In what follows, I shall try, with due modesty before the Unknowable, to depict a number of possible futures of diplomacy – ‘fragments of future history’, these plausible visions might be called. A true ‘predictive history’, as the philosopher Immanuel Kant conceived of it, would be ‘a divinatory historical narrative of things imminent in future time’.

In projecting history forward, I shall not try to foresee it, in Kant’s sense. I shall nonetheless endeavor to think beyond the immediate horizon, and to envision the situation and character of diplomacy as it might look, say, twenty to fifty years from now.

Such conscious future-projection is more and more necessary, I believe, because, with history having accelerated as it has done, national governments, international organizations, and those who represent them are called upon to make very rapid and precise decisions. The future is upon us much faster than it has been in the past. The exigencies of political decision-making in the world today put a premium on anticipation – on insight and foresight, as well as on hindsight. These qualities, fortunately, are ones that diplomats are known for.

The ‘lessons’ of experience – of past history – are a necessary guide, of course. We still study nineteenth-century history today because we have many nineteenth-century problems, including the incidence of terrorism, often resulting from radical ideologies as well as from nationalist feelings, against both imperial structures and modernizing forces. In some respects, the nineteenth century is more relevant to our situation today than is the twentieth century with its large-scale geostrategies as these were carried out in

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1 The text of this article is also to be published in a Favorita Paper, ‘250 Years. Von der Orientalischen zur Diplomatischen Akademie in Wien. Symposium: A Changing Europe in a Changing World’, of the Diplomatic Academy of Vienna. The author and the Editors would like to thank Ambassador Ernst Sucharipa, Director of the Diplomatic Academy and the Editor of the Favorita Paper, for his permission to reproduce the article – in very slightly amended form – here.

two World Wars and a worldwide Cold War. The nineteenth century was also, at least at the international level, a relatively peaceful one. International stability was maintained, by statesmen and diplomats, in the Concert of Europe and through the balance of the European great powers that underlay it. The ‘long peace’ of the Cold War years was, by contrast, less dependent on diplomatic harmonization than on military equilibration – the correlation of armed forces and a nonquantifiable ‘balance of terror’ imposed by nuclear technology and preemptive-strike doctrines.

Despite some resemblances with the past, the twenty-first century may turn out to be very different from it. The international system today, which has moved toward the single pole of the US, is pervaded by the processes of globalization. Driven by economics as well as by technology, globalization is a force that seems to be largely beyond the control of political leadership – or, still less, of diplomacy. However, the dynamics of globalization may offer new opportunities for diplomats. More than leaders or officials at home ever can, diplomats experience directly the upheavals that globalization and related turbulences can produce. These include the ‘clashes of civilization’, including the confrontation of the Western world with Islam that, as Samuel Huntington has argued, give conceptual definition to our time. Diplomats should be in a position, if they are prepared and politically authorized and popularly supported, to lead a ‘dialogue of civilizations’.

Globalization – the spread of ideas, goods, and money that is transforming our global civilization – is not, of course, entirely new. As a historian, I see it as dating from the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, when it came to be widely believed that the world system was ‘closed’. People saw that there was no longer an open frontier for expansion, that outward industrial and political forces were beginning to bump into each other, and that expansionist forces could even bounce back upon their sources, impacting metropolitan societies. The political geographer Halford Mackinder vividly likened this new situation to a kind of echo-chamber. A sound from Europe – or, today, more likely from elsewhere – could spread outward in concentric rings, converge at a point on the opposite end of the earth, and then come crashing back. ‘Every explosion of social forces’, he warned, ‘instead of being dissipated in a surrounding circuit of unknown space and barbaric chaos, will be sharply re-echoed from the far side of the

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4 This was attempted with the United Nations Year of Dialogue Among Civilizations 2001. See http://www.un.org/Dialogue.
globe, and weak elements in the political and economic organisms of the world will be shattered in consequence. 5

