**Introduction**

The world is at a crossroads, with many old certainties crumbling away. It is therefore important to look ahead in order to anticipate potential changes. The aim of this scenarios paper is to assess how peace operations\(^1\) may develop in the future and what this could mean for armed forces. It concludes with recommendations to assist the EU member states’ governments in establishing policy options for their armed forces and security policy with regard to missions.

Since it is impossible to predict the future, this paper embraces uncertainty and applies a scenarios methodology. It aims to foresee rather than to forecast, and to provide a 360° perspective on potential alternative futures. The future is unlikely to be represented by one of the scenarios described in this paper. However, together the different scenarios in this paper cover traits that will actually happen and, by thinking them through, we can be better prepared. In addition, these scenarios aim to stimulate discussion with regard to the future of peace operations and, last but not least, allow for policy planning.

The paper builds on scenarios developed for the Future Policy Survey of the Netherlands armed forces\(^2\) and the Clingendael Strategic Monitor 2012,\(^3\) which monitors these scenarios and describes potential future developments in the field of international security and stability. This paper expands on the implications for peace operations.

The analysis below is based on discussions and insights from the academic and policy field. It builds on knowledge from current debates in literature on the future of peace operations, and complements this with insights generated in scenario workshops organised at Clingendael as part of this project.

This scenarios paper provides:

1) A brief description of the probabilities and uncertainties with regard to potential developments and trends for the future of peace operations as aired in the academic/policy debate

2) An outline of the Future Policy Survey scenario grid, with four quadrants describing the possible directions in which the international system may move. Developments with

---

1 Peace operations in this scenarios paper are broadly defined and include the whole array of crisis management operations ranging from the low to high end of the spectrum of violence, and implemented by a variety of organisations such as NATO, the UN, the EU and other regional organisations, as well as coalitions of the willing and unilateral operations. They include traditional peacekeeping operations, stabilisation operations, humanitarian operations, robust nation-building operations, and ultimately peace enforcement (humanitarian) military intervention. The condition that a peace operation has to be mandated by the Security Council has not been used, because in some scenarios the Security Council may be obsolete. In order to avoid misunderstanding, this paper is as specific as possible when describing operations.


regard to peace operations are assessed for each quadrant, on the basis of which an analysis of alternative futures for peace operations is built.

3) A description of the more likely developments with regard to peace operations and an exploration of their implications for EU member states based on developments in the scenario grid during 2011/12 that were analysed in the 2012 Clingendael Strategic Monitor

4) Conclusions on the probabilities and uncertainties from academic/policy literature and recommendations for EU member states’ security policy and the armed forces on future peace operations.

The future of peace operations – the literature

Literature on the future of peace operations points to the following probabilities, which are dealt with below:

- the importance of civilian actors in peace operations is likely to increase
- the role of private military companies (PMCs) and private security companies (PSCs) is likely to increase
- the regionalisation of peace operations, where regional organisations increasingly carry out missions, is likely to continue
- the involvement of Western countries is likely to decrease while the involvement of the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) countries is likely to increase further.

The literature also raises an uncertainty: How will the responsibility to protect (R2P) and protection of civilians (PoC) develop further?

The importance of civilians is likely to increase: As peace missions grow more complex, the need for specific knowledge and skills becomes more important. The role of civilian experts is therefore likely to increase in the near future, both relatively and objectively. Civilian expertise is also needed to assist peace operations in those areas where the military lacks capacities or abilities. Already the United Nations (UN) has signalled a gap between the expertise needed and the number of experts available. Unless more civilian expertise is made available, this gap is likely to grow.

The role of private military and security companies is likely to increase: As military budgets are cut under pressure from the economic crisis, peace operations are likely to become more

---

dependent on PMCs and PSCs for the delivery of particular capabilities. This is especially true in the transport, logistical and recruitment sectors, which supply peacekeepers with food, water, ammunition and personnel. Other tasks can also be fulfilled by PMCs and PSCs, such as securing sites and transport convoys in insecure areas, or even performing frontline duties. Some of these probable developments are already a growing practice in current peace operations.

The regionalisation of peace operations is likely to continue: The UN started requesting regional organisations to take the lead in implementing UN resolutions in the 1990s. This can be done by either sending a rapid deployable bridging operation for crisis management until a UN force is deployed, by providing over-the-horizon forces, or by mandating a regional organisation to take responsibility for an operation as a whole, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)’s KFOR operation in Kosovo. Organisations such as the European Union (EU) have also deployed observer or assistance missions without a Security Council mandate, but at the invitation of the host country. Lastly, regional organisations have carried out (humanitarian) military interventions without a Security Council mandate. These are sometimes seen as peace enforcement, such as NATO’s air campaign with regard to Kosovo. Many authors expect this trend to increase further as the world becomes increasingly multipolar and the UN is once again on the brink of overstretch. This trend is emphasised by the fact that several regional organisations, such as the African Union (AU), NATO and EU are developing both military and civilian capacities related to peace operations.

