

# Jihadi terrorists in Europe

their characteristics and the circumstances in which they  
joined the jihad: an exploratory study

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
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# 1 Introduction

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## 1.1 Jihadi terrorism

Terrorism is a highly complex and constantly changing phenomenon, which makes headlines on a daily basis and stands at the forefront of national and international agendas. It has many forms and is associated with a wide variety of groups. They range from nationalist-separatist organisations and right-wing and left-wing groups, to political religious networks and groups and individuals that commit terrorist acts based on other or mixed motivations or ideologies.

Of all different kinds of political-religious terrorism, (transnational) jihadi terrorism is the most threatening one to western values, interests and societies. This form of terrorism is the product of a combination of Islamist ideology and the idea of the jihad. The latter term can be translated as a fight or a quest. It connotes a wide range of meanings and has two distinct forms. The first is the so-called 'greater jihad' as explained by The Prophet Mohammed. This jihad is inward-seeking: it involves the effort of each Muslim to become a better human being, to struggle to improve him- or herself and, as a result, to be a good Muslim. In addition, the greater jihad is a test of each Muslim's obedience to God and willingness to implement His commands on earth. The second form is the so-called 'lesser jihad'. It sanctions the use of violence against an unjust ruler, whether Muslim or not,

and can become the means to mobilize that political and social struggle. Today's most radical and violent Islamic groups ignore the greater jihad and adopt the lesser jihad as a complete political and social philosophy.<sup>1</sup> These groups also advocate the lesser jihad as a duty for all individual Muslims.<sup>2</sup>

In this study, the term jihad refers to a violent form of the lesser jihad. A person who engages in it is called a mujahid (in plural mujahedin), a jihadi or jihadi terrorist – the latter depending on the kind of activities in which they are involved. The violent acts of these mujahedin or jihadis are claimed by its supporters and practitioners to be in furtherance of the goals of Islam. These goals may include the establishment of a (pan-)Islamic theocracy and the restoration of the caliphate. Islamism is the ideology that binds these essentially political goals. This ideology holds that Islam is not only a religion, but also a social and political system that governs the legal, economic and social imperatives of the state according to its interpretation of Islamic law.

The term terrorism as used in this study is taken from that formulated by the Council of the European Union. It refers to intentional acts that were committed with the aim of seriously intimidating a population, or unduly compelling a Government or international organisation to perform or abstain from performing any act, or seriously destabilising or destroying the fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social structures of a country or an international organisation.<sup>3</sup>

The combination of Islamism, jihadism and terrorism has resulted in 'intentional acts' such as kidnappings, hijackings, assassinations and (suicide) bombings. The jihadi terrorist threat also includes death threats to politicians, civil servants, scholars, journalists, writers, entrepreneurs and others. Both Muslims and non-Muslims have been among the victims. However, fellow Muslims have been targeted with far greater frequency and lethality, as has been demonstrated by the many bloody attacks in Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan and other Muslim countries.

In fact, until '9/11', jihadi terrorism had been primarily associated with violence within the Muslim world. At present, despite the fact that its targets are still mainly located in the Muslim world and most of its fighters are from

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<sup>1</sup> Ahmed Rashid, *Jihad. The rise of militant Islam in Central Asia*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002, p. 2.

<sup>2</sup> Maurits Berger, *Sharia. Islam tussen recht en politiek*. The Hague: Boom Juridische Uitgevers, 2006, p. 203.

<sup>3</sup> Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on combating terrorism, (2002/475/JHA).

that region, jihadi terrorism is perceived as a truly global phenomenon. Indicators of the worldwide nature of the threat are thwarted plots and 'successful' and failed attacks in, among other places, America, Europe, the Russian Federation, East Africa, Southeast Asia and Australia.

## **1.2 Differences**

With regards to the size and shape of the violent phenomenon that is jihadi terrorism, significant differences exist between and within regions. Jihadi terrorism in Afghanistan or Iraq, for instance, is of an entirely different nature than that witnessed in Indonesia, Kenya, Egypt, Spain or the United Kingdom. In Afghanistan and Iraq, the jihadi fight has the characteristics of guerrilla warfare and civil war, with tens or hundreds of victims every week. In Europe, fortunately, jihadi terrorism has been much less lethal. Yet it remains a Damocles' sword hanging above Europe's head, with the potential to strike at any time.

Another distinguishing characteristic of jihadi terrorism is its fluidity. Its characteristics are constantly changing. This holds particularly true for its organisational structure, *modus operandi*, and the networks and individuals behind it. The jihadi terrorists of the 1980s differ markedly from those of the 1990s, and those of last decade are not the same as the ones involved in the terrorist activities of today.

A constant factor of concern regarding jihadi terrorism is the seriousness of the threat and its lethality posed by jihadi terrorists. These terrorists have been responsible for many of the world's deadliest terrorist attacks, including those by foreign jihadi terrorists in Afghanistan in the 1980s, the attacks on the United States embassies in East-Africa in 1998, the 2002 Bali bombing, the Madrid bombings in 2004, and, of course, '9/11'.

Moreover, jihadi terrorism constitutes more than just a serious threat in terms of the casualty and bloodshed that it inflicts. Its violent activities also hold ponderous consequences for peace between and within religious communities, both at the national and international level.

## **1.3 Jihadi terrorism in Europe**

Traditionally, Europe has been confronted with three types of terrorism: nationalist terrorists, such as the IRA and ETA; left-wing terrorists of which

the RAF and the Red Brigade are the most well known examples, and; right-wing terrorism by neo-Nazi groups. Jihadi terrorism only emerged in the 1990s. In many European countries, awareness of this new development took some time. In fact, the threat posed by jihadi terrorism was underestimated, overlooked, and often misunderstood. As a consequence, the Madrid bombings came more or less as a surprise and had a deep impact on threat perceptions of the general public. Although jihadi terrorism was in fact not new at all, the general public felt that this kind of terrorism had ‘reached’ Europe and that many European countries could now be targeted. The main exception was France, which had already experienced its ‘own’ jihadi terrorist attacks, among others on public transport in Paris and near Lyon, in the mid-1990s.<sup>4</sup>

Despite the fact that most of the perpetrators of the Madrid bombings had been living in Spain for years, the feeling of being under attack continued to be associated primarily with an external threat. Politicians and intelligence and security forces, furthermore, continued to focus predominantly on foreign jihadi networks operating abroad comparable to those that had been responsible for ‘9/11’. Thus, the idea that the threat of jihadi terrorism could also come from radicalized members of Muslim communities within Europe came as a very unpleasant surprise.

The subsequent killing of Dutch filmmaker Theo van Gogh and the attacks on the London metro, clearly confirmed that jihadi terrorism constituted a serious threat—and included a malicious home-grown dimension as well. Recently discovered terrorist plots in Spain, Italy, France, Germany, Belgium and The Netherlands have added to growing awareness of this dimension and the seriousness of the threat of jihadi terrorism in Europe.

#### 1.4 Research

The increasing awareness of the threat has been followed by a growing number of professional and academic publications on Islamist or jihadi terrorism. The focus of most of these studies is on different forms of jihadi terrorism and its different ways to attack Western societies. In particular the development, ideology and *modus operandi* of the Al-Qaeda network has been

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<sup>4</sup> In 1995, for instance, the Armed Islamic Group (*Groupe Islamique Armé*, GIA) staged a series of attacks on public transportation, killing eight and injuring more than 100 persons.



studied in detail.<sup>5</sup> Less attention has been given to the European context and the specific characteristics of jihadi terrorists in Europe.

There are exceptions that need mentioning. These include biographies and studies by journalists of individuals and individual networks associated with jihadi terrorism. Such publications are of much value to learn about these networks and individuals and to understand why and how they turned into jihadis. Think of the biography of Zacarias Moussaoui alias the '20<sup>th</sup> hijacker.'<sup>6</sup> In addition there are a growing number of studies by government agencies on individuals, networks and communities that have been involved in terrorist activities in Europe. Excellent examples are the official report on the first of the 2005 London bombings, ordered by the House of Commons and the study by the Dutch General Intelligence and Security Service on violent jihad in the Netherlands.<sup>7</sup> Other valuable governmental documents on jihadi terrorists include transcripts of legal proceedings – charges and verdicts – and the reporting on terrorist issues to the national parliaments.

The relatively small body of scholarly research on jihadi or Islamist terrorism and individual terrorists and networks in Europe includes studies by, among others, Lorenzo Vidino, Robert Leiken, Fidel Sendagorta, Javier Jordan and Nicola Horsburgh, Rick Coolsaet and Teun Van de Voorde, and Petter Nesser.<sup>8</sup> Also a number of valuable country studies need mentioning, among

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<sup>5</sup> Think of studies by Montasser Al-Zayat, *The Road To Al-Qaeda: The Story of Bin Laden's Right-Hand Man*, 2004; Peter Bergen, *Holy War, Inc.: Inside the Secret World of Osama bin Laden*, 2002; Jason Burke, *Al-Qaeda: The True Story of Radical Islam*, 2004; John Gray, *Al Qaeda and What It Means to Be Modern*, 2005; Rohan Gunaratna, *Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror*, 2003; Marc Sageman, *Understanding Terror Networks*, 2004; Mohammed Sifaoui, *Inside Al Qaeda: How I Infiltrated the World's Deadliest Terrorist Organization*, 2004.

<sup>6</sup> Abd Samat Moussaoui and Florence Bouquillat, *Zacarias Moussaoui, mon frère*, Paris: Editions Denoël, 2002.

<sup>7</sup> Report of the Official Account of the Bombings in London on 7th July 2005. The Stationery Office, 11 May 2006; General Intelligence and Security Service, *Violent Jihad in the Netherlands. Current trends in the Islamist terrorist threat*. AIVD, 2006.

<sup>8</sup> Lorenzo Vidino, *Al Qaeda in Europe: The New Battleground of International Jihad*, 2005; Robert Leiken, *Angry Young Muslims in Europe*, *Foreign Affairs*, Augustus 2005; Fidel Sendagorta, *Jihad in Europe: The Wider Context*, *Survival*, Vol. 47, No. 3 - Autumn 2005; Rick Coolsaet and Teun van de Voorde, *The evolution of terrorism in 2005. A statistical assessment*. University of Gent Research Paper, February 2006; Petter Nesser, *Jihadism in Western Europe after the invasion of Iraq: Tracing motivational influences from the Iraq war on jihadist terrorism in Western Europe*: *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 29:323-342, 2006. *Jihad in Europe: Post-millennium patterns of jihadist terrorism in Western Europe*, Oslo: FFI, 2005.

others a study on jihadist terrorism in Spain by Javier Jordan and Nicola Horsburgh, and one on jihadi activity in Denmark by Michael Taarnby Jensen.<sup>9</sup> Additionally, some considerable research has been conducted on Islam and Islamism in Europe, including publications of leading French experts, Gilles Kepel and Olivier Roy.<sup>10</sup> General academic studies on the (social) psychology of terrorists that are relevant to the study on jihadi terrorists include the works of Robert Pape, Jerrold Post, and Jessica Stern.<sup>11</sup> Most valuable to a better understanding of individual jihadi terrorist, as well as their cells and networks is the research by Marc Sageman. In 'Understanding terror networks' he focuses on the persons and networks behind the global Salafi network linked to Al-Qaeda for the years up to 2003.<sup>12</sup> His study investigates 172 individual cases and four clusters of jihadi terrorists (Sageman speaks of global Salafi jihadis and of mujahedin).<sup>13</sup> It provides important insight into the development of individual terrorists and terrorist cells and networks. Unfortunately, evidence-based studies like the one of Sageman are rather unique.<sup>14</sup> This type of research is, however, of vital importance to be able to track trends and developments with regard to terrorism. Without such research, scholars and, more importantly, decision-makers might be confronted with unpleasant surprises, such as the 'discovery' of homegrown terrorism after failed and 'successful' attacks in The Netherlands, the United Kingdom and elsewhere.

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<sup>9</sup> Javier Jordan and Nicola Horsburgh, *Mapping Jihadist terrorism in Spain: Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 28:169-191, 2005; Michael Taarnby Jensen, *Jihad in Denmark. An overview and analysis of jihadi activity in Denmark (1990-2006)*. DIIS Working Paper no. 2006/35.

<sup>10</sup> Gilles Kepel, *The War for Muslim Minds: Islam and the West*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004; Gilles Kepel, *Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002; Olivier Roy, *Globalized Islam*, London: Hurst 2004.

<sup>11</sup> Robert Pape, *The strategic logic of suicide terrorism*, *American Political Science Review*, vol. 97, no. 3, pp. 343-361; Jerrold Post, *Terrorist psycho-logic: Terrorist behaviour as a product of psychological forces*. In: Walter Reich, ed., *Origins of terrorism: Psychologies, ideologies, theologies, states of mind*. Washington D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1998; Jessica Stern, *Terror in the name of God*, Ecco, 2003.

<sup>12</sup> Marc Sageman, *Understanding terror networks*, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004.

<sup>13</sup> Sageman defines global Salafi jihadi's as international fighters that are part of the Islamic revivalist social movement, Sageman, 2004, pp. 62-63. These fighters he also calls mujahedin.

<sup>14</sup> Other valuable evidence-based studies of this kind include the earlier mentioned study by Robert Pape and Robert Leiken, *Bearers of global Jihad? Immigration and national security after '9/11'*, Nixon Center, 2004.

## 1.5 This study

Although the number of publications on jihadi terrorists in Europe is increasing, much more knowledge is needed if we want to make it as difficult as possible for jihadis to attack us and disturb the peace within our societies. This requires a number of exploratory studies to start with. Basically, we need to know who these jihadis are, where they are from and what they look like. Other fundamental questions relate to their Islamist and jihadi ideologies, the processes of radicalisation and recruitment, and their *modus operandi*. And of course we have to keep track of trends and developments if we want to be able to manage the threat.

This exploratory study addresses a few of these needs. It aims to contribute to a better understanding of the individuals and networks that have been behind jihadi terrorist activities in Europe. To this end, it identifies more than 200 terrorists and their networks, and investigates the following research questions:

What are the characteristics of the **networks** that have been involved in jihadi terrorism in Europe?

What are the characteristics of the **individual jihadi terrorists**?

Under what **circumstances** did these individuals get involved in jihadi terrorist activities?

The study builds heavily upon the work of Sageman and gives heed to his call for new ideas and perspectives in the study of terrorism. It examines individuals and networks involved in terrorist activities in Europe<sup>15</sup> for the period between September 2001 and September 2006. The choice for this region is based upon the previously noted remarks regarding the still rather limited body of research on jihadi terrorism in Europe. We have decided for the 2001-2006 time-frame as we want to contribute to a better understanding of the latest situation of jihadi terrorism in Europe.