Diplomats, I suggest, are uniquely well placed to swim in such historical and cultural cross-currents. More than that, they should be able, in the midst of these reverberations, to identify and interpret the essential messages, and relay these to their governments and also to their publics. No group is better situated to filter out the feedback-effects of globalized communication. The span of globalization is, of course, limited and also uneven – despite the image we generally have of everyone, everywhere, talking with anyone, anywhere. As the British diplomat Robert Cooper has observed, different parts of the world are still living in different phases of history. Pre-modern, modern, and post-modern elements coexist in the same world, even within some of the same countries. 6

There are major regional differences. In Robert Kagan’s no less provocative essay, ‘Power and Weakness’, Americans are said to be still living in the world of ‘power’, whereas Europeans have moved beyond that, to live in ‘a self-contained world of laws and rules and transnational negotiation and cooperation … the realization of Kant’s ‘Perpetual Peace’’. 7 Henry Kissinger does not perceive even a single world system. Despite the unifying effects of globalization today, Kissinger believes, the world has a number of different ‘international systems’ existing side by side within it. The ‘great powers’ of Asia live in ‘the world of equilibrium’, for example. He comments: ‘Wars between them are not likely, but neither are they excluded. The international order of Asia therefore resembles that of nineteenth-century Europe more than that of the twenty-first-century North Atlantic.’ 8

I have five projective visions of diplomacy in mind that are shaped by an awareness of this variation of the world even while globalizing, or unifying, in terms of both history and geography. No model of diplomacy’s possible future is likely to fit all parts of the world the same way with equal realism, or

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plausibility. Some patterns are more likely to be realized in certain places. Other patterns, however, might become almost universal.

The five models, or ‘fragments’ of diplomacy’s possible future history, I have given these names, the exact meaning of which may not, initially, be fully evident: first, ‘disintermediation’; second, ‘Europeanization’; third, ‘democratization’; fourth, ‘thematization’; and, fifth, ‘Americanization’. I shall describe and explain each in turn.

1. Disintermediation

A first model for the future of diplomacy – reflecting the strong challenge to it posed by the private sector – is that state-run diplomacy, with its formal structures and bureaucratic procedures, could be largely bypassed. I refer to a general trend which is affecting governmental authorities and institutions – not just foreign ministries and diplomatic services. A former senior Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs official, George Haynal, who also has business experience, calls the current pattern of private withdrawal from the use of governmental services ‘disintermediation’ on the analogy of what in the 1990s happened to Canada’s chartered banks. People just didn’t want to use them any more. They didn’t want to put their business through them and found, instead, that brokerage firms, insurance companies, and other financial-service providers could fulfill their needs more cheaply, more efficiently, and also more rewardingly.

All established institutions that purport to act as intermediaries between people and power, to view the problem more generally, are being subjected to similar challenges of legitimacy and mandate. They are being ‘disintermediated’ by constituents who feel constrained by excessive paternalism, are stirred to act by an apparent lack of accountability on the part of institutions to which they have entrusted their affairs, and, very importantly, are newly empowered to do so by information technology.

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Disintermediation is a historic challenge, as Haynal sees it. The response of present-day institutions is transformative in a way that is similar to the way the Catholic Church was partially transformed by the challenge of the Reformation.¹¹

Corporations, providing new services somewhat in competition with governments, might, to carry this history-derived scenario further, actually begin to conduct their own 'foreign policies'. Numerous multinational corporations today have budgets that are larger than those of many sovereign nations, three-quarters of these having populations of 20 million or fewer. What, one might wonder, does a large financial company like Fidelity Investments – long America’s largest mutual funds seller – in my own city of Boston, for example, really need diplomats for? It has its own sources of information, the means to gather it, and extensive representation abroad – its own ‘foreign service’.

The above-described speculative future – in which diplomacy would have to work very hard to reform itself to meet private-sector pressures – implies a relatively peaceful – or at least stable – world, one in which most transactions take place normally and without major disruption. Officials of government are quiet, and part of the background. The events of 11 September 2001 – the Al Qaeda attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon – 'brought the state back in', to provide homeland security. Terrorist strikes in New York, Washington, Madrid, and other highly populated centers around the world have produced a surge of statism, of state-protectionism.

