Contents

Normative Power Europe: Introductory Observations on a Controversial Notion
André Gerrits

The EU’s Normative Power in Changing World Politics
Ian Manners

The World in Our Mind: Normative Power in a Multi-Polar World
Lisbeth Aggestam

Normative Power in Europe after the Post-Cold War
Asle Toje

Normative Power Europe: A Russian View
Tatiana Romanova

The Identity Dilemmas of EU Normative Power: Observations from Chinese Traditional Culture
Yitwei Wang

Into the Future: Some Concluding Remarks
André Gerrits

References

About the Authors
Normative Power Europe: Introductory Observations on a Controversial Notion

André Gerrits

Introduction

Paradigms change rapidly in discussions on global politics. While we celebrated the triumph of the ‘West’ less than two decades ago, we now face the dawn of the post-American, if not the ‘post-Western’ world: ‘the decline of the West and the rise of the rest’. ‘Europe’, the European Union (EU),\(^1\) occupies a special place in the ongoing discussion.

First, opinions diverge dramatically on the role and relevance of Europe in world politics. There is considerably wider diversity of opinion on the future of the European Union as an international actor than on the United States, China and – although less apparent – on (re-) emerging powers such as Russia, Brazil and India. Interpretations cover the whole spectrum. They vary from Europe as an (increasingly) irrelevant factor in global relations (Kagan 2008; and Zakaria 2008), to the European Union as one of the three main empires of the twenty-first century (Khanna 2008). This large variety of explanations follows from two circumstances: one, the EU is a fundamentally

\(^1\) ‘Europe’ and the ‘European Union’ are used alternately throughout this publication, mainly for reasons of style and readability. This does not in any way imply that Europe and the European Union are considered identical. This would not only be factually wrong, but also inappropriate. The casual monopolization of the term Europe by the European Union rightly irritates those European countries that do not belong to the Union, as Tatiana Romanova convincingly argues for the Russian Federation in this volume.
novel and unique international actor, and in this respect, Europe knows no predecessor, no equivalent, not even a dominant theory; and two, academic and political interpretations of the international role and relevance of Europe are very closely, if not causally, related. Political assessments of the identities and policies of the European Union feed into the academic debate, and vice versa – more so again, I would hypothetically argue, than in the case of most other global actors.

A second major feature of the discussion on Europe’s global relevance is that it is heavily dominated by European researchers and, more importantly, that it is particularly (if not almost exclusively) among Europeans that Europe is taken seriously as an international actor. This, among other factors, makes the debate rather Euro-centrist. However, Europeans and non-Europeans often tend to think differently about the role and relevance of the European Union.

And third, whenever Europe is accepted as a major global actor, this usually comes with an emphasis on Europe’s distinct power. Europe’s power and influence in world politics are considered to be essentially different from those of other major players, in terms of Europe’s ambitions, sources, instruments, policies and results.

A string of adjectives has been introduced to characterize Europe’s distinct global relevance. Europe or the European Union would be a ‘civilian power’ (Telò 2007), a ‘post-modern power’ (Cooper 2003), an ‘ethical’ (Aggestam 2008a), a ‘structuring’ (Keukeleire and MacNaughtan 2008), a ‘transformative’ (Leonard 2005), a ‘soft’ (Nye 2002, 2004, 2005), or a ‘normative’ (Manners 2002) power. Without downplaying the differences between these definitions, they are all confluent from a 1972 article by Jean Monnet’s French biographer and European civil servant, François Duchêne, in which he characterized the European Community as an emerging ‘civilian’—that is, non-military – power (Duchêne 1972). All of the authors mentioned above interpret the EU as a relevant actor in global politics, whose power and influence are not so much based on military might and other coercive means (which does not exclude other material, mostly economic, sources of power) as on the attractiveness of its example, reflecting such diverse practices, norms and values as shared sovereignty, welfare-state arrangements, multilateralism, democracy, human rights and environmental policies.

Among these designations of European ‘power’, Ian Manners’ notion of normative power has probably drawn most attention. From its inception in the early 2000s, the notion of ‘normative power’ has raised substantial interest and debate among scholars (linked to wider discussions on the ‘nature’ of the EU as an international actor and on the relevance of norms, perceptions and ‘roles’ in international relations) as well as policy-makers. This Clingendael Paper focuses on the relevance of ‘Normative Power Europe’ in the context of the changing global relations mentioned above. Does normative power answer the specific challenges that the current shifts in world politics present to Europe? For this reason, Ian Manners (Roskilde University) has been asked to
elaborate on the topicality of normative power. Lisbeth Aggestam (University of Bath) and Asle Toje (Norwegian School of Management, Oslo) have been invited to add their assessments of the relevance of the concept of ‘Normative Power Europe’. Additionally, and mindful of the ‘Europe-centred’ nature of the debate on normative power, Tatiana Romanova (School of International Relations, St Petersburg State University) and Yiwei Wang (Center for American Studies, Fudan University, People’s Republic of China) have been asked to discuss Russian and Chinese perceptions, respectively, of Europe’s normative power.  

This introductory chapter intends to discuss briefly some of the major academic and political issues that are involved in the discussions on ‘Normative Power Europe’.

**Normative Power Revisited**

Defining Europe as a distinct international actor is not new. The current discussion on normative power revisits an earlier attempt to define the specific nature of Europe’s international role and relevance, which was initiated by Duchêne’s concept of Europe as a civilian power. Duchêne was inspired by what he observed during the mid-1970s as cardinal changes in the nature and distribution of power in international relations. The dawning debacle of US military intervention in South-East Asia, the emergence of non-military powers such as the German Federation and Japan, as well as the first serious signs of detente in East–West relations, all seem to point in the same direction: conventional power politics and the political relevance of large-scale military might seemed to have reached their limits. Optimism, however, reigned briefly (the notion of civilian, normative and related concepts have an intrinsically optimistic connotation). The return to traditional military power politics and East–West confrontation from the end of the 1970s, marked by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and a new round in the arms race as initiated by the Reagan administration in the United States, effectively killed the discussion on Europe as a (relevant) civilian power. As ‘civilian power’ then, the discussion on the notion of ‘Normative Power Europe’ today also seems strongly influenced by a confluence of developments that are partly beyond the powers of Europe itself. Apart from important steps taken in the direction of a common foreign and security policy, as well as the EU’s highly successful enlargement strategy, other factors that have contributed to the friendly international environment that is conducive to the re-emergence of the idea of Europe as a distinct power were the collapse of communism, the end of the Cold War, the emergence of liberal internationalism and political

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2) The contributions were initially presented at a conference on ‘Normative Power Europe’ by the Trans-European Policy Studies Association (TEPSA) in cooperation with the Netherlands Institute of International Relations ‘Clingendael’ in Brussels, May 2009.
universalism, and the broadening of the concept of security, including such non-conventional issues as poverty, the environment and climate change. No single matter, however, seemed to have been more supportive to the (self-) perception of Europe as a normative actor in world politics, in academic as well as in policy circles, as the radical unilateralism of the George W. Bush administration. This is one of the more fascinating aspects of ‘Normative Power Europe’: it was neither the revisionist Russian Federation nor the authoritarian People’s Republic of China that served as its main sources of inspiration, but the behaviour of Europe’s main ally, the United States.

While the resurgence of the Cold War in the late 1970s aborted discussions on Europe’s civilian power, the current changes in global politics, which are also characterized by a pertinent element of traditional power politics, might negatively affect the present-day interest in normative power. In other words, ‘Normative Power Europe’ may be more influenced by the Zeitgeist (or, as Asle Toje puts it in his chapter, normative power as ‘a response to and function of a unique historical context’) than is generally accepted.

The Zeitgeist dimension of normative power is indicative of the extent to which it represents a convergence of academic and political agendas. ‘Normative Power Europe’ serves multiple functions. Normative power defines, directs and legitimizes the international role and relevance of Europe (Diez 2005). Manners’ contribution to this volume sets out what role the European Union could and should play in changing world politics, defined by Manners in a most ominous way by four major ‘catastrophic’ failures: the predominance of neo-liberalism; dramatic climate change; failing development; and global governance strategies. ‘Normative Power Europe’ has become a grand narrative, an answer to the ever more pressing need to bestow an identity on Europe – legitimacy through foreign policy.

An important aspect of the discussion on ‘Normative Power Europe’ is the distinction between normative power by default or by design? Whereas the former is essentially considered a product of Europe’s weakness (Europe has fewer alternative options as a civilian – that is, non-military – power) (Kagan 2008); the latter is seen as a deliberate policy choice. Manners’ and comparable notions of Europe as a distinct ‘power’ seem to combine the two approaches implicitly: normative power is obviously based on carefully considered policy assessments, but it also seems to come from the very nature of the EU. Europe is a normative actor because Europe itself is based on normative principles (Lucarelli 2008). ‘Normative Power Europe’ is not so much about what Europe does (design) – to paraphrase Manners (2008c) – but about what it is (default). His interpretation is echoed by the European Union itself. As the Lisbon Treaty phrases it (European Union 2008):

The Union’s action on the international scene shall be guided by the principles which have inspired its own creation, development and enlargement, and which it seeks to advance in the wider world:
democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human
rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, the
principles of equality and solidarity, and respect for the principles of the
United Nations Charter and international law.

Another of the more problematic aspects of normative power is its
relationship with military power, and with coercive policies in general,
especially in the light of the European Union’s increasing attempts to
establish a common defence capability. The issue involves various aspects.
The tension between military and normative power may be conveniently
neglected (Leonard 2005). One may pay tribute to the US security umbrella,
recognizing that Europe’s normative power merely exists by the grace of
America’s hard power (Hyde-Price 2008). One may reject Europe’s efforts to
come to a common European defence strategy, because it might negatively
impact upon, if not undermine, the EU’s most important international asset:
its normative power and identity (Smith 2004). The more that Europe’s
normative power is accompanied by military capabilities, the lesser the extent
to which it will still rest on the power of the norm itself and the less that it will
be distinguishable from traditional forms of power (Diez 2005). As logical as
this may sound, this is not so to the European Union itself. The EU continues
to reason that normative power and military capabilities go together very well.
Military efforts will support Europe’s normative power; while normative
power may positively impact upon the efficacy of Europe’s normative power.

Who decides whether international power and influence are actually of a
normative nature? Is not normative power like respect: one may ask for
respect, one may even demand it, but ultimately it is the other who bestows
one with respect?

Change is essential to normative power: changing the ‘other’. In
Manners’ conceptual trinity of principles, actions and impact, impact stands
for transformation through adaptation – adaptation to European norms and
standards. Manners crucially argues that Europe may be considered able to
influence others’ perceptions of what should be considered as ‘normal’, hence
normative power should be envisaged as socializing in the impact of the
actions taken to promote these norms.

Does the EU’s effectiveness as a driver of change largely depend, by its
lack of major coercive possibilities, on the receptiveness of these others? In
other words, and to paraphrase Manners again, do normative or comparable
notions of power take the EU beyond rhetoric and self-perception? The
answer to this question may in some measure depend on the timeframe used,
as Manners suggests, but it may also relate to more fundamental issues of
perceived and denied exemplariness and universalism. Kishore Mahbubani
offers a conspicuous example of how the EU’s self-perception (and, most
probably and in general terms, EU member states) conflicts with others’
perception of the EU. In the perception of Mahbubani, Europe is an arrogant,
inward-looking, self-obsessed and conservative entity in decline, which not
only treats non-European cultures and societies with disdain and
condescension but which also fails to establish any kind of meaningful partnership with them (Mahbubani 2008: 266). Even in the very unlikely case that Mahbubani has voiced only his own opinion, the global success of his book *The New Asian Hemisphere* guarantees a more generally shared opinion by now.

Recent research on perceptions of Europe among the citizens of other important players (China, Brazil, India and Japan) offers a mixed picture (Cerutti 2008; Laïdi 2008b; and *European Foreign Affairs Review* 2007). Generally, sufficient knowledge to form an opinion of the EU remains limited to a relatively small part of the population. Familiarity with Europe is a matter of education, socio-economic position and professional affiliation. Europe is most frequently associated with, and criticized for, its economic power – an economic power with a predominantly neo-liberal and protectionist nature. Additionally, the EU is regularly connected with peacekeeping, regional integration and multilateralism, although only a small minority rank the EU among the global powers in these fields. A more generally shared and appreciated feature of Europe is its role as a potential counterweight to the United States. And although the positive perception of Europe is at least partly based on the fact that Europe is not associated with hard power (and the potential threats that hard power may generate), the normative dimension of its power is not commonly recognized either. ‘Normative Power Europe’ is not easily understood, recognized or appreciated outside of the European Union – to put it mildly.

The concept of normative power goes beyond conflicting interpretations of foreign policy norms and international relations between the Russian Federation and the European Union, as Tatiana Romanova argues in her chapter on Russia in this booklet. The concept of normative power denies Russia part of its national identity. ‘Europeanness’ is a crucial aspect of Russian identity, Romanova asserts. The European Union’s monopolization of the notion of ‘Europe’, based on a subjective political (some would argue a cultural) and not an objective geographical definition of what Europe represents, places the Russian Federation outside of Europe. ‘In the dichotomy of Russia versus the West/Europe, Russia can accept that it is not part of the ‘West’, she writes, ‘but [Russia] will never agree with not being part of Europe’.

Yiwei Wang, in his evaluation of Chinese perceptions of ‘Normative Power Europe’, is not much less critical. He lists the same standard complaints that Romanova and others mention: Europe’s misplaced sense of universalism; Messianism; and cosmopolitanism; as well as the EU’s hypocrisy (lack of policy coherence and consistency). As Romanova does for Russia, Wang dichotomizes the Chinese world outlook with the European worldview. His friendly and optimistic conclusions about future EU–China rapprochements hardly veil the stark differences between the two powers’ perceptions of international relations and global politics.
Norms, Power and Europe

The discussion on ‘Normative Power Europe’ is simultaneously notoriously wide and uncomfortably narrow. The debate on the distinct nature of Europe’s global power is a discussion about Europe, almost exclusively among Europeans, who generally believe that Europe does play a special and a relevant role on the world stage. ‘Normative Power Europe’ is a notion whose legitimating and analysing functions are difficult to distinguish; a notion, moreover, that is embraced by many within, although recognized by few outside, Europe.

The three constituent parts of ‘Normative Power Europe’ are all truly mega-phenomena: ‘Europe’; ‘norms’; and ‘power’. These issues offer such diverse academic and political interpretations that the discussion automatically goes into all kinds of directions, resembling a series of parallel monologues rather than a real debate. A primary lacuna in the discussion on the identity, power and the perception of ‘Europe’ beyond its own borders is the relative absence of the individual EU member states. Although the EU as a global actor may be more than the lowest common denominator of its members states (Toje argues that the EU is actually ‘less than the sum of its parts’), the debate on normative power remains rather virtual when the European member states have no place in the concept. ‘(I)f we accept that member states play a crucial role in the empowering of EU agency at the global level’, Aggestam suggests, ‘we also have to recognize that the European integration process is just as much driven by instrumental reasons as a normative ethos’. Concerning Russia, Romanova points out an interesting paradox: whereas the European Union aims to interact with Russia on the basis of its normative power, the EU member states continue to pursue their bilateral relations on the basis of interests. Adrian Hyde-Price (Hyde-Price 2008) referred to this unintended and normative power undermining the division of labour between the European Union and EU member states in a more general sense.

The issue of ‘power’ in normative power (and other, comparable, distinct forms of power) remains principally controversial. Although Manners understands normative power in its ‘ideal’ or ‘purest’ form, he never argues that Europe’s ‘power’ rests exclusively on normative issues. In ‘practical realities’, as he puts it in his chapter, they may very well coincide with ‘other’, more traditional or coercive means of power and influence. This may make the distinctiveness of normative power more questionable, but it does not make the issue of power any less controversial. Mark Leonard (of the European Council on Foreign Relations) opines that Europe’s weakness should really be seen as its strength, as an aspect of its transformative power (Leonard 2005) – that powerlessness should be seen as a function of power. Europe’s relative weakness may make it into an acceptable partner for others, but there is little reason to believe that these others take a serious interest in Europe’s lack of power. Toje ends his chapter of this Clingendael Paper with a
fundamental criticism of the power ‘dimension’ of normative power: that it only captures a potential (if not a hypothetical) aspect of the EU’s capabilities and does not in any way deliver (intended) outcomes, and, finally, that it is ‘unknowingly parasitic’ on traditional, coercive power.

Norms may very well be an important asset in EU foreign policy, but should they necessarily be defined in idealistic terms? Manners’ idealistic understanding of the normative dimension of Europe’s power excludes the possibility of perceiving norms as more or less material standards. Socio-economic, labour, environmental and other standards offer an alternative way of looking at ‘Normative Power Europe’. It is also based on capabilities, rather than only on assumptions; it may not be free of European Messianism, but it does not have this commonly disliked smell of European universalism outside of our continent; while it reflects a rather self-evident sense of self-interest within Europe. Whether ‘Normative Power Europe’ will ever be associated with realpolitik and still survive as a distinct foreign policy interpretation remains to be seen, but that the discussion about the EU as a global player is increasingly moving beyond the purely ideational and idealist interpretation of normative power, as Aggestam concludes, seems beyond doubt.
The EU’s Normative Power in Changing World Politics

Ian Manners

Introduction

The future of world politics is defined by four catastrophic failures: the failure of the neo-liberal economic system; failure to keep global warming below an increase of two degrees Celsius in mean temperatures; failure to reach any of the 2015 Millennium Development Goals; and the failure to develop any meaningful form of global governance that is capable of addressing these, and other failures. Numerous national, European and global ‘security strategies’ and ‘risk assessments’ identify proliferation of conventional arms and weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, state failure, organized crime and cyber security, energy security, climate change and changing demographics as the greatest challenges of the post-Cold War era. All of these are undoubtedly

*) I am particularly grateful to André Gerrits, as well as Lisbeth Aggestam, Christopher Bickerton, Simon Duke, Giovanni Grevi, Knud-Erik Jørgensen, Asle Toje, Jan Rood and Richard Youngs for their helpful comments.

important, but they are mainly symptoms rather than causes of global failures. If the notion of changing world politics is to bring any global governance at all, rather than simply reverting to nineteenth-century ‘great power’ politics, then addressing the root causes of twenty-first-century crises – the economic system, global warming, development goals and global justice – needs to be reconsidered.

This chapter sets out what role the European Union (EU) could and should play in these changing world politics, with an emphasis on the concept of ‘normative power’. To do this, the chapter addresses five interrelated questions regarding the normative power and external politics of the EU in any new global order: 1) what is the concept of normative power in world politics?; 2) what is an effective EU toolbox for tackling new challenges?; 3) how does the EU go beyond self-perception and rhetoric?; 4) what is the raison d’être of the EU; and 5) how might normative power in EU external policies lead to a more just global order?

Normative power is understood in this chapter in its ‘ideal’ or ‘purest’ form – that is, in the absence of other forms of power such as material incentives or physical force. In practical reality, normative power and normative justification clearly coexist alongside other forms of influence and power in world politics and in EU external actions. The question then becomes how ideal or pure forms of normative power are best conceived and practised in the presence of material incentives and/or physical force. It is obviously not possible to address this question in any comprehensive way in this brief chapter, but it is suggested that understanding and prioritizing normative power may help to ensure that any subsequent or simultaneous use of material incentives and/or physical force is practised in a more justifiable and reflexive way.