The outline of the study is as follows. First it gives an overview of the research of Sageman and its methodological framework. Next it identifies and describes 31 cases of jihadi terrorism in Europe. This overview is then followed by an analysis of the characteristics of the networks behind these cases. Based on Sageman's methodology, the study continues to investigate the social, personal and situational variables that make up the 'biographies' of

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<sup>15</sup> In this study the term Europe is defined as the 25 EU member states, countries in the Balkan region and Western European states that are not member of the Union.

the more than 200 persons that are part of these networks. Finally, the characteristics of these European jihadi terrorists are compared with those of the sample of Sageman's 172 global Salafi terrorists. The aim of basing this research on Sageman's methodology is that it may lead to attaining valuable observations of trends and developments in an important time frame not considered by the original work. Given the differences in geographical scope, comparing the samples holds the promise of identifying differences and similarities that may raise new research questions about the context in which individuals and groups joined the violent jihad.

## 2 'Understanding terror networks'

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Marc Sageman, author of *Understanding Terror Networks*, is a former CIA case officer. From 1986 to 1989 he worked with Islamic fundamentalists on a daily basis during the Afghan-Soviet war. After leaving the Foreign Service in 1991, he returned to practice psychiatry, acquired a doctorate in political sociology and specialised in research into the origins of collective violence.

In *Understanding Terror Networks*, Sageman challenges theoretical and popular notions on the role of, among others, poverty, broken families, lack of education, immaturity, brainwashing, mental illness, religious fanaticism and criminality with regard to terrorism. The basis for his analysis constitutes a set of biographies of (initially) 172 global Salafi jihadis that were involved in terrorist activities in the 1990s and the early 2000s. By comparing these biographies, Sageman created one of the most extensive samples of jihadi terrorists available to those that rely on open sources.

In his search for common features explaining why individuals become involved in jihadi terrorism, he investigates seventeen variables. These variables are divided in three general categories: 'social background', 'psychological make-up' and 'circumstances of joining the jihad' (see figure 1). Regrettably, the specific data of the seventeen variables for the 172 global Salafi jihadis are not presented in the book. Some of these data can only be derived from the elaboration and analysis in the part of the text on the

different variables. Sageman’s study, however, does include a list of the names of the 172 persons, their alias, and their date and place of birth.

Figure 1. Variables used by Marc Sageman

‘Social Background’ Geographical origins Socioeconomic status Education Faith as youth Occupation Family status  ‘Psychological make-up’ Mental illness Terrorist personality	‘Circumstances of joining the jihad’ Age Place of recruitment Faith Employment Relative deprivation Friendship Kinship Discipleship Worship
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Marc Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks, 2004

Each variable is related to one or more research questions. These questions are often linked to general notions and theoretical assumptions on terrorism, which are tested. For example, ‘socioeconomic status’ investigates whether terrorists are upper, middle or lower class, as well as the conventional wisdom that terrorism is fuelled by poverty in asymmetrical power situations. ‘Family status’ deals with questions about marital status and having children or not. Moreover it tests the stereotype that terrorists are single men who are not being weighed down by responsibilities or fears of reprisals on their families. The study of variables of the category ‘psychological explanations’ also includes a discussion on various mental illness theses and ideas about pathological personality dynamics related to terrorism. Under the category ‘circumstances of joining the jihad’, Sageman looks into those circumstances that may indicate a situation of rising expectations that have not been met and that may support the relative deprivation thesis.

Based on his analyses of the variables, Sageman rejects many of the social explanations with regard to terrorists. He shows that the stereotype that terrorists are poor, angry and fanatically religious is a myth, as the jihadi terrorists in his sample were generally middle-class, educated young men from

caring and religious families, who grew up with strong positive values of religion, spirituality, and concern for their communities.<sup>16</sup>

Sageman also concludes that contrary to most writings on terrorists, the large majority of the individuals examined were married and most had children. Yet they were willing to sacrifice themselves and others for the cause.<sup>17</sup>

In terms of psychological explanations, the terrorists in his sample did not display any psychiatric pathology. He did not observe a pattern of emotional trauma in their past or any evidence of any pathological hatred or paranoia.<sup>18</sup> Regarding social psychology, Sageman concluded that judging from their backgrounds, individuals did not suffer from long-term relative deprivation or from pathological prejudice.<sup>19</sup>

Sageman found that most of the global mujahedin had strong occupational skills. However, few were employed full-time when they joined the jihad. In the eyes of Sageman, this underemployment must have been a definite grievance and a source of frustration in these generally gifted individuals. These were, however, temporary circumstances just before their joining the jihad, rather than a structural relative deprivation in their original backgrounds.<sup>20</sup>

Sageman's general statements are accompanied by a clear warning that there is no common profile of the global Salafi network. In fact he argues that there are as many profiles as there are clusters of mujahedin. He distinguishes four of them: the central core of Al-Qaeda, Maghreb Arabs; Core Arabs, and; Southeast Asians.

Despite the many differences between the four groups, he argues that there exist common patterns. "*Just before they joined the jihad, the prospective mujahedin were socially and spiritually alienated and probably in some form of distress.*"<sup>21</sup> Analysing the joining of the jihad by the 172 terrorists, he rejects the common notions of recruitment and brainwashing to account for this

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<sup>16</sup> Washington Times, 5 July 2004, 'jihadi militants defy stereotypes, author says'; Sageman, 2004, p. 96. See also interview with Marc Sageman in eJournal USA, 'Common myths about Al-Qaida terrorists, August 2006, [usinfo.state.gov/journals/itps/0806/ijpe/sageman.htm](http://usinfo.state.gov/journals/itps/0806/ijpe/sageman.htm).

<sup>17</sup> Sageman, 2004, p. 97.

<sup>18</sup> Sageman, 2004, p. 97.

<sup>19</sup> Sageman, 2004, p. 97.

<sup>20</sup> Sageman, 2004, pp. 94-95.

<sup>21</sup> Sageman, 2004, p. 98.

process. Instead, he argues for a three-prong process: social affiliation with the jihad accomplished through friendship, kinship and discipleship; progressive intensification of beliefs and faith leading to acceptance of the global Salafi jihad ideology; and formal acceptance to the jihad through the encounter of a link to the global Salafi network. Without it, the potential jihadi groups will undergo a process of progressive isolation or they may try to participate in the jihad, but without know-how or resources.<sup>22</sup> Sageman concludes that social bonds are the crucial element in this process. *“These bonds facilitate the process of joining the jihad through mutual emotional and social support, development of a common identity, and encouragement to adopt a new faith. [...] They are more important and relevant to the transformation of potential candidates into global mujahedin than postulated external factors, such as a common hatred for an outside group. ... As in all intimate relationships, this glue, in-group love, is found inside the group. It may be more accurate to blame global Salafi terrorist activity on in-group love than out-group hate.”*<sup>23</sup>

Sageman’s sample shows that friendship bonds between persons often pre-existed before these individuals went on to join the jihad. Additionally, Sageman’s sample shows that most of them joined the jihad in small clusters of friends. Kinship also played a role in the joining of the jihad. The combined figures for friendship and kinship, eliminating overlap, indicate that about 75 percent of mujahedin joined the jihad as a group with friends or relatives, or had pre-existing social bonds to members already involved in the global jihad. The third affiliation, discipleship, is unique to the group of Southeast Asians. These individuals are followers of the leaders of two Islamic boarding schools in Indonesia and Malaysia.<sup>24</sup> With regard to worship, Sageman stresses that places of worship do figure prominently in the affiliation to the global Salafi jihad. Several specific mosques show up in his sample, among others, the Finsbury Park and the Baker Street Mosques in London, and the Al-Faruq Mosque in New York. He argues that these mosques served many functions in the transformation of young alienated Muslims into global Salafi mujahedin. Many friendship groups formed around the mosques, where *“each new group became a ‘bunch of guys’, transforming its members into potential mujahedin, actively seeking to join the global jihad.”*<sup>25</sup>

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<sup>22</sup> Sageman, 2004, p. 120.

<sup>23</sup> Sageman, 2004, p. 135.

<sup>24</sup> Sageman, 2004, p. 72.

<sup>25</sup> Sageman, 2004, p. 115.



The above-described processes of social affiliation with potential members of the jihad and intensification of beliefs and faith are necessary, but not sufficient conditions for joining the jihad. Sageman shows that the critical and specific element to joining the jihad is the *accessibility* of a link to the organisation of the global jihad. Without someone able to make arrangements with the Al-Qaeda leadership, prospective candidates would remain sympathizers rather than full-fledged mujahedin.<sup>26</sup>

The persons in Sageman's sample had the consent of the Al-Qaeda leadership and went on to become global mujahedin. At the time they joined the jihad, their general characteristics were as follows. They were not particularly young. The average age of joining the jihad was 26 years. Out of 165 mujahedin on whom he found information, 115 (70 percent) joined the jihad in a country where they had not grown up. They were expatriates – students, workers, refugees, fighters (in the jihad against the Soviets) – away from home and family. Another fourteen (eight percent) were second-generation citizens in France, the United Kingdom, and the United States.<sup>27</sup>

Other research on the background of jihadi terrorists supports these findings. Rohan Gunaratna, has argued that “*all the major terrorist attacks conducted in the last decade in North America and Western Europe, with the exception of Oklahoma City, have utilized migrants.*”<sup>28</sup> A study by Robert Leiken of 212 suspected and convicted terrorists implicated in North America and Western Europe since the first World Trade Center bombing in 1993 through December 2003 also indicates the important role of immigrants. Leiken found that 86 percent of the suspected and the convicted were Muslim immigrants, the remainder being mainly converts (eight percent) and African American Muslims.<sup>29</sup>

## 2.1 New developments

With regard to the characteristics of jihadi militants and the circumstances in which they join the jihad, Sageman has called his findings the 'bunch of guys theory'. His set of hypotheses—indicating that most people who join terrorist groups join when they are already radicalised, and that social affiliation plays a

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<sup>26</sup> Sageman, 2004, p. 112.

<sup>27</sup> Sageman, 2004, p. 92.

<sup>28</sup> Gunaratna quoted in Robert Leiken, *Bearer of global Jihad? Immigration and national security after '9/11'*, The Nixon Center, 2004, p. 6.

<sup>29</sup> Robert Leiken, 2004, p. 6.

crucial role in the radicalisation process—constitutes a very important contribution to the understanding of the global Al Qaeda terror network.

Nonetheless, terrorism is a very dynamic social-political phenomenon. In recent years, new questions have risen following the attacks and thwarted plots in Europe. Investigations into the Madrid, Amsterdam and London attacks do not show a clear link with Al-Qaeda or any other global Salafi network. In the case of Amsterdam and London, the jihadi terrorists were homegrown and operated more or less autonomously.<sup>30</sup> The same holds for most of the various plots and failed attacks in Europe.

This situation indicates that the need for and necessity of formal recognition of Al-Qaeda and its support has diminished. After the fall of the Taliban regime, the Al-Qaeda leadership has been severely battered, was forced to go in hiding and subsequently has not been in a position to select and accept or dismiss potential candidates for the global jihad. Nonetheless, recognized affiliates of Al-Qaeda still exist in Iraq and Saudi Arabia. In Europe, however, many jihadis appear to be ‘self-organised’ and ‘self-recognised’ groups or networks. They do not need the consent or the financial or operational support of what Sageman calls the ‘Central Staff’.<sup>31</sup>

Such new developments call for specific questions regarding present-day jihadi terrorist in Europe to be posed, including:

- Are these networks and individuals very different from Sageman’s global Salafi terrorists?
- Are the circumstances in which these global Salafi terrorists joined the jihad fundamentally different from those in which the jihadi terrorist in Europe joined this fight?

In the next chapters we will shed some light on these questions and will compare the characteristics of present-day European jihadi terrorists with that of the persons in the sample of Sageman.

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<sup>30</sup> Report of the Official Account of the Bombings in London on 7th July 2005. The Stationery Office, 11 May 2006; General Intelligence and Security Service, Violent Jihad in the Netherlands. Current trends in the Islamist terrorist threat. AIVD, 2006.

<sup>31</sup> See for instance, Rick Coolsaet and Teun van de Voorde, The evolution of terrorism in 2005. A statistical assessment. University of Gent Research Paper, February 2006; Sebastian Gorka, Al-Qaeda’s next generation. Jamestown Terrorism Monitor, vol. 2, issue 15, 29 July 2004.

### 3 Cases of jihadi terrorism in Europe

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Since '9/11', Europe has been confronted with many jihadi terrorist plots. Fortunately, many of them were thwarted at an early stage, others were foiled at the last minute or somehow failed, as was the case with the second London bombings in 2005 and a possible attempt to blow up trains in Germany in the summer of 2006. In a few cases jihadi terrorists managed to execute their deadly attacks, killing some 250 people and wounding hundreds. Moreover, they succeeded in disturbing the peace between and within communities in Europe. This was clearly demonstrated by the violent reactions following the killing of the Dutch filmmaker Theo van Gogh and tensions in the United Kingdom proceeding the two London bombings.

In the following three chapters we analyse the individuals and networks behind the various terrorist acts in Europe. Such individuals, networks and terrorist acts are defined as follows. We use the term 'jihadi' if they are linked to the violent pursuit of the ideology, which holds that Islam is not only a religion, but also a social and political system that governs the legal, economic and social imperatives of the state according to its interpretation of Islamic law. As mentioned earlier, we speak of a 'terrorist' or 'terrorists' if it relates to intentional acts which were committed with the aim of: seriously intimidating a population, or unduly compelling a Government or international organisation to perform or abstain from performing any act, or seriously destabilising or destroying the fundamental political, constitutional, economic

or social structures of a country or an international organisation, as formulated by the Council of the EU.<sup>32</sup> Based on the above, jihadi terrorist acts include both violent attacks and activities in support of these acts, such as financing, recruiting, and purchasing arms and explosives.

To make a complete and reliable list of the thus defined jihadi terrorist networks and acts is complicated for a number of reasons. Since the attacks on the United States in September 2001, hundreds of persons have been arrested in Europe on suspicion of jihadi terrorist activities. The overwhelming majority of these arrests, however, have not been followed by formal charges and convictions. In fact, most detainees were released within a few days or a few weeks. In the meantime, the media had already spread news about a possible terrorist attack. Reports are rarely based on formal legal charges or other official documents. In fact, more often than not, press reports were built on nothing more than hearsay or one or two statements by the police or other authorities. Thus, it is very difficult to determine whether those arrested were really engaged in committing a terrorist act, or whether they were innocent persons who were taken for terrorists based on wrong information. In addition, in a number of cases it is not clear if the involvement of a person in a jihadi terrorist plot is based on Islamist convictions, as they are not particularly religious or even non-Muslims. A few individuals that are part of jihadi terrorist networks were mainly involved because of personal gain, not because of their belief or political conviction.

