The EU’s Comprehensive Approach to Security: A Culture of Co-ordination?

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Introduction

From the 1990s onwards, the concept of security has changed fundamentally. Security does not only mean avoiding an unwilling form of death, it has to do with management of life and its social and structural conditions (Bigo and Tsoukala 2008). The so-called security and development nexus linked human development, human rights and transnational responsibility with ensuing consequences for how threats to security are addressed (Hettne, 2010). Approaching security questions comprehensively is now in high demand. The operations in Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq have made it clear that military intervention needs to go hand-in-hand with reconstruction, nation-building and development in order to reach stable and self-sustainable social and economic structures. The initial phase was mastered relatively well by the international community, but it is the second phase, aimed at sustainable peace, which necessitates a whole new concept of crisis-management. When the European Union, in 1999, gained a security and defence dimension with the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP, now CSDP) it seemed particularly well-suited to take on these challenges.

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The term ‘comprehensive approach’ is notorious for being a catch-all phrase for what can turn out to be quite different things. Nowadays, most national governments and international organisations dealing with security challenges have at least a reference to ‘comprehensiveness’ in their crisis management operations in their policy documents. There are many overlapping definitions: the German ‘vernetzte Sicherheit’, the Canadian and Dutch ‘3D-approach’\(^2\), the British ‘whole of government’, the UN’s ‘multi-dimensionality’ are all conceptions that refer loosely to responses to security threats which are not strictly of a military nature. In general, comprehensive security refers to an understanding that peace and development are fundamentally intertwined. The United Kingdom defines a comprehensive approach as ‘commonly understood principles and collaborative processes that enhance the likelihood of favourable and enduring outcomes within a particular situation’ (Ministry of Defence, 2006: 5). Most of the definitions include the following elements: ‘the approach is horizontal, including both civilian and military parties and, where possible, allies and international organisations and local nationals; and vertical, taking account of the different stages in the situation from the initial war fighting phase to reconstruction’ (House of Commons, 2010: II).

Key to comprehensive approaches to security is the shared understanding of the why (human security), but also of the how (with integrated policies). In the case of the EU, central to the development and internalisation of comprehensiveness in security policies has been the aim, declared by European Council ‘to ensure a culture of coordination’ (European Council, 2003a). When the Council sought to create a culture of coordination it was implicitly referring to a change in the organisational culture of the EU’s institutions (the how). This means a change away from stove-piping, i.e. separate ways of operating of EU personnel working in the field of crisis management, towards an integrated way of thinking and working. In social psychology and organization studies the most common definition of culture is ‘the set of shared, taken-for-granted implicit assumptions that a group holds and that determines how it perceives, thinks about, and reacts to its various environments’ (Schein, 1996: 236). According to the European Council, the underlying assumption, or norm, that needs to be ingrained into the EU is that of coordinating action for crisis management among EU institutions. This article addresses to what extent the EU’s

\(^2\) 3D stands for Defence, Development and Diplomacy.
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international crisis management approach has achieved organisational change and lived up to what the Council called ‘a culture of co-ordination’.

Although the comprehensiveness of the EU’s security and defence policy was regarded as its added value as a security actor, there has been much criticism of the EU’s ability to act coherently in CSDP crisis management missions, such as in DR Congo or Bosnia Herzegovina (Derks and More, 2009; Norheim-Martinsen, 2010; Keohane, 2009). Part of a culture of coordination is also a shared understanding and sense of purpose (Ministry of Defence, 2006: 6). Therefore, this article will firstly look into the background of the EU’s thinking about security in an integrated manner. Secondly, the main concepts of this EU comprehensive approach are discussed. The third section is devoted to the main challenges to the EU in delivering effective comprehensive crisis management policies. Lastly, the Lisbon Treaty is looked at as a response to the challenge of bringing about a culture of coordination. Although too soon to tell, the article concludes with tracing the evolution of ESDP/CSDP in terms of the possible emergence of a culture of coordination underpinning the EU’s comprehensive approach.

