Clingendael Paper No. 1

This edited paper reports on a unique high-level seminar on the European External Action Service. The seminar was organized by the Clingendael Institute on 4 and 5 October 2010, with the support of the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Senior representatives from 22 EU member states participated. Following the structure of the seminar, this paper explores the problems of external representation in international organizations, the service’s role in development cooperation and more existential questions that have been raised in capitals and missions abroad about the future of national diplomacy. Moving forwards, the paper aims to identify when the establishment of the European External Action Service could be termed a success.

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The European External Action Service: Preparing for Success

Edith Drieskens and Louise van Schaik (eds.)

December 2010

NETHERLANDS INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS ‘CLINGENDAEL’
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Many decision-makers - inside as well as outside the European Union (EU) - were living under the misperception that once the Lisbon Treaty was ratified, the EU’s new Foreign Ministry - the European External Action Service (EEAS) - would be ready for roll out. This, however, was impossible - for several reasons.

Very little systematic preparation had been undertaken in the years preceding ratification. Preparatory processes launched by various EU presidencies had been interrupted, because of fear of interfering with referenda in EU member states. Serious preparation therefore only started during Sweden’s EU presidency in late 2009, once the Lisbon Treaty’s ratification was assured.

The concept of creating the EEAS by copying the organizational structure of national foreign ministries was impossible, for both functional and institutional reasons. First, the range of instruments at the disposal of the EEAS was much broader than the instruments available to national foreign ministries - ranging from classical foreign policy and diplomatic tools, over a very heavy external assistance portfolio, to civil and military crisis management tools. These required the establishment of a *sui generis* body that was distinct from both the Council and the Commission.

Second, the decision-making procedure was cumbersome. The formation of the EEAS required agreement on a basic Council Decision, change to the EU’s financial and staff regulations, and the adoption of a start-up budget. In legal terms, the role of the European Parliament was limited to expressing an
opinion, while it was involved as co-legislator in the other instruments. The reality was that the package could only be passed by accepting de facto co-decision on all elements.

The outlook for an easy way through these institutional hurdles was not good at the start of 2010. The European Parliament’s demands were at odds with the Council’s position on crucial points. Against this background, the completion of the legislative process of four legislative acts in less than six months after Catherine Ashton, the High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, presented her proposal in late March 2010 can by no means be characterized as slow. In fact, for the EU it is close to a Guinness Record for Speed.
Introduction
Edith Drieskens and Louise van Schaik

This edited paper reports on a unique high-level seminar on the EEAS that was organized by the Clingendael Institute on 4 and 5 October 2010.

Like similar initiatives that have taken place in recent months, the seminar illustrated that many questions remain unanswered about the new service, even if it was officially launched on 1 December 2010. However, by bringing together senior officials from 22 EU member states, the seminar managed to provide a fresh look at the EEAS’s establishment, moving beyond institution-building in Brussels, and pointing at the challenges and opportunities for national diplomacy, both in capitals and missions abroad.

Somewhat paradoxically, the service offers new tools for further integration of the EU’s foreign policy activities, but may also trigger a renationalization reflex in some capitals. Core interests may be reserved for the national level(s), whereas strategically less-important issues and difficult messages may be passed onto the new service, also under the new pretext of budgetary reasons. A fair evaluation thus starts with answering the question of whether the new service is an institutional stepping stone towards a more mature foreign policy for the EU, as it was intended to be, or a tool for resolving some of the problems that national diplomacy is facing today.

Building upon the presentations and discussions held at the seminar, this report explores the problems of external representation in international organizations, the new service’s role in development cooperation and more existential questions that have been raised about the future of national diplomacy. Intended to identify parameters for success, this report not only
includes the input paper that we wrote in advance, but also expert contributions by Knud Erik Jørgensen, Simon Smits, James Mackie and Simon Duke, as well as key conclusions drawn under the responsibility of Sophie Vanhoonacker and Simon Duke, who co-chaired the seminar.

As we submit this report, we wish to express our sincere thanks to Poul Skytte Christoffersen for delivering the seminar’s keynote address, to the participants for their open and stimulating interventions, and to Julia Lieb, who acted as rapporteur. In addition, we gratefully acknowledge the support received from the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs and would like to thank the Clingendael Institute for launching the new Clingendael Papers series with this report.

Edith Drieskens and Louise van Schaik
December 2010
During the past year, the design of the EEAS has led to heated debates in political, diplomatic and academic circles. The stakes are high: although not an institution in name, the *sui generis* EEAS is at the heart of attempts to instil more coherence, effectiveness and visibility into the EU’s external relations. It is therefore not surprising that the development of the new service, upon which so many expectations converge, has been preceded by a long and difficult negotiation process.

The discussion among senior diplomats around the four themes outlined in this report did not lead to ready-made solutions, but brought to the fore a number of red lines and questions that demand further attention by the incumbents of the positions appearing on the EEAS’s organizational chart. These are summarized below.

1. The emerging EU diplomatic institutions do not develop in a political vacuum. In the *changing international context* characterized by multiple poles and new challenges, the EU may no longer have the luxury to profile itself as a merely normative power. It is vital that the new institutions are apt to translate the European values and *interests* into policy. In this context, the potential of the EEAS lies in its ability to become a decision-shaping body.

2. A key component of foreign policy is *getting the message across* in both bilateral and multilateral settings. The EU’s failure to gain enhanced observer status at the UN General Assembly illustrates how important it
remains to invest in clear communication, not only internally but also with the EU’s key external partners. The role of the delegations in facilitating external communication will be of considerable importance.

4. The EEAS’s success not only depends upon internal legitimacy and external recognition, but also on **national ownership** or ‘buy in’. A crucial but still uncertain factor is the willingness of EU member states to play an enabling role in the early functioning of the new service, in terms of input (contributions) and output (implementation), both in the capitals (foreign affairs and their line ministries) and the delegations abroad.

5. **Recruitment** to the EEAS must in the first instance be based on merit. The attainment of geographical and gender balance is highly desirable, but it is likely that no real progress will be made on this point until after 2013. It is, however, important that the EEAS is seen as representing the interests of all 27 members as well as their citizens. It is also essential that all EEAS officials, including those in the delegations, have adequate **training** and preparation.

6. The High Representative and the Commissioner for Development must be able to promote the coherence of all **development-related policies**. A close and harmonious working relationship between the EEAS and the Directorate-General for Development (DG DEV) is therefore essential. The same logic can be applied to the European Neighbourhood Policy and International Cooperation, Humanitarian Aid and Crisis Response.