Further, determining jihadi terrorist groups or cells is no simple task as these 'groups' are often no more than ill-defined networks of people. Only in some cases do these networks appear to be quite stable enough to be labelled as a group. Moreover, the fact that some members of one group are also member of another, also poses a difficulty in identifying jihadi terrorist groups and cells. That is why we – in contrast to Sageman – prefer to use the term 'network' instead of 'group'.

Finally, perhaps the largest obstacles to investigation of jihadi terrorism – and terrorism in general – are the limitations of open source information, the lack of reliability of open sources, and the apparent bias of different journalistic and other publications. For example, the media (not to mention public prosecutors and defence lawyers) have produced 'stories' that could not be sustained in front of court. This was exemplified by the discharges and acquittals related to the investigation into the Madrid Bombings of March

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<sup>32</sup> Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on combating terrorism, (2002/475/JHA).

2004. Also in many other cases open sources, including official documents, have proven to be biased and incomplete. In addition, information on terrorist cases is often incomplete. For instance, the discovery of the cyanide and ricin plot in London more than four years ago was widely debated in the media. However, the subsequent acquittal of most of the individuals related to this plot, was largely ignored. And more often than not, attention to jihadi terrorist incidents is mainly focused on one or two key persons in the network, making it very difficult to get a complete picture of all its 'members'. Undeniably, these obstacles and limitations had an influence on both the quantity and quality of information we could gather for this study.

In spite of these difficulties, we have identified individuals, networks and incidents using the following procedure. First we have gathered information on terrorist incidents in Europe, including (failed) terrorist attacks and thwarted plots that have been reported in the media (English, French, German, Spanish and Dutch language) in the period September 2001 to October 2006. In addition we have gathered official reports and statements from websites of ministries, courts, and other governmental agencies. We have also used the dataset of the Terrorism Knowledge Base and other corroborated overviews of terrorist incidents on the Internet. The total amount of this wide range of sources is about 350.<sup>33</sup> Based on this inventory of reports on possible jihadi terrorist incidents, we have selected those cases in which terrorists (were) claimed to be jihadi fighters and adhered to Islamist political ideologies. Next, we selected those cases in which people had been formally charged and taken into custody for an extended period of time, in which they were convicted for terrorist activities or in which they committed suicide during the attack (the first London bombings) or after the attack (the Madrid bombings).<sup>34</sup> Finally, we have excluded cases of terrorist activities in Europe that were aimed against targets outside Europe—such as in recruiting and financing activities for the violent jihad in Chechnya, Iraq and other parts of the Muslim world.

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<sup>33</sup> A presentation of the more than 300 sources would require an even higher number of footnotes or an extensive appendix. Given the limited size of the Clingendael Papers and given the fact that, with some exceptions, this information is readily available on the internet, we decided not to include them in this study.

<sup>34</sup> It should be noted that the total number of detained persons in the United Kingdom and Spain is much higher than in other countries. This is the result of, among others, a higher number of terrorist incidents as well as anti-terrorism laws that allow the authorities to detain persons for a much longer period of time before bringing them to court.

Following the above-mentioned steps, we have identified 31 jihadi terrorist incidents. We have named each case after the name used in the media, the name given to it by the intelligence and security services, and/or based on a description of the incident. Regarding the latter, we have used the term ‘plot’ if the plans for an attack were not fully manifest. We use the term ‘foiled attack’ when it was discovered and prevented in time. We speak of a ‘failed attack’ when it was not ‘successful’ as a consequence of last minute technical or organisational failures from the side of the terrorists. The term ‘successful attack’ speaks for itself.

#### *1 - Foiled attack on the US embassy in Paris*

France, Belgium, The Netherlands - September 2001

In July 2001 a Frenchmen of Algerian descent, Djamel Beghal, was arrested in Dubai. He subsequently confessed to plotting an attack against the American embassy in Paris and was extradited to France in September 2001. His network included Kamel Daoudi, a number of other (French) Algerians, and three French converts. In multiple court cases, both in France and elsewhere, members of this network were given prison terms between one and ten years.

#### *2 – Foiled attack on Belgian air base Kleine Brogel*

Belgium - September 2001

Two days after the 11 September attacks on the United States, Belgium police arrested a network of jihadi terrorists that planned an attack on the Belgian air base named Kleine Brogel that is used by US forces. A main figure in the plot was Nizar Trabelsi, a former professional soccer player. After his arrest large quantities of raw materials for a bomb were found in a restaurant in Brussels. In September 2003 Trabelsi was sentenced to ten years in prison. The others were sentenced for other crimes. They were all closely connected to those behind the foiled attack on the US embassy in Paris.

#### *3 – Foiled attack on the Stade de France*

France - October 2001

The network, linked to the Islamist Algerian Armed Islamic Group (*Groupe Islamique Armé*), planned an attack on the *Stade de France* during a soccer match between France and Algeria in October 2001. In house searches after the arrests police found a pen-gun, a bullet-proof jacket, documentation on the manufacture of explosives, and an Arabic text of Osama bin Laden. Four persons of this network were convicted. The sentences ranged between 13 months and 6 years imprisonment.

*4 – Failed ‘shoe bomber attack’<sup>35</sup>*

United Kingdom, France, The Netherlands, United States - December 2001

On a flight between Paris and Miami, passengers prevented a man from lighting a fuse hidden in his shoes. This man, Richard Reid, was handed over to the FBI and convicted by an American court. Two years later, Saajid Badat, a British citizen, decided to clear his conscience. He contacted law enforcement and confessed he had been part of the same unit as Richard Reid, but at the last moment changed his mind. Consequently, he showed police where he hid the (defused) bomb. He was sentenced to thirteen years imprisonment.

*5 – Plot to attack Jewish targets in Germany*

Germany - April 2002

In October 2005, a network of jihadi terrorists were given sentences up to eight years for planning an attack on Jewish targets in Germany. Presumed targets were Jewish-owned restaurants in Düsseldorf and multiple ‘Jewish’ buildings in Berlin. The terrorist network was coordinated by the late Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi and hence was dubbed ‘The Al-Zarqawi cell in Germany’. The sentences were based on tapped phone calls and a confession of an earlier convicted member of the network.

*6 – Plot to attack British and American warships in the Strait of Gibraltar<sup>36</sup>*

United Kingdom (Gibraltar), Morocco - June 2002

In June 2002 three Saudi citizens were arrested in Morocco. They were plotting a suicide attack on British and American warships in the Strait of Gibraltar. Two of the accomplices tried to acquire a zodiac speedboat, which could have been used in the attack. The investigation was started beginning with interrogations of Al-Qaeda operatives in Guantanamo Bay. After the initial arrest, several others were detained, including the wives of the suspects. In February 2003 the three men were sentenced to ten years and the three women to six months jail.

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<sup>35</sup> In a way, this particular case is a difficult one as it is unclear where the terrorists wanted to blow up the airplane: above Europe, above the United States, or somewhere in-between. However, as Reid’s plane took off from Paris, and Badat’s plan was to take a plane from Amsterdam, we regard it as a European terrorist incident.

<sup>36</sup> Similar to the case of the ‘shoe bomber attack’, this case is a difficult one, as the target of the attack was located between Europe and Africa. As the naval base is located in Europe, we regard it as a European terrorist incident.

*7 – Plot by ‘the Chechen Network’*

France - December 2002

Members of the group named “The Chechen network” visited training camps in the Russian region of Chechnya. Most members had Algerian and/or French nationality. Possible targets of this network included Russian institutions, the Eiffel Tower and/or a shopping mall in Paris. In relation to this network multiple persons from one family – the Benchellalis – were arrested. In June 2006 members of the network were sentenced up to ten years in prison.

*8 – The ‘cyanide & ricin plot’*

United Kingdom - January 2003

In January 2003 anti-terrorist squad officers raided a flat in North London and found a suspected chemical weapons laboratory and castor oil beans, which is the raw material for making the toxic ricin. No actual ricin was found. The key suspect, Kamel Bourgass, managed to escape and was later found in Manchester. In a desperate second attempt to avoid arrest, he stabbed five police officers. One died. In the subsequent trial most defendants were acquitted, with the exception of Kamel Bourgass, who was sentenced to 17 years on terror charges, and who also received a life term for killing a police officer. Another defendant jumped bail, and was apprehended in Algeria where he is now standing trial.

*9 – Plot to make bombs*

United Kingdom - April 2003

After Abbas Boutrab was arrested for immigration offences, police raided his flat in Belfast. There they found computer discs containing downloaded bomb-making instructions and a cassette player of which the electric circuitry had been altered. The Crown Court judge in Belfast decided this indicated intent. In November 2005 Boutrab was sentenced to six years imprisonment.

*10 – Plot to attack unknown target in the United Kingdom*

United Kingdom - October 2003

In September 2005 Andrew Rowe, a British convert to Islam, was sentenced to fifteen years imprisonment. He was arrested leaving France for Britain two years earlier. In searches made after Rowe's arrest, hand-written instructions on how to fire a mortar were found. He also possessed a list with codes to substitute types of mobile phones for words such as “money” and “airport”. In his cloths traces of explosive materials were found.



*11– Plot to attack targets in northern Italy and to recruit terrorists*

Italy - October 2003

In this plot, a network of suspected North African terrorists were arrested by the Italian authorities. Two of them, a Moroccan and a Tunisian, were convicted of being member of a terrorist cell with links to Ansar Al-Islam; an Iraqi Kurdish Sunni Islamist group that promotes an extremely radical interpretation of Islam as well as the violent jihad. The two, Muhammad Rafik and Kamel Hamroui, were also sentenced for plotting attacks in the cities of Milan and Cremona in the north of Italy.

*12 – The Madrid bombings*

Spain - March 2004

On the morning of 11 March 2004 more than ten backpacks containing industrial explosives were detonated in four commuter trains in Madrid. Almost 200 people were killed. A few bombs that did not detonate, eventually led the Spanish police to an apartment in a suburb of Madrid. The seven individuals that were present in the apartment killed themselves before the police could arrest them: the apartment was blown up, and one policeman died.

In the following weeks and months more than a hundred persons were arrested. While many were quickly released, as late as 2006 more than twenty persons were still awaiting trial with most of the court cases set to begin in 2007.

*13 – Plot to attack with home made napalm*

Spain - March 2004

In April 2004 four Spanish residents of Algerian origin were indicted in Spain on terrorism charges. The alleged leader of the network was accused of having knowledge of cell phone detonation devices similar to those used in the Madrid bombings. The four men also possessed materials, which could have been used to create 'home made napalm'. At the time of writing this paper, the four were still in custody.

*14 – 'London Fertilizer plot'*

United Kingdom, Canada - March 2004

In March 2006 seven men were standing in front of court in Britain who were accused of planning a bombing campaign in the United Kingdom. The men were arrested in March 2004, after police found 600 kilogram of ammonium nitrate fertilizer in a self-storage unit near Heathrow Airport. The men were overheard speaking about possible attacks on a nightclub, train or pub. In connection with this network, furthermore, a person was arrested in Canada. As of late 2006, they were still in custody.

*15 – Plot to incite hatred and possession of a terrorist manual*

United Kingdom - May 2004

In May 2004, Mustafa Kamel Mustafa was arrested in London. Better known as Sheikh Abu Hamza al-Masri, he preached at the Finsbury Park Mosque, acquiring fame because of the radical nature of his sermons. After his arrest, the Finsbury Park Mosque and his home were searched. Among the findings were forged passports, gasmasks, knives, guns and a terrorist manual. In February 2006 Abu Hamza Al-Masri was sentenced to seven years imprisonment on charges of inciting racial hatred, having threatening and insulting recordings, and possessing a document that could be useful for terrorists.

*16 – ‘The Asparagus Case’*

Belgium - June 2004

The Asparagus case revolved around a network of Belgians, predominantly of Moroccan descent in the Belgium towns of Maaseik and Brussels (Schaarbeek), with alleged links to the *Groupe Islamique Combattant Marocain*. The first round of arrests was initiated after one of the members was stopped by Dutch traffic police, forcing their Belgian police counterparts to arrest other members of the network before they realised that intelligence services were observing them. The second round of arrests followed the Madrid Bombings as links emerged between the Spanish network and its Belgian counterpart. In the subsequent trial, members of the network were given sentences ranging between two and seven years.

*17 – Plot to attack financial institutions in the US and targets in the UK*

United Kingdom, United States - August 2004

In raids across England, eight men were arrested. Two weeks later they were charged with “conspiracy to commit a public nuisance by the use of radioactive materials, toxic gases, chemicals and or explosives” and the possession of maps to the International Monetary Fund and the New York Stock Exchange. Besides these institutions, the network had set its eyes on different targets in the United Kingdom. A British court convicted one of the terrorists, Dhiren Barot, to life in prison.

*18 – Plot to threaten Dutch politicians and to make an explosive device*

The Netherlands - September 2004

In September 2004, two youngsters of Moroccan descent were arrested and accused of terrorist activities. On 14 February 2005, a court sentenced one of them, Yehya Kadouri, to 140 days in jail and compulsory admission to a psychiatric institution. He was convicted of publishing death threats on the Internet towards Dutch politicians and collecting information and raw

materials to make an explosive device. The individual radicalised almost entirely via the Internet.

*19 – Plot to establish a terrorist network called ‘Martyrs of Morocco’*

Spain - October 2004

Members of this network were recruited inside the Topas prison in Salamanca. The Spanish press dubbed it the ‘Topas Network.’ The persons involved call themselves ‘Martyrs of Morocco.’ The network planned a suicide attack against the high court in Madrid, using a truck filled with explosives. It was aimed at killing judges and court personnel working on terrorist cases. In May 2005, more than a dozen members of the network, mainly from Algeria and Morocco, were charged in relation to this plot. This was followed by charges against more than thirty other suspects in March 2006.

*20 – The killing of the Dutch film maker Theo van Gogh*

The Netherlands - November 2004

On 2 November 2004, Mohamed Bouyeri killed Theo van Gogh, by shooting him and slitting his throat. Bouyeri was apprehended after a shoot-out with the police. For this murder he was sentenced to life in prison. Bouyeri was a member of a Dutch network of jihadi terrorists, which the Dutch intelligence service labelled the ‘Hofstad Group.’