The 9/11 effect, however, may wear off. If it does, the ‘privatization’ of foreign policy and diplomacy, and even of physical security services, may become much more common. The consequence for ‘disintermediated’ diplomacy might be that, as a result of stronger competition, the diplomatic profession will be required to mimic private enterprise and its methods. Already, one sees experiments in the ‘branding’ of countries, such as the early effort of the Labour government under Prime Minister Tony Blair to promote the image of ‘Cool Britannia’. The US government’s more recent effort to sell the idea of ‘America’ to the Arab world, using Madison Avenue methods, also is illustrative. The penetration of ‘marketing’ techniques into the public diplomacy of governments indicates the profound adaptation, or reformation, that professional diplomacy could undergo.¹²

¹¹ Ibid.
¹² Symptomatic of the new approach is Mark Leonard and Vidhya Alakeson, Going Public: Diplomacy for the Information Age (London: The Foreign Policy Centre, 2000).
2. Europeanization

A second model for diplomacy’s future, applicable especially to the more advanced regions of the world, is that of ‘going European’ – that is, subordinating or even replacing national diplomatic services with integrated-international, or fully joint ones. Within the area of the European Union (EU), bilateral diplomatic missions already are being somewhat eclipsed by the inner communicative activity of the EU and also by the effort to create a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) for a united Europe. The ‘cross-national collegial solidarity’ of the members of the Comité des représentants permanents (COREPER) of the Council of the EU, in particular, demonstrates the unifying effect of engagement by national representatives in the same basic activity – that of building ‘Europe’.

According to the Draft Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, there will be, when and if the Treaty is ratified, a European ‘Union Minister for Foreign Affairs’ (Article I-28). This person, to be also one of the Vice-Presidents of the European Commission, will have responsibility for conducting the CFSP and for the overall consistency of the international relations of the European Union and its members. He or she, it is stipulated, shall also express the EU’s positions in international organizations and at conferences. In fulfilling this mandate, the Union Minister for Foreign Affairs is to be ‘assisted by a European External Action Service’ that will ‘work in cooperation with the diplomatic services of the Member States’ (Article III-296). Even within the United Nations Security Council – of which two European countries, Britain and France, are permanent members – there is to be deference to EU positions: ‘When the Union has defined a position on a subject which is on the United Nations Security Council agenda, those Member States which sit on the Security Council shall request that the Union Minister for Foreign Affairs be asked to present the Union’s position’ (Article III-305).

Seen from the outside, this pattern really does not look like ‘multilateral’ diplomacy, though it is sometimes called that. Relations within the area of the European Union are less and less ‘diplomatic’, in the traditional sense of that

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term. They are inter-domestic. ‘The process of European integration’, analysts have noted, ‘is marked by a growing interconnectedness of domestic administrative systems of member states where sector-specific policies are coordinated across national borders without involving diplomats.’ Diplomacy’s new intra-European mode conforms to a process of isomorphism. How far this process of foreign policy integration can go, given the centrifugal effects of the addition of ten new members to the Union, mostly from the less-developed and more nationalistic eastern half of Europe, remains to be seen.

Despite growing EU integration, the bilateral relationships of European countries, including those established by their bilateral missions in one another’s capitals, are likely to survive, even if their roles do change. Many countries in Europe, partly because of their physical locations and their histories, still think of foreign policy in ‘bilateral’ terms. Consular work and most cultural activities also, of course, remain bilateral. Bilateral embassies, which now regularly house officers belonging to other government departments and agencies as well as professional diplomats, can provide needed orientation as well as habitation. The ambassador can be an ‘arbiter’ among these elements. He can also ‘inject reality’ into ministerial briefings. There is a further reason why bilateral embassies may remain important in the EU era. It has been noted that there is an ‘illusion of familiarity’ among the decision-makers in EU states caused by the regularity of their meetings and frequency of their consultations. Bilateral diplomacy can be a corrective to and balance against this over-busy scheduling, or ‘calendar’, effect.

Ambassador Karl Theodor Paschke, former Director-General for Personnel and Administration of the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in a special inspection report to the German government regarding Germany’s embassies in EU countries concluded that although ‘certain functions of traditional diplomacy have become superfluous’, e.g., handing over letters and delivering formal démarches, Germany’s ‘embassies in Europe have not become obsolete’. He found a widespread consensus that ‘European cooperation can only thrive where it is sustained and underpinned by stable, close, trouble-free bilateral relations between EU members’. If anything, Paschke’s report suggests, the need for bilateral missions in Europe may

actually be growing, because of the increased need for governments to ‘explain’ the policies and politics of their countries to the publics of their fellow EU members."

