

The Potential of the European Gendarmerie Force

Michiel de Weger


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Abbreviations

AdC	- Arma dei Carabinieri
AMERIPOL	- American Police Community
CBRN	- Chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear
CEPOL	- Collège Européen de Police (European Police College)
CIMIN	- Comité InterMinistériel de haut Niveau (High-level inter-departmental committee)
COESPU	- Centre of excellence for stability police units
DCBC	- Development, concepts and doctrine centre
EGF	- European Gendarmerie Force
ECPTF	- European Chiefs of Police Task Force
EU	- European Union
FIEP	- France, Italie, Espagne, Portugal
Frontex	- European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders
GN	- Gendarmerie Nationale
GNR	- Guarda Nacional Republicana
HQ	- Headquarters
IPU	- Integrated police unit
JR	- Jandarmeria Româna
KM	- Koninklijke Marechaussee
MoD	- Ministry of Defence

MoFA	- Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MP	- Military police
NATO	- North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NGO	- Non-governmental organisation
NIC	- National Intelligence Council
OGA	- Organisation de gendarmeries africaines (Organisation of African Gendarmeries)
OSCE	- Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PHQ	- Permanent headquarters
SSR	- Security sector reform
UN	- United Nations
US	- United States
USJFC	- United States Joint Forces Command

1. Introduction

The European Gendarmerie Force (EGF) is a relatively young international organisation. In October 2007 the governments of France, Italy, Spain, Portugal and the Netherlands signed a treaty to formally establish it. At present in the EGF the following gendarmerie forces cooperate: the Dutch Koninklijke Marechaussee (KM), the French Gendarmerie Nationale (GN), the Italian Arma dei Carabinieri (AdC), the Portuguese Guarda Nacional Republicana (GNR), the Spanish Guardia Civil (GC) and the Romanian Jandarmeria Româna (JR). Although they have different names, all have a dual police-military character.¹ The EGF is intended for international policing operations.

¹ In Anglo-American countries it is more common to refer to 'military police' or 'paramilitary' forces than 'gendarmerie'. As Scobell and Hammitt (1998) describe, 'paramilitary' has a much broader meaning than 'gendarmerie', also including groupings which are disloyal to and autonomous from the state.

Its creation has received considerable attention,² but no major study seems to have been made thereon. Within the EGF and in the national capitals it is also the case that no long-term vision seems to have been developed.

While being relatively insignificant at present, the EGF has the potential to become (far) more important in international security and a valuable asset for a far larger group of states, as will be argued in this paper. The basic question it intends to answer is the following:

How can the potential of the EGF be used in the next 10-20 years to best serve the interests of its Member States?

To find an answer to this question the EGF and its background will be described in chapter two. In the third chapter it is argued that the EGF could become a success in the kind of operations it is currently aimed at. Chapter four's focus is on the interests of the present EGF Member States in further developing the organisation – this study analyses the options from the interests of the states involved, which are not necessarily the same as those of the participating gendarmerie forces. In chapter five the potential to expand gendarmerie cooperation in the EGF is described. Chapter six analyses the implications of long-term trends to the the EGF's potential. This study ends with final conclusions and policy recommendations for the Dutch and other EGF Member States.

As not much literature exists on the future of the EGF and international gendarmerie cooperation, this is an explorative study. The focus is on its potential. Although this can be analysed combining longer-term security trends, the gendarmerie forces in Europe and beyond and their resources and experiences, whether its potential can and will be attained also depends on politics, policies, ambitions, the leverage over other states, diplomatic skills, unpredictable security developments, and even coincidence. This study mostly aims to identify in what directions the EGF could be developed. It is descriptive and modest in providing policy guidance. Hopefully, other authors will follow with more studies on the future of the EGF and international gendarmerie cooperation.

2 European Confederation of Police (2008), Hazdra (2008), Hillebrand (2008), p. 7, Hovens (2008), Antonescu (2007), Górká-Winter (2007), Marczuk (2007), Patry (2007), pp. 14-15, Selden (2007), Alber cs (2006), p. 183, Assembly of the Western European Union (2006), Hadley Stark (2006), Hansen (2006), pp. 12 and 32, Nowak (2006), pp. 20-21, Ruano (2006), Armitage and Moisan (2005), Lalinda (2005), Lindstrom (2005), p. 24, Ster (2005), p. 35, Coppola (2004) and Rémy (2004), p. 594.

For practical reasons and the limitations in time available for this study, no literature focusing on policing and the internationalisation of the police – and the place of gendarmerie forces within this – has been studied. Emphasis is on the gendarmerie, international security and military literature. As it is difficult to find up to date and detailed information on gendarmerie(-like) forces in the literature, this study relies to a high degree on internet sources. This includes the websites of the forces themselves, government websites and those of international organisations. These can be considered to be the more reliable websites. Information has been compared between various internet sources and existing literature and checked in interviews and correspondence with the gendarmerie forces themselves. The last section of this study ('biography and accountability') includes a list of interviewees and persons with whom the author has corresponded (transcripts available from author). These persons can be considered valuable and knowledgeable sources as they are, or have been, involved in the creation or work of the EGF. At the request of many of them they are not referred to in the text as sources for specific opinions and specific information. They have contributed their personal opinions which are not necessarily those of the organisations and governments they work for.

2. The European Gendarmerie Force

In this chapter the focus is on the EGF as it now exists. In the first section its background of increasing European security cooperation - between the police, the gendarmerie and the military - is described. The second section focuses on the process to create it. In the third section the aim and organisation of the EGF are described. The fourth section shows how the EGF's first operation was conceived.

2.1 Increasing European security cooperation

Gendarmerie forces are security organisations with a mix of police and military characteristics and tasks. The six EGF participating forces are all well-established organisations, created back in the 18th or 19th century. As Emsley (1999) describes, an important task of gendarmerie forces was pacifying (remote) areas where central government had limited influence. While taking part in military operations abroad, their main focus is on internal security. For instance, the French GN has around 140,000 employed personnel, of which only around 1% are involved in operations abroad.³ Gendarmerie forces cooperated with each other before the creation of the

3 Correspondence with the GN.

EGF, at corps level and, for instance, between border police departments, counter-terrorism units and in NATO concerning Military Police (MP) tasks.

Closer contacts developed in the early 1990s. Gendarmerie forces started to be deployed as part of broader international crisis management operations and started to take part in international police operations, for instance in the Balkans, Iraq and Afghanistan. In 1992 the Director General of the French Gendarmerie took the initiative to propose a formal and juridical framework for exchanging experience and information, as well as training between the French, Italian and Spanish gendarmeries. The directors of the three forces formed a commission, signing a Common declaration in Madrid on May 12th 1994 concerning cooperation between their forces. Their aim was to improve domestic security, especially by counteracting transnational crime, terrorism and illegal immigration, both in their own countries and in Europe in general. The FIEP at least discussed creating a European Gendarmerie,⁴ although in its essence the FIEP never developed beyond an association to exchange experiences, which it still remains today. The 1994 agreement was open to other gendarmerie forces. When Portugal joined in 1996 the association was called the FIEP (an abbreviation for France, Italy, España (Spain) and Portugal). Later, gendarmerie forces joined from Turkey (1998), Morocco, the Netherlands (1999) and Romania (2002). In 2002 Ukraine also applied for membership. The Argentinian gendarmerie and the Chilean Carabineros became associated members in 2005. The Internal Troops of Azerbaijan have requested to become associate members.⁵ The FIEP and EGF are not the only international gendarmerie organisations, however.

4 Marczuk (2007). Marczuk writes that there were 'plans' to create a European Gendarmerie. Statewatch states that the FIEP 'discussed' the creation of a European gendarmerie force for stabilisation operations, based on the NATO/Italian MSU concept, back in 1999. www.statewatch.org, Global "policing" role for EU, December 2000.

5 FIEP, Common declaration, Madrid, 25th October 2005. More information at www.fiep-asso.com.

In Africa 26 gendarmerie forces created the Organisation de gendarmeries africaines (OGA, in English: Organisation of African Gendarmeries) in 2003.⁶

The intensification of cooperation between gendarmerie forces is just one of the elements of increasing European security cooperation and integration. In December 1999 the European Council in Helsinki set the goal of being able to deploy (by 2003) an EU military force of up to 50-60,000 within 60 days. By January 1st 2007 this had been achieved. Starting some years previously, European police and judicial cooperation also intensified. In 1994 Europol was established. By now, Europol is the EU law enforcement organisation that handles criminal intelligence. Its aim is to improve effectiveness and cooperation between the competent authorities of the Member States in preventing and combating serious international organised crime and terrorism. In 2001 the EU established a European Chiefs of Police Task Force (ECPTF) to develop informal and personal links between the heads of various law enforcement agencies, to exchange information and to assist in closer cooperation between their organisations. Eurojust is the EU body established in 2002 to enhance the effectiveness of the competent authorities within the Member States when they deal with the investigation and prosecution of serious cross-border and organised crime. Finally, in 2002 the Dutch and German river and harbour police founded Aquapol. By now nine EU Member States participate concerning national river and harbour police or inland navigation inspectorates. Their goal is to increase international cooperation and to act as advisors to European legislative and regulatory bodies.⁷

At the European Council in Feira, Portugal, in June 2000, it was agreed that EU Member States should be able, by 2003, to provide up to 5,000 police officers for international missions across a range of conflict prevention and crisis management operations. This would include being able to deploy up to 1,000 police officers within 30 days. It was not specified to which extent civil

6 Creating an OGA was proposed in 2001, and a convention was signed in 2003. Its aim is to stimulate exchanges and to harmonise and coordinate initiatives between its 26 participating forces. It has a permanent seat in Dakar and a rotating presidency, regional bureaux in Algiers (North Africa), Abidjan (West Africa), and Libreville (Central, East and Indian Ocean Africa). See www.lesoleil.sn, www.afrik.com and www.avmaroc.com. In November 2007 18 Latin-American countries created the American Police Community (AMERIPOL or *Comunidad de Policías de América*). This includes a number of gendarmerie forces, has fighting drugs as a mission and is more like Europol rather than the FIEP or EGF (En.wikipedia.org).

7 www.aquapol-police.com. Only one gendarmerie force participates: the French GN.

police and gendarmerie forces would make up this EU police force.⁸ In 2004, the European Council decided to set up Frontex.⁹ Now based in Warsaw, Frontex coordinates the border security activities of Member States. The year 2005 saw the creation of CEPOL, the Collège Européen de Police or European Police College. It organises training courses for senior police officers from European police forces and engages in research activities. Although it has a secretariat in Bramshill in the United Kingdom, its activities take place at the national police academies of its Member States.¹⁰ Based on their domestic responsibilities, the six gendarmerie forces cooperating in the EGF also participate in and liaise or cooperate with many European security organisations individually.¹¹

Not only these European police and gendarmerie organisations are important in understanding the position of the EGF. As military police organisations gendarmerie forces operate between the civilian police and the regular military. In some countries gendarmerie forces have the task of policing military personnel and military facilities; in other countries the civilian police or MP units do this. In international operations gendarmerie forces often work with the MP of troop-contributing nations, like the United States' (US), British or German MP. In NATO all national organisations responsible for policing the military, thus both 'pure' MP and gendarmerie, cooperate in supporting alliance operations, including in developing doctrine, organising exercises etc.¹² Over the last few decades the size and role of MP organisations

8 Santa Maria de Feira European Council, Conclusions of the Presidency, 19 and 20 June 2000.

9 The formal name is the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders.

10 Occhipinti (2003) contains an excellent overview of increasing EU police cooperation up until 2003. It includes a chronology starting in 1898, but becomes more elaborate in the 1970s and especially in the 1990s.

11 E.g. the Italian AdC takes part in G8 and Schengen (working) groups, the EU police unit, Europol, the EPCTF, Interpol, the EU's 'internal' anti-fraud office – OLAF, the OSCE, and the European National Forensic Science Institute (www.carabinieri.it). The French GN takes part in a wide range of committee and working groups of the EU, and in 'Schengen', Europol, the EPCTF, Frontex, and is permanently represented at the French representation to the OSCE. It is also a partner in bilateral police/customs cooperation organisations with Belgium, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Spain and Switzerland. The Portuguese GNR participates in CEPOL, EPCTF, EUROPOL, FRONTEX and OLAF. The Dutch KM participates in CEPOL, Frontex and Europol. The Spanish GC participates in EPCTF, EUROPOL, OLAF (www.guardiacivil.org). The Romanian JR only participates in FIEP and EGF (correspondence Romanian JR).

12 NATO has a multinational MP battalion, consisting of Poles, Czechs, Slovaks and Croats. A second is led by German MP, a third by the Danish.

have been expanded to contribute more to peacekeeping operations.¹³ In those countries where gendarmerie forces do have the task of policing the military, the gendarmerie and regular military forces have a very close relationship, both domestically and when operating abroad.

To make this *tableau de la troupe* even more complicated, many armed forces have specially trained (infantry or MP) units for crowd and riot control in crisis management operations. The gendarmerie forces also regularly send crowd and riot control units to Bosnia, Kosovo etc. Moreover, (MP and regular) military forces organise counter-crime operations (for instance, against smuggling or the illegal arms trade), just like gendarmerie forces do. Having domestically at least more experience in these kinds of activities, the gendarmerie competes with the MP and the infantry concerning which organisation should take a leading role and provide most of these policing or stabilisation activities in international operations.¹⁴ Civilian police forces also participate in international operations – and in considerable numbers. Countries without gendarmerie-like forces, like Germany and Sweden, actually send considerable numbers of civilian police officers abroad. But even countries with a gendarmerie force, like the Netherlands, also deploy civilian police officers. Until recently the Dutch civil police would only send advisors and trainers for bilateral cooperation, work in international organisations and international policing operations, but this will change as the Minister of the Interior has decided that Dutch civilian police officers are also allowed to contribute to international executive policing operations. Although not sending as many personnel abroad as the Dutch KM have done until now, the difference might thus become smaller in the future. So, gendarmerie forces are also competing with the civilian police for their share in the budgets and personnel for international policing activities. Clearly, this is not a day to day, work-floor level or even always a detrimental kind of competition, but is rather a strategic, long-term, bureaucratic and neo-institutional kind of competition – just as the civil police and the regular military have amongst each other.

13 Hovens (2008). In the Dutch expert meeting it was mentioned that the US MP has been doubled in size: from 30,000 to 60,000.

14 Guisnel (1999).

2.2 The process of creating an EGF

Against this background the creation of an EGF was first proposed by the French Defence Minister, Michèle Alliot-Marie, in September 2003. A Declaration of intent to start an EGF was signed on September 17th 2004 in Noordwijk in the Netherlands. While the text does not specifically mention the fact, the EGF was also intended to deliver a significant part to the rapidly deployable 1,000-officer EU police crisis management force (and other parts of EU police missions). On January 23rd 2006 the EGF was officially inaugurated during a military ceremony in Vicenza, Italy. It was declared fully operational on July 20th 2006. This was after two command post exercises in June 2005 and April 2006. In an EGF exercise in June 2006 Turkey, Britain and Romania participated, while Morocco, Algeria, Qatar, Georgia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Ukraine sent observers.¹⁵ On October 18th, 2007, representatives of the Kingdom of Spain, the French Republic, the Italian Republic, the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Portuguese Republic signed the Treaty establishing the EGF in the town of Velsen, the Netherlands. The Treaty has not yet been ratified.

The creation of the EGF was a complex political and bureaucratic process.¹⁶ Four authors provide more insight into what occurred. As Lalinde (2005) describes, France was the project's originator and showed a clear interest in speeding up the establishment of the new force as much as possible. The EGF should gain its autonomy from already existing infrastructures within the EU, involving units other than those already committed to it. France proposed that the EGF would have permanent headquarters (HQ), in other words assigned forces for operations. The other nations, however, preferred to organise the EGF within the EU, thereby maximising already existing structures. During the negotiations it became clear that it would be difficult to create the EGF within the framework of the EU, especially due to the reluctance of certain countries towards police forces of a military character. In addition, there were multiple opinions among the five countries regarding the force's size. On the one hand, countries such as France and Italy have large-scale gendarmerie forces. Furthermore, both have seen their police responsibilities reduced within their own territories. Hence, they consider their projection abroad as a means of increasing the EGF's added value as

15 Anadolu Press Agency, 1 July 2006.

16 Just like military tasks in domestic security. De Weger (2006) analyses how and why decisions were made in the Netherlands to task the military, including the KM, with additional roles in public order management, explosive ordinance, counter-terrorism, policing at civilian airports and the mobile surveillance of aliens (summary in English).

compared to the civil police. On the other hand, Portugal and the Netherlands do not have very numerous forces. Spain stands somewhere in between the two extremes with a force which has a considerable size. As regards the operations on which the force is to be deployed, there was unanimity from the start that the EGF should be capable of covering all police operations that could arise in a conflict area, including high-risk scenarios, the initial stages of military intervention and situations that have already stabilised.¹⁷ From interviews it is clear that during the negotiations to create the EGF, tasks other than policing during the transition from military to civilian phases of peacekeeping operations were not seriously discussed.

