Conflict Prognosis

A Conflict and Policy Assessment Framework
Part two

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List of Abbreviations

CAP            Conflict Analysis Paper
CPAF           Conflict and Policy Assessment Framework
CPRP           Conflict Policy Research Project
GDP            Gross Domestic Product
GNP            Gross National Product
IFI            International Financial Institutions
IFSP           Integrated Foreign and Security Policy
ILO            International Labor Organization
IMF            International Monetary Fund
NGO            Non-Governmental Organization
PoA            Plan of Action
SPP            Strategic Policy Paper
ToR            Terms of Reference
WB             World Bank
WTO            World Trade Organization
Executive Summary:

Guidelines for Use of the Conflict and Policy Assessment Framework (CPAF) in the Policy Practice

In the light of the prevailing gap between conflict early warning and policy response, there is a compelling need for an integrated approach that includes issues such as predicting and understanding conflict escalation, as well as guidelines for policy intervention. In contrast to many approaches towards early warning for the policy context, the Conflict and Policy Assessment Framework (CPAF) can best be characterized as ‘response oriented’. The suggested response-oriented approach does not imply an early warning or prognosis model per se. Instead, the aim is a conflict and policy assessment framework that integrates conflict analysis and policy analysis, as well as issues of institutional capacity and political priorities, in order to come to realistic policy opportunities for intervention.

The CPAF thus aims at linking conflict and policy analysis to processes of policy planning and implementation (see Figure 1). As such, it not only provides a ‘risk assessment’ of a particular situation, but also options for response that fit the ‘toolbox’ of the framework’s specific end-user. The CPAF in this regard offers a procedural approach for designing conflict-related policies.

This approach consequently departs from the common practice of developing models with an overtly global reach. Indeed, the potential response capacities of members of the international community vary widely, and governments, civil society/NGOs and international organizations each have their own range of instruments to intervene. On the one hand, therefore, it appears to be most appropriate to develop a conflict and policy assessment framework that takes these specific instruments and capacities into account, and that includes prospective policy analysis, lessons learned and missed opportunities. On the other hand, however, the risk of compartmentalization of conflict prevention should be minimized by taking the capacity of the organization only as a starting point in the search for complementary capacities of other actors, and hence streamline cooperation between specific policy desks, departments and international partners.
In practice, the answer may lie in sensitizing the policy context to the need for a conflict-preventive focus. As an institutional memory with regard to conflict and causes of conflict often appears to be weak or lacking, sensitizing the policy context to conflict prevention and creating a ‘culture of prevention’ at the national level is an important first step. Instead of focusing on and searching for new policies and new instruments, it is here argued that the currently available policies and instruments still leave enough room for conflict-preventive actions when properly understood, realized and utilized. Nevertheless, many lessons still need to be learned, and one should not underestimate the fact that issues of peace and conflict are highly complex. Indeed, early warning and ‘early action’ do not end a problem, but will often also require later action.¹ This, in effect, becomes a question of commitment to the prevention process. Box 1.1 summarizes the main operational objectives of the CPAF.

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<td><strong>The Main Operational Objectives of the CPAF</strong></td>
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**A. Clearly define the mission**

Before propagating the possibility of a ‘global’ approach, it is important to have clarity of mission within a particular institutional context. This includes and asks for:

- Standardization of approach and analysis
- Clear choice on the objectives of an integrated foreign and security policy, and the role of conflict prevention within this policy
- Identification of tasks and responsibilities
- Formalization of communication within the institution/organization
- Improved coordination between various policy areas

**B. Catalogue and assess the situation in relation to the policy and response capacity available**

It is imperative to focus analysis of conflict situations in such a way as to derive guidelines for policy interventions. Analysis should be directed towards understanding, anticipation and intervention:

- **Understanding** requires analysis directed towards conflict processes in general as well as the particular contextual conditions (country profile)
- **Anticipation** asks for the monitoring and analysis of dynamic processes and risk evaluation criteria (trend analysis)
- **Intervention** refers to an inventory of the institution’s toolbox, an analysis of the applicability of the policy tools to the goals and the conflict’s various needs, and identification of potential moments and fields for intervention

**C. Deal more effectively with the outcomes of analysis**

Preventive action is about knowing how to do ‘the right thing’. The standardized analysis then needs to be applied for the purpose of:

- Helping to identify and prioritize options for operational response
- Finding the right mix of short-term, medium-term, and long-term projects
- Committing to sustained efforts instead of *ad hoc* operations and betting on instant successes
- Identifying shortcomings in existing policies and instruments, adapting these, or developing new ones

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1 Introduction: Research Rationale

In an attempt to come to a more coherent policy approach towards conflict situations in Third World countries, the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs has commissioned the Conflict Research Unit of the Netherlands Institute of International Relations ‘Clingendael’ to conduct a research on conflict-prevention policy. The two main components of this Conflict Policy Research Project (CPRP) consist of an empirical ‘lessons learned’ exercise as regards Dutch policies towards six countries in conflict, as well as the development of an instrument for conflict prognosis in the policy context. The overall goal of the CPRP is to study the current situation with regard to (Dutch) conflict prevention policies and to focus on the development of an instrument for making future interventions in (potentially) conflict-ridden societies more effective. This report aims at further integrating (empirical) findings of research and policy within the Directorates and Departments that primarily coordinate direct conflict-related interventions, as well as sensitizing the broader policy areas for their potential impact on conflict situations (in Third World countries).

The development of a conflict and policy assessment framework (CPAF) is an integrated attempt at bridging the gap from research on early warning to the policy practice of early response by focusing on the policy planning process. The effort is a follow-up to the mid-term report *Conflict Prognostication: Towards a Tentative Framework for Conflict Assessment*, which included a first stocktaking of international research on anticipating and preventing the outbreak of violent conflict. This stocktaking, as well as international consultation, has enabled us to build on existing knowledge in the field and has avoided duplication of efforts for this newly-to-develop assessment framework. This has resulted in inclusion of, and building on, the Fund for Peace’s analytical model for conflict trend analysis. This model was found most useful for application in policy practice. In contrast to efforts at building international early-warning centres or producing early-warning reports for policy-makers, the framework here consists of an analytical tool that primarily builds on in-house knowledge and capacity. Furthermore, the framework aims at the national strategic policy level. The objective is to improve the coherency of an actor’s policies as regards countries in conflict. The project level is omitted from consideration here.

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2) Liberia, Sudan, Rwanda, Afghanistan, Sri Lanka and Guatemala.
6) The term ‘in-house’ here refers to the national governmental level, and secondly to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, including Development Cooperation. When conflict prevention is placed within the framework of an integrated foreign and security policy, a coherent conflict-prevention design in many instances implies the involvement of Ministries of Defence and Economic Affairs, as well as Parliament.
7) Many efforts are already undertaken at the project level. These include efforts at conflict impact assessment. See, for example, the overview by the Conflict Prevention Network, ‘Conflict Impact
Chapter II of this report addresses the conceptual framework of the CPAF, its main characteristics and the framework's rationale. Furthermore, the CPAF’s key concepts will be described. Chapter III comprises the actual use of the CPAF in the policy practice. The four phases of the framework are described separately, as well as their products, key linkages, and types of analysis. The annexes provide a detailed overview of the various elements, as well as outlines for the main products and analyses. The Fund for Peace’s ‘Manual for Practitioners’, in which the analytical model of internal conflict and state collapse is presented and explained in detail.

This report on a conflict and policy assessment framework is a first step, and an introduction requires a number of additional activities. First, it is here recommended to include an introductory workshop, which would be a joint enterprise of the Clingendael Institute and the Fund for Peace. In addition, implementation in practice requires special training courses for policy-makers. This implies that special training manuals for conflict and policy analysis are required for application in practice. The Clingendael Institute in cooperation with the Fund for Peace can develop a training programme for the Ministry, with a customized curriculum and work exercises. Finally, continuity in approach would require a ‘training-the-trainers’ approach.

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2 The Conflict and Policy Assessment Framework

2.1 New Challenges

Security issues are moving up the international agenda as violent conflicts challenge the international community in various ways. First, armed conflicts are an international security issue of the first order as they may destabilize whole regions. This is the case in so-called Third World regions, but also in regions bordering Western Europe. Further, the civilian impact has increased drastically, and the humanitarian effects of armed conflicts often rise to levels that call for international intervention, be it on the humanitarian or the military level. Recent examples are the conflicts in the Balkans, but examples are also to be found elsewhere (e.g. Somalia). Moreover, armed conflicts may destroy the achievements of the development process and, hence, decades of investment. Internal costs of conflict then become international costs. Thus, when internal conflicts break out, the interests of regional and outside powers are almost always engaged. The costs that actual conflicts impose on outside powers are much higher than is often realized, and include refugee costs, direct economic costs, economic opportunity costs, military costs, and the costs of conflict resolution, reconstruction and rehabilitation.  

The international community is consequently facing a myriad of challenges but has so far not been able to deal with them effectively. These challenges range from conflict prevention to peace-keeping, peace-making, and post-conflict reconstruction. Much is heard, for example, about the need to develop warning and response capacities, conflict-impact assessments, proactive conflict prevention, peace-building, rapid reaction forces, stand-by agreements, et cetera. The categories of instruments and responses also include more ‘traditional’ ones, such as diplomatic services, humanitarian aid and development aid.

Notwithstanding the obvious need to respond, the ‘peace-making’ role of the international community remains controversial, and the record of success has been mixed. This is partly because the international community was not prepared for dealing with ‘new’ types of conflict in the post-Cold War period. Political as well as public consensus on who should act, where and how, is still missing. Whereas late – mainly military – interventions have proven far more complex and costly than was initially thought, attention is now shifting to the potential capacities of the international community in early interventions.

Yet strategic coordination still seems to be lacking. The pressure to act often leads to short-term and ad hoc measures that leave fundamental issues unaddressed and distract attention from longer-term policy goals. Time pressure may thus result in inadequate interventions, due to lack of in-depth understanding of the problems and the possible effects of the measures taken. The complexity of timely and adequate response capacities thus underlines the importance of a coordinated and more coherent approach.

2.2 Response-oriented Early Warning Analysis

Early warning is often appreciated as a special tool in strategies of preparedness and prevention. Ideally, it involves the collection and analysis of data through uniform, systematized procedures and according to a proper scientific methodology. When the data point to a high probability of impending crisis, the warnings should be transmitted to political decision-makers who should then respond ‘adequately’. This would imply that early warning, indeed, is only a matter of information on impending conflicts. Yet focusing on scholarly attempts at gathering information falls short of the requirements of policy-makers in practice. These scholarly attempts often result in too refined and too late warnings without any clear indications as to how to address these crises. What is needed is response-oriented analysis (as distinct from reporting or monitoring) that clearly presents options for effective preventive action and policy. This does not imply a shift of focus from predictive capacities towards the design of a policy ‘toolbox’. Instead, response-oriented analysis requires, foremost, the development of better diagnostic and analytical tools for early warning and policy assessment, i.e. tools to enable analysts to track a conflict over time and to prescribe a viable response strategy to avoid the ‘predicted’ collapse into violence or further escalation thereof.

The overall objective of the CPAF is to provide such a tool to policy-makers for analysing and understanding conflict, as well as analysing and assessing policies, with the aim of providing strategic options for conflict prevention, management and peace-building. In the above-mentioned report Conflict Prognostication: Towards a Tentative Framework for Conflict Assessment (1999) various academic models and attempts at application in the policy practice were assessed according to these criteria. The analysis indicated that, although no such model exists in practice, various models and attempts contain elements that could be used for such a framework. The proposed CPAF is therefore not a completely new concept, but it includes parts of other models and research findings.

**Box 2.1. Characteristics of a CPAF**

- A response- and end-user-oriented ‘good enough’ model
- A bottom-up approach that focuses on a specific institutional framework (‘end-user’), its preventive instruments, and its strengths and weaknesses
- A harmonization of goals and means i.e. clarity on the needs, goals and capacities of the operational agency
- A shift of focus from the warning itself, to an indication of how to deploy available policy instruments in a conflict-preventive way

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The CPAF design is consequently an attempt at eclectically bringing together research findings on causes of conflict, the dynamics of conflict, (prospective) policy analysis, as well as issues of political decision-making.

Neither more accurate and timely early warnings nor the development of new intervention ‘tools’ can make up for a warning-response gap by themselves. Instead, issues of conflict prognosis and policy responses should be considered as interrelated parts of an integral policy planning process. The crucial question, then, is which elements to include in the analysis of such a goal-oriented, practical instrument. Decision-making should evidently be based on understanding the conflict situation and its dynamics. However, it should also take into account an organization’s capacity and its available ‘toolbox’, in order to suggest operationally and logistically realistic responses. Thus, instead of standard response options, suggestions for policy intervention should result from a combination of findings from the conflict analysis, the assessment of the toolbox, and the objectives of an integrated foreign and security policy.

![Diagram of CPAF Process](image)

The choice for a framework that includes decision-making and intervention alongside understanding and anticipation thus implies that an approach should be chosen that prioritizes certain conflict factors and indicators. These conflict factors may then be targeted for specific operational responses. A response-oriented framework, then, enables the end-user to identify and prioritize options. In this regard, issues of political feasibility and desirability, conflicting goals, and ‘political willingness’ need to be addressed. Hence there is a political task of facing the question of political priorities and the question of actual room for manoeuvre allowed by the policies that are being pursued.

### 2.3 The Rationale of a CPAF within the Policy Planning Process

Within the policy planning process, the CPAF first of all focuses on the strategic level. All activities and decisions concerning conflict prevention happen within the much wider context of domestic governance, international politics, economic activity, and related aspects. At the strategic level, therefore, the ultimate ends and goals, as well as limits of means should become manifest. The CPAF’s

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<th>Box 2.2. The Applications of a CPAF</th>
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<td>• Statement on overall objectives of an integrated foreign and security policy</td>
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<td>• Situation monitoring and analysis</td>
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<td>• Policy options identification based on available policy tools and capacities</td>
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<td>• Identification of tasks and responsibilities</td>
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implementation implies the presence of various levels below the strategic level, which may range from technical aspects of policy instruments, to which instruments are deployed, in which way they are deployed, and by whom. There may be a certain hierarchy in levels, but it is obvious that outcomes are not simply imposed in a one-way transmission from top to bottom. The strategic level, hence, should focus on the way the various levels of action interact with one another, as well as on the actions themselves and the dynamics they unfold.  

When formulating an approach to the aggravating conflict situation and hence designing a strategic policy, it is important to take these considerations as regards the organization’s capacity, instruments and objectives as a starting point in order to come to a realistic policy design. As this is a cross-section of international politics, security politics and economic politics as well as development cooperation, this implies a clear and well-defined mission statement on an integrated foreign and security policy and the role of conflict prevention within this policy. Conflict prevention is likely to be only one of the objectives within this policy. Various objectives will compete for priority. In the process of decision-making, therefore, ‘sub-optimal choices’ concerning the objective of conflict prevention have to be made.

Whereas the CPAF aims at offering an in-house analysis capacity for designing policy responses to conflict situations, there is also a need to cooperate with other actors, as well as to complement and streamline various capacities and activities. Here, the focus on the strategic level becomes obvious. On the one hand, this implies the search for partners to come to coherent international policy interventions towards countries in conflict. In this way, an effort is made to avoid duplication and conflicting approaches, as well as to expand the available toolbox of capacities and instruments. On the other hand, this implies the more direct and targeted use of research.

As a lot of research on conflict has already been undertaken, it is now of greatest concern to make these findings available to policy-makers. This may imply a type of cooperation between researchers and policy-makers in which researchers are more actively involved in the process of policy design. However, such change requires a new paradigm on the cooperation between academia and policy-makers. Another objective of the CPAF, therefore, is to focus on conflict analysis. The CPAF attempts to address this issue in a practical way: by using an in-house conflict analysis. Such analysis accommodates early warning of conflicts, and is instrumental to the purpose of designing conflict-prevention policies. Conflict analysis is of crucial concern for policy-makers to understand better the dynamics of the conflict but, moreover, to assess the possible impact of policy interventions. Yet for practical reasons and evident institutional limitations, such analysis cannot go beyond certain levels of detail. It is therefore important to realize that one has to find the ‘level of optimal ignorance’. In terms of analysis, this implies what Fein has called a ‘good enough analysis’.  