*21 – Plot “to attack existing structures and terrorizing Dutch society”*

The Netherlands - November 2004.

Mohamed Bouyeri and more than a dozen other members of the so-called Hofstad Group stood trial from December 2005 onwards. Nine members were convicted in March 2006 and sentenced to between one and fifteen years imprisonment. In its verdict, the court stated that the Hofstad Group aimed at destroying Dutch ‘existing structures’ and terrorizing Dutch society. Although Mohammed Bouyeri was described in the verdict as the ringleader of the network, he did not receive any prison term, as he was already serving a life-sentence for murdering Theo van Gogh.

*22 – Plot to prepare a terrorist attack and attempt to recruit a fellow-prisoner*

The Netherlands - March 2005.

In February 2006, Bilal Lamrani, a young Dutch Muslim was given a three years sentence. According to the court in Rotterdam, Lamrani was preparing a terrorist attack and had tried to recruit a fellow-prisoner while in jail for threatening a leading Dutch Member of Parliament. In his home, the police found hundreds of (digital) copies of radical Islamist texts and information on how to make explosive devices. The 21 year old had close contact with some

members of the so-called Hofstad Group and Mohammed Bouyeri who murdered Theo van Gogh.

*23 – The first London bombings*

United Kingdom - July 2005

On 7 July 2005, four young men detonated their backpacks, filled with explosives, on three metro trains and a bus in London. More than fifty people were killed in the attack and more than 700 were wounded. The images of the suicide bombers were caught on closed circuit television and quickly recognized as Shehzad Tanweer, Mohammed Sidique Khan, Hasib Hussain and Germaine Lindsay. All had been raised in the United Kingdom. Several other persons were arrested in relation to these bombings, but later cleared of any involvement.

*24 – Failed attack on the London metro*

United Kingdom - July 2005

Two weeks to the day after the first London bombings, four men tried to ignite explosives hidden in their backpacks in the London metro. Only the detonators exploded, while the explosives did not. No one was wounded. The four perpetrators were caught on video cameras as they left the transport system. They were arrested in the following weeks, one of them in Italy. As the investigation continued, more people were arrested. Most were charged of withholding information and helping the four to evade arrest. Trial was set to begin in September 2006.

*25 – Inciting local Muslims to carry out acts of terrorism*

Denmark - September 2005

In September 2005, Danish police arrested Said Mansour, a Danish citizen originally from Morocco, on charges of inciting local Muslims to carry out acts of terrorism. Mansour ran a publishing house named Al Nur Islamic Information, in the Danish capital. According to Danish Attorney General, he used the business to produce and distribute propaganda openly inciting young Muslims to join the jihad against enemies of Islam. Mansour remained in custody pending trial that started fall 2006. He previously served a 90-day sentence from December 2004 on weapons possession charges and is the first person to have been charged under Denmark's new anti-terrorism legislation adopted in the wake of the September 11, 2001 attacks in the United States.

*26 – Foiled attack on public transport in France*

France - September 2005

In September 2005 French authorities arrested an Islamist cell that was suspected of planning attacks on the Paris metro, airport or the Parisian

branch of the intelligence agency, the DST. Among those arrested was Safe Bourada, who had been sentenced in 1998 to a ten-year jail term because of its active involvement in the 1995 terrorist attacks in Paris. Another person, Mohamed Benyamina, was also arrested in Algeria in connection to this case. At the time of writing, Bourada and seven others were still in custody. Two of them were converts, who were charged with "associating with evildoers in relation to a terrorist enterprise" and "financing of terrorism" by judges Jean-Louis Bruguière and Thierry Fragnoli.

*27 – Plot to attack politicians and a government building*

The Netherlands - October 2005

Samir Azzouz, a Dutch-Moroccan and a long time suspect of terrorism, was arrested with nine others in October 2005. They were believed to be preparing terrorist attacks on politicians and a government building. Azzouz was close to most of the members of the Hofstad Group. One of the other suspects in this case had already been sentenced for membership of the Hofstad Group. One year after their arrest, a court sentenced Samir Azzouz to eight years in jail for plotting attacks and possessing firearms "with terrorist intent" and sentenced three others, including a woman, to prison terms of three to four years. The case was known as the 'Piranha Group': the code name used by the Dutch General Intelligence and Security Service.

*28 – Plot to commit terrorist acts in Europe*

United Kingdom, Denmark, Bosnia and Herzegovina - October 2005

In November 2005 three men faced charges for the possession of different terrorist related objects. All three were arrested in raids two weeks before. The police discovered that one of the computers contained detailed instruction material for making car bombs. Another possessed papers containing the words "Welcome to jihad" and "Hospital = Attack." Their case seems to be linked to a series of arrests in Bosnia and in Copenhagen.

In Sarajevo, two persons were arrested after purchasing various explosive materials and acquiring a suicide belt. One of them is a Swede of Bosnian origin, the other is born in Denmark and has a Turkish background. Three more persons were apprehended in Bosnia at a later stage. The operation also triggered the arrest in the Copenhagen area of four young Muslims. The two in Bosnia have been accused of terrorism and illegal possession of weapons and explosives. Their trial opened in Sarajevo in July 2006. The four in Denmark were charged under Danish terrorism law and are also still in custody.

*29 – Plot to attack targets in Italy*

Italy - November 2005

In November 2005, five men were arrested in Italy. The individuals supposedly were related to the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat and were believed to have contacts with the jihadi terrorist networks in Algeria, Norway and the United Kingdom. According to the Italian ministry of the interior, the individuals not only supported terrorist networks, but also planned to execute attacks of their own.

*30 – Failed attack on German trains*

Germany - July 2006

A group of Lebanese, some of them studying in Germany, are thought to be involved in a failed attack with bombs fashioned from gas canisters hidden in luggage comported by trains in the cities of Koblenz and Dortmund. One of the Lebanese was arrested in the town of Kiel. Four others are detained in Lebanon. German federal prosecutors want them for several counts of attempted murder and membership in a terrorist organization. According to a leading investigator, the prime suspects in the failed attempt were partially motivated by anger over the publication in Denmark of cartoons of the Prophet Muhammad.

*31 – Foiled transatlantic aircraft attack*

United Kingdom - August 2006

In August 2006, a plot to blow up planes in flight from the United Kingdom to the United States had been disrupted. It is thought the plan was to detonate explosive devices smuggled in hand luggage on to several aircrafts. More than a dozen persons were charged for offences committed under the UK Terrorism Act. At least three other persons that are connected with the foiled attack were arrested in Pakistan. Among them is Rashid Rauf, a Briton of Pakistani descent, who is believed to be the key player in the plot. The UK Foreign Office is seeking Rauf's extradition from Pakistan.

*Other cases*

Besides the above-mentioned 31 cases, there were a number of possible jihadi terrorist incidents that have not been included in the sample. A number of recently discovered plots and foiled attacks could not be included. Some cases had not been brought to court yet and there was too little open source information to include them in this research. This holds in particular for a number of arrests in The Netherlands, Denmark and the United Kingdom.

There is also a lack of information from open sources regarding a number of older cases. Examples are a plot to attack targets in Spain around Christmas

time, which was reported in December 2004, and a plot to blow up an El Al airliner, which was discovered in Switzerland in December 2005.

We were also confronted with a number of cases in which persons were arrested and later released, yet who continued to be under investigation. Such involved a case in Spain with a number of investigations into attempted attacks. In addition, there were a number of terrorist incidents involving Muslims that could not be labelled as jihadi terrorist incidents. For instance, there was a terrorist incident in which a Moroccan resident of Italy blew himself up in a car in front of a McDonalds restaurant in March 2004. The man did so in the name of Allah, but his motivations – written down in a farewell letter – were apparently not of an Islamist nature. Finally, there was a case in the United Kingdom in which two Muslims were sentenced to two years in prison after pleading guilty to conspiracy to place a hoax bomb. They had planted a fake device at the halls of Luton University. These two persons, as well as many others that were involved in such incidents, are not on the list of jihadi terrorists in Europe.

Based on this inventory of 31 jihadi terrorist incidents, 28 networks were identified (see figure 2). The number of networks that were involved is lower, for the simple reason that some networks are behind more than one plot or attack. This holds for the so-called ‘Hofstad Group’ in the Netherlands and the network of Djamel Gebhal, Kamel Daoudi, Nizar Trabelsi and others. Some of the ‘networks’ include only one person who has been brought to court or who has been convicted. However, these individuals had close contacts with other (suspected) jihadi terrorists and/or had links with other jihadi terrorist networks. In the case of Yehya Kadouri, these contacts were of a ‘virtual’ nature, as he mainly radicalised through the Internet. In the case of Sheikh Abu Hamza al Masri, the person convicted is in fact a central figure in a rather large group of jihadis with connections to the infamous Finsbury Park Mosque.

In the following chapter we will analyse the different characteristics of the 28 networks.

Figure 2. Jihadi terrorist networks in Europe and their plots and attacks  
(September 2001- August 2006)

1. Network including Djamel Beghal, Kamel Daoudi and Nizar Trabelsi: Foiled attack on the US embassy in Paris and foiled attack on Belgian air base Kleine Brogel
2. Network linked to the Algerian *Groupe Islamique Armé*: Foiled attack on the *Stade de France*
3. Richard Reid and Saajid Badat: Failed 'shoe bomber attack'
4. 'The Al-Zarqawi cell in Germany': Plot to attack Jewish targets in Germany
5. Three Saudis and their wives: Plot to attack British and American warships in the Strait of Gibraltar
6. 'The Chechen Network': Plot to attack targets in Paris
7. Network including Kamel Bourgass: cyanide & ricin plot
8. Abbas Boutrab: lot to make bombs
9. Andrew Rowe: lot to attack unknown target in the United Kingdom
10. A Moroccan and a Tunisian: Plot to attack targets in northern Italy and to recruit terrorists
11. Unnamed network of more than twenty people: Madrid bombings
12. Unnamed network of four: Pot to attack with home made napalm
13. Unnamed network of nine: 'London Fertilizer plot'
14. Sheikh Abu Hamza Al-Masri: Plot to incite hatred and possession of a terrorist manual
15. Unnamed network of nine: 'The Asparagus Case'
16. Unnamed network of eight: Plot to attack financial institutions in the US and possible targets in the UK
17. Yehya Kadouri: Plot to threaten Dutch politicians and to make an explosive device.
18. 'Martyrs of Morocco': Plot to establish a terrorist network 'Martyrs of Morocco'
19. Mohamed Bouyeri / 'Hofstad Group': The killing of the Dutch filmmaker Theo van Gogh, plot "to attack existing structures and terrorizing Dutch society": 'Hofstad Group', and plot to prepare a terrorist attack and attempt to recruit a fellow-prisoner.
20. Network of four suicide bombers around Mohammed Sidique Khan: The first London bombings
21. Network of four suicide bombers and their helpers: Failed attack on the London metro.
22. Said Mansour: Inciting local Muslims to carry out acts of terrorism



23. Network around Safé Bourada: Foiled attack on public transport in France
24. Network around Samir Azzouz / 'Piranha Group': Plot to attack politicians and a government building
25. Unnamed network of various nationalities including Mirsad Bektasevic: Plot to commit terrorist acts in Europe
26. Unnamed network of three: Plot to attack targets in Italy
27. Unnamed network of Lebanese: Failed attack on German trains
28. Unnamed network of British and Pakistani citizens: Foiled transatlantic aircraft attack

## 4 Characteristics of jihadi terrorist networks

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Although jihadi terrorist plots and attacks have been given much attention in the media, we know relatively little about the networks behind them. Many have no names and we often have no idea about their characteristics. The main exceptions constitute the networks behind the ‘successful’ attacks in Madrid, Amsterdam and London. Moreover, few scholars, professionals or journalists have attempted to compare these jihadi networks. In fact, there is no detailed study we know of that has put side by side the specific characteristics of the Madrid, Amsterdam, London and other jihadi terrorist networks in Europe.

In the following paragraphs we will focus on the distinctive features of the 28 identified networks and compare them. Given the fact that we only deal with 28 networks, we cannot give a complete or exhaustive comparison and have to limit ourselves to some general observations. Having noted that, we will first focus on the general traits of these networks. Next we analyse the main characteristics of these networks using Sageman’s social, personal and situational variables.

#### 4.1 General traits

A quick look at the overview of the plots and attacks shows that the 28 networks behind it differ very much from one another. They differ in size. Some are organised around one person or may be regarded as a one-man enterprise. Other networks, such as those behind the Madrid bombings, include more than thirty persons.

Networks are also dissimilar with respect to the geographic distribution of their operations. Some were only active in one country. The geographic distribution of operations of others was spread over several countries. The list of terrorist incidents also shows that the networks were interested in very different targets ranging from politicians and embassies, to financial institutions and means of transportation. The latter was most often targeted, but does not dominate the sample and can be broken down into airplanes, airports, metro systems, trains and buses.

Finally, the jihadi terrorist networks differ in level of 'success'. Only three networks succeeded in executing their deadly mission, while a few reached a stage worth being merited as a foiled or failed attack. Fortunately, most networks were discovered before they could prepare a deadly terrorist incident.

The networks also have a number of traits in common. Despite the fact that the specific targets differ, all of the known ones have in common that they are high-profile and of a civilian nature – including politicians, stadiums, and public transport. Another similarity is the fact the offences for which they have been charged were all committed in Western Europe. Their geographical area of operations is also almost exclusively limited to this part of Europe. The United Kingdom was the number one country in terms of number of networks that were active on its territory (12), followed by the Netherlands (7), France (4), Spain (3) and Belgium (3). The networks show similarities with regard to the location of their targets; most of them are within capital cities (Madrid, London, Paris, Amsterdam) or seats of government (The Hague). Finally, many networks have in common that they have used, wanted to use or have been interested in using explosives, both homemade and industrial.

## 4.2 Social and personal characteristics

If we focus on the social characteristics of the networks within our sample, we see that most networks have origins in Arab-speaking countries, especially in North Africa. Most networks include members from Algeria and Morocco. This is the case in thirteen out of eighteen networks on which we could gather information. Although the Arab background is dominant, there is a wide variety in the geographical aspects of the 28 networks, especially if we also take into account nationality and place of residence. Based on the last criteria, the background of the networks is very diverse, with networks from Spain, France and the United Kingdom, as well as from Belgium, Denmark and non-European countries as Afghanistan and Lebanon.