Govaarts (2006) mostly focuses on the Dutch position. The Dutch government saw the EGF as a further contribution to European cooperation, but also as a means to increase police cooperation with France. The Dutch Ministry of Defence (MoD) regarded the participation of the KM as a way to improve its contribution to international crisis management operations, while the Foreign Ministry wanted to create a comprehensive approach to crises, spanning diplomatic, economic, humanitarian and military policy instruments, in which the EGF could be an important component. The Dutch representatives took on the role of mediating between the French and the Italians, who were soon found to have differing views as to how the EGF should be structured. Italy had introduced the multinational specialised unit (MSU) concept in NATO to prevent the Italian Ministry of the Interior from having an influence on the Italian AdC in international operations. Italy was concerned that the EGF would not (fully) adopt the MSU concept, which it had also led and for the largest part manned in NATO's operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina from 1998 onwards.

17 Lalinde (2005), pp. 2-3.

In the negotiations at least the Dutch and the French were opposed to the EGF having a standing force and the full integration of the Centre of Excellence for Stability Police Units (COESPU) in the EGF.¹⁸ From interviews it became clear that the Dutch were not alone in their opposition to a standing force and COESPU integration. The Dutch did, however, unsuccessfully recommend that non-gendarmerie forces be allowed to join the EGF.

Armitage and Moisan (2005) write that the EGF Member States saw it as filling a security niche, knowing that the EU could not compete with the US on high-level military tasks and seeing Washington struggle with stabilisation and reconstruction in Iraq. They write that the French Minister of Defence was involved in a bureaucratic struggle with his Finance and Interior colleagues and, by proposing the establishment of such a force, hoped to gain additional budgetary resources as well as to maintain control over the use of the Gendarmerie. The Italians saw the EGF as an opportunity to promote their country as one of the major powers within the EU. Since Germany (for political and historical reasons) had a strict rule of separating military and police functions and Great Britain did not possess these unique types of forces, Spain also saw an opportunity to raise its profile in EU circles. The French saw the EGF as a natural means to maintain its leadership of a southern group of EU Member States, and perhaps to entice new EU members with these low-end specialised capabilities, and to tout the embryonic EU security and defence policy and initiatives. As it became clear from interviews, Portugal wanted to participate in the EGF in order to

18 COESPU is an international training facility for officers from special police forces, with special emphasis on African forces, to be deployed in peacekeeping operations on behalf of international or regional organizations. Just like the EGF PHQ it is located at Vicenza, Italy. COESPU was proposed by Italy, established in 2005 and will function at least until 2010. It is part of a G8-programme to increase peacekeeping capacities, including training 75,000 peacekeepers by 2010, some 7,500 of whom will be gendarmerie-type forces. COESPU is also tasked with developing a common doctrine and common operational standards for employing gendarme-like forces in peace support operations, specifically with regard to crowd control, combating organized crime, high-risk arrests, prison security, the protection of sensitive facilities, election security, VIP security and border control. See: www.carabinieri.it/internet/Coespu and G8 Action Plan, *Expanding Global Capability for Peace Support Operations*, Sea Island, June 10, 2004. In correspondence it was suggested that COESPU has provided training programmes for trainers from at least Cameroon, India, Indonesia, Jordan, Kenya, Mali, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Romania, Senegal, Serbia and Ukraine.

improve its international status by using the know-how and prestige of the GNR.¹⁹

During the creation of the EGF other countries showed an interest in participating. Austria, Belgium, Hungary and Slovenia have been reported as being interested in taking part in the EGF,²⁰ but none of these countries without gendarmerie forces has formally applied to join or is in the process of developing relations with the EGF.²¹ Lithuania, Poland, Romania and Turkey did apply for membership. Poland proposed to contribute some 130 troops from its *Żandarmeria Wojskowa* (literally 'military gendarmerie') and was given partner status in March 2007.²² When France blocked the Turks for political reasons²³ as was stated in interviews, the Italians also blocked Romania, asking for time to discuss what was precisely the EGF's definition of 'police with military status'. According to others, the Portuguese opposed Polish membership of the EGF because it regarded the Military Gendarmerie as an MP organisation, with some policing skills, not a full gendarmerie force.²⁴ The French did favour Poland's full membership. The Portuguese then proposed to discuss the definition of 'police with military status'. This was agreed at a meeting in The Hague, in March 2007: 'gendarmerie-like forces have an all encompassing jurisdiction in its homeland and towards its community, tasked with judicial and administrative policing and crime prevention, and whose members possess policing and basic military skills.'²⁵ Turkey's application is still pending, but the Italian AdC and the Turkish government have recently signed a twinning agreement with the aim of

19 Correspondence with the GNR.

20 www.senzacensura.org, www.statewatch.org, 29 January, 2004 and BBC monitoring European, 6 February 2006. Hillebrand (2008), p. 7, argues for German participation. The German Minister of Defence had ruled out this possibility some years previously (*Europäische Zeitschrift* (2004)), but it has been reported that an unit of the German *Bundespolizei* has been created for rapid international deployment and robust policing and it will have a joint training centre with the French GN at its barracks in Saint Astier – *Einsatz in der Grauzone*, in: Focus, 17 March 2008.

21 Interview.

22 People's daily online, english.people.com.cn and correspondence with the GNR.

23 Emine Kart, France blocks Turkey's participation in EuroGendFor, in: Today's Zaman, 17 July 2007.

24 The Polish Military Gendarmerie is a 3,500-strong MP force, with tasks including arresting and prosecuting civilian offenders for crimes against military personnel. It has participated in UN and EU operations in Afghanistan, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Chad, Congo, Iraq, Kosovo, Lebanon and Syria. The force seems to assist the civilian police on many occasions. Interviews, letter from the Polish Embassy in The Hague, 20th August 2008 and Nawrot ea (2008).

25 Correspondence with the GNR.

preparing for EGF membership.²⁶ In the third EGF exercise, in Portugal in December 2008, the Poles, Lithuanians, Romanians and Turks took part²⁷ Romania became a full EGF Member State in December 2008,²⁸ while the Lithuanian Viesojo Saugumo Tarnyba (Public Security Force) is expected to become an EGF Partner.²⁹

2.3 The aim and organisation of the EGF

The aims of the EGF are laid down in the EGF Treaty³⁰ Article 1 states that only police forces with a military status can participate and that the EGF is meant to perform all police tasks within the scope of international crisis management operations. While ‘all police tasks’ are later specified, ‘international crises’ are not. The EGF is a multinational police force comprised of a PHQ based in Vicenza, Italy, and forces designated to it by participating states (art. 3a and b). The EGF has as its decision-making body the High Level Interdepartmental Committee (art. 3g), commonly referred to by the French abbreviation CIMIN (Comité InterMinistériel de haut Niveau). The CIMIN appoints the Commander of the EGF (art. 3h) and commanders to lead EGF operations (art. 3i). The CIMIN meets twice a year. It has a Working Group with lower-level representatives that meets every two months.

Article 4 of the Treaty lists the operations for which the EGF may be used. It states that the EGF can substitute or strengthen the local police during all phases of an operation. It can be put under civilian authority or under military control.

26 ANSA – Politics News Service, Italia-Turchi: gemellaggio arma carabinieri e gendarmeria, 10 February 2009.

27 In August 2008 the CIMIN decided that the Romanian gendarmerie meets all the requirements for becoming a full member. A formal decision will be taken in December 2008 at a CIMIN meeting in Coimbra, Portugal, in which Romania will participate (correspondence with the GNR).

28 ROMPRES, Romania becomes a European Gendarmerie Force member, 17 December 2008.

29 Dutch expert meeting. The Lithuanian Public Security Force is not part of the military. It has 1,150 employees, most of whom followed military training before joining the force (interview). Its tasks are the transportation of detainees and prisoners, the protection of state objects, public order management in extraordinary situations, searching for persons, providing support to the police, and defending home territory in case of war. www.vstarnyba.lt (in English).

30 Information and basic documents can be found at: www.eurogendfor.org.

The EGF can fulfil the following tasks:

- carrying out security and public order operations,
- monitoring, advising, mentoring and supervising local police in their day-to-day work, including in criminal investigations,
- public surveillance, traffic regulations, border policing and general intelligence work,
- carrying out criminal investigations, including detecting offences, tracing offenders and transferring them to the appropriate judicial authorities,
- protecting people and property and maintaining order in public disturbances,
- training police officers as regards international standards,
- training instructors, particularly through co-operation programmes.

As article 5 states, the EGF may be placed at the disposal of the European Union (EU), the United Nations (UN), the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), and any other international organisation or ad hoc coalition. Any EU Member State possessing a police force with a military status may apply to join the EGF (art. 42). EU candidate countries with police forces with military status may apply for observer status, just like EU Member States can as a first step to accession. Observer States have the right to second a liaison officer to the EGF PHQ (art. 43). EU Member States and candidate countries that have a force with military status and some police skills may apply for partner status. For partners specific rights and obligations will be defined (art. 44). Very important, civilian police forces can take part in EGF activities and operations under certain conditions to be determined by the CIMIN.³¹

As had been stated in the Declaration of intent and as it became clearer from interviews, the EGF would have a force structure consisting of:

- a HQ,
- integrated police units (IPU), consisting of approximately 120 persons, for public security and public order management,
- specialised units for criminal investigation, intelligence, special operations (arrests, observation, VIP close protection), the detection and disposal of

31 Correspondence with the GNR. In interviews it was also mentioned that the EGF is willing to cooperate with any military or police organisation, and not only from EU Member States or EU candidate countries.

explosives, traffic control, border policing or illegal immigration and environmental policing.³²

- a logistic support component for supplies, restocking, maintenance, the recovery and evacuation of equipment, transportation, medical and health care.

The Declaration of intent also states that the EGF will possess an initial rapid-reaction capability of approximately 800 persons within 30 days. If all the possible components of the EGF were to be deployed the total would be 2,300.³³ The CIMIN will determine the operational standards of EGF units. It is a national responsibility to attain and maintain these standards. To attain the required level of interoperability the EGF will engage in exercises.³⁴ The permanent EGF HQ will, among other things, be tasked to monitor the areas of possible operational intervention, plan operations, plan and direct exercises, define the lessons learned, implement improvements and certify units. It will also develop operational doctrines which are compatible to those of the EU.

Observer States can assign liaison officer(s) to the EGF-HQ in Vicenza, and take part in ordinary and special sessions of the CIMIN, Working Groups and the Financial Board concerning activities in which they participate. Observers can participate in operations, exercises and EGF seminars. Unless it is stated otherwise, they have access to EGF documents. EGF partners have the same prerogatives, except that they are not allowed to attend special sessions of the CIMIN. Both Observers and Partners are 'expected to respect the spirit of the EGF Treaty and to comply with decisions and documents that are approved by CIMIN, including to draw up a national contribution to the EGF Catalogue of capabilities and to keep this catalogue regularly updated.'³⁵

Each EGF participant will pay for the expenditures arising from its participation in the EGF, including the costs of operations and exercises. Common costs, like for the PHQ, will have to be approved by all Member

32 The EGF has a Catalogue of Capabilities. This states which kind of units can be deployed, how many and by which countries. This has unfortunately not been made public. Interviewees have informed the author as to which specialised elements are in the Catalogue at present.

33 Hazdra (2008), Govaarts (2006).

34 A training programme has been developed to increase interoperability. The programme is currently in its approval phase (Correspondence with the GNR).

35 EGF, *The status of EGF Member, EGF Observer and EGF Partner*, Amsterdam, 15 November 2007. Available at www.gnr.pt/eurogendfor.

States and will be divided ‘proportionally’ between them. Permanent costs are set annually. As the host nation Italy covers some of the costs of the EGF PHQ.

The EGF decides whether to start operations on a case-by-case basis. EGF Member States are not obliged to take part in all EGF operations. Moreover, they do not have to contribute to all integrated or specialised police units which the EGF deploys. These can be even dual or single nation in their composition. According to Hazdra (2008) the EGF aims to be able to deliver two operations, one small, one large, at the same time.

2.4 How Bosnia became the first operation

The first EGF operation started formally on December 14th 2007; providing the commander and a part of the HQ of the IPU for the EU’s military force in Bosnia-Herzegovina (Althea). It would also coordinate the national contributions of the at that time five EGF Member States. This included one of the two public order companies, the other provided by Turkey and Romania, and seven investigation teams, with an additional two provided by Hungary.³⁶ For the EGF Member States this was not a new mission, as they had already contributed to EUFOR’s police force. Only coordination through the EGF was new. Before the EGF took over, Italy was the lead nation in the EU operation and the AdC provided its commander and much of the staff, but they were replaced by EGF staff, again led by an Italian AdC as the commander.

The difficulty in agreeing on this neither new nor challenging operation provides another warning that it is by no means certain that the EGF will be a success. Without new missions the EGF probably faces an unpleasant future. It could very well share its fate with SHIRBRIG, the Standby High-Readiness Brigade created in 2000 for UN peacekeeping. In early 2009 its contributing states pulled the plug on this initiative after delivering only one operation.³⁷ Back to the EGF, Hazdra (2008) suggests that the decision to deploy its first mission to Bosnia-Herzegovina was mostly taken because of the realisation that the EGF should soon commence an operation so as not to lose momentum. What becomes clear from other literature and interviews is that

36 www.euforbih.org. EUFOR (‘Althea’) has a military and a police part. See Hazdra (2008). Also based on correspondence with the GNR.

37 www.shirbrig.dk.

the EGF Member States considered a wider range of options for its first operation. The French Defence Minister, Alliot-Marie, suggested that the EGF should be sent to Iraq to train local police officers or to Congo.³⁸ There were never any requests for this from the EU or UN, however.

As it became clear from the interviews and the literature, deployments to Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo were discussed more extensively, including with EU representatives. EGF Member States could not agree on Kosovo as its first operation. The UN and the EU³⁹ requested that the EGF should form a bridging force between the UN and the forthcoming EU operations; this was blocked by Spain. For domestic reasons (the Basque region) the Spanish did not want to legitimise Kosovar 'seperatism' by deploying the EGF. The 'first Bosnia, then Kosovo' option also did not receive unanimous support. Italy also objected to an operation in Kosovo and preferred the EGF to be deployed to Bosnia because it had large numbers of AdC deployed there, which could then partially be replaced by other EGF forces. The Netherlands thought that Bosnia was no longer a 'robust' operation area and preferred Kosovo. In its view the EGF should be sent to areas with a less benign security situation and to provide executive policing services, not merely HQ staff. Portugal agreed on the deployment to Bosnia-Herzegovina as it would provide an opportunity, in not too demanding circumstances, for improving coordination and interoperability within the EGF.⁴⁰

38 BBC monitoring European, 6 February 2006.

39 Zecchini, L., Cinque pays, dont la France, lancent une gendarmerie européenne, *Le Monde*, 27 January 2006.

40 Correspondence with the GNR.

2.5 Sub-conclusions

From this chapter six main conclusions can be drawn. First, since the early 1990s cooperation between European gendarmerie forces has increased as part of a broader process of increasing integration between European police and military organisations.

Second, domestically and for international crisis management operations gendarmerie forces compete for tasks with the civil police, the MP and regular military forces.

Third, the creation of the EGF was a complex political and bureaucratic process in which there were considerable differences between the Member States concerning its architecture and position, such as its relationship with the EU, whether it was to have a standing force and whether non-gendarmerie forces would be allowed to join.

Fourth, the EGF is intended to provide a wide variety of police tasks, thereby strengthening or substituting local police in international operations. The EGF Treaty and its Declaration of intent do not define in what kinds of international crises the EGF can be used.

Fifth, only police forces with 'military status' and military forces with 'some policing skills' can participate in EGF activities. Only EU Member States can become full members of the EGF. Many countries expressed an interest in participating in the EGF, but the decision making on new participants was blocked for some time by a lack of agreement as to what kind of forces should be allowed to join.

Sixth, the EGF has not yet proved its value as it has only recently started its first operation. Its Member States had considerable difficulty in agreeing on where to deploy it.

3. Why the EGF could be a success

The EGF's Treaty and Declaration of Intent state that it is meant for 'international crisis management operations'. Stemming from the early experiences in the Balkans, the EGF was created for and is currently only preparing to undertake policing tasks in the transition from the military to the civilian phase in peacekeeping operations after the (civil) war. In this chapter it is argued that the EGF can be expected to be successful in this. If it will indeed be successful, Member States might want to use the EGF for additional tasks. In chapter five it will be considered what the EGF could do in other kinds of crises, to prevent crises and even in non-crisis situations.

The first section of this chapter describes the growing demand for international policing operations. In the second section the focus is on the peacekeeping experiences of the six gendarmerie forces. This is followed by an analysis of the characteristics needed for these kinds of operations. In the fourth section it is discussed whether the EGF has learned from deficiencies in earlier international policing operations. Finally, the reasons why the EGF might fail in becoming a successful organisation in peacekeeping operations are discussed.