Such an analysis suggests identifying cause-effect relationships to such an extent that the user is confident that a given policy activity upon which it wants to embark will be sufficiently effective.

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14) Here, a ‘good enough analysis’ may be compared with medical diagnosis of chronic diseases. Whereas no conclusive physical tests exist, a diagnosis is based on the appearance of clusters of known symptoms, some of which are verifiable through testing, some merely observable by expert assessment. See Baker and Weller, *Fund for Peace Analytical Model of Internal Conflict and State Collapse*, p. 14. The CPAF applies
Although conflict should be analysed from a variety of policy fields, a standardized framework is suggested to enable discussion, cooperation and coherence, and to operate feasibly the variety of tasks involved. Yet although the ‘symptoms’ or indicators may be similar in different conflict cases and point to similar trends, this never implies standard responses. Conflicts may have various causes that can be dealt with in various ways. The CPAF therefore suggests establishing a joint ‘task force’ for conflict analysis and policy assessment. This will improve the decision-making process in that it will be based on an integrated and coherent analysis, shared by all relevant actors, thus enabling a clearer and more objective justification for the type of intervention decided upon (including the option of non-intervention).

2.4 Conflict and Policy Analysis: A Pragmatic Conceptual Approach

Without downplaying the importance of a clear demarcation of what is meant in discussing conflict, conflict escalation, policy tools and response options, opting for a pragmatic typology is here recommended. In an attempt to make the concept of conflict prevention more feasible for policy practice, some of the ‘fine tuning’ should be left aside.

2.4.1 Conflict

The fact that conflicts can differ from secession to state collapse, from violent repression to genocide, from intrastate to interstate, or from socio-economic to political-military dimensions, makes anticipating possible conflicts not a matter of precise prediction and timing. Yet to enable an assessment on conflict potential and policy design, a clearer conceptual approach towards conflict is needed. Here conflict is approached in such a way as to signify only violent conflict and thus exclude those disputes that do not have a violent character. Furthermore, the emphasis is on internal conflict. Although the form in which conflicts manifest themselves varies widely, depending on the causes and the actors involved and resulting in specific dynamics and outcomes, the CPAF approach will in particular focus on group identity. Group identity is not to be perceived as a limiting factor, as it can manifest itself in various ways as a basis for conflict. This requires extensive knowledge of societies at risk, ruling elites, history, culture, demography and economy. Another critical element in this regard is an understanding of the specific social groups, their political relations to each other and to the state. Moreover, analysis should acknowledge the complexity of fluidity of group identity in disputes, instead of thinking in stereotypical delineations. Hence identities become relevant for different purposes in different situations and may be (politically) manipulated in this regard.¹⁵

A second point of emphasis in our concept of conflict is the focus on the state level, i.e. state-society relations. State failure is key to this concept of internal conflict as a pathology of the state. Violent conflict, then, is mainly observed in situations when the ‘autonomous’ state disintegrates and regimes cannot or will not protect their citizens (i.e. when the state becomes an instrument of one person, group or faction). The state then becomes a predatory instrument of repression against opposing groups.

2.4.2 Problem Areas and Aspects of Conflict

Conflicts are multi-causal processes in which anything can lead to escalation. Research has indicated that factors may vary in importance and effect. They may also be interrelated, thus reinforcing or neutralizing each other at various levels. These complex relationships make it difficult to classify possible causes of conflict, as the role of factors may differ from case to case. However, research findings also suggest that, although factors of conflict may be interrelated in various ways, it is possible to identify useful clusters. Such clusters can consist of internal and external factors, as well as political, economic, socio-cultural or institutional factors. Whereas underlying causes may be too deep to be targeted by a policy that aims at conflict prevention, proximate or accelerating factors (i.e. at the medium term) are more interesting here. They usually lie in factors that foment political decay at the centre, including poor governance, institutional degeneration, massive and endemic corruption and destructive leadership.

Significant in response-oriented research is to assess the conflict potential of individual and combined clusters of factors to understand fully the underlying causes of symptoms and indicators of conflict. Only in this way can a policy be assigned to address the causes of these symptoms. Whereas in some cases one can do no more than ‘soothe’ the consequences of conflict, overall many more options of addressing conflict factors are available when acknowledged in a timely fashion. This requires a policy-useful classification of causes as well as linkage of these causes to response options.

Eight broad clusters have been identified for the use of the CPAF. These clusters of factors have been labelled problem areas, and Box 2.3. gives an overview of the problem areas. The problem areas should be interpreted as fields that can reinforce a trend towards violent conflict. The problem areas are therefore also fields for interventions aimed at redressing such trends. Their categorization results

16) Here the following definition is adopted of Baker and Weller, Fund for Peace Analytical Model of Internal Conflict and State Collapse (p. 10): ‘A state refers to a political entity that has legal jurisdiction and physical control over a defined territory, the authority to make collective decisions for a permanent population, a monopoly on the legitimate use of force, and an internationally recognized government that interacts or has the capacity to interact in formal relations with other such entities. A state must perform minimum functions for the public and maintain social cohesion.’

17) The approach of the Fund for Peace as well as the CPAF is state-centred. According to the Fund for Peace this should not be confused with a ‘statist approach’, which views conflict in terms of hierarchical power struggles among elites. Research has indicated that it is essential to understand the relationship between state and society. The state-centred approach focuses on this relationship. Baker and Weller, Fund for Peace Analytical Model of Internal Conflict and State Collapse, pp. 12-13.

18) In this regard, the CPAF integrates the assumption of the Baker and Weller, Fund for Peace Analytical Model of Internal Conflict and State Collapse Fund for Peace (pp. 12-13) that state failure is a primary cause of internal (or ethnic) conflict, not its consequence.
from an attempt to make the areas instrumental for use in policy practice without straining the findings of conflict research in this regard. In fact, the problem areas relate to the framework for conflict trend analysis as used in the CPAF, as well as to policy fields that are susceptible to control and intervention.

The problem areas are main categories that are composed of particular components with specific features, so-called aspects of conflict. These aspects of conflict are specific factors that can have destabilizing effects, and possibly generate conflict trends. The aspects of conflict are therefore important for identifying important variables to be targeted by policies. The role of individual aspects in the country under scrutiny will be established by the conflict trend analysis. It may very well be that conflict aspects of various problem areas are interrelated and affect each other mutually. Annexe B2 provides a description of the problem areas, aspects of conflict and the ways in which they are interrelated.

2.4.3 Stages of Conflict

Over the last few years, ‘conflict prevention’ in practice boiled down to dealing with situations in which escalation to violent conflict had already taken place. The policy toolbox for dealing with conflict management in this stage is limited, and focuses mainly on diplomatic, military, and humanitarian instruments.

What is required instead is a shift of focus to the medium and longer term. Conflict prevention policy, then, applies to the pre-conflict as well as the post-conflict stage. In both stages conflict is latent, peace fragile, and the options for a more varied approach viable. The typology proposed here of conflict stages is not too rigid and academic. It distinguishes between ‘latent conflict’ and ‘fragile peace’, and ‘open conflict’. The first and last type both apply to pre- as well as to post-conflict

Box 2.3. Problem Areas
- Governance
- Justice and human rights
- Socio-economic setting
- Political-cultural setting
- Internal security setting
- Resource management
- Regional security setting
- International political-economic setting

Box 2.4. Stages of Conflict
- Latent conflict and fragile peace:
  Many countries are in a state of ‘latent’ conflict, either because conflicts are subsiding (positive trend), or showing signs of re-emerging (negative trend). Pre- as well as post-conflict situations therefore need to be valued and monitored for their conflict potential. Various structural injustices, local economic grievances, or political exclusionary discourses may raise tensions to levels that present a risk of violence. Latent conflict can also exist in a regional context, as some relatively stable countries are threatened by the violent spillover of conflict in neighbouring countries.

- Open conflict:
  Escalation into and continuation of violence refer to a situation of ‘open conflict’. Many of these conflicts are long term, subsiding and escalating over time. In contrast to high-intensity and often rapidly evolving open conflicts, protracted conflicts include both elements of latent conflict and fragile peace.


situations. As regards ‘open conflict’, it is furthermore useful to distinguish between high-intensity open conflict and protracted conflict. The latter type of conflict implies situations as can be found in, for example, Sri Lanka. Whereas high-intensity open conflict leaves little room for manoeuvre, protracted conflict does. In fact, protracted conflict often includes both elements of latent conflict and fragile peace. Protracted conflict should therefore be included in the list of situations where application of a wide range of conflict-preventive or managerial instruments is feasible.

For dealing effectively with conflict, optimal opportunities for intervention need to be identified. Hence, as regards conflict analysis and conflict tracking over time, a more detailed approach to conflict dynamics is needed to understand fully the critical issues or ‘breaking points’ that determine the course of conflict. Many societies may have a predisposition for violent conflict (stage 1), but only when root causes of conflict are combined with precipitating events that fuel internal conflict (stage 2) does the potential that conflict will escalate increase. This, however, does not imply that conflict will turn violent, as local elites may choose a non-violent as well as a violent path towards transition (stage 3) and transformation (stage 4). The outcome (stage 5), representing a situation of fragile peace and latent conflict, is a continuum between chaos and constitutionalism. For dealing effectively with conflict, optimal opportunities for intervention need to be identified. Hence, as regards conflict analysis and conflict tracking over time, a more detailed approach to conflict dynamics is needed to understand fully the critical issues or ‘breaking points’ that determine the course of conflict. Many societies may have a predisposition for violent conflict (stage 1), but only when root causes of conflict are combined with precipitating events that fuel internal conflict (stage 2) does the potential that conflict will escalate increase. This, however, does not imply that conflict will turn violent, as local elites may choose a non-violent as well as a violent path towards transition (stage 3) and transformation (stage 4). The outcome (stage 5), representing a situation of fragile peace and latent conflict, is a continuum between chaos and constitutionalism.20 This, however, implies that the outcome, i.e. the ending of violence, does not mean the end of the process. Instead, a state can move up or down the continuum, or it can backslide or relapse21 to an earlier stage if the peace is too fragile or the institutional core too weak to sustain it.

Moreover, the five stages in particular depict the frailty of the non-violent path towards transition and transformation. Analysts and policy-makers must therefore be on the watch for ‘stings’ – unanticipated or uncontrollable factors – all the time.22

2.4.4 Conflict Prevention as a Policy Strategy

The stated policy objective of conflict prevention has so far not proven successful. ‘Conflict prevention’ has, in fact, become an ambiguous objective in policy documents. Lip service is paid to it, but the objectives and achievements in practice are few and far between. Within the CPAF, the concept of conflict prevention centres around the idea of ‘sustainable security’23 as a strategic aim, as well as a standard by which assessments may be made to determine when sufficient progress has been made so that external intervention is not or

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<th>Box 2.5. Fund for Peace Measures for Sustainable Security</th>
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<tr>
<td>- A competent domestic police force and corrections system</td>
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<tr>
<td>- An efficient and functioning civil service or professional bureaucracy</td>
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<tr>
<td>- An independent judicial system that works under the rule of law</td>
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<tr>
<td>- A professional and disciplined military accountable to a legitimate civilian authority</td>
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20) See annexe F on the Fund for Peace’s Manual for Practitioners, Figure 1 on page 16, for a schematic overview.
21) ‘Backsliding’ refers to a regression in the process of conflict resolution, marked by a one-stage setback. ‘Relapsing’ is a more severe form of backsliding, representing a dangerous and possibly irreversible setback. See Baker and Weller, Fund for Peace Analytical Model of Internal Conflict and State Collapse, p. 24.
22) These include surprises and triggers, idiosyncrasies, national temperaments, and spoilers. See Baker and Weller, Fund for Peace Analytical Model of Internal Conflict and State Collapse, p. 35.
no longer needed. In this way, the CPAF offers the option of a minimum ‘exit strategy’. This ‘measurable’ standard is constitutionalism, *i.e.* the autonomous functioning of the four core state institutions. These institutions are: a competent domestic police force and corrections system; an efficient and functioning civil service or professional bureaucracy; an independent judicial system that works under the rule of law; and a professional and disciplined military accountable to a legitimate civilian authority.

The concept of sustainable security hence refers to the ability of a society to solve its own problems peacefully as a *minimum* criterion for a more ideal form of democratic political system. Elections are not enough to create long-term stability without the appropriate institutional foundation. Other outcomes short of democracy, including power sharing, charismatic leadership, partition and enlightened autocracies, then become optional as shorter-term solutions to avert mass violence.

By focusing on these minimum conditions of institutional foundation, a hierarchy of needs and corresponding goals can thus be identified that is attainable progressively over time. More modest goals such as basic order are sought in the short term, and more ‘ideal’ ends pursued in the long term.²⁴ State-building should thus be at the heart of peace efforts in collapsed states.²⁵

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²⁵) Baker and Weller, *Fund for Peace Analytical Model of Internal Conflict and State Collapse*, p. 12: ‘It is important to note that “state-building” is not synonymous with “nation-building”, a more expansive goal which involves rehabilitating the economy and re-establishing civil society. Nation-building should be the primary responsibility of local leaders, not of foreign intermediaries. International aid and assistance may be needed, but it should be coordinated with, and not divert attention from, the central goal of achieving sustainable security or reconstituting the minimum elements of a state.’
2.5 A Schematic Overview of the CPAF

Figure 2.2 provides a more detailed overview of the key elements of and 'steps' in the CPAF. These elements will be elaborated upon in chapter III.
3 The CPAF in the Policy Practice

3.1 Prerequisites, Key Linkages and Products

The application of the CPAF in the policy practice results in a number of products: a mission statement, a country profile, a conflict analysis paper (CAP), a strategic policy paper (SPP), and a plan of action (PoA). These products are closely and logically interrelated. The first two, the mission statement and country profile, need to be valued as prerequisites of the CPAF. These require a one-off time investment. They are considered the basis of conflict and policy assessment with the aim of formulating policy responses to situations where worrisome and deteriorating conflict trends have been identified. Furthermore, it should be emphasized that the mission statement and country profiles are not restricted to the sole objective of conflict prevention, but may also form the basis for other policy objectives. One can, for example, think of country or regional programme papers for general foreign policy as well as for development cooperation purposes.

In an attempt to bridge the gap from warning to response, a number of key linkages are established that facilitate the process of translating country conflict analysis into the formulation of a strategic policy plan. These linkages are: a conflict trend projection on the basis of twelve top indicators; identification of problem areas and their related aspects of conflict; identification of the main policy fields, Directorates and Departments that may be involved in redressing the problem areas; discerning the relevant available policy instruments; assessment of the opportunities for applying the recommended policy strategy; and, finally, the search for partnerships and coalitions.

The resulting papers on conflict analysis and the recommended strategic policy then need to be assessed and decided upon in order to come to a plan of action. In this process, the recommended conflict-preventive measures are assessed in the light of an integrated foreign and security policy (IFSP) mission statement, as well as overall policy objectives. The implementation of the plan of action is here considered to be a feedback process of monitoring whether the conflict situation, the impact of implemented measures or the policy objectives require reformulation or adaptation of policy interventions.

Figure 3.1. gives a schematic overview of the CPAF’s composition. In the following paragraphs the main elements of the CPAF will be discussed separately. The annexes will provide a more detailed description of how to apply the analytical tools, as well as of the main elements that need to be included in the products.
### 3.2 Mission Statement

An IFSP mission statement comprises the overall strategic policy objectives. A clear IFSP statement and the role of conflict prevention and conflict management therein is indicative of the objectives, type and timing of intervention. Such a statement furthermore specifies the toolbox necessary for realizing these objectives, the organization’s capacities and the need for cooperation.
The mission statement should primarily be based on official policy documents and the analyses thereof. Very often such an IFSP mission statement has to be constructed from various sources that may include some points of contradiction or ambivalence. The exercise of formulating an integrated foreign and security policy may help to achieve more coherence and clarity of purpose. Box 3.1 gives an overview of the main elements that need to be addressed in a mission statement.