The involvement of Western countries is likely to decrease while the involvement of the BRICS countries is likely to increase further: Rising powers, such as most of the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa), are increasingly taking a larger interest in peace operations. A clear example of this is the rise of China and Brazil as troop contributors to UN peacekeeping missions. Of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council (P5), China has become the second largest troop contributor to UN peacekeeping missions, second to France. Other P5 members are not in the top 40 troop-contributing countries to the UN. In addition, Brazil plays a large role in defining and determining the UN’s priorities. Simultaneously, Western countries, such as many EU members and the United States (US) – which since the mid-1990s have deployed many forces in non-UN operations – show signs of peace operation fatigue and are struggling with budget cuts due to economic crisis. These developments indicate that the role of the rising powers as important contributors to operations is likely to increase. This may have a great impact on where and how missions are deployed in the future.

7 United Nations Association in Canada, Peacekeeping to Peacebuilding, p.160.
The main uncertainty as perceived in literature is:

How will the responsibility to protect (R2P) and protection of civilians (PoC) develop further? With the military intervention in Libya, R2P appears to have become a legitimate justification for intervention. Security Council resolutions 1970 and 1973 both make reference to R2P. However, it also appears that both China and Russia held a much narrower interpretation of these resolutions than how they were implemented in practice. Moreover, when looking at other civilian populations in need of protection, e.g. in Syria, enthusiasm for a Libya-style military intervention is considerably lower. The way forward is not yet clear. Libya may have confirmed that R2P as a reason for military intervention has become more generally accepted, but it may also prove to have been a one-off occurrence or become an ad hoc legitimisation of military intervention when this is opportune.

In the meantime, Brazil has introduced the concept of ‘responsibility while protecting’, providing guidelines with regard to R2P. At the same time, the UN is struggling to implement PoC in peacekeeping operations in places such as eastern Democratic Republic of Congo.

Peace operations in four scenarios

The question about how the future of peace operations will develop ties in closely with the question of how the world will develop in the next two decades. This in turn depends on the degree of cooperation within the world system (‘Will the world system develop in the direction of increased cooperation and integration or of declining cooperation and fragmentation?’) and on the type of actors playing a role in security in the world system (‘Is our security determined mainly by states or by non-state actors?’). In the Future Policy Survey for the Netherlands armed forces, a scenario grid was created consisting of two axes based on these two key uncertainties. Four scenarios were developed: Multilateral, Multipolar, Fragmentation and Network. Two scenarios are state-centric: Multilateral and Multipolar. In the first there is effective cooperation between states, while in the second there is mainly rivalry and non-cooperation between states and poles (super powers and power blocs) in the international system. The two non-state-centric scenarios – Fragmentation and Network – are based on the rise of non-state actors. States are present in the world system, but non-state actors have gained more influence. While Fragmentation is mostly ‘every man for himself’, in Network there is cooperation on a global scale between various types of actors that are closely connected and mutually interdependent. These scenarios are summarised in Figure 1 below.

In order to assess how peace operations may develop in the future and what their call may be on armed forces, the following seven questions are asked for each of the quadrants:

1. What? What kind of peace operations prevail?
2. Who? Who carries out peace operations?
3. Where? Where are peace operations likely to be deployed?
4. How long? What is likely to be the duration of missions?
5. How? Which type of instrument is leading?
6. Why? For which reasons are peace operations deployed?
7. How many? How frequently are peace operations deployed?

Figure 2 gives a concise overview of answers to these questions and the future of peace operations in each quadrant. The description of operations in each quadrant is further elaborated on in the following paragraphs.
### Figure 2: The future of peace operations in the scenario grid