7. However important the structures and processes are, they are never an end in themselves, but merely **instruments**. The key question underlying the debate should therefore always be whether the new body is fit for its intended purpose. Does it provide essential support to the senior EU posts in external relations? And does it allow the EU to be a credible and coherent diplomatic actor exerting influence on the international scene?
Introduction: *La nouvelle UE est arrivée*

It should be no surprise that the EEAS has forced itself on the agenda of academics, civil servants and politicians: the drafters left plenty of room for interpretation, limiting themselves to marking the contours of the service’s organization and functioning. Indeed, the Lisbon Treaty (Article 27(3) of the EU Treaty) only stipulates that the new High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR/VP) is assisted by the EEAS.¹ The new service is to work in cooperation with the diplomatic services of the EU member states and comprises officials from the relevant departments of the General Secretariat of the Council and of the Commission, as well as staff seconded from the national diplomatic services of the EU member states. It was established by a decision of the Council, acting on a proposal from the HR/VP, after consulting the European Parliament and obtaining the consent of the Commission.


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¹ It is important to note that the EEAS was established by a decision of the Council, acting on a proposal from the HR/VP, after consulting the European Parliament and obtaining the consent of the Commission. This decision was made on 21 June 2010, following weeks of intense and often difficult negotiations, in which the European Parliament challenged the borders of its consulting role, pushing for greater influence over the service’s activities.
for a more communitarian design.² The Parliament secured the right to be informed on Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) developments and the right to hear the new Heads of Delegation and Special Representatives. Using its new privileges, the Parliament recently announced its intention to call six of the senior appointees for a hearing to test their knowledge of the dossier for which they will be responsible – that is, for China, Georgia, Japan, Lebanon, Pakistan and Sudan. Moreover, the Parliament still has to give its opinion on staff and budget rules.³ In other words, even if important steps have been taken, significant challenges and even risks remain.

One size fits all? Implications for EU representation in international settings

The precarious nature of the situation became abundantly clear when the UN membership decided on 14 September 2010 to shelve the EU’s request for additional rights in the UN General Assembly. Much to the surprise of the HR/VP and the EU member states, the majority of the UN’s membership was not (yet) willing to respond positively to the EU’s request for an enhanced (observer) status.⁴ Importantly, the list of countries not giving a green light not only included members of regional groupings aspiring to similar rights and privileges, but also traditional allies and key partners, including Australia, New Zealand, Canada, China, Brazil, India and the Russian Federation.

The course of events may be explained by the fact that the EU has given, with the Lisbon Treaty, a rather institutional answer to the external challenges that it faces, concentrating on its external representation and replacing the rotating EU presidency with a more permanent system.⁵ In redefining itself in that way, the EU seems to have prioritized the question of ‘who is representing the EU?’ (messenger) over the equally important questions of ‘which EU is being represented?’ (message) or ‘who is the EU addressing?’ (audience). In doing so, the EU has not only prioritized form over content, but also its own institutional logic over the external context in which it needs to operate. Yet, as became crystal clear in the UN General Assembly, the

³) The Parliament did so on 20 October 2010.
latter context is also a critical success factor for realizing the EU’s foreign policy ambitions.

The question is then whether a new round of outreach and the possibility of a similar status for other groupings will be sufficient to convince the UN membership. It is no secret that a number of countries that supported the adjournment of the debate have a wish list of their own, including their own regional representation in the context of the UN. Some of them may be tempted to use the momentum to enter into a more general discussion on representation, also tackling membership of the UN Security Council or even of international financial institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF). For sure, most of them will not be impressed if the ‘new’ EU decides not to address the plenary meeting of the UN General Assembly during its ‘old’ time slot, thus staging a silent protest against recent developments.

Some partners will also find it difficult to reconcile the Lisbon logic of streamlining the EU’s representation in international settings with the multitude of actors that they encounter on the ground: the HR/VP; the President of the European Council; the Commission President; individual Commissioners; the rotating EU presidency; and the EU member states themselves. Even more confusing will probably be the EU’s adherence to team representation, including within the framework of bilateral summits. Even if one could argue that the lack of clear delineation of tasks among the various actors is rather normal in a transition stage, it looks as if the EU’s future representation will consist of more players and arrangements, not less. Importantly, it is not only the EU’s international partners that seem to be confused; also the EU member states find it difficult to see the wood for the trees.

The matrices that have been drafted to organize the EU’s representation and functioning in Geneva, Vienna, Rome and other capitals where international organizations are located, illustrate the degree of differentiation and fragmentation. Even if inspiration may be drawn from the ongoing implementation at the UN in New York City, the reality of shared competences is often a complicating factor in those cities, implying a representative role for the rotating EU presidency even after Lisbon. It has become clear that the EU member states are rather reluctant to transfer authority over external representation to the European Commission in cases of shared competence. A dispute between the legal services of the Commission and the Council Secretariat demonstrates that ‘one size’ does not fit all.
Table 1: The EU’s actors in external relations after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Decision-making body</th>
<th>CFSP/CSDP: Exclusive member state competence</th>
<th>External policy: Exclusive EU competence</th>
<th>External policy: Shared / complementar y EU competence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Foreign Affairs Council; European Council</td>
<td>Council (formation depends on issue discussed)</td>
<td>Council (formation depends on issue discussed)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decision-making rule</td>
<td>EU position decided upon by consensus</td>
<td>EU mandate decided upon by QMV</td>
<td>EU position or mandate, usually decided upon by consensus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External representation</td>
<td>HR/VP; President; European Council; EEAS</td>
<td>European Commission (President or Commissioner)</td>
<td>Rotating Presidency, HR/VP or Commission?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On the ground</td>
<td>EU Delegation</td>
<td>EU Delegation</td>
<td>Embassy, rotating EU presidency or EU delegation?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Parliament</td>
<td>Consultation</td>
<td>Assent required when EU ratifies / concludes</td>
<td>Assent required when EU signs, ratifies and concludes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Indeed, the Lisbon Treaty may have the ambition of streamlining the EU’s external representation, but as Table 1 illustrates, it does not streamline the distribution of competences or the differences in decision-making procedures: there was no overnight change to the EU member states having different views on the priorities and scope of EU foreign policy, including in relation to the UN and other international contexts. It thus remains to be seen to what extent the EEAS can contribute to the formulation of shared principles guiding the foreign policy not only of the EU, but also of its member states. Put differently, the establishment of the EEAS raises important questions of both external and internal legitimacy.
Questions for discussion:

- What lessons can be drawn from the recent developments at the UN General Assembly for ensuring external support for the EEAS (and thus the EEAS’ external legitimacy)?

