Characterizing the European Union’s Strategic Culture: An Analytical Framework

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Abstract

This article does not question whether the EU has a strategic culture, but rather asks how one can investigate its nature. It creates and utilizes an analytical framework to demonstrate that the European Union’s strategic culture is based on an extended concept of security and on a comprehensive, multilateral and internationally legitimated approach to threats, implying the use of military and civilian instruments in an integrated manner on over 20 common security and defence policy (CSDP) operations. It suggests that the analytical framework can also act as a stable reference point to compare and contrast the strategic cultures of a range of actors.

Introduction: What is Strategic Culture?

The use of force – where, when and how elite decision-makers (civilian and military) use it – is central to the understanding of national strategic cultures. The term ‘strategic culture’ was developed first in 1977 by Jack Snyder in an analysis of how American and Soviet competing strategic cultures influenced nuclear rivalry, strategic thinking and decision-making. Snyder (1977) argued that Soviet strategic culture provided the context for understanding the intellectual, institutional and strategic-cultural determinants that bind Soviet decision-making in a crisis and the behavioural propensities that would

1 Snyder (1977, pp. 8–9) directly transplants the notion of political culture into an international context (see also Gray, 1981, pp. 35–7).
motivate and constrain Soviet leaders. In a bipolar cold war with superpowers involved in nuclear strategic balancing, strategic threats were military (nuclear and conventional) and strategy was understood to mean the use of coercive military (conventional and nuclear) force to achieve political objectives. The concept of national strategic culture was shaped by the classical understanding that security dealt with defence of state sovereignty and territorial integrity through the use of military instruments.

Strategic culture is conventionally characterized as the set of beliefs, assumptions, attitudes, norms, world views and patterns of habitual behaviour held by strategic decision-makers regarding the political objectives of war, and the best way to achieve it (Klein, 1991; Duffield, 1999). The utility of this concept for policy analysts and decision-makers centres on whether a given strategic culture determines, or merely shapes, strategic decision-making (the so-called ‘Johnston–Gray debate’). One view is that strategic culture provides a distinct and critical explanation for the way different groups of people think and act when it comes to the use of force. Cultural, ideational and normative influences explain the motivations and causes of state behaviour and that of their leaders (Johnston, 1999; Heiselberg, 2003). The underlying central assumption embedded within the concept is ‘the belief that traditions, values, attitudes, patterns of behaviour, habits, symbols, achievements and historical experience shape strategic behaviour and actual policy making’ (Toje, 2005,p. 11).

An opposing view holds that it is important to study strategic culture as it provides a useful constitutive and discursive context for understanding decisions but does not dictate strategic behaviour: ‘other domestic and external variables’ – for example, political and physical geography, as well as the material (economic and military) balance of power and structure of the international system – also shape behaviour (Gray, 1999; Desch, 1998). Strategic culture is an aid to understanding motivations, self-image and behaviour patterns of decision-makers – it ‘helps shape’ but ‘does not determine how an actor interacts with others in the security field’ (Booth, 2005, p. 25). It supplements rather than supplants realist approaches to international relations, although, as Duffield (1999, p. 777) notes, the influence of strategic culture is condition-based: it is ‘particularly strong when the international setting is characterized by relatively high levels of complexity, uncertainty, and ambiguity’.

This narrow cold war focus of the meaning of strategic culture rather than its influence on decision-makers has shaped investigations over the nature of strategic cultures in a post-cold war context – not least the relevance of this concept for understanding the European Union (EU). Howorth (2007, p. 205) notes that: ‘The emergence of an EU strategic culture is one of the
greatest challenges facing ESDP’. Some analysts contend that the EU has not yet developed a sufficiently coherent or consistent approach to the use of force to be able to speak of an EU strategic culture (Lindley-French, 2002; Rynning, 2003; Tardy, 2007). It is argued that the EU has reached a pivotal point and faces a difficult choice ‘whether to remain a primarily civilian actor in international politics or to transform itself through greater foreign and security policy integration’ (Toje, 2005, p. 9; Heusgen, 2005).