This chapter focuses on justification in EU external actions rather than explanation, interests or incentives. Normative political theorists such as Andreas Føllesdal or Molly Cochran place an emphasis on justification as providing criteria or means of overcoming distinctions between self and selfless interest and concerns (see Manners 2010). Føllesdal has identified justifiability as one of the fundamental conceptions of what legitimacy is about in normative political theory. He argues for a concern ‘about the normative legitimacy of the EU, often expressed in terms of justifiability among political equals’ (Føllesdal 2006: 156, emphasis in original). Similarly, Cochran argues that it is ‘a task of normative IR theory to enquire into the value invested in this norm [respect for state sovereignty] and to determine whether it is justifiable’ (Cochran 1999: 10). In this chapter the term ‘justifiable’ is thus used as a means of capturing the way in which moral claims are put forward rather than their universal or particular scope (Cochran 1999: 14). Such means involves attempting to ensure that EU relations and policies with the rest of the world are explicable and justifiable to first, second and third parties – the EU, its citizens and to other, non-EU, parties.
The Concept of Normative Power in World Politics

There are many different understandings of ‘normative power’ in social sciences. This section’s purpose is to help clarify the concept of normative power in world politics, as developed in EU studies over the last ten years. The section uses a five-point conceptualization of normative power as being: ideational; involving principles; actions; and impact; as well as having broader consequences in world politics. For each point, both a general observation about world politics and a specific comment about the EU are made (see Keene 2008; and Forsberg 2009).

The past two decades have seen rapid and radical transformations of the global economy, society, environment, conflict and politics. During this period, three events in particular seem to capture these notions of global transformation: the 1989 collapse of communism; the 2001 terrorist attacks; and the 2008 global financial crisis. The beliefs of eastern Europeans in 1989, al-Qaeda terrorists in 2001 and financial investors in 2008 all contributed, in very different ways, to a transformation of the international order and the emergence of new global agendas. These events, and the transformations to which they led, say something about the power of ideas and ideation in world politics.

Ideational

The concept of normative power, in its ideal or purest form, is ideational rather than material or physical. This means that its use involves normative justification rather than the use of material incentives or physical force. Clearly, the use of normative justification implies a very different timescale and form of engagement in world politics. In this respect, relations and policies with the rest of the world should be ‘normatively sustainable’—that is, ‘normatively’ explicable and justifiable to others, and ‘sustainable’ into the next generation. To capture the sea change in global thinking that the concept of normative power implies, it is useful to juxtapose two visual metaphors (borrowed from Jonathan Power’s Story of Amnesty International and from Francis Ford Coppola’s Apocalypse Now respectively) – normative power works like ‘water on stone’, not like ‘napalm in the morning’.

In the post-Cold War period, the power of ideas and ideation has been influential in the evolution of the European Community (EC) into the EU. Such ideas have helped to create an EU that is concerned about more than economic policies, and that exercises more than material forms of influence and power (see Manners 2000; and Manners 2002). In this respect, the incorporation of normative power and exercise of normative justification can be increasingly found in much of the EU’s relations with the rest of the world, including the external dimensions of internal policies – enlargement, trade and development policies – and external relations more generally. Two examples of the power of ideas and ideation in the EU’s post-Cold War
relations with the world include the ideas of ‘sustainable development’ and ‘humanitarian intervention’. In both cases the ideas came from within the UN system, were adopted into the EU treaty base, and then were eventually promoted and practised in EU external relations.

**Principles**

Conceptualizing normative power as ideational non-material justification involves a three-part understanding of its use and analysis-linking principles, actions, and impact (Manners 2008a; and Manners 2009a). Normative power should primarily be seen as legitimate in the principles being promoted. If normative justification is to be convincing or attractive, then the principles being promoted must be seen as legitimate, as well as being promoted in a coherent and consistent way. Legitimacy of principles in world politics may come from previously established international conventions, treaties or agreements, particularly if these are important within the UN system. Coherence of principles comes from the extent to which differing principles, and practices to promote them, can be seen to be sound and non-contradictory. Meanwhile, consistency of principles comes from the extent to which differing principles, and practices to promote them, are uniform – both within and without the promoting entity – and are applied uniformly.

Principles in the EU and its relations with the rest of the world draw upon the principles of the UN Charter, as well as the Helsinki Final Act, the Paris Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and UN Covenants, and the Council of Europe/European Convention on Human Rights. In practical terms, such principles can be differentiated into the prime principle of sustainable peace; core principles of freedom, democracy, human rights and rule of law (as set out in article 6 of the Treaty on European Union); as well as the objectives and tasks of equality, social solidarity, sustainable development and good governance (as set out in article 2 of the Treaty on European Union and article 2 of the Treaty establishing the European Community). Coherence and consistency in the international promotion of these principles is intended to come from the role of a High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Catherine Ashton.

**Actions**

Normative power should also be perceived as persuasive in the actions taken to promote such principles. If normative justification is to be convincing or attractive, then the actions taken must involve persuasion, argumentation and the conferral of prestige or shame. Persuasion in the promotion of principles in world politics involves constructive engagement, the institutionalization of relations and the encouragement of multi- and plurilateral dialogue among participants. Within these international and domestic venues for dialogue, the
debate and argumentation can involve reference to international principles as well as encourage understanding and agreement (although also misunderstanding and disagreement). Similarly, such engagement and debate can also involve the conferral of prestige or shame by participants. The attribution of prestige may range from public declarations of support to membership of an international community, while the attribution of shame may involve public condemnation or the use of symbolic sanctioning.

EU actions in the promotion of principles cover a full spectrum of practices and policies, encouraging a more holistic or comprehensive approach to the many challenges of world politics. The EU has historically been better at addressing more structural challenges through development aid, trade, inter-regional cooperation, political dialogue and enlargement. During the last decade, the gradual evolution of conflict-prevention and crisis-management policies has helped to improve the EU’s ability to deal with more immediate challenges, such as humanitarian crises and post-conflict reconstruction. This combination of EU actions marks a first step towards a more sustainable peace strategy, where the EU is able to address both the structural causes and violent symptoms of conflict. However, the EU’s inclination in the promotion of principles is not structural capacity or crisis ability, but to encourage processes of engagement and dialogue. Such EU engagement entails initiating and institutionalizing regular patterns of communication or partnership, such as through accession procedures, stabilization and/or association agreements, the European Neighbourhood Policy, African, Caribbean and Pacific relations, and strategic partnerships.

Alternative approaches to the promotion of principles might include more extensive use of material incentives, such as positive conditionality or negative conditionality and robust sanctions. But concerns regarding the efficacy and ‘ethicacy’ of applying sanctions to, or withdrawing trade preferences from, some of the world’s poorest peoples raises questions about more extensive use of material incentives (Manners 2009c: 794–795; and Financial Times 2009). Clara Portela suggests that EU sanctions have geographical priorities, involve only ‘targeted sanctions’, and involve new ‘modes of operation’, including mutual accommodation (Council of the European Union 2004; Portela 2005; and Portela 2009). Portela’s research illustrates the way in which the EU’s use of material incentives such as sanctions policy also appears to be increasingly shaped by the need to encourage processes of engagement and dialogue.

Impact

Normative power should ultimately be envisaged as socializing in the impact of the actions taken to promote such principles. If normative justification is to be convincing or attractive, then its impact must involve socialization, partnership and ownership. Socialization as an impact of the promotion of principles in world politics should be seen as part of an open-ended process of
engagement, debate and understanding. Partnership as an impact of the promotion of principles may be the result of institutionalized relationships created by the participating parties, whether multilateral or plurilateral, international or transnational. Ownership as an impact of the promotion of principles implies practices of joint or local ownership as a result of partner involvement and consultation. However, such impacts of normative power should be based on the recognition that while international diplomatic socialization is largely a mirage, the nurturing of domestic, transnational and international support for international principles can be helped by the three-part processes of normative justification conceived here. An example of longer-term socialization impact can be seen in Alexander Warkotsch’s work on EU democracy promotion in Central Asia, in which he argues for:

[... a more long-term approach that concentrates on the break-up of authoritarian structures by emphasizing certain equality rights and government accountability [... with the overall aim of restructuring socialization efforts along the criteria of target accessibility and programme appreciation (Warkotsch 2009: 269).]

The EU’s impact in promoting principles can be extraordinarily difficult to judge (see Manners 2009b; and Manners 2009c). Clarity of principle is important in ensuring that others understand what the EU is trying to promote, as with the idea of ‘never again’ in the post-Yugoslav space. Simplicity of action is important when the EU, albeit very rarely, is the only or predominant actor, as with the EU’s pre-accession processes of the 1990s. Consistency of promotion is crucial to ensure that the EU avoids claims of ‘double standards’, as is often the case in state recognition (such as with Kosovo) or UN resolutions (such as the Middle East). Holistic, ‘joined-up’ thinking is important in the broader promotion of principles through the multilateral system, such as the many challenges of the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) Doha Round of trade liberalization, the Millennium Development Goals, and addressing climate change at the Copenhagen COP15. Partnership, not EU unilateralism, is important for building global consensus and ensuring success in multilateral institutions. Finally, the timescale is important when attempting to judge EU principles, actions and impact in any normatively sustainable way.

Consequences

A belief in, and practice of, normative power has three broader consequences concerning the possibility of more holistic, justifiable and sustainable world politics. The concept of normative power invites more holistic thinking ‘outside the box’ about the purposes of agency, power and policy in world politics. Such holistic thinking demands more thorough consideration of the rationale/principles, practices/actions and consequences/impact of actors/agents in world politics. The concept of normative power is conceived
here in its ideal or purest form, but in practical terms it is often used together with material incentives and/or physical force. However, prioritizing normative power may help to ensure that any subsequent use of material incentives and/or physical force is considered and utilized in a more justifiable way. Finally, the concept of normative power, with its emphasis on holistic thinking and justifiable practices, raises the possibility that more sustainable world politics will embrace both the power of ideas – the ‘thinkable’ – and physical power – the ‘material’.

The European Union has a history of, and capacity for, the practice of normative power in world politics, but three challenges remain. The evolution of EU politics and policies over the past decade has occasionally copied some of the technologies and habits of other actors in world politics, for instance in the ‘war on terror’ and the ‘securitization’ of ordinary life, or in trying to rival other ‘great powers’ in international relations. Such technologies and habits tend to involve copying other ‘boxes’, not inviting more holistic thinking ‘outside the box’. In this respect, the development and use of EU material incentives and/or physical force has tended to follow the patterns and practices of ‘great powers’ instead of thinking about and using normative power in a more justifiable way. To address these tendencies and better prepare for the challenges of the twenty-first century, the EU should return to making creative efforts to ensure that global challenges, as with endemic war in Europe, become ‘not merely unthinkable, but materially impossible’ through the exercise of normative power in world politics.

An Effective Toolbox for Tackling New Challenges?

Having clarified the concept of normative power in world politics, it is worth asking how an effective EU toolbox for tackling the new challenges identified in this chapter’s opening paragraph would look. To what extent and under what conditions may normative power offer the EU an effective toolbox of foreign policy instruments and capabilities that take into account new challenges? The first response to this question is to seek to identify further what, exactly, these new challenges are—here it may be possible to differentiate between international and transnational challenges. New international challenges tend to focus anew on ‘great power’ relations relating to the rise of ‘new powers’, a shift of wealth and economic capabilities from the west to the east, and questions of coming multi-polarity from the G8 to the G20. In contrast, new transnational challenges are of a much greater magnitude, including economic globalization and the crisis of the global economic system, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, global terrorism, organized crime and cyber security, energy security, food security and climate change, changing patterns of migration, and the role of non-state actors in all of these challenges, as mentioned above. Both international and transnational challenges are amplified by the inability to address growing
inequalities within and between societies, as well as the inability to reform a UN system that was created for a long-passed world.

The second response is to try to discern the conditions that characterize this rapidly emerging era of new challenges – conditions of complexity and interconnectedness are especially relevant here. The evolving EU consensus on new challenges and foreign policy appears to recognize these conditions, with the 2008 Council Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy (RIESS) arguing that ‘globalization has also made threats more complex and interconnected’ (Solana 2008: 1). The 2003 European Security Strategy (ESS) contended that in the post-Cold War world ‘no single country is able to tackle today’s complex problems on its own’, with the RIESS observing that ‘five years on, these have not gone away: some have become more significant, and all more complex’ and concluding that ‘twenty years after the Cold War, Europe faces increasingly complex threats and challenges’ (Solana 2008: 3 and 1). The ESS and RIESS suggest that complexity is greatest in three areas: counter-terrorism; Mediterranean relations; and European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). The 2003 acknowledgement in the ESS that terrorism arose out of ‘complex causes’, including ‘the pressures of modernization, cultural, social and political crises, and the alienation of young people living in foreign societies’ (Solana 2003: 3), appeared to recognize the intricacy of addressing new transnational challenges in the post-Cold War world. Five years later, the RIESS suggested that the Mediterranean still posed ‘complex challenges’ for the EU, including ‘insufficient political reform and illegal migration’ (Solana 2008: 7). The RIESS also acknowledged the difficulties for the ESDP in answering the demand for assistance and arguing that ‘the more complex the challenges we face, the more flexible we must be’ (Solana 2008: 9).

In parallel, the evolving EU foreign policy consensus also appears to recognize the second condition of the interconnectedness of new challenges. While the ESS and RIESS tend to refer to interconnectedness and interdependency in terms of terrorist threats and energy security, the 2006 European Consensus on Development (ECD) talks in terms of globalization and poverty eradication. These conditions of interdependency and interconnectedness are illustrated by the ESS’s reference to the new global challenges that ‘have increased European dependence – and so vulnerability – on an interconnected infrastructure in transport, energy, information and other fields’ (Solana 2003: 2). In this context, the ESS identified the new threats of global terrorism as ‘increasingly, terrorist movements [that] are well-resourced, connected by electronic networks, and are willing to use unlimited violence to cause massive casualties’ (Solana 2003: 3). In addition, the ESS and RIESS placed increasingly emphasis on the new challenge of energy security and interdependence – energy dependence is a special concern for Europe’ and ‘concerns about energy dependence have increased over the last five years’ (Solana 2003: 3; and Solana 2008: 5). The ECD went beyond talking in terms of threat and security to discuss ‘the context within which
poverty eradication is pursued is an increasingly globalized and interdependent world; this situation has created new opportunities but also new challenges' (European Parliament, Council, Commission [EPCC] 2006: 1). The ECD appeared to recognize that 'combating global poverty is not only a moral obligation; it will also help to build a more stable, peaceful, prosperous and equitable world, reflecting the interdependency of its richer and poorer countries' (EPCC 2006: 1). The ECD also suggested that EU responses to new challenges must involve the promotion of 'understanding of interdependence and encourage North–South solidarity' and involve providing agricultural resources to assist developing countries that are ‘dependent on commodities’ (EPCC 2006: 9 and 13).

Acknowledging the conditions of complexity and connectedness in tackling new international and transnational challenges leads to the question of whether, and to what extent, normative power provides the EU with an effective toolbox of foreign policy instruments and capabilities. Coming to terms with such conditions and challenges demands the clear and coherent fusion of the EU’s acquis communautaire to its external strategy. While the acquis holds the principles that might provide an effective toolbox, it has not yet been strategically organized with EU foreign policy tools. The Lisbon Treaty takes a step in this direction by linking together the promotion of values and principles from the acquis with its ‘action on the international scene' through external actions and the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). With the Lisbon Treaty, efforts to promote the principles of the UN Charter and international law, as well as the identified values and principles, are likely to fail unless the means of promotion are more systematic and sustainable than previously. Such systematic promotion would require that any reforms ensure consistency and coherence within and between the different areas of EU external actions as the policies are developed and implemented. Such sustainable promotion would require, as suggested above, prioritizing normative justification over material incentives and/or physical force to ensure that the EU is equipped with an effective, normatively sustainable, toolbox for tackling new global challenges.

Beyond problems of the Lisbon Treaty, its implementation and its sustainable promotion, very big questions remain over the role of EU member states and the EU’s readiness for the catastrophic failures that were outlined at the beginning of this chapter. Even if the EU was willing and able to implement reforms, and to engage in systematic and sustainable promotion, would the EU then have an effective foreign policy toolbox for tackling new global challenges? Possibly not, as it is likely that in the short and narrow term most EU member states are incapable of taking the steps needed to deal with, for example, systemic economic crises, global sea-level rises, pandemic poverty, and the realization of structures of global governance. This endemic structural problem means that most EU member states' views are too short, narrow and inward-looking to be able to adapt quickly enough to the new global challenges in order to avoid fast-encroaching crises. Added to these
problems of association with the role of member states is the simple observation that, even when implemented, the Lisbon Treaty is ‘a pre-crisis treaty for a post-crisis world’ (Münchau 2009). Wolfgang Münchau argues that the institutional and legal changes of the Lisbon Treaty do not address what he sees as the EU’s three main defects: ‘its ability to coordinate during a crisis, its failure to enact policies to strengthen its potential growth, and its failure to project itself effectively at a global level’. Clearly, even with the Lisbon Treaty, Münchau believes that ‘the treaty’s institutional and legal changes offer little comfort’ for the EU’s inability to coordinate. In many respects this is problematic, but not unexpected – its hybrid polity, consisting of extensive intergovernmental practices in the external relations arena, ensures ongoing difficulties of coordination, implementation and effectiveness. In sum, even if foreign policy reforms were implemented, it is highly likely that problems within member states and weaknesses within the EU’s configuration itself would not provide an effective toolbox of foreign policy instruments and capabilities. Fusing together acquis with strategy and the use of normative power would represent one step towards more normatively sustainable EU external actions, but this alone is unlikely to be enough to tackle new global challenges under conditions of complexity and connectedness.

**Going Beyond Self-Perception and Rhetoric?**

Alongside the empirical question of effectiveness is the normative question of whether the concept of normative power takes the EU beyond self-perception and rhetoric. In order to answer this question, it is necessary to discuss notions of ‘beyond’, ‘perception’ and ‘rhetoric’. First, there is the question of going beyond perception and discourse in order to assess the EU objectively for evidence of convenient self-perception and discourses of political rhetoric. The alchemic quest for a means of going beyond perception and discourse has long been the aim of empiricist and positivist approaches that seek objectivity in the subjective social world. The difficulties of going beyond can be seen in the attempts to measure quantitatively the gap between capabilities and expectations in EU foreign policy, as well as the attempts to judge qualitatively how normative the EU is compared to other foreign policy actors. In both of these examples, the analytical difficulties of objectively assessing gaps and normativeness render such studies problematic. Ultimately, as most critical scholars observe, ‘those engaged in positivist approaches […] cannot avoid normative assumptions in the selection of what data is important, in interpreting that data, and in articulating why such research is significant’ (Cochran, 1999: 1).

By admitting that normative assumptions are unavoidable, a step may be taken towards understanding the importance of perception and discourse in the EU’s construction as an actor in world politics. Perception, discourse and
identity construction are deeply implicated in the study of the EU in world politics, and require analytical techniques that are appropriate for understanding their role. Whether using social constructivist, critical theoretical or post-structural approaches, the examination of EU perception and discourse requires an interpretive understanding of how subjects see their world. Understanding the role of perception and discourse in the concept of normative power necessitates the use of ‘longitudinal interpretation’. The practice of longitudinal interpretation is important for normative power analysis as it suggests that time and technique are factors that could improve our understanding of the EU in world politics. A long analytical timeframe ensures that analysis captures generational change rather than momentary fluctuation. Ideally, any study would include at least the origins of principles, their translation into actions, and the impact and consequences of these actions. This is important because the normative power approach ‘works interpretively’, in that it is ‘interested in the level of meaning and believes that social science is about providing various phenomena with content and meaning. Interpretations contain elements of both understanding and explanation’ in this approach (Alvesson and Sköldberg 2000: 136).

By using the analytical practice of longitudinal interpretation, the method of ‘tripartite analysis’ facilitates the study of rhetoric, perception, discourse and identity in EU external actions. Tripartite analysis involves interpreting the construction of principles, actions and impact as EU policies are created and recreated. The analysis requires looking at how all three parts shape and feed into each other over long timeframes, as well as applying normative critiques. Such critiques require comparing the EU with other examples at all three stages within the method of the tripartite analysis, as well as comparing the claims of principles against the aims of actions and the consequences of impact. In this way, the construction of ‘convenient self-perceptions’ and ‘political rhetoric’ can be analysed and critiqued for the longer-term power and inconvenience of such perceptions and rhetorical techniques.