- Taking into account that states remain the key players in intergovernmental contexts like the UN, how can one ensure full cooperation of the EU member states (and thus the EEAS’s internal legitimacy), including in terms of sharing (confidential) information?

- How will the external representation role of the EU’s rotating presidency be defined for issues of shared competence and within the framework of bilateral summits and meetings?

Life after Lisbon? Implications for national diplomacy

The previous section has already suggested that the EU member states remain important players in foreign policy, also after Lisbon. In fact, the Lisbon Treaty itself is rather clear in that regard, limiting the scope of the new provisions – provisions that have raised high expectations. Indeed, Declaration 13 determines that the new provisions do not affect the responsibilities of the member states in formulating and conducting their foreign policy, nor their national representation in third countries and international organizations. Moreover, the provisions do not prejudice the specific character of the member states’ security and defence policy. In the same vein, Declaration 14 specifies that the new provisions will not affect the existing legal basis, responsibilities and powers of the EU member states in relation to the formulation and conduct of their foreign policy, their national diplomatic service, their relations with third countries and their participation in international organizations, referring explicitly to membership of the UN Security Council. Those disclaimers suggest that there is indeed room for national diplomacy after Lisbon.

The question is, then, how the establishment of the EEAS will affect the scope and objectives of national diplomacy, particularly in a context of general budget scarcity. EU member states may be tempted to rationalize their national representation, leaving countries and regions of limited strategic importance to the EU delegations, and reallocating their remaining diplomatic sources to those countries and regions that they consider to be important from a national point of view. Such a development would not only

6) Declaration concerning the Common Foreign and Security Policy.

7) Declaration concerning the Common Foreign and Security Policy.
affect intra-EU balances, especially power relations between the smaller and bigger member states; there is also the risk that external partners will turn to the highest bidder. Partners may play the various actors off against each other, because the EU’s strategic partnerships are only vaguely defined. Even if one could imagine a role for the EU delegations in harmonizing the various voices on the ground, it is likely that EU member states that stake their diplomatic capital on a limited number of countries and regions would like to have their voices heard and recognized.

The coexistence of EU delegations and national embassies not only raises important questions, but also offers opportunities. Following lengthy negotiations, political agreement was reached on the EEAS potentially offering limited consular services, as long as they do not entail additional costs. True, assistance to nationals abroad makes national diplomacy visible and tangible, and justifies public spending. Moreover, migration issues often require consular presence by the EU member states in the countries of origin. However, when budget cuts are on the agenda, one could imagine delegating those tasks to the EU delegation, especially in countries and areas where only a few of a member state’s nationals reside or transit.

The same argumentation applies to political reporting. While the sharing of political reporting may seem logical from an efficiency point of view, one should not forget that such reporting often symbolizes the value that a member state attaches to obtaining a tailor-made context for realizing its commercial and other interests and ambitions. As a result, the question is not only whether the EU member states will be willing to share sensitive and confidential information - thus also reducing their own comparative advantage - but also whether they want to be dependent upon information that is gathered and organized centrally.

Questions for discussion:

- What does the establishment of the EEAS mean for the scope and focus of national diplomacy, both in the capitals and on the ground?

- How substantial is the likelihood that member states will rationalize their representation abroad, earmarking their diplomatic sources to those countries and regions that are of national importance?

- How can the unity and impact of the EU’s message(s) be guaranteed in important regions and countries? How can the various actors on the ground (EU member states and the EU delegations) prevent being played off against each other?

- What are the tasks of the national embassies once the EEAS has become operational?
• Will national political reporting continue to persist, or will the EU delegations become the primary sources of information?

• Likewise, what does the establishment of the EEAS mean for consular affairs, including for migration control?

**New competition in town? Implications for development policy**

Development policy has been one of the most contentious issues in the negotiations on the EEAS, splitting participants into two opposing camps. The first camp argued that aid is so intimately linked to, and crucial for, achieving foreign policy objectives that it should be fully embedded within the structures where EU foreign policy is developed; the second camp claimed that development cooperation is guided by its own objectives, of which poverty reduction is the most important, and that its operation should not be subjected to foreign policy objectives.  

Another dimension in the debate is the rivalry between the European Commission and the EU member states over who should develop the policy and manage the European aid budgets in Brussels. Today, the Commission delivers about 20 per cent of European aid; the remaining part is contributed by the EU member states. If contributions are added up, the EU is the largest development donor in the world. The Commission ranks second, behind the United States, but ahead of Japan. As a donor, the EU is larger than the World Bank and just slightly smaller than the whole UN system. Little surprise, then, that it opposed a transfer of its management power over those funds to the EEAS. It feared them becoming subjected to a larger degree to (foreign) policy preferences of the EU member states. Moreover, the EU commissioners responsible for development cooperation, humanitarian aid and the neighbourhood funds did not want to be subordinated to the HR/VP.

Whereas the European Parliament supported the Commission, most EU member states saw things differently. However, their biggest fear was that by giving the EEAS a high stake in deciding development priorities and aid

allocation, the call for EU donor coordination would be strengthened and that EU delegations would set the rules for doing so. For instance, EU delegations in third countries will lead coordination efforts and most likely also dialogues with the governments of recipient countries, thus diminishing the standing of national embassies and pressuring EU member states to alter national development priorities and procedures (with possible consequences for accountability over the funds). Of course, that concern is linked to the broader debate on division of labour among EU donors as such and the complementarity and impact of their activities.9

It was eventually decided that the EEAS will be responsible for the overall strategy towards third countries, which includes the strategic priorities for development policy. The EEAS and the Commission will jointly prepare the proposals for the European Development Fund and Development Cooperation Instrument, as well as their programming documents, under the responsibility of the Commissioner responsible for Development. These proposals are submitted together with the HV/VP for decision by the College of Commissioners.10 Policy development – notably on thematic strategies – will still be the task of DG Development, and DG EuropeAid will remain in charge of policy implementation (that is, aid disbursement). All will have to work closely with the EU delegations in the donor countries. Since the geographical desks of DG Development will be transferred to the EEAS, it is expected that the remaining parts of DG Development will eventually be merged with DG EuropeAid.

It remains to be seen how the arrangement will affect the coherence of the EU’s external relations. On the one hand, the EU has subscribed to the objectives that all of its policies with an external effect should respect its development cooperation objectives (that is, the policy coherence for development objective). On the other hand, progress on other external relations objectives of the EU – such as ensuring security, human rights protection, combating climate change and diminishing migration flows – is considered to be strongly dependent on development funds being available for them as well.