The EU’s uneven path to a civil-military approach

To date, the EU has conducted twenty-three ESDP missions of which six can be denominated military. The vast majority of missions have therefore been of a civilian or of mixed military-civilian nature. Considering that, at the onset of ESDP, the EU was completely new to conducting military operations, it is not surprising that these operations have generated considerably more attention than the civilian activities of ESDP. The focus on building up the ‘defence’ part has from the start been to the detriment of the (civilian) ‘security’ part of ESDP, both in the institutional sense and in the capabilities sense. Despite the EU’s claim to approach security comprehensively, it has, until now, poured most of its energy into setting up military institutions, military planning, and generating military capabilities with the civilian institutional counterparts lagging behind and with relatively little attention devoted to civilian personnel and equipment. Eleven years after the launch of ESDP, it is increasingly recognised that this lopsided situation needs to be remedied if the EU wants to make optimal use of its relative advantage as a security actor that is by nature able to bring a comprehensive approach to the table. The former High Representative, Javier Solana, underlined this as follows:
The comprehensive approach underpinning ESDP is its value added. The logic underpinning ESDP – its distinctive civil-military approach to crisis management – was ahead of its time when conceived. That logic has proved its validity and has been adopted by others. It provides a sound basis on which to approach the coming ten years (Solana, 2009).

A comprehensive understanding of security not only includes the recognition of the multidimensional quality of security issues, the widening of actors as objects and subjects of security, but also the broadened scope of security responses. As phrased in the EU’s Civilian Headline Goal of 2004:

Developing the civilian dimension is part of the EU’s overall approach in using civilian and military means to respond coherently to the whole spectrum of crisis management tasks such as conflict prevention, peacekeeping and tasks of combat forces in crisis management including peacemaking and post-conflict stabilization (European Council, 2004).

However, despite the fact that the EU is a natural actor for combining civilian and military approaches, the effectiveness of this linkage has proven difficult. This is caused, among others, by the specific path the development of a European foreign, security and defence policy within the EU has taken.

When ESDP was launched, first in St. Malo by Tony Blair and Jacques Chirac at the end of 1998, and subsequently taken forward during the German Presidency in the first half of 1999, civilian missions were not on their mind. The EU being a thoroughly civilian institution, the focus of ESDP at its inception was firmly on shaping a military capacity for the EU. The institutional build-up of he EU had to be adapted, partly because of the need for enhanced security procedures in the security and defence sector (Menon and Sedelmeier, 2010). The German Presidency took institution-building forward, but in the drafts of the Cologne Presidency Conclusions neither civilian crisis management nor conflict prevention is mentioned. Resisting predominantly French opposition the Finnish and Swedish governments managed to get both included in the final version of the conclusions. Likewise, it was only during the Finnish Presidency of the second part of 1999 that CIVCOM (Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management) as a civilian counterpart to the EU Mili-
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tary Committee (EUMC) was introduced. The civilian side of EU security management can therefore be considered as a counter-balancing afterthought to the set-up of ESDP.

In the first instance, the EU needed a credible military force to back up its nascent foreign policy. The immediate external incentive to ESDP was the EU’s obvious inability to complement its many carrots with a credible stick during the Yugoslav succession wars from 1991-1995 and the Kosovo war starting in 1998. However, owing to the very diverse strategic cultures of the (then fifteen) Member States an intense lobby for boosting the civilian side of ESDP emerged only once the Franco-British initiative had been launched. Particularly the former neutral states Sweden, Finland, Austria and Ireland considered a military ESDP too one-sided and could only be won for incorporating a defence element into the EU if it included a credible non-military response to crises as well. Consequently there was a different sequencing to creating the civilian and military strands. They were ‘separated at birth’ (Misiroli 2008), thereby creating individual, stove-piped structures into the set-up of ESDP.