The processes of constructing self-perceptions and the discursive rhetorical practices of ‘normative power’ have undoubtedly been important over the past fifteen years. The inclusion of references to principles such as democracy, human rights and rule of law during the 1990s has contributed to an evolving EU foreign-policy consensus over much deeper international principles, such as human security, sustainable peace and effective multilateralism. From a short-term, one-dimensional understanding of power, the constructions and discourses advocating promotion and adherence to such principles may appear as convenient and ‘mere’ rhetoric. But it is equally likely that such perceptions and rhetoric may prove inconvenient and persuasive over the longer term and with a more multi-dimensional understanding of power. The rising importance of human security within the discursive construction of EU external relations and security strategy has accelerated over the past decade (see the discussions of human security in Manners 2006a; and Manners 2006b). As the RIESS acknowledged in 2008:
[...] we have worked to build human security, by reducing poverty and inequality, promoting good governance and human rights, assisting development, and addressing the root causes of conflict and insecurity. [...] We need to continue mainstreaming human rights issues in all activities in this field, including ESDP missions, through a people-based approach coherent with the concept of human security (Solana 2008: 2 and 10).

Similarly, the increasing importance of the principle of sustainable peace can also be seen in the RIESS: ‘As the ESS and the 2005 Consensus on Development have acknowledged, there cannot be sustainable development without peace and security, and without development and poverty eradication there will be no sustainable peace’ (Solana 2008: 8; see also the discussions of sustainable peace in Manners 2006c; and Manners 2008b).

Finally, the RIESS also suggests the discursive importance of the principle of effective multilateralism:

The ESS called for Europe to contribute to a more effective multilateral order around the world. [...] But the international system, created at the end of the Second World War, faces pressures on several fronts. [...] This means sharing decisions more, and creating a greater stake for others. Faced with common problems, there is no substitute for common solutions (Solana 2008: 11–12).

While the EU profession of adherence to all three of these central UN principles is a fairly recent, twenty-first century phenomenon, the significance of such discursive practices is likely to prove distinctly inconvenient in EU external actions. As suggested elsewhere, public pronunciation, discursive deployment, and inclusion into strategies and policies have ‘the effect of reconstituting the EU “habitus” by changing the way in which socially acquired and embodied systems of cultural reproduction adapt to innovation and advocacy’ (Lucarelli and Manners 2006: 210). Furthermore, the UN’s principles of human security and sustainable peace have large constituencies of support from international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and global civil society, making it unlikely that such principles are easily forgotten from the public memory. Ultimately, the construction of EU normative power will likely prove inconvenient for the manoeuvrability of the EU’s foreign policy in the longer term.

In addition to these comments on going beyond perception is the question of the role of rhetoric in EU external actions. While ‘rhetoric is broadly acknowledged as an important feature of the political process’, with rhetoric having ‘the normative power of the argument’, it is still popular to discuss rhetoric as ‘empty’ in political studies (Gottweis 2007: 240; and Dimitrakopoulos 2008: 321). Rhetoric is best understood in its Aristotelian meaning as the art of persuasion encompassing ethos (morality), logos (logic) and pathos (emotion) in argumentation (Leith 2009). All three elements are to be found in EU rhetoric and persuasion, and should be considered
important to the understanding of the power in ‘normative power’. The ethos of an argument refers to the morality of the speaker, to their character claim to be moral and ethical. In the concept of normative power, ethos can be seen in the need to legitimize principles through reference to previously established moral credentials such as international law or the UN Charter. An argument’s logos is the logic used by the speaker to appeal to reason. In the concept of normative power, logos can be seen in the need to act persuasively through argumentation suggesting the pros and cons of a line of reasoning. In EU external actions that emphasize previously legitimated principles, the argumentative logic often refers to both the pros and cons of, for example, acting in line with international law or the UN Charter. The pathos of an argument is the appeal to emotion that is used by the speaker. In the concept of normative power, pathos can be seen in the extent to which the EU can have a socializing impact in the form of greater social understanding between the EU and its partners.

What is the Raison d’être of the European Union?

Discussions of the concept of normative power, the new challenges facing the EU and the role of perception and rhetoric have so far all suggested how the EU might deploy normative power in changing world politics, but they have not necessarily spelt out ‘why’? To answer that question, it is necessary to take a step backwards – to ask what the EU is for. What is the raison d’être of the EU?

While Europe may never have been so prosperous, so secure and so free, it does not feel this way to most of its citizens, its third-country residents, or those on its borders. For EU citizens and near-citizens, as well as most of the rest of the world, the EU seems like a foreign country: an unintelligible, remote, neo-liberal place where they do things differently than the world of first-hand experience. European unification has made peace and prosperity possible within Europe, but in that moment of achievement the EU has lost its way and lost its meaning. For EU citizens and beyond, the EU has no meaningful raison d’être, no clear mission twenty years after European unification and 50 years after its creation.

At exactly the same time, the EU has never been more needed, more called upon to act, and more important in global politics. As the opening paragraph of this chapter spelt out, the immediate future of the world in the next two decades will be defined by four catastrophic failures. The EU could contribute to addressing these failures if it were able to find a meaningful role in the world – to find a means of linking its institutional acquis with its global ‘strategy’ in a normatively sustainable way, as discussed in section two of the chapter. Taking this step to finding a raison d’être – a mission – does not need and must not focus on institutional or treaty reform. EU citizens and near-citizens, as well as the rest of the world, need and deserve more than slogans.
and platitudes, more than decision-making diagrams and unintelligible treaties.

Finding the EU’s *raison d’être* in world politics involves an intellectual return to the creative efforts that lay at the origins of the EU. Recognition that the touchstone of the EU – its *acquis* – holds the key to its mission and role can only be achieved by returning to the lost treasures of the Schuman Declaration. In the 1950s the making of creative efforts in the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) involved pooling basic production and instituting a new high authority; making war materially impossible and unthinkable; raising living standards and promoting peaceful achievements. This fusion of interests and ideas provided the intellectual origins of the EU as we know it – and should provide the EU’s *raison d’être* in world politics.

The creative efforts needed in the twenty-first century must also be proportionate to the dangers that new global threats and challenges hold for the EU. Recognition of the fusion of interests and ideas within the EU is captured in the EU’s prime aim of promoting peace, values and well-being. It is here that clarity is needed in linking *raison d’être* and mission with the EU’s *acquis* and strategy in world politics. The emphasis on material interests through the pooling of production, making war materially impossible and raising standards of living leads to the aim of promoting well-being – in other words, prosperity in Europe and beyond. In parallel, the emphasis on normative ideas through instituting a new high authority, making war unthinkable and promoting peaceful achievements leads to the aim of promoting values – in other words, progress in Europe and beyond. This aim and mission of promoting peace, prosperity and progress both inside and outside the Union provides the EU with a much clearer *raison d’être* in world politics, but it does not necessarily help to provide a means of promotion.

The fusion of interests and ideas in the EU’s *raison d’être* is matched by the fusion of aims and means in promoting peace, prosperity and progress. In other words, the EU’s role, its perception, its strategies, and external actions are not separable – aims and means, words and actions, constitute the EU in world politics. But it is useful to think in new ways about the EU’s interests and ideas in world politics by differentiating between material policies and instruments and normative ideas. Material interests and material/physical policies and instruments are central to conventional thinking about the EU as a global actor. As discussed in section one of this chapter, normative ideas and normative justification have not been considered important, but their role and deployment as normative power are critical if the EU’s role, perception, strategies and actions are to become more meaningful and more normatively sustainable in changing world politics.

In this respect, the EU’s *raison d’être* in world politics should aim to promote peace, prosperity and progress through prioritizing normative power. Only by clearly stating what the EU is for, its *raison d’être*, and how it intends to promote these aims in a normatively sustainable way can the EU take any step towards improving its perception from outside Europe. The strategy of
clear, coherent, consistent and committed normative justification that guides any subsequent use of material incentives and/or physical force should be deployed in order to sustain any global influence if the EU is not to be rendered internationally invisible in the next ten to twenty years. Finally, with the Lisbon Treaty, the EU must refine and develop its array of policies and instruments to ensure that it prioritizes normative justification in the promotion of peace, prosperity and progress for its own and other peoples in changing world politics.

Normative Power and EU External Actions in Changing World Politics

This chapter has set out what role the EU could, and should, play in changing world politics that are characterized by new global challenges under conditions of complexity and interconnectedness. It is suggested that these challenges and conditions are likely to be accelerated by four catastrophic failures in the next two decades, making the need for more sustainable thinking on EU external actions all the more imperative.

The chapter began by setting out the concept of normative power in world politics. It was argued that conceptualizing normative power in this way helps us to understand the need for the practice of normative justification in EU external actions. The chapter then asked how an effective EU toolbox for tackling new global challenges would need to look. Here it was argued that the complexity and interconnectedness of new international and, more importantly, new transnational challenges demand an EU external action toolbox that can engage in a more normatively sustainable mission and politics. Third, the chapter examined how the EU might move beyond perception and rhetoric in its external actions. In this respect it was argued that perception, discourse and identity require a stronger means of understanding, and that the practice of rhetorical engagement is an important element of normative power. Fourth, in order to understand why normative power might be important, the chapter asked what the raison d’être of the EU might be. The response was that the EU should return to making creative efforts to promote peace, prosperity and progress through prioritizing normative justification over material incentives and physical force.

So how might normative power in EU external actions help in changing world politics? As suggested at the outset, addressing the root causes of twenty-first-century failures and crises requires a radical rethink of world politics, and the EU’s role within them. More sustainable global economics, a more sustainable global environment, more equitable human development and more sustainable systems of democratic global justice require different thinking and a different direction in national, international and transnational politics. The EU may have a role to play in that new direction by helping to reinvent international relations, but equally it may have no new role to play by
reproducing traditional international relations. It is perfectly plausible for the EU to become a new pole in the emerging multi-polar world, to reproduce the ‘great power’ politics of the nineteenth century. If that is to be the case, however, we are likely to continue to reproduce and accelerate the great wars, great famines, genocides, poverty and starvation, and impending eco-catastrophe that traditional international relations has cultivated.

Changing the direction of the development of EU external actions into more normative justificatory practices would lead to at least five expectations about attempting to address the root causes of twenty-first century global crises. The first expectation would be that more normative justificatory practices might bridge the gap between communitarian self-interested concerns and cosmopolitan other-interested concerns. Such a bridging may involve moving towards ‘cosmopolitical’ approaches that seek to disentangle ‘soft cosmopolitanism’ from neo-liberal capitalism as part of a commitment to ‘more discursive engagement across lines of difference, more commitment to reduction of material inequality, and more openness to radical change’ (Calhoun 2003: 111). Following this first commitment, the second expectation would be for greater attention to principles of equality and social solidarity as part of a commitment to reducing material inequality, and more sustainable social economics in order to address the failings of the neo-liberal economic system. On top of these two commitments, a third expectation would be for greater adherence to the principle of sustainable development in order to address the lifestyle choices at the roots of eco-catastrophic global warming. The fourth expectation would be for greater consideration of the expansion of ‘development as freedom’ (Amartya Sen), in order to address injustices in human development. Finally, the fifth expectation would be for more openness to radical change in global governance in order to address these, and other, failings of the twenty-first century. Ultimately, any commitment to normative power and EU external actions in changing world politics needs to ‘profess normative values and practise pragmatic principles’, at the same time as maintaining ‘a clear sense of long-term objectives’, but acknowledging the limits of the EU’s ‘day-to-day actions’ (Lucarelli and Manners 2006: 214; and Kay 2009: 11).
Introduction

This paper considers a paradox in current discussions about the European Union as a global actor. It relates to two sharply different narratives about the world in which the EU seeks to exercise its power and influence. The first narrative emphasizes the decline of Europe in a multi-polar world that is characterized by the rise of new economic and military powers, such as China, India, Russia and Brazil. Globalization, in this view, does not just generate a cobweb of interdependence and greater solidarity, but will also lead to increased fragmentation, involving open contestations over the precise interpretation of norms and a more naked competitive pursuit of interests and security. The former Director of the EU Institute for Security Studies, Nicole Gnesotto, remarked a few years ago that ‘a significant phase in history – the West’s political domination of the world (of which Europe is part) – is coming to an end’ (Gnesotto 2007). Frans-Paul van der Putten of the Clingendael Institute in the Netherlands recently put it even more starkly by arguing that ‘the question is not whether Europe will be a less powerful actor in international security, because that process cannot be avoided, but whether Europe will still be capable of protecting its interests around the world’ (van der Putten 2009). Another common theme within this narrative of decline is the need for Europe to come to terms with the fact that it will have to exercise power within an international society that largely lacks robust international governance structures and where tension between the normative pursuit of order and justice is more manifest.
The second narrative projects an entirely different story: that of Europe as the hub of developments in a world transformed. In this world, it is not economic and military power that ultimately matters, but the power of ideas. Europe stands here as the harbinger of a ‘better world’. Europe exerts its power through attraction and example, rather than traditional forms of power politics. The idea of normative power draws here on a well-established tradition of progressive thought in European integration that envisages the gradual erosion of national sovereignty towards a new, post-national institutional agency at the European level. This liberal narrative fits snugly within a wider discourse of idealism that followed the end of the Cold War and the prospects of a new world order shaped by non-materialist forms of power. The European Union is envisaged as playing a decisive role within this transformed world by shaping conceptions of what is considered ‘normal’ in the international society of the twenty-first century (Manners 2002; and Manners 2008a: 45). What makes the EU so remarkable is that its normative power resides primarily in the symbolic expression of what the EU stands for – what it is – rather than what it says or does (Manners 2002). It represents the ‘difference engine’ (Manners and Whitman 2003) that helps to propel a ‘sea change’ of transformation in global politics towards greater cosmopolitanism and universality (Manners 2009a: 2). Unsurprisingly, this version of normative power is popular in Brussels, but it also has supporters in more unexpected quarters. For instance, British Foreign Minister David Miliband has made reference to ‘the power of Europe as an idea and model’ (Miliband 2007).

Academically, the concept of ‘Normative Power Europe’ (NPE), as first formulated in Ian Manners’ seminal article of 2002, has been an important source of debate. In part, this debate has been linked to a wider academic discussion in international relations (IR) about the role of norms (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998) and the ‘constructivist turn’ in IR theorizing (Hopf 1998). But the concept of NPE has also received critique for how it has been formulated and defined. It has unsettled traditional academic distinctions and conventions of conceptual analysis by blurring empirical, theoretical and normative definitions. In one of his later contributions, Manners declares that the ‘EU has been, is and always will be a normative power in world politics’ (Manners 2008a: 45). This claim makes a critical analysis of the concept difficult and moves it closer to an ideological concept that is linked to a political project.’

In many ways, the two contrasting narratives about Europe’s role in the world are reminiscent of the ‘First Great Debate’ between idealists and realists over the role of the League of Nations in the inter-war years. E.H. Carr wrote in his classic book, The Twenty Years’ Crisis, that ‘we require

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1) On this point, see the reference to President of the European Commission José Manuel Barroso in Manners 2008a, pp. 59–60.
‘utopian’ ideas about how the world ought to be, but these need to be tempered by a close study of power relations as they exist’ (quoted in Frost 2003: 478). This chapter’s aim is to explore a middle way between the poles of realism and idealism within which a spectrum of possible normative and strategic action by the European Union is possible, rather than privileging one worldview over another. This involves a critique and reconsideration of some of the central assumptions about the concept of NPE, but should not be taken to mean a carte blanche acceptance that the world in the twenty-first century will be dominated by a Hobbesian logic of power politics instead of Kantian cosmopolitanism. The argument pursued in this chapter is that both will prevail in an uneasy coexistence that will bring into focus the ethical choices and dilemmas that the European Union will have to face if it wishes to become a global power.

The chapter concludes that both academic and policy discussions about the EU as a global actor are increasingly moving beyond the idea of normative power in its more purist formulation. Concepts of Europe have always been conditioned by the particular historical conjectures in which they are articulated. François Duchêne’s original concept of civilian power reflected the constraining context of the Cold War, while normative power grew out of the idealism that followed the end of the Cold War. We now seem to find ourselves at a new political juncture within which our concepts about Europe’s global role need to be reconsidered, and this involves a more rounded, multidimensional analysis of power.

**Transformation and Progress: Europe’s Power in Shaping Normality**

Fundamental to the concept of ‘Normative Power Europe’ is the idea of transformation. Any progress that moves away from a state-centric paradigm of politics has transformative potential. Manners lists three global transformations – the 1989 collapse of communism, the 2001 terrorist attacks and the 2008 global financial crisis – as watersheds in the transformation of international order and the emergence of new global agendas (Manners 2009a: 2). The potential for progress lies in the way in which these consequences invite the use of more ‘holistic’, ‘outside-the-box’ thinking about the purposes of agency, power and policy in world politics (Manners 2009a). Through its ‘creative efforts’, the European Union has become the standard bearer of these transformations:

Simply by existing as different in a world of states and the relations between them, the European Union changes the normality of ‘international relations’. In this respect the EU is a normative power: it changes the norms, standards and prescriptions of world politics away from the bounded expectations of state-centricity (Manners 2008a: 45).
This thinking follows closely in the footsteps of mainstream European integration theories, which contain underlying assumptions about the desirability of supranationalism as an ideological goal (Gilbert 2008: 659). It is a teleological view of progress that opens up the prospects of a world beyond the nation-state. Within this scenario, the European Union is the hub of transformation, which is why the EU is seen as the exemplar for the rest of the world.

A central assumption is that the European Union embodies post-Westphalian values that others wish to emulate, which include the prime principle of sustainable peace, the key principles of freedom, democracy, human rights and the rule of law, as well as the values of equality, social solidarity, sustainable development and good governance (Manners 2009a: 3). These principles could also be interpreted as part of the current democratic ethic in the international society of states (see Frost 1996). The importance attached to these principles expresses optimism about the possibility of achieving constitutional features of liberty on the international level. The exceptional claim to ‘difference’ on the EU’s part could therefore be questioned, as there are many states in the international system that make reference to these values in their constitutions. Nonetheless, by simply existing as a different kind of hybrid actor, it is argued that the EU plays a key role in changing the norms of international society. Normative power, as Manners proclaims, is ‘power of an ideational nature characterized by common principles and a willingness to disregard Westphalian conventions’ (Manners 2002: 239).

Importantly, the legitimacy of this normative power is conceived as arising from its universal origins in the UN Charter, the Helsinki Final Act and a string of Declarations and Conventions on Human Rights (Manners 2009a: 3). This claim of universality forms a central plank in the defence against the charges that the European Union is a post-imperialist power projecting European values (Diez 2005). The normative justification arises from the fact that the principles that are practised and projected in EU external relations have first been agreed within the UN and thereafter been incorporated into EU treaties:

> Normative power should primarily be seen as legitimate in the principles being promoted. [...] Legitimacy of principles in world politics may come from previously established international conventions, treaties, or agreements, particularly if these are important within the UN system (Manners 2009a: 2)."
tragedies that have been witnessed on the European continent over the centuries, and bestows upon the EU a powerful message of peace for the wider world.

This non-materialist perspective of the ideational power of the European Union to shape conceptions of normality rests on three central claims about progress in the international system: first, that new forms of collective agency are replacing the sovereign state as the key actors in the international system; second, that universal principles of peace and justice are increasingly taking centre stage in politics at all levels, including the international; and third, that the European Union is the example par excellence of these transformations and that this essentially constitutes the core of its ideational, non-materialist power.