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10) See Article XX of the final Council Decision (see footnote 2).
In addition, there is the complex relationship between aid and trade. Increasing the flow of trade is generally believed to have a positive effect on poverty reduction. That argument underpins a number of agreements through which the EU grants preferential access to its markets for products from developing countries (for example, Everything But Arms and the Economic Partnership Agreements). There is, however, a trade-off with the EU’s objectives for general trade liberalization, ensuring access to other markets and the non-tariff barriers arising from EU standards that are set for the environment, food safety and other reasons. With trade policy having remained completely outside the remit of the EEAS, the question is whether the EEAS can really ensure the coherence of the EU’s external relations in general, and with development cooperation aspects more specifically.

In summary, as the establishment of the EEAS abolishes the previous geographical divides that existed between the Commission’s DG External Relations, DG Development and desks in the Council Secretariat, it has the potential to reinforce the coherence of EU external relations with development cooperation and to improve EU donor coordination. Yet much still remains to be seen with regard to how this will work out in practice.

**Questions for discussion:**

- How can one ensure coordination between, and complementarity of, the aid funds that are disbursed at different – that is, EU and national – levels?

- Can the EEAS become successful if EU aid cannot be used for achieving foreign policy objectives?

- Will the EEAS be able to strengthen coherence between development cooperation and other aspects of EU external relations, including trade?

**The EEAS in 2012: Identifying parameters for success**

With specific criteria lacking for the evaluation of the EEAS, it is likely that the EEAS will be judged for its contribution to realizing the EU’s foreign policy objectives. That contribution includes shaping those objectives by stimulating consensus among the EU member states and aligning them. Three elements seem to be crucial in that regard: organizational structure; diplomatic culture (or esprit de corps); and early successes.

The organization chart that has been circulated already gives an idea of the EEAS’ organizational structure, but much of the division of labour and exact tasks still have to be decided. In that respect it is important to recognize that EU foreign policy is fundamentally different from traditional foreign policy. It is less rooted in security thinking and more oriented towards
promoting economic interests and values. In addition, it is increasingly affected by external developments, such as the emergence of a new world order and the increasing prominence of dossiers for which line ministries and directorates often hold primary responsibility, as is the case with terrorism, agriculture, or climate change. The establishment of the EEAS provides a unique opportunity for dealing with those foreign policy challenges in an integrated way, making policy coordination a central task for all parts of the service. The EEAS already integrates the traditional tasks of ministries of foreign affairs, defence and (parts of) development cooperation. The question, however, is how coherence can be ensured for those issues that do not fall within the EEAS’s responsibility, or for which it is disputed whether they do.

It is also important to ensure that officials who previously worked for the Commission, Council Secretariat or national administrations will start to work together in a cooperative and effective way. The EU’s institutions already have considerable experience with the challenges of cross-cultural and multilingual working environments, but in the case of the EEAS, 27 national foreign policy traditions also need to be integrated. As to avoiding interbureaucratic turf wars, it needs to become clear what will be expected from the ‘European diplomats’ in order to make a career, which working methods will be used and which are the leading priorities and objectives. Ensuring proper training for EEAS staff will be crucial. Rotation could not only ensure that EEAS staff members cooperate with, and learn from, a larger number of colleagues over the years; it would also avoid them becoming attached to a specific dimension of the EU’s external relations, as was sometimes the case in the former system.

Most will agree that early success is important, but that defining success is rather difficult and that securing it cannot be guaranteed. Moreover, the EEAS will not only have to align the EU member states, but if it succeeds in making a difference on the ground, it will also need to be able to claim its realizations. As perception is important, it will be vital that EEAS staff are continuously willing to ‘sell’ the organization and to invest in a well-functioning public diplomacy department.

This brings us back to the importance of ensuring that an adequate structure and personnel policy will be in place soon. Until now, the main focus has been on the design of the new service, perhaps inevitably so. Yet with the timeframe for evaluation in mind, it seems wise to bend the high expectations into reasonable parameters for success.

Questions for discussion:

- What structure should the EEAS have, considering the nature of EU foreign policy and the need to continuously coordinate policies with
the various government departments of the EU member states and European Commission?

- How should the training of EEAS staff be organized in order to foster an effective and professional *esprit de corps*?

- What priority issues should be chosen so as to ensure early success of the EEAS?

- What are realistic parameters against which the EEAS can be judged in 2012 and 2014?
5 One Size Fits All?
Knud Erik Jørgensen

How could the EEAS prepare for success concerning the EU’s performance in multilateral institutions? Does one size fit all? The short version of the answer is ‘clearly not’, but as the topic concerns highly important aspects of world politics – including serious problems such as the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), responses to the current financial/debt crisis, negotiations on rules for global trade and deadlocks within climate change – the issue deserves more attention than merely a brief answer. Five dimensions seem crucial:

- Bridging form and content;
- Balancing coordination and outreach;
- Applying a differentiated approach;
- Improving performance;
- Welcoming a politics of European foreign policy.

Bridging form and content

The age-old distinction between form and content is highly relevant for the EU’s international performance. The problem is that the EU tends to prioritize form over content and its own institutional logic over external context. One example concerns the highly developed legalistic culture in
which EU institutions are embedded, as demonstrated when the EU declares that its strategy towards Russia has 'expired'. Most strategists would be greatly surprised to learn that strategies can 'expire'. It thus seems that we have somehow become prisoners of Europe's grand strategy objective of legalizing international politics.

A second example concerns the fabulous mathematics of formal representation. Concerning EU representation in multilateral institutions, it is tempting to focus on legal arrangements and institutional design. Indeed, there are excellent studies on both aspects. However, the EEAS should probably not go too far in that direction, especially because it will end up being an 'accountant' – that is, obsessed with counting or recalculating seats or votes, disregarding the fact that this is just one of several aspects.

**Balancing coordination and outreach**

Two consistent conclusions arise from existing research:

- European diplomats are hard-working people, yet spend most of their time on internal coordination, leaving limited time for outreach;
- The cumbersome process of common-interest formation makes the EU a fairly inflexible negotiator.

While coordination is a precondition for a union of states, the organization of coordination is in severe need of creative thinking. In a sense, the Lisbon Treaty is the outcome of such an internal mega-coordination process. It took the EU ten years to reach this result and, subsequently, a series of difficult negotiations to flesh out institutional implications. Finally, on 31 August 2010, the EU could table UN General Assembly Resolution A/64/L.67. One cannot be anything but surprised that European diplomats in New York City did not foresee the rejection of the resolution on 14 September 2010. Even some strategic partners did not support the resolution, suggesting that the combination of key bilateral relations and multilateral aspirations has been unsuccessful or simply absent. Is this simply a case *par excellence* of getting absorbed in coordination and downplaying outreach?