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Multipolar</th>
<th>Multilateral</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Two sorts of operations prevail in this quadrant:</td>
<td>Two sorts of operations prevail in this quadrant:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. a) Traditional peacekeeping b) (Military intervention followed by) Stabilisation operation</td>
<td>1. a) (Military intervention followed by) Humanitarian operation b) (Military intervention followed by) Nation-building operation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. a) UN (potentially OSCE) b) Regional organisations</td>
<td>2. UN and other organisations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. a) At the fringes of or between the poles b) Inside poles and in their ‘backyards’</td>
<td>3. Fragile states</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Long term</td>
<td>4. Long term</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Military lead</td>
<td>5. a) Civilian humanitarian lead</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Pole or alliance security</td>
<td>b) Civilian development lead</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Medium frequent</td>
<td>6. Human security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Examples:</td>
<td>7. Frequent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a) UN in UNTSO, UNDOF and UNMOGIP b) NATO in Libya and Balkans, ECOWAS/CIS and other regional organisations’ missions</td>
<td>a) UN in UNOSOM, MINURCAT and UNAMID b) UN in UNTAC and ONUMOZ, and UN and regional organisations in Kosovo and Timor-Leste</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fragmentation</th>
<th>Network</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>One sort of operation prevails in this quadrant:</td>
<td>One sort of operation prevails in this quadrant:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Military interventions</td>
<td>1. a) (Military intervention followed by) Stabilisation operations b) (Military intervention followed by) Humanitarian operations c) Police missions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Unilateral and ad hoc coalitions</td>
<td>2. Hybrid operations of UN, regional organisations and states, in cooperation with corporations, PMCs, PSCs and NGOs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Close to the interveners</td>
<td>3. Unconnected and resource-rich areas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Short term</td>
<td>4. Long-term networked (different organisations)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Military lead</td>
<td>5. Networked lead</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. National or state security interests</td>
<td>6. a) Human security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Infrequent</td>
<td>b) Economic security interests</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Examples:</td>
<td>7. Frequent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia/Kenia in Somalia</td>
<td>Examples:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>a) NGO operations, such as Nonviolent Peaceforce in Sri Lanka and Georgia b) Anti-piracy off the coast of Somalia c) A potential police mission in Ciudad Juárez, Mexico</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Multipolar

- Two sorts of operations prevail in this quadrant:
  1. a) Traditional peacekeeping
     b) (Military intervention followed by) Stabilisation operation
  2. a) UN (potentially OSCE)
     b) Regional organisations
  3. a) At the fringes of or between the poles
     b) Inside poles and in their ‘backyards’
  4. Long term
  5. Military lead
  6. Pole or alliance security
  7. Medium frequent

Examples:
- a) UN in UNTSO, UNDOF and UNMOGIP
- b) NATO in Libya and Balkans, ECOWAS/CIS and other regional organisations’ missions

### Multilateral

- Two sorts of operations prevail in this quadrant:
  1. a) (Military intervention followed by) Humanitarian operation
     b) (Military intervention followed by) Nation-building operation
  2. UN and other organisations
  3. Fragile states
  4. Long term
  5. a) Civilian humanitarian lead
     b) Civilian development lead
  6. Human security
  7. Frequent

Examples:
- a) UN in UNOSOM, MINURCAT and UNAMID
- b) UN in UNTAC and ONUMOZ, and UN and regional organisations in Kosovo and Timor-Leste

### Fragmentation

- One sort of operation prevails in this quadrant:
  1. Military interventions
  2. Unilateral and ad hoc coalitions
  3. Close to the interveners
  4. Short term
  5. Military lead
  6. National or state security interests
  7. Infrequent

Examples:
- Ethiopia/Kenia in Somalia

### Network

- One sort of operation prevails in this quadrant:
  1. a) (Military intervention followed by) Stabilisation operations
     b) (Military intervention followed by) Humanitarian operations
     c) Police missions
  2. Hybrid operations of UN, regional organisations and states, in cooperation with corporations, PMCs, PSCs and NGOs
  3. Unconnected and resource-rich areas
  4. Long-term networked (different organisations)
  5. Networked lead
  6. a) Human security
     b) Economic security interests
  7. Frequent

Examples:
- a) NGO operations, such as Nonviolent Peaceforce in Sri Lanka and Georgia
- b) Anti-piracy off the coast of Somalia
- c) A potential police mission in Ciudad Juárez, Mexico
**Multipolar:** In this quadrant, forced by the manifestation of other poles, the EU has become a pole of its own. The EU member states’ armed forces have been integrated through task specialisation in the European armed forces and NATO. Interests rather than values, such as R2P, count. As a result of a lack of cooperation between Security Council members, in the Multipolar quadrant the great powers agree to deploy peace operations less frequently. Consequently, the number of ongoing missions has decreased. Those operations the Security Council manages to agree on are traditional peacekeeping operations. Military interventions and more robust operations still sometimes take place, but without a Security Council mandate. NATO out-of-area operations – such as the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan – have become a relic of the past, as poles do not allow competing poles to operate in either their own spheres of influence or in contested areas. There are mainly two types of peace operations in this quadrant: 1) traditional peacekeeping operations at the fringes of or between the poles; 2) more robust stabilisation operations, sometimes after military interventions in unstable zones inside poles or in the ‘backyards’ of poles.

