia</b>	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Signed	1
<b>Austria</b>	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Signed	1
<b>Belgium</b>	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Signed	1
<b>Bosnia and Herzegovina</b>	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Signed	1
<b>Bulgaria</b>	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Signed	1
<b>Canada</b>	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Signed	1
<b>Chile</b>	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Signed	1
<b>Croatia</b>	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Signed	1
<b>Cyprus</b>	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Signed	1
<b>Czech Republic</b>	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Signed	1
<b>Denmark</b>	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Signed	1
<b>Estonia</b>	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Signed	1
<b>Fiji</b>	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Signed	1
<b>Finland</b>	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Signed	1
<b>France</b>	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Signed	1
<b>Germany</b>	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Signed	1
<b>Greece</b>	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Signed	1
<b>Guatemala</b>	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Signed	1
<b>Iceland</b>	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Signed	1
<b>Ireland</b>	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Signed	1
<b>Italy</b>	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Signed	1
<b>Japan</b>	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Signed	1
<b>Latvia</b>	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Signed	1

	2022 Mar (ES-11/1)	2022 Mar (ES-11/2)	2022 Apr (ES-11/3)	2022 Oct (ES-11/4)	2022 Nov (ES-11/5)	2023 Feb (ES-11/6)	2024 Jul (78/316)	2024 Dec (79/184)	2025 Feb (ES-11/7)	2025 Dec (ES-11/9)	2025 Dec (80/223)	Bürgerstock	Category
Liechtenstein	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Signed	1
Lithuania	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Signed	1
Luxembourg	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Signed	1
Malta	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Signed	1
Moldova (Republic of)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Signed	1
Monaco	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Signed	1
Montenegro	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Signed	1
Myanmar	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Absent	1
Netherlands	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Signed	1
New Zealand	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Signed	1
Norway	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Signed	1
Papua New Guinea	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Signed	1
Poland	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Signed	1
Portugal	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Signed	1
Romania	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Signed	1
Samoa	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Absent	1
Seychelles	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Absent	1
Slovenia	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Signed	1
South Korea (Republic of)	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Signed	1
Spain	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Signed	1
Sweden	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Signed	1
Switzerland	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Signed	1
Ukraine	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Signed	1
United Kingdom	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Signed	1
Uruguay	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Signed	1
Argentina	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	Signed	2
Costa Rica	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	M	Y	Signed	2
Dominican Republic	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	Signed	2
Ecuador	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	M	Y	Y	Signed	2
Georgia	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	M	Y	Y	Signed	2

	2022 Mar (ES-11/1)	2022 Mar (ES-11/2)	2022 Apr (ES-11/3)	2022 Oct (ES-11/4)	2022 Nov (ES-11/5)	2023 Feb (ES-11/6)	2024 Jul (78/316)	2024 Dec (79/184)	2025 Feb (ES-11/7)	2025 Dec (ES-11/9)	2025 Dec (80/223)	Bürgenstock	Category
<b>Hungary</b>	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Signed	2
<b>Israel</b>	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Signed	2
<b>Malawi</b>	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	Signed	2
<b>Marshall Islands</b>	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Signed	2
<b>Micronesia</b>	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	Signed	2
<b>North Macedonia</b>	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	Signed	2
<b>Palau</b>	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Signed	2
<b>Panama</b>	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	Signed	2
<b>United States of America</b>	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Signed	2
<b>Bahamas</b>	Y	Y	Y	Y	N	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Absent	3
<b>Barbados</b>	Y	Y	A	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Signed	3
<b>Belize</b>	Y	Y	A	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Absent	3
<b>Bhutan</b>	Y	Y	A	Y	A	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Absent	3
<b>Cabo Verde</b>	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Signed	3
<b>Comoros</b>	Y	M	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	M	Signed	3
<b>Côte d'Ivoire</b>	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	A	Signed	3
<b>Guyana</b>	Y	Y	A	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Signed	3
<b>Jamaica</b>	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Absent	3
<b>Liberia</b>	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	M	Y	Y	M	Y	Signed	3
<b>Mexico</b>	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	A	A	Y	Y	Y	Present, but did not sign	3
<b>Nauru</b>	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	M	M	Y	Y	M	Absent	3
<b>Peru</b>	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	A	Signed	3
<b>Philippines</b>	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	A	Signed	3
<b>Saint Kitts and Nevis</b>	Y	Y	A	Y	A	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	A	Absent	3
<b>San Marino</b>	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	M	Y	Signed	3
<b>Singapore</b>	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	A	Signed	3
<b>Slovakia</b>	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	Signed	3
<b>Solomon Islands</b>	Y	Y	M	Y	Y	Y	M	A	Y	Y	A	Absent	3
<b>Suriname</b>	Y	Y	A	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Signed	3
<b>Timor-Leste</b>	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	Signed	3