The European Union is not alone in seeking to legitimize and incorporate values in its external actions, but this does not in itself equate to normative power (Keane 2008). Normative power assumes that other actors will want to emulate the norms for which the Union stands and the example that it sets. This is where the central thesis of normative power shaping the definitions of normality originates – that is, the attraction and presumed acceptance by others of the values that the EU projects and promotes. The implication of this argument is twofold: first, it projects a view of others in need of change; and second, it implies an endorsement of European definitions of the common good in international society.

Unsurprisingly, these claims are problematic when considered through the lens of a multi-polar world. To begin with, the extent to which the Westphalian system is undergoing a profound transformation could be questioned. There are analysts who even argue that what we are witnessing is a ‘return of history’ rather than its end (Kagan 2008). The question about the weight accorded to a purely non-materialist view of power is also central. It is important to remember that the central claim of NPE is about the power of ideas themselves. Their attraction should be seen as independent from any links to material incentives. This is the critical difference of NPE to its predecessor: namely, Europe as a civilian power that made a clear link between ideational and material sources of power (Duchêne 1972; Maull 1990; and Maull 2005). Although Manners opens the door to the possibility that in practical terms, normative power is frequently used together with material incentives and/or physical force (Manners 2009: 4), this retraction would raise serious questions about the coherence and distinctiveness of the concept of NPE in the first place.

We will return to questions about agency and power later in the chapter, but will first look at the claim of universality that is another intrinsic part of the idea of normative power. Liberal interpretations of universalism and peace are currently challenged from both within the academic and policy-making communities (Richmond 2006). The philosophical discussion about the validity of liberal universalism will be left to one side in this short chapter, but even if we generally accept the claim that universal principles are ‘natural
rights’ in a broad sense as part of our common humanity, their specific meaning in practice may be more contested. In other words, to simply proclaim that agreements within the UN framework render these values universal legitimacy quickly sidesteps the problems associated with the implementation and specific interpretation of meaning within different localities. For instance, the EU’s attempt to invoke normative commitments from China and Russia has not been well received. To assert that the EU’s projection and practice of these principles hold universal significance and traction may therefore be challenged. Another example is the recent UN Conference on Racism in Geneva, which amply demonstrated the contestations that are now emerging over the central principles of human rights. Similarly, European countries such as Sweden and Denmark have been embroiled in discussions at the highest diplomatic levels about the meaning of a range of liberal principles and rights, such as ‘freedom of speech’ and ‘freedom of religion’. These contestations bear witness to the fact that globalization does not just bring greater homogeneity, but also greater fragmentation and diversity. From a pluralist perspective of international society, it could be argued that this cultural diversity is a ‘practical and moral barrier to the pursuit of collective moral purposes other than maintaining order’ (Dunne 2008: 21).

We should therefore question whether the European Union really does possess this star quality of normative power. Does the EU, in other words, constitute a magnet of attraction for the values that it stands for and projects? A recent study of the EU’s influence to promote human rights within the UN system does not provide an encouraging read in this regard (Gowan and Brantner 2009).

**Power and Logics of Action**

Normative power works like ‘water on stone’, not like ‘napalm in the morning’ (Manners 2009a: 2).

To ensure our security and meet the expectations of our citizens, we must be ready to shape events. That means becoming more strategic in our thinking, and more effective and visible around the world (Solana 2008).

To be a normative power does not imply a one-dimensional emphasis on ideational power per se. The United States, for instance, can also be considered a normative power, in the sense that it, too, conceives of itself as an exceptional actor with a normative mission in the world (Sjursen 2006).

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However, American claims to ‘soft power’ (Nye 2002) are considered in combination with more material forms of influence. In contrast, the central claim made in regard to ‘Normative Power Europe’ is that this is purely ideational power without direct links to economic and military resources. As mentioned earlier, this exclusive emphasis on ideational power is what essentially distinguishes NPE from civilian power, which it otherwise strongly resembles. As Manners makes clear:

[…] its use involves normative justification rather than the use of material incentives or physical force. Clearly, the use of normative justification implies a very different timescale and form of engagement in world politics (Manners 2009a: 2).

These assumptions lead to a particular interpretation of action envisaged by the European Union. It also involves the rejection of a number of key assumptions that are traditionally made in regard to foreign policy, relating to strategy, interests, outcomes and accountability.

Normative power is not part of a toolbox to be used in foreign policy to achieve European interests. Indeed, Diez and Manners explicitly discard this strategic rationale, which would allude to ‘great power’ patterns and practices (Diez and Manners 2007). This would undermine the holistic, ‘outside-the-box’ thinking that NPE supposedly encourages (Manners 2009a: 4). It is worth recalling in this context that much of the conceptual thinking on European normative power took place when George W. Bush was President of the United States. One can hence detect the underlying ‘other’ against which Europe’s identity and normative vision of world politics is articulated.

In contrast to a coercive imposition of norms, Manners envisions a different type of action by the European Union, which involves:

- persuasion and argumentation;
- invoking norms;
- shaping the discourse;
- showing example;
- and conferral of prestige or shame (Manners 2002; and Manners 2009a: 3).

To reiterate, these actions are conceived as normative actions in and of themselves. The weight that the European Union can put behind these actions rests on its hegemonic, albeit benign, normative power. It is a benevolent power, in the sense that it spreads like a ‘contagion’ (Manners 2002), or ‘water on stone’ (2009a: 2). These are grand claims that rest on the perception that the international community of actors holds the EU in high esteem. Recent research into external perceptions of the EU suggests, however, a much more modest response to these claims. In some parts of the world, the EU does not even register on the radar screen as a global actor (see
Chaban and Holland 2008; and Lucarelli and Fioramonti 2009). The long timescale, and the kind of action in which the EU is envisaged to engage, makes it difficult to evaluate Europe’s effectiveness and impact as a normative power. This in turn has implications for accountability. The outcome of a policy based on an abstract normative principle is not easy to evaluate, which has led to the charge that this kind of policy constitutes ‘rhetoric without responsibility’ (Chandler 2003).

This chapter argues that there is currently a major shift away from the purist ideational conception of European normative power, symbolized in the increasing emphasis placed on European action rather than simply referring to the power of Europe as an idea. This does not necessarily mean a major change in terms of the EU’s normative ethos, but it does imply a change in terms of how power is conceived and to what effect (Aggestam 2008). The development of a European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) and the formulation of a European Security Strategy (ESS) reflect the European Union’s ambition to link its power more purposefully to clearly defined objectives. In this sense, European power is becoming more strategic in character, but it certainly does not represent a march down the road to a ‘superpower in the making’ (Galtung 1973). Nonetheless, the development towards a more strategic conception of European action has profound implications for our discussion of NPE. It relates, first, to the question of sources of power; and second, to the relationship between norms and interests.

The notion that European normative power simply rests on ideational sources of influence has always been contested. What is clear, however, is that the European Union in the past tended to be more reluctant, at least openly, to using other, more material forms of influence strategically in order to achieve its normative principles. However, throughout the 1990s, the European Union increasingly developed a more strategic mindset that made a clear linkage between ideational and material sources of power. Two events were crucial to this cognitive development: first, war and conflict in the former Yugoslavia; and second, the process of EU enlargement. In the first case, the feebleness of European action in response to the serious challenges of violence in the Balkans underscored the necessity of being able to draw on a wide range of power resources, including military power. The second case, that of EU enlargement, which has been widely seen as the success story of the EU’s normative power (Aggestam 2008a), was nonetheless crucial in cementing a new repertoire of conditional EU action that included ‘carrot-and-stickism’ to promote normative principles, such as human rights, minority rights and good governance (Sedelmeier 2006). Manners acknowledges that in practical terms, normative power is used together with more material sources of power (Manners 2009a: 4), but as mentioned earlier, this qualification calls into question his original idea of normative power. For instance, persuasion and shaming as normative forms of action take on a completely different dimension when linked to material incentives,
and introduce potentially more coercive elements to European normative power.

The second issue of the relationship between norms and interests has also been a major source of contention. The emphasis on normative power excludes the dynamics involved in the interest-based dimension of European integration. Most analysts will agree that norms and interests tend to be deeply interlinked and therefore difficult to separate clearly (Young 2004). Nonetheless, on an analytical level, the distinction is still crucial when we think of the kind of action that the EU is likely to pursue, as well as the normative justification made in favour of a particular action. Empirically, it could also be argued that the interest-based dimension of European integration will become more manifest in a multi-polar world where Europe’s overall influence is predicted to decline. In those instances where norms and interests do not easily coexist, the choices will become starker and more evident. This is already obvious in a number of the EU’s external relations, such as energy security and migration. Furthermore, there seems to be a gap between European self-perceptions and the views held by external actors about what the guiding principles of EU action are. In a recent study of the EU’s partnership agreements with developing countries, Elgström found widespread self-perception among European officials that EU policy was guided by altruistic, normative principles, which contrasted sharply with the view held by external actors of the EU as a ‘demon’, driven by self-interest and a ‘hidden agenda’ (Elgström 2008).

Power and Agency

The privileging of norms over interests is also connected to the post-Westphalian concept of European normative power. Similarly to many other European integration theories, NPE shares the same institutionalist storyline that envisages a path-dependent process leading to ever more complex forms of supranational governance. This is why Manners sees the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy as the key promoter of the Union’s coherence and consistency (Manners 2009a: 3). Very scant attention is made to the role of member states in this process, although few analysts would dispute their importance to any advancement of European power. Rather than progressively erasing the role of the state in concepts of Europe’s normative power, it could be argued that we need to bring the state back in if we wish to understand the complicated composition of European agency at the global level.

This should not be taken to mean that the European Union as a global actor is simply seen as the lowest common denominator of its member states. The European Union is a global actor with a collective presence on the international stage that goes well beyond the role played by traditional intergovernmental organizations. The EU is a unique international actor that
qualifies as an institutional agent (Erskine 2003), in the sense of possessing an identity that is more than the aggregate of its parts, having its own decision-making capacity and an ability to enter into legal relations with other international actors. The aim here is not to diminish the unique international agency of the EU, but to question the purist conception of NPE, which takes no account of the critical dimension that the member states represent. If the concept aims to have any grounding in empirical reality, the normative advocacy to think ‘outside the box’ in a more holistic way should not be articulated as the opposite to any consideration of the constraining and enabling dynamics that the member states represent.

The notion that the state as a collective form of agency for political action should be relegated to history has become increasingly questioned in both academic and policy circles. In a recent article in The Guardian, Anthony Giddens proclaims that ‘the state is back’ (Giddens 2009). To Giddens, the tremendous challenges of global issues – such as the financial crisis and climate change – will require more, not less, state agency to coordinate and plan the international responses. In this view, the responses to global problems will continue to be channelled through the state as a collective form of agency. In the European context, however, member states are likely to channel and coordinate their political action through European institutions, as well to increase their collective weight and influence. As Menon argues in his recent book, the creation of the European Union should essentially be seen as a response by member states to address ‘a world of complex politics’ (Menon 2008). Importantly, if we accept that member states play a crucial role in the empowering of EU agency at the global level, we also have to recognize that the European integration process is just as much driven by instrumental reasons as a normative ethos. Paradoxically, this may spur member states to channel their actions much further through the European Union, so as to counteract their increasing marginalization in a multi-polar world.

Concluding Remarks: Ethics and European Power in a Multi-Polar World

This chapter has critiqued the concept of ‘Normative Power Europe’, as developed by Manners since his first article appeared in the Journal of Common Market Studies in 2002. The key arguments about transformation, norms, universality, power, action and agency have been scrutinized with the aim of providing a more rounded view of the European Union as a global actor in the multi-polar world that is emerging in the twenty-first century. The main line of argument has neither been to reject the role of norms in global politics, nor simply to endorse a realist understanding of the EU’s role in the world. Instead, this chapter’s central claim is that the twenty-first century will be ‘a world of many worlds’, wherein the logic of power politics
will prevail in an uneasy coexistence with islands of more rule-based order. In this sense, the two narratives about the EU’s global role, which were referred to at the start of this chapter, are both valid depending on the world to which we are referring. Nonetheless, if we accept this diversity, we also have to conclude that the pursuit of normative power will be challenging and highly uncertain. This position does not imply opposition to the idea of progress in the international realm of politics, but questions the path-dependent transformational process on which the vision of NPE rests. The clarity, coherence, simplicity and uniformity that Manners calls for in the quest for normative justification (Manners 2009a: 3–4) underestimates the contradictory, conflictual and ambiguous ethical practices that the European Union will encounter as a global actor. Three ethical challenges are sketched out in this concluding part.

First, if we recognize that the international realm is currently lacking an overarching normative architecture, we have to accept that there exist diverse and, at times, competing ethical practices and concepts of rights. As the recent Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy noted, ‘Globalization is accelerating shifts in power and is exposing differences in values’ (Solana 2008). The problem with the idea of normative power is that it assumes that European interpretations of universal principles hold power. Despite Manners’ emphasis on normative justification and ‘cosmo-politics’ as the empowering of ‘people in the actual conditions of their lives’ (Manners 2008a: 60), this foundational conception of NPE privileges European definitions of the ‘good life’ that are intrinsically non-reflexive. After all, this is the core of the European Union’s presumed ideational power and as such it implies a change in others, not of itself. It is ‘the example’. There is no mention of the fact that the European Union itself may change through its interaction and dialogue with other actors.

Second, the concept of European normative power is premised on ultimate system change, from ‘Westphalian self-regarding’ to ‘post-Westphalian other-regarding’ (Manners 2008a: 60). This presupposes ethical duties ‘beyond borders’, which have been central to discussions, for instance, about humanitarian intervention since the end of the Cold War. The concept of human security, which reflects these ethics, has clearly had a strong resonance and following within the European Union (Kaldor et al. 2007). At the same time, it is also clear that a more communitarian ethical dimension – with emphasis on duties towards European citizens – is becoming more manifest in the discourse to legitimize European action at the global level. This embeddedness within different ethical practices could give rise to conflicts within the EU’s own ‘ethical space’ about to whom the EU is responsible when ethical practices run counter to each other.  

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3) This concept of a conflict within our ‘own ethical space’ is drawn from Frost 2003, p. 483.
Finally, while this could be conceived as tension between particularistic and universal ethics, a conflict can also be envisaged between universal normative principles themselves. It is by now recognized that the promotion of human rights and democracy does not always work hand in hand and may indeed have destabilizing effects that end up contradicting the original objectives. From a deontological position, the rightness or wrongness of an action does not depend on the goodness or badness of its consequences. But this understanding of ethics may conflict with a more teleological or utilitarian conception of ethics (Aggestam 2008a: 10). The three maxims that Manners suggests should guide the European Union’s normative power – ‘live by example’, ‘be reasonable’ and ‘do least harm’ (Manners 2008a) – seem highly idealistic from this point of view, as they presume that these three distinct ethics (virtue, duty and consequence) can be brought into one harmonious whole. The point here is not to discourage a normative view of universalism, but to contemplate the ethical dilemmas involved in the pursuit of these values on the international level. As a global actor in a multi-polar world, the European Union needs to reflect and accept that some of its policies may lead to ‘tragic outcomes’. As Mayall observes:

An awareness of the possibility of tragic outcomes is a necessary antidote to the hubris of progressive thought and the constant liberal temptation to avoid accepting responsibility for well-intended actions that go wrong (Mayall 2003: 498).
Normative Power in Europe after the Post-Cold War

Asle Toje

Introduction

The symbolic importance of the European Union’s foreign policy goes beyond its actual and potential real-world impact; it is the vanguard of the EU’s presence, or its ‘actorness’. No other part of European integration more clearly embodies the ambition to develop a political union than the foreign policy dimension. The question of the European Union as a power conjures up the EU’s external dimension, in a manner that transcends the metaphorical ‘pillars’ intended to visualize the Union’s workings. It thus captures a foreign and security policy that runs from the Commission’s development and neighbourhood policies via the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) under the auspices of the High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy and into Police and Judicial Cooperation.

The line of argument presented here is straightforward. The past decade has cast new doubts on the notion of the EU’s ‘normative power’. The normative flair of European Union foreign policy was a response to, and function of, a unique historical context, namely uni-polarity. The EU has found it difficult to accept that changes in global power patterns impact upon its own ability to influence. Policies formulated in the 1990s have persistently failed to deliver the expected results under the changed circumstances of the 2000s. There are particular concerns over security and defence where attempts at pooling resources and political consensus have failed to generate the expected results. This chapter’s modest goal is to demonstrate that any
systematic discussion of the EU as a power in the international system is better understood through a traditional understanding of power.

The basic outline of the chapter falls into three main sections. Since the notion of normative power is contingent on the roles that the EU performs and is expected to perform in the international system, the chapter begins with a brief outline of the EU’s foreign policy dimensions. The second section focuses on the factors that are putting EU foreign policy under pressure: NATO’s struggle for self preservation; the diminished importance of Europe in US geopolitics; the semi-failure of European foreign policy integration; and the absence of a grand bargain among Europe’s leading powers. In the third section, the notion of power and powers in international politics is re-examined.

**Ten Foreign Policy Dimensions of the European Union**

The international system is in essence a set of regularized practices that provides its constituent elements with some of the most fundamental givens of their existence. Yet the system does not determine behaviour. Actors obviously possess an identifiable presence within the international system, and their actions contribute to the functioning of the whole. In order to understand better the EU’s power, it is necessary to consider the European Union’s presence on an international level. The term ‘dimension’ is here intentionally chosen for its malleability. EU members have been careful not to hand the EU institutions specific authority, nor is there any determinism present where the EU has a self-evident mandate to perform certain functions that are vital for the whole’s survival.

There is no defined set of chores that must be shouldered in order to be considered a player in the international system. Different actors balance various aspects of the international system’s presence in accordance with the means available and the ends to be attained. The primary ordering mechanism in an international system that Reinhold Niebuhr called ‘managed anarchy’ is power (Niebuhr 1944: 174). The international system is not mechanical. But one can suppose that within the international state system some actors have an identifiable presence, to the extent that certain things would either not have occurred or would have occurred differently in their absence. On that basis we can discern the intertwined internal and external functions that the EU’s foreign policy performs.

*The EU is a power in a traditional sense. Since 1999 the EU has developed the capacity to interfere – by military, economic and political instruments – in states or regions where European interests are threatened and/or the peaceful evolution of the international community of states is under threat. The EU is in many ways an inconsistent power. Its role in the international system is less a result of any grand ambition than an incremental process where the sum total of many foreign policy initiatives amounts to something larger. As the*
EU has become a purveyor of the security order in Europe, pressure for action in 'extended Europe' and abroad has multiplied. The Europeans have had to settle for a less robust approach than many had hoped. The EU is less than the sum of its parts; the EU's collective power and reach are smaller than many of its member states. The European Union is not a 'great power'; it is a small power (Toje 2010). The attempts at developing a collective global outlook are constrained by internal limitations and external pressures (Winand 1993).

The EU is a regional pacifier. The Union is not, of course, the only cause of the remarkably long period of peace in the region, but without the Union such key elements as the Franco-German axis and the democratic transitions of Greece, Portugal and Spain would have been less likely. Kenneth Dyson has illustrated how the EU’s expansion into Central and Eastern Europe has helped to reduce the possibility of serious disputes breaking out between, and within, the new democracies (Dyson 2006). The EU’s post-conflict management in the former Yugoslav republics is the most high-profile example. The Union’s strategic use of its accession process is arguably the EU’s most powerful foreign policy tool. Since the United States is reducing its commitments in Europe while the EU is increasing its own, it will increasingly fall to the EU to act as arbiter when regional stability in Europe is under threat. In institutional terms, it means that the Union is something more than the ‘teeth’ of the international community, as it has sometimes been described (Solana 2005). The EU derives its legitimacy from a deeper level of commitment among its member states than that of these forums, and the transformational power of EU membership is clearly a source of stability in the region, providing the dynamism and capacity to mobilize resources for actions that purely institutional bodies rarely achieve.