The European Union has a particular challenge in this respect with its ‘democratic deficit’ – the widespread perception that policies and decisions are made in Brussels and in Strasbourg without adequate participation, or even knowledge, on the part of the mass of Europe’s citizens. The low voter turnout for the June 2004 European Parliament elections was particularly alarming. ‘The average overall turnout was just over 45%’, the Economist noted, ‘by some margin the lowest ever recorded for elections to the European Parliament.’ Most ‘depressing’ of all, ‘at least to believers in the European project’, was the extremely low vote in the new member countries from central Europe – in Poland, just slightly over one-fifth of the electorate. ‘Disillusion with Europe’ was manifested also in the protest vote for ‘a rag-bag of populist, nationalist and explicitly anti-EU parties’.

This reaction, too, may be a demonstration of the complex process of ‘Europeanization’ and of things to come. Both ‘bilateral’ and ‘multilateral’ diplomacy on the part of European states, and the diplomacy of a constitutionally established Union itself, will need to play a larger role within European society.

3. Democratization

This leads me to my third model, or fragment of possible future history. I call it ‘diplomacy as democracy’. By this, I refer to democracy at the international level. This is a concept that Dr Boutros Boutros-Ghali sought to develop when he was serving as Secretary-General of the United Nations in his paper, An Agenda for Democracy. ‘Democratization internationally’, he argued, is a necessity on three fronts – that of transforming the structures of the United Nations itself, that of providing new actors on the international scene with formal means of participation there, and that of achieving a culture of democracy throughout international society.

I confess that I had been skeptical of the ‘international democracy’ idea. It seemed to me to rest on a faulty analogy of countries with persons. The basic

principle of ‘one country, one vote’ at the UN, with no weighting, is manifestly undemocratic when one considers the size of the populations of China and also other larger countries such as India, Indonesia, Japan, or Brazil that are not permanent members of the Security Council. Yet the UN Charter’s reaffirmation of ‘the equal rights’ of ‘nations large and small’ and the UN commitment to act in accordance with principle of ‘the sovereign equality of all its Members’ (Article 2, paragraph 2) are likely to remain fundamental norms of the world organization.

Owing in part to an interest in geography, I have come to see ‘democracy’ at the international level as well as at the national level as a system of representation of points of view as well as the expression of numbers of persons. I refer not to the points of view of individual countries, as ‘countries’, or to the points of view of clusters of countries, conceived as ‘regions’, in the voting group sense but, rather, to their situational points of view – ultimately, physical points of view. ‘Democracy’ at the international level should include geographical representation. There surely must have been a nature-based, as well as a conservative Burkean basis, in the thinking of the founders of the United Nations when they wrote into the Charter in the first paragraph of Article 23 the phrase ‘equitable geographical distribution’, as a major criterion for the election of non-permanent members to the Security Council.

My consultative work on the diplomacy of small states for the Commonwealth Secretariat and the World Bank has further sensitized me to the possible meaning of this requirement, as very small states can be especially sensitive indicators of the welfare of the entire global system. The perspectives of small states add new sight-lines to the international consensus. These are especially valuable regarding matters of the world environment. Indeed, the Association of Small Island States (AOSIS) has been characterized as the ‘International Conscience’ on that subject.19 An illustration of an initiative they have taken is the Global Conference on the Sustainable Development of Small Island Developing States held in Bridgetown, Barbados, in 1994. From that conference resulted the Barbados Programme of Action, which has framed the discussion of the environmental and development concerns of the world’s island and coastal developing countries ever since. As the current UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, has said, the places inhabited by peoples of the small island states are the ‘front-line zone where, in concentrated form,

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many of the main problems of environment and development are unfolding’. Their experiences, and also their perspectives, are invaluable to all of us. Many of their problems, though local to them, are global problems. Recognition of the global-ness of environmental and other world-systemic issues is a very sound basis, along with population-size and wealth considerations, for determining ‘equitable geographical distribution’ of influence within the United Nations.