The UN is generally the only organisation with sufficient legitimacy to deploy missions at the fringes of or between poles. Such missions have limited observer mandates and are directed at maintaining the status quo, preventing clashes, and maintaining stability between the poles. They generally have a first generation peacekeeping character, such as the UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) and the UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) in the Middle East, or the UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP). These operations are military only and consist of light infantry units with a monitoring or observer mandate. The main powers that lie at the heart of the poles do not contribute to these operations as this might set off fears among their competitors. Smaller or neutral countries are the main contributors to these operations. Moreover, due to the frequent use of vetoes the number of these types of operations has decreased compared to current numbers. Potential operation areas are where the Indian and Chinese or the US and Chinese poles clash. Closer to home, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) may also be a potential organisation for deployment in the Caucasus and Caspian region.

With regard to missions deployed in case of instability within poles or in the ‘backyards’ of poles, the core – generally in the context of a regional organisation-led operation – intervenes militarily and deploys a stabilisation mission. These operations are aimed at strengthening alliance or pole security, and are likely to operate at the higher end of the spectrum of violence. In each pole other values will be used to legitimise these military interventions or stabilisation operations. Europe may still legitimise its missions with concepts such as democracy and human rights, but China may frame its military interventions through a sovereignty or stability discourse. If the core of the pole does not support a mission, little will happen. Generally, such stabilisation operations do not have a Security Council mandate. Further, they are likely to reflect current and past operations such as Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) operations in West Africa, Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) operations in the former Soviet Union or NATO-led operations in Libya and the Balkans. Potential future deployment areas in the case of the European pole are regions such as North Africa, the Middle East and the Balkans.
Both sorts of operation have a relatively long duration because, in general, political processes needed for peace do not get off the ground as conflicting parties are often able to get military support from other poles.

**Multilateral:** In the Multilateral quadrant relationships in the Security Council are cooperative. Conflicts are generally solved at the negotiation table. In fragile states the ‘international community’ cooperates to overcome threats, mainly to human security and for the purpose of R2P. These fragile states are particularly located in a ‘belt of instability’ that runs from Central America, from West to East Africa, and into the Middle East and South Asia.

R2P has gained general acceptance and if governments do not live up to their responsibilities they face diplomatic pressure and ultimately Security Council mandated (humanitarian) military intervention to enforce cooperation and human security, such as in Libya. Subsequently, if sufficient political will is lacking or there is no capacity to deal with the underlying causes and issues, humanitarian operations are deployed to deal with the consequences of fragility and conflict, to protect civilians, and to ensure human security. These operations consist of a military component which – in order to ensure neutrality – is often separate from, but provides support to, humanitarian assistance. They tend to last for a long time as a political process to solve the underlying problems and causes has not gained momentum. Such operations resemble UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM), the UN Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT), and the AU/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID).

Particularly after peace agreements, but also in some cases after (humanitarian) military interventions, broadly-mandated multidimensional robust nation-building operations are deployed. Such nation-building operations consist of large civilian components, as well as police, to address the underlying problems and causes of fragility in the host states. Attention is given to, among other issues, the rule of law; disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR); and security sector reform (SSR). These missions are generally deployed for a longer period and have a civilian development assistance lead. The military aspects of operations are embedded in a wider integrated approach, and in an increasing number of cases they can be called civilian missions only. These nation-building operations are similar to the UN operations deployed after comprehensive peace agreements in Mozambique (ONUSOM) and Cambodia (UNTAC), or after the humanitarian emergencies or interventions in Timor-Leste and Kosovo.

The UN is the key actor in missions in this quadrant, not only because all missions are UN mandated, but also because it is heavily involved in most missions. Nonetheless, particularly when the UN is overburdened or does not have the operational capacity, regional organisations – such as NATO, the EU, the Organization of American States (OAS) or the AU – may step in. Those organisations may take care of whole missions, or provide bridging operations or over-the-horizon forces. Such a division of labour is possible because there is a high level of trust and understanding between countries and organisations. The permanent members of the Security Council are relatively forthcoming in contributing civilian personnel and militarily to both high- and low-end operations, while the BRICS countries get an increased influence in the peacekeeping agenda.
**Network:** In the Network quadrant the international system is more complex than it has ever been. States and intergovernmental organisations are no longer dominant, but cooperate on an equal footing with non-state actors such as corporations, PMCs, PSCs, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and so on. The world has become non-polar, and the global market economy and global civil society determine the direction of developments in the international system. The Security Council is no longer the arena where decisions are made; networked alliances and informal groupings of various actors ensure global governance. Often solutions are found in international regimes, codes of conduct, and international law in which non-state actors are also integrated. Those connected to the network grid of the international system are doing well, but regions, groups and individuals that are not lag behind.