But should the EU develop a strategic culture? While Naumann (2005) argues that the EU should develop military capabilities to match its ambition, Rynning (2005, p. 46), in contrast, strongly states that the EU as a pluralist construct, a ‘successful European peace project’, should ‘leave strategic affairs to those who have the capacity to think and act strategically – such as the US or coalitions of willing European states’. Heisbourg (2000) and Howorth (2001) concluded that after St Malo, differences amongst Member States towards the use of military force were already narrowing. There was a greater acceptance as to what constituted EU values and threats to those values. By 2005, Cornish and Edwards (2005, p. 802) noted that ‘the political and institutional confidence and processes to manage and deploy military force, coupled with external recognition of the EU as a legitimate actor in the military sphere’ had ‘developed markedly’. While the potential to gain a strategic culture was recognized, in the judgement of these leading analysts this culture had yet to emerge.

Our study rests on three interlinked arguments. First, that strategic culture is under-explored in terms of theory and methodology (Poore, 2003; Herd, 2009) and it needs to be embedded in a contemporary, rather than cold war, strategic context. Indeed, there are no metrics for judging when a strategic culture has been obtained, or a commonly accepted typology of strategic cultures for those states that are perceived to have them that might provide a useful reference point. The concept of ‘strategic culture’ is not rigorous; it lacks an analytical framework. Second, by deploying a more sophisticated and relevant understanding of the meaning of ‘strategic culture’, it is possible to demonstrate that the EU possesses one and to characterize its nature. Third, the method of investigation which flows from such an analysis provides a framework and practical metrics that may be useful for further research into this under-conceptualized area.

The concept of ‘strategic culture’ has been applied at the state level within a national security context (Katzenstein, 1996), but also at the institutional

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2 For the sake of consistency we adopt the 2009 Lisbon Treaty reformulation of European security and defence policy (ESDP) as common security and defence policy (CSDP), except where ESDP is cited in quotation.
level the term ‘organizational culture’ or even ‘institutional culture’ is often used (Powell and DiMaggio, 1991). We refer to ‘strategic culture’ in a narrower national strategic context rather than a broader national security context. This article does not focus on the origins of the EU’s strategic culture, but rather on identifying quantitative and qualitative metrics that establish whether a strategic culture has been operationalized and attest to its nature. We argue that the EU is institutionalizing its strategic guidelines and so shaping its own strategic framework.

The EU has elaborated strategic guidelines, the threats against which to act, and developed the capacity to act – including both the tools and the institutional machinery – as well as shared norms on the legitimacy of action that have culminated in 24 CSDP operations as of July 2011. In support of these three interlinked arguments, the first section of this article identifies and examines a series of past challenges and obstacles to the formation of an EU strategic culture. The second redefines the concept of strategic culture to fit the contemporary strategic context and then identifies the key formal and informal characteristics of this culture. The third section concludes the argument by highlighting the importance and potential versatility of the analytical framework developed in this article.

I. Obstacles to the Formation of an EU Strategic Culture

A range of reasons – mostly internal and integral to its design – are given as to why the EU has yet to develop a strategic culture and why it never will. These are captured in Table 1.3 First and foremost, the EU is not a nation-state and in political and cultural terms it does not behave like one – at best, it can be considered a hybrid entity. An EU postmodern complex multi-level governance clashes with the modern necessity of executive authority to undertake military coercion: CSDP is very much a creature of the Member States, a sovereignty-sensitive intergovernmental construct, rather than one under the control of the supranational EU Commission, Parliament and Courts. Until the EU develops as a supranational federal state, rather than an arena for intergovernmental bargaining, it cannot forge a strategic culture – the state being the sine qua non of strategic actor status. The EU’s paradox is that centralized authority would have capacity without legitimacy and national institutions have legitimacy without (sufficient) capacity. Bailes (1999) has argued that there are no distinct European models or set of European values in the organization of defence to allow for convergence and the development

3 For an exhaustive contemporary analysis of internal and external dynamics of European security, see Tardy (2009); Bulut et al. (2009).
of an EU strategic culture. This generates an obstacle to the EU’s potential to construct a strong strategic culture (Rynning, 2003). As a result, and as Freedman (2004) notes, if the EU-27 does generate a military doctrine for CSDP it would be dysfunctional as it ‘would stem from a determination to demonstrate political unity and not from the need for a doctrine that would provide effective guidance in an active conflict’.

There is a lack of consensus and agreement among Member States about the means and ends of security policy (Baun, 2005), about ‘where, how, when and for what reasons the EU should engage in foreign policy’ (Toje, 2005, p. 10). As a result of such divergence, there was an unsuccessful effort to issue a European White Paper, introduced under the heading ‘defence and security’, as one of the 2001 Belgian Presidency priorities in an attempt to promote a dynamic trend that would have eventually resulted in the redaction of a European White Paper on Security and Defence (Dumoulin et al., 2003). The European Security Strategy (ESS), A Secure Europe in a Better World (European Council, 2003), does not make explicit reference to the ‘use of force’ or ‘power’, but rather ‘military activities’, ‘robust intervention’ and a ‘price to be paid’ (Toje, 2005, p. 552).