3.1 The growing demand for international policing operations

There is ample demand for police personnel in international crisis management operations – as other authors have also concluded.⁴¹ The UN has recognised the importance of international police operations. In the mid-1990s the UN’s department for peacekeeping operations appointed a Police Advisor and in 2000 a Police Division was created to support UN policing operations. By January 2008 operations were taking place in 13 countries, including over 11,000 police officers. The UN has created a Standing police capacity, consisting of 25 officers, a rapid-response team for operation assessment and organising the commencement of an operation⁴² It was deployed to Chad for the first time.




Figure 1: Quantitative developments in UN peacekeeping operations.

Source: UN department for peacekeeping operations at www.un.org/depts/dpko. Numbers for January of each year.

Figure 1 shows the quantitative developments in UN peacekeeping operations. What the figure makes clear is that police operations are steadily increasing in importance when compared with observer operations. The

41 Armitage and Moisan (2005).

42 www.un.org/Depts/dpko/police. There are operations in (the largest personnel numbers in brackets) Afghanistan, Burundi, Cyprus, D.R. Congo (1,029), East Timor (1,555), Georgia, Haiti (1,813), Ivory Coast (1,157), Kosovo (2,025), Liberia (1,231), Sierra Leone, Sudan and Western Sahara.

number of police officers has also steadily increased.⁴³ The rapid growth in the military personnel deployed since 2000 also leads one to expect that police operations will increase in size. What will happen is that, as the security situation in the operation area improves, the number of military personnel is reduced, while the number of police deployed increases as the role of guarantors of stability is slowly taken over by international police operations⁴⁴ This is the longer-term pattern observed in the Balkans and it is likely to occur in other countries.

As was mentioned above, the EU also is developing its own deployable police force. As was decided at the June 2000 European Council in Feira, Portugal, this force should consist of 5,000 police officers. In May 2007 the EU had 6 active policing operations.⁴⁵ A three-year EU police mission in Afghanistan started in June 2007, while in February it started a 2,000-strong rule of law operation in Kosovo. As for Iraq, the US-led coalition deployed a stabilisation force that was too small and was slow to deploy police officers in adequate numbers, while it failed to anticipate that the power vacuum created by the fall of the Saddam regime would be immediately filled by criminals and extremists.⁴⁶ In Iraq the demand for law enforcement was high. In May 2003 the US had about 150,000 military personnel in the country. This included 10,400 MP, out of which 59% had to come from reservists.⁴⁷ To give another indication of how much gendarmerie could be used: out of a total of 1,400 military personnel Italy deployed 40% Carabinieri in its sector in Southern Iraq. More in general, one would expect that in the (near) future security conditions will allow the large numbers of military in Iraq and Afghanistan to be replaced by international police forces.

43 Dobbins et al. (2005), p. 229, also identify this trend.

44 Armitage and Moisan (2005) estimate that European gendarmerie capabilities alone are far too small to provide the extensive long-term support that the US and NATO need to cover the growing operational security gaps in, e.g., Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq. Both the EU and the US government will not simply increase robust policing capacities, but will better tailor existing (infantry) forces to these new operations.

45 Active civilian security operations are EUPM in Bosnia-Herzegovina (440), EUBAM Rafah (71) and EUPOL COPPS in Palestine (33), EUPOL Kinshasa (49), EU SEC (36) in Congo, and police training support to AMIS II (31) in Sudan/Darfur. The EU has already conducted Proxima (200) and EUPAT in Macedonia (30), EUJUST LEX in Iraq (17), EUJUST Themis (9) in Georgia, EU border assistance operations in Moldova and Ukraine (69) and the Aceh monitoring operation (80). In brackets is the highest number of personnel mentioned. Sources: EU Council Secretariat (2007) and Nowak (2006).

46 Dobbins et al (2005), pp. 209-210.

47 Binnendijk and Johnson (2004), p. 79.

3.2 Gendarmerie experiences in peacekeeping

A reason to expect that the EGF will be successful in the transition from military to civilian phases of peacekeeping operations is that its six EGF participating forces have been involved in many international crisis management operations since 1990, as is demonstrated in Annex A.⁴⁸

This makes it clear that although the size, length and precise tasks might have differed, the six combined EGF participating forces have considerable experience in peacekeeping. The Dutch KM (with the French GN) might have participated in the largest number of operations, but being the smallest force it will probably have contributed relatively small numbers of personnel. The Portuguese GNR and the Romanian JR probably have the least experience, the French GN and the Italian AdC have the most. Although there is no operation where all six have participated, five were in Congo and Kosovo. Four of them have participated in Afghanistan, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Iraq, Macedonia and Palestine. In Albania, Angola, East Timor and Haiti three have common experiences. Considering that these include the largest and longest international policing efforts,⁴⁹ it is fair to expect there is also considerable experience among the six EGF participating forces in working together in peacekeeping.

3.3 Well suited for peacekeeping?

Gendarmerie forces are considered to be well suited for policing in international peacekeeping operations. While no (detailed) studies comparing the performance of civilian police officers, the military, gendarmerie and MP in peacekeeping seem to have been published, many authors have noted that a gap exists between military personnel and civilian police deployments and that gendarmerie forces are suitable to fill this gap.⁵⁰

Some authors describe in more detail why gendarmerie should be preferred. Armitage and Moisan (2005) argue that special forces and MP lack the full gamut of specialised equipment to deal with lower levels of stabilisation and

48 This includes cases of only providing MP services.

49 Dobbins et al. (2005), www.un.org/depts/dpko.

50 Hillebrand (2008), p. 7, Hovens (2008), Armitage and Moisan (2005), Lutterbeck (2005), p. 247, Rémy (2004), Bronson (2002), p. 125, Field and Perito (2002), p. 80, Bigo (2000), p. 189, Dziedzic (1998), p. 143, Oakley, Dziedzic and Goldberg (1998), pp. 518-520. Interestingly, Zimmermann (2005) argues that paramilitary forces are also best suited for counter-terrorism, not police or military forces.

nation building. Gendarmerie forces have conducted numerous operations in many parts of the world. They will not be confused with those who have just done the fighting and they are highly skilled in the tactics and doctrine of the light infantry, including rapid deployment and an ability to sustain themselves logistically. Moreover, they can be placed under military command and can work in a military environment.

Bigo (2000) states that a large spectrum of the activities of gendarmerie forces allows them to be present where the police dare not go (restoration of order in a crisis situation) and where the military do not want to or do not know how to intervene (not killing the enemy, but controlling the opponent). Gendarmerie forces have been prepared for centuries for internal security, having an advantage over the regular military due to their role as the soldiers of the law and due to their authority to use military means in a civilian context, while knowing not to transform its opponent into an enemy to be eradicated. Their structure allows them to accompany the rise of violence without a brutal change of position and without breaching the threshold of public opinion. Gendarmerie forces combine the knowledge of the police and the military, and have an intimate knowledge of crisis management.

Finally, Rémy (2004) writes that gendarmerie forces are the most suitable for stabilising a country because of their nature, military character, operations concept and an ability to carry out policing in all circumstances.

3.4 Lessons learned from earlier operations

A fourth reason to expect that the EGF will be successful is that the way it is organised shows that it could prevent deficiencies in earlier international policing operations. A review of the literature indicates the most common problems in these kinds of operations. An area of difficulty is police-military relations. Doctrinal, logistical, planning and cultural differences between contributing police forces also create problems. In many operations the chain of command is not clear or is not clear from the beginning. Finding enough qualified officers and having them available in time has also proved to be too difficult on numerous occasions. A lack of flexibility in national regulations limits cooperation between police officers from different countries taking part in the mission. The literature also makes it clear that policing other peoples is (far) more difficult. Often international policing operations take place under inadequate mandates. During the operation too much time is generally spent

on internal organisation. Finally, international efforts do not leave local authorities in charge⁵¹ Of course the EGF does not negotiate mandates for its missions – although it could advise the diplomats who do negotiate its mandate if it were to be contacted early enough. Policing other peoples is probably just as difficult for the EGF as it is for other foreign police forces. By developing common standards, doctrine and procedures, certifying and designating units, being able to deploy within a month and having an integrated chain of command, the way the EGF is organised addresses the lessons learned from earlier international operations. It can therefore be expected to perform better.

A review of the problems in four international policing operations (Cambodia, East Timor, Kosovo and Afghanistan⁵²) points at other, more detailed problems. Some of the international forces deployed lacked the right composition – like having too little police capacity. In some cases there was no advance planning and no exit strategy, while no operational plans had been developed or the operation was not evaluated at all. In some cases the international forces demonstrated poor human rights standards, had no internal disciplinary procedures and were not being policed themselves. A lack of equipment, limited logistical support and limited training resources reduced their effectiveness. The international police had no standards for training local police forces and lacked expertise in training, selecting, vetting and interviewing local police recruits. The slow development of policies, procedures and management structures for local forces and being slow in equipping them are also mentioned in the literature. In some of these four operations too few local police officers were trained. Other problems mentioned included the limited knowledge of the country on arrival. In these operations the wide array of external and internal stakeholders was poorly coordinated. Coordination and an overlap with other actors in the operation also caused problems. In some operations there was too much emphasis on developing specialised local police forces and too little effort being made in the field of common policing capacity. Poor performance in high-profile cases of politically motivated violence also limited the effectiveness of some of these missions. The rotation frequency of the international police was too high and this limited the quality of the performance. In some operations the absence of structural reforms in the ministries of the host nation limited the effectiveness

51 De Weger (2007).

52 This included the German-led police reforms after the fall of the Taliban, the UN Assistance Mission to Afghanistan's efforts to help the Afghan police prepare for presidential and parliamentary elections and ISAF training local police itself or hiring police-building teams.

of the international operation. To end this long list of problems in earlier international policing operations, some created local police forces requiring unsustainable levels of effort by the local government.⁵³

Can the EGF be expected to prevent these problems in its operations? Here again, some issues are beyond the influence of the EGF. This includes the composition of the whole force for the international crisis management operation, the exit strategy, delivering a sustainable effort, the coordination of stakeholders, reforms in ministries and balancing the development of specialised and basic police forces. This is the realm of international diplomacy and national governments. As can be deduced from the tasks of EGF-PHQ as described in section 2.3, however, in developing operational plans, ensuring that there is enough equipment and logistics, limiting the rotation frequency and evaluating operations, the EGF seems to have addressed many of the problems of earlier international policing operations. Moreover, from their domestic tasks the present EGF forces can be expected to apply reasonable human rights standards when operating abroad - this could change when more countries join the EGF. From interviews it also became clear that the EGF is now developing standards for training, recruiting, equipping and developing local police forces. Within the EGF internal discipline is an item in standard operating procedures and rules of engagement for operations. The EGF-PHQ gathers information from public sources on the country in which it will start an operation.⁵⁴

3.5 Reasons why the EGF might fail

Although the EGF can be expected to become a successful organisation in policing in the transition from military to civilian phases of peacekeeping operations, there are reasons why it might not.

53 De Weger (2008).

54 It would be an interesting idea, as was suggested in an interview, if the EU and EGF were to make a list of areas in the world where the geographical or security conditions provide the best option for gendarmerie forces. The EGF could follow the developments in these areas and prepare for potential operations.

Following the analysis in the above section, the EGF does not so far seem to be addressing the situation of being policed itself⁵⁵ training resources and expertise, managing relations with other actors in the operation and its performance in high-profile cases. Explicit policies and having units or officials responsible for this would further professionalise and increase trust in the EGF. In the Dutch expert meeting it was also suggested that the EGF should close the 'ethics gap'. It could develop its own code of conduct⁵⁶, rules of engagement, transparency and accountability standards, and status of forces agreement formats that could be applied in operations when none or not sufficient ones are made available by the EU or another organization for which the EGF is deployed. However, the EGF should not duplicate the policies, doctrine and standards that are available at the EU, UN or other (international) organizations.

The literature and the interviews conducted allow us to identify more potential causes of failure. As a result of high demand and initial success contributing EGF forces might find themselves overstretched. French-Italian rivalry might affect performance or development. Member States might withdraw or decide not to make units available, and limit funding or personnel for the PHQ.⁵⁷ Contributing gendarmerie forces might be incorporated into national or civilian police forces or otherwise as a result of (other) domestic politics lose the ability to deploy larger numbers of personnel abroad. Regular military, MP and special forces might learn public order management and control crime more effectively and satisfy much of the demand for robust policing.⁵⁸

55 EGF forces have to apply national and international laws, regulations and standards. Investigating and prosecuting any violation is regarded as a national responsibility and will be performed by the national authorities and criminal investigation/internal affairs units of the gendarmerie force involved. The point here is that the EGF does not deploy an internal affairs unit in operations, which would probably be more effective in investigating and whose presence would send a stronger message to the forces deployed.

56 The FIEP has developed a code of conduct for gendarmes, but this has apparently never been published.

57 Armitage and Moisan (2005).

58 Bigo (2000), p. 144.

Technical, tactical, procedural and cultural differences between the contributing countries could make cooperation difficult.⁵⁹

In the interviews and during the Dutch expert meeting other reasons why the EGF might not become a success were mentioned. The EGF might lose momentum, because of either internal political differences or a lack of acceptance, even distrust, by other (EU) countries not deploying in enough or challenging operations. With too little 'output' the EGF will not prove its added value and its Member States could become less and less committed to achieving success. On a different level, the effectiveness and efficiency of EGF cooperation could remain limited by not speaking each other's languages or really mastering English. It was also indicated that policy making at Vicenza is rather embryonic and too many activities take place nationally rather than at the EGF-HQ, as would be the case in a really multinational organisation. The personnel at the PHQ change every two or three years (in key positions), with many arriving/leaving together, thereby limiting continuity and making it difficult to retain experience. The CIMIN meets only twice a year and its working group every two months in national capitals, lacking direct contacts and more detailed steering of PHQ activities⁶⁰ Some fear that the era of having many international crisis management operations might be coming to an end as Western states, because of domestic public opinion, are no longer willing to intervene abroad as much as they did in the last two decades. The era of peacekeeping could also end if rising tensions in international relations will make international agreement on peacekeeping operations less frequently possible or will make peacekeeping less of a priority for Western states. Whether the longer-term security outlook is favourable for the EGF will be discussed in chapter 6.

59 Coppola (2004) and Hovens (2008), p. 674. Hovens warns that gendarmes might become accustomed to EGF standards for using violence, which are based on compromises between differing national approaches. Applying these domestically could constitute an illegal use of force. To try and prevent this EGF Member States will try to negotiate EGF doctrines that are as close as possible to their national regulations. Solving this dilemma at least constitutes a challenge to developing EGF standards.

60 In comparison: NATO ambassadors are permanently based in Brussels, have their own staff there and have regular meetings every week. The same holds true for the national military representatives in the Military Committee.

3.6 Sub-conclusions

From all this, two conclusions can be drawn. First, when combining an ample demand for these kinds of operations, the experiences of EGF contributing forces, gendarmerie suitability and the lessons learned from earlier operations, there is reason to believe that the EGF could become a successful organisation considering its present aim.

Second, it is by no means certain that the EGF will be successful. The EGF could improve its preparation by specifically addressing more lessons from earlier operations. This includes being policed itself, training resources and expertise, managing relations with other actors in the operation and performance in high-profile cases. It might find itself overstretched or not delivering enough added value. The EGF might prove to be inefficient or unable to overcome cultural differences and reach agreement on common doctrines, standards and policies. Its development might be curtailed by changes in international or domestic security, or by losing out to other parts of the military in providing robust policing.

4. Why the EGF should be developed further

How the EGF could be developed in the decades ahead will be described in the following chapters. In the present chapter, however, the question is why developing the EGF along these lines is in the interest of its Member States. In the first section it is analysed what basic interests would be served therewith. In the second section what kind of security operations would be the preferable option for gendarmerie forces will be looked at. How to deal with the dilemmas that Member States will face when developing the EGF is the subject of the third section.

4.1 Basic interests of Member States

There seems to be relatively little literature on the question why EGF Member States should want to develop the EGF from where it is. In the literature only one reason is mentioned. The first interest which EGF Member States have is that if the EGF would be the best option to counter

more security problems than it is meant to tackle for now, it would of course be in the interest of Member States to have the EGF do so.⁶¹

In interviews four other basic long-term interests were expressed. These are described and discussed below as interpreted by the author. The second interest of Member States is that further developing the EGF can mobilize more resources and use existing resources more efficiently. As will become clearer in the next chapters the EGF can take over some tasks of the real military, which are more expensive and at present lack capacity for operations. The EGF also seems to be able to attract more states and participating forces. If these want to contribute resources for the same security goals as the current Member States have, it would of course be in their interest to have these states join. EGF Member States will also mildly pressure each other to contribute more. EGF participants with experience in certain policing activities can have a leading role in the development of doctrine, in teaching and training others and later on they can take the lead in these new kinds of operations. This would also increase overall operational capacity. As EGF partner status does improve the image of forces, countries not contributing to international policing operations could be persuaded to do so in exchange for becoming an EGF partner. With declining populations in EGF Member States⁶² more participants would be welcome.⁶³ Moreover, if the EGF wants to serve more than one international body (the EU), it must have sufficient capacity to satisfy more than one at a time.⁶⁴ Allowing more states to join also serves the interest of strengthening bilateral ties.