**Applying a differentiated approach**

When it comes to international organizations, two features are worth emphasizing:

- Even if belonging to the same category, international organizations are not like units. They have highly different governance structures
and memberships and this pronounced diversity in an external context explains why one size does not fit all.

- Most institutions are creations of the twentieth century and are therefore not necessarily suitable for the challenges of the twenty-first century. Strong engagement in reform efforts seems indispensable.

This is potentially good news, because if the EU genuinely aims at enhanced representation in these organizations, it appears to be easier to achieve when the institutions are bound to change. Yet it is also bad news, because international organizations are notoriously difficult to reform. European policy-makers hence face a difficult dilemma. One option would be the long march through institutional reform, a march characterized by numerous veto players and a limited record of successful reforms. One should keep in mind that the EU has experienced some agony concerning reforming itself during the last two decades. The second option would be to initiate new forums in which the EU is represented as the Union prefers to be represented. As demonstrated by the examples of the World Trade Organization (WTO) fifteen years ago and the recent emergence of the G20, this option is not necessarily wishful thinking.

**Improving performance**

While organizational performance is difficult to measure, feasibility studies have shown that it is possible to measure the four main elements that constitute EU performance.

Concerning **effectiveness** – that is, the degree to which stated objectives are achieved – the record is very mixed. The example of EU representation in the WTO shows the effectiveness of the model of supervised delegation. By contrast, both human rights and climate policy diplomacy represent cases of gradual decline. Whereas we tend to assume that the EEAS will crown a long constitutional process enabling Europe to punch finally at its weight, the proliferation of cases of failure suggests that the EEAS might become Europe’s Gorbachev – that is, the manager of decline.

**Efficiency** concerns the costs, relative to other organizations, of achieving the stated objectives. While the EEAS might be run in a cost-efficient manner, European diplomacy remains probably the most expensive diplomatic service in the world, employing more than double the number of American diplomats. Up to 28 diplomatic services operate simultaneously, yet often out of sync. The reasons for this extremely suboptimal arrangement are well known: the EU is a union of states, each cultivating more or less distinct traditions. Yet ministries of finance might be less romantic, focusing more on efficiency, not least in times of severe budget constraints.

The **relevance** of performing organizations tends to be assessed differently by different stakeholders. EU member states belong to the category of key
stakeholders, yet are increasingly squeezed between efficiency and symbolic politics – that is, the power, pride and prestige of being represented in international organizations. Moreover, it is increasingly difficult to understand what exactly EU member states want, if not the cake and to eat it too. Double representation is hence a common feature, although significant variation characterizes the state of affairs. In some cases, member states do not find EU institutions relevant at all (as in the UN Security Council and NATO, etc.); whereas in other cases (such as the IMF), the poor performance of the EU is nothing but remarkable.

The final element of performance is financial viability – that is, the question of whether the performing organization is capable of securing a budget that matches the activities outlined in its mandate. If the current Zeitgeist determines both downsizing budgets and increasing global aspirations, it is quite predictable that a gap will emerge between supply and demand. Such gaps should be part of any measurement of organizational performance.

Welcoming a politics of European foreign policy

The fifth precondition for success is that the EEAS, as an instrument, finds sponsors for its policies. Any European foreign policy worthy of the name will be determined by a politics of European foreign policy – that is, societal groupings cultivating their specific and often competing ideas about the means and ends of foreign policy. The groupings comprise political parties, NGOs, the media and commercial interests. NGOs working on development issues are illustrative of this dynamic. They might be highly critical of European development policy and programmes, but can also be seen as one of the push-factors of policy-making within the field. If the EEAS develops a politics of European foreign policy without such interfaces, it is likely that it will become a bureaucratic-diplomatic institution of limited consequence.

11) For example, European shipping companies that have a direct interest in Operation ATALANTA, the EU’s first naval operation, which was launched in 2008 under the framework of the CSDP to deter, prevent and repress acts of piracy and armed robbery off the coast of Somalia.
The input paper written by Edith Drieskens and Louise van Schaik of the Clingendael Institute has already told us that there will be a life for national diplomacy after Lisbon. There is little doubt that for years to come, EU member states will have a network of embassies and missions around the world, covering most – if not all – third countries. What the implications of the EEAS will be for these networks of bilateral embassies is a question that cannot for the moment be answered easily. In order to answer that question, we need to go back a few steps. We need to know what it is that we are now constructing.

**Supporting the High Representative**

All 27 EU member states agreed that the EU’s external action needed to be strengthened. The post of High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy was thus established. In the same fashion, we decided that for the High Representative – Catherine Ashton – to be able to strengthen the EU’s external action, she should be assisted by the EEAS.

During the current process, we need to ask ourselves whether we are truly working on establishing a system that will support the High Representative, or are we creating a substitute for our national diplomacy, or, perhaps, yet another way to promote national interests – and not necessarily
the interests of the EU? In short, do we all have the same expectations of the EEAS and the EU delegations?

Since 1 December 2009, there have been extensive deliberations and negotiations about the decision, and discussions are still taking place with the European Parliament about the financial and personnel regulations and the budget. At the same time, the High Representative is expected to play her role, or her roles, and the EU delegations to act as primus inter pares in third countries. The EU member states must be critical in a constructive way and must allow the High Representative room to play her role.

The diplomatic service: national sovereignty versus EU delegations

Looking at our diplomatic service, the implications of the EEAS – the ‘new kid in town’ – are not immediately clear. Political departments in the national embassies will adjust to the new EU delegations. With the EU delegations responsible for coordination, negotiation and representation, the question is how they will adapt. Will EU member states downsize their political departments, since the EU delegations are primus inter pares for third countries? With the political departments of the EU delegations strengthened, why should all of the different EU member states duplicate the work already done by the delegations? Perhaps the political departments will remain the same as they are now. As we have seen, national diplomacy is still necessary, as is national input, of course, in deliberations at the EU level. Another option is that the political departments will be strengthened. After all, a member state could in this manner influence common EU policy rather efficiently.

On the broad spectrum, embassies do much more than political reporting. There is trade promotion, public diplomacy, cultural promotion and cooperation, development cooperation, and so on. Furthermore, embassies are a symbol of sovereignty. They will not disappear in a flash. Of course, the focus might shift in the long run. We might see more economic diplomacy, for example.