Annexe A1 comprises key requirements for a mission statement. The formulation of a mission statement is an internal procedure, but in the case of an IFSP, however, the mission statement needs to take into account the objectives and capacities of other relevant Departments, as well as further internal deliberations and choices.

### 3.3 Country Profiles

A second prerequisite for the functioning of a CPAF is to establish a dossier of ‘profiles’ of countries on which the organization intends to focus attention. This implies selecting countries based on a set of criteria. These criteria may result from the mission statement. Exemplary may be countries with a well-established development relationship, or with which there are special political or historical relations. The resulting list of focus countries can be considered to contain candidates for the compilation of a country profile.

The objective of the country profile is to provide conflict-relevant information on the underlying structures and longer-term conditions of a society. The profile furthermore is the reference point for trend analysis on contemporary developments within these societies, and should therefore include information that enables later analyses to detect trends towards or away from conflict.

The significance of the country profile as a tool for institutional memory and communication should not be underrated, in particular given the fact that officers are only temporarily assigned to specific desks. The need for information-sharing may also facilitate the creation of a so-called ‘culture of cooperation’, as the profile will draw upon information from various Departments and Directorates. The sharing of information at this early stage hence enhances the opportunity for cooperation in later stages of the conflict analysis and policy design.

Annexe A2 contains guidelines for the design of a country profile. The provisionary checklist indicates that the creation of a country profile requires in-depth knowledge of a country. It is a tool for

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26) A mission statement could comprise the aim of ‘sustainable security’ in risk countries or countries in conflict. See Chapter 2 and the Fund for Peace’s manual in the separate annexe.
making choices out of the wide range of often unstructured information on a country’s history, political, social, economic and cultural setting. The type of specific information may differ per country. It is nevertheless necessary that the country profile should at least contain information on the twelve top indicators of the conflict trend analysis (see Box 3.5.), as well as on related problem areas (see Figure 3.2.). The variety of information requires input from several sources, such as country experts, embassies, NGOs and civil society organizations, security experts, business and private sector organizations and multilateral organizations. The data – qualitative as well as quantitative – should be stored in a data base system that can be easily updated.

3.4 Conflict Analysis

The overall objective of the conflict analysis is to analyse and understand the dynamics of a potential conflict situation and present the findings in a conflict analysis paper. Ideally, the conflict analysis is undertaken by a task force in which various Departments and key Directorates are represented. Whereas the focus of analysis is first of all on countries, an additional regional perspective may be desirable. In some cases a regional security complex requires the analysis to include developments and actors in bordering countries as well, since these may be interrelated. West Africa – Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea-Bissau – and Central Africa make a clear case for a regional approach.

The conflict analysis consists of the Fund for Peace trend analysis, which is put into perspective on the basis of consultation of the country profile. The resulting trend projection will then be further analysed for outstanding aspects of the conflict, the main problem areas and their interrelations. The conflict analysis paper provides a two-page overview of the country’s past, present, and expected future conflict trends, identifies the aspects of the conflict that cause the dynamics of the conflict trend, identifies conflict-prone problem areas and their interrelations and, tentatively, recommends relevant policy fields for intervention (see Box 3.3. and Annexe B3).

In short, the conflict analysis should enable the identification of changes in a conflict situation and the key factors involved. In order to avoid oversimplification, and depending on the country situation, additional analysis may be required. The consultation or more permanent involvement of external experts may be considered. Ideally, however, the conflict analysis should primarily remain an ‘in-house’ activity by thematically and regionally involved policy-makers. This does not imply restricting the analysis to only one Directorate or section, but instead the incorporation of different disciplinary and institutional perspectives. This justifies the call for inter-Departmental task forces, would improve information-sharing and facilitate a common vocabulary.

The following sub-paragraphs will give an outline of the two main types of analysis: the conflict trend analysis; and analysis of the problem areas.
3.4.1 Conflict Trend Analysis

The Fund for Peace trend analysis aims at recognizing trends towards violent conflict, and provides practitioners and policy-makers with a first indication of potential future conflict situations that require timely attention. The aim of the analytical framework (see also Box 3.4.) is not to provide complete and exhaustive analyses of conflict situations, but to provide a first, ‘good enough’ indication of a conflict trend. As conflicts are dynamic phenomena, the focus is on trends, instead of on causes of conflict. The conflict trend analysis should focus on the middle- to short-term conflict escalatory process.

Assess All Twelve Top Indicators

The Fund for Peace analytical model uses twelve top indicators on the national state level. Whereas these are a central part of the format of the conflict trend analysis, there is flexibility in how to assess these top indicators. The annexe F on the Fund for Peace manual contains a list with data and information (‘measures’) that may help form a judgement on each top indicator. It is crucial that all twelve top indicators are included in each assessment, since these indicators are in many ways interrelated. The manual deals with this in more detail.

Gather Information on Twelve Top Indicators to Assign ‘Weights’

‘Weights’ (i.e. an informed assessment of importance) ranging from 0 to 10 are assigned to the twelve top indicators. 0 (zero) indicates no significance in the specific case, 10 refers to a critical significance. These weights are assigned by individual members of the task force, thus establishing a trend line when taking several years as reference points. Annexe F on the Fund for Peace manual deals with this in more detail.

Box 3.5.
Fund For Peace Top Indicators

1. Mounting demographic pressures
2. Massive movement of refugees or internally displaced persons
3. Legacy of vengeance-seeking group grievance or group paranoia
4. Chronic and sustained human flight
5. Uneven economic development along group lines
6. Sharp and/or severe economic decline
7. Criminalization and/or delegitimization of the state
8. Progressive deterioration of public services
9. Suspension or arbitrary application of the rule of law and widespread violation of human rights
10. Security apparatus operates as a ‘state within a state’
11. Rise of factionalized elites
12. Intervention of other states or external political and/or economic actors

Source: Fund for Peace Analytical Model of Internal Conflict and State Collapse (1998)


**Discuss and Decide on the Trend Line**

The trend is decided upon by taking the individual analyses together. Discussion and assessment are based around the twelve top indicators. Whereas analyses may differ between the individual members of the task force, the ‘language’ (the twelve top indicators) is shared. This enables discussion and information-sharing on why particular indicators need to be assigned more/less weight. Diverging individual analyses may be brought together by sharing information on specific issues, and focusing on how the indicators are influenced by each other. In this way, conflict (trend) analysis becomes an important instrument for information-sharing and facilitates communication as the twelve central indicators for conflict are accepted as the lead points of discussion. However, it should be noted that in assessing the trend line, analysts need to be aware of ‘stings’ and factors that may obfuscate the findings. This aspect of ‘quality control’ of the analysis needs special attention, and is dealt with in more detail in the annexe on the Fund for Peace manual.

### 3.4.2 Analysis of the Problem Areas

The indicators of instability (*i.e.* top indicators that are considered to be ‘critical’) as decided upon in the trend analysis should be linked to focal points for policy and operational responses. This linkage is key, as the conflict analysis aims to go beyond simply early warning. Policy-relevant conflict analysis asks for *response-oriented warning*. This implies that the analysis should indicate aspects of conflict that may worsen or escalate the situation. These may point to direct as well as indirect causal relations. By assessing these underlying aspects of conflict, certain problem areas may come to stand out. The overall aim of this exercise is not so much to grasp all the factors that cause a conflict situation, but instead to – at least to a certain extent – unravel the complexity of interrelated causal factors. Problem areas, then, are indicative of potential opportunities for policy interventions to redress a negative trend. What should be avoided is an open-ended list of possible causal factors. Hence although the list of twelve top indicators (Box 3.5.) as well as the list of aspects of conflict and problem areas (Figure 3.2.) has its limitations, this seems to be true for *any* listing or categorization. What is more relevant is the fact that the top indicators point to conflict dynamics that can be observed. These dynamics are likely to consist of a variety, or clusters, of underlying factors that provide options for intervention. Specific combinations of these aspects of conflict add up to so-called problem areas. Both the aspects of conflict and the problem areas are likely to interact on various levels, hence contributing to the ‘dynamics of conflict’, and at the same time to the complexity of dealing with conflict. The analytical process should thus help to establish a more coherent picture of the conflict situation and provide viable options and policies for intervention.

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**Box 3.6. The Rationale of Aspects of Conflict and Problem Areas**

- Relates the warning (trend) to responses (response-oriented warning) in order to intervene and hence disconfirm the anticipated conflict escalation
- Assesses the room for manoeuvre in situations of latent conflict or fragile peace
### Figure 3.2 Aspects of Conflict and Problem Areas

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ASPECTS OF CONFLICT</th>
<th>PROBLEM AREAS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- Exclusive government</td>
<td>Governance</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Lacking state capacity (basic services and managing transition)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Legitimacy deficit of government and public institutions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Human rights violations</td>
<td>Justice and human rights</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Violations of political group rights</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>- Biased law application and enforcement by judicial and security services</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>- Inter-group inequality</td>
<td>Socio-economic setting</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Regional inequality</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>- Economic deterioration</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>- Economies of war</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>- Absence of pluralism, diversified debate and independent media</td>
<td>Political-cultural setting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Political exploitation of differences</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>- Distrust among (identity) groups</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Criminalization</td>
<td>Internal security setting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Private militias/paramilitary</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>- Contested state control</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>- Lacking rule of law</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>- Demographic pressures</td>
<td>Resource management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Destabilizing settlement patterns</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>- Competition over resources</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>- Entitlements versus distribution</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Lack of economic potential</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Political instability in neighbouring countries</td>
<td>Regional security setting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Support of outsiders to militant groups</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Regional war economies and illicit trade</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Influx of refugees</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Destabilizing external investment patterns (direct and indirect)</td>
<td>International political-economic setting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Destabilizing international policies (including trade and aid)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Annexe B2 contains a description of the individual problem areas, aspects of conflict, and some references to the relations between the problem areas. Furthermore, the annexe gives an impression of how to translate the broad top indicators and their respective measures into aspects of the conflict, hence indicating a first step in identifying significant variables to be targeted by intervention policies.

### 3.5 Policy Analysis

The overall aim of the policy analysis is to identify policy response options for the conflict situation and to present recommendations concerning the type, instruments and moment of intervention, as well as possible channels of cooperation, in a strategic policy paper. Ideally, and conforming with the conflict analysis, the policy analysis is undertaken by a task force in which various Departments and key Directorates are represented. In some cases, a regional approach is required in order to address
spillover effects, but also because a country’s deteriorating conflict situation may be instigated by outside forces.

The policy analysis first of all consists of an assessment of the organization’s available capacities, in order to establish the policy fields and Directorates that may become involved in the policy design. Analysis should then move on to identify the policy instruments available to these Directorates. This is the actual exercise of toolbox assessment, which may differ per conflict case, as the availability of instruments is dependent on the type of relationship with the country. When assessing the opportunities for intervention, it is important to include issues such as timing and possible combinations of instruments. This implies a lessons-learned exercise. In order to complement lacking capacities to intervene and/or to streamline intervention, an assessment is made of possible partnerships and coalitions with other actors.

In short, the policy analysis should enable identification of viable options for policy intervention, and should recommend to decision-makers a coherent policy approach to the conflict (for an outline of a strategic policy paper, see annexe C5). The options presented require further elaboration in the planning, assessment and decision-making phase. The following sub-paragraphs will give a description of the main types of analysis in order to substantiate this recommendation: the organization’s capacity assessment and the related toolbox assessment, the policy intervention impact assessment and lessons learned, and the assessment of the overall security context.

### 3.5.1 Organization’s Capacity Assessment

The conflict analysis results in a statement if, how, and why there is a potential for conflict escalation, and identifies priority problem areas. A next step in linking these problem areas to response options is made by assessing the available capacity of the organization to address these problem areas.

A first, rough assessment may be made by going through a listing that links problem areas to overall policy fields and Directorates. Whereas Figure 3.3. provides an example of such linkage for only one problem area, annexe C1 contains a full listing of all eight problem areas. Problem areas hence refer to policy fields, and these again to policy Directorates. Fine-tuning of this listing is needed according to changes in the (sub-) organizational structures, mandates and capacities.

Linking problem areas to policy fields and Directorates furthermore may raise the awareness of

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Box 3.7. Policy Analysis</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Produces a Strategic Policy Paper (SPP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- A two-page document on a conflict situation drawn up by a task force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Builds on the country analysis paper, and the key linkages to policy fields and Directorates, policy instruments, opportunities for intervention, and partnerships and coalitions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Provides recommendations on the type, timing and instruments for intervention</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Box 3.8. The Rationale of the Linkage ‘Policy Fields and Directorates’</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- Relates the identified conflict’s problem areas to the organization’s available capacity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Identifies relevant Directorates to be considered for involvement in the policy design</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Points to the complementary capacities of Directorates and the need for cooperation in a coherent policy design</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Sensitizes the broader policy areas for their possible impact on conflict situations</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
individual Directorates to their possible role and contribution to the objective of conflict prevention, mitigation and/or resolution.

It may hence contribute to the sensitization of the broader policy context for conflict prevention and the creation of a ‘culture of prevention’.

Figure 3.3 Linking Policy Fields and Directorates to the Problem Area of Governance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PROBLEM AREAS</th>
<th>POLICY FIELDS</th>
<th>POLICY DIRECTORATES And DEPARTMENTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Governance</td>
<td>- Democratization (including power-sharing and devolution)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Good governance</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Civil society development</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Capacity building</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Economic stability and reform</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>- Human rights</td>
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3.5.2 Toolbox Assessment

The involvement of a wide range of policy Directorates in a conflict-prevention policy furthermore emphasizes the fact that the toolbox is often more extensive than expected. In particular when the aspect of timing shifts from short-term, *ad hoc* interventions to the middle- (and even longer-) term, the number of available instruments may multiply. Hence ‘conflict-prevention policy’ does not limit itself to creating *new* policies and instruments, but should instead make optimal use of the broad range of available instruments.

Annexe C2 contains a provisionary overview of a toolbox. This overview is based on international literature on conflict-prevention instruments as well as on Dutch policy documents that hold clues about specific conflict-prevention tools of the Netherlands Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defence. This categorization is based on the identified eight problem areas, but could be rearranged to express the instruments available to the specific Directorates.

3.5.3 Policy Assessment and Lessons Learned

Based on the toolbox assessment, a ‘strategy’ for policy intervention may be put together. This includes elements of timing as well as combining instruments. The number of options available is dependent on the conflict situation, available policy tools, the urgency of intervention, and a first rough assessment on expected policy priorities. The exercise of putting together coherent intervention policies requires a good understanding of the impact of (combinations) of policy instruments. Impact
assessments therefore require knowledge of the instruments, as well as of the specific conflict situation and country structures. In this regard, many lessons still have to be learned, and one should not underestimate the fact that issues of peace and conflict are highly complex. The opportunities that are identified may be optimal, maximum approaches, but – because of the inclusion of a realistic capacity assessment and a first indication of policy priorities – may also be sub-optimal. The option of non-intervention must also be considered as a viable option in this regard.

Annexe C3 includes an overview of issues that are of concern when deciding on a realistic policy approach. The more timely the interventions (i.e. focus on middle-term conflict prevention), the wider the range of instruments available, and hence the broader the choice on a policy approach.

### 3.5.4 Assessment of the Overall Security Context

Whereas previous assessments concern the national level, *i.e.* the range of policy objectives and instruments available to the various relevant Departments and Directorates, here the focus is on national capacity within the wider international security context. Hence in-house capacity is now assessed in combination with other actors. This assessment of the international security architecture also includes aspects of a lessons-learned exercise.

Although the focal point of the CPAF is on the national level (i.e. the individual organization), it is unrealistic to exclude other levels from the analysis. The complementary nature of instruments and capacities may indeed increase the impact of intervention manifoldly. In order to come to such a degree of cooperation, however, having a realistic assessment of one’s own organization’s capacity and priorities at the basis is a prerequisite.