Third, the EGF is a unique security organisation in the world. It offers its Member States a competitive advantage over countries without gendarmerie forces.

61 As is implied by Armitage and Moisan (2005).

62 USJFC (2007), p. 8, Ministère de la Défense (2007), p. 29, DCBC (2006), pp. 8 and 34, NIC (2004), p. 8.

63 Armitage and Moisan (2005).

64 Hazdra (2008) and Armitage and Moisan (2005). Hazdra (2008) also points out that the EGF can have no real additional value as the structure and expertise of its units are the same as those of the EU.

It is an instrument which the US⁶⁵ and NATO currently do not have.⁶⁶ All EU Member States benefit from using the EGF for EU operations. Using the EGF for additional kinds of policing operations would increase the international status and international influence of the EGF Member States. Having more states join the EGF would also have the same effect as long as the current Member States can lead the organisation and its operations.

The fourth basic interest in further developing the EGF might serve is professionalization. Increasing standards, interoperability and effectiveness in policing would serve Member States' domestic and international security interests. EGF cooperation increases professional standards in participating forces by setting certain standards, doctrinal development, engaging in exercises, the certification process and learning from experiences in operations together. With revolving units and personnel being offered to the EGF this effect extends well into the participating forces, also permeating domestic performance. With more participating forces and a broader scope of policing activities this effect will increase. Countries willing to join will be encouraged to increase their technical and ethical standards. EGF cooperation also professionalises international policing operations. Not only has it learned the lessons from earlier operations, but having a PHQ responsible for continuity in the quality of participating forces will probably be better than without an EGF. Present EGF forces could of course also learn from new participants. Interestingly, including forces from countries closer to actual conflict areas, from different cultures and countries with more demanding geographical or security conditions might offer present or European gendarmerie forces an opportunity to learn more and improve their preparations for future operations.

Fifth, further developing the EGF can strengthen European integration, which in itself enhances the security of EGF Member States. It would strengthen bilateral ties, but also provide impulses to develop EU security policies. It can reinforce the EU's planning and planning skills. Because of strategic competition by the EGF, but also cooperation between it and the six

65 Armitage and Moisan (2005). Since 2007 the US has been creating a 'stabilisation force' that can be deployed with the military for initial assessments and the programming of activities needed for stabilising countries. It has a 250-person active duty component and can call on 2,000 standby employees of the federal institutions. It includes police advisers. However, to date it does not include personnel for executive policing.

66 NATO might also start including gendarmerie/paramilitary forces more often, as Selden (2007) writes.

EGF contributing forces, European civil police and regular military forces are challenged to increase cooperation.

4.2 The EGF as the preferred option

Except for peacekeeping there seems to be no gendarmerie, international security and military literature on the tasks and conditions which make gendarmerie forces the preferred option. The reasons mentioned in the literature as to why gendarmerie forces are suitable for policing in the transition phase of peacekeeping operations can however be generalised to argue what kind of other tasks, in what kind of conditions, can be best dealt with by gendarmerie forces and not by the regular military, MP and civilian police. In interviews and correspondence other elements were added. In addition, the domestic tasks and general differences between gendarmerie and their competitors can be discerned. In combining these factors the following picture can be sketched concerning what tasks and under which conditions gendarmerie forces should be the preferred option.

While gendarmerie forces to some extent differ from each other, generally speaking they do have certain advantages over a civilian police force. As Rémy (2004) argues, gendarmerie forces are able to carry out policing in all circumstances, while a civilian police force is only used to working in conditions of peace. Armitage and Moisan (2005) point to the light infantry nature of gendarmerie, which civilian police forces do not have, making them suitable for more threatening security conditions. Being military organisations gendarmerie can be rapidly deployed and are able to sustain themselves logistically. Gendarmerie also have the advantage over civilian police forces that they can be placed under military command and can also work in a military environment. Bigo (2000) adds that gendarmerie forces can be used where the police dare not go. In interviews additional advantages were mentioned. Being military personnel, gendarmes can be ordered to join deployments abroad and in dangerous surroundings. They are allowed by law to operate under both civilian and military control, which many civilian police forces are not. Together with the military, gendarmerie forces share methods for planning, command and control, the rotation of forces, training and exercises on levels which civilian police forces cannot reach, making it better equipped for larger and complex operations. Finally, one could add that having mainly rural tasks domestically, possessing more robust, military equipment because of having to share equipment, and training and being deployed with the military abroad, gendarmerie forces are better able to operate in more demanding geographical areas. Contrary to civilian police

forces, gendarmerie can combine more robust policing tasks with basic policing tasks, which it also performs domestically. Gendarmerie forces should also be preferred for tasks in which they have domestic experience.

On the other hand, gendarmerie forces have advantages over the regular military. As Armitage and Moisan (2005) point out, gendarmerie forces have specialised equipment to deal with lower levels of stabilisation and nation building. They will not be confused with the military and are less threatening to civilians. Bigo (2000) writes that gendarmerie forces can be used where the military do not want to or do not know how to intervene. Gendarmerie forces are more suitable than the regular military in scenarios of securing internal security and enforcing the law in a civilian context. They are better in preventing opponents from not transforming themselves into an enemy and not alienating public opinion. In interviews additional advantages were mentioned. Having less sophisticated and not as much equipment and requiring less logistical support gendarmerie forces are less expensive. Because of their domestic tasks gendarmerie forces are able to provide security to civilians according to their own domestic standards. Finally, one could add that in some cases it will be more politically acceptable to local conflicting parties or surrounding countries to deploy gendarmerie than regular military forces. Gendarmerie forces should also be preferred for tasks in which they have domestic experience, while the regular military do not.

4.3 Dilemmas when developing the EGF

If the EGF would be developed along the lines mentioned, Member States and participating forces would face a number of dilemmas. In interviews the following five were mentioned. These are described and discussed below as interpreted by the author.

First, when developing the EGF along the lines of the larger community of European police, gendarmerie and military cooperation formats will create dilemmas. In some cases and circumstances it will not be in the interest of EGF Member States to develop the EGF to the detriment of other organisations, but in others it will be. While for some tasks it might be increased cooperation with or support from other international organisations, for other tasks it might be better to choose to invest in the EGF – even if this creates tension with other states. Some organisations, especially the FIEP and COESPU are so relatively close to the EGF that merging with the EGF or being continued in the EGF are serious options despite the fact that other EU Member States or G8 states might not initially like the idea.

Second, just like the EU and other organisations the EGF will be faced with the question whether the acceptance of new members and the taking on of new tasks will result in too much loss of cohesion and quality (deepening versus widening). As development progresses it seems inevitable that cooperation will be intensified. On the other hand, over-institutionalising should be avoided. The dilemma can be solved by gradually increasing cooperation, while not having too many new participants joining too quickly. Still, with more and more Member States it will become increasingly difficult to reach decisions on starting new operations. At some point it might be wiser to decide that unanimity will no longer be required. Instead, more flexible formulas can be introduced.

Third, at present EGF Member States decide to contribute to operations on a case-by-case basis with a reaction time of 30 days. A quicker reaction would improve the EGF's value, while for some potential new kinds of operations quicker reactions are necessary (for instance, providing security after disasters and the identification of victims as well as non-combatant evacuations). Creating a standing force – and speeding up the political decision making – would be an option to achieve this. In peacekeeping this would be beneficial, while for interventions in other kinds of international crises deployment times should be even faster, for instance after natural disasters or outbreaks of contagious diseases. This dilemma can only be solved by discussing for which tasks a quicker reaction would benefit Member States interests and under what conditions these 'immediate' reaction forces can be used.

Fourth, as its name suggests, the EGF pretends to be a European organisation. With its present membership and autonomy with regard to the EU, it is not – as are many other organisations having 'European' included in their name. To become truly European in membership there is already pressure in the EGF to be lenient concerning military status or having policing skills just to have more EU Member States join,⁶⁷ thereby potentially diluting the gendarmerie character. The alternative, of course, is that the EGF remains a rather insignificant organisation. On the other hand, as more EU Member States join the EGF the pressure will mount to give up the EGF's autonomous position and to become an EU organisation. This would probably limit its potential to work for the UN and attract non-EU countries to become partners. As will be described in the following chapters, there are more 'real' gendarme forces outside than within the EU. While within the EU

67 From interviews it is clear that EGF Member States set conditions on enhancing military status or policing skills for states interested in joining, thereby (intentionally) influencing the architecture of national security systems.

a delicate balancing act not to dilute the gendarmerie character is needed, outside Europe this does not seem to be an issue. The prospect of becoming 'EU only' is undesirable for others and gives rise to pressure to allow non-EU forces to at least become partners, which would of course enhance the EGF's capacity and significance, but dilute its 'European character'. The solution to this dilemma seems to be that enough EU forces with sufficient gendarmerie qualities should join the EGF to be logical partners for the EU and to become an organisation having enough capacity to lead a large group of non-European gendarmerie forces, some contributing large numbers of personnel, in operations for NATO, the OSCE or the UN. In short: the EGF will attain more of its potential if it becomes a 'European-led' police-military organisation.

Fifth, by including more Member States or partners from the European periphery and beyond the possibility that the EGF could be deployed to countries or regions where Member States or partners have direct security interests, or are even directly involved in crises, will considerably increase. For instance, including Poland, Lithuania and Romania will probably introduce discussions on the situation at the borders with Belarus, Moldova and Russia in the EGF. While at present the prospects are that the EGF has operations in rather distant conflict areas (although the Balkans are quite close to Italy), with broadened participation it might become more of a collective security organisation, in which participants assist each other. Placing trust in local partners has, of course, its operational advantages. By including kinds of operations other than policing in the transition from the military to the civilian phase of peacekeeping operations, as will be discussed in the following chapters, the mutual assistance element will thus also become more important. Becoming more of a collective security organisation could of course serve the interests of Member States, thus being worthy of discussion as EGF membership is broadened.

4.4 Sub-conclusions

From this chapter three conclusions can be drawn. First, it would serve the interests of EGF Member States to develop the EGF because it offers a competitive advantage over countries without gendarmerie forces, strengthens European integration and increases police professionalization in Europe and beyond. It would serve their interest to expand its aim to security problems for which it is best suited to counter and allow like-minded countries that are willing to contribute resources for the same security goals to join.

Second, the EGF would be preferred to using civilian police in more threatening security conditions or more demanding geographical areas. Contrary to a civilian police force, gendarmerie forces can combine more robust policing tasks with basic policing activities. They are to be preferred when rapid deployment and logistical self-sustainment is required, when operations have to take place under military command or in a military environment and in the case of larger and more complex operations. On the other hand, the EGF should be preferred to the regular military in dealing with lower levels of violence, in scenarios of securing internal security, when costs can be saved and in cases where deploying regular military forces is less acceptable politically. Gendarmerie forces should also be preferred for tasks in which they have domestic experience and the regular military and civilian police force do not.

Third, as the EGF will be developed it will face dilemmas. Detailed discussions should be held on relations with other organisations. Deepening and widening cooperation should be balanced. Shortening reaction times might offset interests in deciding on a case-by-case basis. While including more EU Member States and intensifying relations with the EU will increase the EGF's 'European character', it will attain more of its potential if it becomes a 'European-led' police-military organisation. As EGF membership is broadened its character might change into more of a collective security organisation.

5. The potential of gendarmerie cooperation

This chapter focuses on the potential of expanding EGF cooperation. The first section addresses the question of what are gendarmerie forces. In the second, the prospects for including more European gendarmerie forces are analysed, while in the third we look at the rest of the world. In the fourth section it is determined what additional policing expertise the six EGF contributing forces' tasks could be made available to broaden its scope. The final section discusses suggestions for additional tasks for the EGF, not merely policing in the transition phase of peacekeeping operations, but also to prevent crises and policing in non-crisis situations. The basic interests of EGF Member States and the domains in which the EGF should be the preferred option that were found in the previous chapter, as well as some realism added by the author, are used to determine what part of the full potential of further developing the EGF should be focussed on.

5.1 What are 'gendarmerie' forces?

To be able to determine which additional forces can be regarded as potential applicants to join EGF cooperation – either as full members, observers, partners or in other formats, a necessary first step would be to define which organisations should be regarded as gendarmerie forces. This is not as easy as it might sound, however. As it became clear in chapter two, what kind of and

which specific forces would be allowed to join has been a matter of contention between EGF Member States right from the start. The EGF Treaty describes gendarmerie as police forces with military status. EU Member States and candidate countries that have a force with military status and some police skills may apply for partner status. The Treaty does not, however, define precisely what is military status, being a police force or having policing skills. Of course, to clarify the potential of the EGF to develop by attracting more participants - either Member States, Observers and Partners – it is necessary to establish which states could become participants and which can not.

Rather than trying to develop a definition of ‘gendarmerie’, this paper will explore the ‘police-military domain’ to identify elements of military status and identify police skills. Firstly, it is important to realise that many forces called or labelled gendarmerie have ceased to exist. Introduced by Napoleon Bonaparte’s conquests outside France in the early 19th century, copied by many other states and transported to colonies, there used to be many more than there are now.

Gendarmeries have ceased to exist in 23 countries.⁶⁸ From a historical point of view it cannot therefore be excluded that even the six EGF participating forces will dispense with gendarmeries – based on whatever kind of definition. In the broadest definition all military organisations with some policing tasks can be regarded as a ‘gendarmerie’. This would include the military border police/guard of Egypt, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan. In addition, there are military coastguards in a wide variety of countries, like Egypt, Jamaica, Kuwait, the Seychelles, South Korea and the US. At least in Denmark, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom military units specialise

68 Afghanistan, Austria (*Bundesgendarmerie*, 1849-2005), Belgium (*Rijkswacht* until 2001), Bolivia (*Carabineros* and *Gendarmería* until 1952), Burundi, Czechoslovakia (*Četnictvo*, 1918-1939), Denmark (*Grænssegendarmeriet* (1838-1958) and *De Blå Gendarm* (1885-1897)), El Salvador (*Guardia Nacional* and the national police until 1992), Ecuador, Germany (Gendarmerie or *Landjäger* in some territories until the mid-20th century), Greece (Gendarmerie or *Chorofilaki* 1833-1984, on Crete until the 1800's and on Cyprus), Honduras (Civil Guard), Hungary (*Csendőrség* until 1945), Iran, Japan (*Kempeitai* (1881-1945), *Tokeitai* and *Tokubetsu Kōtō Keisatsu*), Luxembourg (*Gendarmerie Grand-Ducale* until 2000), Mexico (*Guardia Rural* (1861-1914), Panama (National Guard), Peru (*Guarda Republicana* and *Gendarmería Nacional*), the Philippines (Philippine Constabulary (1901-1991)), Russia (Special Corps of Gendarmes, 1836-1917), Rwanda (until 2000) and Switzerland. Colonial or occupation forces are not included. Das (2006) and En.wikipedia.org.

in domestic counterterrorism interventions.⁶⁹ In many countries the military are permanently responsible for the security and safety, not just ceremonial, of heads of state or government officials and assets.⁷⁰ In the tiny state of San Marino the Guardia di Rocca is a military unit performing border patrol, guarding the seat of the national government and assisting the police. In the Dominican Republic the military are responsible for airport and port security.⁷¹ Neither the literature nor the interviewees refer to these single-task military law enforcement organisations as gendarmerie forces, despite the fact that gendarmerie forces do have these kinds of tasks domestically (border control, VIP and site security). Nevertheless, it would be interesting for the EGF to consider developing working relations with these kinds of forces, to have them join or to try, via diplomacy, to have these integrated into or form the basis for fully-fledged gendarmerie forces.

There are also civilian security organisations with military elements, which is not so strange as, historically, all police forces were modelled on the military and thus at present are likely to bear some or even a significant resemblance. These might also include interesting partners for the EGF. Israel's Border Police (Mishmar HaGvul) is an interesting case. Some 20% of the 6,000 force patrol the streets of Jerusalem. It is a civilian organization, but military conscripts can choose to serve in it. The South Korean National Police Agency is a civilian organisation, but it has a 'combat police' branch for public order tasks. Personnel are 'drafted from military conscripts'.⁷² Some sources consider just about all central government police forces to be gendarmeries. Mentioned are, for instance, Egypt's Central Security Forces, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, the German Federal Police, the Hungarian Rendészeti Biztonsági Szolgálat and the Iraqi National Police.⁷³

69 K. Gelijs, *Black Tulip: spannend en uitdagend*, in: Defensiekrant, nummer 15, 18 April 2002.

70 E.g. Bhutan's Royal Body Guard (1,000), Burkina Faso, Cameroon, the Chad Republican Guard (5,000), Gabon, Gambia, the Guinean Republican Guard (1,600), the Ivory Coast Presidential Guard, the Kazakhstan Government Guard (500) and Presidential Guard (2,000), the Kuwait National Guard (6,600, Das (2006), pp. 469-470 mentions that its officers are trained in guard services at the military college), Mali's National Guard (2,000), the Moroccan Royal Guard (6,000), the Norwegian *Hans Majestet Kongens Garde*, the Pontifical Swiss Guard, the Republic of Congo, the Seychelles, the Spanish *Guardia Real* and the Thai military Royal Guard.