This lack of consensus reflects the range of different national strategic cultures, divergent military doctrines and traditions within the EU. Howorth (2002), for example, argues that there are six types of divergences across EU Member State national security cultures: allied/neutral, Atlanticist/Europeanist, professional power projection/conscript-based territorial defence, nuclear/non-nuclear military/civilian instruments, large/small states and weapons providers/consumers. The net effect of such divergence and difference is strategic incoherence: ‘How else to explain Germany’s reluctance to send troops abroad, Poland’s difficulties with trusting European
partners, Britain’s attachment to the US, France’s insistence on a global autonomous role?” (Meyer, 2005, p. 51; Lantis, 2002). In Finland, for example, the focus on homeland defence based on national conscription and self-determination is shaped by its historical experience of great power domination. The United Kingdom and France, by contrast, have an imperial/colonial tradition and an activist attitude to the use of force although the former is considered Atlanticist in orientation and the latter continental and European. This divergence only increases as the EU enlarges its membership (Baun, 2005; Krotz, 2009).

An alternative conceptualization agrees with the notion that there exist multiple national strategic cultures in the EU, but notes that two dominant clusters or strands can be identified. The first strand is represented by smaller and non-aligned states with strategic cultures that favour the current status quo – consensus-driven, regionally orientated crisis management in which co-operation with partners is confined to this limited ambition. The second strand consists of large former colonial great powers – France and the United Kingdom – which have the capacity and are willing to undertake full-spectrum missions globally, including taking decisive military action when necessary (as has been the case during the Libyan crisis in 2011). Both want to have their preferred national strategic culture more or less replicated at the level of the EU and each is subject to incremental Europeanization of their foreign and security policies (Rieker, 2006a, b).

It is not just that national strategic cultures are so different, but that they are resistant to change that challenges the formation of an EU strategic culture. Historical experience, and how it is understood, is a particularly important element of such practice. As Meyer (2005, p. 51) explains: ‘Traumatic defeats, oppression, betrayal and exclusion, guilt as well as military triumphs plant themselves deep into collective memories as “lessons learnt” and “beliefs held”’. Hyde-Price (2004) argues that the strategic cultures of selected European states – Germany, France, the United Kingdom and Poland – reflect a security environment of the latter half of the last century rather than the strategic context of the 21st century. The weight and burden of history in the shape of World Wars I and II, the Holocaust, the cold war territorial defence focus and US/USSR subordinate ‘allies’ status (where autonomous strategic ambition was discouraged) constitute important and powerful impediments to developing new national European security strategies in the new century, as well as on the formation of an EU strategic culture.

In addition, and to complicate matters, some EU Member States’ national strategic cultures are themselves plagued by internal tensions, with no single dominant political and strategic culture evident. Germany, some argue for example, refused to support the Iraq intervention not because of a pacifist or
of an anti-American strategic alliance, but because of the co-existence of two competing schools of thought within Germany’s strategic culture (Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2005; Drent, 2008). In Sweden it is argued that a mental gap exists between military elites that view military operations (rapid, high tech, deployable, employable) as the primary mission of the future and a public opinion and a large segment of the officer corps that focuses on the notion of a people’s army and concerns itself with territorial defence as the primary strategic mission (Åselius, 2005). A last example is Denmark. Here two forms of strategic culture co-exist: cosmopolitanism (neutrality, conflict resolution through non-military means, support of international institutions) and defensism (military preparedness, Nato alliance). The compromise result is a strategic culture that stresses both deterrence policy and ‘new activism’ (Rasmussen, 2005).

II. Strategic Culture and the EU: The Need for Conceptual Clarity

In the context of the debate over whether or not the EU has a strategic culture, the need for conceptual clarity is all too evident. The EU is barred from strategic culture status because it is not a state. If it is granted the possibility of strategic culture, this status is rejected on the grounds it has not sufficiently demonstrated a willingness to privilege, stress adequately or actually use military force to gain its political objectives. There is no consensus over the appropriate quantitative or qualitative metrics that can be applied to determine whether or not a strategic culture has emerged. In fact, there has been no effort evident in the literature to debate or even discuss what these metrics might be. Both these sets of arguments underscore the need to update strategic culture to the post-cold war realities and a new strategic context. Our definition of ‘strategic culture’ captures both the ‘stateness’ issue and the question of by what tools security goals are reached.