Solutions to truly global problems, as Inge Kaul and her colleagues at the UN Development Programme have emphasized, should increasingly be seen in terms of providing ‘global public goods’, i.e., those that are in everyone’s interest – or, stated differently, in the democratic interest. There is, as Kaul and her UNDP team point out, a ‘participation gap’ that prevents global problems from being adequately understood and addressed. Despite ‘the spread of democracy’, there still are ‘marginal and voiceless groups’. By expanding the role of ‘civil society’ and also of the ‘private sector’ in international negotiations, they suggest, governments will ‘enhance their leverage over policy outcomes while promoting pluralism and diversity’. While keeping in mind the need for ‘legitimacy and representativeness’ – that is, the formal requirements of one-country, one-vote democracy based on sovereignty – they observe that ‘the decision-making structures in many major multilateral organizations are due for re-evaluation’.

What could this mean for diplomacy? It could mean that, as the ‘democratic’ responsiveness of the international community grows, diplomats are increasingly assigned to multilateral work, within a reformed and more open United Nations system. It could also mean that they will be assigned directly to ‘priority concerns’ – to environmental and developmental and also to health issues (e.g., HIV/AIDS), for instance – rather than to countries or even to international organizations at all.

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20 Statement by the Secretary-General, General Assembly Plenary – 1b – Press Release GA/9610 Twenty-second Special Session ENV/DEV/519 1st Meeting (AM) 27 September 1999.

4. Thematization

This brings me to my fourth futuristic model, the rise of what sometimes has been called ‘thematic diplomacy’. This is akin to but also is somewhat broader than functional diplomacy – such as the highly specialized diplomacy of trade negotiations, as practiced at the World Trade Organization, or nuclear safeguards discussions, as carried out within the framework of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the institutional setting of the International Atomic Energy Agency, for example.

‘Development’ itself is one such grand overarching theme. ‘Human rights’, generally, is another. So too, of course, is ‘security’. This word suggests far more than just police protection or national defense. It implies the psychological and social need to feel safe – a subjective problem as well as an objective problem. Theme-related, or thematized, diplomacy is a way of mobilizing the resources of society, and also of mobilizing public opinion – internationally, as well as at home. The current and possibly long-term ‘Global War on Terror’ of the United States is a prime example. How long this preoccupation with global terrorism will last – whether it will be temporary – will depend in part on the course of things, i.e., on detailed future history in Kant’s ‘narrative’, or predictive, sense.

The British historian Niall Ferguson, taking a longer-than-usual view, thinks that 11 September 2001 actually changed very little. It was ‘less of a turning point than is generally believed’. Yet, as a ‘deep trend’, as he terms it, ‘the spread of terrorism’, or ‘use of violence by nonstate organizations in pursuit of extreme political goals’, will continue into the future. The hijacking of planes and suicide attacks on high-value targets had occurred long before. ‘All that was really new on Sept. 11 was that these tried-and-tested tactics were applied in combination and in the United States.’

Thematic diplomacy, as this suggests, is topical, in the sense of being contingent upon events. These, though dramatic, may be very local and also ephemeral. Thematic diplomacy tends to be emergency-focused. An outbreak of famine in the Sahel or a SARS epidemic in China or a resumption of nuclear testing on the Indian Subcontinent might (or might not) concentrate the world’s attention. Events can be used to highlight ‘themes’, which may or may not be scientifically related to ‘deep trends’. In this respect, thematized diplomacy resembles another kind of diplomacy, ‘crisis management’, which

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does not even attempt to address the more profound or enduring causes of problems.

The exploitation of critical happenings, however, can set a nation, and other nations that may be associated with it, on a long forward course. ‘Making history’ this way might turn out to be going on a tangent – a serious historical policy miscue. It is difficult to know in advance. Leadership does make its own destiny. The resolve of President George W. Bush after the events of 9/11 was impressive in its way. He saw America – the whole country – as having been ‘attacked’ and persuaded most Americans that the United States was ‘at war’ with Al Qaeda and terrorism with a global reach. If reactive, he was decisive. President Bush remembers exactly what he was thinking when he was told that a second airplane had hit the second tower of the World Trade Center. ‘They had declared war on us’, he recalled, ‘and I made up my mind at that moment that we were going to war.’