The challenges in this quadrant are also networked. Criminals, terrorists and pirates cooperate closely in their struggle over market share of the unconnected people and areas that have been called the ‘gap’. This ‘gap’ is mainly located in the ‘belt of instability’ which runs from Central America, through West to East Africa and into the Middle East and South Asia. However, there are also smaller areas and groups that have not been able to keep up with the network and which have lost their connection in regions that are largely connected, such as Europe and North America.

The UN, as an intergovernmental organisation, has become a minor player in most peace operations because different actors – often non-state organisations, companies and ad hoc coalitions of the willing – work together in hybrid missions. Large parts of missions are outsourced, meaning that military or police components are often implemented by PMCs or PSCs, and humanitarian and development components by NGOs. In fact, some peace operations have been completely outsourced. For example, NGO monitoring missions have become common practice. Success of these missions is largely determined by the extent to which all these different actors are able to work together in an integrated approach in dealing with the problems at hand. In addition, cooperation between missions has increased: regionally – different operations deployed simultaneously, such as currently in the Horn of Africa, and chronologically – different operations deployed during different stages of a peace process, for example between initial-entry operations and follow-up missions.

Non-state actors have a large influence over where missions are deployed. Often the interests of companies lead. Although economic security is key, humanitarian norms are still advocated by NGOs. In the case of grave human rights violations, public opinion continues to cry out for action. R2P, however, has become a difficult concept as non-state actors have also become security providers and are held responsible to protect. Consequently, peace operations are particularly deployed to places where there are resources and transportation lanes, where criminality affects economic interests, or where the gravest human rights violations take place. These areas are primarily located in the ‘gap’, but also in unconnected areas outside the gap. The latter operations are small as they only have to focus on smaller regions, cities or even parts of cities, and are generally police mission in character. These stabilisation, humanitarian and police operations are deployed for longer periods dealing.

---


with the economic or human security effects of ‘unconnectedness’. Often, however, the underlying causes are left unaddressed as this would require a complete overhaul of the global economic system.

**Fragmentation:** In the Fragmentation quadrant the international system is crippled and remilitarised, as distrust rules. Non-state actors – such as Hamas and the Lord’s Resistance Army – have taken over, or at least create significant levels of violence, in large parts of the world and provide some governance in those regions they control.

Although the need for peace operations to deal with the violence and mistrust is enormous, the ability to actually deploy them is limited. Agreement on the deployment of missions is rare, and neither the UN nor regional organisations embody the trust needed for their deployment. Although the market for NGOs is endless, they have only very limited possibilities to actually do anything.

It is debatable whether interventions in this quadrant can actually be called peace operations because most (international) military interventions are actually unilateral or ad hoc coalitions’ military invasions and occupations. Nonetheless, the countries undertaking them portray their actions as peace operations to increase their legitimacy. These military interventions are short, take place in the immediate neighbourhood of the intervening countries, and the military is clearly in the lead. Operations are mainly high end, initial entry and short lasting. Neither international nor human security is a leading motive for them. The concept of R2P is alien to this world, while efforts to realise PoC are rhetorical at best. National or state security determines where interventions take place because the (national) security interests of individual states or governance units rule this scenario. Recent examples of such operations are the military interventions of Ethiopia and Kenya in Somalia. For the Netherlands, for example, such an operation would be unlikely to take place outside Western Europe.

**Continuity and change in the world system**

The Clingendael Monitor tracks international developments annually and places them in the perspective of the above scenarios. In 2012, it found that the international system is increasingly becoming less state-centric. Progressively, PMCs and PSCs – but also NGOs – become players to reckon with. At the same time, cooperation in the international system is decreasing. Particularly, the economic crisis has contributed to states focusing more and more on their national rather than international and human security. Rising powers are claiming their share of influence in the global arena, and gradually relations are perceived in competitive terms. Scarce resources, energy and arable land are becoming particularly subject to rivalry. While Western norms and values have dominated international discussions with concepts such as democracy, good governance and R2P, these are progressively contested as alternative models appear on the horizon. As a consequence, the global security architecture is under stress. Cooperation in the Security Council over such issues as non-proliferation, conflict management and environmental issues has become ever more difficult. Consequently, the main conclusion of the Monitor is that, although currently we are still in
the Multilateral quadrant, in the coming five to ten years we are likely to be moving into the Multipolar quadrant and in the direction of the Fragmentation quadrant. In the process we are also heading closer to the zero point in the middle of the scenario grid, which not only means that the world becomes increasingly diffuse and resembles all four quadrants, but also that uncertainty is increasing.