The input paper also suggested that it is very likely that – as is the case now – third countries will try to drive a wedge between EU partners. We need to find a way and we need to build on creating more and more trust, in order to avoid third countries playing the EU member states against each other. It might mean sacrificing parts of the national interest for the greater cause of the EU, and it might also mean standing up for a member state in order to prevent the third country from dividing the Union.

Another aspect that should be discussed is the support that EU delegations should be able to give to member states in their role of providing consular protection to EU citizens in third countries on a resource-neutral basis. We need to discuss how to make this a reality. How do we make sure that the EU delegations can actually help out when needed? How can we
design a system that is effective and efficient and will satisfy all of the different interests in this field of expertise?

Moving forwards together with trust

Finally, it is important to reiterate a few points. We need to make sure that the member states have a clear view on where to go with the High Representative and the EEAS. And second, we need to evolve a state of mind of openness and willingness to work even closer together, to place more trust in what the EU can achieve, in order to strengthen the EU’s external action.
This section first provides some contextual elements to situate the EU contribution to development cooperation, and the development provisions in the Treaty of Lisbon are then outlined. Key structural issues regarding the EEAS are raised and the roles of the High Representative and the EEAS in development are discussed.

Context

There are many EU policies, both external and domestic, that are relevant to, and have an effect on, developing countries: development policy; CFSP/CSDP; trade; migration; agriculture; and fisheries, etc. So the Lisbon Treaty – with its promise of encouraging coherence in EU external policy – is very important for European development professionals.

The EU is the largest provider of overseas development aid (ODA) globally. The joint contributions of the EU member states and the Commission account for 60 per cent of global ODA. Yet there is also considerable institutional fragmentation within the EU development sector. All 27 EU member states have development programmes. For some, ODA is channelled mostly through the Commission and the UN system, or through non-governmental organizations (NGOs), but many also have a development agency and some a development bank.
There are several EU-level frameworks in place to guide both the Commission’s work in development and the member states. Since 2005 there is a single policy statement – known as the *European Consensus on Development* – that applies to all of them. There is a *Code of Conduct on Division of Labour and Complementarity*, which was agreed in May 2007, and there are strategy documents such as the Joint Africa-EU Strategy, which also cover EU member states and the Commission. So on paper at least, and despite the actual fragmentation of the European aid architecture, there is a commitment to working together within an increasingly unified framework. In practice, however, while steady progress is being made, EU member states still run their own bilateral aid programmes without any real constraints or much coordination.

**The development provisions of the Treaty of Lisbon**

The Lisbon Treaty gives increased prominence to poverty eradication as one of the overall objectives of the EU (TEU Art.3) and its external action and the primary focus of development cooperation. It is also reflected in the values of the EU. So poverty eradication cannot be set aside easily. All officials working in EU external action, and not just development professionals, are expected to work to this end.

Lisbon also institutes a strong commitment to promoting policy coherence for development (PCD) (TFEU Art.208). In other words, all EU policies – both external and internal – should be coherent with the Union’s development policy, ideally support it and certainly not undermine it.

Development cooperation remains a shared competence in the EU, but there is a requirement for the Commission and EU member states to coordinate and to seek complementarity between their various programmes. They are also expected to complement and reinforce each other in the field, with EU delegations playing a stronger coordination role.

On the omission side, there is no longer any reference to the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries in the Treaty, or to the existence of a European Development Fund (EDF).

**The EEAS: its structure and role in development**

At the core of the debate about what role the EEAS should play in development is the question of whether development cooperation is crucial for achieving the EU’s wider diplomatic or security objectives, or whether it is

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12) The Treaty of Lisbon is in two parts: a short Treaty of the European Union (TEU); and a longer Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).
more effective if it is guided purely by its own objectives. Many people would prefer for development cooperation to be kept out of the EEAS completely, so as to lessen the chances of it being undermined or in some way used by broader EU foreign policy. Others argue that development cooperation cannot be isolated, because aid alone will never eradicate poverty, and it is essential that development policy interrelates with and influences other policies. If so, the EEAS potentially provides more scope for improved policy coherence.

A second issue has been the rivalry between the Commission and the EU member states and what the EEAS, with its greater member state involvement, will mean for the policy orientations and management of European aid budgets. Is the EEAS simply a way for member states to gain more influence over the Commission’s development budget?

Finally there is a question about what is needed to ensure coherence in EU external action. This raises issues of capacity, skills, accountability and effective collaboration. One important decision taken was to move all of the policy geographic desks into the EEAS and to leave none in the Commission. This is clearly important in terms of avoiding duplication, but it removes control of country strategy from the Commission.

In practice, what has been decided is that the High Representative, Catherine Ashton, and her EEAS will be involved in programming the support from all of the external action financial instruments in the EU budget as well as the EDF. This therefore includes the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI), the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) and part of the Instrument for Stability (crisis prevention and recovery), and involves preparing the geographic allocations and the programming documents that have traditionally been the preserve of the Commission. However, for the DCI and the EDF, the EEAS will do this work under the responsibility of the Development Commissioner and the final decisions will be taken by the Commission as in the past. In other words, High Representative Catherine Ashton and European Commissioner for Development Andris Piebalgs are expected to work closely together on programming. At the end of the process they will need to present their proposals jointly to the Commission for approval.

The role of the Development Commissioner is therefore to be responsible for all development policy (DG DEV) and for implementation (DG EuropeAid). He is also responsible for the allocation and programming of development funds, even though this work is done in the EEAS. Finally, he is expected – with the support of the High Representative – to promote PCD

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13) Since the seminar, a decision has been taken to merge the remnants of both DGs (subsequent to the removal of those officials who move to the EEAS) and to create one new DG called DG DEVCO for Development Cooperation.
and EU coordination (that is, with the member states) on development cooperation.

The role of EU delegations also changes. First, as the EU now has a legal personality, the delegations represent the EU in the full range of Union competences. They take over the role of the rotating EU presidency, which implies an increased role for the EU ambassador in political dialogue with partner countries.  

Equally, the delegations acquire greater responsibility to coordinate EU member states in-country.

Conclusions

By virtue of the High Representative’s close link with the EU member states, the balance is shifting and the Commission’s development cooperation is moving more into the intergovernmental sphere. On the other hand, EU coordination on development cooperation is expected to intensify. Development will also be institutionally closer to other external action policies. The old institutional split between the ACP and other developing countries (LDCs, or least-developed countries) will finally be overcome. The development assistance chain will instead be split between the Commission and the EEAS, albeit overseen by one commissioner, Andris Piebalgs.