The ‘war’ theme – as surely was expected by US leaders – turned out to be a powerful generator of consent – at least of acquiescence. It did help diplomats and others to form an ad hoc ‘coalition of the willing’ – a broader and more diverse alignment even than the international alliance led by the United States during the Cold War years.

A ‘thematized’ coalition may not be a permanent one. Its existence depends on having something to react to and visible targets to pursue. In organizational and operational terms it invites the creation of ‘task forces’ and ‘special missions’, consisting often of outsiders and experts, rather than of accredited diplomats or other resident representatives. It is not institutional or positional. The challenge for traditional diplomacy, operating within such a ‘thematized’ climate of international opinion as that of the present, is to strive to maintain, on the basis of well-situated facilities, a constancy of presence and continuity of representation. The capacity to deal even with crises, or emergencies, depends on being there. The most effective diplomat is the one who is locally involved, and on the scene.

5. Americanization

This brings me to my fifth, and final, model of a possible diplomatic future. To me, this model is the most complex and interesting of all. By ‘Americanization’, I distinctly do not mean what is today sometimes much too

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easily said: the United States has become an ‘empire’, and, being the sole surviving superpower (whether it knows it or not), is exercising ‘hegemonic’ control over the world. What I have in mind is something very different, though not completely unrelated. I shall call this last vision the ‘American politics as world politics’ model. I have more than once heard, in Europe, the observation that, nowadays and for the foreseeable future, ‘diplomacy will be about reacting to the United States’.

The United States is indeed a puzzle. It is a country without a clear center – that is, a single, controlling point, either Washington, D.C., or, within it, the White House. The federal system and the separation of powers, and also the increased influence of interest groups and the media in American policy-making, make government in the United States highly indeterminate. A former British ambassador to the United States, Sir Nicholas Henderson, recalled moving about the corridors of Washington trying in vain to figure out where ‘the government’ – the locus of decision – was. Such a fixed point probably does not exist.  

The real problem of dealing with the United States, therefore, is not that of finding a ‘counterweight’ to it, though this is sometimes suggested in Europe. It is particularly cited as a reason for forming an ever larger, more powerful, as well as more perfect European Union. What the United Kingdom recently has done in attempting to manage the United States is instructive. By firmly siding with the US government over the Iraq problem, the British government forced consultation upon it – at least with British leaders, including Prime Minister Blair, and certain British diplomats, including Britain’s UN Representative, Sir Jeremy Greenstock. Somewhat similarly, the North Atlantic Council earlier gained a measure of influence over policy-making in Washington by invoking Article 5 – the mutual-defense pledge of the 1949 Treaty of Washington. These were, however, essentially political and diplomatic interventions external to the American political process.

In order to exert further influence, it is becoming necessary for foreign diplomats to engage, as Ambassador Henderson long ago sensed, in lobbying – or internal intervention within American politics. Today it is clear to most diplomats at Washington that effective representation can require using public relations and also enlisting the support of NGOs, businesses, labor unions,  

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and other players in the game. The ‘national government’ of the United States now includes a good deal more than just the institutional ‘U.S. government’. The diplomatic community is a part of this enlarged system. Having a high profile in Washington – a big embassy, a lavish entertainment budget, and so on – still makes a wide impression. Embassies are latter-day foreign ‘palaces’ that symbolize the domestic presence of the sponsoring country within the United States.

The country that probably has done the most in recent years to advance this ‘internalization’ of diplomatic behavior is Canada. The new Canadian government under Prime Minister Paul Martin has an ‘enhanced representation initiative’ under way within its neighbor to the south. Not only Washington, D.C., itself but also other cities, states, and regions around the US are being targeted by Ottawa for the exertion of purposeful Canadian influence. The Canadian government’s reasoning is that by the time an issue that is of serious interest to Canada gets to the US capital, and into the halls of Congress, it may be ‘too late’ to effect the changes that may be desired. Thus, early intervention where it counts, which may be far outside the Washington Beltway, is prepared for.