After a hesitant start (with some Member States fearing that attention to the civilian dimension would dilute the military side) soon most Member States showed considerable support for the civilian side of ESDP. The topic is less controversial than the military dimension and transatlantic-oriented countries, military non-aligned and militarily introverted countries in particular have been vocal and active in this support. The United Kingdom, Austria, Germany, Sweden, Finland, Denmark and The Netherlands can be counted among those with the most politically positive and active attitude towards the civilian aspects of ESDP (Jakobsen, 2009). Both political interests in the role of the EU and a genuine belief that civilian tools would be necessary to turn ESDP into an effective crisis management instrument played their parts (Lee-Ohlsson, 2009).

Despite the fact that ESDP was originally conceived as a project equipping the EU with military means, in 2011, the current CSDP has delivered something different. The need to find consensus among EU Member States has led to a considerable ‘civilianisation’ of the EU’s security and defence policies. Also, the influence by the Commission to conceive security as broadly as possible to be able to exert influence in the newly booming area of European integration has had its impact on the EU adopting a broad definition of security policy (Menon and Sedelmeier, 2010).
The Civil-Military Coordination concept

Related to the concept of comprehensive security are the notions of civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) and civil-military coordination (CMCO). The concept of CMCO is central to the EU’s comprehensive approach. CIMIC is of an earlier date and in contrast to CMCO is not unique to the EU. The EU’s concept of CIMIC owes much to NATO’s doctrine of Civil-Military Cooperation. It was drawn up by the EU Military Staff and adopted by the Council in 2002 (European Council, 2002). The EU CIMIC-concept was, similarly to that of NATO, a tactical level doctrine. It provides for the interaction in the field with the environment and other actors, while CMCO is a more encompassing concept at the political-strategic level. CMCO is defined by the EU as addressing ‘the need for effective co-ordination of the actions of all relevant EU actors involved in the planning and subsequent implementation of EU’s response to the crisis.’ (European Council, 2003a: 2-3). CMCO is in effect EU jargon for translating its comprehensive approach to security from the strategic planning to the operational phases:

(...) it is important to recognise that this CMCO culture needs to be “built into” the EU’s response to a crisis at the earliest possible stage and for the whole duration of the operation, rather than being “bolted on” at a later stage (ibid.).

The three consecutive Presidencies of the EU (from July 2005 to December 2006), the United Kingdom, Austria and Finland, made civil-military coordination a centrepiece of their involvement in CFSP/ESDP. In 2005, the three Member States produced a joint Non-Paper on CMCO (Pullinger, 2006). It divided the issue into five parameters: analysis, planning, management of operations, methodology of measuring progress, and management of capabilities (Perruche, 2006).

The central coordination instrument of CMCO is the Concept for Comprehensive Planning. Following an initiative of the UK Presidency in 2005, the EU has developed this Concept which constitutes a living document, amendable in light of accumulated experience in an operation or mission (European Council, 2005). The concept involves the EU institutions and Member States, and reaches across the whole planning cycle of operations across pillars. The idea is to provide risk and situation analyses, stipulate goals, regulate the coordination of Commission and Council instruments and differentiate according to
different time horizons. The pitfall with the Concept for Comprehensive Planning is that it only contains recommendations or suggestions and does not carry any authority with the different structures (Ehrhart, 2007).

The Finnish Presidency focused on the implementation of CMCO in situation awareness. Also, as part of the CMCO concept the Council and the Commission are now conducting joint, comprehensive reviews of all EU operations and actions taking place in the same region. The Council charged the Austrian Presidency with the operationalisation of this concept for the cases of the ESDP missions in Aceh, Darfur and Bosnia, with the aim to provide a ‘Single Comprehensive Overview’ of the EU’s activities in these cases. When drafting these overviews, the need for the development of a systematic review and lessons learned process for all EU actors involved in crisis management came to the fore. Almost all agents kept different standards for recording lessons learned.