In sum, the new institutional architecture creates both opportunities and risks. The opportunities include, first, the potentially greater scope for high levels of PCD through the closer integration of CFSP/CSDP, political dialogue and technical cooperation. This could ideally mean that lessons from development cooperation, such as long-term partnership building and country ownership, are increasingly taken on board in CFSP/CSDP. It should also mean that the political dialogue with developing countries becomes stronger, and that a global approach to development that goes beyond aid and aid effectiveness may become easier. In other words, a development effectiveness agenda, which recognizes poverty reduction as the goal, but also involves contributions from other policy areas, all in the pursuit of this goal, should become easier providing that the EEAS can indeed be used as an instrument to increase coherence. Finally, because EU member states have a greater stake in the EEAS and should therefore feel more ownership of its decisions, it is hoped that the EEAS will also encourage better coordination and more complementarity in the work that the EU and member states each undertake to promote development.

On the other hand, there are also risks. The biggest danger is the instrumentalization of development funds by external policy, with

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14) All delegations are expected to gain an extra staff position for a ‘political adviser’ who will also, at the High Representative’s behest, have responsibility for monitoring human rights in-country.
development cooperation coming to be seen as promoting the interests of the EU rather than of tackling global poverty and promoting development. Development cooperation could also become marginalized within the greater external action entity headed by a High Representative who is primarily interested in diplomacy and security issues. ACP/LDC interests could then, as many of their governments fear, start to slide down the EU agenda. There is also a risk that the EEAS may not have the staffing capacity and skills to do the programming task effectively and we may find that the High Representative and her service do not cooperate well with the Development Commissioner and his Directorate-General. Finally, of course, the EU member states may not give the EEAS the space that it needs to develop into an effective entity and to play the coordinating role that is expected.
We have to start by recognizing that the EEAS has to be a success since there is no way back. The stakes are high for the EU and its member states – failure is not an option. It is also worth reminding ourselves that much of the outside world is losing patience with the endless rearranging of deckchairs on the EU deck. The danger is that the debates about the internal cuisine of the service will distract attention from the fundamental aims of the Lisbon Treaty in the EU’s external relations (to improve coherence, efficiency and visibility). It is therefore important that these three words should guide the establishment and functioning of the service. Ultimately, the internal litmus test for the EEAS is the extent to which it provides support to the key actors in the EU’s external actions. For the EU as a whole, the external test is the extent to which external partners find the EU to be more coherent, efficient and visible.

We have to recognize that the Council decision of 26 July 2010 on the organization and functioning of the EEAS was a compromise between the constituent parties. As such, the decision leaves a number of important questions open, such as the manner in which the EEAS will operate, without prejudice to the ‘normal tasks’ of the Council Secretariat or the Commission. The relationship between the geographical and the thematic desks is also unclear (most notably, the issue of how development-related issues are to be incorporated). Is the idea to ‘mainstream’ thematic or horizontal issues on a systematic basis to the geographical desks, or will the geographical desks treat the thematic desks as resource bases, given that many of the issues covered are often quite technical in nature (such as the non-proliferation of WMD)?
Whatever the resolution, the intention to offer an integrated policy approach – that is, non-silo – through the EEAS must be borne in mind.

The coordination mechanisms between the High Representative (HR/VP) and other key Commission actors have yet to be fully worked out. This is particularly urgent in the case of the Commissioner for Trade, who sits outside the envisaged coordination mechanisms and falls under either the President of the Commission or the College of Commissioners as a whole. The fact that such an important external relations portfolio lies beyond the HR/VP’s coordination role needs swift review. The issue of who should deputize for the HR/VP is also of considerable importance, given the potentially crippling demands implied by her various roles, and is becoming somewhat clearer. The role (and identities) of the chair of the Political and Security Committee and the Strategic Policy Planning Team may also be important in this context.

The role of the delegations is critical for the EU’s external visibility and in this regard the role of the heads of delegation remains unclear, especially when it appears that Commission officials in the delegation can be tasked directly for those duties that fall within the Commission’s competences, with the head in copy. Will the head of delegation be seen as an administrative cipher? The question of how temporarily assigned national diplomats will conduct themselves in the field, especially with regard to their own local diplomatic presence, remains open.

Finally, many of the more specialized CSDP bodies – such as the European Union Military Staff (EUMS), Civilian Planning Conduct Capability (CPCC) and Crisis Management Planning Directorate (CMPD) – have been left at arm’s length. How will they relate to their Commission counterparts and how will the essential linkages between conflict prevention, crisis management, post-crisis stabilization and peace-building be reinforced (as was envisaged by MEPs Elmar Brok and Guy Verhofstadt in their organigram for the EEAS)?

**Short-term priorities**

The ‘pregnant pause’ is undermining international (let alone European) patience. Decisions on the necessary amendments to the financial and staff regulations should be made to keep things on track for the actual operation of the service by 1 January 2011. The legitimacy of the service will depend upon the first appointments and whether they meet the awkward criteria of appointment on the basis of merit, geographical balance and gender. The first 29 nominations for senior delegation posts illustrate that any such balance will be difficult to reach and will be subject to keen national and EU institutional scrutiny.

The disappointing 16 September 2010 European Council also points to another short-term priority. Put at its most provocative, the EU has no idea
what type of actor it is or what its role should be on the international stage. Thankfully, President of the European Council Herman van Rompuy has started off a long-overdue and necessary debate on the EU’s strategic priorities, since a Union with no less than fifteen ‘strategic partnerships’ (whatever that may mean) begins to look rudderless. If the European Council, backed by the HR/VP’s recommendations, can present the broad priorities of the EU on the international stage, who the key strategic partners are, and how the often difficult dialogue between values and interests should be conducted, then the EEAS’s general tasks will be far clearer. In the absence of any such strategy at the macro level, it is difficult to see how the EEAS will make critical decision on programming priorities related to financial instruments.