Moreover, open ‘advocacy’, and not just quiet diplomacy, is to be pursued. A formally designated ‘Washington Advocacy Secretariat’ under a ‘Minister (Advocacy)’ has been set up in Canada’s monumental new embassy building on Pennsylvania Avenue near the Capitol. Not only diplomats but also other Canadian officials, and national and provincial legislators as well, will be brought into play, both by bringing them to Washington and by dispatching them anywhere else in the country where they may be needed to make their points. The Martin government’s initiative is expected to improve the ‘management and coherence’ of Canada’s relations with the United States, and it is thought to be ‘a more sophisticated approach’ that recognizes ‘the valuable role of legislators and representatives from various levels of government’.

The situation that Canada faces in dealing with the United States arises, fundamentally, from proximity. So interdependent are the two North American countries that Canada can be more affected by US domestic policy than by US foreign policy toward Canada. One of the first persons to understand this well was Allan Gotlieb when serving as Canada’s ambassador.

in Washington. If ‘American foreign policy is largely an aggregation of domestic economic thrusts’, explained Gotlieb, the result is that ‘Canadian foreign policy is the obverse side of American domestic policy affecting Canada’. This meant, in practice, that Canadians could not rely on their ‘principal interlocutors’ in the US federal government (including their State Department opposite numbers) to speak up for or to protect their interests. Canadians had to ‘recognize, realistically, that a great deal of work has to be done ourselves’.27

The Americanization of diplomacy, thus described, might be thought, from the Canada-US example, to be a ‘fragmentary’ vision, limited only to neighboring countries or to single regions. There is merit in this view. However, even in cases of more geographically and culturally distant relationships, such as that between the United States and Japan, strong influence, which penetrates to the inner levels of decision-making, can be observed. Called ‘gaiatsu’ diplomacy in the Japanese context, heavy and even intrusive pressure applied diplomatically by former US Vice President Walter Mondale (‘Mr. Gaiatsu’) when serving as Ambassador to Japan was markedly effective.28 Such pressure can be, as it evidently was in Japan, functionally needed – to make a country do ‘the right thing’ in its trade and other policies, in its own interest as well as in the interest of others and the world. Pressure from outside has helped ‘infighters’ for internationalism liberalize and somewhat internationalize a country’s markets. Even the People’s Republic of China, with respect to such issues as intellectual property rights and to an extent even human rights, is increasingly open to, if not yet actually receptive to, such targeted pressure.

Between societies that share value systems and have similar legal systems, as basically do those of North America and of Europe, ‘gaiatsu’ diplomacy normally should be expected to encounter much less resistance. A specific example of this easier Atlantic interpenetration of systems is the European Union’s filing an amicus curiae brief with the United States Supreme Court in


opposition to the Massachusetts Burma Law, a state legislative measure that discriminated against firms doing business with the military dictatorship of Burma. In that case, the particular issue was federal vs. state control of foreign policy, as the basic policy positions of Europe and the United States regarding Burma were not very different. Thus Europe’s pressure was not generally taken amiss. In the environmental field, European pressure, coming from NGOs as well as from the EU and national governments, can have a substantial progressive effect – reinforcing and encouraging American supporters of, for example, the Kyoto Protocol regarding global warming. On a profound ethical matter such as the human death penalty, many Americans (including this one) positively welcome European diplomatic, legal, and popular – moral – representations, and intervention.

The ‘Americanization’ model of diplomacy may be coming to Europe, too. The controversy over subsidies to Airbus and to Boeing is an example. Diplomats and other agents, including company representatives, are active in Brussels, in other capitals, and in relevant cities like Toulouse. These representations are not formal-organizational. They are informal-political. And they are increasingly public and vocal, having the practical aim of getting things done and doing them in the ‘American’ (and Canadian) way – by ‘ourselves’.

Fragments of a Future Whole?

In sum, I briefly recapitulate. Among the various possible futures of diplomacy that one can project – though not with certainty or, in narrative detail, actually ‘divine’, to use Kant’s term – are those that I have described above in general outline, with some illustrative specificity.