71 Examples from Das (2006), IISS (2008) and en.wikipedia.org.

72 Examples from Das (2006), IISS (2008) and en.wikipedia.org.

73 En.wikipedia.org/gendarmerie.

To make all this more complicated, there are police forces having similar names as the six EGF contributing forces ('gendarmerie', 'carabinieri' and 'guarda' and equivalents in several languages) but do not have any military or police element. In many countries the 'National Guard' is a military reserve force without any law enforcement duties of its own. These are used in civil emergencies, but also for international crisis management or war. Examples can be found in, for instance, Latvia and the US. Despite its name the Irish police, Garda Síochana, is purely civilian. While in Anglo-American literature gendarmerie forces are frequently called a 'constabulary', not all forces called a constabulary are gendarmerie. The Jamaica Constabulary Force and the Royal Papua New Guinea Constabulary, for example, are purely civilian, as is the UK's Civil Nuclear Constabulary that polices and protects nuclear sites, materials and transportations overseas.⁷⁴ 'Carabineer' can also refer to regular military troops armed with a carbine (a short rifle) that used to exist in many military establishments. 'Republican Guard' refers to civilian units to protect heads of government (like in Belarus and the Democratic Republic of the Congo) or regular military units, like the former Iraqi.

Returning to the contention in the EGF as to what should be regarded as gendarmerie forces, the interviews clarified that as a reaction to the many requests (for information), to become an EGF Member State a more extensive definition of what should be regarded as gendarmerie forces was agreed upon. In March 2007 the present EGF Member States agreed to introduce a Partnership status, allowing Poland to be included in EGF cooperation. This, of course, has opened the door to many other forces to become EGF Partners in the future. To this end 'a police force with military status' was defined as: 'a force with an all encompassing jurisdiction in its homeland and towards its community, tasked with judicial and administrative policing and crime prevention, and whose members possess policing and basic military skills.'⁷⁵ This definition cannot be expected to end the debate on what is actually a gendarmerie force, however, because even the six EGF participating forces differ in military status and policing skills.

As to policing skills, the case of the Dutch KM makes clear that among EGF Member States a force can be regarded as a gendarmerie without having an all-encompassing jurisdiction in very large parts of its homeland territory, as is at present the definition of 'a police force with military status'. The Dutch KM has policing tasks in specific geographical areas and towards specific

74 En.wikipedia.org

75 EGF, The status of EGF Member, EGF Observer and EGF Partner, Amsterdam, 15 November, 2007.

parts of the Dutch population (or aliens/visitors to the country). However useful these activities might be, it does not police rural areas and small cities throughout the Netherlands as the other four do – and as the KM did until the end of the Second World War.⁷⁶ Apparently the other EGF Member States think that the Dutch KM combines military status with enough policing tasks outside the military to be a gendarmerie force. The difference with the Polish Military Gendarmerie is that the Dutch KM has a number of policing tasks outside the military. Similar forces can thus be expected to be allowed to participate in the EGF, the bottom line being that the force involved has policing tasks towards part(s) of the population and outside military sites, military transports etc. Any regular task beyond the military domain would make it more than an MP organisation. In Annex B the domestic tasks of the six EGF contributing forces are listed. Such a list could be used when establishing which and how many policing skills EGF applicants have. As to what constitutes ‘military status’, EGF participating forces also differ considerably, as figure 2 below shows. To be regarded as gendarmerie it is not necessary to be formally a part of the military forces in peacetime (not in France and Portugal). Several other elements are mentioned in sources to indicate military status: being subject to military law, providing policing to the military, having training and education with(in) the military, harmonising doctrine, armaments and equipment with the military, and being transferred to the armed forces in the case of emergency or war.⁷⁷ Concerning these elements the EGF forces also differ.

76 The Dutch KM only has all-encompassing jurisdiction at civilian airports and military sites. It is also responsible for the protection of royal palaces and transportations from the national bank all over the country. It carries out border control in ports, airports and along the coast. Its policing tasks concerning aliens are limited to direct border areas, while recently it was tasked by the law with countering trafficking in human beings and travel and identity documents fraud. For this it is allowed to act all over the country and towards all persons on Dutch territory, but not randomly: only with a previous and reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.

77 Easton (2001), p. 107, in her study on the process of demilitarizing the former Belgian gendarmerie (*Rijkswacht*) between 1940 and 1998, identifies additional military elements: having tasks in defence of the country, military hierarchy, centralised decision making and being quartered on (military) bases. These could also be included when analysing whether a force aspiring to join the EGF has enough military elements, as is proposed in this study.

	Branch of the military in peacetime	Subject to military law	Policing the military	Training and education with(in) the military	Doctrine, armaments and equipment with the military	Transfer to the armed forces in the case of emergency or war
French GN ⁷⁸		X ⁷⁹	X	X	X ⁸⁰	
Italian AdC	X	X	X	X	X	
Spanish GC		X ⁸¹	82	X ⁸³		X
Portuguese GNR		84		X ⁸⁵	X	X
Dutch KM	X	X	X	X	X	
Romanian JR				X ⁸⁶		X

Figure 2: Military elements in EGF forces.

Source: IISS (2008), Das (2006), www.fiep-asso.com, en.wikipedia.com, polis.osce.org, www.mde.es, www.guardiacivil.org, correspondence GNR, correspondence GC, correspondence Romanian JR, interviews.

5.2 Having more European forces join the EGF

Generally speaking, provided they are like-minded, it would serve the basic interests of the present EGF Member States if more European states would join. It would bring more resources for common goals, it would result in more capacities when using this unique organisation, thereby professionalising more

78 The situation as of January 2009 when the Ministry of the Interior will be responsible for the domestic operations and organisation of the GN.

79 In military operations only.

80 Only for military operations.

81 In military operations only.

82 The Spanish GC does not perform MP tasks domestically, but is often asked to do so concerning the Spanish military in operations abroad.

83 A small section of GC officers are educated in the Spanish military academy. A small number of GC personnel take part in other courses with the regular military.

84 The GNR is subject to the Portuguese Military Status Law and to the Contingence and Military Honours Law. It has a Disciplinary Law which is separate from the regular military.

85 Das (2006), p. 675, senior GNR and Army officers are trained at the military academy, 'even if the course is specially designed for GNR needs and is internal-security oriented'. Correspondence with the GNR confirms this and states that a few courses are in mixed groups with the regular military.

86 The military staff of the Romanian JR are graduates from military education institutes. Some gendarmerie officers are trained at the MoD (www.fiep-asso.com).

gendarmerie forces and policing in Europe, and would further intensify European security integration.

What other potential EGF participants exist in Europe? Included in Annex C are candidates: all other organisations called gendarmerie, guard, carabinieri or internal/interior troops within, further east and south-east of the EU.⁸⁷ What this overview makes clear is that in the EU few additional partners can be found: only in Bulgaria. Limiting full EGF membership to countries with police forces under military command would at present exclude the majority of EU Member States, as Hazdra (2008) has also concluded. Over the following decades, however, the EU may enlarge once again. Albania, Serbia and Turkey seem to be the most likely candidates with a police-military force.⁸⁸ Georgia and Ukraine could follow, but Belarus, Moldova and Russia at present seem to be even further off for political reasons. If being 'European' would be defined more broadly then the EGF could really become a significant organisation. If more pan-European gendarmerie forces could at least become EGF partners its resources could increase considerably. As was argued in the previous chapter, assisting and motivating these forces to professionalize and apply human rights and other democratic standards could be another good reason to include them in EGF cooperation. Whether these countries could join of course also depends on political circumstances, progress in European integration in general and in security and police cooperation more specifically, and on the success of long-term strategic initiatives like the European Neighbourhood Programme.

This would, however, not solve the political problem of not having enough EU Member States participating in the EGF to really become a 'European' gendarmerie and be asked by the EU to start operations more frequently. Under its present Treaty the EGF can allow MP organizations to become Partners. For political reasons it would be very interesting to have larger states like Germany and the United Kingdom participating in this way. Including a large number of MP organizations or some large MP organizations – these are deployable to a far higher degree than gendarmerie forces, as MP forces have no tasks outside the military - would, however, weaken the police-military

87 Information on gendarmerie forces is in some cases rather difficult to find. It would really help researchers, but also policy makers and journalists, if more information could be available on the internet and in the literature.

88 In the European Commissions 2008 *Enlargement strategy and progress reports Turkey*, along with Croatia and Macedonia, have accession partnership agreements, while Albania and Serbia (along with Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro and Kosovo) have European partnership agreements.

character of the EGF. This would threaten the EGF losing its additional value. Moreover, some states could not accept merely becoming a Partner, but would insist on full membership. For the EGF to attain its much larger potential it would be beneficial to take a lenient stance as to the character of forces from EU Member States. As long as the EGF maintains its 'gendarmerie' character it should be acceptable to have a state join with civilian police units meeting EGF standards. Another interesting option would be to allow a state to join with both MP and rapid deployment, robust civilian police units. Combined, they would probably have enough policing tasks and military elements to satisfy EGF demands.

The Dutch government would probably be the best candidate to mediate concerning the EGF participation of countries like Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark and Hungary – crucial for the EGF if it is to become a real EU/European force. Like the Netherlands these are all small, 'northern' European states currently without large gendarmerie forces, but sharing the historical experience of having had one.

5.3 Cooperating with the world's gendarmerie forces

Increasing cooperation with gendarmerie forces outside 'Europe' would also serve the basic interests, as described in the previous chapter, of the current EGF Member States. Provided that like-minded states join EGF cooperation in some way, it would mean more resources for common political goals. As long as European states take the lead the EGF will become a more important and unique European instrument in international security. Cooperating with more gendarmerie forces would expand the professionalization effects to more forces and countries, making the populations in the new partner countries and the world just that little bit safer, which is also in the interest of the present EGF Member States.

Annex D lists police-military organisations in the rest of the world.⁸⁹ As it makes clear, outside Europe more gendarmerie forces can be found, including many that are part of the military. The list includes many former French, Portuguese and Spanish colonies (and Russian/Soviet Union-dominated, now independent states). Combined, the gendarmerie and police-military organisations mentioned have a staggering strength of about 2.5 million

⁸⁹ Information on some of the forces included is very difficult to find. Information can also be outdated, as is often the case in Das (2006).

personnel. Especially the Brazilian *Policía Militar* and *Força Nacional de Segurança* and the Chinese People's Armed Police have enormous capacity. The latter is technically a purely police-military organisation, while the military character of the former two is more limited. Nevertheless, also from a geopolitical perspective, cooperating with these two is an interesting option to consider. But even excluding these two, there are many gendarmerie forces in the world that would be interesting partners for the EGF, even though they might never become EGF Member States.

From a region adjacent to Europe, the North-African gendarmerie forces of Algeria and Morocco would be interesting partners for the EGF, just like the ones from Eastern Europe or Turkey. Both are politically feasible. Morocco is a regular contributor to peacekeeping, its gendarmerie is already a member of the FIEP. Professionalizing the Algerian gendarmerie could help in increasing longer-term political stability in that country. Both are interesting partners from the perspectives of counter-terrorism and illegal immigration, too.

Annex D includes some forces that are very active in international peacekeeping, like the Argentinian gendarmerie and the police forces from Nepal and Sri Lanka. In the top-20 contributors of police to UN operations also Cameroon, Gambia, Jordan, Niger, Pakistan and Senegal have gendarmerie forces. The EGF may very well have to cooperate with these in UN operations, making it interesting to share doctrine and engage in exercises with them. By training them much could also be gained in professionalizing these forces for their domestic tasks. Large gendarmerie forces that up until now do not seem to have contributed much to peacekeeping could be motivated to do so in exchange for developing political ties with, sharing doctrine with, being trained by or having exercises with the EGF. Especially larger forces like those in Chile, Colombia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Vietnam would be interesting to consider.

Annex D also includes many countries with obvious domestic security problems, like Colombia, Congo, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Zimbabwe.⁹⁰ Technical assistance to the forces from these countries offers opportunities to positively influence the domestic situation, although it can be expected that these forces will be gradually or partially demilitarised when domestic conflicts diminish. Getting to know and knowing how to work with these forces is also interesting from the perspective that it might be in their

90 UN, Briefing for CIMIN presidency, Lisbon, 2 May 2008.

country and with them that the EGF will have to cooperate in future UN peacekeeping operations in their country.

There are, of course, many reasons why establishing cooperation with some of the forces in Annex D might not be acceptable at this time. Political relations with some countries, like Iran, Venezuela and Zimbabwe are too sour to start cooperation. Some forces in Annex D could be excluded from more intensive contacts because of large-scale corruption or extensive human rights violations. Some might be so involved in domestic security challenges that their governments will not be willing to allow them to take part in international policing operations, which is the EGF's aim at present. Frankly, the cultural differences might in some cases be too great to make efficient cooperation possible. Some states might only be willing to participate in the EGF on an equal footing and would be averse to being led by their former colonial masters or European forces; some might rather create their own regional international gendarmerie force, like the OGA, in Latin America, the Middle-East or Asia, and have that organisation relate to the EGF. Over the next decades domestic security in and political relations with the states in Annex D can change considerably, making the development of cooperation (far) more or less politically acceptable.

Whatever will happen, it might be wise to take a realistic approach and not to include all of these states in intensive cooperation with the EGF. For practical, political and cultural reasons it seems advisable to develop doctrinal, training and exercise contacts with those interested and to develop more intensive ties with a rather select group of like-minded states with large and comparable gendarmerie forces. The French GN, Portuguese GNR and Spanish GC and their governments could use existing relations to set up relations between forces from their former colonies and the EGF. Not having these kinds of ties, the Dutch and Italian governments could mediate in this if necessary, while setting up or intensifying contacts with other countries in Annex D.

Individual EGF Member States could intensify bilateral ties.⁹¹ The EGF could stimulate the creation of other regional gendarmerie organisations in the world. Enlarging the FIEP or setting up a world gendarmerie organisation to intensify contacts between gendarmerie forces could also be considered.

5.4 Broadening the scope of the EGF

Even when no other forces would join and no additional tasks are entrusted to the EGF, the organisation's capacities could be further developed by broadening the scope of the resources and expertise which the present EGF contributing forces make available to it – providing more capacity in the present fields of expertise would, of course, also do this, but requires no further discussion here.⁹² Making more expertise available for policing in the transition from the military to the civilian phase of peacekeeping operations would serve the EGF Member States' basic interests, provided that they are only used in operations when necessary and that these forms of expertise regularly prove to be useful. It would make more resources available, enhance this unique organisation, professionalize the units and departments involved and increase European integration in their fields.

91 The Italian AdC has signed technical bilateral agreements with the Romanian gendarmerie, the Internal Military Troops of the Ukraine, the Armed Forces of Qatar, the National Gendarmerie in Argentina and the *Carabineros* in Chile (www.carabinieri.it). The Portuguese GNR has a bilateral cooperation agreement with the Public Security Police of Macao (China). It participates in the Police Chief Council of Portuguese-speaking countries, in which Angola, Mozambique, Cape Verde, Guinea Bissau, Sao Tomé and Príncipe, Brazil and East Timor are also represented (this emerged from the interview). The French GN at present has staff deployed for cooperation with police forces in Algeria, Benin, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Djibouti (gendarmerie), Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Guinea Conakry, Jordan, Madagascar, Mali, Morocco, Niger, Romania, Senegal, Togo, Ukraine and Qatar (correspondence with the GN). The Spanish GC at least has regular ties with the Costa Rica *Guardia Civil* and has technical cooperation programmes in Albania, Morocco, Rumania, Poland and Turkey (www.guardiacivil.org, en.wikipedia.org). The Dutch KM has no regular bilateral cooperation. The Romanian JR has bilateral relations with similar gendarmerie forces in Argentina, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Chile, China, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Israel, Italy, Morocco, the Netherlands, Portugal, Serbia, Spain, Turkey, Ukraine and the US (www.jandarmeriaromana.ro and correspondence with the Romanian JR).

92 Hovens (2008) argues that EGF capacity should be enhanced, using a calculation based on the population size of the top-10 'failed states' in the world and RAND's analysis that in order to be effective 250 police officers are required for every 100,000 citizens.