If this expectation becomes reality, it would mean that peace operations are likely to increasingly resemble the description given for missions in the Multipolar quadrant. This would mean that for the purpose of the European pole’s (and in the end its member states) interests and security, operations will still be demanded. Should military interventions occur, they will increasingly use existing institutional frameworks such as NATO and the EU rather than those of the UN, but in ever-changing coalition compositions. Particularly, demand on the armed forces for NATO and EU operations at the fringes of the European pole and Europe’s ‘backyard’ is likely to increase, often legitimised by the growing call for R2P, and supported by the ‘success’ in Libya. However, the potential need for operations as a result of nationalism and social instability, and resulting potential conflicts in central and southern Europe, should not be disregarded. Stabilisation operations within Europe, as well as contributions to UN operations between different poles, may still lie ahead. In particular, North Africa, the Middle East, the Balkans, the Caucasus and the Caspian region are likely areas of deployment. Although to a lesser extent than before, the EU member states’ armed forces may still be called on in the next five to ten years to contribute to peace operations in the so-called ‘belt of instability’. Nonetheless, the time of large-scale contributions to operations dealing with fragility in Central America, sub-Saharan Africa or Asia east of the Middle East seems to have largely passed.

In a more Multipolar world, Europe will be expected to take more responsibility for its own ‘backyard’ as the US will not always come to the rescue. More will therefore be expected of European armed forces. This stands in stark contrast to the decreased willingness to deploy armed forces for peace operations as a consequence of decreased financial means and the less internationalist attitude of the population. As a result, the EU governments find themselves maintaining a difficult balance between the need to integrate further internationally and the population’s increasing preference for the renationalisation of policy. Ways to decrease the costs of operations will have to be sought. In a Multipolar future, international contributions will probably be smaller and less frequent. Additionally, particularly if the current economic crisis deepens, contributions to UN operations in conflicts between poles may become more attractive to smaller countries such as the Netherlands and the Nordic countries because such deployments are partly reimbursed from the UN budget and may relieve some of their costs, while maintaining the legitimacy of having armed forces.

**Conclusions and recommendations**

Reflecting on insights from the current debate on peace operations based on probable future developments in the international system and scenarios, it appears that what the literature regards as probable is often actually uncertain. The importance of civilians in operations, the role of PMCs and PSCs, the regionalisation of peace operations, and the involvement of
Western as well as BRIC countries are not developments that take place in all scenarios. They therefore depend on the quadrant in which we find ourselves in the future. Similarly, uncertainty with regard to the future of R2P is quadrant-specific. However, the expected move towards the Multipolar quadrant means that:

a) the trend that the importance of civilians in operations is increasing, may actually be reversed
b) the trend that the role of PMCs and PSCs is increasing may reverse
c) the regionalisation of peace operations is likely to intensify
d) the global involvement of Western countries is likely to decrease further and European attention is likely to focus on Europe and its direct neighbours, while the involvement of the BRIC countries elsewhere probably increases; and
e) although R2P will probably still be used as legitimisation for military interventions, and PoC for the use of violence during operations, these two concepts are probably not becoming a core motive for deploying forces abroad.

It would, however, not be prudent to build strategy on expectations or forecasts. For this reason, scenario planning as described at the beginning of this scenarios paper is useful. By looking at what is required from armed forces in each scenario and by comparing this with the results for other scenarios, overall conclusions can be drawn. If something appears to be the case (or not) in all four scenarios, it is a robust finding. If something happens (or does not happen) in all but one scenario, it is good to have thought about what to do in case the future reality is that single scenario as well as preparing for the other likely scenarios. The following scenario-planning exercise looks at a number of issues with regard to peace operations following the framework of the Future Policy Survey.¹⁸

It must be emphasised that this analysis only looks at the implications for armed forces with regard to peace operations. In every alternative future or scenario, armed forces are likely to also have responsibilities other than peace operations, such as defence of national or allied territory, and national tasks. However, these are not considered in this paper.

The issues looked at for peace operations in each scenario are:

The **qualitative ambition level** of the armed forces refers to the sort of tasks the armed forces have to perform in different peace operations and is expressed in their strategic functions. In peace operations these range from anticipation, to prevention, deterrence, intervention, stabilisation and eventually normalisation. See Box 1 for further elaboration of these.