Assessing possible partnerships and coalitions implies the need to identify instruments, mandates and agendas at various levels in relation to the capacity of one’s own organization (i.e. the national level). This assessment may include international actors, regional actors and local actors. Annexe C4 contains a format for assessing the various levels of cooperation in relation to the identified significant problem areas.

### 3.6 Planning, Assessment and Decision-making

The planning, assessment and decision-making phase refers to the process of setting priorities and designing specific plans of action (see Box 3.12.). The recommended policy intervention here, as
indicated in the strategic policy paper, is reflected upon in the light of the mission statement on an integrated foreign and security policy. It is first necessary to specify who will be involved in the process of planning, assessing and decision-making. This will depend on the nature of the recommended intervention (i.e. regular development cooperation interventions that aim at conflict prevention in the middle to long term differ substantially from sending personnel and material for peace-keeping or peace-enforcing operations). Second, this phase includes what could best be described as a political cost-benefit analysis on the final action. The CPAF, then, should help identify which interventions are sound options under the circumstances given (including overall policy objectives).

3.6.1 A Political Cost-benefit Analysis

As mentioned above (see paragraph 3.2. on the mission statement), conflict prevention may only be one of the objectives of an IFSP, and hence a political cost-benefit analysis should shed light on the importance given to the various objectives. This is also true for the wider policy context (including domestic policy objectives), and it is therefore to be expected that the more drastic the recommended policy intervention, the more difficult the assessment will be. As indicated in Box 3.13., the political cost-benefit analysis is a process of weighing the pros and cons of the various intervention scenarios against the policy priorities. This process will for the main part remain a ‘black box’ for outsiders. In-house, however, the various elements of the CPAF should enable a realistic assessment of the political feasibility and desirability of opportunities for intervention. The planning, assessment and decision-making phase thus offers the possibility of coming to reasoned opinions and actions by placing conflict and policy analyses alongside policy and political objectives. It hence comes down to setting priorities.

A political cost-benefit analysis should include the context-specific character of the conflict trend, the requirements for dealing effectively with them and an impact analysis of such a response. Annex D2 provides an overview of the key requirements of such a political cost-benefit analysis.

3.7 Implementation

The implementation phase of the CPAF focuses not so much on the actual implementation of the policy plans of action, but rather on the assessment of whether the intervention’s objectives are reached (see Box 3.14.). This implies ‘management’ of the conflict trend in order to prevent (further)
escalation. Hence, the implementation phase requires monitoring and assessment of the impact of interventions in relation to the conflict situation, focal problem areas and the strategic goals.

Although the planned intervention can be expected to change favourably a conflict’s conditions, each activity can also create different and unexpected circumstances that enhance or inhibit the realization of the strategic policy objectives. It is useful here to focus once more on long-term versus short-term objectives. The pressure to act promptly, for example, not only may distract attention from more strategic longer-term objectives, but could also undermine such objectives. Changing circumstances and unintended effects may require new approaches, plans, and/or timing of activities. These vary from addressing weak points and blind spots of the existing plans to exit strategies. If the monitoring process indicates that further involvement may become counterproductive with the available instruments, exit strategies are needed. Not only is flexibility in policy implementation required in this regard, including cooperation and funding arrangements, but also special attention for the effects of these changes (including sudden or gradual withdrawal). The implementation phase of the CPAF in short emphasizes the longer-term commitment that is needed to realize the objectives of conflict prevention, management and/or resolution.

3.7.1 Impact Assessment Monitoring

Impact assessment monitoring thus includes linkages to the previous stages of conflict and policy assessment, and the planning, assessment and decision-making phase. It may be considered to be the feedback loop of the CPAF (see Box 3.15.). Impact assessment monitoring as regards the conflict analysis can be realized by continued application of the Fund for Peace trend analysis to help assess progress or the lack thereof. As regards the policy analysis, impact assessment monitoring offers continuity in the process of learning lessons on the use of policy tools in interventions, as well as on timing and cooperation arrangements. This may need to find its reflection in a reformulation and adaptation of policy planning and decision-making.

Annexe E1 provides an overview of issues that may be assessed and considered in such an impact assessment monitoring process. Note that this ex post facto impact assessment monitoring is closely related to, and provides input for, the ante-post impact assessment of the policy instruments.

**Box 3.14. The Implementation Phase Implies a Longer-term Commitment:**

- In order to Realize the objectives of conflict prevention, management and/or resolution. Impact assessment monitoring should lead to recognition of changing conditions that influence the policy intervention and vice versa
- Reformulation or adaptation of policy

**Box 3.15. The Rationale of Impact Assessment Monitoring**

- A feedback loop to the conflict and policy analysis, planning and decision-making to assess whether objectives are met
- Informs, when necessary, on how to adapt the policy plan to changed conditions
- Provides input for the lessons-learned exercise
3.8 Guide to the Annexes

The annexes provide a more detailed description of the various types of analyses and key linkages in the CPAF. They also contain illustrative listings of indicators, problem areas, policy fields and Directorates, and policy instruments, as well as concept versions of the various products of the CPAF. Figure 3.4 gives an overview of these annexes.
# Figure 3.4. Overview of the Annexes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Prerequisites</th>
<th>Conflict Analysis</th>
<th>Policy Analysis</th>
<th>Planning, Assessment and Decision-making</th>
<th>Implementation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Annexe A</td>
<td>Annexe B</td>
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<td>Annexe D3</td>
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## Annexe A
- **Product:** Conflict Analysis Paper
- **Annexe B3**

## Annexe B
- **Product:** Strategic Policy Paper
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## Annexe D
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## Mission statement
- **Country profile**
- **Fund for Peace trend analysis**
- **Analysis of problem areas**
- **Organization’s capacity assessment**
- **Toolbox assessment**
- **Policy assessment and lessons learned**
- **Assessment of overall security context**
- **Political cost-benefit analysis**
- **Impact assessment monitoring**

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<td>Identification of changes in a conflict situation on the basis of a more or less standardized format of indicators</td>
<td>Search for factors that are significant in causing the trend, and identify how these issues are interlinked</td>
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Annexe A

Prerequisites
Annexe A1 – Mission Statement

### Key Requirements of a Mission Statement

- Formulation of an integrated foreign and security policy (IFSP)
- Definition of the strategic objectives regarding peace and security including a position on conflict prevention and conflict management
  - Objectives based on existing capacities and instruments, including those of other relevant Ministries
  - Indication of preference for types of intervention and cooperation
  - Suggestions and criteria as regards focus countries for IFSP
  - Indication of the operational mechanisms required for implementing responses

\textit{Note:} The aim of the CPAF is to present a framework for conflict and policy assessment. This implies that no specific instruments or statements are mentioned, as they may vary per actor. The information on the mission statement, therefore, concerns requirements and guidance notes.

- **Formulation of an integrated foreign and security policy**

  Research on the causes of conflict indicates that security can no longer remain limited to military issues. Dealing with conflicts implies a broadening of the security agenda. Such a broadening also affects the way in which policy-makers should deal with conflicts. An integrated approach is required that covers aspects of foreign and defence policy, as well as development cooperation, economic affairs and humanitarian aspects. The mission statement should therefore comprise and link elements of these policy fields.

- **Definition of strategic objectives and priorities regarding peace and security**

  The CPAF aims at a combined conflict and policy assessment. This implies that the political objectives have to be as clear as possible in order to be successful. These objectives and priorities are, ideally, outlined and conceptualized in the mission statement. As regards the objectives, the mission statement on an integrated foreign and security policy (IFSP) should provide adequate parameters at the strategic level, as well as clear definitions.

  The concepts and notions of, for example, conflict, conflict prevention, peace-building, good governance, sustainable peace and institutional capacity-building may have diverse meanings in the national as well as the international context. In order to enhance coordination within and between organizations, a common language and terminology is a first requirement. The mission statement
should provide the basis for further application. As the aim is an integrated policy, the following issues need to be addressed in the mission statement.

- **Objectives based on existing capacities and instruments, including those of other relevant Ministries**
  The CPAF stresses ‘realism’ and modesty in setting policy goals, and aims to link the mission statement to the available policy toolkit. This is the first guideline of the consumer-oriented approach suggested. It is, of course, short-sighted to suggest that the options available are the only ones possible. Cooperation with other national actors, as well as international organizations and NGOs could result in a range of additional options for tackling conflict-related problems. Such an approach, however, could result in a ‘the sky is the limit’ approach without a focus. In order to arrive at a true IFSP, the objectives and capacities of relevant Departments should be compared, linked and streamlined. Large discrepancies between individual objectives will make it difficult to streamline objectives and activities.

- **Indication of preference for types of intervention and cooperation**
  The mission statement should guide the process of cooperation and provide clear guidelines for political targets. This implies defining the objectives and indicating time-frames for reaching the aims, as well as setting parameters for the institutional framework in which these objectives are to be realized. The objectives also require specified statements on more concrete goals and targets, and especially focus on implementation and cooperation. Here too the mission statement should provide strategic guidance notes that can be used for specific application at the Departmental, as well as the Directorate and project level.

- **Suggestions and criteria as regards focus countries for IFSP**
  It is likely that in order to become more effective, policy activities will target specific countries. In the case of development cooperation, such a targeting policy resulted in so-called ‘focus countries’. This targeting can also be applied with regard to other policy fields. The criteria for targeting countries, however, have to be clear and need to link up with the objectives of the IFSP.

- **Indication of the operational mechanisms required for implementing responses**
  The mission statement should furthermore provide information on the organization, and should indicate how the strategic objectives are to be reached. There are several important levels involved. They all have particular decision-making frameworks and bureaucratic mandates. The mission statement on the IFSP should provide guidelines for the Directorates involved on how to include the strategic elements in their respective mission statements. The mission statement on the IFSP should therefore also indicate which Directorate is the lead agency. The mission statements at the Directorate level should become as practical as possible with regard to the objectives, mandates and the instruments.
Annexe A2 – Country Profile

Key Requirements of a Country Profile

- Offer a format for reporting with a clear policy focus
- Provide information on structural characteristics of a society in order to function as a reference point for trend analysis
  - Ideally introduce an easily accessible data base

Note: The level of extensiveness of the country profile may differ among countries, and depends on the actual and desired relationship with the particular country. Consequently the use of the country profile is not limited to the sole effort of conflict analysis and conflict prevention, but instead provides input for a broad range of policy strategies, the development of country-wide and regional programmes and impact assessments.

- Offer a format for reporting with a clear policy focus

The State Failure Project over the last few years has undertaken a large-scale effort in identifying the main variables for discriminating between state failures and stable cases. The focus of variables has been on the longer term, i.e. forecasting state failure risks two years in advance. The two successive reports (1995 and 1998) conclude that the variables that consistently emerged in a wide variety of models are democracy, material living standards, and trade openness. Although many additional variables showed significant correlation with risks of state failure, they did not add statistical power to the models based on the three key variables.

These three variables form the starting point for creating the country profile. Although they refer to the more generally used categories of social, economic and political context, the categorization proposed here provides a more obvious link to policy fields and demonstrates an underlying linkage between the three variables. Before providing a provisional outline for a country profile, Boxes A2.1., A2.2. and A2.3. will give an overview of the major findings of the State Failure Project with regard to the three key variables, and the suggested policy link.

1) The State Failure Task Force Report: Phase II Findings (1998) demonstrates that the broad-based material standard of living and quality-of-life indicators strongly correlate with a variety of other variables encompassing economic performance, education, social welfare, environmental quality, and democratic institutions. The level of democracy variable correlated closely with indicators of civil and political liberties, as well as with measures of economic well-being. Finally, trade openness only correlated with indicators of economic development and population size.
Box A2.1.:
Democracy

- **Partial democracies**—particularly in lower-income countries where the quality of life remains poor—are associated with elevated risks of state failure.
  
  Although full democracies and autocracies are fairly stable, the in-between forms of government are at high risk of undergoing abrupt or violent change. This suggests that while a policy of promoting democracy may eventually lead to a world of stable liberal states, one cannot presume that the inevitable intermediate stages will also be stable. Policy-makers need to be particularly attentive to the risks of failure in such states, and should seek and encourage progress towards full democracy. Moreover, if helping to increase the odds of stability in such states is a goal, then policy-makers need to focus on developing policies that help foster international trade, as well as on supplementing democratization programmes with broad development programmes that help improve the overall level of material living standards.

- **Newer democracies, especially in countries where quality of life is relatively low, are more likely to fail than long-lived ones.**
  
  It is important to focus on conditions under which democratic transitions are likely to succeed or fail. The problem-ridden history of democratic transitions raises questions about the future durability of newly-established democracies. Analytic results suggest that it is crucial that international support for democratic institutions be reinforced by policies that promote improvement in the quality of life.


---

Box A2.2.:
Material living standards

- **Material living standards have an undeniable effect on the risks of state failure.** The overall level of material living standards as well as the direction of change have emerged as significant in relation to state failure. In either case, the policy implication is that efforts to improve material living standards are a significant way to reduce risks of state failure.

  The region-specific study on sub-Saharan Africa showed that high levels of urbanization reinforce this effect. States with high levels of urbanization that experience growth in GDP per capita have only a fraction of the risk of state failure of those urbanized states that experience economic stagnation or decline.

Box A2.3.: Trade openness

- Involvement in international trade, as measured by trade openness, is associated with a lower risk of state failure in virtually all states and all contexts. This finding suggests that policies or measures—including internal factors such as dependable enforcement of contracts, modest or low corruption, and improved infrastructure, as well as bilateral or multilateral efforts to eliminate trade barriers—that help to foster higher levels of international trade could help prevent political crises.

It appears that it is the involvement in international trade itself, and not the eventual prosperity that such trade provides, that is the key to this effect. Free trade, if sustained, helps bring together coalitions of elite actors that support the rule of law and stable property relationships as a condition for building wealth. Such coalitions may or may not be democratic, but in either case they promote political stability.


- Provide information on structural characteristics of a society

The significance of the country profile should not be underrated, in particular given the fact that officers are only temporarily assigned to specific desks. Whereas the country profile requires a one-off time investment in putting the file together, it will increase efficiency. The country profile provides information on the underlying, long-term structures of a society. Furthermore, it is the reference point for trend analysis on contemporary developments within these societies.

The issue of what to include in a country profile is debatable. Indisputable, however, is the observation that the country profile needs to provide relevant information on which to base the trend assessment. Conflict trend analysis does not hold value by itself, as a ‘snapshot’ of a particular moment in time. Instead, it should be based in relation to reliable data on past situations in order to establish whether a situation is worsening, improving or stable. Hence the profile should provide information on the twelve top indicators in past measuring moments. Current conflict trend analysis may then be used to update the country profiles. As for the assessment of top indicators in the trend analysis, the observation applies that the weight of these top indicators may be based on a variety of sub-indicators and data (see annexe B1).

This implies that the country profile should at a minimum consist of information that enables informed judgements on:
1. Demographic pressures
2. Movement of refugees or internally displaced persons
3. Legacies of vengeance-seeking group grievance or group paranoia
4. Chronic and sustained human flight
5. Economic development along group lines
6. National macroeconomic development
7. Levels of criminalization and/or (de)legitimization of the state
8. The state of public services
9. The application of the rule of law and human rights
10. The security apparatus
11. The level of coherence or fragmentation of elites and rhetoric
12. Relations to other states or external political and/or economic actors

With regard to the more descriptive part of the country profile on the underlying structures, data gathering may be based around the above-mentioned three key variables: democracy, material living standards and trade openness.