Gendarmerie forces perform most of their activities domestically. An overview of the domestic tasks and areas of expertise of the six EGF contributing forces is presented in Annex B. Compared with the EGF IPU's and specialised elements that EGF Member States have offered to supply for EGF operations, as mentioned in section 2.3, a few (major) policing fields are missing. The EGF could create units in the field where at least two of the present gendarmerie forces have domestic expertise. This would include: agriculture policing, anti-counterfeiting, anti-drugs operations, interventions in chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) incidents, cyber crime, forensic/scientific investigations, human trafficking, labour policing, maritime/waterways policing, public health control, security and policing at airports, policing the military, tax evasion investigations, transport security, transporting convicts, and gun permits and arms control.⁹³

5.5 Additional tasks for the EGF

Another way of identifying what additional tasks the EGF could develop is by analysing which other activities the six EGF contributing forces have performed or potentially could perform abroad or domestically. Further developing the EGF in this way would serve the EGF Member States' basic interest of increasing European integration, professionalizing and broadening the EGF as a unique European instrument. Provided that more of the six gendarmerie forces would contribute, resources for these kinds of activities would also increase. As these would be additional tasks for the EGF, the question whether the EGF should be the preferred option to prepare for and execute operations in these fields, the first basic interest of EGF Member States, is more relevant than in the previous sections. Here the conclusions of the previous chapter as to what is the preferred domain for gendarmerie forces have to be considered.

Below there is a list of specific activities that have been executed by the six EGF contributing forces. All can reasonably be considered to be part of the

⁹³ In the Dutch expert meeting it was noted these forms of expertise have not been requested for EGF operations until now, and some of the fields mentioned can also be handled by the current EGF criminal investigation units or IPU's. It was also suggested that some of the specialists mentioned, i.e. human trafficking, would not require much standardisation, exercising, certification etc. at the EGF level, because of the frequent international contacts and cooperation when working on domestic tasks. Some Member States do not want to offer more units to the EGF, including those in the *Catalogue*, as this increases the likelihood of actually deploying them.

EGF's aim as mentioned in its Treaty: performing 'police tasks within the scope of international crisis management operations'. Many of these tasks are delivered or foreseen as part of EGF operations, but at present the EGF is not considered to be an instrument by which to deliver these kinds of activities as separate from large operations in the transition from the military to the civilian phases of international peacekeeping. Additional to gendarmerie forces being the preferred option, it would be realistic to limit the further development of the EGF to activities in which they have more experience – just like policing in the transition from the military to the civilian phase of peacekeeping operations became the mission of the EGF after a decade of contributing to these kinds of operations individually. Listed below are the kinds of operations in which at least two of the six EGF participating forces have experience, and they are ranked by the amount of that experience. For each potential new task it is discussed why and in which security conditions the EGF should be the preferred option.

In the literature and the interviews of the following activities were mentioned:

Protection of European sites or EU diplomatic locations in the world.⁹⁴ The EGF could be used to reinforce normal security at these sites. The six EGF contributing forces have considerable experience in the protection of their government embassies abroad. The EGF could also permanently protect these sites, but as far as this should be considered as a reaction to a crisis – in some countries security conditions have been very poor for many years, so that entrusting the EGF with this task would require an amendment to the present EGF Treaty. The EGF should be the preferred option compared to a civilian police force in more threatening security conditions, when reinforcements has to be deployed rapidly and logistical self-sustainment is necessary. The EGF should be preferred over the regular military in non-war-like conditions and when deploying the military is less politically acceptable to the host nation.

94 Rémy (2004). The French GN provided protection to the French embassies in Brazzaville (Congo) at the end of the 1990s and in Algeria during the terrorist period, which was between 1992-2002. At present it provides security to 84 French embassies (283 persons) (correspondence with the GN). The Italian AdC and the Dutch KM also contribute to the security of embassies (correspondence with the Italian MoD and an interview). The Spanish GC is responsible for the protection of 15 Spanish embassies abroad, including at NATO HQ in Brussels (correspondence with the GC).

Security sector reform (SSR).⁹⁵ This includes providing advice, training, equipment, mentoring and monitoring etc.. EGF forces have considerable experience in this. . It should be preferred instead of a civilian police force in more threatening security conditions, more demanding geographical conditions, when military command or cooperation with military forces is necessary and highly complex SSR programmes have to be executed. It should be preferred instead of the regular military in non-war-like conditions, when the organisations to be reformed are meant for internal security or the tasks of the EGF contributing forces are performed domestically, and when deploying the regular military is politically unacceptable. If EGF Member States were to choose to broaden EGF cooperation in this field, it would be an option to consider continuing COESPU's activities in the EGF after its current mandate ends in 2010.

Monitoring, for instance, elections or truces.⁹⁶ The EGF could create a pool of specialists for this and organise their deployment. This is a field in which the present EGF forces have considerable experience. It should be preferred to the regular military in non-war-like conditions, in internal security and when deploying the military is less acceptable. In less than peaceful security conditions, more demanding geographical conditions, when rapid deployment, cooperation with the military or a large, complex operation is required, then deploying the EGF should be preferred instead of a civilian police force.

95 The Dutch KM has for the past couple of years provided police reform advisors to Burundi (interview). The Spanish GC under bilateral agreements has provided technical assistance in El Salvador (1992), Guatemala (1997), Angola (1996), Mozambique (1997), Nicaragua (1997), Costa Rica (1999) and contributed to the reorganisation of the Albanian police (es.wikipedia.org, www.guardiacivil.org). The French GN has contributed in Guinea Bissau (correspondence with the GN). The Italian AdC provided bilateral assistance to the Albanian police and military police between 1997 and 2002 (www.carabinieri.it) and provided training and mentoring to the national police in Jordan (on enforcing labour regulations, 2008), in Qatar to train the Security Force in VIP close protection/Special Forces and in Guatemala, Colombia, Argentina, Cuba, Cyprus, Iraq, Peru and Bolivia, Mexico, Ecuador and in COESPU on protecting cultural heritage (correspondence with the Italian MoD).

96 The Dutch KM participated in 2001 in the OSCE monitoring operation in Macedonia. In 1993 it supplied UN monitors to South Africa to be present in political and Peace Committee meetings (UNOMSA) (www.nimh.nl). The Spanish GC provided monitors in South Africa in 1993 (EUNELSA), in Palestine in 1995, and in Guatemala (MINUGUA) in 1995 (es.wikipedia.org). Since 1996 the Italian AdC has had observers in Palestine (Hebron) (www.carabinieri.it) and contributed monitors to UNFICYP in Cyprus (Correspondence Italian MoD). All six EGF forces contribute to the EU monitoring mission in Georgia.

International investigations into, for instance, (war) crimes and smuggling.⁹⁷ The EGF could create and lead or contribute to multinational teams doing this. Its contributing forces have considerable experience in this field. The EGF should be preferred for this, if an international mission is required, compared to a civilian police force in more threatening security conditions or geographically demanding areas, when rapid deployment, logistical self-sustainment or cooperation with the military are required, as well as when the domestic fields of expertise of the gendarmerie forces are involved, and a large and complex programme needs to be executed. Unless investigations need to be executed under war-like conditions, the EGF should be preferred to the regular military.

Some authors and interviewees provided other suggestions. While these could be included under the present EGF Treaty, it seems that the EGF contributing forces have less experience in this.

VIP protection⁹⁸ Gendarmerie VIP protection teams could travel with high-level EU or other officials to protect them. These are rather small missions, not requiring much logistics or complex operations. Gendarmerie forces would therefore only be preferred to a civilian police force in less benign security conditions, in more demanding geographical areas and when rapid deployment or cooperation with the military is required. Gendarmerie should be preferred over the regular military in less than war-like conditions and when deploying the military is politically sensitive.

Enforcing embargos.⁹⁹ EGF teams could perform checks and enforce obedience. The EGF could lead embargo operations, for instance against the

97 The Dutch KM participated in 1995/1996 in the UN investigation into weapons sales to the Rwandan military (www.nimh.nl). The Spanish GC supported the International Court for the former Yugoslavia in 1999 (www.guardiacivil.org). The Italian AdC worked with the FBI, for the International Court for the former Yugoslavia, to compare weapons used in the civil war (correspondence with the Italian MoD). The French GN participates in the investigation concerning Mr Hariri, the former prime minister of Lebanon (correspondence with the GN).

98 The Spanish GC protected the EU Administrator in Mostar (1995), the UN High Representative in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1997 and the EU High Representative in Afghanistan in 2002 (www.guardiacivil.org, es.wikipedia.org). The Italian AdC protected OSCE observers during the elections in Albania and the former King of Afghanistan in 2002 after returning to his country (www.carabinieri.it). The Romanian JR contributed to VIP protection in UNMIK-Kosovo (www.jandarmerieromana.ro).

99 The Dutch KM and the Spanish GC participated in the 1993-1996 Western European Union embargo controls on the River Danube. (www.nimh.nl, www.guardiacivil.org).

smuggling of weapons or other economic embargos. Especially useful here could be the air services, border control, maritime/waterways policing, mountain police and airport police parts of the EGF contributing forces. For these kinds of operations gendarmerie should be preferred over civilian police forces in more threatening security conditions, more demanding geographical areas, when rapid deployment, logistical self-sustainment, cooperation with the military or a large, complex operation is required. The EGF should be preferred over international operations by the regular military as it saves costs, in non-war-like conditions, when internal security actors have to be checked, a domestic area of the gendarmerie's expertise is needed (e.g. border control), or deploying the military is less acceptable.

Identifying victims of, for instance, disasters or war crimes.¹⁰⁰ Relatively small, specialist EGF forces could be trained and deployed for this. In the case of war-like conditions all would need military protection. Here gendarmerie forces would have advantages over civilian units in case a large, complex operation, cooperation with the military, rapid deployment or logistical self-sustainment is required, when the operation has to take place under less benign security conditions or in more demanding geographical conditions. In some cases deploying the regular military could be politically less acceptable.

Election support. The EGF could maintain public order and secure vital persons and objects to allow elections to be held in a secure environment. Gendarmerie forces would be preferred in non-war-like and non-peaceful conditions. In more demanding geographical areas, when rapid deployment is necessary, in the case of logistical self-sustainment, a large, complex operation or cooperation with military forces is required, the EGF should be preferred compared to a civilian police force. Deploying the EGF could save costs and be politically more acceptable than using the regular military. It is better suited as this is a matter of internal security.

Providing security after natural disasters.¹⁰¹ The EGF could secure infrastructure, guide or protect transport, prevent looting and maintain order. It would have the same advantages as in the case of election support.

Non-combatant evacuations.¹⁰² The EGF could reach and collect European civilians who have to be evacuated from disaster areas or other circumstances

100 The French GN and the Italian AdC did this after the 2004 tsunami in Thailand. (Fr.wikipedia.org and the correspondence with the Italian MoD).

101 In an interview it was stated that deployment after the Asian tsunami in 2006 had been discussed in the EGF.

short of war. In more threatening security conditions gendarmerie special forces, site security and transport security units could be necessary. For this potential task the EGF has the same advantages as in the case of election support.

Searching for and arresting (war) criminals.¹⁰³ Gendarmerie intelligence, observation and arrest teams would be able and competent to track and arrest, with or without cooperating with the local police, and transport these criminals out of the country. Again, there are the same advantages as in the case of election support.

Security of refugee camps.¹⁰⁴ The EGF could be responsible for the security of refugee camps, refugee convoys and refugee flows. It could also provide transport and logistical support. See the election support for the advantages of using the EGF.

In interviews it was also suggested that the EGF could be used for an activity that cannot be regarded as international crisis management. It would therefore require changes to the EGF Treaty, a process which can, of course, be started if the EGF Member States require this. The following was mentioned:

Cooperation in domestic tasks.¹⁰⁵ EGF participating forces already cooperate bilaterally to some extent as well as in European policing organisations concerning their domestic tasks (see the second chapter). More direct, more intensive and more far-reaching cooperation in domestic tasks could be organised in the EGF, for instance by setting up a coordination cell and exchanging liaison offers. Including domestic tasks in EGF cooperation is a politically sensitive issue and therefore seems to be a less realistic aim.

102 Rémy (2004). The French GN contributed to the evacuation of foreign nationals in Chad (2006), Georgia (2008), Guinea (2006) and Lebanon (2006) (correspondence with the GN). The Dutch KM recently participated in a Dutch military evacuation exercise (*Defensiekrant*, 18 September 2008, p. 4).

103 Uppal, R. *Global Insight Daily News*, 24 January 2004. The Italian AdC gathered information on war criminals in the former Yugoslavia for the International Court (PIFWIC, correspondence with the Italian MoD).

104 The Spanish GC provided security for the Hamallah camp in Albania in 1999 (www.guardiacivil.org)

105 In the Dutch expert meeting it was mentioned that during the creation of the EGF it was agreed that it would not be used to provide assistance to other EGF Member States on their national territory. This is, of course, different from cooperating for domestic tasks with each force operating on its own territory, i.e. by exchanging information, joint operations etc.

Duplicating cooperation in, for instance, Europol and bypassing civilian police – also in the six EGF Member States - should be avoided. European states without gendarmerie forces can be expected to seriously oppose this – as they do with the EGF itself at present, of course. In any case it would also be somewhat difficult because of the differing domestic tasks of EGF forces. If the scope of the EGF would be broadened by cooperation in domestic tasks, then merging the EGF and FIEP could be considered (depending, of course, on membership congruence). Nevertheless, if EGF Member States want to use the EGF as the basis for cooperation to improve domestic tasks, this does seem possible. Just like creating the EGF for policing in the transition from military to civilian phases of international peacekeeping operations, it is a matter of political will.

5.6 Sub-conclusions

From this chapter four conclusions can be drawn. First, EGF Member States have not adequately defined what constitutes ‘military status’ and what are considered ‘policing skills’.

Second, throughout the world there are many military organisations with single policing tasks. It would be interesting for the EGF to consider developing relations with these kinds of forces.

Third, in the EU and the foreseeable EU Candidate States there are few gendarmerie forces. Only Bulgaria has a gendarmerie force and is EU Member State. Albania and Serbia seem to be the most likely EU candidates with a gendarmerie force, followed by Georgia, Turkey and Ukraine. By limiting EGF participation to EU Member States and EU candidates with gendarmerie forces defined as organisations that are parts of the military in peacetime and that have more than one police task in their own country, the EGF will remain a rather insignificant organisation for quite some time.

Fourth, the EGF could reach its full potential by developing into a ‘European-led’ organisation with a dual police-military character. Among the EU Member States it should take a lenient stance as to the character of new participants. Outside the EU the EGF has a considerable potential for additional partners. It would be realistic to prioritise creating closer cooperation with like-minded states with comparable forces in the Mediterranean area and Eastern Europe. Low-intensity contacts could be developed with many gendarmerie forces in the rest of the world and more

intensive ties with a rather select group of like-minded states with large and comparable gendarmerie forces.

Fifth, based on domestic and international expertise EGF cooperation could be expanded. The EGF could include more specialised units in its Catalogue and its preparation for operations. Judging from the extent of international experience, reinforcing the security of European sites in the world, international investigations, monitoring elections and truces, and SSR seem to be the most promising additional kinds of operations for which the EGF could be used. Finally, cooperation should be included within the EGF so as to improve the performance of their domestic tasks.

6. The EGF's potential based on long-term trends

Would long-term trends decrease or increase the potential of the EGF? This chapter's focus is on the developments predicted for the next 10-20 years. In the first section general trends are described. The second focuses on trends that provide opportunities for an even greater broadening of EGF cooperation.

Predicting the future is a tricky business. The analysis below is based on what are probably the best sources available: academics, Shell International and the US, British and French military.¹⁰⁶ Trends mentioned in multiple sources can, of course, be expected to be more likely to really occur. Excluded are trends in fields like governance and legitimacy, medical progress, economics and finance, globalisation, family systems, ethics and culture.

106 Not all sources differentiate according to degrees of probability. The Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre (DCBC) (2006) does so by differentiating >95%, >60%, >10% and <10% probability categories (p. xiv). Only the >95% category is included below.

6.1 General trends

Five clusters of trends seem to be relevant to the EGF's long-term potential. First, the political outlook seems rather favourable to a European security organisation like the EGF, although competition for resources increases the possibilities of real military conflicts.¹⁰⁷ With the decreasing probability of great power conflict, increasing multipolarity, more flexible international cooperation, more democracies and growing respect for human rights,¹⁰⁸ there is more potential for EGF Member States to find like-minded countries and develop relations with their gendarmerie forces. Increasing regionalism is also predicted,¹⁰⁹ which for the EGF means that working in or around Europe and having strategic partners outside Europe will become more important.

Second, the general security outlook seems to indicate that the demand for EGF operations to increase security in troubled countries or regions is likely to increase even further. The 'arc of instability' spanning the Middle East, Asia and Africa is predicted to remain.¹¹⁰ With more socio-economic inequality and tensions, crime, terrorism, disorder and insurgency, internal conflicts, failed states, the internationalisation of domestic conflicts,¹¹¹ it seems fair to expect there will be ample international crises of the kind that the EGF can help to resolve.