The geographic background within networks is more homogeneous. Place of residence and country of origins is often shared. For instance, persons involved in the ‘Hofstad Group’ are mostly Dutch with Moroccan roots. Three out of the four terrorists behind the London bombings of July 7 were British from Pakistani descent. Those involved in the ‘fertilizer plot’ were all British Pakistani. The plot to attack the *Stade de France* in October 2001 was ‘Algerian’, and that of the failed attack on German trains was ‘Lebanese’. In general one can say that differences between networks are much larger than within networks.

With regard to the socioeconomic status there are no typical similarities or dissimilarities between networks. Within networks, differences exist regarding their socioeconomic background. People from various socioeconomic strata are able to form networks together. In many cases the jihadi terrorist networks include persons with very different kinds of occupation. In the case of the foiled attack on the United States embassy in Paris, one of the network members had served in an elite army battalion, two persons held menial jobs, and another was a computer specialist working for local government.<sup>37</sup>

Looking at family status, we found no particular differences or similarities between the networks in our sample. Married, divorced and single men were spread evenly over the entire sample. There is, for example, no network in which almost all members were married. Only in one of the younger networks (that of the London fertilizer plot) those involved were all single men at the time of their arrest. This was, however, the only homogeneous network with regard to family status.

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<sup>37</sup> See data set jihadi terrorists in Europe, case 2.

### 4.3 Situational characteristics

The category ‘situational characteristics’ stands for the circumstances under which the future terrorists joined the jihad. With regard to these traits, we see that there are significant differences in the average age of the networks that have been involved in terrorist incidents. That of the oldest networks is around 34<sup>38</sup>, the average age of the youngest network, the one behind the failed attack on trains in Germany, is 20,5 years.

The available information shows that all networks have experienced an increased devotion of its members before and during their creation. Members have demonstrated a tendency to become more religious in comparison to their (earlier) childhood.

The 28 networks are also very similar with regard to age *within* networks. Many of them consist of people that are of the same age group. This is, for instance, the case for the above-mentioned group in Germany, where all were very young (between 19 and 22).

With regard to the place of recruitment the sample shows that most networks seem to be established in the country where their members reside. In some cases there is also some sort of ‘foreign connection’.<sup>39</sup> This means that part of the radicalisation and recruitment process took place outside the country of residence, for instance in London, Saudi Arabia or Pakistan. Nonetheless, one can claim that the place of recruitment and place of residence more or less coincide. Think for instance of the network behind the first London bombings, which was comprised of British residents who joined the jihad while living in the United Kingdom. In general, the place of recruitment is often shared among members of a network. The same holds for country of residence. For instance, members of the ‘Hofstad Group’ reside in the Netherlands, and most, if not all, have joined the jihad in the same country. This situation also applies for the network involved in the failed attack on the London metro on July 21 and the network involved in the fertilizer plot. Considering nationality, a more diverse picture emerges, mostly because about a quarter of the jihadi terrorists in Europe have double nationalities. As a consequence some networks include many different nationalities, while others are more homogeneous in that respect.

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<sup>38</sup> See data set jihadi terrorists in Europe, cases 3, 7, 11, 19, and 26.

<sup>39</sup> In three cases – 1, 2 and 4 – there might be a (indirect) link with Al-Qaeda. In others we have not found strong indications that suggest a link with this network.

Social affiliation is a ‘circumstance’ that played a role in about two-thirds of the networks that were composed of more than one person, making these networks very similar on this important variable. Nevertheless, there are differences between networks if we look at the kind of social affiliation. In some networks kinship is very important, in others friendship is the dominant type of relation between its members. Think of the network around the Benchellali family and the network of friends responsible for the first London bombings.<sup>40</sup>

#### 4.4 Conclusion

In general there are noticeable differences *between* networks with regard to their size, geographic distribution of their operations and in the level of ‘success’. If we look at Sageman’s variables, main differences pertain to the kind of employment and family status. The most striking similarities between networks include the interest in high profile, civilian targets and the region of family origin. Almost all networks have roots in the Arab-speaking world, especially in the Maghreb countries. Looking at similarities *within* networks, we see that networks often show homogeneity in relation to age, geographical roots and place of recruitment. One could, therefore, argue that jihadi terrorist networks in Europe tend to form around people who share age group, country of family origins, and the country in which they live.

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<sup>40</sup> For data on the Benchellali family, see data set, case 7.

## 5 Characteristics of individual jihadi terrorists in Europe

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The number of persons accused or convicted of being involved in the 28 jihadi terrorist networks amounts to over 200 persons. This includes eleven persons who committed suicide as part of the attack (London) or in order to prevent arrest (Madrid). In the previous chapters we briefly described their plots and attacks and investigated various features and aspects of their networks. But who are the individual jihadi terrorists, and what are their characteristics?

In order to answer this question, we have investigated almost twenty variables regarding their social and psychological background, and the circumstances in which they joined the jihad. Thus, we have followed Sageman's methodological framework. In addition we have also looked at sex as a measurement for female terrorists.

## 5.1 Sex

Conventional wisdom has it that terrorists are male. Our sample confirms this general notion: we found 237 males and only five females.<sup>41</sup> However, we would like to stress that this image might be subject to change. Recent reports from the Dutch General Intelligence and Security Service indicate that the role of women in terrorist networks is becoming more prominent.<sup>42</sup> Nevertheless, it could very well be that this development is only taking place in the Netherlands.

## 5.2 Geographical background

One can determine the geographical background of individuals in four different ways: by family origin, by country in which people were raised, by place of residence or by nationality. If we look at family origin, most persons in our sample are of non-European extraction and are first, second or third generation migrants. In fact, very few terrorists' families originate from Europe (17 persons). If they are, the person often is a convert, child of a mixed marriage or from Bosnia-Herzegovina. The region from which most persons in our sample originate is North Africa (Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia). Other typical regions and countries of origin include Pakistan and the Horn of Africa (see figure 3).

A significant part of these persons of non-European extraction, however, have been born and raised in Europe: i.e. the group of second and third generation migrants. This was the case of 56 out of the 146 cases in which we could determine the country in which the jihadi terrorists grew up.<sup>43</sup>

Looking at place of residence, the overwhelming majority of the jihadi terrorists in our sample are residents of a European country (211 out of 219 persons). As mentioned above, more than a third of them have been (born and) raised in these countries. Others have been living for more than ten years in a European country. Very few of the jihadi terrorists resided in other parts

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<sup>41</sup> Hafsa Benchellali, Mulumebet Girma, Yeshiemeбет Girma, Soumaya Sahla, and Cossor Ali.

<sup>42</sup> See for instance General Intelligence and Security Service, Annual Report 2005. AIVD, 2006, p.28.

<sup>43</sup> Some jihadi terrorists migrated with their parents to Europe at a young age. Those who migrated after the age of ten are considered to have been raised in the country of origin.



of the world before being involved in terrorist activities in Europe (eight persons in total).

Focusing on nationalities, we find a few to be very prominent. Out of the 227 individuals of whom we could find information on nationality, 59 Moroccans, 55 Algerians, and 46 Britons. Other prominent nationalities include 15 Pakistani, 15 French, 10 Dutch, 8 Belgians and 8 Spanish (see figure 3). About twenty percent of them have dual citizenship (55 persons).

As a whole, the geographical background of the jihadi terrorists in Europe is very diverse. There are more than 29 different nationalities and 26 countries of origin. In contrast, however, the number of countries of residence is much lower, being only thirteen.

Figure 3. Top ten geographical backgrounds in terms of place of residence, nationality and family of origin

Country of residence (N =219)	Nationality (N = 282*)	Country of the family of origin (N = 215**)
UK (62)	Morocco (59)	Algeria (64)
Spain (58)	Algeria (55)	Morocco (64)
France (36)	UK (46)	Pakistan (24)
Netherlands (15)	France (15)	Lebanon (7)
Belgium (13)	Pakistan (15)	Ethiopia (5)
Germany (8)	Netherlands (10)	France (5)
Italy (8)	Belgium (8)	'Palestine' (6)
Denmark (6)	Spain (8)	Tunisia (5)
Afghanistan (3)	Lebanon (6)	Syria(4)
Lebanon (3)	Denmark (5)	UK (4)

\* Includes 'double counts' as some persons have more than one nationality (56)

\*\* Includes 'double counts' as some persons are of mixed marriage (4)

**5.3 Socioeconomic background**

With regard to the socioeconomic background of the jihadi terrorists we have followed Sageman's distinction between 'lower', 'middle' and 'upper' class

background.<sup>44</sup> Given the limited information on the socioeconomic status of these persons and their families of origin, and given the ups and downs in their financial situation, determining this variable requires some crude judgements.<sup>45</sup>

Of the 72 persons on whom we could gather socioeconomic data, only three can be regarded as upper class, 30 middle class and 39 lower class. From this data it appears that very few jihadi terrorists in Europe come from higher socioeconomic classes. More than half of the individuals are from the lower classes within society. Given the immigrant background of the families of origin, however this situation may, above all, simply be a reflection of the general socioeconomic character of Muslim immigrant communities in Europe.

#### 5.4 Education

Despite the many media reports and the detailed description of persons in transcripts of legal proceedings, surprisingly little is to be found on the educational background of the 242 persons in our sample.<sup>46</sup> From the 48 persons of whom we could gather information on education, a majority finished secondary education (42 persons). Fifteen of them finished college or university. It should be stressed that of those persons of whom we could not find information, some were arrested at a young age (eighteen persons were twenty years old or younger). These individuals were still students at the time and simply could not have finished university, college or even secondary education. Such was evidenced by the youth arrested in Denmark.

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<sup>44</sup> Determining social class is a highly subjective exercise. As a measurement we took the dominant occupational background of a person and his or her family: i.e. unskilled worker is lower class; semi-skilled worker is middle class, and; high-skilled worker is upper class. Depending on the type of business, entrepreneurs are classified as middle or upper class: i.e. a shopkeeper versus someone managing a large company.

<sup>45</sup> See also Sageman, 2004, p. 73.

<sup>46</sup> As a measurement of educational background we took the highest level of education the person had completed. This means, for instance, that (former) students at university that did not finish their studies fall within the category 'secondary education'.

## 5.5 Faith as youth

We found information on the childhood faith of 50 persons. Fourteen of them were converts: thirteen persons with a Christian and one with a Hindu background. Of the rest, eleven were raised in a religious family and 25 did not have a particularly religious childhood. The latter were raised in families not actively practising their religion and ‘rediscovered’ their faith at a later age. Some of them had a history of drinking and using drugs. For instance, the Courtailler brothers, who were involved in the foiled attack on the United States embassy in Paris, converted to Islam to beat a drug and drinking habit.<sup>47</sup>

## 5.6 Occupation

Of the 103 persons on whom we could collect information on their occupation, 34 were unskilled workers, nineteen persons had semi-skilled occupations and twelve had a job that can be described as skilled.<sup>48</sup> In addition there were twelve persons that could best be described as entrepreneurs, mostly shop keepers. About fifteen percent of this sample were unemployed at the time of their arrest or had a long history of unemployment. Seventeen persons were students. Among the 103 were also two former (semi) professional sportsmen: one soccer player and one athlete.<sup>49</sup>

The relative number of unskilled workers and unemployed in our sample is very high compared to national averages. However, these figures reflect the occupational situation of many persons belonging to immigrant Muslim communities in Europe. Consequently, the data of our sample does not uphold the general notion that jihadi terrorists are typically unemployed or have much lower-skilled jobs than other persons within their communities. Moreover, the figures are generally reflective of European averages. For instance, the average unemployment rate of the persons we could collect information on is about fifteen percent. This is higher than that of the European Union, which is 8.2 percent, but it is lower than the unemployment rate for this age group. The EU figure for those under-25 is 17.7 percent.<sup>50</sup>

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<sup>47</sup> Los Angeles Times, 22 October 2001, ‘Embassy plot offers insight into terrorist recruitment, training’. BBC News, 25 May 2004, ‘Shock over ‘French Taliban’ case’.

<sup>48</sup> Unskilled workers include cleaners and factory workers. Examples of semi-skilled workers are electricians and administrators. Highly skilled workers are medical doctors, army officers, scientists, etc.

<sup>49</sup> Nizar Trabelsi (case 2) and Abdelmajid Bouchar (case 12).

<sup>50</sup> Eurostat, Euro indicators, Newsletter, July 2006, p. 6.

This is an important point to consider, as a clear majority of the unemployed in our sample is also under-25.

### **5.7 Family status**

Of the 242 jihadi terrorists in Europe, we gathered information on family status for more than 100 persons. However, in only 66 cases we could label the information as being very reliable. Among them, 39 individuals were married or engaged at the time of their arrest and eight had been divorced. Twenty-five of them had children. Twenty-two persons were single. It should be noted that of those we could not collect reliable information on family status many appear to be single. There are no reports of spouses or partners and some of them – the 16 and 17 year olds – were possibly too young to be engaged or married.

### **5.8 Criminal record**

Of the persons in our sample, at least 58 had a criminal record while involved in jihadi terrorist activities. This means that almost a quarter of the jihadi terrorists in Europe had previously been convicted by court before their arrest for terrorist offences. A few of these criminal records can be linked to the terrorist activities for which they had been arrested or convicted at an earlier stage. This is the case for half a dozen persons. Most of them have been sentenced for the illegal possession of arms.<sup>51</sup>

### **5.9 Psychological explanations**

The biographies of the persons within our sample indicate that eleven of them suffer from mental illness. This figure represents almost five percent of the total sample. This percentage is significantly higher than the world base rate, which, according to Sageman, is about one percent.<sup>52</sup> Two of the mentally ill suffer from paranoia. It should be mentioned that four of the terrorists have become ill after their arrest, with three of them undergoing a serious depression.

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<sup>51</sup> Three of these cases were in the Netherlands: Nouredine el Fahtni (case 21), and Samir Azzouz and Soumay Sahla (case 27).

<sup>52</sup> Washington Times, 5 July 2004, 'jihadi militants defy stereotypes, author says'.

### 5.10 Age

In our sample of 242 we have found the date of birth or the age at the time of their arrest for 224 of them. Their average age while participating in the jihad (measured at the time of their arrest) is 27.3. The statistical distribution of age is very spread out. The standard deviation is more than seven. The youngest jihadi terrorists were 16 and 17.<sup>53</sup> The oldest person in our sample was 59 when he was arrested.<sup>54</sup>

### 5.11 Place of recruitment

Most of the 70 persons of whom we could find information on their place of recruitment were recruited in Europe: most of them in the countries in which they were resident. Among these countries, the United Kingdom ranks first (26 persons), followed by Spain (15), The Netherlands (13), France (7), and Germany and Denmark (6). Outside the European Union, persons have been radicalized and recruited in Arab countries (5), Afghanistan (3) and Bosnia (2). Given the high number of persons in our sample that are of Pakistani descent and the many reports of persons in our sample that have visited the country, Pakistan also seems to be an important place of recruitment.