A – *Democracy*
- Regime type: institutionalized democracy, institutionalized autocracy, populist state
- Elite characteristics
- Qualities of state leadership
- Political and economic cleavages
- Conflictual political culture
- Militarization of society
- International environment

B – *Material living standards*
- Population pressure
- Youth bulge
- Social welfare distribution
- Social heterogeneity
- Social mobility
- Constraints on resource basis

C – *Trade openness*
- Strength of national economy
- Government’s economic management
- Investment and trade patterns
- International economic aid

The above-mentioned listing is only indicative, as are the ‘checklists’ in Boxes A2.4., A2.5., and A2.6., which contain a more detailed list of specific data that may be included in the effort of drawing up a country profile.
Box A2.4.
Democracy

- **Regime type: Institutionalized democracy**
  1. Guarantee of political and civil rights for all citizens
  2. Effective constitutional limitations on the power of the executive
  3. Multiple political parties that compete for office and transfer of power by constitutionally prescribed means

- **Regime type: Institutionalized autocracy**
  1. Most power concentrated in the executive
  2. Limit or ban on political parties, and sharply restricted civil rights and political participation
  3. Political power is usually transferred and distributed among members of a tiny political elite

- **Regime type: Populist state**
  1. Weak institutionalized political system in a transitional state to either democracy or increased autocracy
  2. Transfer of political power through military coups or popular uprisings, short of revolution
  3. Frequent leadership changes, with no predictive sequence
  4. Wide, often disruptive political participation through functional groups, and many transient political parties and movements
  5. Regime durability (how many years since the last abrupt change?)
  6. Government revenues as % of GNP
  7. History of the regime’s reliance on coercion to maintain power
  8. Willingness/capacity to negotiate the outcome of a political conflict

- **Elite characteristics**
  1. Ethnic and religious base
  2. Revolutionary leadership
  3. Exclusionary ideology
  4. Personality cult around leader

- **Qualities of state leadership**
  1. Social and ethnic base
  2. Source of support for the chief of state and his inner circle
  3. How power was attained (revolution, factional power struggles, electoral competition)
  4. History of regime’s reliance on coercion to maintain power
  5. Single party dominates political scene for many years
  6. Training and education (Western or Third World)
  7. Orientation on key variables: modernization, nationalism, private versus public sector
  8. Relation of religion to the state
  9. *De facto* regime control of the judiciary
  10. *De facto* state control of the media
  11. Open discrimination or bellicose language (‘hate speech’)
  12. Use or toleration of violence against particular minorities

- **Political and economic cleavages**
  1. Extent and degree of group discrimination
  2. Limited group participation (of minorities/ethnic groups) in politics compared with other groups
  3. Income inequality (and minorities/indigenous peoples/ethnic dividing lines; rural versus urban areas)
  4. Proportion of group members in elective offices or civil service
  5. Base of non-state political organizations (class, ethnic, regional, functional, etc.)
  6. Breadth of support for non-state political organizations
  7. Militancy of leaders of non-state political organizations
**Conflictual political culture**
1. History of ‘revolutionary’ or ‘ethnic’ war
2. Genocide/politicide (political mass murder)
3. History of low-level conflict
4. History of political rights violations
5. Effects of the introduction of democracy on political/ethnic cleavages
6. History of involvement in politics by armed forces

**Militarization of society**
1. Ratio of total military personnel to total medical personnel
2. Military expenditures as percentage of total government spending
3. Changes in arms imports
4. Military or civil monopoly over means of violence
5. Military or a democratic regime
6. Level of professionalization of the armed forces
7. Proportionality of group members (minorities/ethnic groups) in higher-ranking police and military positions
8. Magnitude (or ratio) of the army/internal security force
9. Distribution of weapons among the civilian population
10. Distribution of weapons over minorities or other opposition groups
11. Mobilization of sectors of the population for (para-)military duties
12. Coalition-building by armed opposition groups
13. International support for minorities or other opposition groups
14. Level of (technological) arms race involving the procurement and deployment of weapons
15. Connection between upward trends in weapon imports and the emergence of conflicts

**International environment**
1. History of military interventions
2. Shifts in inter-state conflict/cooperation
3. Internal wars and politicides in contiguous countries
4. Foreign (political) interventions (other/neighbouring states, international movements, international organizations):
   a) Financial support
   b) Provision of intelligence information
   c) Provision of safe-havens for exiles, refugees or opposition groups
   d) Mercenaries and military advisers
   e) Weaponry and supplies
7. Magnitude of (illicit) arms trade in the border regions
8. Magnitude of narcotics trade
Box A2.5.:
Material living standards

- **Population pressure**
  1. Population growth
  2. Population density
  3. Land burden and carrying capacity (cropland relative to labour force in agriculture)

- **Youth bulge**
  1. Ratio of 15-25 year olds to 30-54 year olds, 5-year changes over a 15-year period (including distribution over minorities/indigenous peoples)
  2. Ratio of 15-25 year olds to 30-54 year olds, 5-year changes over 15-year period (rural versus urban areas)

- **Social welfare distribution**
  1. GDP per capita
  2. Gini coefficient
  3. Health care (as % of total government spending, and distribution over minorities/indigenous peoples)
  4. Education (as % of total government spending), and
     - Education attainment
     - Limited group access to (higher) education
     - Proportionality of group members in commercial, managerial or professional positions
  3. Life expectancy (and distribution over minorities/indigenous peoples)
  4. Change in infant mortality (and regional and/or group distribution)
  5. Excess infant mortality (relative to GDP per capita, or to other countries in the region)
  6. Housing

- **Social heterogeneity**
  1. Ethnolinguistic diversity
  2. Government position on minorities/indigenous populations
  3. Participation of minorities/indigenous populations in political life
  4. History of disputes between ethnic groups
  5. Effects of state formation/nation-building on disputes between minorities
  6. Degree to which minorities are dispersed throughout the country, or concentrated in specific parts of the country
  7. Forcible relocation of minorities
  8. Number of minorities in contiguous countries
  9. Number of refugees or displaced persons
  10. Demographic ratio between minorities
  11. Manifest signs of cultural or political exclusion/oppression

- **Social mobility**
  1. Mobility blockage (changes in ratio of secondary to tertiary enrolment, including distribution over minorities/indigenous populations)
  2. Distribution of productive resources, goods and services (including distribution over minorities/indigenous populations)
  3. Access to financing for productive efforts (including distribution over minorities/indigenous populations, and rural versus urban)

- **Constraints on resource basis**
  1. Water depletion
  2. Soil degradation
  3. Famine
Box A2.6.: 
Trade openness

- **Strength of national economy**
  1. Level and change in per capita income 
  2. Per capita consumption 
  3. Surplus in balance of payments/regime on the verge of bankruptcy

- **Government’s economic management**
  1. Economic policies and national development strategies (changes in allocation of productive resources) 
  2. Change in government revenues as % of GDP 
  3. Change in public sector debt 
  4. Change in reserves 
  5. Change in inflation 
  6. Capital outflows

- **Investment and trade patterns**
  1. Sum of imports and exports as % of GDP 
  2. Foreign direct investment 
  3. Economy/trade dependent on limited number of commodities (raw materials/primary products), or monoculture 
  4. Global network of trading partners

- **International economic aid**
  1. IMF quota and annual draw 
  2. World Bank loans 
  3. Multilateral aid 
  4. Effects of structural adjustment programmes 
  5. Bilateral ODA 
  6. International debt
Annexe B:

Conflict Analysis
# CONFLICT ANALYSIS

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<td>Aspects of conflict and problem areas</td>
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| PRODUCTS         | Conflict analysis paper (CAP)  |
Annexe B1 – Fund for Peace Trend Analysis

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<td>• Identification of a lead agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Conflict trend projection according to the <em>Fund for Peace Analytical Model of Internal Conflict and State Collapse</em></td>
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• **Formation of an interdepartmental task force**

The composition of task forces may differ according to region and country. Participation in the task force should depend on the involvement or the expected involvement of Departments or Directorates. This implies that the important actors for dealing with the conflict have been involved and consulted from the beginning. Their involvement not only enriches the analysis, but may also limit large discrepancies in points of view.

• **Identification of a lead agency**

There should not only be a clear decision on who to involve in the task force, but also on who will coordinate the analytical process. Such leadership is imperative for guiding the analytical process, as well as for directing the process in the following stages.

• **Conflict trend projection according to the *Fund for Peace Analytical Model of Internal Conflict and State Collapse***

*Note: The CPAF conflict analysis uses the analytical model as developed by the Fund for Peace. In order to do justice to the model, the ‘Analytical Model of Internal Conflict and State Collapse: Manual for Practitioners’ is included in a separate annex. The Model’s conceptual framework, however, is integrated in the CPAF as presented in Chapters 2 and 3.*
Annexe B2 – Analysis of Problem Areas

Key Requirements of Analysis of Problem Areas

- Assess the underlying aspects of conflict on the basis of the trend analysis’s vital indicators
- Indicate the main problem areas
- Assess the interlinkage between the problem areas, in order to decide whether problem areas are directly or indirectly linked to the escalating conflict trend
- Assess problem areas to be targeted in the short, medium and long term

Note: The CPAF distinguishes a number of problem areas and aspects of conflict. The eight problem areas comprise 29 aspects of conflict. The aspects of conflict include variables that in some cases may be valued as direct causes of conflict, sometimes as aggravating, sometimes as pivotal factors, and sometimes as background conditions. Yet they can all contribute to the weight of a problem area. The multi-causal character of conflict implies that various aspects and areas can interact. Such combinations are likely to be found as a conflict escalates.

- Assess the underlying aspects of conflict on the basis of the trend analysis’s vital indicators

The indicators of the trend analysis point to aspects of the conflict that need attention, whether by alleviating the consequences of conflict (i.e. refugee aid) or addressing more fundamental, underlying issues (i.e. governance). The aspects of conflict thus give an indication of underlying factors that contribute to the ‘measured’ significance of a top indicator.

In this regard, it is important to notice that whereas a similar weight may be assigned to a specific top indicator in two different cases, the underlying factors may differ. Exemplary may be the top indicator ‘progressive deterioration of public services’. Whereas in some cases the underlying factor is considered to be exclusive government, in others this could be lacking state capacity. Both ask for a specific approach.

Box B2.9. at the end of this annexe B2 provides a concept exercise of translating the top indicators and their respective sub-indicators into aspects of conflict.
- **Indicate the main problem areas**

The same exercise is undertaken for translating aspects of conflict into problem areas (see also Figure 3.2. in Chapter 3). The problem areas link certain aspects of conflict thematically, and the problem areas can in their turn be linked to policy fields.

The linkage of these problem areas to the aspects of conflict and indicators can also be found in Box B2.9.

- **Assess the interlinkage between the problem areas**

It is then of importance to establish the significance of the individual problem areas and how these are interrelated. Governance issues, for example, may be strongly interrelated to socio-economic ones. The boxes below will provide an overview of the individual problem areas and make references to how these may be interlinked. A clear picture should be established on the complex of variables that underlie a situation of conflict escalation. A realistic policy can only be designed on the basis of an analysis that establishes the significance of underlying factors.
Box B2.1:

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<th>Problem Area</th>
<th>Governance</th>
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<tr>
<td>Aspects of Conflict</td>
<td>• Exclusive government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Lacking state capacity</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Legitimacy deficit</td>
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The problem area on governance focuses, firstly, on the political ‘rules of the game’. These rules are usually summarized and specified in constitutions and contain the fundamental principles of justice that underlie the state. Such principles are subject to interpretation, as well as to change and amendment when social, economic and political circumstances alter. Systematic violation of the principles, or neglect to change them in the face of altered circumstances, often leads to erosion of legitimacy. In order to create or retain consensus, there should be equal access to decisions and allocations. There can be no strong sense of community within a state if one segment of its population is proscribed from participating in politics in all its dimensions, or is systematically excluded from state allocations of funds and services. This already indicates the problem of exclusiveness of categories, as it implies a link with the problem area on the socio-economic context (see below). A neutral state/authority should ensure the primacy of common citizenship and attending rights over privileges based on family, ethnicity or religion.

Important characteristics of the problem area on governance furthermore include the need of a clear distinction between private gain and public service. Personalization of the state, as in so-called ‘patrimonial states’, blurs the distinction between the state and the ruler. Patron-client relations form the basis of the polity, thus making state structures an object of manipulation, often leading to systems of social, economic and political domination and injustice (referring to both the problem areas on justice and human rights, and the political-cultural context).

It is unacceptable for a political community that leaders use the state as a vehicle or platform for excessive personal enrichment at their expense. This also applies to the military. There should be civilian control over the military. When the military takes over the state, it necessarily excludes normal political activity. When its command over the instruments of violence is furthermore particularly prone to use force against segments of the population, it becomes a security threat within the state. Here one can see a link with the problem area on the internal security setting.

Another related issue concerns the capacity of the state to provide basic services. This can also depend on structural features and patterns created and sustained by larger forces than single decisions or programmes of rulers (e.g. colonial legacies and certain aspects of the world economic system). When weak states do not have the resources to accomplish these tasks, when leaders fail to deal with this problem and additionally resort to predatory and unlawful practices, social tensions will exacerbate, and loyalty erodes. Here one can see a link with the problem area on the international macroeconomic setting.

Yet another aspect concerns the ability of the state to provide an environment in which economic activities can thrive. Legal protection for property is a first prerequisite for local and international private business to invest. These services can be considered basic, as well as part of the socio-economic setting, as the state should facilitate all sectors and groups of society in this regard.
Problem Area | Justice and Human Rights
--- | ---
Aspects of Conflict | • Human rights violations
| • Violation of political group rights
| • Biased law application

Box B2.2.: This conflict area refers to violations of civil and political liberties, such as the right to vote and to assemble. Exemplary factors that are of importance are, for example, an increase in intimidation; illegal arrests; disappearances; and the transformation of civil society organizations into mobilizing agents for political activity. The broad category of human rights is often considered to be the most evident indicator of impending conflict. The restriction or denial of political and social rights to (large) segments of the adult population may be a first step towards escalation. Yet these linkages are not self-evident and require empirical substantiation. However, improvement of the human rights situation may be an important policy objective by itself, irrespective of its relationship to conflict.

Escalation can result from an increase in intimidation and biased law application. There is a link with the conflict areas on the socio-economic and the cultural contexts, in that specific groups can be denied certain rights, and specific characteristics of groups—religious or cultural—restricted or even prohibited. If this marginalization policy is taken to its extreme, groups targeted by it may become organized and claim their rights in a violent way.
Box B2.3.:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Problem Area</th>
<th>Socio-economic Setting</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aspects of Conflict</td>
<td>Inter-group inequality</td>
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<td>Regional inequality</td>
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<td>Economic deterioration</td>
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Research has indicated that poverty as such does not necessarily contribute to conflict. Inequality, however, appears to be of greater importance. However, socio-economic inequality cannot be seen separately from political and governance issues. This applies especially to cases in which specific groups are continuously denied access to goods and services, or perceive this as being the case. Sometimes economic deterioration and inequality can result from natural conditions and catastrophes. In these cases it is important how (local) governments deal with such situations and attempt to alleviate poverty and shortages. When catastrophes result from man-made disasters or mismanagement of resources, the link with (local) governments becomes even more obvious. This implies a link with the problem area on resource management.

Inter-group and regional inequality can also be related to issues of redistribution that have a political connotation. If groups or regions are denied access to economic resources as well as political representation, the issue of marginalization becomes pressing and might result in all sorts of resistance, varying from radical political parties to the formation of violent groups and even secessionist tendencies. Economic deterioration can also contribute to increasing problems in the socio-economic setting. Here another link can be found with the problem area on governance, more specifically the aspect on lacking state capacity, and especially problems with providing basic services. The most extreme aspect of conflict is the emergence of economies of war that thrive on conflict as a base for generating income. The more that a state progresses on the path to economic deterioration, mismanagement and economies of war, the more likely large-scale disinvestment and capital flight will happen. The result is likely to be a downward spiral of economic deterioration in the capacity of public services to provide basic needs.
Box B2.4.:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Problem Area</th>
<th>Political-Cultural Setting</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Aspects of Conflict | • Absence of pluralism, diversified debate and independent media  
|                   | • Political exploitation of differences  
|                   | • Distrust among (identity) groups |

The problem area of the political-cultural setting refers to (elite) rhetoric and (elite) interpretations of reality. These can change as a consequence of changes in the political power balance. It is in particular the opinions and strategies of key elites that are of importance here.