The EU is a humanitarian actor. The EU remains the principal interlocutor between the developed world and the less-developed majority. The EU carries out this role in a variety of fields, such as EuropeAid, the Mediterranean Dialogue and its channel of communication with ‘bottom billion’ countries (Collier 2007). Europe is the world’s biggest provider of development aid, responsible for 55 per cent of global aid. The EU is the third-largest single donor of development assistance. In the 1990s, the EU constructed its aggregate development policy with EuropeAid. The European Commission plays the central role in increasing coordination with EU member states, managing one-sixth of their overall aid flows, roughly 10 per cent of global aid. There is also an increasing understanding that humanitarian policies are also a foreign policy tool that can be used to achieve objectives, particularly in Africa. This position has increased over time, partly because of the structural limits on cooperation between very poor and relatively rich states, and partly because of ideological shifts towards doctrinal idealism that took place in the 1990s. The line between foreign aid to gain and maintain influence and the provision of foreign aid to promote development is a fine one (Holden 2009). Whether the EU’s aid policy is an
effort to augment the EU’s structural power through targeted political and economic liberalization, or whether it is an altruistic endeavour, is a matter of continuous discussion.

The EU is a system of governance. Integration is an effective tool for defusing historic grievances. One of the architects behind the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), Robert Cooper, is among those who see EU membership as a long-term solution to the fundamental insecurity of the anarchic international system. He has suggested that advanced countries are ‘moving towards a system of overlapping roles and responsibilities with governments, international institutions and the private sector involved, but none entirely in control’ (Cooper 1996: 47). The case of the EU is popular with academics who are interested in studying the ways in which membership in an international organization can redirect national interests. Much has been written on this topic since Ernst Haas saw a ‘supranational’ style of decision-making taking hold in the Coal and Steel Community (Haas 1958: 490). Recent literature on this topic has been concerned with how national preferences are transformed into a common EU interest, exemplified in Simon Bulmer’s book on the transfer of policy ideas between EU states.1 Michael E. Smith sees the trend towards consultation among national governments on foreign policy issues as part of a broader trend of ‘Europeanization’ (cited in Goetz and Hix 2001). This process has traditionally been most pronounced in the ‘heartland’ of the six founding members of the EU and has not only helped to quell nationalism, but also to nurture a common European identity.

The EU is a community of values. By continuously adding new members to its ranks, European integration has been crucial in expanding a community of values and sharing a blend of free-market economics, rule of law, human rights and democracy coupled with tolerance and individualism, captured in the EU motto ‘Unity in Diversity’ (for more, see Giorgi, Homeyer and Parsons 2006). What sets the EU apart is that the treaty underlining cooperation clearly articulates common values. Unlike NATO, for example, the EU has consistently applied these values as a yardstick when reviewing applications for membership.2 The values underpinning the EU are enshrined in the Lisbon Treaty on European Union. Values are an important factor in explaining the attraction of EU membership to new democracies. Policy-making in the EU is a dynamic process through which interests and objectives emerge as a result of interaction at the domestic, national and European levels. Consequently, the clear distinction between national and European politics has become less distinct, even in what has traditionally been seen as ‘high politics’. Perhaps the strongest testimony to the importance of norms

1) For a guide to the key literature, see Bulmer 2007.
2) For instance, Greece and Turkey’s lapses into dictatorship had few consequences for their NATO membership during the Cold War, in contrast to the EU.
and values is that negotiations, diplomacy, economic interdependence and the use of inducements have gradually replaced sanctions, military deterrence and balance of power as the hallmarks of the regional order.

The EU is a security community. European integration has helped, if not to change, then to rethink, EU member states' perceived interests in a way that favours cooperation through consultations and participation in multilateral forums. There can be little doubt that such legitimacy has played an increasingly important role in reducing the scope of hard power in relations among the EU member states (see Deutsch 1957). To understand the logic behind the EU’s external security dimension, it is necessary to keep in mind the internal security argument, which is often referred to as the Kantian or ‘peace argument’ for integration, and which sees integration as a bulwark against a return to Europe’s troubled past of national interest-driven policies, military power balances and war as the final arbiter. Disarmament is seen as an integral part of this effort. According to this rationale, integration is a goal in itself, because the alternative is that the incentives embedded in the international system could again plunge the region into zero-sum competition. After half a decade of integration among the EU member states, the common-market area is characterized by complex interdependence, social interpenetration and strategic interaction, to such an extent that the EU resembles what Barry Buzan calls a ‘security complex’ (Buzan 1991: 190) – ‘a group of states whose primary security concerns link together sufficiently closely that their national securities cannot be realistically considered apart from one another’ (Wæver, Buzan, Morten and Lemaitre 1993: 9).

The EU is a power bargain. Over the past two centuries, the goal shared by Europe’s three former ‘great powers’ – France, Germany and Great Britain – has been to prevent any one power from dominating the continent. The European integration project has provided the institutional framework for reconciliation between France and Germany – and no less remarkably it has done much the same for Britain. The Franco-German ‘axis’ has been the primary dynamo in driving the integration project towards fulfilling the Treaty of Rome’s promise of an ‘ever closer union’ (European Commission 1957). When Britain joined the EU in 1973, London joined Paris and Bonn in an informal grouping, a ‘Directoire’, known as the EU-3. The intra-European understanding – in which the most powerful states agree to submit themselves to the same rules as the smaller ones – made it possible for Europe’s many small and middle-sized states to venture into an ‘ever closer union’ with greater powers, without fear of ending up like the proverbial pig being persuaded by the hen to ‘join up to make bacon and eggs’ (Keukeleire 2006). This understanding has also helped to sustain states that might otherwise have been of doubtful durability, what Alan Milward calls a ‘European rescue of the nation-state’ (Milward 1992). The EU’s unique role as an instrument of economic, political and security cooperation among the member states has brought Europe’s ‘great powers’ closer in matters of security and defence,
lending relevance to the EU-3 as an executive committee in pressing foreign policy matters.

The EU is a trade bloc. Trade is one of the foreign policy fields where EU members have agreed to pool their weight and act as a Union. The EU’s share of world trade – roughly one-quarter – makes the Union the world’s largest trading federation. The EU is consequently one of the single most important actors in the negotiating process of global and regional trade regimes (see Tilly, Welfens and Heise 2007). The EU’s presence has gradually become more apparent, culminating in monetary union in 2002. The euro is the foremost symbol of European integration, as well as of European power. With a single currency, the EU is making international monetary decisions its preserve, alongside China, Japan and the United States. This means that the EU is developing a presence that it did not previously possess in institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. Although the 27 EU members conduct the major part of their trade with each other, the Union is collectively one of the indispensable actors – again alongside the United States, China and Japan – in world trade politics. The financial crisis that ruptured in September 2008 has increased calls for a more managed global economy. Accordingly, state actors seek new arrangements and models of governance to address what are seen as the flaws of the market. In practice, this means that the Western world’s most powerful economies are joining together in established constellations such as the G-8 and new arrangements such as the G-20. Because of its capacity to act comprehensively and consistently on behalf of such a large share of the global economy, the EU has become an indispensable player in all such forums.

The EU is a civilian power. The concept of ‘civilian power’ is associated with the work of François Dûchene (Dûchene 1973). Most analysts today agree that the European Community (EC), and later the EU, has played a limited but nevertheless important role as a ‘civilian power’ in the international system and that it relies on ‘soft power’ by using diplomacy, trade, aid and enlargement to further European interests abroad. Especially after the Cold War, the integration process has been used for political goals beyond the borders of the EU member states. Karen Smith lists the primary instruments of the CFSP as being declarations, confidential demarches to foreign governments, high-level visits, diplomatic sanctions, political dialogue, making peace proposals and dispatching special envoys (Smith 2004: 10–11). The EU enlargement process has proved to be an important tool in teaching the new democracies in Europe the ways of liberal democracy, not only in terms of domestic and economic good governance, but also in conducting foreign and security policy. This process is the only path through which new states can join the Union. The EU’s neutral member states have embraced the Union’s civilian efforts to promote stability in Europe and beyond. The primary significance of the EU’s civilian approach has been to develop open, transparent and predictable relations with the states on its borders. Partly for
these reasons, the ‘Pax Europa’ acts as a magnet and a model for countries on the fringes of the Union.

The EU is a normative power. The concept of normative power is inseparable from the work of Ian Manners. Manners prefers to describe Europe’s power as normative, and dependent on certain ‘core ideals’, which it tries to pass onto other nations in order to create a more peaceful world culture that is based on democracy, basic respect for human rights, and on economic rather than military dominance (Manners 2002). The concept of normative power, in its ideal or purest form, is ideational rather than material or physical, meaning that it involves using normative justification rather than reliance on material incentives or physical force (Manners 2009a). The idea is that the EU is committed to exporting norms and thereby changing what is regarded as ‘normal’ in international affairs, again without relying on material incentives or physical force. While that is certainly true on an aspirational level, it is less obvious that the EU is an effective driver of ‘value change’ in the international system beyond the group of countries seeking EU membership. Although Michelle Pace has questioned the claims regarding the merits of such ‘normative power’ as a geopolitical tool (Pace 2007), the concept remains influential. As Laïdi and others have argued (Laïdi 2008b), the EU’s power of attraction is clearly found, at least in part, on what it is seen to represent on an ideational level.

End of the American Interlude

The European Union’s ‘normative power’ is a true-born child of the heyday of liberal internationalism, when it was assumed that the main purpose of foreign policy would be for the greater good, as opposed to self-interest. The basic aim of EU foreign policy would be to make the world more like the EU. Over the past decade, the liberal internationalist agenda has been rapidly running out of steam. There are a number of reasons for this, one being fatigue. Results have often not reflected efforts. This challenges the unspoken assumption that underpins much EU foreign policy: that if an action is based on certain good intentions, it will necessarily serve the best interests of a society. While it is difficult to quantify the relative weight of each of the dimensions of EU foreign policy, it remains clear that the lack of an effective decision-making mechanism and of an agreed ‘European interest’ to be pursued has led to stronger emphasis on applying persuasive (as opposed to coercive) measures to issues on the fringes of the international agenda.

While the first decade after the end of the Cold War surprised scholars with its continuity, the last ten years has been a decade of profound change. The host of post-modern challenges from the agenda of the 1990s has been joined by more familiar ones, such as state-sponsored terrorism and interstate warfare. As American satirist Jon Stewart summarized it, ‘while we were building a bridge to the future, the nineteenth century was busy tunnelling’. A
maze-like mix of traditional and post-modern threats signals the end of the post-Cold War interlude. The United States looks weaker and the emerging powers look stronger – seemingly making the question of a multi-polar international system a question of not if, but when (see Zakaria 2008; and Kagan 2008). This poses a particular challenge for the EU, since its foreign policy dimension was built on a foundation of, and as a supplement to, American ‘hyper-power’. In a multi-polar system, it is not at all clear whether the EU will have a seat at the high table, for four sets of reasons that will be mentioned briefly below.  

A main trend of the past decade falls under the heading of the ‘semi-failure of European political integration’. The term ‘semi’ is used here, because the EU has succeeded admirably in fusing 27 states into a union that effectively limits the exercise of hard power internally. The flaw lies in the external dimension. There can be little question that increased interdependence and political integration have facilitated common foreign policies. But the EU member states have retained autonomy of their reactions and foreign policy outlooks (Keohane 2002; see also Posen 2004). The EU is clearly a potentially formidable strategic actor, but it is partial and incomplete. Moreover, there is simply very little desire for further political integration (Parker 2007). The integration drive of the 1990s achieved a number of results that had been thought impossible, with monetary union chief among them. At the same time many issues were left unresolved, especially in terms of political integration. The Lisbon Treaty will most likely enter into force devoid of a decision-making mechanism that is capable of overcoming dissent. Zaki Laïdi correctly concludes that the EU can never be a ‘great power’ as long as it does not take responsibility for its own territorial security (Laïdi 2008a: 3), but doing so could also undo the entire project.

Europe is growing less important in American foreign policy. The United States is turning its military resources and policy attention away from Europe (Daalder 2003). American attitudes towards the EU over the past two decades have been characterized by a strong sense of ambivalence. The main fault line of the Cold War ran through Europe. The United States repeatedly threatened an ‘agonizing reappraisal’ of American security guarantees to Europe unless the Europeans together shouldered their reasonable part of the burden. That never happened – mainly because Europe was the centrepiece in the United States’ global grand strategy. Today we are witnessing the convergence of two dominant agendas in American foreign-policy thinking: one favours continued US engagement in European security through the primacy of NATO; the other sees the European Union’s emergence as a power in its own right and as the best long-term strategy to ease the United States’ burden in an increasingly multi-polar world. The bipartisan agreement stems from a shared understanding that US political and military resources in

3) The four challenges are discussed in greater detail in Toje 2008.
the years ahead will face a new set of challenges beyond Europe, and that – ready or not – the Europeans will have to begin carrying the costs of their own security (for example, Zakaria 2008; Kagan 2008).

NATO is in a great deal of trouble. NATO has, in the words of Henry Kissinger, evolved towards becoming ‘an alliance à la carte whose capability for common action does not match its general obligations’ (Kissinger 2008). Five years after signing the ‘Berlin Plus’ agreement on EU–NATO cooperation, the Alliance finds itself in difficult circumstances. In 2009, the largest of these circumstances, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, was in its eighth year with no sign of an end in sight. Should the mission end in failure, there is every reason to ask whether it is possible for NATO to go back to being a defensive alliance or whether it has by now been too weakened? The erosion of the Alliance, both in terms of capabilities and common purpose during the ‘post-Cold War’ interlude, is not easily reversed. The 2008 war in South Ossetia put territorial defence back on NATO’s agenda. In the words of Polish Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski, it ended ‘the era in which one could dispense security guarantees without anticipating having to bear any cost for them’ (cited in Dempsey 2008).

The failure to integrate and the consequent weakening of NATO are compounded by the failure to fuse the ESDP and NATO. The awkwardness of EU–NATO interaction is well known. Despite overlapping members and objectives, there is surprisingly little substantial cooperation between the two. The formal framework for dialogue – the Political and Security Committee–North Atlantic Council (PSC–NAC) meetings – has not become the forum envisioned in the 2003 ‘Berlin Plus’ agreement. When NATO and EU ambassadors meet, they are only authorized to discuss ‘joint EU–NATO operations’ – of which there was just one, Althea in Bosnia–Herzegovina – as well as to select capability initiatives. Other important issues – such as anti-terror cooperation, Iraq, Afghanistan and Sudan – were simply not on the agenda. It is no secret that this state of affairs may be attributed, in no small degree, to the fraught political relations between EU member Cyprus and NATO member Turkey. The intricacies of the dispute are too complex to revisit in detail here, but the outcome of the impasse is that EU missions in Afghanistan and Kosovo are denied military protection from NATO, which hampers the Union’s efforts.  

Finally, the absence of an EU-3 grand bargain prevents the EU from responding effectively to events. In the absence of an effective collective decision-making mechanism, an obvious supranational alternative is a system in which the stronger states form a Directoire to provide strategic guidance to the EU. Indeed, the past decade has seen the emergence of a semi-permanent power bloc, notably the ‘EU-3’, which has occasionally been central to EU

4) For more on the Turkey–Cyprus question, see Duke 2008.
foreign policy-making.’ Former EU Commissioner for External Relations Chris Patten put it bluntly: ‘I mean no disrespect to other states, but there is no European policy on a big issue unless France, Germany and Britain are on our side’ (Patten 2005: 159). The problem is that the three are keener on ‘uploading’ national interests than ‘downloading’ European interests. Each of the EU-3 has, depending on the circumstances, played important roles both as vanguards, but also as obstacles – sometimes as Euro-idealists, sometimes as national interest-driven realists.

In sum, many of the post-modern assumptions on which EU foreign policies have been constructed have proven flawed. As a concept, normative power is a European adaptation of Fukuyama’s assumption that the world is necessarily turning to liberal democracy. In normative power, liberal democracy has been decoupled from power resources, which have been replaced by a mystical community – ‘Europeanness’. The latter seems to embody the same things that were referred to not long ago as ‘being civilized’. Normative power places the power of ideas as somehow independent of, and alternative to, power that is based on economic and military strength. Unfortunately, there is little to indicate that a multi-polar world will become more like Europe. Europe is simply not as much of an example as it believes itself to be. Two cases can stand in the place of many: since the Georgian war of 2008, Russia’s ‘authoritarian capitalism’ has overshadowed the EU’s efforts in their shared hinterland; and in Africa, China’s no-frills approach is undoing the Paris Agenda’s donor tutoring of African states. These developments reintroduce the definition of power to the European debate.

Power and Powers in International Politics

Power is, as Leslie Gelb begins his book Power Rules, the heart of foreign policy (Gelb 2009). Perhaps because the concept of power is the basic currency in international relations, it is also difficult to delineate. Most attempts at definition tend to start off with Bertrand Russell’s definition: ‘Power is the production of intended effects’ (Russell 1946: 35); or, as Gelb has it, ‘power is the capacity to get people to do what they don’t want to do, by induction and coercion, using one’s resources and position’ (Gelb 2009: 7). Power in international relations has traditionally been seen as the degree to which resources, capabilities and influence can be mobilized to meet

6) See the book based on his 1989 essay—Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York: Free Press, 1992)—in which Fukuyama argues that the ‘universalization of Western liberal democracy’ may signal the end of mankind’s ideological evolution and be ‘the final form of human government’.
7) See Gat 2007; and, for a counter-argument, see Deudney and Ikenberry 2009.
defined foreign policy objectives. In the ‘Russell tradition’, power has two main components, namely, the sources and the effects of influence. The ability to exert influence depends on the resources that can be mobilized. Resources vary in relevance. A given capability – military, economic or diplomatic – might be indispensable in one situation and irrelevant in another. Resources translate into influence only if they can be mobilized for political purpose.

Since the end of the Cold War, redefining power has become somewhat of a rite of passage for scholars eager to earn their professorial spurs. The initial schism was that of ‘hard’ power versus ‘soft’ power, where hard power was seen as relating to coercive power – both military and economic – and soft power was seen to refer to diplomacy and cultural influences. Joseph Nye coined the term ‘soft power’, which translates into ‘the power to make the other want the same as yourself’ (Nye 1990: 5) by acting as a model or example. In Europe this morphed into ‘normative power’. The obvious problem is that normative power fails the basic test of delivering intended outcomes. Ian Manners’ claim that normative power works like ‘water on stone’, as opposed to ‘napalm in the morning’ (Manners 2009a: 2), does not absolve it from intended outcomes. Normative power does not have specific means and ends. The ideational aspects that are perceived as underestimated by capability-grounded power analysis are replaced by an exclusive focus on ideational aspects.

Power has tended to be treated in political science as the domain of political realism (Carr 2001). Most realists set out from the assumption that power is one actor influencing another to do what it would not otherwise do. This is by no means an uncomplicated perspective. Foreign policy actions often have unintended consequences. The many volumes written on the ‘paradoxes of power’ are testimony to the often erratic link between capabilities and outcomes (Baldwin 1989; Mansfield 1993: 105). Space does not permit an enquiry here into how power constitutes powers. The debate over the existence and nature of power and powers pivots off what Barnett and Duvall (2005: 43) call ‘compulsory power’, or as Kalevi Holsti put it:

For the theorist of international politics, mere quantitative changes on a particular dimension of international communication over a relatively short period of time will probably be of relatively little interest unless those trends have demonstrable major impact on how diplomatic, military, or commercial things are typically done. The change must have significant consequences (Holsti 1998: 7).

Power manifests itself in practice; potential power does not count. But should potential plus intention be equated to the existence of power? Kenneth Waltz, among others, has argued that for those at the receiving end, power does not hinge on intentionality (Waltz 1959: 16). Power still operates even when those who directly dominate others are not conscious of how their actions are producing effects. An actor who does not control the means of power,
however potentially formidable, will not exercise directly controlling effects similar to those who do. To the extent that displayed power is the key, then, evidence of power may best be found not in the intentions of the subject but instead in the consequences, as viewed from the objects of that power. Tough talk can sometimes be an indicator of weakness rather than strength. Former British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher is attributed with the quote: ‘Being powerful is like being a lady. If you have to tell people you are, you aren’t’.

Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall consider power in two main analytical dimensions: the social relations through which power works; and the social relations through which effects are produced (Barnett and Duvall 2005). Consequently, although (or more accurately because) ‘great powers’ command military means, they can be expected to rely on non-coercive measures. Much power is yielded through ‘sounding out’ the anticipated reactions of the weak. Normative power without hard power to back it up is a velvet glove without an iron fist inside it. Non-coercive power is relevant to the tendency among some academicians to applaud multilateral means and see foregoing unilateral instruments as evidence of an EU bid for ‘great power’ status. The concept of displayed power also opens the question of whether reliance on coercive means is necessary for being seen as belonging in the top power league. Displayed power concerns the direct control of others, but consists of a variety of mechanisms that allow one party to control the behaviour and circumstances of another.

Not all powers are equal. Robert Keohane distinguishes between different kinds of powers by examining whether their leaders have a decisive impact on the international system (Keohane 1969: 295–296). He sees three types of powers: ‘system-determining’, that is, those that can influence the international system through unilateral or multilateral action; ‘system-affecting’, that is, those that cannot influence the international system on their own but that can do so together with other states; and ‘system-ineffectual’, that is, those that adjust to the international system and cannot change it. A ‘great power’ is an actor or state that has the ability to exert its influence on a global scale. ‘Great powers’ characteristically possess military, economic, diplomatic and cultural might, which may cause smaller powers to take them into consideration when making policy decisions.

The Intellectual Weakness of Normative Power

If scholars of European integration have sometimes failed to take sufficient note of the importance of power in international affairs, there is no such shortfall regarding the contemporary debate about the existence, nature and consequences of the EU as a power.\(^8\) The problem with focusing on

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\(^8\) For an introduction to this literature, see Guttmann 2001.
normative power to the detriment of traditional power is that it is only true if it is twinned with a *sui generis* perspective. The EU is a ‘special’ kind of superpower. While a perspective that underlines the EU’s uniqueness helps to explain why the EU has fallen short of fielding anywhere near the sum total of the individual member states’ weight in terms of foreign policies, it also tends to invalidate comparative analysis, which renders success and failure matters of prejudice. The EU is not a strong, centralized federation like the United States; it is a weak federation with a fragmented centre. In this sense the concept of ‘normative power’ smacks of euphemism.

The dilemma with normative power as a tool of analysis is threefold: one, it only captures one potential aspect of EU power; second, it is hard to see how this sort of ‘power’ can be applied to deliver the intended outcomes; and third, the concept is unknowingly parasitic on traditional power. On a more fundamental level, there is the intrinsic validity that normative power bestows on the values on which the EU’s power is supposedly based. There is an obvious need to deal with Immanuel Wallerstein’s critique, put forth in *European Universalism* (Wallerstein 2006), where he questions the so-called universal values promoted by Western Europeans ever since the sixteenth century – be they Christian, democratic or scientific – as mere justifications of Western intervention around the world. There is something unsettlingly naive in the *Weltanschauung* [world philosophy] where the world is seen as a struggle between ‘progressive’ and ‘reactionary’ forces, in which the Europeans represent the former. What is meant by ‘progressive’ is a set of European values and truths that are presented as universal and that serve as justification for European intervention policies in the world. These values, which are meant to be encrusted in natural law, are in Wallerstein’s opinion neither truly universal nor beneficial to humankind, as they are partial and biased. Curious as it may sound, it has never occurred to many European constructivists that emerging powers simply do not see the EU as an example to emulate. This points too a fundamental challenge, namely that the normative power concept is the carrier of much of the same teleology that makes Fukuyama’s ‘End of History’ problematic.

Invoking explanations that do not lend themselves to falsification should be an explanation of last resort in social science. Normative power can be used to black-box phenomena that can be explained in reference to measurable variables. However, there are good reasons to avoid explaining international politics in terms of normative power. Social science should not be reduced to pointing out inter-actor similarities and then adding a normative explanation. I concur with Adrian Hyde-Price (2006) that the realism’s stripped-down assumption of universal strategic rationality delivers more in terms of predictive quality than the check for capability determinism sought by introducing normative power. Although values and norms clearly must be taken into consideration, it is equally certain that much can be explained by rational-actor-models, comparative advantage, technological imperatives, et cetera.
In sum, the hypothesis that the concept would have been deduced from a normative power perspective in 1999 would, in many cases, have been falsified by 2009. The claim that normative power is seen to operate on a very long timeframe ('like water on stone') not only serves to inoculate it from falsification, it also greatly weakens it as an analytical tool. There is every reason to ask whether normative power stands in causal relation to traditional power, or whether they are identical. Subsequently, any systematic discussion of the EU as an actor in the international system is better understood through the lens of traditional power. Beyond the level of rhetoric, one must not forget that the trends discussed above represent a mammoth challenge for the EU. As a foreign policy actor, the EU was constructed for the asymmetries of unipolarity, not the rough and tumble of multi-polarity. The EU has developed its various foreign policy dimensions with little thought of the interests to be protected and the specific goals to be attained. The United States’ role as a system that determines power allowed the EU member states to drop their defence expenditures to historic lows, even as other emerging powers sharply increased their security spending (The International Institute for Strategic Studies 2009: 20, 106, 213 and 372). The fallout of the current financial crisis is still uncertain, but it seems likely that it will introduce an element of scarcity into the international system that could sharpen competition over relative gains. In such a system, displayed capability-based power tends to trump potential ideational normative power every time.
Normative Power Europe: A Russian View

Tatiana Romanova

Introduction

The normative power agenda has reaffirmed itself as the dominant idea of most of the European Union’s foreign engagements. Why is it important for EU–Russian relations? The EU and Russia are key partners in the European arena; despite numerous recent contradictions they are designing a strategic partnership. But such a partnership cannot emerge unless it takes into consideration the EU’s normative thinking and Russia’s response to it. Furthermore, since 2008 the EU and Russia have been working on the new agreement that will replace the 1994 Partnership and Cooperation Agreement and provide the basis for future EU–Russian relations. Again, this new document will not be viable unless the EU’s normative power and Russian views on it are taken in consideration.

Moscow does not currently view the EU’s normative power positively. On some occasions, it voices its criticism; at other times, it bluntly disregards it. As Russia feels increasingly confident (both domestically and internationally), it increasingly questions the EU’s normative power. The EU, meanwhile, feeling undermined by this progressively critical attitude of its biggest neighbour, responds with criticism of the Russian policy and its leadership.

This chapter explores and attempts to explain the deficiencies of the EU’s normative power from the Russian point of view. By Russian point of
view, I intend here the views expressed by Russian officials in various official documents and statements.

The values of human rights, democracy, the rule of law and sustainable development per se are not disputed by Moscow. On the contrary, they have been central to the post-Soviet development of Russia and are deeply integrated into EU–Russian relations. The 1993 Constitution of the Russian Federation states in article 1 that Russia is a democratic state. It devotes a whole second chapter to the ‘rights and freedoms of man as citizen’. Clearly referring to the legacy of the 1789 French Revolution. It further stresses that rights and freedoms are inalienable and are ‘directly operative’ (Constitution of the Russian Federation 1993). Moreover, being a signatory of all relevant United Nations (UN) documents and a member of the Council of Europe and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), Russia declares its full support for the principles of democracy, human rights and the rule of law. It also promotes the ideology of sustainable development.

The EU–Russian Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA), which was signed in 1994, underlined in its opening paragraph the parties’ commitment to the documents of the (then) Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and to the Charter of Paris for a New Europe. It also stresses that the parties are ‘convinced of the paramount importance of the rule of law and respect for human rights, particularly those of minorities, the establishment of a multiparty system with free and democratic elections and economic liberalization aimed at setting up a market economy’ (European Union and Russian Federation 1994). Article 1 of the PCA further specifies that the PCA is meant to ‘strengthen political and economic freedoms, to support Russian efforts to consolidate democracy and to develop its economy and complete transition into a market economy’. The text of the 2005 roadmaps for the four common spaces between Russia and the EU reconfirms their determination ‘to further strengthen their strategic partnership on the basis of common values, which they pledged to respect’ (European Union and Russian Federation 2005).

So, why – despite these numerous references to values – does the EU’s normative power provoke so many questions in Russia? Why is Russia not comfortable with the notion? This chapter advances a two-level explanation. It first looks at why Russia is critical of the concept of normative power in EU–Russian relations. It then examines the consistency and coherence of the EU’s normative power, and how these affect the Union’s policies vis-à-vis Russia. Each of the two parts looks at the reasons for Russia’s critique, provides some illustrations and demonstrates Russian suggestions for how to improve the mutual relationship. The successful outcome of this discussion is a condition for the EU–Russian strategic partnership, and it requires attention to both EU and Russian argumentation.
What is Behind the Concept of the EU’s Normative Power?

The concept of normative power conflicts with some of the Russian Federation’s fundamental foreign policy ideas. First, and foremost, Moscow views the world as a multi-polar entity where Russia, the EU, the United States, China, India and possibly some others are equal poles. The notion of equality deserves special attention here because it is absolutely fundamental for Moscow. The 2008 *Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation* states that ‘Russia looks forward to the emergence of a stable system of international relations based on the principles of equality, mutual respect and mutually beneficial cooperation as well as on the norms of international law’ (Russian Federation 2008). It not only implies equality of status, of value system, traditions, and ultimately of civilizations, but it also includes the equality of power – that is, not solely military or economic power but also the ability to influence global developments and to project values externally. The *Foreign Policy Concept* also clearly states that ‘Russia will continue to seek the strengthening of principles of multilateralism in international affairs’ (Russian Federation 2008). Interestingly, Russia recently substituted ‘multi-polar’ with ‘multilateral’. One can only speculate that multi-polar is about equality in crude (military and economic) power, whereas multilateralism would for Russia imply equality in values and among various civilizations. Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergei Lavrov maintains that the current system is based on a market economy and democracy, which provide the framework for competition among different political systems. This competition reflects various traditions, divergent history and plurality of civilizations (Lavrov 2006).

The notion of equality is of extreme importance for Russia because of both its history and its current situation as a central power, and it is the EU’s normative power that is perceived by Russia as an immediate challenge to its own status. Russia asserts that the EU projects the image of a polity that has reached its *finalité politique*. All other countries need to catch up with the EU’s position, whereby their progress is measured and assessed by the EU itself. The application of normative power is limited to the world beyond the EU. The countries measured by the European Union are not accepted as equals, not even if they agree with the need for the EU’s assessment. Brussels reserves the role of judge for itself. Moreover, the majority of these countries (with the notable exception of EU membership candidate countries) are bound to stay external partners of the EU’s political process. They remain outsiders.

The 1994 PCA between Russia and the EU was very straightforward in this respect: it clearly implied that the Union had achieved the needed level of democracy, human rights and the rule of law, while Russia was to catch up. Article 1 of the PCA stated that one of the goals of the PCA was to support Russian efforts to consolidate democracy and the rule of law. Additionally, article 55 underlined the necessity of EU–Russian legal approximation; in other words, it stated that Russia had to adapt – as much as possible – to the
legislation, which was developed by the EU. The provision of this article ignored the fact that this legislation was not meant for Russia and did not take into consideration Russia’s specificities or its concerns and preferences. Moreover, it neglected the fact that Russia (unlike EU candidate countries) will never take part in the development of future EU legislation.

These provisions could only be agreed upon and ratified, because at the beginning of the 1990s Russia took a very naive attitude towards the West (and particularly towards the European Union): Russia’s belief was that both the West and Russia had won the Cold War (Morozov 2008) and that Russia was therefore ready to realize the deepest possible engagement with the West through various international institutions. Hence, when Russia accepted the clauses about legal approximation and the ability of the EU to monitor the progress of its reforms, it was hoping for an ‘insider’ type of equality – this did not necessarily imply EU membership, but it certainly amounted to Russia being accepted as an integral and prominent partner in the West.

As time passed, however, Moscow increasingly felt that its efforts were not being reciprocated. It was left on its own, with a harsh economic transition, and with the responsibility for coping with its nuclear weapons arsenal, with numerous secessionist movements in the post-Soviet area, as well as with the huge Soviet debt to be paid to the West. Russia grew increasingly disillusioned about this cooperation with the Western world.

Today, it is commonly believed in Russia that during the first half of the 1990s the country was open for cooperation as an equal partner, but that the West – instead of assisting Russia in overcoming the legacy of the Cold War – exploited its weakness. Yuri Luzhkov, the mayor of Moscow, tellingly claims that the West during these years ‘benefited from Russian economic collapse, its oligopoly of bankers and chaos, which led to the weakening of the country’s economic potential and to deep poverty’. According to Luzhkov, this provided the West with the chance to exploit Russian natural resources on very privileged conditions. These ideas also have a firm basis in Russia’s public opinion. According to polls, 40 per cent of Russians feel that Europe treats Russia as a resource appendix; 25 per cent believe that Russia solely provides human resource to Europe; 20 per cent have the impression that Russia is a territory of investments for companies that have little concern about laws; and 17 per cent feel that Europe considers Russia to be an undeveloped and unpredictable country.

1) See Ordzhonikidze 2007. Multiple answers to the question were possible. The results also partly indicate why (then) President Vladimir Putin called the collapse of the Soviet Union the biggest geopolitical catastrophe of the twentieth century (Putin 2005). This should not so much be understood as a preference for the Soviet past, but rather for those times when Russia was perceived and respected as an equal partner in the world. In the eyes of many Russians, the sudden collapse of Russia led to uni-polarity and, thereby, to Russia’s inferior status.
The increase in oil and gas prices ensured high cash revenues to Russia’s state budget and allowed Russia to repay its Soviet and 1990s’ Russian debt. Following the 2000 elections, (then) Russian President Vladimir Putin proclaimed the goal of re-establishment of all public institutions, of the ‘Power Vertical’ (that is, the dominance of the federal centre over Russia’s regions) and the dictatorship of law (Russia’s interpretation of the rule of law, which had been much welcomed after the disorder of the 1990s). Hence, the notion of the new Russia, which ‘stood up from its knees’ and was going to make up for the 1990s, emerged. In the international context, this implied that Russia was no longer going to accept mutely the West’s recipes, including in this context the EU’s normative power. Being refused a place ‘inside’ as a winner of the Cold War, it reoriented itself towards equality of power, as well as (national) traditions and civilizations. Russia opted again for the more familiar ‘outsider’s position’, not part of but next to the West.

It is worth quoting the Russian President’s former Foreign Policy Adviser and current member of the State Duma, Konstantin Kosachev, who asserted that:

Neither Mikhail Gorbachev, nor Boris Yeltsin or Vladimir Putin viewed Russia’s openness to the West as a manifestation of their country’s weakness. All three leaders believed that the Soviet Union/Russia and the West were to meet each other halfway. By the beginning of the new century, Russia had reached the halfway mark in its rapprochement with the West. At this point, any sort of further unilateral movement by Russia would have meant the following: the establishment of external control over Russian resources; the construction of European and global security systems patterned after NATO [the North Atlantic Treaty Organization] and without Russia’s participation in it; and a continuous loss of influence by Russia in the area of its strategic interests (Kosachev 2007).

The change in Russian foreign policy was inevitable. Russia’s 2008 Foreign Policy Concept succinctly phrased this outsider’s redefinition of equality and balance by emphasizing that ‘Russia calls for building a truly unified Europe without divisive lines through equal interaction between Russia, the European Union and the United States’ (Russian Federation 2008; italics added).

Russian emphasis on equality, following the years of exploitation and contempt during the 1990s, fundamentally conflicts with the normative power as projected by the EU.

Besides its desired state of parity, Russia proclaims respect for traditional international law and its supremacy in all its official documents, from the Constitution and its Foreign Policy Concept to its National Security Strategy and other documents. However, Russia respects and demands respect for national sovereignty, non-interference in domestic affairs and the inviolability of borders. These are key issues for Russia. According to the 2008 Foreign Policy Concept:
[...] attempts to lower the role of a sovereign state as a fundamental element of international relations and to divide states into categories with different rights and responsibilities are fraught with undermining the international rule of law and arbitrary interference in the internal affairs of sovereign states.

The EU’s normative power, meanwhile, reserves for an external actor the right to interfere in the domestic affairs of a third country if human rights are violated there. This intervention can be physical (a military operation), as in the case of former Yugoslavia, but it can also take the shape of moral pressure through public statements and critiques, through recalling diplomatic personnel, through embargoes and cutting economic and trade privileges. This strategy is rooted in a relatively new – and not yet universally recognized – concept of international law, which was born at the end of the twentieth century. According to the interpretation of international law, human rights are of the highest value and no sovereignty justifies non-interference by third parties in the event of massive human rights’ abuse. The EU’s attempts to introduce the possibility of unilaterally freezing any agreement or modifying economic relations in the event of massive human rights violations in any of its partner countries are perceived by the Russian Federation as illegitimate interference in the internal affairs of sovereign countries. This explains why Russia’s top officials and diplomats are so keen to argue that although they do not deny the existence of problems in Russia, they consider these as Russia’s internal questions, which Russia is going to deal with by itself.

Moreover, the argument goes, the EU itself has numerous problems with human rights. It should deal with its own issues first, before it criticizes other countries. The non-citizenship status of the Russian-speaking population in the Baltic countries and violations of their rights has become the most common illustration of human rights abuse in Europe referred to by Russian authorities. Putin’s 2007 proposal to establish a Russian institute on human rights in Europe could be considered a logical step. Two branches of the new Institute for Democracy and Cooperation were opened in Paris and New York early in 2008. Russia’s interpretation of international law is obviously another serious barrier to Russia accepting the EU’s normative power seriously.

Third, Russia tends to consider itself to be a very realistic actor, which bases its foreign policy on interests. The notion of ‘national interests’ permeates the National Security Strategy and the Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation. This is Russia’s conception of the ‘normal’. In a sense, Russia is very similar to the United States in its vision of the world, and therefore shares with Washington all of its conceptual problems of dealing with the EU’s post-modern Kantian power – famously although simplistically analysed by Robert Kagan (Kagan 2003).

In this context, Russia perceives the normative power of the EU in two different ways: in its pure idealistic form it is not deemed suitable for today’s
international relations; from a realist angle, which corresponds more closely with the Russian view of the world, normative power is perceived as a rational exercise by the EU, which actually masks its real intentions through the use of pretty notions such as human rights, democracy and the normatively defined rule of law. When the EU insists on legal approximation of its neighbouring countries to the EU’s *acquis communautaire*, and when it also takes the position of sole arbiter to assess the progress made, Russia takes this as an encroachment on its sphere of influence. This particularly applies to the post-Soviet countries, with Ukraine being the prime and most controversial example.

Fourth, most Russians profoundly believe that they are Europeans. In the famous words of Fyodor Dostoevsky, ‘We Russians have two motherlands: our *Rus*, and Europe’. This has also become the official interpretation, the national ‘idea’ of the new Russia after the end of the Cold War. The 2008 *Foreign Policy Concept* states that Russia is ‘the biggest European state with a multinational and a multi-confessional society and a centuries-old history’ (Russian Federation 2008). ‘Europeanness’ is part of Russian identity, based on shared believes (on the heritage of antiquity and Christianity), a common history, and a common literary and arts tradition. Few would doubt that Fyodor Dostoevsky or Leo Tolstoy are part of European culture. Nor would anybody assert that Sergei Diaghilev’s ballets are a non-European phenomenon.