### 5.12 Faith

With regard to the faith of persons at the time of joining the jihad, it is not surprising to see that in many cases (58 of the 61 in which we found reliable information) faith increased in the months before recruitment.<sup>55</sup> The would-be jihadi terrorists participated in courses on the Koran (at home or abroad) or were vigorously debating Islam on the Internet. Others tried to convert acquaintances or colleagues, or changed liberal mosques for more orthodox or extremist ones. Three persons did not become more faithful when joining the jihad.<sup>56</sup> Two persons maintained in front of court that they were not part of

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<sup>53</sup> Suhjah Khayam (case 14), Yehya Kadouri (case 18), two of the arrested Danish youngsters (case 28), and Abdul Muneem Patel (case 31).

<sup>54</sup> Chellali Benchellali (case 7).

<sup>55</sup> Reliable information on faith issues is difficult to obtain, partly because faith is rarely mentioned in formal charges or verdicts.

<sup>56</sup> As the three 'not faithful' persons were knowingly and actively involved in jihadi terrorist activities, we consider them jihadi terrorists nonetheless.

any jihadi terrorist network, claiming not to be very religious.<sup>57</sup> One of them – who was involved in the Madrid bombings – may have participated in the jihadi terrorist network for other political or personal reasons.<sup>58</sup>

### **5.13 Employment**

Concrete information about full-time or part-time employment of persons in our sample is rare. We mostly extrapolated this information from data on the occupational situation of persons at the time of their arrest. Over 50 percent of the terrorists appeared to have had full-time jobs (47 out of 76 cases for which we gathered information). Fifteen persons held part-time jobs and fourteen persons were unemployed.

### **5.14 Relative deprivation**

With regard to the idea of relative deprivation, we did not find enough information to indicate whether or not this concept was relevant to jihadi terrorists in our sample. In 23 cases we found evidence of a situation of relative deprivation.

### **5.15 Social affiliation**

In our sample we observed 43 situations in which persons were friends at the time of their joining of the jihad. A slightly stronger indicator for social affiliation between jihadi terrorists is kinship. Of the 242 persons in our sample, 50 were related through kinship. In other words, in more than 35 percent of the sample social affiliation may have played a role in recruitment. In one extreme case, that of the Benchellali family, six family members were arrested for terrorist activities of which four have been convicted.<sup>59</sup> Moreover, there are half a dozen (half) brothers who joined the same jihadi terrorist network.

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<sup>57</sup> Shadi Abdallah (case 5) and Mourad Benchellali (case 7).

<sup>58</sup> José Emilio Suarez Trashorras (case 11).

<sup>59</sup> Family involved in the ‘Chechen Network’ (case 7).

## 5.16 Conclusion

Studying the characteristics of the 242 jihadi terrorists in our sample leads to one obvious disclaimer and one evident conclusion. Starting with the first; it is impossible to gather complete information from open sources for all variables for the more than 200 persons in our sample. This means that our generalisations sometimes required some crude judgement on our part. The evident conclusion of this chapter is that there is no standard jihadi terrorist in Europe. Our sample includes very young ones and persons in their forties and fifties. Some have no education, others finished university, et cetera.

Nonetheless, there are a number of, more or less, common traits. A clear majority of them are from Arab countries and have roots especially in North Africa (mainly Algeria and Morocco). Many of these first, second or third generation immigrants also have in common that they come from the lower strata of society. A strikingly high number of persons had a criminal record; at least a quarter of the sample. Finally it should be noted that almost all jihadi terrorists in Europe are male, and that many of them relate to each other through kinship or friendship.

## 6 Comparing samples

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After the publishing of ‘Understanding terror networks’, new questions have risen following the jihadi terrorist attacks in Madrid, Amsterdam and London and the many thwarted plots in Europe. Many of these terrorists proved to be ‘home-grown’ and appeared to have joined the violent jihad through different processes than those of the sample of Sageman. The characteristics of the European networks and individuals behind these terrorist activities may therefore differ from Sageman’s global mujahedin.

In this chapter, we compare the data of our sample with those of Sageman, by looking at the variables that make up the biographies of the jihadi terrorists in Europe and those involved in global Salafi networks. It should be noted that there is some overlap between the samples. We collected information on individuals involved in terrorist activities since September 2001 and Sageman’s sample covers the period 1990s - 2003. As a consequence, nine persons are in both samples.<sup>60</sup>

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<sup>60</sup> The persons in both samples are: Abu Hamza al-Masri, Tarek Maaroufi, Safé Bourada, Djamel Beghal, Kamel Daoudi, Richard Reid, Nizar Trabelsi, and David and Jerome Courtailler.



## **6.1 Sex**

Of the variables that indicate the social background of jihadi terrorism, 'sex' is not looked at by Sageman. In his sample, all 172 individuals seem to be male. In our sample only 5 out of 242 people are female. Therefore, it is safe to say that terrorism is mainly a male thing, both in Europe and within global Salafi networks.

## **6.2 Geographical background**

There is a striking difference between the nationality of terrorists in Sageman's sample, and ours. In the former, they mainly come from Saudi Arabia (31), Egypt (24) and France (18). In our sample, the dominating nationalities are that of Morocco (59), Algeria (55) and the United Kingdom (46). Most of these Moroccans and Algerians live in Europe and many of them were born and raised in a European country. The majority of these first, second or third generation migrants live in Spain, France, Belgium and the Netherlands. Compared to the sample of Sageman, the number of Core Arabs and South-east Asians is very small. Moreover, we have not come across persons that can be regarded to belong to the Central Staff of the global Salafi network.

Apart from the above-mentioned top three countries, the two samples show a wide range of geographical backgrounds in terms of nationality and country of family origins. With regard to place of residence, the geographical background of Sageman's 172 terrorists is a truly global one, whereas the network of jihadi terrorists operating in Europe is both global – 29 different nationalities and 26 countries of origin – and very 'European' – only eight jihadi terrorists resided in other parts of the world before becoming involved in terrorist activities in Europe.

## **6.3 Socioeconomic background**

There is a difference in social-economic background between jihadi terrorists in Europe and those in Sageman's sample. Sageman states that eighteen individuals in his group are upper class, 56 middle class and 28 lower class. In short, a clear majority is middle class. However, Sageman notes that this is different for the "excluded" Maghreb Arabs in France and a large part of the western converts to Islam. They are predominantly lower class. Nonetheless,

Sageman refutes the theory that terrorists are mainly from the lower strata of society.

Our sample, however, shows many persons from the lower class – as is the case for most first, second and third generation Muslim migrants in Europe. Among the individuals of which we could find information, 40 belong to this socio-economic part of society, followed by middle class (30) and upper class (3). These figures are similar to those of the ‘Maghreb Arab’ cluster in Sageman’s sample.

#### **6.4 Education**

The educational levels of terrorists in our sample and that in Sageman’s are difficult to compare. In the latter case, no less than 42 percent finished university. In the European sample we found too little information on the educational background to be able to compare it with the 137 persons on whom Sageman could gather information. We could determine the educational background of only 47 persons, of which fourteen finished university.

Sageman notes that some people in his sample were too young to be able to have finished higher education. We have also observed a number of cases in which persons have been arrested while attending college or university, and even a few cases where persons were enrolled in secondary school.

#### **6.5 Faith as youth**

In Sageman’s sample, about half of the persons he could find information on were secular during their youth (53 out of 108 persons). He notes that in the case of the Maghreb Arabs this percentage is higher. Sageman explains this difference by looking at the secular character of France; the country of residence for most of them. The basic idea behind this explanation is that if people are raised in a secular country, they are more likely to have a secular youth. In our sample, more than a third of the jihadi terrorists were (born and) raised in secular European countries. We find that the number of persons (not including converts) that were secular during their youth is twice as large as the number of persons that were faithful during this phase of life (24 compared to 11).

Similar to Sageman, we find a significant number of converts in our sample (fourteen persons). Some of them can be described as faithful Christians during (at least parts of) their youth.

## **6.6 Occupation**

Among jihadi terrorists in Europe the predominant occupational category is that of unskilled occupations. Also the group of semi-skilled occupations is relatively large. Together they account for more than seventy percent of those of which we could find information (103 persons). The categories dominating the sample of Sageman are skilled occupations and professionals (57 out of 134 persons). This is not the case within the cluster of Maghreb Arabs in which unskilled and semi-skilled occupations are the dominant ones (90 percent). Again, this particular cluster shows many similarities to that of our sample of jihadi terrorists in Europe.

In both samples, a significant percentage of the terrorists were unemployed at the time they joined the violent jihad or were involved in terrorist activities: about ten per cent in the case of Sageman, some fifteen percent in the case of jihadi terrorists in Europe.

## **6.7 Family status**

We could find information on the marital status of the jihadists for only a quarter of the persons studied. This figure is lower than in Sageman's sample. Contrary to Sageman, we did record a number of divorced men and women. In his sample most of the men were married and most of them had children. We found only 38 persons being married, of whom 24 had children. Despite limited information, it is safe to say that Sageman's image of 'married mujahedin' does not apply to the case of jihadi terrorists in Europe. Moreover, our sample does not contradict the typical image of single males.

## **6.8 Psychological Explanations**

Among jihadi terrorists in Europe we found eleven individuals suffering from mental illness or a psychological disorder. This is a much higher percentage of the population than in the sample of Sageman (five percent compared to one percent). It should be stressed that the absolute number are very low for both samples. Similar to Sageman, we found no proof that terrorists suffered from pathological narcissism or an authoritarian personality.

## **6.9 Criminality**

Sageman analysed criminal behaviour in his paragraph on mental illness. He stated that about one-quarter of the persons in his sample had been involved in criminal activities (forgery, document trafficking, and petty crime). In our sample the level of criminality appeared to be similarly high. Also about a quarter of the jihadi terrorists in Europe had a criminal record. Of those without a criminal record, many had been involved in criminal activities without having been in prison or sentenced in a different way.

## **6.10 Age**

Age was the first variable of the category 'circumstances of joining the jihad'. In Sageman's sample the average age was 25.7 years. The average in our sample was higher at 27.3 years. In both cases, most persons joined the jihad well past adolescence, often in their mid- or late-twenties. It should be noted that there are a significant number of exceptions to this general picture as the range of ages within both samples was quite wide.

## **6.11 Place of Recruitment**

Sageman noted that recruitment for the jihad was high amongst men that were 'cut off' from their original roots, far from their families and friends. Seventy percent joined the jihad in a foreign country. In our sample the situation was rather different. The overwhelming majority (more than 80 percent) of the persons that we could find information on were recruited in their country of residence. Most of them were second- or third generation immigrants who were born and raised in these countries. If one wants to regard this situation as one in which a persons is being cut off from cultural and social origins, it supports Sageman's assumption that being away from 'home' is a very important factor in the process of joining the jihad. However, most of our 242 jihadi terrorists in Europe were not far from their families and friends, and in many ways were at home in the countries of recruitment. We regard the term 'home-grown' as very appropriate to the European sample. Hence the two samples differ significantly on this issue.

### **6.12 Faith**

Both in the sample of Sageman and ours, almost all persons on which information could be found became more devout before joining the jihad and being involved in terrorist activities. Thus, our findings support Sageman's conclusion that before joining the jihad and getting involved in terrorist activities most people become more religious.

### **6.13 Employment**

In our sample there were few examples of full-time terrorists. Most people had a 'normal life' and most of the persons on whom we could find information had full-time jobs. This was, for instance, the case for three of the four suicide bombers responsible for the first London bombings. This general picture is quite different from that of the global mujahedin in Sageman's sample. He found many examples of full-time jihadis as well as many students that can be considered as such. In Europe, in contrast, participating in terrorist activities seemed to be a 'part-time activity'.

### **6.14 Relative Deprivation**

Given the fact that we could not gather enough information to indicate whether or not the concept of relative deprivation was relevant to jihadi terrorists in our sample, we could not compare data between the two samples.

### **6.15 Social Affiliation**

In our sample we found 92 cases of social affiliation at the time people started to get involved in jihadi terrorist activities. Kinship was the dominant one (49 cases), followed by friendship bonds (43 cases). We found no evidence of discipleship. The figures for kinship and friendship represent about 35 percent of the total sample. This is a much lower percentage than that of Sageman. Among his global mujahedin a clear majority of persons had social bonds with network members at the time of their joining the jihad (150 out of 172 persons). In his sample friendship bonds were far more important than kinship bonds. In addition he found many examples of discipleship among Southeast Asians.

### 6.16 Formal acceptance

In his study, Sageman stressed the importance of formal acceptance of potential candidates to the jihad through discovering a link to the global Salafi network. This was the final part of his three-pronged process of joining the jihad. Within the group of 242 jihadi terrorists in Europe, we found only a few cases of (possible) foreign connections and links with global Salafi networks. We did not find concrete information that supports the existence of the final phase in Sageman's three-pronged process of joining the jihad. We did observe examples in which individuals seemed to join the jihad more or less entirely on their own. Hence, in Europe this process seemed to be fundamentally different from that of the global mujahedin.

### 6.17 Conclusion

Comparing the sample of the European group with that of Sageman's members of global Salafi networks the main conclusion must be that there are more dissimilarities than similarities between the two. There is the difference in average age between Sageman's group (25.7 years) and ours (27.3). Whereas the former mainly consists of married men, the jihadi terrorists in Europe were predominantly single. The samples also differ very much with regard to socioeconomic status and occupational background. The subgroup within Sageman's sample that comes closest to the group of Islamist terrorist in Europe is that of the Maghreb Arabs. Both groups share a socioeconomic background, faith as youth, type of occupation, and the fact that many of them have a criminal record. These similarities are partly explained by the overlap of the two samples.<sup>61</sup>

Differences between the two samples are less explicit with regard to circumstances in which individuals in both groups joined the jihad. Whereas most members of global Salafi networks were recruited far from their families and friends, European terrorists joined the jihad under opposite circumstances. Thus, the situation in Europe goes against Sageman's assumption that people were recruited while away from home. It should also be noted that instead of the term 'recruitment', the term 'self-recruitment' seems more appropriate in the European setting. Most of the jihadi terrorists

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<sup>61</sup> See footnote 57. Except for Abu Hamza al Masri, all persons that are in both samples belong to Sageman's sub-group of Maghreb Arabs.

in Europe joined the jihad by process of radicalisation and recruitment with very limited or even no outside interference.