The studies on EU impact in Aceh, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Darfur and also the Democratic Republic of Congo are a step forward in creating a more structured operational evaluation process. Continuous and structured assessment is needed to inform the review of operational scenarios and capability objectives. The CMCO concept of the EU is geared towards optimising coherence and coordination among its crisis management assets, but still lacks a practical application of its principles into a CMCO doctrine. What is also still missing is links on the ground to other international organisations, such as the UN, NATO, the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the African Union, which can also be involved in a crisis management situation. Therefore, the CMCO concept lacks an external dimension and seems to be an EU-introverted mechanism. Moreover, in comparison to other international organisations, such as the UN or the OSCE, mechanisms that utilise the added value of the input of NGOs or even commercial companies in planning and implementation is lacking in the CMCO as well.

**Institutional reforms and operational record: not quite comprehensive**

CSDP is governed by intergovernmental decision-making, within a largely supranational (or communitarian) European Union. The comprehensiveness of the EU’s security conception demands a high amount of EU-internal coordination, also with the relevant Commission departments, such as Development
Cooperation, Humanitarian Aid and Crisis Response. Overlapping competences lie in issues such as election monitoring, dual-use goods, defence industrial aspects, conflict prevention, civilian crisis management, small arms and light weapons and issues of external representation. (Duke, 2006). The overlap in the territory of civilian crisis management is a complex riddle to solve, because of the differing finance systems, budget-cycles and long-term versus rapid response timing of policies. Moreover, through ESDP the EU designs and executes missions, while the Commission’s most commonly used strategy is that of a donor awarding grants to third organisations to carry out the work. Bringing the resulting organisational cultural differences together is a clear challenge.

The artificial division between Council Secretariat and Commission on crisis management has been recognised and has led to reforms. In 2008, ahead of the institutional changes connected to the new Treaty, the Crisis Management Planning Department (CMPD) was created in the Council structures, merging the two directorates for civilian and military crisis management. The CMPD is the now unified institution for combined civil and civil-military strategic planning on crisis management. The strategic planning of military missions remains with the separate EUMS. On the operational level of civilian missions, there was still an Operational Headquarters facility missing from the EU’s structures. A Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC) (the ‘Headquarters’ title was taboo for the United Kingdom) for operational planning and conducting civilian EU-missions was therefore created.

With these institutional reforms the separation of civilian and military strategic and operational planning has been partly corrected. However, the comprehensive approach has only been taken half-way, leaving strategic planning on civilian and military missions in separate institutions. A next step is needed to bring the EUMS and CMPD into one planning institution. The most ‘comprehensive’ solution would be to merge civil and military planning and conduct into one permanent, Brussels-based Civil-Military Headquarters (European Parliament, 2010; Drent and Zandee, 2010; Bentégeat, 2009).

To what extent has a culture of coordination been conducive to the comprehensiveness of the EU’s crisis management missions? In assessments about the comprehensiveness of the EU crisis management efforts in DR Congo, the verdict is mixed. Of the two military operations (Artemis in 2003, EUFOR DR Congo 2006) the first one was clearly divorced from long term conflict resolution, while EUFOR was far more embedded in joint Council-Commission con-
cerns for the political future of DRC and of importance for the UN relationship (Knutsen, 2009). Moreover, EUFOR was coordinated with the civilian missions in the DRC, EUSEC and EUPOL. The largest civilian crisis management mission of the EU so far, EULEX Kosovo, is getting good reviews in terms of the internal consistency of the EU’s effort there (Derks and Price, 2010). These examples testify to improved procedures and working relations among the relevant EU bodies. However, some disclaimers are in order. In the DRC, EUSEC and EUPOL are living their separate lives, despite plans to merge the two into one comprehensive mission. Also, the verdict on the efficiency of EULEX is still regarded to be largely dependent on the ability of individuals to work well together. In the light of a culture of coordination this can be seen as the emergence of a ‘logic of appropriateness’ for staff to coordinate. However, it is too soon to declare this cooperation as a sign of an emerging culture of coordination, but it does support the possibility of this emergence in the longer run.