Legacies of violence and distrust between groups may be found in many societies, but it is the political exploitation or manipulation of history and differences that feed these legacies in becoming conflict indicators and factors. The exploitation of political distrust by political entrepreneurs is of special importance, as it can amplify feelings of hate and promote violence. In particular, the generalization of negative stereotypes is an important indicator. The presence of hate media indicates a further escalation towards violent conflict. This situation is even more explosive when there is no option for a pluralistic and diversified debate. This implies a link with the problem areas on governance and justice and human rights, especially in the fields of political group rights and exclusive government in cases of prohibition of verbal expressions and opposition views.

The political-cultural setting is furthermore related to the problem area of governance, since the degree to which the political cultures of elites and civil society are separated may be an indication of the level of legitimacy of political institutions and practices.

Box B2.5.:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Problem Area</th>
<th>Internal Security Setting</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Aspects of Conflict | • Criminalization  
|                   | • Private militias/paramilitary  
|                   | • Contested state control  
|                   | • Lacking rule of law |

As regards the internal security setting, two functions are important: (1) the state as the sovereign authority; (2) the state as the security guarantor. Weakening of these functions is an indicator of the process of state collapse. In this process the authoritative, legitimate and functioning political institution that is sovereign over a recognized territory loses the legitimate power and capacity to rule. At the end of this process, the basic functions of the state can no longer be performed. Widespread criminalization, the rise of private militias and paramilitary are primary indicators. This also applies to militias that are part of the state, as they operate outside the law.

Contested state control is another important indicator, implying that the state de facto is no longer acknowledged as the sovereign authority in a specific area. This may be the result of governance problems extending over successive governments that are confronted with a growing lack of legitimacy. A deteriorating internal security setting is an important indicator of the process of state collapse itself. The lack of rule of law can be seen as the indication of a development in which no central authoritative political institution is acknowledged and able to control the territory of the state.
Resource management increasingly receives attention as a contributing factor to conflict. Sometimes the need for resource management results from natural circumstances, but often man-made aspects are of main importance.

This applies, for instance, to the interrelated factors of demographic pressures and destabilizing settlement patterns. When land is scarce, fertility rates high and local opportunities for alternative social resources are lacking, people often opt for migration. Such migration may result in a movement to urban areas, as well as to neighbouring provinces or even neighbouring countries. The destabilizing aspects of such migration may take the shape of additional demographic pressures in the destinations of these groups, as well as increasing problems with regard to competition over resources. In addition, problems may arise in the receiving provinces or countries in the problem areas on the socio-economic and the political-cultural settings (inter-group inequality, economic deterioration, and distrust among groups). Political exploitation of such situations in particular requires special attention.

Attention should also be paid to the governance aspects involved. Since the problem area is on resource management, the role of local and national governments is of particular importance. This applies especially to the role of governments in issues on entitlements and distribution in relation to political exploitation of local situations.
Box B2.7:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Problem Area</th>
<th>Regional Security Setting</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aspects of Conflict</td>
<td>• Political instability in neighbouring countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Support of outsiders to militant groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Regional economies and illicit trade</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Conflicts often have regional dimensions. This applies to interstate wars, as well as to internal conflict. Neighbouring states are frequently in one way or another involved in these conflicts. This involvement is not limited to simple spillover effects.

Regional dynamics can be more complex, and the actors can vary from passive victims to active contributors. Sometimes the roles of actors can change over time, e.g. if migration flows into neighbouring countries have a politically or socially destabilizing effect on the recipient country. Refugee flows can result in new guerrilla forces with military training facilities in the recipient countries. Internal conflict may also result in an increasing inflow of arms in the region, as well as increasing criminalization and the rise of networks of illicit trade in countries. The spillover risks of a conflict may also result in increasing military spending in neighbouring countries, in order to ward off such effects.

The effects of the regional security setting are not always clear. In some cases, overt interventions may take place, in others neighboring countries may act more covertly. It is, however, obvious that as there is a grey market for weapons there is also a grey area for governments to act. These factors have to be taken into account when analysing a conflict, and especially when trying to formulate policies for dealing with conflict.
**Box B2.8.:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Problem Area</th>
<th>International Political-Economic Setting</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aspects of Conflict</td>
<td>- Destabilizing external investment patterns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Destabilizing international policies, including trade and aid</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A focus on the internal and regional levels does not suffice. The problem area of the international political-economic setting is included to ‘grasp’ external forces on internal settings, which are expressions of growing international interdependency as well as dependency.

The term political-economic setting is used here to pay attention to the parallel existence and dynamic interaction of ‘state’ and ‘market’. These may include: terms of trade, commodity prices, export dependency, indebtedness, and tariff walls. The IFIs and international economic organizations such as the WTO and ILO may affect internal situations to such a degree that decisions made at these levels become destabilizing factors within a local economy. Structural Adjustment Programmes, for example, have been criticized in this regard. The same holds for sanction policies as these often affect society and civilians hardest.

The problem area is also linked to resource management, as international companies may become involved as parties to the conflict. Destabilizing investment patterns may then occur in countries rich in resources such as oil. Indirect investment patterns have also become of growing concern, as financial flows have a large spillover effect into other emerging markets, greatly affecting new markets and economies, as well as fragile democratic transitions.

- **Assess problem areas to be targeted in the short, medium and long term**

As already briefly mentioned above, it is not always possible to address the root causes of conflict, nor is it realistic to expect short-term interventions to remove these causes. In order to design a realistic policy approach, it is therefore important to find a balance between short-, medium- and long-term interventions. The analysis of problem areas should hence result in a clear picture of the conflict situation that addresses underlying conflict conditions, accelerating factors, as well as the consequences of the conflict situation. On the basis of this analysis, a variety of policy strategies may be assessed (i.e. the CPAF policy analysis phase), depending on the policy tools available.
**Box B2.9.: Fund for Peace Analytical Model of Internal Conflict and State Collapse**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Top indicators</th>
<th>Measures</th>
<th>Potential aspects of conflict</th>
<th>Problem areas</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mounting Demographic Pressures</strong></td>
<td>A. Pressures deriving from high population density, relative to food supply and other life-sustaining resources (agricultural failure, environmental disaster)</td>
<td>• Competition over resources&lt;br&gt;• Lacking state capacity&lt;br&gt;• Lack of economic potential</td>
<td>• Resource management&lt;br&gt;• Governance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B. Pressures deriving from group settlement patterns that affect the freedom to participate in common forms of human and physical activity, including economic productivity, social interaction, religious worship, etc.</td>
<td>• Entitlements versus distribution&lt;br&gt;• Demographic pressure&lt;br&gt;• Destabilizing settlement patterns&lt;br&gt;• Group-based inequality&lt;br&gt;• Lacking state capacity</td>
<td>• Resource management&lt;br&gt;• Socio-economic setting&lt;br&gt;• Governance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>C. Pressures deriving from group settlement patterns and physical settings, including border disputes, ownership or occupancy of land, access to transportation outlets, control of religious or historical sites, and proximity to environmental hazards</td>
<td>• Entitlements versus distribution&lt;br&gt;• Demographic pressure&lt;br&gt;• Destabilizing settlement patterns&lt;br&gt;• Group-based inequality&lt;br&gt;• Lacking state capacity</td>
<td>• Resource management&lt;br&gt;• Socio-economic setting&lt;br&gt;• Governance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>D. Pressures from skewed population distributions, such as a &quot;youth or age bulge&quot;, or from divergent rates of population growth among competing communal groups</td>
<td>• Entitlements versus distribution&lt;br&gt;• Demographic pressure&lt;br&gt;• Distrust among (identity) groups&lt;br&gt;• Lacking state capacity</td>
<td>• Governance&lt;br&gt;• Political-cultural setting&lt;br&gt;• Resource management</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**II Massive Movement Of Refugees or Internally Displaced Persons**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Top indicators</th>
<th>Measures</th>
<th>Potential aspects of conflict</th>
<th>Problem areas</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A. Forced uprooting of large communities as a result of random or targeted violence and/or repression</td>
<td>• Destabilizing settlement patterns&lt;br&gt;• Private militias/paramilitary&lt;br&gt;• Human rights violations&lt;br&gt;• Violation of political group rights&lt;br&gt;• Political exploitation of differences</td>
<td>• Internal security setting&lt;br&gt;• Justice and human rights&lt;br&gt;• Political-cultural setting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Top indicators</td>
<td>Measures</td>
<td>Potential aspects of conflict</td>
<td>Problem areas</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>III Legacy of Vengeance-Seeking Group Grievance or Group Paranoia</td>
<td><strong>A. History of aggrieved communal groups based on recent or past injustices, which could date back centuries</strong>&lt;br&gt;• Exclusive government&lt;br&gt;• Political exploitation of differences&lt;br&gt;• Contested state control&lt;br&gt;• Absence of pluralism, diversified debate and independent media&lt;br&gt;• Inter-group inequality&lt;br&gt;• Regional inequality&lt;br&gt;• Distrust among (identity) groups</td>
<td><strong>Socio-economic setting</strong>&lt;br&gt;• Political-cultural setting&lt;br&gt;• Governance</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### IV Chronic and Sustained Human Flight

**A. ‘Brain drain’ of professionals, intellectuals and political dissidents fearing persecution or repression**
- Exclusive government
- Political exploitation of differences
- Biased law application and enforcement by judicial and security services
- Human rights violations
- Violation of political group rights
- Absence of pluralism, diversified debate and independent media

**Problem areas**
- Governance
- Justice and human rights
- Political-cultural setting

**B. Voluntary emigration of ‘the middle class’, particularly economically productive segments of the population, such as entrepreneurs, business people, artisans and traders, due to economic deterioration**
- Lacking state capacity
- Lack of economic potential
- Economic deterioration

**Problem areas**
- Governance
- Socio-economic setting
- Resource management

**C. Growth of exile communities**
- Exclusive government
- Political exploitation of differences
- Contested state control
- Human rights violations
- Violations of political group rights
- Biased law application and enforcement by judicial and security services
- Absence of pluralism, diversified debate and independent media

**Problem areas**
- Governance
- Justice and human rights
- Political-cultural setting
- Internal security setting
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Top indicators</th>
<th>Measures</th>
<th>Potential aspects of conflict</th>
<th>Problem areas</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>V Uneven Economic Development along Group Lines</td>
<td>A. Group-based inequality, or perceived inequality, in education, jobs, access to land and economic status</td>
<td>* Exclusive government * Political exploitation of differences * Lacking state capacity * Legitimacy deficit of government and public institutions * Lack of economic potential * Inter-group inequality * Regional inequality * Entitlements versus distribution * Distrust among (identity) groups</td>
<td>* Governance * Socio-economic setting * Political-cultural setting * Resource management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B. Group-based impoverishment as measured by poverty levels, infant mortality rates, educational levels, etc.</td>
<td>* Exclusive government * Lacking state capacity * Inter-group inequality * Regional inequality * Lack of economic potential * Economic deterioration * Entitlements versus distribution</td>
<td>* Governance * Socio-economic setting * Resource management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>C. Rise of communal nationalism based on real or perceived group inequalities</td>
<td>* Contested state control * Legitimacy deficit of government and public institutions * Political exploitation of differences * Distrust among (identity) groups * Inter-group inequality * Regional inequality * Entitlements versus distribution</td>
<td>* Governance * Internal security setting * Socio-economic setting * Political-cultural setting * Resource management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Top indicators</td>
<td>Measures</td>
<td>Potential aspects of conflict</td>
<td>Problem areas</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
| VI | A. Pattern of progressive economic decline of the society as a whole as measured by per capita income, GNP, debt, child mortality rates, poverty levels, business failures, and other economic measures | • Lacking state capacity  
• Economic deterioration  
• Lack of economic potential | • Governance  
• Socio-economic setting  
• Resource management |
| Sharp and/or Severe Economic Decline | B. Sudden drop in commodity prices, trade revenue, foreign investment or debt payments | • Lacking state capacity  
• Economic deterioration  
• Destabilizing external investment patterns  
• Macroeconomic instability | • Governance  
• Socio-economic setting  
• International political-economic setting |
|  | C. Collapse or devaluation of the national currency | • Lacking state capacity  
• Economic deterioration  
• Lack of economic potential  
• Destabilizing external investment patterns  
• Macroeconomic instability | • Governance  
• Socio-economic setting  
• International political-economic setting |
|  | D. Extreme social hardship imposed by economic austerity programmes | • Lacking state capacity  
• Macroeconomic instability | • Governance  
• International political-economic setting  