But still, since the 1970s the European Community and later the European Union have increasingly talked on behalf of ‘Europe’, as is well reflected in numerous EC and EU documents. The address of the official website of the European Union (http://europa.eu) is another good illustration. The EU, contemplating which countries would be able to join the Union, redefined the idea of Europe. Turning down the accepted geographical criteria as well as the definition based on history and culture (as promoted by Russia), the EU opted for a values-based definition. The 1993 Copenhagen European Council argued that countries that would be accepted for membership of the Union would respect democracy, human rights and the rule of law (as well as being able to implement the *acquis* and to bear the competitive pressure of the internal market). This 1993 Copenhagen statement has been one of the most vivid manifestations of the EU’s normative agenda. It provided the normative criteria both for candidate countries and – more importantly for Russia – for the definition of Europe. By adopting the Copenhagen criteria, the EU reserved for itself the right to decide which country is European, and which is not. This was considered a direct attack on Russian identity, because by its definition of Europe, the EU undermined the very basis of Russian self-perception.

In the dichotomy of Russia versus the West/Europe, Russia can accept that it is not part of the ‘West’, but it will never agree with not being part of Europe. Additionally, Russia will always counter the EU’s values-based definition of Europe and its arrogation to speak on behalf of Europe. A good
example of the current rhetoric is Vladimir Putin’s 2003 statement at the 300th anniversary of the founding of the city of St Petersburg, which was constructed to bring Russia even closer to European politics: ‘In this particular place, it is especially vivid that Russia – both historically and culturally – is an integral part of Europe’.

By using normative arguments to formulate its own definition of Europe and by therefore consequently questioning Russia’s identity, the EU has further undermined its normative power in the eyes of Russia.

What is the Russian alternative to the EU’s normatively inspired external relations and world outlook? First and foremost, Moscow adheres to a primarily interest-based foreign policy. As mentioned above, ‘interests’ are the key concept of all major Russian foreign policy documents. This corresponds with Russian self-perception, with its current assertiveness and its realist vision of the world. It is little wonder that (neo-)realism is still the most popular foreign policy approach in Russia. The Russian elite wholeheartedly supports the idea of an interest-based interaction between the EU and Russia as its own idea of ‘normality’. Although this does not exclude values, Moscow insists on being open and vocal about its interests, and about their legitimacy. They should not be covered by a normative veil.

Second, Russia tries to create its own ‘ideational’ normative concept. Two dimensions are to be discerned here. One is the concept of ‘sovereign democracy’, a term that was coined by Russian politician Vladislav Surkov in a 2006 speech to the United Russia Party to show that Russia is democratic – and hence adheres to universal values – but that it will not tolerate interference in its domestic affairs or accept mentoring on how to construct its democracy. Another dimension of this ideational power is the conviction that Russia is, as phrased by its first Minister of Foreign Affairs Andrei Kozyrev in 1992, a ‘normal great power’ and that its behaves accordingly. This means that it acts on the basis of interests that are well comprehended through the realist prism, and defined by the 2008 Foreign Policy Concept as those of ‘the individual, the society and the state’ (Russian Federation 2008). However, this document does not reveal whether these interests are given forever and hence objective, or whether they are the result of a dynamic interaction of various internal forces. The Russian Federation’s conflict with Georgia neatly fits this vision. Russia acted in its neighbourhood, as the EU did in its own vicinity in Kosovo although previously it disputed the EU’s motivation.

The question, of course, is why Russia cares to provide its own interpretation of normative power. The explanation is two-fold. In all of its versions of normative power, Russia shows that values and norms are secondary to interests and independence. Interests, in fact, are understood as values by Russia. Moreover, Russia’s current interpretation of equality

2) See Surkov 2006; also see Trenin 2006 and Popescu 2006.
3) See Makarychev 2008; Giusti and Penkova 2008; and Tsygankov 2005.
requires it to present its own alternative norms in what it perceives as a competition of values. Interestingly, even those who define themselves as realists insist that Russia has to compete on the ‘values’ market’ (Bordachev 2009).

Third, instead of legal approximation, Russia offers legal convergence. Both the EU and Russia have to change and adopt some new legislation to enable better contacts and to level the playing field. The easiest examples of convergence will be within the context of international agreements. Current negotiations on global climate change or the G-20 discussions on the new financial architecture are relevant cases. It is considerably more difficult, of course, to agree on changes outside any international institutional context, and when the norms and rules are already deeply entrenched in Russian and EU systems. The advantage of legal convergence for Russia is that it emphasizes the equality of both partners. The disadvantage, as discussed elsewhere (Romanova 2005), is the more open-ended nature of convergence as compared to legal approximation. Unlike legal approximation, legal convergence does not always give reference to existing standards or sets of rules, nor does it provide us with clear end-of-process goals. It is also not particularly appealing to the EU, given the difficulty of achieving internal consensus among the 27 EU member states and the complexity of EC and member states’ legislation. And finally, it clearly runs counter to the EU’s habit of normative projection beyond its borders.

Finally, Russian leaders never tire of stressing that they do not want another Cold War, but neither will they continue to make concessions to avoid it by all means. It is therefore up to their Western partners to decide whether or not they want to return to that pattern of confrontation. In other words, the Kremlin urges ‘Normative Power Europe’ to be considerate and cooperative. Otherwise, Russia might postpone its World Trade Organization (WTO) membership, backtrack on the negotiations for a new EU–Russian basic agreement and curtail its relations with NATO. This may not be in Russia’s long-term interests, and its leadership understands this very well, but speculating on a new Cold War, as Russian President Dmitry Medvedev did in 2008 after the war with Georgia, is perceived as a means to delimit and frustrate the EU’s normative game.
'Normative Power Europe’ and how it comes into play in EU–Russian relations has a profound consistency and coherence problem. First, although normative power may by now be a well-established notion within the EU, this is not always reflected in either the Union’s or EU member states’ policies towards Russia. These are ambiguous and inconsistent. This fact reinforces Russian beliefs that the EU is quite hypocritical in proclaiming the normative agenda.

EU–Russian energy relations serve as a good illustration. Since 2004, the EU has been constantly politicizing and securitizing its energy dependence on Russia. Brussels had multiple reasons for this. The EU’s initial vision of energy relations with Russia did not work because Russia refused unilateral legal approximation. Oil and gas prices steadily increased before the 2008 economic crisis and nurtured Russia’s growing assertiveness. The 2004 accession of new EU member states that were critical of Russia, as well as the Russian–Georgian conflict and Russian–Ukrainian supply crises served as other impetuses for securitization. These events also led to a steep decrease of the EU’s trust in Russia. The Union, trying to diversify away from Russia by all possible means, started to improve relations with the Central Asian republics, whose track record on human rights and democracy is much worse than Russia’s. In other words, while securitizing EU–Russian energy relations, the EU at the same time ‘de-securitized’ such fundamentally important normative issues as human rights, democracy and the rule of law in its relations with Central Asia. This process served as another illustration in the eyes of the Russian leadership that the EU is indeed hypocritical in pursuing a normative agenda: for the sake of lessening its energy dependence on Russia, the EU is ready to sacrifice its human rights agenda. Meanwhile, EU–Russian energy relations continue to be based on business-like interest and they remain mutually beneficial.

Normatively defined policies are applied differently, according to the interests of the Union. It is one thing to be critical of Myanmar (Burma), but it is quite another to come to an agreement to initiate punitive measures against Nigeria, which possesses hydrocarbon resources. While this varying attitude can be rationally explained, it provides Russia with yet another example of the inconsistency of the EU’s actions. Moreover, it perfectly illustrates that normative power only comes into play when interests, as defined in realist terms, are absent.

Second, Russia holds that the EU quite arbitrarily decides what norms to apply. Its normative agenda is unpredictable. In April 2007, on the eve of a celebration commemorating the end of the Second World War, Estonia decided to relocate the Bronze Soldier monument, which commemorated Russian soldiers who lost their lives in that war. This decision provoked a vehement reaction on the part of Russia and Estonia’s Russian-speaking population. The date chosen and the way that the decision was executed were
an insult to Russia, its war veterans and to Estonia’s Russian-speaking population. It was also a straightforward neglect of the devoir de mémoire, which EU member states have upheld since the end of the Second World War. However, the EU, instead of reminding Tallinn of the respect that it needed to show for history and historic memory, criticized Russia’s perceived overreaction. It also indirectly accused Russia of a cyber attack on Estonian governmental bodies, violating the presumption of innocence, only to discover later that the cyber attack was staged by a computer specialist of Estonian nationality.

Similarly, the presumption of innocence is regularly violated when the EU (members of the European Parliament more frequently than officials of other EU institutions) accuses the Russian leadership of assassinating human rights activists, either in Russia or elsewhere (such as Alexander Litvinenko in the United Kingdom). While these cases obviously present a problem, the Russian leadership has been consistently claiming that it conducts investigations, which take time. The EU’s eventual criticism of the pace of these investigations probably serves as a compromise between the need to criticize Russia for its human rights abuses and the presumption of innocence.

Yet another recent example of the EU picking arbitrarily from its arsenal of normative power arguments is related to Russian exports of raw timber. In an attempt to develop its own timber-processing industry and to decrease the environmental impact of illegal logging, Russia slashed export quotas for Russian timber transported to the EU. The EU pictures itself as an innovative leader in the environmental field. Sustainable development is an important part of the EU’s normative agenda. So in theory it should have supported the decision of the Russian leadership, which would decrease the CO₂ emissions. Reprocessing in Russia would mean lower transportation costs than shipping the raw timber to the EU. Moreover, reducing the volume of illegal logging would also preserve forests. However, two small towns in Finland depend exclusively on Russian wood resources. Timber-reprocessing factories serve as the only employer. Therefore, instead of welcoming Russia’s decision, which had a substantial positive environmental impact, the EU supported Finland in stating that this decision went against the freedom of trade. The EU threatened to raise this question in the context of Russian preparations for WTO membership. This implied that sustainable development (and hence, a substantial part of the EU’s normative agenda) is inferior to the material interests of Finnish citizens. While this is perfectly understandable from a political point of view, it does not add credibility to the EU’s normative power in the eyes of Russia.

These cases are stark reminders of George Orwell’s saying that ‘all people are equal but some people are more equal than others’. The uneven application of the normative agenda and the selectivity of the EU – or double standards in Russian parlance – clearly discredit the EU’s normative power in the eyes of both Russian politicians and grassroots.
Third, the EU is, and remains, a strange animal for Moscow. As a Russian specialist in European integration, I am frequently approached with questions about the nature of the EU: is it just a ‘bureaucratic machine’, or a ‘block of 27 member states’, or perhaps a ‘marriage of convenience, which can be conveniently forgotten whenever national interests require it’? The explanations that the EU is *sui generis* a novel and specific legal order, or a peace project, do not suffice. This is an issue that Russia shares with many other partners of the European Union.

The EU is keen to argue that Russia is purposively trying to drive a wedge between various EU member states and different institutions. Although this might be true on some occasions, the EU has only itself to blame. It is very difficult to resist the temptation of using the negotiation advantage that the EU (un)consciously offers. Moreover, the EU itself on a number of occasions did not carry out its obligations, on the grounds that what it had promised as an organization did not in fact fall within its competences. Although this might be fully legitimate from the point of view of EC legislation, it severely damaged the EU’s credibility in Russia, and hence decreased Russia’s willingness to listen to it, and to cooperate with it. This, in turn, weakened the EU’s normative power, which is mainly promoted at the EU level.

The 2007 Russian–Polish meat crisis is a good illustration. Throughout 2007, the EU and Russia were trying to open negotiations on a new EU–Russian agreement. Poland, however, opposed the agreement, because of Russia’s blockage of its meat exports. In the run-up to this conflict, Moscow asked Brussels to develop common phyto-sanitary certificates for EU agricultural products. While initially promising to do so, the European Commission briskly backtracked, saying that it was – unlike trade and agriculture – not in the EU’s competences. Ultimate responsibility was therefore transferred to Warsaw, which at the end of the day had to find an agreement with Russia. Poland, in turn, tried to involve the EU’s weight and power in the dispute – irrespective of the division of competences – and managed to postpone EU–Russian negotiations on the post-PCA legal framework.

For Russia, these events were just additional proof that the EU is nothing but a bureaucratic machine, where the ultimate responsibilities lie with member states. Willingness to take the EU’s normative agenda seriously simply evaporates. One cannot push a normative agenda and then backtrack on solving pertinent questions, refuse one’s obligations or accept manipulations by individual member states.

Furthermore, the EU is a highly compartmentalized structure. On the subject of normative power, the European Parliament is much stricter than the European Commission. Yet it is also the institution that has the least responsibility in constructing relations with Russia. The European Commission, in turn, is much more pragmatic. The position of the Council of Ministers fluctuates, depending largely on the country that chairs it and on
particular issues. The differences in how to construct relations with Russia and what priorities to choose also split institutions from the inside. In the energy field, the European Commission’s DG Transport and Energy is responsible for a stable energy supply – and hence is more ready to tolerate considerable lack of competition in Russia (and, consequently, inside the EU). DG Competition, for its part, is responsible for a different subject matter, and it therefore considers competition and the promotion of consumers’ rights as of the highest importance. DG External Relations is interested in overall stable relations with Russia and will therefore try to develop a more balanced line towards Russia.

The situation is aggravated by the fact that the EU does not have a clear strategy for its policy on Russia. Brussels knows well how to deal with candidate countries. The European Neighbourhood Policy was modelled after the enlargement strategy, which was one reason why Russia refused to participate in it. The EU is also very well seasoned in development policies. Neighbourhood and development relations have one major aspect in common: they are profoundly unequal. The EU stands out as a donor, as a values’ diffuser and as a control body. It can promote its policies through the ‘carrot’ of better relations/accession and through a ‘stick’ of reducing the scope of economic relations. None of these instruments are valid, however, in the case of the Russian Federation. Russia does not aspire to become a member state; it does not need the EU’s economic assistance; and it is not afraid of a decrease in economic cooperation, given that it is largely made of oil and gas trade, which will stay intact anyway.

EU relations with partners such as the United States, Japan, Canada and Australia provide another pattern for the EU’s foreign engagement. These relations are based on shared values and equality in economic, political and social life. This is the model that also appeals to Russia. However, the EU is not yet ready to grant this, because of perceived deficiencies in Russia’s economic and social development, as well as mutual misunderstanding and a profound lack of trust.

It is little wonder that Europe’s normative power is frequently lost in these complex institutional procedures and conceptual discussions. The fluidity and multiplicity of views and approaches with regard to Russia present Russia with a very mixed picture of the EU and raise fundamental doubts about the consistency of the EU’s normative power.

Fourth, as mentioned earlier, values and norms in EU-Russian relations are pursued at the EU level, while member states continue to interact with Russia on the basis of interests (Timmins 2006). Interaction with EU member states is much more consistent with Russian views of foreign policy as interactions that are based on interests. The 2004 EU enlargement, however, further exacerbated problems. Certain new member states (such as the Baltic states and Poland, in particular) were explicitly critical of Moscow and supported harsh EU statements about human rights, democracy and the rule of law in Russia. They also used the EU and their new membership to
draw a line between their (Soviet) past and their democratic/normative present to further their distance from Russia. The end result was a worsening of the overall EU–Russian relations, and increased criticism by Russia of the EU’s supposed normative power. This did not prevent interest-based and mutually beneficial relations at the national level, however. Examples are ubiquitous. Finland increased its cross-border trade and continued enhanced economic relations with Russia. Germany cooperated constructively with Moscow on, among other issues, the Nord Stream gas pipeline. France increased the levels of both economic and security collaboration. Bulgaria enhanced its energy relations with Russia. The Baltic countries, despite their normative stances at the EU level, engaged in close cooperation with Russia’s north-west, as did Poland with the Kaliningrad region of Russia. The list can be continued.

On a number of occasions, the EU has been used by member states to ‘Europeanize’ bilateral issues, and this strategy has been more frequently applied by new member states. The reasons for this behaviour deserve further research. Such facts as low understanding of the EU’s political practices, its formal and informal norms, as well as the new member states’ historic unease with Russia and the desire to demonstrate new ways of defending their interests are certainly part of the explanation. Again, examples are numerous. Following Russia’s blockage of Polish meat exports, Warsaw vetoed the start of negotiations between Moscow and Brussels on a new agreement that would replace the 1994 PCA. Lithuania later joined Poland when Russia stopped oil flows to Lithuania in order to repair the Druzhba pipeline (it was considered to be an insufficient explanation by Vilnius). Latvia tried to reopen the EU-Russian deal on Russian accession to the WTO in order to return to operation Ventspil oil pipeline, which Russia had closed a few years before. In 2006, as mentioned earlier, Estonia contributed to the worsening of Russia’s image in the EU, and hence to the deterioration of EU–Russian relations, by relocating the Bronze Soldier monument.

Overall, new member states have tried to mobilize the EU’s normative agenda to guarantee a strong EU stance towards Russia, especially in the fields of democracy and the rule of law. Unsurprisingly, the criticisms intensified when other, mostly economic, problems occurred in relations between individual member states and Russia – another reason why the Russian Federation rejects the notion of ‘Normative Power Europe’ and only reluctantly engages with Brussels.

How does the Russian Federation respond to these issues? First, Russia recommends that the EU puts its own house in order, before it criticizes others. Although Russia uses the many opportunities offered by the EU’s internal controversies and ambiguities, these are not in its long-term interests. It is worth quoting Russia’s 2008 Foreign Policy Concept again, which states that ‘the Russian Federation is interested in the strengthening of the European Union, development of its capacity to present agreed positions in trade, economic, humanitarian, foreign policy and security areas’ (Russian
Federation 2008, italics added). This is not hypocrisy. In the case of a stronger Union, Russia will certainly lose its ability to play member states against each other or to undermine a common EU vision. At the same time, the EU will gain more credibility, and hence will provide Russia with more certainty.

Second, Russia insists on the development of a joint EU-Russian agenda, which should be designed together and not just amount to Russia copying the EU’s legislation or patterns that have been developed for other partners. Nor should it be used by certain EU member states to take revenge for past injuries or today’s difficulties. It should be based on joint security and economic interests. Discussions on norms and values may be part of the negotiations, but interests should form the basis of EU-Russian relations.

Lastly, Russia has come to use the notions of ‘true’ and ‘false’ Europe to oppose new member states in their policy of damaging overall EU-Russian relations. Those EU member states that are friendly to Russia fall into the category of ‘true Europe’; while others, which are more critical – and which, incidentally, joined the European Union recently – are ‘false Europe’ and still have to achieve or prove their ‘Europeanness’ (Morozov 2009). It is interesting to note that Russia’s ‘true Europe’ frequently coincides with former US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s notion of ‘old Europe’, while ‘false Europe’ corresponds with his ‘new Europe’. By drawing these normative and identity lines, Russia tries to put limits on how new EU member states can exploit the EU’s normative power to impact on EU-Russian relations.

**Conclusion**

This chapter outlines the reasons why and how Russia criticizes the idea of ‘Normative Power Europe’, despite the fact that it continues to adhere to the values of democracy, rule of law and human rights. At the conceptual level, Russia criticizes normative power for its profound lack of balance. Normative power reserves for Brussels the right to define and diffuse norms as well as to assess the performance of other players. This runs against the fundamental idea of Russian foreign policy – that of equality. Moreover, the notion of normative power is not consistent with the Russian realist vision of international relations and with Russia’s adherence to the classical concept of international law. Finally, the way that the EU defines itself and its normative power seriously undermines Russia’s European credentials and is considered to be an attack on its identity. At the more practical level of consistency and coherence, the EU’s normative power is undermined by its selective application and by the fluidity of the process of norms’ selection. Moscow terms it ‘double standards’. The consistency and coherence of the EU’s normative power are discouraged by the differences among EU institutions on how to develop relations with Russia and by the compartmentalization of the
decision-making process. Finally, member states undermine the EU’s normative power by forging interest-based links with Russia at the national level and by ‘Europeanizing’ their problems.