**Box 1: Strategic functions of armed forces in peace operations**

- **Anticipation** is ‘preparing for foreseen and unforeseen developments and incidents that may affect [...] the international rule of law’.
- **Prevention** entails ‘active steps intended to prevent a threat occurring to [...] the international rule of law’.
- **Deterrence** is ‘discouraging activities that conflict with [...] the international rule of law by holding out the prospect of retaliatory measures’.
- **Intervention** is ‘enforcing a change in the behaviour of one or more parties that threaten [...] the international rule of law’.
- **Stabilisation** is ‘establishing security in a current or former conflict zone to achieve political stability and economic and social development’.
- **Normalisation** is ‘restoring normal living conditions after a conflict or disaster’.¹⁹

The *quantitative ambition level* is the size and number of contributions to peace operations deployed. This ranges from high to low.

*Mission duration* varies from a short to long presence. *Force projection* deals with the expected distance between the EU member state and areas of operation. The *mission area* is subsequently the expected mission area(s).

The level of *international cooperation* describes the intensity and depth of international cooperation. *International partners* lists the partners with whom this cooperation takes place. Similarly, the level of *civil/military cooperation* describes the intensity and depth of cooperation between the armed forces and national partners, and *national partners* describes which partners these are.

*Personnel* describes the particular competencies needed for armed forces personnel. These include, among other skills, fighting capacity, the ability to cooperate and the ability to speak different languages.

*Particularly required capabilities* in armed forces notes the capabilities particularly needed in peace operations.

---

¹⁹ Ibid.
### Figure 3: Issues for armed forces in future peace operations in each scenario

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Qualitative ambition level (strategic functions)</th>
<th>Multipolar</th>
<th>Multilateral</th>
<th>Network</th>
<th>Fragmentation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Deterrence; intervention; stabilisation; and normalisation</td>
<td>Anticipation; prevention; deterrence; intervention; stabilisation; and normalisation</td>
<td>Anticipation; prevention; deterrence; intervention; stabilisation; and normalisation</td>
<td>Anticipation; prevention; deterrence; intervention; stabilisation; and normalisation</td>
<td>Anticipation; deterrence; and intervention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quantitative ambition level</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mission duration</td>
<td>Long/medium</td>
<td>Long</td>
<td>Long</td>
<td>Short</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Force projection</td>
<td>Regional</td>
<td>Global</td>
<td>Global</td>
<td>Sub-regional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mission area</td>
<td>Middle East and northern Africa; Caucasus; Caspian area; Balkans; Southern and central Europe</td>
<td>Belt of instability (Central America; west, central and east Africa; Middle East and South Asia)</td>
<td>Belt of instability (Central America; west, central and east Africa; Middle East and South Asia) and other unconnected areas that may also be found in otherwise stable ‘core’ countries.</td>
<td>Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level of international cooperation</td>
<td>High/medium</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International partners</td>
<td>The European pole (EU) (task specialisation and cooperation) and where possible NATO; UN for traditional peacekeeping operations</td>
<td>International and regional organisations such as: UN; NATO; EU; AU; other partner countries</td>
<td>Networked (inter)state and non-state organisations, such as international PMCs, PSCs, NGOs and corporations</td>
<td>Operationally and logistically independent and mostly self-reliant; cooperation only on an ad hoc basis with like-minded nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level civil military cooperation</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National partners</td>
<td>Gendarmerie</td>
<td>Diplomacy; development; gendarmerie and civilian police</td>
<td>Diplomacy; development; civilian police; non-state organizations, such as international PMCs, PSCs, NGOs and corporations</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Personnel

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scenario</th>
<th>Personnel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Flexible; agile; able to shift from diplomatic to fighting modus; able to cooperate with international partners; SSR knowledge; high cultural awareness; speak foreign languages, particularly French and English. In case of task specialisation or further pole cooperation/integration, some competencies may no longer be needed.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flexible; agile; able to shift from diplomatic to fighting modus; able to cooperate with (inter)national partners; SSR knowledge; high cultural awareness; and speaks foreign languages particularly French and English.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Similarly to under Multilateral with more attention for cooperation with non-state and civilian actors.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fighting tasks are the key competency; little (intern)national cooperation also means foreign languages are not necessary.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Particularly required capabilities in armed forces

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scenario</th>
<th>Required Capabilities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Special Forces; expeditionary light infantry; Gendarmerie; air transport; air-to-ground; and close air support. In case of task specialisation or further pole cooperation/integration some capabilities may no longer be needed.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Forces; expeditionary light infantry; high end land intervention capabilities; Gendarmerie; SSR; rule of law; intelligence; air transport; air-to-ground; close air support; and maritime surveillance.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Forces; intelligence; air-to-ground; and close air support.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Robust findings and options