To tackle the first issue – the EU is not a state therefore cannot have a strategic culture. Although it is true that the EU is not a state, its ‘competences are increasing, its power structure is deepening, its membership is widening and its mandate expanding’ and it possesses ‘something of the character of the administrative-bureaucratic mode of state formation’ (Hadfield, 2005, p. 65). Adrian Hyde-Price (2008, p. 29), for example, reiterates that there is ‘a broad consensus […] among member states that the EU plays a distinctive role in international politics’, in an article criticizing the content of this role but not the EU’s actorness in foreign and security policy itself. However, the question is not the formal de jure status of the EU – whether or not it has sufficient attributes of statehood to be considered capable of possessing a strategic
culture. If strategic culture concerns itself with the attitudes of elites, militaries and publics towards the management of sources of strategic insecurity (that is, their ability to think and act strategically), then the extent to which these EU actors possess such attitudes, values and express such behaviour should be our focus.

The second objection – the EU does not make sufficient reference to the use of force for an EU strategic culture to have yet ‘emerged’. Such an understanding of strategic culture ignores a contemporary strategic context. The post-9/11 strategic agenda focused on transnational sources of insecurity such as terrorism, fragile states and regional crisis and proliferation of WMD (weapons of mass destruction). At the end of the first decade of the 21st century, and in the wake of the global financial crisis, a new and pressing nexus between the global economic system, the environment and climate change and energy resources has received widespread attention. An acknowledgement that strategy, as an element of strategic culture, now involves the use of all tools (civilian and military, soft and hard power combinations) as appropriate to the nature of the threat to be addressed and that strategic decision-makers are concerned with conventional military threats, as well as the defence against non-conventional and multidimensional threats that can be transnational and global, structural and systemic in nature and location, allows us to circumvent the narrow understanding of strategic culture. Strategic culture comprises the identity-derived norms, ideas and behaviour about what is appropriate and legitimate concerning the use of military and civilian instruments for security goals.4

To understand the nature of EU strategic culture and its drivers we should therefore ask when, where, how and why the EU uses a range of appropriate instruments – diplomatic, economic (development aid/assistance, trade sanctions), political, normative/legal, as well as military force – to achieve strategic political objectives (managing a range of contemporary strategic threats). Here, military strategy and the role of the use of force should be understood from within the context of the EU’s overall set of strategic preferences. The answer to these questions will help characterize the nature of an EU strategic culture rather than settle the issue as to whether it has one or not.

III. EU Strategic Culture: Key Characteristics and Drivers

The EU’s strategic culture is based on an enlarged vision of security and on a comprehensive, multilateral and internationally legitimated approach to

4 This characterization is inspired by the definition used by Meyer (2006, p. 20).
threats. It is operationalized through the use of military and civilian instruments, in an integrated manner. The strategic culture is high context – it acknowledges complexity, interconnections and trade-offs. How can we account for the EU’s acquisition of such a strategic culture? As the dynamics of the EU security and defence dimension cannot be exhaustively captured by a single international relations theory (Schwok and Mérand, 2009), we can locate the answer in realist-constructivist and liberal-constructivist approaches to international relations, and centre our analysis on three interlinked dynamics.

First, the EU’s recognition of new threats and the subsequent adaptation of its institutional capacity and capability to address the threats and then the political will to launch CSDP operations to manage them is a key driver of the development of an EU strategic culture. Second, the operations themselves and the learning process they engender (lessons identified and learned) is another powerful driver. A third driver is the shared norms with regards to using appropriate instruments, military force included, to tackle security challenges, and the processes by which these norms are institutionalized.

The ESS (European Council, 2003) is a document central to understanding the EU’s identification of threats and how they should be addressed. It represents the codification of an already existing way of thinking and practice. Although the EU has conducted more civilian operations than military ones, the growing militarization of the EU’s strategic culture is under way as the Union responds to a wider array of strategic threats and it develops, at the same time, military instruments to tackle these threats. Trends of this progressive EU militarization can be found in the institutionalization of permanent structured co-operation introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon. Nevertheless, core initiatives in the field of defence also occurred before 2009, indicating the willingness to proceed in this way. An example was the April 2003 Tervuren meeting among France, Belgium, Luxembourg and Germany, where decisions of military initiatives like the creation of a common headquarters in Tervuren, near Brussels, were discussed. A general consensus within the EU exists as to threat identification and management, strategic objectives and foreign policy principles – and this is reflected in its ESS and its emphasis on the rise of non-state transnational sources of instability – fragile states and regional crises, environmental change, organized crime, WMD proliferation and terrorism (Baun, 2005).