Other circumstances that are rather different include employment and social affiliation. Most have work or study, some are married with children, others live with their parents or friends. Basically, they seem to live 'normal' lives that look similar to those of most of the people within their communities. Sageman's global mujahedin, however, were often full-time jihadis. In both cases social affiliation played a role in joining the jihad. However, in the case of Europe, kinship was more important than friendship; while in the case of global jihadi terrorists it was the other way around.

In general, the above-mentioned differences in the circumstances for joining the jihad cannot be regarded as fundamental. Social affiliation, the most crucial factor in this process, played a role in both samples.

Finally, the third phase in Sageman's three-pronged process, that of formal acceptance of potential jihadi fighters by global Salafi networks, such as Al-Qaeda, is not a vital phase in the case of jihadi terrorists in Europe. As mentioned above, most of the jihadi terrorists in Europe joined the jihad with very limited or no outside intrusion.

## 7 Conclusions

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In this exploratory study, we identified 242 jihadi terrorists in Europe, examined their ‘biographies’, and compared them with those of 172 members of global Salafi networks. By doing so, we have presented many little pieces of the puzzle of jihadi terrorism in Europe. Given all the obstacles and limitations for this kind of research, the overall picture of this puzzle is still not complete. Nonetheless, we will attempt to combine some of the pieces and give an impression of what that overall picture may look like.

With regard to the characteristics of the 28 **networks** that have been involved in jihadi terrorism in Europe the broad picture is the following. Most of the networks are active in Western Europe and differ in size, target selection, geographic distribution of their operations, average age, geographical background, and other variables. However, *within* networks there is homogeneity. Members of the network often are about the same age and come from the same places. This may be explained by the way these networks are formed, which often is through social affiliation. Many consist of people that are related to each other through kinship or friendship.

Our analysis of the characteristics of the 242 **individual jihadi terrorists** leads to the following general picture. They are mostly single males that are born and raised in Europe; they are not particularly young; they are often from the lower strata of society; and many of them have a criminal record.



Their socioeconomic background and their often tainted criminal history are reflective of many youngsters in immigrant Muslim communities in Europe, to which most of them belong. Given the fact that more than 40 percent of them were born in Europe and an additional 55 percent have been raised in European countries or are long-term residents, the label 'home-grown' is very appropriate to this group.

If we look at the **circumstances** in which these individuals became involved in jihadi terrorist activities, a picture emerges of networks including friends or relatives that do not seem to have formal ties with global Salafi networks; that radicalise with little outside interference; and that do so in the country in which they live, often together with family members or friends.

**Comparing** the sample of the European group with that of Sageman's 172 members of global Salafi networks leads to the conclusion that European jihadi terrorists are rather different from Sageman's global Salafi terrorists. This holds in particular for age, family status, and socioeconomic and geographic background. However, the circumstances in which these global Salafi terrorists joined the jihad are not fundamentally unlike those in which the jihadi terrorist in Europe joined the terrorist struggle to further Islamist ideology. In both cases social affiliation plays an important role in joining the jihad.

## 7.1 Implications

The conclusion of this study, that there is no standard jihadi terrorist, has implications for the idea of profiling certain groups of people that are considered likely to commit a terrorist crime. Based on the analysis of the characteristics we investigated, such a policy does not promise to be very fruitful. Not only at the individual level, but also at group level there are few common traits. The fact that most of them are of North African descent is a commonality that is too broad to be very useful to detect possible terrorists in a continent that is home to a few million of Maghrebis. Even the conclusion that many would-be terrorists join the jihad as groups of friends or relatives does not provide clear signs that would make it easier for the intelligence community to spot jihadi networks at an early stage. There are uncountable groups of friends and family members and our sample also includes groups of persons that lack pre-existing social ties. Moreover, there are examples of persons that seem to have operated almost entirely on their own.

The outcome of this study's findings is not very encouraging in light of the vast range of socioeconomic policies being carried out with the aspiration of stopping individuals from joining the jihad. Of Sageman's circumstances in which this process takes place some could (theoretically) be changed, others not. The latter category includes the variables age, family status, psychological make-up, and friendship and kinship. Other variables such as education, occupation and employment, may be influenced by specific policies that are aimed at immigrant and Muslim communities. However, before embarking on such a course of action, it is essential that we know much more about the relationship between certain circumstances and the joining of the jihad by groups and individuals. Unless we have profound insight in these links and processes, socioeconomic policies may seem to make sense, but might just as well make no difference at all. Moreover, such policies may even make things worse, for instance, by stereotyping immigrant and Muslim communities as possible jihadi terrorists and contribute to polarization between Muslims and non-Muslims.

## **7.2 Final remarks**

As mentioned in the introduction of this chapter, the picture of the puzzle of jihadi terrorists in Europe is still incomplete. Given the heterogeneity of this group and the complexity of the networks, it remains to be seen if we will ever have clear insight in the characteristics of this group. This is not to say that further research is futile. Collecting information on individuals and networks behind jihadi terrorist activities in Europe needs to be continued. More data on individuals as well as updated knowledge on the process of joining the jihad and developments within networks are much needed to stay aware of trends and developments. This awareness is essential to prevent unpleasant 'surprises', such as the 'discovery' of homegrown suicide terrorists in July 2005 in Britain. More conclusive research on jihadi terrorists in Europe is also needed to test the assumptions and to further explain the observations that were presented in this study.

## Data set jihadi terrorists in Europe

Nr	Case	Name	Sentence Custody	Age	Nationality	Country of family origin	Country of residence
1	1	Abdelkrim Lefkir	6 years	32			France
2	1	Ahmed Laidouni	7 years	35	France	Algeria	France
3	1	David Courtailler	4 years	28	France	France	France
4	1	Djamel Beghal	10 years	39	France / Algeria	Algeria	France
5	1	Jerome Courtailler	4 years	27	France	France	France
6	1	Abdelghani Rabia	6 years	30	Algeria	Algeria	Netherlands
7	1	Johan Bonte	1 year	21	France	France	France
8	1	Kamel Daoudi	9 years	27	France / Algeria	Algeria	France
9	1	Mohamed Chaouki Baadache	10 years	34	Algeria	Algeria	France
10	1	Nabil Bounour	6 years	30	Algeria	Algeria	France
11	1	Rachid Benmessahel	3 years	32			France
12	2	Nizar Trabelsi	10 years	31	Tunisia	Tunisia	Germany
13	2	Amor Sliti	5 years	44	Belgium / Tunisia	Tunisia	Belgium

<b>Nr</b>	<b>Case</b>	<b>Name</b>	<b>Sentence Custody</b>	<b>Age</b>	<b>Nationality</b>	<b>Country of family origin</b>	<b>Country of residence</b>
14	2	Tarak Maaroufi	6 years	36	Belgium / Tunisia	Tunisia	Belgium
15	2	Abdelcrim el Hadouti	5 years	24	Morocco	Morocco	Belgium
16	3	Abderahmane Chenine	6 years	35	Algeria	Algeria	France
17	3	Charef Betterki	30 months	33	Algeria	Algeria	France
18	3	Nacim Rebani	5 years	32	France	Algeria	France
19	3	Nasseredine Mamache	2 years	42	Algeria	Algeria	France
20	3	Rabieh Chenine	5 years	29	Algeria	Algeria	France
21	4	Saajid Badat	13 years	24	UK / Malawi	Malawi	UK
22	4	Richard Reid	Life sentence	28	UK / Jamaica	UK / Jamaica	UK
23	5	Ashraf al-Dagma	7.5 years	32	Jordan / Palestine	Palestine	Germany
24	5	Djamel Moustafa	5 years	28	Algeria	Algeria	Germany
25	5	Ismail Shalabi	6 years	28	Jordan / Palestine	Palestine	Germany
26	5	Mohammed abu Dhess	8 years	25	Jordan / Palestine	Palestine	Germany
27	5	Shadi Abadallah	4 years	28	Jordan / Palestine	Palestine	Germany
28	6	Abdallah M'Sefer Ali al Ghamdi	10 years	21	Saudi-Arabia	Saudi-Arabia	Afghanistan
29	6	Mohamed Nadiri	1 year		Morocco	Morocco	Morocco
30	6	Hilal Jaber Alassiri	10 years	31	Saudi-Arabia	Saudi-Arabia	Afghanistan

<b>Nr</b>	<b>Case</b>	<b>Name</b>	<b>Sentence Custody</b>	<b>Age</b>	<b>Nationality</b>	<b>Country of family origin</b>	<b>Country of residence</b>
31	6	Mohamed Mafamane	1 year		Morocco	Morocco	Morocco
32	6	Zuher Hilal Mohamed al Tbaiti	10 years	26	Saudi-Arabia	Saudi-Arabia	Afghanistan
33	7	Maamar Ouazane	2 years	22		Algeria	France
34	7	Khaled Ouazane	Not public	36		Algeria	France
35	7	Hassan Habbar	Not public	35		Algeria	
36	7	Abdelwahab Djouba	Not public			Algeria	France
37	7	Abdelwahed Regad	Not public	26		Algeria	France
38	7	Chellali Benchellali	18 months	59	Algeria	Algeria	France
39	7	Hafed Benchellali	Not public		France / Algeria	Algeria	France
40	7	Hafsa Benchellali	Not public		Algeria	Algeria	France
41	7	Menad Benchellali	10 years	32	France / Algeria	Algeria	France
42	7	Mirouane Benahmed	10 years	33	France / Algeria	Algeria	France
43	7	Mourad Benchellali	Not public	25	France / Algeria	Algeria	France
44	7	Nouredine Merabet	9 years	31	Algeria	Algeria	France
45	7	Mohamed Marbah	8 years			Algeria	France
46	7	Said Arif	9 years	40		Algeria	France

<b>Nr</b>	<b>Case</b>	<b>Name</b>	<b>Sentence Custody</b>	<b>Age</b>	<b>Nationality</b>	<b>Country of family origin</b>	<b>Country of residence</b>
47	8	Kamel Bourgass	17 years	31	Algeria	Algeria	UK
48	8	Mohammed Meguerba	10 years	34	Algeria	Algeria	Ireland
49	9	Abbas Boutrab	6 years	27	Algeria	Algeria	UK
50	10	Andrew Rowe	15 years	34	UK	UK	UK
51	11	Muhammad Rafik	4 years, 8 months	40	Morocco	Morocco	Italy
52	11	Kamel Hamroui	3 years, 4 months	28	Tunisia	Tunisia	Italy
53	12	Rabei Osman el Sayed Ahmed	10 years	32	Egypt	Egypt	Italy
54	12	Abdelilah el Faoual el Akil	In custody	33	Morocco	Morocco	Spain
55	12	Abdelmajid Bouchar	In custody	22	Morocco	Morocco	Spain
56	12	Abdennabi Kounjaa	Suicide	34	Morocco	Morocco	Spain
57	12	Abderrahim Zbakh	In custody	33	Morocco	Morocco	Spain
58	12	Adnan Waki	In custody	28	Syria	Syria	
59	12	Allekema Lamaari	Suicide	32+	Algeria	Algeria	Spain
60	12	Asri Rifaat Anouar	Suicide	24	Morocco	Morocco	Spain
61	12	Basel Ghayoun	In custody	25	Syria	Syria	Spain
62	12	Daoud Ouhnane	Fugitive	34	Algeria	Algeria	France

<b>Nr</b>	<b>Case</b>	<b>Name</b>	<b>Sentence Custody</b>	<b>Age</b>	<b>Nationality</b>	<b>Country of family origin</b>	<b>Country of residence</b>
63	12	Faisal Alluch	In custody	33	Morocco	Morocco	Spain
64	12	khalid zeimi Pardo	In custody	28	Morocco	Morocco	Spain
65	12	Fouad el Morabit Anghar	In custody	28	Morocco	Morocco	Spain
66	12	Hamid Ahmidan	In custody	27	Morocco	Morocco	Spain
67	12	Hasan al-Haski	In custody	41	Morocco	Morocco	
68	12	Jamal Ahmidan	Suicide	33	Morocco	Morocco	Spain
69	12	Jamal Zougam	In custody	31	Morocco	Morocco	Spain
70	12	José Emilio Suárez Trashorras	In custody	28	Spain	Spain	Spain
71	12	Mahmoud Slimane Aoun	In custody	44	Lebanon	Lebanon	Spain
72	12	Mohamed Afalah	Fugitive	30	Morocco	Morocco	
73	12	Mohamed Bouharat	In custody	24	Morocco	Morocco	
74	12	Mohammed Oulad Akcha	Suicide	31	Morocco	Morocco	
75	12	Mohannad Almallah Dabas	In custody	40	Spain / Syria	Syria	Spain
76	12	Moutaz Dabas	In custody	39	Spain / Syria	Syria	Spain
77	12	Otman El Gnaout el Ghanoui	In custody	29	Morocco	Morocco	
78	12	Rachid Aglif	In custody	25	Morocco	Morocco	

<b>Nr</b>	<b>Case</b>	<b>Name</b>	<b>Sentence Custody</b>	<b>Age</b>	<b>Nationality</b>	<b>Country of family origin</b>	<b>Country of residence</b>
79	12	Rachid Oulad Akcha	Suicide	34	Morocco	Morocco	Spain
80	12	Rafa Zuher	In custody	25	Morocco	Morocco	
81	12	Said el Harrak	In custody	32	Morocco	Morocco	
82	12	Sehjane ben Abdelmajid Fakhet	Suicide	35	Tunisia	Tunisia	Spain
83	12	Mohammed Larbi Ben Selam	In custody	27	Algeria	Algeria	Spain
84	12	Nasreddine Bousbaa	In custody	42	Algeria	Algeria	Spain
85	12	Youssef Belhadj	In custody	28	Morocco	Morocco	Belgium
86	13	Ali Kaouka	In custody	30	Spain / Algeria	Algeria	Spain
87	13	Mohamed Nebbar	In custody	33	Spain / Algeria	Algeria	Spain
88	13	Djamel Boudjelthia	In custody			Algeria	Spain
89	13	Mohamed Tahraoui	In custody	31	Spain / Algeria	Algeria	Spain
90	14	Anthony Garcia	In custody	21	UK / Pakistan	Pakistan	UK
91	14	Nabeel Hussain	In custody	18	UK / Pakistan	Pakistan	UK
92	14	Ahmad Khan	In custody	18	UK / Pakistan	Pakistan	UK
93	14	Jawad Akbar	In custody	20	UK / Pakistan	Pakistan	UK
94	14	Mohammed Momin Khawaja	In custody	29	Canada / Pakistan	Pakistan	Canada