**Wanted: shared political objectives**

According to the EU’s own documents, the EU’s comprehensive crisis management approach is to be based on ‘shared political objectives’ (European Council, 2003a). This distinguishes crisis management policies from the EU’s humanitarian action. CSDP is ultimately a foreign policy tool of the European Union at the service of its greater interests and objectives, while disaster relief and humanitarian action are ‘politically neutral’ means to alleviate human suffering (Art. 214 TFEU). This is notwithstanding the more practical issue that military hardware and logistics can be of use for these humanitarian operations and a sort of functional cross-over from CSDP to the Commission dominated humanitarian action is possible. Europe’s political ambitions as a security actor, however, should determine the priorities of its crisis management policies. Nevertheless, the strict dividing line between humanitarian emergency and political objectives is difficult to draw, since the relief of human suffering can be part of a (larger) political objective as well.

A shared set of ideas on the strategic objectives of the EU’s external policies is indispensable for the desired ‘culture of coordination’ to emerge. Without these common strategic goals it will be nearly impossible for all actors involved in EU crisis management – at the level of the Commission, the Council, the EEAS, and the individual Member States – to coordinate their efforts...
effectively. Getting to a strategic vision is a difficult endeavour and, at the EU-level, has so far proven to be impossible, the European Security Strategy from 2003 notwithstanding (Biscop, 2009). Neither the ESS nor the 2008 Implementation Report provide sufficient prioritisation and translation into specific policies that guide action. In organisational culture theory, the forging of a common culture depends largely on leaders. ‘(...) dominant figures or ‘founders’ whose own beliefs, values and assumptions provide a visible and articulated model for how the group should be structured and function’ (Schein, 1990: 115). In the case of the EU, the President of the European Council’s analogy of a convoy of 27 ships was apt, but in the case of Civil-Military Coordination it is rather a convoy of at least 29 ships, since the Commission and the Council also have a role to play (Van Rompuy, 2010). The EU suffers from a ‘leadership and strategic deficit’.

CSDP is not an end in itself but is designed to serve the larger purpose of the EU’s foreign policy. The EU’s crisis management efforts should not be ad hoc, as they largely have been so far, but should be deployed as instruments to reach results according to pre-established priorities. In general, if the EU wants to approach security comprehensively, operations have to be embedded in a larger strategic outlook. Furthermore, an operation must be considered as a part of a complete set of actions by the EU itself and by the EU in relation to other actors in the field. The Lisbon Treaty provides an opportunity to remedy this deficient bottom-up approach and devise ‘comprehensive common strategies’, allowing the new High Representative, aided by the European External Action Service a much more directive role.

The Lisbon Treaty and an emerging culture of coordination

Improving coherence and effectiveness were the guiding phrases for reform in the Lisbon Treaty. The idea behind the Lisbon Treaty for the EU’s foreign, security and defence policy has the promise to be conducive to the emergence of a culture of coordination as well. The posts of the High Representative of CFSP and the Commissioner of External Relations have been merged into one. The new High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy will have an integrated European External Action Service (EEAS) to help her to carry out her job. The crisis management institutions such as the CMPD, the EUMS and CPCC have also been brought within the EEAS and
report directly to Ashton. She should at least be able to ensure the coordination of the different aspects of crisis management and unity of command (Nowak, 2006: 11). HR/VP Catherine Ashton is certainly trying to contribute to the sustenance of this culture, as she refers to the ‘comprehensive approach’ in many of her communication so far (Ashton, 2010, 2011). However, it remains to be seen whether this new hierarchy will be sufficient to overcome the different organisational cultures to be merged into one common organisational culture. Most of all, considering the resilience of organisational cultures, how long will this take (Hofstede, Neuijen, Ohavy and Sanders, 1990)