We can assess developments of EU strategic culture against the three strategic aims and goals it has set itself in the ESS: defence against threats (‘in failed states military instruments may be needed to restore order’); strengthen Europe security in the neighbourhood; and promotion of world order on the
basis of effective multilateralism. The ESS states: ‘[W]e need to develop a strategic culture that fosters early, rapid, and when necessary, robust intervention’ (European Council, 2003).

A distinguishing feature of the ESS is its comprehensive understanding of security, a comprehensive approach to tackling threats and seeking multilateralist solutions wherever possible in what it has dubbed ‘effective multilateralism’. Effective multilateralism has internal and external dimensions. It is an expression of what the EU itself is and thereby creates standards and benchmarks for the normative model the EU wants to embody. It also represents the philosophy underlying the EU’s external actions, with support for the United Nations system a high priority. The EU’s comprehensive approach is also directly related to what the EU is and what it comprises: almost all policy areas of governance. Given that the EU’s approach accepts that the military instrument is one of a range of options available for crisis management, comprehensiveness is almost logical. The EU strives not only to coordinate civil and military resources, but to create an integral civil–military strategy (Drent and Zandee, 2010).

The ESS has been examined and debated under the French Presidency of the EU during the second half of 2008 leading to the publication of an implementation report (Commission, 2008). The French Presidency managed to clarify the types of military and civilian capabilities the EU needed to acquire, and explained in greater detail the operational tasks to which these capabilities would be deployed. In short, the EU should be able to deploy two major stabilization and reconstruction operations – of up to 10,000 troops each – two rapid response operations involving EU Battle Groups, an evacuation operation for European citizens, an air or sea monitoring operation and a military–civil operation of humanitarian assistance. It is clear that the EU now gives higher priority to further developing its ‘hard’ security capability and places a greater emphasis on coercive instruments to complement existing soft-power tools, as well as using them in a better integrated manner. Indeed, during the French Presidency the issue of common civil–military planning capabilities was addressed. EU Member States encouraged the Secretary General to establish a new civil–military planning structure for CSDP missions and operations, thus fostering the civil–military nature of the European strategic culture (Biava, 2009). To that end, a Crisis Management and Planning Directorate (CMPD) was created.

5 For an analysis of the most relevant CSDP issues addressed during the French Presidency, see Ramel (2009).
Habitual behaviour is learned behaviour (Snyder, 1977). CSDP can now reflect on eight years of operational experience. Seven of the 24 operations are military and of these four have been successfully completed while three are still ongoing (as of July 2011). So far, CSDP operations are in line with expectations generated by the EU’s perception of its strategic role. The operations are predominantly gendarmerie style, appeal to the ‘hearts and minds’ of the local population, generally ad hoc initiatives, more reactive than preventative, but always within the more general framework of a larger development strategy in which they are embedded and make use of force sporadically and only as a last resort. In terms of the speed of reaction, the most robust operation, Artemis, was under French command and was predominantly composed of French soldiers. Although the signature of French military-operational culture on the conduct of the operation was evident, this ‘French-style’ operation was nevertheless influenced by a Europeanized planning process, the immediate engagement of Swedish Special Forces, as well as the assistance of many other European units (including some contributions from non-EU partners). As of July 2011 a total of 16,672 troops (not taking into account rotations) have participated in CSDP interventions (see Table 2).

The common development, understanding and convergence of CSDP norms around an increasingly more robust strategic culture that links the use of force within a more comprehensive toolbox of policy instruments with both civilian and military aspects of CSDP is the last key driver. How are these norms shared and accepted within the EU? As noted above, EU strategic documents help to identify key shared norms and the socialization and learning-by-doing processes contribute to spreading and institutionalizing these norms. Operational practice and institutional evolution is reflected in a greater propensity to use force and is driven by a socialization of militaries and cost-cutting at national levels. There is an increasing propensity of EU Member States such as the United Kingdom, Germany and Finland to frame their security strategies and military reform efforts around the framework of the ESS. Given the severity of the financial crisis, it is highly likely that EU Member States will increasingly legitimize military expenditure reductions and force downsizing through the pooling of resources in the name of Europeanization.