First, there is the ‘disintermediation’ model according to which, in a globalizing world economy and with an increasingly dominant private sector, the formal institutions of diplomacy will be more and more bypassed. Multinational corporations with their business networks, and even individual citizens with access to the Internet, can communicate and also deal directly with much, though not yet all, of the world. The response to this latest modernization challenge by foreign ministries and the diplomatic profession could be either to ‘let it happen’ or, more probably, slowly to adapt and even to adopt some of the same private-sector methods, including branding and marketing.

Second, there is the ‘going European’ model. It focuses on the impressive evolution of the institutional structures of the European Union – and,
prospectively, of other regional groups too, such as MERCOSUR in South America or ASEAN in Southeast Asia. The Draft Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, with its provisions for a ‘Union Minister for Foreign Affairs’ and also greater use of qualified majority voting in foreign policy, suggests a rise of supranationality in the world – or at least in some of its parts. This development, as has been seen, could subordinate traditional bilateral diplomacy, but it will not displace it. Rather, embassies in Europe could function more in a ‘public diplomatic’ role.

Third, there is the ‘diplomacy as democracy’ model. It is premised on the sovereign equality of states – large and small – and also on the existence of multilateral structures such as the United Nations and related organizations. These formal frameworks permit the expression of geographical points of view as well as the sheer power of numbers or of wealth. It is the all-inclusiveness, or universality, of these organizations that gives them, taken together, their strength as world public fora for the discussion of matters of truly planetary concern. This asset could be wasted, of course, if resolution-mongering and log-rolling should gain the ascendancy over common deliberation and rational persuasion. To open these institutions to civil society may help to prevent that. For traditional diplomacy, ‘democratization’ is likely to mean listening more carefully to diverse voices from the outside, as well as to those within the ever-larger diplomatic world itself.

Fourth, there is ‘thematic diplomacy’. It is topical. It may be highly focused on events, such as those of 11 September 2001, which provide the opportunity, if not the necessity or entire motivation, for crusade-like efforts like the US war against global terrorism. The ‘war’ metaphor can be and has been used also against disease, crime, drugs, and other threats to world society. For diplomacy, such thematized efforts may require rising to the occasion – and also a willingness to improvise. But they also should counsel patience. While thematic campaigns do create chances for career advancement, they can endanger institutions and also standards. Should special missions replace embassies, diplomacy would be the poorer. Outsiders and experts, no matter how energetic and capable they may be, will not have the local knowledge or sensitivity – or, very importantly, accountability – for responsible long-term diplomatic action (or, sometimes best, inaction).

Fifth, there is the ‘Americanization’ model, which I have defined not as hegemonization but, rather, as the approximation and even assimilation of international politics to the American domestic political system. Operating within such a system, diplomats must be able to function as lobbyists and as advocates – doing their ‘own’ work, instead of relying, in their representational and liaison roles, on host government ‘interlocutors’ to relay
their messages for them. In situations of very high interdependence, such as between Canada and the United States, domestic and foreign affairs are almost indistinguishable. With globalization, such international interdependence is spreading, and even countries as far apart as the United States and Japan are becoming closely interconnected in policy-making. Outside pressure and interference may even, at times, be ‘invited’. Between the United States and Europe as well, diplomats are becoming, and must be, more directly interventionist. Within the Atlantic community, it is becoming more and more evident, sound national and international policy-making is not possible if American and Europeans decide on things alone.29

Do these projective visions add up to a single, if not fully integrated, picture of the future of diplomacy? In the sense of a larger ‘universe’, or whole diverse body of things, perhaps they do. At least they do overlap somewhat. The story of future international relations cannot be dictated in advance, in the Kantian sense of ‘predictive history’. However, some general lines of the future development of diplomacy can reasonably be extended outward in time, on the basis of what is known about the world’s processes. ‘Whatever concept one may hold, from a metaphysical point of view, concerning the freedom of the will, certainly its appearances, which are human actions, like every other natural event’, as Kant wrote, ‘are determined by universal laws.’30 Globalization may not obey universal law. But, like ‘universal history’, it is inclusive – and a process that may unite, even as it divides. The ‘universe of discourse’ of diplomacy, though its actual history may be fragmentary, is cosmopolitan. It is inspired by unity. The diplomatic historian should be inspired by no less.

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