	2022 Mar (ES-11/1)	2022 Mar (ES-11/2)	2022 Apr (ES-11/3)	2022 Oct (ES-11/4)	2022 Nov (ES-11/5)	2023 Feb (ES-11/6)	2024 Jul (78/316)	2024 Dec (79/184)	2025 Feb (ES-11/7)	2025 Dec (ES-11/9)	2025 Dec (80/223)	Bürgenstock	Category
Tonga	Y	Y	Y	Y	M	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	A	Signed	3
Trinidad and Tobago	Y	Y	A	Y	A	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	A	Absent	3
Türkiye	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	M	Y	Signed	3
Tuvalu	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	M	Y	A	M	Y	Absent	3
Vanuatu	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Absent	3
Afghanistan	Y	Y	M	Y	Y	Y	M	M	M	M	M	Absent	4
Antigua and Barbuda	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	M	A	Signed	4
Bahrain	Y	Y	A	Y	A	Y	A	A	A	A	A	Present, but did not sign	4
Benin	Y	Y	M	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	M	Y	M	Signed	4
Botswana	Y	A	A	Y	A	Y	Y	A	A	A	A	Signed	4
Brazil	Y	Y	A	Y	A	Y	A	A	A	A	A	Present, but did not sign	4
Brunei	Y	A	A	Y	A	Y	A	A	A	A	A	Absent	4
Cambodia	Y	Y	A	Y	A	Y	A	A	Y	A	A	Absent	4
Chad	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	M	M	A	M	A	Absent	4
Colombia	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	A	A	A	A	Present, but did not sign	4
Djibouti	Y	Y	M	M	Y	Y	M	A	Y	A	A	Absent	4
Dominica	Y	M	Y	Y	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	Absent	4
DR of the Congo	Y	Y	Y	Y	M	Y	Y	M	M	M	M	Absent	4
Egypt	Y	Y	A	Y	A	Y	A	A	Y	A	A	Absent	4
Gabon	Y	Y	N	Y	A	A	A	M	A	M	M	Absent	4
Gambia	Y	Y	A	Y	A	Y	Y	M	Y	A	A	Signed	4
Ghana	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	A	M	A	Signed	4
Grenada	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	M	M	Y	A	M	M	Absent	4
Haiti	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	A	M	N	A	M	Absent	4
Honduras	Y	Y	Y	A	A	Y	M	A	A	Y	A	Absent	4
Indonesia	Y	Y	A	Y	A	Y	A	A	Y	A	A	Present, but did not sign	4
Iraq	A	Y	A	Y	A	Y	A	A	A	A	A	Present, but did not sign	4
Jordan	Y	Y	A	Y	A	Y	A	A	Y	A	A	Present, but did not sign	4
Kenya	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	A	A	A	Signed	4
Kiribati	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	M	Y	A	Y	M	Absent	4