Third, some trends indicate that gendarmerie forces will become even more suitable for international operations than their alternative. Predicted is an increased need for sensitivity, as religious and intercultural tensions might rise

107 Glenn and Gordon (2007), p. 14, Verlaan (2007), pp. 33-34, Ministère de la Défense (2007), p. 24, USJFC (2007), pp. 8 and 24-25, DCBC (2006), pp. 6-8, 24-25 and 32, Shell International (2005), p. 189, Kennedy, Messner and Nuscheler (2002), p. 192. Only NIC (2004), p. 8, predicts that energy supplies will remain sufficient to meet demand.

108 Glenn and Gordon (2007), p. 18, USJFC (2007), p. 22, Verlaan (2007), pp. 21-23, Ministère de la Défense (2007), p. 23, DCBC (2006), pp. 15, 44-47 and 49, Shell International (2005), pp. 125, 129-141, NIC (2004), pp. 8 and 18, Kennedy, Messner and Nuscheler (2002), pp. 187 and 194. The US is expected to remain the most important power, however.

109 DCBC (2006), p. 72. USJFC (2007), pp. 21 and 28.

110 NIC (2004), p. 8. Shell International (2005), pp. 149-157, only focuses on Africa. It sees both positive and negative developments on the continent.

111 Glenn and Gordon (2007), pp. 22, 24 and 34, USJFC (2007), pp. 8, 10-12, 19 and 25-26, Ministère de la Défense (2007), pp. 23 and 29-30, Verlaan (2007), pp. 30-31, DCBC (2006), pp. 3, 15-16, 38, 53 and 68, Kennedy, Messner and Nuscheler (2002), pp. 185, 187 and 192-193. Competition for resources will also increase domestic socio-economic tensions and conflict.

and the role of women will increase.¹¹² From their domestic experience gendarmerie forces are better prepared for this than MP and the regular military. Some also foresee an increase in the difficulty in distinguishing between combatants and non-combatants.¹¹³ From their domestic experience gendarmerie forces are well suited to assist the regular military during operations to make this distinction and deal with situations involving only non-combatants or combatants in non-life threatening situations.

Fourth, the literature indicates that the EGF's operations will become more difficult. EGF forces will have to adapt the way they operate to remain successful. A growing population in underdeveloped countries is predicted.¹¹⁴ This will result in urbanisation, increased youth unemployment and shortages of basic resources, increasing the potential for escalating radicalisation, crime and public order disturbances. Successfully operating in large and dense urban areas might require more efforts by EGF forces because their domestic tasks are mainly in rural areas. Predicted is also a loss of technological superiority. Education and the spread of new technologies will increase.¹¹⁵ Weapons and equipment will become cheaper and more available to individuals and non-state actors. Foreign intervention forces can be followed and counteracted more easily. Some also foresee an increase in the unpredictability of when and how conflicts erupt and develop.¹¹⁶ This would also increase demands on the EGF, especially in planning and operational flexibility.

112 Glenn and Gordon (2007), p. 32, USJFC (2007), p. 12, Verlaan (2007), p. 31, DCBC (2006), pp. 6, 17 and 39. Kennedy, Messner and Nuscheler (2002), p. 187.

113 DCBC (2006), p. 71.

114 Glenn and Gordon (2007), p. 16, Ministère de la Défense (2007), p. 29, USJFC (2007), pp. 8, 10 and 15-16, DCBC (2006), pp. 6-9 and 34, Shell International (2005), pp. 166-167, Kennedy, Messner and Nuscheler (2002), p. 186.

115 Glenn and Gordon (2007), p. 22, USJFC (2007), pp. 14 and 22, DCBC (2006), pp. 57, 61 and 74, NIC (2004), p. 8, Kennedy, Messner and Nuscheler (2002), p. 187. Verlaan (2007), pp. 26-28, also mentions robotics.

116 DCBC (2006), p. 68.

Finally, three trends mentioned in the literature seem to reinforce some of the suggestions for additional tasks for the EGF as mentioned in the previous chapter. First, CBRN operations will become more likely with the predicted spread, technological development and stocks of weapons of mass destruction.¹¹⁷ Not only more states, but also non-state actors and extremist individuals might gain access to these weapons. The demand for CBRN intervention teams in EGF operations might thus increase. Second, providing security after disasters will become more frequent in international crisis management. Industrial and technological disasters¹¹⁸ will become more frequent because of advances in technology and increased living standards and more severe because of denser and larger urban areas. Climate change¹¹⁹ will result in increasingly stronger storms, heavier rainfall and more flooding, but also more habitat shifts, desertification and draughts, forest fires, lightning strikes, failed harvests and mud slides. In most cases international assistance is needed to maintain order and gendarmerie forces are more suitable to provide this than the regular military, as is now often the case. Third, environmental protection will become more important as environmental degradation increases.¹²⁰ Pollution, climate change, growing populations and urbanisation will in certain areas seriously affect biodiversity and living conditions for humans, animals and plants. By assisting the enforcement of laws and regulations on, for instance, deforestation, agriculture or the hunting of endangered animals, the EGF can help limit damage to the environment.

6.2 Additional potential for the EGF

The literature also mentions trends that might increase the potential for EGF cooperation beyond what was described in the previous chapter. First: outbreaks of contagious diseases, like different strains of flu or Ebola.¹²¹ This threat will increase because of urbanisation, the ease of travel and concentrated livestock. Populations need to be controlled and medical

117 Ministère de la Défense (2007), p. 29, also mentions non-state proliferation, DCBC (2006), pp. 17 and 75, NIC (2004), p. 8, Kennedy, Messner and Nuscheler (2002), p. 192.

118 Ministère de la Défense (2007), p. 30.

119 Glenn and Gordon (2007), p. 12 and 36, Ministère de la Défense (2007), pp. 24 and 30, USJFC (2007), pp. 10 and 22-24, DCBC (2006), pp. 2 and 24, Shell International (2005), p. 207, NIC (2004), p. 8, Kennedy, Messner and Nuscheler (2002), p. 190.

120 Ministère de la Défense (2007), pp. 29-30, Shell International (2005), p. 214, Kennedy, Messner and Nuscheler (2002), p. 191.

121 Glenn and Gordon (2007), pp. 12 and 26, Verlaan (2007), pp. 23-24, Ministère de la Défense (2007), p. 29, DCBC (2006), pp. 7 and 27-28.

locations or transportation secured. If international assistance is needed and tensions and levels of violence are too high for a civilian police force but too low for the regular military, the EGF could be the preferred option. Of course EGF units should be well protected against these diseases themselves.

Second, illegal migration¹²² and related crime will increase as a result of wars and conflicts, population pressure, mass poverty, environmental degradation, climate change and growing prosperity inequalities. Both European and other countries might be faced more often and more intensively with population flows. Gendarmerie forces are at least better equipped than the regular military to assist local law enforcement and border police (including providing additional resources to Frontex¹²³).

Third, non-state actors are predicted to become more powerful because of better education and the spread of technology.¹²⁴ This includes sub-national government, (multinational) corporations, the media, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), mercenaries and other private security companies, tribes and religious organisations. Besides making EGF operations more difficult, as described above, this trend offers an opportunity for the EGF. In domestic security civilian police forces and gendarmerie have experience working with private security firms. The US and UK military have also done so in international operations. So far the military in the EGF Member States do not seem to have set up structural relations with security firms in order to prepare for cooperation. The EGF could gain some more competitive advantage by doing so.

Fourth, ungoverned areas are predicted by some to become a growing menace to surrounding countries and the world community.¹²⁵ These are areas where local law enforcement is absent or very ineffective, in some cases by being too corrupt. Becoming hotspots for international crime, they negatively influence

122 Ministère de la Défense (2007), p. 23. USJFC (2007), pp. 8 and 16-17, DCBC (2006), pp. 6, 8, 36 and 48, Shell International (2005), p. 167. Kennedy, Messner and Nuscheler (2002), p. 186.

123 As Frontex is the EU's organization for border control this study excludes the option that the EGF would also aim at policing the EU's borders. It could easily assist Frontex, however, as it already has units for border policing and is prepared to use them in peacekeeping operations.

124 Ministère de la Défense (2007), p. 23, USJFC (2007), pp. 18-19 and p. 27, DCBC (2006), pp. 40-42, NIC (2004), p. 8.

125 DCBC (2006), pp. 16, 49 and 70. Korteweg and Ehrhardt (2005) provide a list of 41 areas. Other interesting sources might be indicators from the annual Failed States Index (www.fundforpeace.org) and the Global Peace Index (www.visionofhumanity.com).

domestic security in neighbouring areas, but also in the rest of the world. Ensuring that central government gradually gained control over these areas in their own countries was an important task of gendarmerie forces in the past, as was noted in chapter two. Assisting or substituting the local police to this end could be a new kind of operation for the EGF. It could provide SSR, but also executive counter-crime and public security capacity until local forces have become sufficiently effective. Anti-counterfeiting, anti-drugs, border control, counter-terrorism, labour policing, policing airports, public health controls, site security, tax evasion, transporting convicts, VIP protection, controlling gun permits, but also basic local community policing units could be useful.

6.3 Sub-conclusions

What could longer-term trends mean for developing the EGF?

First, the political and general security outlook seems rather favourable for the EGF. The trends of an increased need for religious, cultural and gender sensitivity, and the increased difficulty in distinguishing between combatants and non-combatants indicate that gendarmerie forces will become even more suitable for international operations than its alternatives.

Second, the growing population in underdeveloped countries, a further loss of technological superiority and the increased unpredictability of conflicts will make the EGF's operations more difficult. The EGF should address these issues.

Third, trends indicate that in the decades ahead there will be an increased demand for some of the activities that EGF forces could perform: CBRN operations, providing security after disasters and environmental protection.

Fourth, trends suggest that it could be interesting to consider including providing security after outbreaks of contagious diseases, limiting illegal immigration, cooperating with private security forms and international assistance operations with EGF cooperation to gain control over ungoverned areas.

7. Conclusion

7.1 Final conclusions

What are the main conclusions of this paper? First, cooperation between European gendarmerie forces has been increasing since the early 1990s. Gendarmerie forces compete for tasks with civil police, MP and regular military forces. The EGF is meant for policing tasks in the transition from military to civilian phases of international peacekeeping operations. Only police forces with ‘military status’ and military forces with some ‘policing skills’ can join, but both concepts have not been adequately defined by the EGF. Only EU Member States or EU candidate countries can join. The EGF has not proved its value as it only recently started its first operation.

Second, there is reason to believe that the EGF will become a successful organisation in policing the transition from the military to the civilian phase of peacekeeping operations, as there is ample demand for this, EGF contributing countries have forces with this experience, gendarmerie forces are suitable for this task and the EGF addresses many lessons learned from earlier operations. It is, however, by no means certain that the EGF will be successful. It might find itself overstretched or not delivering enough results, it may prove to be inefficient, it could be blocked by differences between Member States, it may attract too few or, in their capacity, too small new participants, be curtailed by

changes in international or domestic security, or lose out in competition with the regular police or other parts of the military.

It would serve EGF Member States' interests to develop the EGF further. The EGF offers a competitive advantage over countries without gendarmerie forces and it strengthens European integration as well as increasing police professionalization in Europe and beyond. It would also serve their interest to expand the EGF's aims to security problems for which the EGF is best suited in order to counter the threats and allow countries that are willing to contribute to the same security goals to join the EGF. The EGF should be preferred to a civilian police force in more threatening security conditions, in more demanding geographical areas, when rapid deployment and logistical self-sustainment is required, for operations under military command or in a military environment and in cases of larger and complex operations. The EGF should be preferred to the regular military for dealing with lower levels of violence, for internal security, to save costs and when deploying the regular military is politically less acceptable. Gendarmerie forces should also be preferred for tasks in which they have domestic experience and the regular military and civilian police forces do not.

There is considerable potential to increase gendarmerie cooperation based on the EGF. In the EU however, there are few gendarmerie forces which can join the EGF: only in Bulgaria. The EGF could reach its full potential by developing into a pan-European organisation with a dual police-military character. This would include MP organizations and robust, quickly deployable civilian police units from EU Member States and gendarmerie forces from Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean area. In the rest of the world there are many gendarmerie forces. Here EGF should be selective in developing cooperation. Based on domestic and international expertise EGF cooperation could be expanded to include more specialised units, be used for other kinds of activities than policing the transition from the military to the civilian phase of peacekeeping operations and even cooperation in order to improve their performance in domestic tasks.

The political and general security long-term (10-20 years) outlook seems rather favourable for the EGF. The trends of an increased need for religious, cultural and gender sensitivity, and an increased difficulty in distinguishing between combatants and non-combatants indicate that gendarmerie forces will become even more suitable for international operations than its alternatives. The growing population in underdeveloped countries, a further loss of technological superiority and the increased unpredictability of conflicts will make the EGF's operations more difficult. Trends indicate that in the

decades ahead there will be an increased demand for CBRN operations, providing security after disasters and environmental protection, while indicating that the EGF has opportunities for additional tasks in providing security after outbreaks of contagious diseases, limiting illegal immigration, cooperating with private security forms and international assistance operations to gain control over ungoverned areas.

7.2 Reflection

By 2030 we might see the EGF acting as a platform to organise a wide variety of coalition, European or European-led policing activities. Most EU Member States and some 40 other countries have gendarmerie, MP, or civilian special police forces trained and certified in EGF standards. They regularly participate in EGF led operations. The EGF provides NATO with MP tasks. Gendarmerie units temporarily provide additional resources to patrol Mediterranean Sea shores to limit illegal immigration. In the Amazon and on Indonesian islands an European-led gendarmerie operation reinforces local police and the military against illegal timber felling, thereby preventing climate change from spinning out of control. After flooding and looting in Bangladesh the EGF evacuated foreign nationals and provided security to the international humanitarian assistance operation. It provides teams to step up security and train local police at a number of international airports. European oil drilling facilities and pipelines in crises-ridden and remote areas are protected by European gendarmes to ensure energy supplies. In some African, South-American and Asian border areas the EGF has been deployed for up to a decade to assist local police to counter general lawlessness. Once again it is preparing to send teams to the Congo and Tibet to monitor and secure free and fair elections. EGF standardisation has contributed significantly to the professionalization and harmonisation of policing in Europe and beyond. Gendarmerie forces throughout the world quickly and efficiently exchange information and cooperate to counter crime and terrorism, thereby providing an example to police forces around the globe. Just fantasy, a possibility or something to aim for?

8. Recommendations

As must have become clear from the preceding chapters: the EGF has a far greater potential than it has currently reached. How should the EGF be developed to best serve the interests of its Member States? Recommendations cover three core issues: improving the EGF's preparation for operations, having more states join the EGF and expanding the scope of policing tasks which the EGF should be able to deliver. What should be the priorities for the next few years and what should be considered for the longer term?

8.1 Priorities

First, in order not to lose momentum it is crucial that the EGF in the next few years will have more operations. With only one, in Bosnia-Herzegovina, not even a challenging one, the EGF is simply not seen as serious. The project would lose momentum and could eventually be abandoned altogether. It might be wise to set aside some political differences to allow the EGF more opportunity to reach its potential. On the other hand, not too many operations should be started too soon: overstretch should be avoided, too.

Second, in order to gain the necessary level of political acceptance the EGF should work hard to have more Member States and Partners, especially from the group of present EU Member States. More efforts should be made to

explain what gendarmerie forces are and what the EGF is and is not. Without this the EGF will remain a little known and understood initiative and, seriously limiting the chances of reaching its potential, it will be remain faced with distrust and political opposition by non-participating states and civil police. The best qualified organisations should be allowed to join, even though they are not gendarmerie organizations, but MP or (parts of) civilian police organizations that can meet EGF standards, including being quickly deployable.

8.2 Improving preparation

Third, EGF Member States should consider developing common policies for a division of labour among civil police, gendarmerie, MP and regular military forces for both domestic and international activities. This would limit undesirable competition between forces, while by increasing the similarity between gendarmerie forces making EGF cooperation easier. Police-military organisations should be integrated into the Member States gendarmerie forces as much as possible.

Fourth, what should also be considered is improving EGF‘preparation for its present task. This would include preparing to be policed itself, developing training resources and expertise, developing standards in managing relations with other actors in the operation and for performance in high-profile cases. The EGF should also improve its abilities to work in densely populated areas, in conditions of less technological superiority and with the increased unpredictability of conflicts.

Fifth, the EGF should consider training with and the certification of those private security companies (contracted by other states) with which EGF forces regularly cooperate in operation areas.

8.3 Having more states join

Sixth, for the longer term, too, EGF Member States should consider redefining the criteria to join the EGF. To allow more forces to contribute to the EGF should define which elements amount to ‘military status’ and what are considered to be ‘policing tasks’. It could define a minimum of military elements and policing tasks for EGF participants.

Seventh, Partner status in the EGF could be opened up to all states participating in the EU's Neighbourhood Policy (ec.europa.eu/world/enp) and which are willing to contribute to the security goals of EGF Member States, having forces with enough military elements and policing tasks and meeting EGF standards. Later this could be expanded to all states participating in the OSCE.