Institutionalized socialization within foreign and security policy-making elites and military professionals also occurs at the EU level. Most EU policymakers would argue that the EU is developing a strategic culture over time as

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Intervention Type</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Mandate duration</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Number of EU personnel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ongoing</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. EUFOR-Althea</td>
<td>Military</td>
<td>2 December 2004</td>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>2,500 (2008)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. EUPM</td>
<td>Law enforcement</td>
<td>1 March 2003</td>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. EULEX Kosovo</td>
<td>Rule of law</td>
<td>16 February 2008</td>
<td>Kosovo</td>
<td>1,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. EUROP COPS</td>
<td>Law enforcement</td>
<td>1 January 2006</td>
<td>Palestinian Territory</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. EU BAM Rafah</td>
<td>Border control</td>
<td>30 November 2005</td>
<td>Palestinian Territory</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Eustatex</td>
<td>Rule of law</td>
<td>1 July 2005</td>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. EUROP Afghanistan</td>
<td>Law enforcement</td>
<td>15 June 2007</td>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>230</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. EUROP RD Congo</td>
<td>Law enforcement</td>
<td>30 June 2007</td>
<td>DR Congo</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. EU BAM</td>
<td>Border control</td>
<td>2 June 2005</td>
<td>Moldova/Ukraine</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. EUSEC</td>
<td>Security Sector Reform</td>
<td>8 June 2005</td>
<td>DR Congo</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. EUROMM</td>
<td>Monitoring mission</td>
<td>1 October 2008</td>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. ATALANTA</td>
<td>Military–Counter piracy</td>
<td>13 December 2008</td>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>1,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. EUTM Somalia</td>
<td>Military–Training of security forces</td>
<td>7 April 2010</td>
<td>Somalia/Uganda</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Completed</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1. Artemis</td>
<td>Military</td>
<td>12 June–1 September 2003</td>
<td>DR Congo</td>
<td>1,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. EU support to AMIS</td>
<td>Civil–military</td>
<td>2 June 2005–31 December 2007</td>
<td>Darfur</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. EUFOR DR Congo</td>
<td>Military</td>
<td>1 June–30 November 2006</td>
<td>DR Congo/Gabon</td>
<td>800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. EU SSR Guinea-Bissau</td>
<td>Security Sector Reform</td>
<td>1 June 2008–30 September 2010</td>
<td>Guinea-Bissau</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Based on Grevi et al. (2009, annexes 1 and 2, pp. 414–15) adapted and updated to July 2011.
individuals become aware of EU priorities and familiarize themselves with CSDP objectives. This awareness is inculcated and institutionalized through the socializing effects of participation in CSDP interventions (civilian and military) and training exercises and service on EU structures and committees. Christoph O. Meyer (2006), for example, concluded that CSDP’s central institution, the Political and Security Committee (PSC), has had an important role in the convergence of Member States’ strategic cultures. The PSC builds confidence, establishes consent and brokers compromises even in areas where this would not be expected and acts as a multiplier of social influence that is able to forge norm convergence through informational influence as well as peer pressure (Meyer, 2006; Matlary, 2006). As Biava (2011a, b) has empirically evidenced, socialization processes within the PSC generate shared norms, common expectations and common visions, which are essential to the emergence of a European strategic culture. To take one last example, between 2000 and 2003 the EU Military Staff developed a set of ‘concept papers’ covering all the main doctrinal topics where Member States’ agreement was needed prior to the mounting of military CSDP operations. These papers, mainly classified EU RESTRICTED, were all staffed through the EU system, achieving unanimous Member State agreement and ending up as official Council documents. The 15 agreed papers ranged from the first one on ‘Military Strategic Planning’ to the final and most difficult one on ‘Use of Force’, including a generic ‘Rules of Engagement’.7

Such behaviour is also habituated through the provision of increased professional development and training opportunities open to diplomatic and military personnel at the EU level. Indeed, a clearly stated goal of the European Security and Defence College (ESDC) is to spread EU strategic culture. The ESDC and European Police College (CEPOL), which organizes 80–100 courses, seminars and conferences per year, are just two of several training organizations under the EU umbrella. Both serve to incrementally and voluntarily transplant EU civilian and military security norms to the national Member State level. In addition, the European Defence Agency (EDA, 2006) aims to overcome policy culture differences that have caused previous collaborative armaments projects to fail and as such ‘could play a crucial role in institutionalizing peer group pressure among the national military establishments’ (Grant, 2004, p. 61). The work-plan of the EU’s Institute of Strategic Studies in Paris, created to help foster an EU strategic culture, now complements that of the PSC and has already produced think-pieces outlining an EU ‘White Paper’.