Although the consolidation of the CFSP/CSDP structures after Lisbon is still pending, the mere relabelling and shifting of directorates into a new organisational chart is not going to bring more coherence by itself. In fact, the EEAS seems to have added another layer of complexity to the communitarian and intergovernmental ones. The EU now also knows an ‘EEAS-method’, introducing a decision-making mode in which there is a cut between communitarian and intergovernmental competences within the same policy-making strand. The division of labour on development policies between the Commission and the Council is an illustration of this cut. The EEAS is involved in the programming of how and where the substantial development budget of the EU will be spent, but the implementation phase lies with the Commissioner as well as responsibility for all development policy (Mackie, 2010).

Nevertheless, from a coherence and coordination viewpoint it does make sense to bring all officials into one organisation. The different professional cultures of the Commission and Council employees need to be reconciled for the development of a culture of coordination. In this way, the culture of coordination has a much better chance to develop, since the emerging of cultures is related to regular and extensive interaction between those involved (Norheim-Martinsen, 2010: 13). To also achieve ‘bottom up’ changes, personnel working in the bureaucracy in Brussels and in the missions will need to be given specific attention to the extent in which ‘comprehensiveness’ is built into the way they are recruited, trained, are given incentives and promoted.

Another matter hampering comprehensiveness is the way crisis management is financed. The Lisbon Treaty does not fundamentally alter this. Civilian crisis management missions remain funded through the EU-budget and military operations are still for the large part financed by the Member States themselves, with common costs funded by the ATHENA-mechanism. Different budget holders across the Commission and Council, different requirements and
Disbursement mechanisms as well as a fragmentation of the funds that can be earmarked for crisis response hamper coherence between the instruments to tackle crises (Drent and Zandee, 2010). However, the Treaty does now cater for the setting-up of a start-up fund by the High Representative for preparatory activities for the so-called Petersberg tasks ‘not charged to the Union budget’ (Art. 41 (28) TEU). In principle, this provision clears the way for the Council to set-up a fund that can pay for crisis management operations for which the EU-budget does not provide. In terms of comprehensiveness the fund could be beneficial since it applies to both civilian and military crisis management purposes. Another, albeit modest, improvement for comprehensiveness is the availability of parts of the Instrument for Stability (IfS) to the EEAS. The IfS was an important crisis response tool for the Commission’s development policies. Now, its long-term part (mostly capacity-building) remains under the mandate of the Development Commissioner Andris Piebalgs and the crisis response facility or short-term part has transferred to the EEAS, where it resorts directly under Ashton.

Conclusion

Very quickly after the launch of ESDP, the civilian and military structures became ‘separate worlds’. Ever since, the EU and its Member States have been gradually trying to repair this, with as guidance the development of a ‘culture of coordination’ in its concept of Civil-Military Coordination (CMCO). The envisaged division of labour in Maastricht between the Commission and the Council had the unintended consequence that the effective delivery of foreign and security policy is hampered by the fragmentation of authority, budgets and capacities. Moreover, the first decade of ESDP/CSDP has learned that within the Council civilian and military crisis management activities and capabilities are still separated, despite the creation of the CMPD and despite that these institutions are within the EEAS.

The evolution of the comprehensive approach to security turns out to be one of slow adaptation and learning from mistakes from EU missions and overall foreign policy effectiveness. On paper, the new position of the HR/VP and the EEAS have been created in the spirit of coherence and coordination. It is too soon to tell whether the potential of these new institutions will be fully put to use. Still some steps need to be taken by the EU in the areas of comprehensive planning and conduct of operations, effective financing of CSDP and strategic
guidance and leadership. As the first few months of the EEAS also illustrate, many of these points for improvement will hinge on a culture change within the EU structures. The multi-dimensional (potential) conflicts close to Europe’s borders will not be patient while the EU engages in artificial institutional turf wars.

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