Moscow has suggested various alternatives to normative power in its relations with the European Union. It counters the very concept of the EU’s normative power by its emphasis on interest-based interaction between equals. At the instrumental level, it offers legal convergence instead of EU-sponsored legal approximation. As to the issue of (in)consistency, Russia’s short-term response is to differentiate between the so-called ‘true’ and ‘false’ Europes and to take advantage of the EU’s internal divisions and lack of consensus. Moscow’s longer-term answer, however, is to recommend that the EU puts its own house in order and opens discussions about a bilateral agenda that would be acceptable for both Russia and the EU.

This combination of Russian ideas and approaches with respect to the EU’s normative power may not (yet) be very systematic, but it needs to be taken into consideration in the ongoing discussion on the new legal framework for EU-Russian relations. It is essential to the European Union in order to make its normative power sustainable, and it is also of crucial importance for Russia, which is striving to be recognized as an equal player in the world. And obviously, it is of vital importance for the EU–Russia relationship, which can only be stable and mutually beneficial if reciprocal interests are taken into consideration and shared values are agreed upon.
The Identity Dilemmas of EU Normative Power: Observations from Chinese Traditional Culture*

Yiwei Wang

In international relations, self-perception and the perception of others are not the same thing. Read the great Chinese poet Su Shi in his ‘Written on the Wall of Xilin Monastry’:

Horizontally we see a range of hills, and sideways a peak,
Each perspective and altitude shift gives a different shape.
The true face of Lushan is not to be revealed,
To one lost in its misty haze.¹

The perceptions of others towards the European Union (EU) reflect both the essence of the ‘other’ as well as the core of the times themselves (the Zeitgeist). Against the background of China’s ancient civilization and at a time of rapid change and rejuvenation, Chinese perceptions of ‘Normative Power Europe’ have their own unique characteristics.

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How Do Chinese Scholars View EU Normative Power?

In recent years, ‘soft power’ has become increasingly important in China’s ‘soft rise’, countering the image of the so-called ‘China threat’. For this reason, Chinese scholars have become more and more interested in the EU’s normative power (see Song 2008). Sharing a traditional respect of the West, Chinese scholars in general tend to appreciate the following observations concerning Europe:

[...] the EU is a normative power: it changes the norms, standards and prescriptions of world politics away from the bounded expectations of state-centricity. However, it is one thing to say that the EU is a normative power by virtue of its hybrid polity consisting of supranational and international forms of governance; it is another to argue that the EU acts in a normative (i.e. ethically good) way (Manners 2008a).

Overall, there are two basic perspectives through which Chinese specialists on the European Union view the EU’s normative power (Men 2006). From a ‘realist’ perspective, the European Union is considered to be an important global ‘pole’. Some observers, influenced by the concept of contemporary Western power (lieqiang), tend to understand normative power as hard power or ‘might’ (qiangquan):

The EU is using its advantages as the world’s largest market, strengthening its hegemony of discourse and power of rules on global issues such as the environment, sustainable development and human rights, and gradually moving towards the direction of a new kind of international ‘normative qiangquan’ (Cui 2007).

Scholars who look at Europe from a ‘liberalist’ angle identify the EU as an exclusively normative force. These scholars are not satisfied with the performances of China and the United States on the world stage, and have shifted their focus of optimism to the EU, echoing the views of many European scholars. Qiu Yuanlun, for one, has valued the EU throughout its 50 years of existence as a power of stability, balance and peace (Qui 2007).

Most Chinese, however, the people as well as the leading elite, are used to the global policies of and relations with the United States and are insecure about the European Union. They often ask themselves whether the EU is in essence a hard power or a soft power, or whether it just tries to hide its real interests behind normative considerations. China’s EU experts, meanwhile, who are greatly affected by EU-funded research projects, have limited influence on scholarly perceptions in general, and even less so on the Chinese public, which is largely unaware about the EU or simply identifies the EU with Europe. As a result, China’s understanding of the EU, like the EU’s understanding of China, tends to be largely defined by their respective self-
perceptions. Each sees the ‘other’ through the lens of how they perceive themselves. In other words, there is ample space for EU public diplomacy in China.

Dimensions and Dilemmas for the EU’s Normative Power Identification

‘Normative Power Europe’ knows three dimensions. Historically, the EU’s normative power relates to European civilization, including ancient Greek and Roman cultures and modern civilization since the Renaissance. The EU’s enlargement is the expansion of European civilization, which is comparable to what the ancient Roman Empire achieved two millennia before. Today, EU normative power comes from Europe’s most successful regional integration and enlargement practice, for which the Union functions as a model. Looking into the future, some Chinese scholars consider the EU as an ‘example’, as a global standard. Others, however, argue that the United States has essentially set the parameters for European integration and that the EU’s normative power has to adapt to a more diverse world. With other countries modernizing rapidly and rejuvenating their civilizations, the power and attractiveness of Europe will be increasingly limited to its ancient civilizational features, rather than its modern-day features.

In today’s world, mutual learning and tolerance among different civilizations is an inexhaustible source of strength for social progress. The European Union is a rising power on a declining continent, which reveals the following dilemmas concerning the EU’s identification as a normative power:

- **The dilemma of representativeness**: Most countries do not belong to the so-called post-modern world; most people do not live in post-modern societies. The EU is in a minority position. It may advocate the human rights of other people, but it represents less than one-twelfth of the world’s population and can therefore never act in the name of international society. The EU is a regional civilization that claims to represent universal values – in this respect, it fails to recognize the gap between idealism and reality. In a hugely diverse world, the EU is a lone actor, whose ‘power of ideas and ideation’ is neither accepted, nor applauded, by other civilizations (Manners 2009a).

- **The dilemma of integration**: The EU advocates diversity within its own borders but it promotes uniformity (on the basis of its own norms) outside – this is another crucial contradiction with regard to the notion of normative power. Since the EU’s normative power originates from European civilization, it will be difficult to cross civilizations and to impact on others than Europe’s own, rather homogeneous, civilization, which is based on Christianity. The EU’s successful enlargement in
recent years and the difficulties caused by Turkey’s potential membership reveal this clearly. States applying for EU membership do so in their perceived self-interest, not because they necessarily share the Union’s ‘original’ norms and ideas. They consider the Union as an umbrella for protection or as a platform for bargaining.

- **The dilemma of words and deeds:** The EU presents and defends both norms and interests. This raises the suspicions of other states, which suspect the Union of being hypocritical and of applying double standards. For instance, the EU has recognized Russia’s market-economy status while it denies China’s (despite the fact that China is a member state of the World Trade Organization (WTO), while Russia is not). European scholars occasionally express their concerns too: ‘The identity projection, by presenting the EU as a strong and effective actor, has a potential negative impact on value diffusion because the EU may no longer be considered a benign and altruistic actor by foreign audiences’ (Rasmussen 2009).

Additionally, ‘Normative Power Europe’ reflects the following problems of mentality:

- **European superiority and ‘centralism’:** As Scheipers and Sicurelli assert: ‘The EU’s identity construction as a normative power has often been described as a practice by which the EU portrays itself as a force for good while at the same time depicting other actors as inferior, thereby disempowering them rhetorically’ (Scheipers and Sicurelli 2008). Europe was once one of the centres of the world. With the power shift to the east, the policy paradigms are also shifting. The world is returning to a ‘normal’ situation: if a ‘concept’ at all, ‘Europe’ has become a regional concept again. ‘Europe’ is no longer a universal concept. True multipolarity implies not only a redistribution, a plurality, of powers, but also a decentralization of ideas.

- **Dichotomy:** Highly influenced by Christian culture, EU elites often take means to be goals, dividing the world into ‘Europe’ and ‘non-Europe’. Democracy offers a good example. Democracy is actually a means, but it is seen as a goal for reaching people’s hearts. The EU often blames China for being a non-democratic country, but it does not seem to realize that Chinese culture prefers to reach people’s hearts directly, in its own way, and not necessarily through European-style democracy. The Chinese philosopher Zhao Tingyang put it eloquently:

  The framework of thinking for the West is people as the objects to ‘view/see’ the world. In this theory-of-knowledge framework, every subject that cannot be ‘converted’ is viewed absolutely: God or Other.
Hence, God has been identified as the source of creation, but Other – especially heathens – are affirmed as irreconcilable enemies (Zhao 2005).

- Mentality of linear evolution: One of the prime examples of strictly linear thinking is the ‘European’ interpretation of Russia’s history and identity. Europeans tend to look down on Russia, mainly because Russia has never undergone the benign effects of such crucial stages in European modernization as the Renaissance period. Yet the European Renaissance came after the Dark Age, and as there was no Dark Age in Russian history, why would there have been a Renaissance? In today's world, this type of linear thinking, an important aspect of European culture, has lost relevance. Other powerful countries have not been part of Europe’s history. They have not followed the pattern of European experience. Europe’s pattern of development is not universal.

If the EU wants to build a healthy and beneficial relationship with China, it needs to confront these issues. It would be much more productive if the EU accepted China and the Chinese model of development as an alternative to its own. It should consider China as a unique civilization, and not attempt to tailor it according to modern EU mentality, including such issues as human rights and democracy.

Identifying the EU’s Normative Power: Implications from Chinese Culture

Different from the European conception of normative power, traditional Chinese culture distinguished between four kinds of normatively informed power: Lì; Tao; Fa; and Shu. 2) Seen from Chinese historical and cultural perspectives, it becomes quite obvious to what extent the EU’s normative power actually has its contradictions and limitations. Because of the absence of the so-called ‘Tao’ realm, the EU remains eager to intervene in the internal affairs of others, thereby showing little respect for the principle of ‘Tao Follows Nature’. Because the global order lacks a hierarchical basis, it becomes difficult to solve the issue of equality, leading inevitably to a ‘democratic deficit’, because dominant legal thought lacks the substance of

2) There is a Chinese saying: “诸道同源之理，万法归一之道，纲举目张之法，提纲挈领之术”
[Li理: Confucian concept of ritual, customs, etiquette or morals; Tao道: Taoism concept of way, path, route or doctrine; Fa法: Legalist concept of law or principle; and Shu术: Zonghengjia concept of method, tactic, art or statecraft].
Shi (*, which refers to legitimacy, power or charisma. This gives the EU its hypocritical essence: the concept of peace without Mohism’s idea of Shangtong (identification with the superior). Europe’s so-called ‘Liberté, égalité, fraternité’ [freedom, equality, brotherhood] only work within Europe, and even within the borders of Europe they are not enjoyed by its illegal immigrants. To put it bluntly, regional integration European-style cannot match the great harmony of thought to which Chinese culture adheres. This is the basic reason, the historical root cause, why the Chinese people do not have much confidence in, and are not particularly optimistic about, EU normative power.

Chinese views have been validated by global public opinion. While Ian Manners (2009a) has outlined ‘sustainable peace’ as a prime normative principle of the EU, a recent international survey seriously questions the EU’s role in the world:

Europe should be a force for stability in the world. But an EU without an effective foreign policy mechanism, without the ability to shoulder its share of the military burden associated with keeping the world safe, with a faltering Euro and with too many new members is a big void where the world needs strength. Sometimes the greatest threat comes from those who could take action to preserve stability but who do not (‘The World’s 10 Most Dangerous Countries’ 2009).

3) Chinese scholar Zhang Zhizhou suggests Shi instead of ‘power’ as China’s core IR concept; see Zhang 2008.
As to Chinese and European soft power, the same goals can be reached but through different approaches:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>China</th>
<th>EU</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Starting point</strong></td>
<td><strong>Empire by example</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Peaches and plums do not have to talk, yet the Earth beats a path</td>
<td>• Cosmopolitan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• One can be modest if one has no selfish desires</td>
<td>• Mission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Measures of implementation</strong></td>
<td><strong>Normative power</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Confucius: If remote people are not submissive, all positive influences of civil culture and virtue are to be cultivated to attract them; and only when they have been so attracted, will they bend and accept</td>
<td>• Soft imperialism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Change oneself, change the world</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Baijia 2002)</td>
<td><strong>Ideas of implementation</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Objectives of Pursuit</strong></td>
<td><strong>Promoting EU values around the world</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• The art of dealing with differences: accept the beauty of your own civilization, and accept the beauty of other civilizations too; share beauty and create the world’s great harmony</td>
<td><strong>Procedural democracy: effective multilateralism</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Art of seeking the common ground: EU standard</td>
<td><strong>Civilian power</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These similarities and differences have clearly come to the fore in the China-EU human rights dialogue. The civilizational limits and specificities of the EU’s normative power are still the main basic reasons for the dialogue’s lack of progress. China’s rise will result in the rejuvenation of Chinese civilization, which will absorb and integrate the advantages of various other civilizations. It is naive and counter-productive to try to pressure China into a European framework with modern ideas such as democracy and human rights. The EU cannot set norms and standards for China. Europe tries to shape the future of China inspired by Western superiority, while it is actually being shaped by others too, including China. Sino-EU relations are typically relations among
different civilizations that are interactive and constructive. They should not be mistaken for a teacher–student relationship.

**China and the EU: Building a Harmonious World**

Compared with China’s academic field, China’s official views of the EU are considerably more stable and consistent. As China’s EU Policy Paper phrases it:

The European Union (EU) is a major force in the world. China attaches importance to the role and influence of the EU in regional and international affairs. To strengthen and enhance China–EU relations is an important component of China’s foreign policy (China’s EU Policy Paper 2003).

China is probably the most supportive ‘great power’ on the European integration process outside of the EU. China generally supports the EU model, as difficult as it is for the Chinese to accept the EU’s perceived power of ideas and ideation, which are considered to be deeply ingrained in a materialistic mentality. Based on their pragmatic mentality, the Chinese used to consider the European Union as a reliable power to build a multi-polar world and to oppose US unilateralism. And indeed, the current global financial crisis, which revealed the pitfalls of the Anglo-Saxon model, again highlights the more moderate ideas among most EU member states, giving yet another reason for China to express its support for the EU.

Both China and the European Union share ambitions to shape the international order according to their own values. The only way to avoid a clash of ideas is to look for, and to stress, the elements of agreement and consensus between China and the EU. Surpassing domestic and ideological disputes, China and Europe share more and more common international values such as effective multilateralism and global governance. But even in the domestic field, China shares common social values with Europe, such as secularity in the societal sphere and cultural diversity. As the biggest developing country and the biggest developed bloc, respectively, China and the EU will be the most important models to build a harmonious world.

Keeping this in mind, from the Chinese side, there are three ‘beyonds’ to be achieved:

- **Beyond the state, concerning society:** since the Opium War, China has been preoccupied with national independence and prosperity, seeking nation-building and international stature as its dominant goals. When China eventually changes its economic growth model from export-oriented to domestic demand-driven, focusing more on harmonious society-building,
it will undoubtedly have more to learn from the EU model, and hence understanding will grow.

• **Beyond rejuvenation, concerning innovation:** Since Chinese development is still at the stage of growth and rejuvenation, the Chinese think more in terms of practical results (GDP) than in process (happiness). Immediate ambition (rise) is of greater importance than the distant goal (harmony). The EU mirrors these sentiments, stressing the essence and goal of development. In the future, in its ‘post-rise’ era, China will undoubtedly share with the European Union more emphasis on cultural innovation and on contributing to global values.

• **Beyond the nation, concerning humanity:** Traditional Chinese diplomacy aims to safeguard and enhance national interests. In the post-rise era, China will be more and more concerned with the harmony of humanity. China’s contribution to mankind is not just ‘Made in China’ but its way of living; not just its achievements in modernization but also the norms to shape the international system. The liberalist perspective on ‘Normative Power Europe’ will eventually grow stronger among Chinese observers, at the expense of the realist one.

To achieve the three ‘beyonds’ described above, China-EU relations and the whole content of the relationship between China and the world need a leap forward, from common interests and common challenges to common values (consensus). The future of Sino-EU relations lies in seeking common ground and putting aside differences in order to deal with the uncertainties of our times, to work on a new global consensus and to build a harmonious world with long-lasting peace and common prosperity (see Hu 2005; and Hu 2009).
How future-proof is ‘Normative Power Europe’? If the attractiveness and relevance of normative power are actually a response to, if not a product of, a specific international context or Zeitgeist, as Asle Toje and André Gerrits have argued in their chapters, there is ample reason to believe that the concept of normative power is in for some rough weather. Those aspects of European and global politics from the early 1990s that were particularly conducive to normative and other essentially ‘non-material’ forms of foreign policy and external relations seemed to have lost power. The ‘uni-polar moment’ was what it says, a ‘moment’; liberal internationalism and universalism are past their peak; and the Bush administration, whose radical unilateralism contrasted so conveniently with Europe’s self-image of moderation, multilateralism and soft power attractiveness, is long gone and succeeded by a perfectly acceptable new US government, led by Barack Obama. If results have not reflected efforts, as Toje concludes on Europe’s normative agenda during the first post-Cold War era, there is little reason to believe that it will be much more successful now, when the international environment is decidedly less friendly. On the basis of an analysis of how global politics have changed over the last two decades, belief in the importance of a distinct European power becomes increasingly problematic.

Ian Manners comes to different conclusions. In a way, his contribution is more future-oriented than the others. Manners’ ideas on the continuing relevance of the normative power concept are largely based on the nature of the issues that he believes will dominate world politics for some time to come,
on his ‘four catastrophic failures’: neo-liberalism; global warming; poverty; and lack of global governance. These different interpretations show that one’s ideas on the relevance of normative power not only depend on (theoretically informed) views of international relations and global politics, but that they are also critically informed by how one defines and estimates the regional and global issues that need to be addressed. A re-emerging, revisionist Russia (hypothetically) presents the European Union with a range of completely different challenges and problems than a rise in sea levels or in global temperatures. If one disagrees on the nature and urgency of the problems facing the European Union, one can hardly expect to reach consensus on the nature, means and direction of EU external relations and foreign policies. Rather implicitly, Lisbeth Aggestam’s ‘world of many worlds’ concept, which is based on two different narratives of Europe in a changing world, attempts to overcome, or actually to combine, these diverging starting positions: the logic of power politics and that of rule-based order will (continue to) coexist in an uneasy balance. The debate is not so much on the nature of Europe’s power – which is generally considered as distinct, if not *sui generis* – but on the extent to which Europe’s distinct power continues to matter in the light of today’s rapidly changing world.

Every single recent EU document on international relations and security policies acknowledges these changes, including the shifts in global power and the increasingly complex threats and challenges that they present to ‘Europe’. Analyses of the Union’s global environment are all largely identical; it is the way that the EU is supposed to respond that differs, if not so much in substance as in tone. ‘Europe will rise to these challenges, as we have done in the past’, the *Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy* confidently puts it. The report relates the global achievements of the Union to its ‘distinctive’ foreign and security policy approach (Solana 2008). José Manuel Barroso’s *Political Guidelines for the Next Commission* is even more audacious (as a piece of political ‘advertisement’ should probably be). ‘For Europe, this is a moment of truth’, Barroso claims. Europe has a choice. ‘Do we want to lead, shaping globalization on the basis of our values and our interests, or will we leave the initiative to others and accept an outcome shaped by them?’ (Barroso 2009). How Europe should cope with the changes, the challenges and the threats remains rather ambiguous. A bit more of everything seems the most convenient option. Whereas the Commission’s *Annual Report to the European Parliament* tends to stress the need to improve further the Union’s military capabilities (European Commission 2009), Barroso rather stresses the normative dimensions of the EU’s external policies (Barroso 2009). ‘The world today offers Europe an unprecedented opportunity to shape events’, he asserts. ‘The (financial) crisis has shown yet again that the world needs values, it needs models of society to inspire new ideas for new circumstances.’ Barroso knows who he is dealing with. His optimistic words may serve as the political guidelines for the next Commission as much as they are supposed to mobilize the European
Parliament’s support for his candidacy as the Commission’s President. Barroso knows what Brussels wants to hear.
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