7 The authors gratefully acknowledge Major General Graham Messervy-Whiting, Chief of Staff of the EU Military Staff (2000–03), for providing this argument.

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The pressure of external threats, the EU’s cumulative operational response and the internal generation of EU norms towards the use of military and civilian instruments for security goals generate a growing narrative and security discourse that frames the EU as a strategic actor. The adaptation of capabilities and capacities to address and manage the new threats and the development of shared norms within the CSDP are interconnected dynamics which shape and drive forward the EU’s strategic culture. This is facilitated by a growing ‘discourse coalition’ of ‘euro-strategists’ operating at the EU level and in think tanks and academic departments of the Member States themselves pushing for a ‘global power’ grand strategy (Rogers, 2009, p. 845; Krotz, 2009, p. 560). In addition to extensive exercise experience in Nato, the EU Member States have a good record of participating in UN peacekeeping operations, also side by side. Many Member States have also co-operated in multinational force structures, with Eurocorps being an example of this.8 Thus, CSDP can also rely on some acquis concerning practices, procedures, conduct, modes of operational experiences and connections gained on a bi/tri/multilateral basis.

Conclusions

The conception of the EU as a Kantian postmodern normative power (as captured in Table 1) is an outdated stereotype. Even if it is to be argued that the narrow cold war conception of strategic culture as the use of military force to address strategic threats holds true today, then the fact that some CSDP missions have used military force to achieve political objectives must demonstrate that the EU has a strategic culture. The question therefore is what type of strategic culture, given the magnitude, frequency and purpose of these military missions.

Table 3 provides us with an analytical framework through which we can capture the nature and evolution of an EU strategic culture. It notes when strategic guidelines and frameworks were elaborated, which ipso facto are evidence that the EU has an evolving strategic approach. This process is taking place within Title V of the Treaty on the European Union, in the framework of the ESS of 2003 and the Report on its Implementation of 2008, but also through a number of key documents within the CSDP that are progressively shaping the EU’s strategic behaviour. That these guidelines identify what it is that constitutes strategic threats makes it clear that the EU

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8 Other examples include: Eurofor, Euromarfor, the European Gendarmerie Force, the Spanish–Italian amphibious force, the European Air Group, the European Air Co-ordination cell in Eindhoven, the Athens Multinational Sealift Co-ordination Centre and the Dutch–British amphibious force.
Table 3: An Indicative Analytical Framework

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Strategic guidelines – ‘framework for action’</th>
<th>Strategic threats – ‘against which to act’</th>
<th>Military and civilian tool-building – ‘capability to act’</th>
<th>Institutional machinery – ‘capacity to act/to decide to act’</th>
<th>Norms – ‘legitimacy for acting’</th>
<th>Key military &amp; civilian operations – ‘acting’</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>Amsterdam Treaty (enters into force 1999)</td>
<td>Petersberg tasks = humanitarian, search &amp; rescue, peacekeeping, crisis management, peacemaking</td>
<td>Crisis management toolbox = diplomatic, military, economic = comprehensive approach</td>
<td>High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy and EU Special Representatives established</td>
<td>Humanitarian intervention; multilateralism; UN and IL support; consensus; restraint</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>St Malo summit</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>PSC/COPS to manage CSDP missions. Five national operational HQs = Mont Valérien, Northwood, Potsdam, Larissa, Centocelle</td>
<td>Democracy-building</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999 (EU at 15)</td>
<td>Helsinki Headline Goal</td>
<td>Civilian/military RRF crisis management = force projection capabilities</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>CEEC to manage CSDP missions. Five national operational HQs = Mont Valérien, Northwood, Potsdam, Larissa, Centocelle</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>Nice Treaty; European Council summit (Lisbon) – European Capabilities Action Plan (ECAP). Belgian EU Presidency attempt to launch a dynamic trend for the redaction of a European White Paper on Security and Defence</td>
<td>Gendarmerie Force (EGF); legal officials; civil administration experts; disaster relief intervention teams. EUISS – EU agency gives analysis to Council of EU and High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy</td>
<td></td>
<td>EU MC and EUMS (supervising operations) advise Council of Ministers. CEB – Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management; Berlin-plus</td>
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</tbody>
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Table 3: (Continued)