Related problem areas:  
• Socio-economic setting |
|  | E. Growth of hidden economies, including the drug trade, smuggling, and capital flight | • Lacking state capacity  
• Lacking rule of law  
• Economies of war  
• Economic deterioration  
• Lack of economic potential  
• Criminalization  
• Regional war economies | • Governance  
• Socio-economic setting  
• Resource management  
• Internal security setting  
• International political-economic setting |
|  | F. Increase of levels of corruption and illicit transactions among the population | • Lacking state capacity  
• Legitimacy deficit of government and public institutions  
• Economies of war  
• Lack of economic potential  
• Criminalization | • Governance  
• Socio-economic setting  
• Internal security setting  
• Resource management |
|  | G. Failure of the state to pay salaries of government employees and armed forces or to meet other financial obligations to its citizens, such as pension payments | • Lacking state capacity  
• Economic deterioration  
• Destabilizing external investment patterns | • Governance  
• Socio-economic setting  
• International political-economic setting |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Top indicators</th>
<th>Measures</th>
<th>Potential aspects of conflict</th>
<th>Problem areas</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>VII</td>
<td>A. Massive and endemic corruption or profiteering by ruling elites</td>
<td><em>Exclusive government</em>&lt;br&gt;<em>Legitimacy deficit of government and public institutions</em>&lt;br&gt;<em>Criminalization</em></td>
<td>Governance&lt;br&gt;Socio-economic setting&lt;br&gt;Internal security setting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B. Resistance of ruling elites to transparency, accountability and political representation</td>
<td><em>Exclusive government</em>&lt;br&gt;<em>Violations of political group rights</em>&lt;br&gt;<em>Absence of pluralism, diversified debate and independent media</em></td>
<td>Governance&lt;br&gt;Justice and human rights&lt;br&gt;Political-cultural setting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>C. Widespread loss of popular confidence in state institutions and processes, e.g. widely boycotted or contested election, mass public demonstrations, sustained civil disobedience, inability of the state to collect taxes, resistance to military conscription, rise of armed insurgencies</td>
<td><em>Lacking state capacity</em>&lt;br&gt;<em>Legitimacy deficit of government and public institutions</em>&lt;br&gt;<em>Lacking rule of law</em></td>
<td>Governance&lt;br&gt;Internal security setting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>D. Growth of crime syndicates linked to ruling elites</td>
<td><em>Exclusive government</em>&lt;br&gt;<em>Criminalization</em>&lt;br&gt;<em>Lacking rule of law</em></td>
<td>Governance&lt;br&gt;Internal security setting</td>
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<tr>
<td>VIII</td>
<td>A. Disappearance of basic state functions that serve the people, including failure to protect citizens from terrorism and violence and to provide essential services, such as health, education, sanitation, public transportation, etc.</td>
<td><em>Lacking state capacity</em>&lt;br&gt;<em>Lacking rule of law</em></td>
<td>Governance&lt;br&gt;Internal security setting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B. State apparatus narrows to those agencies that serve the ruling elites, such as the security forces, presidential staff, central bank, diplomatic service, customs and collection agencies, etc.</td>
<td><em>Exclusive government</em>&lt;br&gt;<em>Inter-group inequalities</em>&lt;br&gt;<em>Human rights violations</em>&lt;br&gt;<em>Violations of political group rights</em>&lt;br&gt;<em>Absence of pluralism, diversified debate and independent media</em></td>
<td>Governance&lt;br&gt;Socio-economic setting&lt;br&gt;Political-cultural setting&lt;br&gt;Justice and human rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Top indicator</td>
<td>Measures</td>
<td>Potential aspects of conflict</td>
<td>Problem areas</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
| IX            | A. Emergence of authoritarian, dictatorial or military rule in which constitutional and democratic institutions and processes are suspended or manipulated | • Exclusive government  
• Lacking rule of law  
• Biased law application and enforcement by judicial and security services  
• Human rights violations  
• Violations of political group rights  
• Absence of pluralism, diversified debate and independent media | • Governance  
• Justice and human rights  
• Political-cultural setting  
• Justice and human rights |
|               | B. Outbreak of politically inspired (as opposed to criminal) violence against innocent citizens | • Exclusive government  
• Human rights violations  
• Violations of political group rights  
• Lacking rule of law  
• Biased law application and enforcement by judicial and security services  
• Absence of pluralism, diversified debate and independent media  
• Private militias/paramilitary | • Governance  
• Justice and human rights  
• Political-cultural setting  
• Internal security setting |
|               | C. Rising number of political prisoners or dissidents who are denied due process consistent with international norms and practices | • Exclusive government  
• Human rights violations  
• Violations of political group rights  
• Lacking rule of law  
• Biased law application and enforcement by judicial and security services  
• Absence of pluralism, diversified debate and independent media | • Governance  
• Justice and human rights  
• Political-cultural setting |
|               | D. Widespread abuse of legal, political and social rights, including those of individuals, groups and cultural institutions (e.g. harassment of the press, politicization of the judiciary, internal use of military for political ends, public repression of political opponents, religious or cultural persecution) | • Exclusive government  
• Human rights violations  
• Violations of political group rights  
• Lacking rule of law  
• Absence of pluralism, diversified debate and independent media  
• Private militias/paramilitary | • Governance  
• Justice and human rights  
• Political-cultural setting  
• Internal security setting |
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Top indicator</th>
<th>Measures</th>
<th>Potential aspects of conflict</th>
<th>Problem areas</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| X Security Apparatus Operates as a ‘State Within a State’ | A. Emergence of elite or praetorian guards that operate with impunity | • Exclusive government  
• Private militias/paramilitary  
• Lacking rule of law  
• Human rights violations  
• Violations of political group rights | • Governance  
• Internal security setting  
• Justice and human rights |
| | B. Emergence of state-sponsored or state-supported private militias that terrorize political opponents, suspected ‘enemies’, or civilians seen to be sympathetic to the opposition | • Exclusive government  
• Lacking rule of law  
• Human rights violations  
• Violations of political group rights  
• Absence of pluralism, diversified debate and independent media  
• Criminalization  
• Private militias/paramilitary | • Governance  
• Internal security setting  
• Political-cultural setting  
• Justice and human rights |
| | C. Emergence of an ‘army within an army’ that serves the interests of the dominant military or political clique | • Exclusive government  
• Lacking rule of law  
• Human rights violations  
• Violations of political group rights  
• Criminalization  
• Private militias/paramilitary | • Governance  
• Internal security setting  
• Justice and human rights |
| | D. Emergence of rival militias, guerrilla forces or private armies in an armed struggle or protracted violent campaign against state security forces (contested state control) | • Contested state control  
• Exclusive government  
• Lacking rule of law  
• Inter-group inequality  
• Regional inequality  
• Private militias/paramilitary | • Governance  
• Internal security setting  
• Political-cultural setting  
• Justice and human rights |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Top indicator</th>
<th>Measures</th>
<th>Potential aspects of conflict</th>
<th>Problem areas</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>XI</td>
<td>A. Fragmentation of ruling elites and state institutions along group lines</td>
<td>• Exclusive government • Political exploitation of differences • Biased law application and enforcement by judiciary and security services • Inter-group inequality • Absence of pluralism, diversified debate and independent media</td>
<td>Governance • Justice and human rights • Socio-economic setting • Political-cultural setting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B. Use of nationalistic political rhetoric by ruling elites, often in terms of communal irredentism or of communal solidarity</td>
<td>• Exclusive government • Political exploitation of differences • Distrust among (identity) groups</td>
<td>Governance • Political-cultural setting</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Top indicator</th>
<th>Measures</th>
<th>Potential aspects of conflict</th>
<th>Problem areas</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>XII</td>
<td>A. Military or paramilitary engagement in the internal affairs of the state at risk by outside armies, states, identity groups or entities that affect the internal balance of power or resolution of the conflict</td>
<td>• Contested state control • Support of outsiders to militant groups • Political instability in neighbouring countries</td>
<td>Internal security setting • Regional security setting</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Annexe B3 – Conflict Analysis Paper (CAP)

Outline of a Conflict Analysis Paper

- What is the conflict trend?
- Why is there a conflict trend?
- What are the main problem areas?
- Are there opportunities for intervention to redress a negative conflict trend?

Note: The conflict analysis paper is not an in-depth paper of the country’s situation, but instead should be valued as an instrumental paper for the policy process. For this reason all significant information should be represented in a concise and lucid way. The CAP, therefore, presents the findings and conclusions of the underlying information and analysis.

- What is the conflict trend?

The CAP should start with a short outline of the country’s situation. This implies that a paragraph should be spent on how the current conflict trend projection should be interpreted in the light of previous projections and the country profile.

- Why is there a conflict trend?

The process of attaining an understanding of why this trend is observed should lead to a discussion of the following issues:
  a. What are considered to be the significant top indicators?
  b. What aspects of conflict and problem areas are involved?
  c. What actors and agendas are involved?
  d. What regions are involved?

- What are the main problem areas?

The discussion of why a conflict trend may be observed should therefore provide a more coherent picture of the interrelations between the observed key problem areas. This paragraph is a first indication of the problem areas that are considered of key importance in the country’s conflict situation.
Are there opportunities for intervention to redress a negative conflict trend?

This final paragraph should first of all provide a concise overview of relevant activities already undertaken in the region or country. Furthermore, the paragraph should include a rough indication on possible future policy interventions. These may be of a structural nature as well as of a more direct nature. It should therefore contain an indication of the urgency of intervention.
Annexe C

Policy Analysis
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>POLICY ANALYSIS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>ANALYSIS</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Organization’s capacity assessment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Toolbox assessment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Policy assessment and lessons learned</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Assessment of the overall security context</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>KEY LINKAGES</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Policy fields and Directorates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Policy instruments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Opportunities for intervention</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Partnerships and coalitions</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>PRODUCTS</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>- Strategic policy paper (SPP)</td>
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Annexe C1 – Organization’s Capacity Assessment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key Requirements of the Organization’s Capacity Assessment</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>▪ Identify priority policy fields on the basis of the assessment of key problem areas and their interlinkages</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Indicate relevant thematic and regional Directorates and their capacities</td>
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</table>

▪ Identify priority policy fields on the basis of the assessment of key problem areas and their interlinkages

The conflict analysis paper provides a more coherent picture of the interrelations between the observed key problem areas. The nature of the conflict situation enables identification of priority policy fields. These may include more direct conflict-related interventions, such as peace-keeping or humanitarian aid, but should also raise awareness of the broad range of other policy fields that may be included in a conflict-prevention approach.

▪ Indicate relevant thematic and regional Directorates and their capacities

These policy fields again are an indication of thematic and regional Directorates that could be involved in designing a policy approach. The broad range of policy fields may require a number of Directorates and Departments to be included because of their complementary capacities. This implies sensitizing these organizations for conflict prevention and the impact of individual measures on conflict situations, as well as more strategic coherency. Hence the need for cooperation in a coherent policy design is emphasized.

Box C1.1. provides an overview of interlinkages between problem areas, policy fields and policy Directorates.
### Box C1.1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PROBLEM AREAS</th>
<th>POLICY FIELDS</th>
<th>POLICY DIRECTORATES AND DEPARTMENTS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Governance</td>
<td>• Democratization (including power-sharing and devolution)</td>
<td>To be filled in according to the Department, Directorate or the organization involved</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Good governance</td>
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<td>• Civil society development</td>
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<td>• Capacity-building</td>
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<td>• Economic stability and reform</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Human rights</td>
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<tr>
<td>Justice and human rights</td>
<td>• Human rights</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Judicial and legal measures</td>
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<td>• Civil society development</td>
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<td>• Democratization</td>
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<td>• Capacity-building</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Protection of minority rights</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Police reform</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Professionalization and reform of armed forces</td>
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<td>Socio-economic setting</td>
<td>• Economic development</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Poverty reduction</td>
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<td>• Basic human needs</td>
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<td>• Redistribution</td>
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<td>• Employment opportunities</td>
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<td>• Credit opportunities</td>
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<td>• Education</td>
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<td>• Investment patterns</td>
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<td>• Health services</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Demobilization and reintegration</td>
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<td>Political-cultural setting</td>
<td>• Communication</td>
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<td>• Media</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Education</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Civil society development</td>
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<tr>
<td>Internal security setting</td>
<td>• Security sector reform</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Control of (small) arms proliferation</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Police reform</td>
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<td>• Human rights</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Judicial and legal measures</td>
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<tr>
<td>Resource management</td>
<td>• Migration and resettlement</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Environment</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Resource management</td>
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<td>• Agriculture</td>
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<td>• Redistribution</td>
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<td>• Investment patterns</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Humanitarian aid</td>
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<tr>
<td>Regional security setting</td>
<td>• Regional organizations</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Illicit trade (drugs, arms)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Diplomacy</td>
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<td>• Humanitarian aid</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Peace-keeping</td>
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<tr>
<td>International political-economic setting</td>
<td>• Investment patterns</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Lending conditions/debt relief</td>
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<td>• Market regulation</td>
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<td>• IFI conditionality</td>
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Annexe C2 – Toolbox Assessment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key Requirements of a Toolbox Assessment</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>▪ Categorize the available tools in such a way as to fit practice and purpose</td>
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<tr>
<td>▪ Focus on strategies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Pragmatism regarding the timing dimension</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

▪ **Categorize the available tools in such a way as to fit practice and purpose**

As is the case with conflict indicators, policy instruments may be categorized in a variety of ways. No conclusive answer can be given to the question of which particular instruments should be included in such a listing. In the international literature on conflict-prevention instruments, the ‘toolkit’ as developed by Michael Lund stands out. This categorization is based on the type of instrument: diplomatic measures, non-official conflict management measures, military measures, economic and social measures, political development and governance measures, judicial and legal measures, and communications and education measures. Boxes C2.1. through C2.7. provide a listing of this typology of instruments.¹ For application in practice, however, the listing is insufficient. First, the listing is not exhaustive. Second, the tools can be applied in a variety of ways and a range of policy fields.

The toolbox assessment is thus not as much an exercise in establishing a listing of all the tools available, but instead in deciding on the instruments to apply in practice in the particular conflict context. It is hence more a question of what one can do with the instruments available. The options for what can be done based on an in-house toolbox may appear to be limited, thus restraining the options for intervention. When the options of cooperation and partnerships, financial contributions to operations, and diplomatic/international agenda are included, the number of options may multiply. This is even more so when the toolbox is extended from direct, short-term conflict-prevention tools towards middle- and longer-term conflict prevention. Under such circumstances, a clear focus is imperative.

▪ **Focus on strategies**

The comprehensive character of certain (potential) conflict situations may require broad strategies instead of the application of single instruments. The aim of the policy analysis stage, therefore, is to come up with a strategic policy paper (SPP). In the selection of instruments the focus should be on designing strategies for intervention. The CAP’s information indicates which problem areas and aspects of conflict require special attention. Based on this information and the objectives of the

¹ This listing is based on Michael Lund’s toolkit (various publications), the *Search for Common Ground* toolkit for NGOs, the *US Foreign Policy Tools: An Illustrative Matrix of Selected Options*, and a listing of conflict-related policy tools as mentioned in a variety of policy papers of the Netherlands Government (drafted by Paula Souverein).
mission statement, strategies should be designed that aim for opportunities to manage or mitigate the (potential) conflict situation. The toolbox assessment should therefore focus on the instruments available to deal with the problems identified, and especially on ways in which the instruments can be linked. The optional strategies for a specific conflict situation are further analysed in annexes C3 through C5.

- Pragmatism regarding the timing dimension

The timing of interventions (i.e. when should particular instruments be put into use) takes second place, as the main focus of the Fund for Peace trend analysis in the CPAF is on the middle term. This does not imply that timing has become an insignificant element. On the contrary, any decision on whether it is opportune to use particular instruments depends on the particular conflict situation. However, the issue of timing should be used as pragmatically as possible. For this reason, the typology of latent conflict, fragile peace, and open (protracted) conflict was introduced. Whereas latent conflict and fragile peace can be considered as ‘two sides of the same coin’, it is notably in post-conflict situations that the range of instruments broadens. This is a result of the observation that in a post-conflict situation, in particular when this is the result of a process of peace negotiations, the willingness of the actors involved to contribute to peace increases.

The preference for the middle term thus results from the desire to have more options for intervention, and especially the possibility to include a broad as possible range of instruments. This also implies the possibility of designing more comprehensive strategies.

Note: The list of instruments as displayed in Boxes C2.1. through C2.7. is not exhaustive. As regards the categorization, different types of categorization—e.g. according to short-, middle- or long-term application—are possible.
### Box C2.1.
**Diplomatic Measures**

- Facilitation of mediation/negotiations
- Informal consultations
- Conciliation
- Good offices
- Mediation
- Negotiations
- Preventive diplomacy: SGUN, OSCE, HCNM
- Diplomatic sanctions
- Unilateral goodwill gestures
- Hot lines
- International appeal/condemnation
- Diplomatic (de-)recognition
- Special envoys
- Coercive diplomacy
- Crisis and war diplomacy
- Conflict prevention or management centres
- Peace conferences
- Fact-finding missions
- Observer missions
- Monitoring missions
- Verification missions
- Certification/decertification

### Box C2.2.
**Non-Official Conflict Management Measures**

- Non-violent campaign
- Cultural exchanges
- Pro-active unofficial mediation
- Conflict resolution and prevention centres
- Civilian peace monitors
- ‘Friends’ groups
- Building indigenous conflict resolution institutions
- Non-official facilitation/problem-solving workshops
- Civilian fact-finding missions
- Peace commissions
- Visits by eminent organizations/persons/‘embarrassing witnesses’
- Civilian observer missions
- Civilian monitoring missions
- Civilian verification missions

### Box C2.3.
**Military Measures**

- Threat of projection of force
- Peace enforcement
- Peace-keeping
- Preventive deployment (military, police)
- Separation of troops
- Military intervention
- Collective security or cooperation arrangements
- Military training and professionalization
- Military contingency planning
- Security guarantees
- Deterrence
- Arms embargoes or blockades
- Disarmament
- Mine clearance
- Military demobilization and reintegration
- Transparency of arms transfers: Wassenaar agreement
- Transparency of arms sales
- Military restructuring and integration
- CSBMs
- CBMs
- Arms control agreements
- Arms proliferation control
- Non-aggression agreements
- Military-to-military programmes
- Demilitarized/peace/nuclear-free zones
- Military aid
Box C2.4.  
Economic and Social Measures

- Conditional ODA
- Development assistance
- Economic rehabilitation assistance
- Private economic investment
- Trade policy
- Debt policy
- Relief aid
- Emergency food aid
- Economic and resource cooperation
- Economic integration/cooperation
- Economic reform
- Inter-communal trade
- Economic sanctions/embargoes
- Health assistance
- Joint projects
- Agricultural programmes
- Providing basic needs
- Social reform including social safety nets
- Repatriation or resettlement of refugees and displaced people

Box C2.5.  
Political Development and Governance Measures

- Federation
- Confederation
- Autonomy
- Political institution-building
- Political party-building
- Constitutional commissions/reform
- Democratization
- Special rapporteurs on human rights
- Electoral assistance
- National conferences
- Conflict prevention training for officials
- Training executive powers
- Promotion of the rule of law
- Training of public officials
- Human rights monitoring
- Community organization on trans-group grounds
- Training judicial personnel
- Support to judicial/legal/dispute resolution institutions
- Human rights promotion
- UN human rights centres
- Promotion of good governance within army, police, and judicial system
- Electoral observers
- Electoral reform
- Promotion of transparency and control
- Ombudsman

Box C2.6.  
Judicial and Legal Measures

- War crimes tribunals/truth commissions/ICC
- Prosecution of war criminals by national institutions
- Arbitration
- Constitutional commissions/reform
- Support to judicial/legal/dispute resolution institutions
- Judicial/legal reform
- Human rights institution-building
- Police reforms
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Communications and Education Measures</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>▪ Training for journalists on how to defuse inflammatory coverage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Creation of pluralist press</td>
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<tr>
<td>▪ Media professionalization</td>
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<tr>
<td>▪ Peace radio/TV</td>
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<td>▪ Exchange visits</td>
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<td>▪ Peace education</td>
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<td>▪ Anti-stereotype workshops</td>
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<td>▪ International broadcasts</td>
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<tr>
<td>▪ Cross-ethnic team reporting for journalists</td>
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<td>▪ Political/scientific trans-ethnic publications</td>
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<td>▪ Civic education</td>
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<tr>
<td>▪ Formal education projects</td>
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<tr>
<td>▪ Conflict prevention courses in schools</td>
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<tr>
<td>▪ Joint action programmes: bringing together opponents to work on a shared problem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Promote alternative information and communication sources</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Key Requirements of Policy Assessment and Lessons Learned

- Lessons-learned assessment on expected consequences of the response options
- Indication of conditions enhancing/inhibiting realization of the strategic policy objectives

- Lessons-learned assessment on expected consequences of the response options

A focused policy approach implies designing strategies based on combinations of instruments. It is then of significance to assess these policies as regards their impact on conflict situations. This requires experience with the instruments, as well as knowledge on the conflict situations and country structures. Experience with the application of specific (combinations of) instruments or strategies may be instructive with regard to what can be expected. Such lessons-learned analyses are often part of evaluations of previous interventions, and may therefore be easily accessible. They are important, as they may indicate the pitfalls of certain approaches. Linking these lessons with information on the conflict situation to be addressed should indicate whether such pitfalls are to be expected. The lessons-learned analysis may then provide lessons on how to avoid these.