Eighth, as for police-military organizations in the rest of the world, EGF Member States should consider taking the initiative to create a 'world police-military organizations association' to increase the exchange of policies and doctrines. This could be done by expanding FIEP or creating a new organization. It would also be in the interest of EGF Member States if other regions in the world would initiate organizations like EGF or OGA. The EGF could assist in this and develop relations with these other regional gendarmerie organizations. Developing low intensity relations with 'gendarmerie' forces in the rest of the world and more intensive cooperation with a limited number of strategic police-military organizations should also be considered. Individual EGF Member States could expand bilateral cooperation programmes with other states' gendarmerie forces.

8.4 Adding tasks

Ninth, the EGF should consider including additional specialised gendarmerie units in its preparations for operations.

Tenth, the EGF should consider expanding the scope of international crises for which it could be used beyond traditional policing in the transition between the military to the civilian phase of peacekeeping operations. This could include the protection of European sites in the world, SSR, monitoring elections and truces, as well as international investigations.

Finally, EGF Member States should study what role the EGF could have in providing security after outbreaks of contagious diseases, limiting illegal immigration, cooperating with private security forms and international assistance operations to gain control over ungoverned areas.

Annex A Participation in peacekeeping operations

	Dutch KM	French GN	Italian AdC	Portuguese GNR	Spanish GC	Romanian JR
Afghanistan	X	X	X		X	
Angola	X			X	X	
Albania	X		X		X	
Bosnia-Herzegovina	X	X	X		X	
Cambodia	X		X			
Central African Republic		X				
Chad			X			
Congo	X	X	X		X	X
Croatia					X	
Cyprus	X		X			
Djibouti	X					
East Timor			X	X	X	
El Salvador			X		X	
Ethiopia/Eritrea	X		X			
Guatemala			X		X	
Guinea Bissau		X				
Haiti	X	X			X	
Indonesia (Aceh)	X					
Iraq	X		X	X	X	
Israel	X					
Ivory Coast		X				
Kosovo	X	X	X		X	X
Kurdistan			X			
Lebanon		X	X			
Liberia	X					
Macedonia	X	X	X		X	
Mozambique			X		X	
Namibia	X		X			
Nicaragua					X	
Pakistan	X					
Palestine	X	X	X		X	
Qatar	X					
Rwanda		X			X	
Santo Tome					X	
Somalia			X			
Sudan	X		X			
Total	21	12	21	3	18	2

Sources: *en.wikipedia.org*, *es.wikipedia.org*, *www.carabinieri.it*, *www.fiep-asso.com*, *www.marechaussee.nl*, correspondence with the Italian MoD, correspondence with the GC, the GNR and JR.

Annex B Domestic tasks of participating forces

(Only tasks mentioned in laws or tasks of special departments, units or branches et cetera.)

Areas of expertise	Dutch KM	French GN	Italian AdC	Portuguese GNR	Spanish GC	Romanian JR
Agriculture policing		X	X			
Air service		X	X		X	
Anti-counterfeiting		X	X	X		
Anti-drugs		X	X	X	X	
Aliens policing	X					
Arrest teams	X	X	X	X		X
Asylum process	X					
Border control	X			X	X	
CBRN intervention unit		X	X			
Criminal investigation	X	X	X	X	X	X
Crowd and riot control	X	X	X	X	X	X
Counter-terrorism		X	X		X	X
Cyber crime unit		X			X	
Diver units		X	X	X	X	X
Environmental protection (hunting, fishing, forests and natural parks)		X	X	X	X	X
Explosives detection	X	X	X	X	X ¹²⁶	
Forensic/scientific investigation		X	X	X		
Human trafficking	X	X				
Labour policing		X	X			
Local/community police service		X	X	X	X	X
Maritime/watercourse policing	X	X	X	X	X	X
Mountain police		X	X	X		X
Mounted police		X	X	X	X	X
National heritage protection			X			
Observation teams	X	X	X	X		X
Parachute units		X	X			X
Police dogs	X	X	X	X	X	X
Policing airports	X	X			X	X
Policing the military	X	X	X			
Presence in overseas	X	X				

¹²⁶ Also defusing explosives.

parts of the country						
Public health control		X	X			
Rescue teams		X	X	X	X	X
Site security (military and civilian, incl. abroad)	X	X	X	X	X	X
Tax evasion (fiscal guard) and smuggling				X	X	
Traffic policing/highway patrol		X	X	X	X	
Transporting convicts		X			X	
Transport security	X	X	X	X		X
Tourist police						X
VIP close protection (military and civilian)	X	X	X	X		X
Gun permits and arms control		X			X	
Total personnel size ¹²⁷	6,800	139,148	111,367	21,600	72,600	35,000 ¹²⁸
Total personnel size	246,750					

Sources: www.marechaussee.nl, www.defense.gouv.fr/gendarmerie, www.carabinieri.it, www.jandarmeriaromana.eu, www.fiep-asso.com, en.wikipedia.org, interviews, correspondence with the GN, the GNR and the J.R.

127 IISS (2008). Including reservists, excluding civilian personnel.

128 Correspondence Romanian J.R.

Annex C European potential EGF participants

Country and name	Part of the military in peacetime	Size	Tasks
Albanian National Guard (Garda e Republikes) ¹²⁹		1,000	Protect and guard government VIPs and residences.
Belarus: Interior Troops		11,000	Assist local police, enforce state of emergency, guard prisons, cargo and infrastructure, assist in searching missing persons or prisoners.
Bulgarian Zhandarmeriya ¹³⁰		Unclear	Security of facilities and buildings, riot control, counter-terrorism, rural policing.
Georgia: Gendarmerie and Interior Troops ¹³¹	X	10,300	Public order
Moldova : Trupelor de Carabinieri ¹³²		2,300	Protection of state facilities and assisting army in counter-insurgency. Public order, security of foreign diplomatic missions.
Monaco's Carabiniers ¹³³		110	Security of Prince and his family
Russia: Internal troops (Vnutrenniye Viska Ministerstva Vnutrennikh Del) ¹³⁴		200,000	Prison security, guarding (nuclear and military) facilities guarding, counter-terrorism, riot control, intelligence, MP, border police.
San Marino: Corpo della gendarmeria ¹³⁵		100	Law and order

129 www.garda.gov.al (only in Albanian). Under Ministry of the Interior (www.moi.gov.al). Albania did have a gendarmerie force between 1913 and 1938 (Das (2006) and en.wikipedia.org).

130 www.mvr.bg.

131 IISS (2008) mentions paramilitary Ministry of Interior Troops (6,300). Das (2006), p. 312 mentions that a 4,000-strong National Gendarmerie has 'recently' been formed. www.delgeo.ec.europa.eu has a report describing the reorganization stating that Interior Troops have been transferred to the MoD.

132 www.mai.md/dep-carab. IISS (2008) also mentions a 900-strong OPON riot police under the Ministry of the Interior.

133 www.gouv.mc. Many have served and trained in the French military.

134 Officers also trained at the military academy and in wartime transferred to the MoD.

135 The Head is an Italian AdC officer.

Serbian Žandarmerija ¹³⁶		2,000	Public disturbances, counter-terrorism, prison riots, organized crime, reinforce martial law.
Turkey: Jandarma ¹³⁷	X	150,000	Crime prevention, counter-smuggling, guarding (prisons, critical industry and infrastructure, airports), criminal investigations, MP, public order, border control, tourism police, mountain search and rescue, enforcing hunting and fishing laws, fighting forest fires, coast and lake control, highway police, commando units, forensic activities, air units.
Ukraine: Interior troops (Vnutrishni Viyska) ¹³⁸		39,900	Public order, guarding (nuclear and defence) facilities, counter-crime, counter-terrorism, special transport cargo protection, detainees' protection, embassy protection in Ukraine, assisting civilian police (militsiya), crowd and riot control, maintaining state of emergency.
Vatican City Corpo della Gendarmeria		130	Security, public order, border control, traffic control, criminal investigations, and other general police duties
Total personnel strength		435,840	

Sources: IISS (2008), Das (2006), www.fiep-asso.com, www.globalsecurity.org, www.interpol.int, polis.osce.org and en.wikipedia.org.

136 Reported to have again been founded in 2001. The Special Operations Unit and Special Police Unit were attached to it. www.crwflags.com and www.shadowspear.com.

137 Recruits from military service, (non-commissioned) officers transferred from the Army, junior officers from the military academy, after which infantry, commando and gendarmerie training follows. Provides training support to Gambia, Georgia and Azerbaijan 'gendarmerie' organisations.

138 Part of the Ministry of the Interior or under the rule of the President, but officers also trained at military academies and in wartime transferred to the MoD. Cooperation protocols with Romanian *Jandarmeria* and Russian Internal troops, memorandum on intentions of cooperation with Turkish *Jandarma*, *technical agreement on cooperation with the Italian AdC*, agreement on cooperation with US Department of Energy. International military cooperation documents with counterparts in Egypt, Argentina and Latvia. The State Border Guard Service is an independent agency under the President of the Ukraine. It includes the Coast Guard. In wartime it will also fall under the command of the military.

Annex D World police-military organisations

Country and name	Part of the military in peacetime	Size ¹³⁹
Algerian Gendarmerie Nationale (El Dark el Watani) ¹⁴⁰		20,000
Argentinean Gendarmerie Nacional Argentina ¹⁴¹		18,000
Benin Gendarmerie ¹⁴²	X	2,500
Bhutan Royal Bhutan Police ¹⁴³	X	3,500
Brazil Polícia Militar and Forca Nacional de Seguranca ¹⁴⁴		385,600
Burkina Faso Gendarmerie ¹⁴⁵	X	4,200
Cambodia Royal gendarmerie ¹⁴⁶	X	7,000
Cameroon Gendarmerie	X	9,000
Central African Republic Gendarmerie	X	1,000
Chad Gendarmerie	X	4,500
Chile – Carabineros ¹⁴⁷	X	38,000
China Peoples’ Armed Police ¹⁴⁸	X	1,500,000 ¹⁴⁹
Colombia – Policía Nacional de Colombia ¹⁵⁰	X	136,000
Comoros – Gendarmerie ¹⁵¹	X	500
Congo (Republic) Gendarmerie	X	2,000
Congo (Democratic Republic) Gendarmerie ¹⁵²		Unclear

139 IISS (2008) unless indicated otherwise.

140 Das (2006), pp. 17-18. Fr.wikipedia.org states size is 60,000.

141 Provides border security, site security (E.G. nuclear plants), counter-crime, counter-terrorism, economic crime, environmental protection, illegal immigration, embassy protection abroad. Fought in the Falklands War, but also served the UN in Angola, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, East-Timor, Guatemala, Haiti, Lebanon and Rwanda.

142 www.gouv.bj.

143 Personnel size in Das (2006).

144 The former are subject to state governors, the latter to national government. These are the auxiliary and potential reserve to the federal military forces. Organised according to military principles.

145 www.defense.gov.bf.

146 Administrative, judicial and military police. Recreated in 1993. www.rgc.gov.kh and www.mond.gov.kh.

147 Arrest teams, securing presidential palace and maintaining public order and security. www.carabinerosdechile.cl and www.defensa.cl. The criminal investigation police are also part of the armed forces. www.investigaciones.cl.

148 Focus on internal and border security according to www.China-defense.com. Also involved in civil defence and fire fighting, engineering, site security, VIP security, events security and guarding prisons (en.wikipedia.org).

149 En.wikipedia.org.

150 www.mindefensa.gov.co and www.policia.gov.co.

151 Size on en.wikipedia.org and in Das (2006).

Djibouti Gendarmerie ¹⁵³	X	1,400
Equatorial Guinea ¹⁵⁴ Guardia Civil or Gendarmerie	X	400
Gabon Gendarmerie	X	2,000
Gambia National Guard ¹⁵⁵	X	Unclear
Guinea Gendarmerie	X	1,000
Guinea Bissau ¹⁵⁶ Gendarmerie	Unclear	2,000
Ivory Coast: Gendarmerie	X	7,600
Jordan Gendarmerie ¹⁵⁷		Unclear
Kazakhstan Internal Security Troops		20,000
Kyrgyzstan Interior troops ¹⁵⁸	X	3,500
Lebanon Gendarmerie (Amen el Dakhli or El Darak) ¹⁵⁹	Unclear	9,100
Madagascar Gendarmerie ¹⁶⁰	X	8,100
Mali Gendarmerie ¹⁶¹	X	1,800
Mauritania Gendarmerie ¹⁶²	X	3,000
Mongolia Internal Troops		1,200
Morocco Gendarmerie Royale ¹⁶³	X	20,000
Nepal: Armed Police Force ¹⁶⁴		15,000

152 Das (2006) writes that gendarmerie existed at least until 1976. IISS (2008) mentions a Republican Guard of 14,000 and a national police force (no size mentioned). According to en.wikipedia.org only the former is military.

153 www.presidence.dj.

154 IISS (2008) mentions *Guardia Civile* and a coast guard under the MoD. En.wikipedia.org states there is a gendarmerie and the armed forces include a 400-strong paramilitary.

155 Was called gendarmerie from 1984-1994. www.accessgambia.com.

156 In the interview it was stated that Guinea-Bissau is creating a new 'national guard'.

157 Currently being created (The Jordan Times on 16th June 2008), consisting of the former Ministry of the Interior Special Security Forces, Diplomatic Security and air units. Will protect foreign services, vital infrastructure, 'special operations' and assisting local police in case of riots. En.wikipedia.org states border guards and His Majesty's Special Security unit are part of the military and the Public Security Directorate can be put under military command in crises and in wartime.

158 Part of the MoD (En.wikipedia.org), subordinate to the Ministry of Internal Affairs (Das (2006)).

159 Most of all policing rural areas and can be mobilised for public order management. Size in Das (2006).

160 According to Das (2006) it has mainly rural policing tasks. www.madagend.org.

161 www.defense.gov.ml.

162 www.mauritania.mr and www.armee.mr. IISS (2008) also mentions a 2,000-strong National Guard, which Das describes as having public order tasks and training with the gendarmerie at the military school.

163 Tasks include public order, guarding and border guard. Auxiliary force (30,000) also has military status according to en.wikipedia, and is subordinated to the Ministry of the Interior and has the same tasks.

164 Provides policing tasks relating to public order, serious crimes, border guards, site protection, counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency. En.wikipedia.org states that its size is

Niger Gendarmerie ¹⁶⁵	X	1,400
Pakistan Rangers and Mehran Force ¹⁶⁶		75,000
Senegal Gendarmerie ¹⁶⁷	X	5,000
Sri Lanka National Police ¹⁶⁸	X	30,200
Syria Gendarmerie		8,000
Taiwan Republic of China Military Police ¹⁶⁹	X	12,000
Tajikistan Interior troops		3,800
Tchad Gendarmerie Nationale ¹⁷⁰	Unclear	Unclear
Togo: Gendarmerie ¹⁷¹	X	750
Turkmenistan Interior Troops	X	Unclear
Uzbekistan Interior Troops		19,000
Venezuela National Guard ¹⁷²	X	23,000
Vietnam People's Police ¹⁷³	X	80,000
Zimbabwe Republic Police Force ¹⁷⁴	X	19,500
Total personnel strength		2,487,550

Sources: IISS (2008), Das (2006), en.wikipedia.org, www.ipcs.org.

40,000 and it has contributed to operations in Iraq, Kosovo, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Haiti and Sudan. Works with both the military and the civilian police. www.apf.gov.np.

165 Operates in rural areas and is made up of MP and judicial police.

166 En.wikipedia.org, www.defence.pk and www.pakistanidefence.com states that the Rangers engage in border police, protecting sites, assisting in maintaining law and order and anti-smuggling roles in Punjab province. Under the Ministry of the Interior, but commanded by seconded army generals. Rangers above Sub-Inspector rank have police arrest and search authority. Rangers have policing authorities under the Customs Act and Government Notifications. The Mehran force in Sindh province much resembles the Rangers. The Pakistani Frontier Corps (65,000, under the Ministry of the Interior, IISS (2008)) also report to Army headquarters and can be attached to Army units if necessary.

167 www.forcesarmees.gouv.sn.

168 En.wikipedia.org states that the size is 60,000 and that it has taken part in UN operations in East Timor, Haiti, Sudan and Liberia. Includes a 'special task force' of 3,000 for counter-terrorism (IISS (2008)).

169 Has MP, presidential protection, counter-terrorism, VIP protection and domestic intelligence as its tasks. Assists local law enforcement on a regular basis. Personnel size at en.wikipedia.org.

170 Only mentioned on fr.wikipedia.org.

171 IISS (2006) states the gendarmerie is part of the Ministry of the Interior, Das (2006), p. 847, MoD.

172 Wwww.guardia.mil.ve.

173 Das (2006), pp. 911-912, and en.wikipedia.org state 'are considered' or 'is' one of the armed forces. Personnel size from Das.

174 Part of the military according to en.wikipedia.org. MoD site does not support this (www.mod.gov.zw), while the website of the Ministry of the Interior does mention the force (www.moha.gov.zw).

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