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<tr>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Treaty establishes a Constitution (Mutual Defence Clause, Solidarity Clause, Permanent Structured Co-operation), European Security Strategy</td>
<td>Terrorism, state failure, regional crises, organized crime, WMD proliferation, environment</td>
<td>Initiatives for further military integration and a common EU military HQ to be located in Tervuren, close to Brussels, discussed at a ‘Tervuren Group’ (France, Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg) April meeting</td>
<td>Improve capabilities; co-ordinate civilian and military power; expand co-operation with non-EU partners</td>
<td>International order based on ‘effective multilateralism’ within the UN system, Nation-building; counter-insurgency; preventative engagement</td>
<td>First CSDP mission EUROM; FYROM EUFOR Concordia; DRC ‘Operation Artemis’ Operational HQ Mont Valérian</td>
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<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>EDA Long Term Vision for European Defence Capability and Capacity Needs</td>
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</tbody>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Updating Petersberg tasks</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Discussions on permanent structured co-operation</td>
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<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td></td>
<td>EU BG’s fully operational. EU Operations Centre (EUOHQ); Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC) – Joint Situation Centre (STFCEN)</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>EU mutual solidarity article</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>EUFOR Althea reconfigured – 12-month UNSC mandate (until November 2008)</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>CPCC, Civilian HQ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Lisbon Treaty enters into force 1 December</td>
<td>High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. External Action Service. Permanent structured co-operation</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Creation of the Crisis Management and Planning Directorate (CMPD), locating planning of civilian and civilian–military operations in one body</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Internal European Security Strategy</td>
<td>Creation of the External Action Service (EAS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5–10 years plus?</td>
<td>EU Defence White Paper? EU Military Doctrine? EU at 31 (Croatia, Greenland and Iceland)? EU at 34 (Serbia, Albania, Macedonia)?</td>
<td>Food, health &amp; migration security?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Unified European army? EU embassies? Better co-ordination of the security–development nexus?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Union Minister for Foreign Affairs? For Defence? Enhanced strategic partnerships with BRICS/N-11 states? European civil–military headquarters?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Preserving the global commons? Ecological responsibility; R2P; individual privacy?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>From 24 to 40 CSDP operations? Longer, larger, greater geostrategic range, more military, better integrated?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Adapted and updated to July 2011 from Herd (2009, table 1, pp. 56–7).
considers a range of military and non-military sources of strategic insecurity. The construction of both military and non-military tools demonstrates the political will to have the capability to act, as does the strengthening of institutional machinery which is evidence of an increased capacity to act in countering or managing strategic sources of insecurity. The slow expansion of the normative framework within which operations can occur demonstrates an increased legitimacy for military and civilian operations designed to achieve political objectives. Finally, as noted above, the actual application of civilian instruments and military force to address the strategic sources of insecurity demonstrates a political will to use the capabilities created in support of the stated strategic objectives.

The analytical framework captures formal drivers of the EU’s strategic culture – the institutions, operations and strategic-level guidelines that set out the purpose, means and goals of security policy as expressions of the content of strategic culture – as well as the informal normative underpinnings of such a culture. The content of this framework is the resultant and material expressions of a strategic culture, the metrics by which the nature of a strategic culture can best be established. In addition, the range of these analytical categories fully captures the nature of the EU’s evolving strategic culture and traces its development over time, evidencing not a decoupling between saying/rhetoric and doing/action, but a characteristic gradualist implementation process.

That culture is based on an enlarged vision of security and on a comprehensive, multilateral and internationally legitimated approach to threats, implying the use of all sorts of instruments (military and civilian) in an integrated manner. It would also be interesting, albeit highly speculative, to use this analytical framework to project forward and identify possible pathways that would track the future evolution of an EU strategic culture. For example, in the immediate term how might a CSDP humanitarian assistance operation in support of an Egyptian-led post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction force in Libya shape the EU’s strategic culture? Over the medium term, might we witness the development of a Defence White Paper and military doctrine, a unified European army and diplomatic service, with EU embassies (for which the EAS can be considered a precursor), an EU Minister for External Affairs, as well as for Defence and a geostrategic reach that is global in support of preserving a western normative framework that governs access to and use of the global commons? This analytical framework can also act as a stable reference point to compare and contrast the strategic cultures of a range of actors, so locating the EU’s strategic culture within a global spectrum.
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References


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CHARACTERIZING THE EU’S STRATEGIC CULTURE