Training dimensions

Finally, a training strategy for the EEAS is long overdue. Staff entering the service will have to be given the right skills and analytical capabilities to operate at the European level of diplomacy. A short, concentrated induction course should be mandatory for all staff entering the service, which – aside from content – would instil a corps d’esprit into the staff. Beyond this, there is no one-size-fits-all answer to training, since the demands of the constituent staff of the EEAS will differ. Hence a modular approach to the appropriate parts of the service, offering different skills or analytical tools, will be necessary. Nor is there the need to reinvent the wheel completely. Many existing courses at European (such as Train4Diplo, the European Diplomatic Training Programme, etc.) and national levels will be of relevance for preparing headquarters and delegation staff. Finally, much concentration at the moment is – understandably – on the AD-level staff (administrators), but any longer-term training strategy will have to consider the broader training needs of all staff.
9 About the Authors

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Simon Smits Acting Director-General for European Cooperation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands
James Mackie Programme Coordinator, Development Policy and International Relations, European Centre for Development Policy Management
Appendix 1
Conference Programme

Monday 4 October 2010
Arrival of the participants at the Park Hotel, The Hague

19.00 Dinner with the participants at the Park Hotel, The Hague

**Special words of welcome and introduction**
by Jaap de Zwaan, Director of the Clingendael Institute; and Simon Smits, Acting Director-General for European Cooperation, the Netherlands

**Keynote address**
**Towards an effective European External Action Service**
by Poul Skytte Christoffersen, Special Adviser to the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of the European Union
Tuesday 5 October 2010

09.00 Registration

09.30 Opening
Managing a triangular relationship: The High Representative, European Council President and Commission President’s roles in international affairs
Jaap de Zwaan, Director, Clingendael Institute

09.40 Setting the scene: Presentation of the input paper
Edith Drieskens and Louise van Schaik, Clingendael Institute

09.50 Introduction by the Chair
Sophie Vanhoonacker, Jean Monnet Professor, Department of Politics, Maastricht University

10.00 Session 1
One size fits all? Implications for EU representation in international settings
(status question in UN capitals, shared competences, team representation)

Introduction by
Knud Erik Jørgensen, Professor of International Relations, Aarhus University

Comments by
Xavier Demoulin, Director-General for European Cooperation, Belgian Presidency of the EU
Peter Schoof, Director for European Integration, Federal Foreign Office, Germany

Roundtable discussion among all the participants

11.15 Coffee break

11.40 Session 2
Life after Lisbon? Implications for national diplomacy
(focus and scope of national diplomacy, consular affairs, political reporting)

Introduction by
Simon Smits, Acting Director-General for European Cooperation, the Netherlands
Comments by
*James Kariuki*, Head of Europe Global Group, Foreign Office, UK
*Péter Sztáray*, Political Director, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Hungary

Roundtable discussion among all the participants

13.00 Lunch

14.00 **Introduction by the Chair**
*Simon Duke*, Professor, European Institute of Public Administration, Maastricht

14.10 **Session 3**
New competition in town? Implications for development policy
*(development cooperation and foreign policy, donor coordination, aid and trade)*

**Introduction** by
*James Mackie*, Programme Coordinator, Development Policy and International Relations, European Centre for Development Policy Management, Maastricht; and Visiting Professor, College of Europe, Bruges

**Comments** by
*André Haspels*, Deputy Director-General for International Cooperation, the Netherlands
*Arkadiusz Michonski*, Deputy Director of the European Policy Department, Poland

Roundtable discussion among all the participants

15.25 Tea break

15.45 **Session 4**
The EEAS in 2012: Identifying parameters for success
*(structure, esprit de corps, early successes, training, expectations)*

**Introduction** by
*Simon Duke*, Professor, European Institute of Public Administration, Maastricht
Comments by
Hakan Emsgard, former Deputy Director-General, Department for European Union Affairs, Sweden
Alfonso Dastis Quecedo, Deputy Director-General for Institutional Affairs of the European Union, Spain

Roundtable discussion among all the participants

16.45 Summary and policy recommendations by the Chairs

17.00 Drinks
Appendix 2
List of Participants*

Abelis, Mr Indulis
Director of European Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Latvia

Baillie, Mrs Sasha
Deputy Secretary-General, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Luxembourg

Benisheva, Mrs Bisserka
Director-General of European Union Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Bulgaria

Blockmans, Mr Steven
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Burbach, Mrs Karen
Senior Policy Officer, European Integration Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands

Burianek, Mr Petr
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*) Please note that all names marked with an asterisk were speakers at the seminar.
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Crowe, Mr Brian
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Grahammer, Mr Walter
Director-General for European Integration and Economic Affairs, Federal Ministry for European and International Affairs, Austria

Gstöhl, Mrs Sieglinde
Director of Studies, Department of EU International Relations and Diplomacy Studies, College of Europe
Gulbinas, Mr Tomas
*Acting Director EU Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Lithuania*

Haspels, Mr André*
*Deputy Director-General for International Cooperation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands*

Hemery, Mr John
*Director, Centre for Political and Diplomatic Studies, Oxford*

Herrera, Mr Carmel
*Chargé d’Affaires, Embassy of Malta, The Hague*

Ipavic, Mrs Metka
*Coordinator of Task Force EEAS, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Slovenia*

Jørgensen, Mr Knud Erik*
*Professor of International Relations, Aarhus University*

Kariuki, Mr James*
*Head of Europe Global Group, Foreign Office, United Kingdom*

Kingma, Mr Wepke
*Deputy Director-General for European Cooperation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands*

Korhonen, Mr Klaus
*Ambassador to the Netherlands, Embassy of Finland, The Hague*

Lak, Mr Maarten
*Strategic Adviser, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands*

Larsen, Mr L.B.
*European Correspondent, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark*

Lieb, Mrs Julia
*Research Fellow, German Institute for International and Security Affairs*

Mackie, Mr James*
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Senior Visiting Research Fellow, Clingendael Diplomatic Studies Programme, Clingendael Institute

Ruzicka, Mr Frantisek
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Schoof, Mr Peter*
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Smits, Mr Simon*
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Sztáray, Mr Péter*
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Ton, Mr Ron
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Jean Monnet Professor, Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, Maastricht University

Ward, Mr Brendan
Director of Strategy and Performance, Department of Foreign Affairs, Ireland
This edited paper reports on a unique high-level seminar on the European External Action Service. The seminar was organized by the Clingendael Institute on 4 and 5 October 2010, with the support of the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Senior representatives from 22 EU member states participated. Following the structure of the seminar, this paper explores the problems of external representation in international organizations, the service’s role in development cooperation and more existential questions that have been raised in capitals and missions abroad about the future of national diplomacy. Moving forwards, the paper aims to identify when the establishment of the European External Action Service could be termed a success.

**Edith Drieskens** (Ph.D. Leuven, 2008) is a Senior Research Fellow in the Clingendael Diplomatic Studies Programme (CDSP). Her current work explores the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty in the multilateral context of the UN and analyses the challenges for cooperation and coordination in New York, Geneva and Vienna.

**Louise van Schaik** (Ph.D. Leuven, 2010) is a Research Fellow in the Clingendael European Studies Programme (CESP). Her recent research has looked at the EU’s performance in international negotiations, notably on climate change, health and food standards. She has also worked on EU external relations and the Lisbon Treaty, EU development cooperation and sustainable development.