<b>Nr</b>	<b>Case</b>	<b>Name</b>	<b>Sentence Custody</b>	<b>Age</b>	<b>Nationality</b>	<b>Country of family origin</b>	<b>Country of residence</b>
95	14	Omar Khayam	In custody	22	UK / Pakistan	Pakistan	UK
96	14	Salahuddin Amin	In custody	31	UK / Pakistan	Pakistan	UK
97	14	Shujah Khayam	In custody	17	UK / Pakistan	Pakistan	UK
98	14	Waheed Mahmoud	In custody	32	UK / Pakistan	Pakistan	UK
99	15	Abu Hamza al-Masri	7 years	47	UK / Egypt	Egypt	UK
100	16	Khalid Oussaih	5 years	32	Belgium / Morocco	Morocco	Belgium
101	16	Abdallah Ouabour	5 years	31	Belgium	Morocco	Belgium
102	16	Abdelkader Hakimi	8 years	39	Belgium / Morocco	Morocco	Belgium
103	16	El Mostapha el Abdeslami	40 months		Belgium / Morocco	Morocco	Belgium
104	16	Khalid Bouloudo	5 years	30	Begium	Morocco	Belgium
105	16	Lahoussine el Haski	8 years	29	Belgium / Morocco	Morocco	Belgium
106	16	Mostafa Lounani	6 years	41	Belgium / Morocco	Morocco	Belgium
107	16	Mourad Chabarou	5 years	25	Morocco	Morocco	Belgium
108	16	Rachid Iba	3 years	25	Belgium	Morocco	Belgium
109	17	Abdul aziz Jalil	In custody	31	UK	Pakistan	UK
110	17	Dhiren Barot	Life sentence	32	UK / India	India	UK

<b>Nr</b>	<b>Case</b>	<b>Name</b>	<b>Sentence Custody</b>	<b>Age</b>	<b>Nationality</b>	<b>Country of family origin</b>	<b>Country of residence</b>
111	17	Junade Feroze	In custody	28	UK	Pakistan	UK
112	17	Mohammed Naveed Bhatti	In custody	24	UK	Pakistan	UK
113	17	Nadeem Tarmohammed	In custody	26	UK	Pakistan	UK
114	17	Omar Abdul Rehman	In custody	20	UK	Pakistan	UK
115	17	Quaisar Shaffi	In custody	25	UK	Pakistan	UK
116	17	Mohamed ul-Haq	In custody	25	UK	Pakistan	UK
117	18	Yehya Kadouri	140 days	17	Netherlands	Morocco	Netherlands
118	19	Abdelkrim Bensmail	In custody	42	Algeria	Algeria	Spain
119	19	Amhed Chebli	In custody	21	Algeria	Algeria	Spain
120	19	Aspri Smali	In custody	36	Spain / Algeria	Algeria	Spain
121	19	Baanou Abdullah	In custody	31	Lebanon	Lebanon	Spain
122	19	Bachir Belhakem	In custody	39	Algeria	Algeria	Spain
123	19	Baldomero Lara Sanchez	In custody	29	Spain	Spain	Spain
124	19	Dibali Abdellah	In custody	29	Algeria	Algeria	
125	19	Djamel Merabet	In custody	42	Algeria	Algeria	Spain
126	19	Djilali Mazari	In custody	42	Algeria	Algeria	

<b>Nr</b>	<b>Case</b>	<b>Name</b>	<b>Sentence Custody</b>	<b>Age</b>	<b>Nationality</b>	<b>Country of family origin</b>	<b>Country of residence</b>
127	19	Eddebdoubi Taoufik	In custody	24	Morocco	Morocco	Spain
128	19	Hocine Kedache	In custody	48	Algeria	Algeria	Spain
129	19	Kamara Birahima Diadie	In custody	31	Mauritania	Mauritania	Spain
130	19	Soubi Khouni	In custody	42	Algeria	Algeria	Spain
131	19	Majid Sahouane	In custody	36	Algeria	Algeria	Spain
132	19	Majid Mchmacha	In custody	35	Morocco	Morocco	Spain
133	19	Mohamed Akli Amine	In custody	32	Morocco	Morocco	Spain
134	19	Mohamed Boualem Khouni	In custody	35	Algeria	Algeria	Spain
135	19	Mohamed Boukiri	In custody	30	Algeria	Algeria	Spain
136	19	Mohamed Acharf	In custody	30	Morocco	Morocco	Switzerland
137	19	Mokhatar Siah	In custody	29	Algeria	Algeria	Spain
138	19	Mouad Douas	In custody	24	Spain	Spain	Spain
139	19	Mourad Yala	In custody	44	Algeria	Algeria	Spain
140	19	Moustafa Farjani	In custody	33	Morocco	Morocco	Spain
141	19	Mustafa Zanibar	In custody	32	Morocco	Morocco	Spain
142	19	Salah Zemat	In custody	40	Algeria	Algeria	Spain

<b>Nr</b>	<b>Case</b>	<b>Name</b>	<b>Sentence Custody</b>	<b>Age</b>	<b>Nationality</b>	<b>Country of family origin</b>	<b>Country of residence</b>
143	19	Said Afif	In custody	26	Algeria	Algeria	Spain
144	19	Mohamed Keussabi	Fugitive	30	Algeria	Algeria	
145	19	Mohamed Hamid	Fugitive	36	Algeria	Algeria	
146	19	Mohamed Arabe	In custody	47	Morocco	Morocco	
147	19	Djamel Seddiki	In custody	35	Algeria	Algeria	Spain
148	19	Reda Cherif	In custody	34	Algeria	Algeria	Spain
149	19	Abdellah Hawari	In custody	37	Algeria	Algeria	
150	19	Mohamed Amin	In custody	38	Palestine	Palestine	
151	19	Abdol Ghaffar Hasemi	In custody	31	Afghanistan	Afghanistan	Spain
152	19	Abdelaziz Mouratik	In custody	33	Morocco	Morocco	
153	19	Abdelkrim Ouazzani	In custody	37	Morocco	Morocco	Spain
154	19	Abdezarrak Azzi	In custody	43	Spain / Morocco	Morocco	Spain
155	19	Azzedine Bellid	In custody	37	Algeria	Algeria	Spain
156	19	Mohamed El Ouazzani	In custody	23	Morocco	Morocco	Spain
157	19	Mustapha al Maymouni	In custody	33	Morocco	Morocco	
158	19	Noureddin Belid	In custody	39	Algeria	Algeria	Spain

<b>Nr</b>	<b>Case</b>	<b>Name</b>	<b>Sentence Custody</b>	<b>Age</b>	<b>Nationality</b>	<b>Country of family origin</b>	<b>Country of residence</b>
159	19	Said Rehou	In custody	22	Morocco	Morocco	
160	19	Mohammed Afalah	Fugitive	29	Morocco	Morocco	Spain
161	19	Samir ben Abdallah	In custody	37	Morocco	Morocco	Spain
162	20	Mohammed Bouyeri	Life sentence	27	Netherlands / Morocco	Morocco	Netherlands
163	21	Ahmed Hamdi	2 years	26	Netherlands / Morocco	Morocco	Netherlands
164	21	Ismael Akhnikh	13 years	21	Netherlands / Morocco	Morocco	Netherlands
165	21	Jason Walters	15 years	19	Netherlands / USA	Netherlands / USA	Netherlands
166	21	Mohammed el Morabit	2 years	24	Netherlands / Morocco	Morocco	Netherlands
167	21	Mohammed Fahmi Boughabe	18 months	22	Netherlands / Morocco	Morocco	Netherlands
168	21	Nouredine el Fahtni	5 years	23	Morocco	Morocco	Netherlands
169	21	Youssef Ettoumi	1 year	25	Netherlands / Morocco	Morocco	Netherlands
170	21	Zine Labidine Aourghe	18 months	27	Morocco	Morocco	Netherlands
171	22	Bilal Lamrani	3 years	21	Morocco	Morocco	Netherlands
172	23	Germaine Lindsay	Suicide	19	Jamaica	Jamaica	UK
173	23	Hasib Mir Hussain	Suicide	18	UK / Pakistan	Pakistan	UK
174	23	Mohammad Sidique Khan	Suicide	30	UK / Pakistan	Pakistan	UK

<b>Nr</b>	<b>Case</b>	<b>Name</b>	<b>Sentence Custody</b>	<b>Age</b>	<b>Nationality</b>	<b>Country of family origin</b>	<b>Country of residence</b>
175	23	Shehzad Tanweer	Suicide	22	UK / Pakistan	Pakistan	UK
176	24	Abdul Sherif	In custody	28			UK.
177	24	Adel Yahya Ahmed	In custody	23	UK / Ethiopia	Ethiopia	UK
178	24	Esayas Girma	In custody	20	Ethiopia	Ethiopia	UK
179	24	Ismael Abdurahman	In custody	23			UK
180	24	Manfo Kwaku Asiedu	In custody	32	UK / Ghana	Ghana	UK
181	24	Mohammed Kabashi	In custody	23			UK
182	24	Muhedin Ali	In custody	27			UK
183	24	Muktar Said Ibrahim	In custody	27	UK / Eritrea	Eritrea	UK
184	24	Mulumebet Girma	In custody	21	Ethiopia	Ethiopia	UK
185	24	Omar Nagmeloin Almagboul	In custody	20			UK
186	24	Hussain Osman	In custody	27	UK / Ethiopia	Ehtiopia	UK
187	24	Ramzi Mohamed	In custody	23	Somalia	Somalia	UK
188	24	Shadi Sami Abdelgadir	In custody	23			UK
189	24	Siraj Yassin Abdullah Ali	In custody	30			UK
190	24	Whabi Mohamed	In custody	23	Somalia	Somalia	UK

<b>Nr</b>	<b>Case</b>	<b>Name</b>	<b>Sentence Custody</b>	<b>Age</b>	<b>Nationality</b>	<b>Country of family origin</b>	<b>Country of residence</b>
191	24	Yasin Hassan Omar	In custody	24	Somalia	Somalia	UK
192	24	Yeshiemebet Girma	In custody	29	Ethiopia	Ethiopia	UK
193	25	Said Mansour	In custody	44	Denmark	Morocco	Denmark
194	26	Safé Bourada	In custody	35	France	Algeria	France
195	26	Mohamed Benyamina	In custody		Algeria	Algeria	France
196	26	Djamel Badaoui	In custody				
197	26	Achour Ouarab	In custody				
198	26	Kaci Ouarab	In custody				
199	26	Manuel	In custody	31	France	France	France
200	26	Stephane	In custody	36	France	France	France
201	26	Mohamed B.	In custody	34	France		
202	27	Soumaya Sahla	In custody	23	Netherlands / Morocco	Morocco	Netherlands
203	27	Mohammed Chentouf	In custody	31	Morocco	Morocco	Netherlands
204	27	Samir Azzouz	In custody	19	Netherlands / Morocco	Morocco	Netherlands
205	28	Tariq al-Daour	In custody	19	UK		UK
206	28	Wassem Mughal	In custody	22	UK		UK

<b>Nr</b>	<b>Case</b>	<b>Name</b>	<b>Sentence Custody</b>	<b>Age</b>	<b>Nationality</b>	<b>Country of family origin</b>	<b>Country of residence</b>
207	28	Younis Tsouli	In custody	22	UK		UK
208	28	Mirsad Bektasevic	In custody	19	Denmark	Bosnia	Sweden
209	28	Abdulkadir Cesur	In custody	18	Turkey	Turkey	Denmark
210	28	Bajro Ikanovic	In custody	30	Bosnia	Bosnia	Bosnia
211	28	Suspect 1	In custody	20	Denmark	Bosnia	Denmark
212	28	Suspect 2	In custody	16	Denmark	Palestine	Denmark
213	28	Suspect 3	In custody	19	Denmark	Denmark	Denmark
214	28	Suspect 4	In custody	16	Denmark	Morocco	Denmark
215	29	Achour Rabah	In custody		Algeria	Algeria	Italy
216	29	Khaled Serai	In custody	35	Algeria	Algeria	Italy
217	29	Mohamed Larbi	In custody	31	Algeria	Algeria	Italy
218	29	Sami Tartaq	In custody		Algeria	Algeria	Italy
219	29	Yamin Bouhrama	In custody	32	Algeria	Algeria	Italy
220	30	Khalil al Boubou	In custody		Lebanon	Lebanon	Lebanon
221	30	Jihad Hamad	In custody	20	Lebanon	Lebanon	Germany
222	30	Khaled Khair-Eddin El Hajdib	In custody		Lebanon	Lebanon	Lebanon



<b>Nr</b>	<b>Case</b>	<b>Name</b>	<b>Sentence Custody</b>	<b>Age</b>	<b>Nationality</b>	<b>Country of family origin</b>	<b>Country of residence</b>
223	30	Ayman Hawa	In custody		Lebanon	Lebanon	Lebanon
224	30	Youssef Mohamad El Hajdib	In custody	21	Lebanon	Lebanon	Germany
225	31	Abdula Ahmed Ali	In custody	25	UK		UK
226	31	Cossor Ali	In custody	23	UK		UK
227	31	Nabeel Hussain	In custody	22	UK		UK
228	31	Tanvir Hussain	In custody	25	UK		UK
229	31	Umair Hussain	In custody	24	UK		UK
230	31	Mehran Hussain	In custody	23	UK		UK
231	31	Osman Adam Khatib	In custody	19	UK		UK
232	31	Mohammed Yasar Gulzar	In custody	25			UK
233	31	Umar Islam	In custody	28	UK		UK
234	31	Waheed Arafat Kahn	In custody	24	UK	Pakistan	UK
235	31	Abdul Muneem Patel	In custody	17	UK		UK
236	31	Assad Ali Sarwar	In custody	26	UK		UK
237	31	Ibrahim Savant	In custody	25	UK	Iran	UK
238	31	Shamin Mohammed Uddin	In custody	35	UK		UK

<b>Nr</b>	<b>Case</b>	<b>Name</b>	<b>Sentence Custody</b>	<b>Age</b>	<b>Nationality</b>	<b>Country of family origin</b>	<b>Country of residence</b>
239	31	Wabeed Zaman	In custody	22	UK		UK
240	31	Rashid Rauf	In custody	25	UK / Pakistan	Pakistan	UK
241	31	Mohamed Al-Ghadra	In custody		Pakistan	Pakistan	
242	31	Ahmed Al-Khan	In custody		Pakistan	Pakistan	