	2022 Mar (ES-11/1)	2022 Mar (ES-11/2)	2022 Apr (ES-11/3)	2022 Oct (ES-11/4)	2022 Nov (ES-11/5)	2023 Feb (ES-11/6)	2024 Jul (78/316)	2024 Dec (79/184)	2025 Feb (ES-11/7)	2025 Dec (ES-11/9)	2025 Dec (80/223)	Bürgenstock	Category
Kuwait	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	A	A	A	A	A	Absent	4
Lebanon	Y	Y	M	Y	A	M	A	A	A	A	A	Absent	4
Lesotho	Y	Y	A	A	A	Y	M	A	A	Y	A	Absent	4
Libya	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	A	A	A	A	A	Present, but did not sign	4
Malaysia	Y	Y	A	Y	A	Y	A	A	Y	A	A	Absent	4
Maldives	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	A	A	Absent	4
Mauritania	Y	Y	M	Y	A	Y	A	A	A	A	A	Absent	4
Mauritius	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	A	Y	A	A	Signed	4
Nepal	Y	Y	A	Y	A	Y	A	A	Y	A	A	Absent	4
Nigeria	Y	Y	A	Y	A	Y	A	A	Y	A	A	Absent	4
Oman	Y	Y	A	Y	A	Y	A	A	A	A	A	Absent	4
Paraguay	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	A	Y	A	Signed	4
Qatar	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	A	A	A	Signed	4
Rwanda	Y	Y	M	Y	A	Y	M	A	A	M	A	Present, but did not sign	4
Saint Lucia	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	M	A	Y	M	A	Absent	4
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	Y	Y	A	Y	A	Y	M	A	A	M	M	Absent	4
Sao Tome and Principe	Y	Y	M	M	M	Y	Y	M	A	M	M	Signed	4
Saudi Arabia	Y	Y	A	Y	A	Y	A	A	A	A	A	Present, but did not sign	4
Serbia	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	A	Y	M	A	Signed	4
Sierra Leone	Y	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	A	Y	A	A	Absent	4
Somalia	Y	M	M	Y	Y	Y	M	M	Y	M	M	Signed	4
Thailand	Y	Y	A	A	A	Y	A	A	Y	A	A	Present, but did not sign	4
Tunisia	Y	Y	A	Y	A	Y	A	A	Y	A	A	Absent	4
United Arab Emirates	Y	Y	A	Y	A	Y	A	A	A	A	A	Present, but did not sign	4
Yemen	Y	Y	A	Y	A	Y	A	A	A	A	A	Absent	4
Zambia	Y	Y	M	Y	Y	Y	Y	M	A	M	M	Signed	4
Angola	A	A	A	Y	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	Absent	5
Bangladesh	A	Y	A	Y	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	Absent	5
Guinea-Bissau	M	A	A	Y	A	M	A	A	M	M	A	Absent	5
Madagascar	A	A	A	Y	A	Y	A	A	M	M	M	Absent	5



	2022 Mar (ES-11/1)	2022 Mar (ES-11/2)	2022 Apr (ES-11/3)	2022 Oct (ES-11/4)	2022 Nov (ES-11/5)	2023 Feb (ES-11/6)	2024 Jul (78/316)	2024 Dec (79/184)	2025 Feb (ES-11/7)	2025 Dec (ES-11/9)	2025 Dec (80/223)	Bürgenstock	Category
<b>Republic of the Congo</b>	A	A	N	A	A	A	A	A	M	A	A	Absent	7
<b>Tajikistan</b>	A	A	N	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	Absent	7
<b>Uzbekistan</b>	M	A	N	A	A	A	A	M	A	A	M	Absent	7
<b>Vietnam</b>	A	A	N	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	Absent	7
<b>Zimbabwe</b>	A	A	N	A	N	A	A	N	A	A	N	Absent	7
<b>Burkina Faso</b>	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	N	N	N	N	Absent	8
<b>Burundi</b>	A	A	N	A	A	A	N	N	N	N	N	Absent	8
<b>Central African Republic</b>	A	A	N	A	N	A	A	A	N	A	N	Absent	8
<b>Equatorial Guinea</b>	A	A	M	M	A	M	A	A	N	M	N	Absent	8
<b>Niger</b>	Y	Y	A	Y	Y	Y	M	N	N	N	N	Absent	8
<b>Sudan</b>	A	A	A	A	A	A	A	N	N	N	N	Absent	8
<b>Belarus</b>	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Absent	9
<b>Eritrea</b>	N	N	N	A	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Absent	9
<b>Mali</b>	A	A	N	A	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Absent	9
<b>Nicaragua</b>	A	A	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Absent	9
<b>North Korea (DPR Korea)</b>	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Absent	9
<b>Russia</b>	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	N	Absent	9

A
M
N
Y
Signed
Absent
Present, but did not sign