This scenario exercise does not generate certainty about the future of peace operations. There are no developments that are sure to happen. This means there are also few robust policy options that work in all scenarios and are therefore guaranteed to be successful. Looking ahead much depends on the level of cooperation in the international system. One of the most robust findings is that future peace operations are likely to remain long-term affairs. They are still likely to be deployed frequently, but not as frequently as now. The locations where they are deployed are still likely to be unstable or fragile areas – such as Central America; west, central and east Africa; and South Asia – although probably closer to the fringes or in the ‘backyards’ of poles. For the EU, that would mean in particular northern Africa, the Middle East, the Balkans and the Caucasus. At the same time, in most scenarios operations may also
be required within the EU. Military interventions probably continue to take place, most often as an introduction to follow-up operations.

Less robust are findings about the likely types of peace operation. They are still likely to be stabilisation or humanitarian operations as traditional peacekeeping, nation-building or police (anti-crime) operations are more scenario-specific. Ways to ensure flexibility may be considered so that, if a particular scenario becomes reality, such operations can still be implemented, but organising armed forces for these particular sorts of operation would be suboptimal. Human security may still play a role, but the more we move away from the multilateral scenario, the less idealistic the motives for deployment become and the more ideals are used for legitimisation only. Similarly, the more the international system moves away from that scenario, the more operations once again become military led and the less civilian capacities are needed. Furthermore, the more the international system loses its state-dominated character, the more the UN – but also regional organisations such as the EU and NATO – lose their position in peace operations, and the more either states unilaterally or NGOs become involved.

Armed forces are probably still requested to perform a wide variety of tasks in peace operations. Anticipation and prevention – and particularly deterrence, intervention, stabilisation and normalisation – are likely to be required strategic functions. Their force projection is likely to remain global to regional, their quantitative ambition level high to medium and their sustainment long term. In addition, armed forces probably need to continue to cooperate internationally, particularly in the context of regional organisations such as the EU and NATO. However, the more networked the future becomes, the more NGOs, PMCs, PSCs and other non-state actors will also play a role. Such a Network scenario would also require increased attention to civil-military cooperation, but in all other scenarios the level of such cooperation probably remains at the current level, or decreases. Military personnel are likely to be required to remain flexible, agile, able to shift from diplomatic to fighting modus, and able to cooperate with (inter)national partners, while having SSR knowledge, high cultural awareness and the ability to speak foreign languages, particularly French and English. Only in a Multipolar scenario would some of these abilities be less required, as a result of further (task) specialisation and cooperation. In Fragmentation, the focus would be on fighting tasks and not on (inter)national cooperation. Special Forces, air-to-ground capabilities and close air support are the only robust policy options because all scenarios may see military interventions. Everything else – particularly capabilities such as expeditionary light infantry, high-end land intervention capabilities, Gendarmerie, SSR, rule of law, intelligence, air transport and maritime surveillance – is likely to continue to be required for peace operations. However, in Fragmentation the focus should be more on high-end capabilities while in Multipolar capabilities may also be provided by allies.

Multipolar options

Since analysis suggests that the international system is slowly moving from the Multilateral to the Multipolar quadrant, and that the character of peace operations is likely to change similarly, in addition to looking for robust findings it is possible to build on these expectations. Compared to the present situation, it could be expected that armed forces within the context of peace operations – once again, excluding the other tasks armed forces
have – are likely to become less involved in anticipation and prevention tasks. Their quantitative ambition level – the number of operations and forces deployed – probably decreases. The duration of operations is likely to remain long and therefore their sustainment remains critical. Operations will probably take place closer to home in the European ‘backyard’ and for stabilisation purposes potentially inside (central and southern) Europe itself. Infrequently, deployment at the fringes of (between other) poles may also be required in order to maintain the status quo in the context of a traditional peacekeeping operation. The level of international cooperation is likely to remain high, but it will increasingly focus on the EU and NATO. Sometimes, however, the UN may remain the framework for participation in traditional peacekeeping operations. Civil-military cooperation probably decreases again in a more Multipolar world. Military personnel are likely to face similar challenges to those they are confronted with today, but these may increasingly be shared by European allies within the context of task specialisation and international cooperation. For the armed forces to be prepared for peace operations in a Multipolar world, Special Forces, expeditionary light infantry, Gendarmerie, air transport, air-to-ground and close air support are the main foci, although again these tasks may be reduced through potential task specialisation or cooperation. In such a world there will be less demand for Special Forces, SSR, rule of law, intelligence and close air support within the context of peace operations.