- Indication of conditions enhancing/inhibiting realization of the strategic policy objectives

Based on the lessons-learned assessment, an estimate of the policies on the conflict trend should become possible. Since—on the basis of organizational capacities, limitations and priorities—it is obvious that not all (potential) conflict cases are candidates for maximum intervention, strategies should be developed that take into account the impacts of minimum, sub-optimal and non-interventions.

In order to make such an assessment on impacts, the objectives need to be realistic. This requires an assessment of the local structures to support such an intervention, *i.e.* an assessment of the capacity and support of local actors as well as of so-called spoilers in this process.
Annexe C4 – Partnerships and Coalitions

Key Requirements of Assessment of Overall Security Context

- Assess partnerships and coalitions that could enhance and broaden in-house capacity
- Identify instruments, mandates and agendas at various levels

- Assess partnerships and coalitions that could enhance and broaden in-house capacity

For a variety of reasons it can be decided to opt for partnerships and coalitions in the intervention policy. These partners for alliances should be assessed on their capacities and objectives, as well as their activities so far in the regions/countries under consideration for intervention.

- Identify instruments, mandates and agendas at various levels

The assessment of capacities and objectives can be structured around three key issues: instruments, mandates and agendas. Box C4.1. provides a framework for assessment of national, international, regional and local actors with regard to the eight problem areas within the CPAF. The table should identify which partners are interesting for certain types of intervention. This information is then to be used in the strategic policy paper (SPP).
### Box C4.1. Assessing Partnerships and Coalitions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Problem Area I</th>
<th>Problem Area II</th>
<th>Problem Area III</th>
<th>Problem Area IV</th>
<th>Problem Area V</th>
<th>Problem Area VI</th>
<th>Problem Area VII</th>
<th>Problem Area VIII</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>National actors:</td>
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<td>International actors:</td>
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Annexe C5 – Strategic Policy Paper

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outline of a Strategic Policy Paper</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>▪ Characterize the ‘early warning’</td>
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<tr>
<td>▪ Identify the focal point for an ‘early response’ strategy in the particular conflict situation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Identify and characterize the capacities that are available in-house</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Identify and characterize the potential of feasible partnerships and alliances</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Recommendations on the design, type, timing and instruments for intervention</td>
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**Note:** The strategic policy paper is not a listing of all possible policy approaches and combinations of instruments, but instead should be valued as a paper instrumental for the planning, assessment and decision-making process. For this reason all significant information should be represented in a concise and lucid way. The SPP thus presents the findings and conclusions of the underlying policy analysis by recommending the most viable options for a policy approach.

▪ **Characterize the ‘early warning’**

The SPP should start with a short outline of what is considered to be the early warning. This outline is based on the conflict analysis paper on the current situation and assessment of the main problem areas involved and the interlinkages of the aspects of conflict.

▪ **Identify the focal point for an ‘early response’ strategy in the particular conflict situation**

Based on the analysis of a toolbox assessment, the policy priorities, and the opportunities for intervention, a strategy for dealing with the particular conflict situation should be recommended.

▪ **Identify and characterize the relevant capacities that are available in-house**

On the basis of the strategic focal point, suggestions should follow on how to deploy available in-house capacity. This includes recommendation about the Directorates and Departments to be involved, and their respective instruments, mandates and agendas.

▪ **Identify and characterize the potential of feasible partnerships and alliances**

When streamlining and cooperation is regarded to be important, but also in the case of insufficient national capacity, recommendations should be made on feasible partnerships and alliances. This may include involvement by international and regional as well as local actors. Again, this recommendation should be based on an assessment of instruments, mandates and agendas.

▪ **Recommendations on the design, type, timing and instruments for intervention**
The final recommendation of the strategic policy paper is a clear strategic policy design based on the elements mentioned in the outline above. The recommendation focuses on the type of intervention and the deployment of the instruments involved, as well as on the role of potential partners and the time-frame of the intervention. The SPP should also be clear on the expected impact of the intervention.
Annexe D

Planning, Assessment and Decision-Making
# PLANNING, ASSESSMENT AND DECISION-MAKING

| ANALYSIS          | • Working out SPP into draft plan of action  
                      | • Political cost-benefit analysis |
|-------------------|------------------------------------------|
| KEY LINKAGES      | • Mission statement  
                      | • CAP  
                      | • SPP |
| PRODUCTS          | • Plan of action |
Annexe D1 – Draft Plan of Action

Key Requirements of a Draft Plan of Action

- Overall strategy or strategies for managing or mitigating the (potential) conflict situation
- Main objectives and priorities
- Alliances for cooperation
- Policy instruments
- Guidance notes for management procedures and terms of reference for responsibilities and cooperation

Note: The draft plan of action is the first outline of the final strategy for dealing with the conflict situation. It should build on the mission statement, the findings of the conflict analysis paper, and the recommendations of the strategic policy paper. The first draft, however, needs to be assessed with regard to its impact on the conflict situation, as well as its political and economic costs and its feasibility for the longer term. This will be dealt with in Annexe D2.

- Overall strategy or strategies for managing or mitigating the (potential) conflict situation

The plan of action describes the main strategy as decided upon on the basis of the previous phases of the CPAF: the CAP and the SPP. In addition, the mission statement should provide clear guidelines for setting parameters for the type of intervention. A tentative impact assessment should also be part of the drafting phase. The recommended plan of action should have:
  - Clear objectives: *i.e.* what is the aim of the intervention (e.g. conflict management or conflict resolution)?
  - A clear time-frame: *i.e.* does the intervention aim at short-term goals or longer-term sustainability?
  - Terms of reference for responsibilities and cooperation: *i.e.* what is the lead agency for the intervention? Which alliances should be aimed at, and why?

- Main objectives and priorities

The focus on objectives is of prime importance. The aims can differ from preventing, managing, mitigating or resolving a potential conflict situation. For practical reasons it is obvious that the commitment should remain limited as regards economic and political costs, as well as regarding the time-frame. The objectives should also relate to the instruments available in-house, or in combination with third actors. The objectives can also be prioritized politically or realistically. The plan of action should be clear in this regard and, if possible, provide options for flexibility in dealing with contingencies.
- **Alliances for cooperation**

Previous stages and assessments have identified candidates for intervention partners. The strategy opted for on the basis of the objectives, priorities and instruments available can be strengthened by building alliances. Candidates for alliances are actors (national, international or local) with common agendas and complementary capacities and instruments that are able to maximize the effectiveness of the intervention strategy. The alliances and parameters for cooperation should be clearly identified and integrated in the plan of action.

- **Policy instruments**

The previous mapping of the problems, the objectives and the actors has resulted in a range of instruments that can be applied. Here a clear link to the objectives, the actors and the terms of reference (ToRs) for cooperation is required. The plan of action provides an outline of the requirements and the instruments to reach the goals.

- **Guidance notes for management procedures and terms of reference for responsibilities and cooperation**

In addition to the identification of the instruments required, the plan of action should also provide clear guidance notes for management procedures during its implementation. These guidance notes are of importance for application on the project level and the drafting of project memoranda. As they can vary according to specific types of intervention, the guidance notes and the ToRs may have to be defined for all actors involved. This applies especially to third actors. The guidance notes should not function as strait-jackets, but instead incorporate a margin for manoeuvre in order to make it possible to reach the main objectives.

- **Options for review of strategies**

*Intervening in conflicts implies stepping into complex processes that may change as a result. The complexity of the process may imply a necessity to adapt initial strategies. Such flexibility should be part of the strategy as presented in the plan of action.*
Annexe D2 – Political Cost-Benefit Analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Key Considerations of a Political Cost-Benefit Analysis</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>▪ Who is involved in the political cost-benefit analysis and decision-making?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ How does the plan of action (PoA) relate to the mission statement?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Does the PoA affect or link to other policy priorities?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ What are the ‘political costs’ of the PoA:</td>
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<tr>
<td>▪ What is the internal political basis for the PoA?</td>
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<tr>
<td>▪ What is the external political basis for the PoA?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ How does the PoA affect external partnerships?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ What are the financial costs of the PoA?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>▪ Do the financial costs affect its feasibility?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The key aspect of the planning, assessment and decision-making phase concerns a political cost-benefit analysis. The political cost-benefit analysis is of importance at the strategic decision-making level, as it can tilt the balance in favour of certain decisions. In this regard, the political cost-benefit analysis precedes a final decision on the plan of action. Depending upon the type of intervention, a political cost-benefit analysis may not always be required. It is also important to note that no clear guidelines can be designed or given, as this type of analysis and the ensuing decision-making are very case-specific and depend totally on given or actual political settings.

▪ **Who is involved in the political cost-benefit analysis and decision-making?**

This type of analysis usually reaches the heart of the political trade. In this stage, it is therefore important to include policy-makers with a mandate to take decisions or with a direct relationship with the decision-making level.

▪ **How does the plan of action relate to the mission statement?**

The role of the mission statement is explained in annexe A1. The political cost-benefit analysis is directly linked to the mission statement, as this statement contains the main priorities for decision-making. However, political practice may require case-to-case flexibility in dealing with conflict situations. The strategic objectives outlined in the statement are therefore essentially guidelines for political decision-making that may be adapted in specific cases. The political cost-benefit analysis provides guidance in this regard.
- **Does the plan of action affect or link to other policy priorities?**

Guidance of the political cost-benefit analysis may focus on weighing objectives and priorities as stated in the mission statement, as well as emanating from political cooperation with internal and/or external actors. The weighing of priorities may require political decisions on specific short-, middle- or long-term objectives, of which conflict prevention is only one.

- **What are the political costs of the plan of action?**

The cost-benefit analysis in this stage of the CPAF focuses mainly on the political costs of specific policy options. These costs can be identified at different levels, ranging from the internal political landscape to international relations and partnerships. The decision to embark upon a costly or risky plan may also depend on the expected outcome. In this regard the impact assessment is of importance. If certain objectives may be reached, but at high costs, and if the outcome is expected to last only for a limited duration, the plan may be considered to be not worth the effort. In case of internal or international discord as regards such actions, the political costs—alienation of important or potential partners—may be too high. The final decision, however, will depend on the attainability of the goal and its political ‘weight’. The following questions should therefore be addressed.

  - **What is the internal political basis for the plan of action?**
    Political will is hard to define, as it may depend on a broad range of factors. One of these factors is the internal political basis for certain actions. Plans to embark upon certain actions that are costly or risky may require broad political backing. This obviously does not apply to all decisions, but may play an important role in specific cases, especially when such actions concern the deployment of (Dutch) military personnel in ‘out-of-area’ conflicts.

  - **What is the external political basis for the plan of action?**
    Certain plans may be valid with regard to their objectives, but can at the same time cause problems because of limited international political receptiveness. The question, then, is to decide whether it is worth to get out of step in specific cases, and to assess the political cost or damage that may result from such actions.

  - **How does the plan of action affect external partnerships?**
    Increasing globalization and cooperation may imply less room for national decision-making. The room left for such decisions may still affect political relationships and specific partnerships. These effects have to be taken into account when a decision is made.

- **What are the financial costs of the plan of action?**

  - **Do the financial costs of the plan of action affect its feasibility?**
    The cost-benefit analysis of the plan of action does not remain limited to the political costs. In the same regard, political costs are not purely political. The feasibility of a plan is also decided upon the basis of financial costs. If a plan requires heavy or long-term investments, the willingness to embark upon it may diminish. The feasibility will therefore also depend on this aspect, as long-term investments require special commitments.
Annexe D3 – Plan of Action

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outline of a Plan of Action</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A four-page document describing:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Overall strategy or strategies for managing or mitigating the (potential) conflict situation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Main objectives and priorities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Guidance notes for management procedures and terms of reference for responsibilities and cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Options for review of strategies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Policy instruments</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note 1: The final plan of action focuses on the strategic level, and provides the point of departure for all activities. The plan of action should therefore be used as an annexe to all plans and activities at the project level.

Note 2: The requirements of the plan of action are explained in Annexe D1 on the draft plan of action.
Annexe E

Implementation
## IMPLEMENTATION

<table>
<thead>
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<th>ANALYSIS</th>
<th>Impact assessment monitoring</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KEY LINKAGES</td>
<td>Feedback loop to conflict analysis, policy analysis and planning, assessment and decision-making</td>
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<tr>
<td>PRODUCTS</td>
<td>Redesign and reformulation of CAP, SPP and/or plan of action</td>
</tr>
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</table>
Annexe E1 – Impact Assessment Monitoring

### Key Requirements of Impact Assessment Monitoring

- Continuation of conflict trend analysis
- Reassessment of conditions, actors and problem areas that enhance/inhibit the realization of the policy plan and its objectives
- Input for redefinition of context-specific policy priorities and plans of action

#### Continuation of conflict trend analysis

Intervening in conflicts implies changing the circumstances and factors in complex processes. The outcomes of such interventions can only be assessed during the intervention, or *ex post facto*. In order to increase the effectiveness of interventions, it is necessary to monitor the effects. Methodologies are still lacking, but are in development. However, one method is to reassess the conflict trend. Applying the standardized conflict analysis model has the advantage of identifying clear deviations (positive or negative) that may require adaptation of the strategy or the instruments applied. The application of the conflict analysis at this stage should again have a participatory character, and should ideally involve the actors that were active in the implementation phase.

#### Reassessment of conditions, actors and problem areas that enhance/inhibit the realization of the policy plan and its objectives

The conflict trend analysis may result in a reassessment of the strategy, as the conditions or actors that enhance or inhibit the realization of the objectives can change during the process. This may imply a new trade-off of activities, *i.e.* a new impact assessment and a new cost-benefit analysis.

#### Input for redefinition of context specific policy priorities and plans of action

Reassessment of the conflict trend should result in identification of new opportunities to deal with the problem and become part of an adapted plan of action, as well as project memoranda.
Annexe F

Fund for Peace Analytical Model of Internal Conflict and State Collapse: Manual for Practitioners
For the Fund for Peace Analytical Model of Internal Conflict and State Collapse, Manual for Practitioners, see

http://www.fundforpeace.org