About this report

This study is part of a project initiated by the OSCE Network of Think Tanks and Academic Institutions that was founded in the summer of 2013. The Project was adopted during a meeting of participating institutes on October 30 2013¹. The first phase of this project, undertaken by twenty think tanks in OSCE countries,² is a quick scan of the threat perceptions of relevant state actors in their countries.

On the basis of these country studies, a common report will be written comparing the states’ main threat perceptions to find out which are shared and where they diverge. Our intention is that the final report will provide a more solid background for current and future debates within the OSCE.

¹ See Annex I
² The list of Project Participants is attached as Annex II.
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1. Introduction

On the basis of the project outline, one might expect this report to consist of the following:
- One or two chapters on the perceived threats in the Netherlands now and in 10 years time;
- A chapter discussing which of these threats require international action;
- A chapter on the possible role of the OSCE in addressing these threats.
However, during the course of our enquiry we unexpectedly came across some interesting issues and questions that merit special attention.

Firstly, and most importantly, we raise some questions, touching the heart of our project because they question the question itself: is it wise and in the interest of our countries to limit the scope of our enquiry to threats or are we overlooking something important? This is the subject of the first chapter.

Secondly, we noticed that in the Netherlands a study of official documents leads to quite different conclusions about threat perceptions than the interviews we held. We therefore decided to deal with these two sources separately.

2. Questioning the question: the scope

2.1 What is the question?

What are, according to official documents and background interviews with advisors of the government, the great threats and challenges the Netherlands\(^3\) is facing now and in ten years time? That is the first and main question we try to answer in this study. With the OSCE in mind, we are in particular interested in perceptions of military threats and of transnational threats, but we have included other threats in our scope to prevent possible blind spots.

This, however, leaves open several questions. Why do we only look at threats? Shouldn’t we also look at opportunities? How do we define a “threat”? Should we make a distinction between threats and challenges? What are currently the concrete threats and risks to the wellbeing of Dutch people? Should we concentrate on acute threats or also include chronic threats? Should we look at how governments perceive threats or at what they publicly say about their perceptions? What to do with unknown threats?

2.2 Why not also look at opportunities?

The purpose of our project is to map threat perceptions as a contribution to current and future debates within the OSCE. However, as think tank we should also have a critical look at the question itself. Why is it that we are limiting ourselves to looking at threats? Could it be that traditional security thinking leads to an one-sided look at reality: clearly discerning threats, but overlooking opportunities?

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\(^3\) The Kingdom of the Netherlands consists not only of the country in Europe, but also of a number of islands in the Caribbean. The Caribbean part of Kingdom is confronted with the same global challenges as the European part, but it faces also a number of challenges of its own. In view of the already very wide character of our subject and the short time available, we have left these specific challenges outside the scope of this study.
Some of the big challenges of our times, such as climate change and scarcity of clean water, do not only present threats, but also opportunities. By concentrating on the threat side we risk to overlook the opportunities. We suggest to make this point in our final joint report.

2.3 How do we define a threat?

For the purpose of our project, we defined a threat as any phenomenon that can have a negative influence on the wellbeing of a country and its inhabitants. This definition encompasses both traditional threats such as external and internal enemies and other threats such as diseases, floods and scarcities.

The term “threat” is traditionally used to denote an external, purely negative phenomenon that simply has to be stopped or defeated. In the present study, the term “threat” is used in a wider sense, and includes problems that do threaten us, but cannot be simply defeated. Examples of problems that have to be managed rather than defeated are local shortages of clean water and climate change. The reader should therefore be aware that in this study a “threat” does not necessarily imply the existence of a malicious actor behind it and can usually be rephrased as a challenge.

We therefore do not make a strict distinction between threats and challenges, since the term challenge is often used as a more constructive manner to denote a threat. The scarcity of raw materials, for example, can be described either as the threat of shortages or as a challenge to assure availability.

2.4 What are the objective threats to the wellbeing of people?

The purpose of our project is to find out what in governmental circles are perceived to be threats, not what the objective threats are. However as a background it is useful to take notice of the objective threats and to note that in the top 15 causes of ill-health, disability or early death in the Netherlands there is not a single traditional security threat, such as war, terrorism and crime, nor any infectious disease. The six most important factors leading to disease, disability and death of inhabitants of EU and EFTA countries in 2010 were the following:

1. Dietary risks
2. High blood pressure
3. Smoking
4. High body mass index
5. Physical inactivity
6. Alcohol use

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4 See [http://www.healthmetricsandevaluation.org/publications/policy-report/gbd-eu-report](http://www.healthmetricsandevaluation.org/publications/policy-report/gbd-eu-report). The top 15 causes of years lost due to ill-health, disability or early death in the Netherlands in 2010 were the following:

1. Low back pain
2. Major depressive disorder
3. Ischemic heart disease
4. Lung cancer
5. COPD (Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disease)
6. Stroke
7. Falls
8. Neck pain
9. Other musculoskeletal disorders
10. Colorectal cancer
11. Alzheimer’s disease
12. Anxiety disorders
13. Diabetes
14. Breast cancer
15. Road injury

5 According to the IMHE. See also Annex VI
Of course, there is no guarantee that these will remain the main risk factors during the next 10 to 20 years. The possibility that a pandemic or a nuclear weapon will make huge numbers of victims cannot be excluded. However, it is very likely that also in the coming years, the main threat to the wellbeing of most people in the OSCE-area will be their lifestyle, not criminals and terrorists, just as the prosperity of most countries will probably be more threatened by short sighted policies than by external enemies.

2.5 Should we concentrate on acute threats or include chronic threats?

Traditional security policy was mainly directed at acute threats such as armed attacks. When the security concept was widened, other acute threats were included such as pandemics and hurricanes. Chronic threats, such as pollution and smoking, that do not present an acute threat but have a large negative influence on the wellbeing of a country and its inhabitants usually do not receive much attention in security strategies. It should however be noted that the number of years of life lost and years lived with disability as a result of chronic diseases is in OSCE-countries (but not only there) far greater than the number of years lost due to infectious diseases, natural disasters and terrorism combined.

We recognize that threats that are of our own making, where, so to say, we are our own worst enemies, such as loss of biodiversity and smoking, cannot be simply equated with traditional threats. However, in order to provide a comprehensive and balanced overview of the threats and challenges our government is confronted with, we believe that all types of threats should be taken into consideration.

2.6 Perceived threats versus publicized threats

The objective of the project is to analyze the threat perceptions of relevant state actors, inter alia by looking at official publications. Official publications do however not necessarily reflect the real threat perceptions of governments. Governments might be hesitant to admit that they are worried about a threat as long as they have not decided whether and how to respond. Governments might furthermore be inclined to underplay certain risks because they do not want to alarm the population or because that seems politically more convenient.

We therefore have to reckon with the possibility that official publications present a different picture than background interviews.

2.7 The challenge of unknown threats

When asked what they expected to be the major threats in 10 to 20 years, most of our interlocutors felt that it is impossible to say anything meaningful about the future apart from stating that most if not all of the current threats will very likely still be present in 10 or 20 years.

Who would have dared to predict 25 years ago that the Baltic States would now be members of the European Union? That the United States might soon be an exporter of energy again? That China has become the second economy of the world? That about six billion people now have access to mobile phones while only 4.5 billion have access to working toilets?

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6 According to the IMHE. See also Annex VI
Some of our interlocutors therefore stated that, as it is very likely that countries and their populations will be confronted with unexpected threats and challenges, the challenge is not only to address current threats, but also to strengthen their ability to respond to threats and challenges that are not yet known. Strengthening this responsiveness should be considered at the individual level, e.g. through education and lifelong learning, at the national level and at the international level, e.g. by developing and maintaining an effective infrastructure of international cooperation and governance.

3. Threats according to the official documents

3.1 Introduction: which documents to choose?

As it was our intention to look at a broad spectrum of threat perceptions the number of possibly relevant official papers and records\(^7\) to consider was enormous. We therefore asked our respondents to make recommendations. They recommended in particular the following documents:

- National Security Strategy
- Future Policy Survey, A new foundation for the Netherlands Armed Forces
- International Security Strategy
- Government wide investigation of trends

Because none of these documents encompasses a government broad view of all challenges and threats and because it is therefore not possible to extract from these documents a government wide ranking of all the different threats and challenges, we also looked at two of the, very rare, truly government-wide policy statements:
- Speech from the Throne by the Dutch king on 17 September 2013.

In this chapter the reader will find a short description of each document, indicating for each document why it cannot be considered as an overview of the threat perceptions of the Netherlands government. We made lists of the threats and challenges that are mentioned in each of these six documents. We have placed these lists in footnotes, leaving it to the reader to read them or not. It should of course be kept in mind that these documents were not written with the purpose of listening threats and challenges. For this report, we had to reduce the threats to their essence and to ignore many subtleties of these documents.

3.2 Troonrede (Speech from the Throne) 2013

The *Troonrede*\(^8\) (Speech from the Throne) is delivered by the King of the Netherlands at the opening of the parliamentary year. Its purpose is to inform Parliament, and the wider public, of

\(^7\) According to the Project Proposal the official documents to be studied “will include state security policy and defence strategies, white books, official statements, including those from international organizations, governmental statements in parliamentary records, and articles by and interviews with officials in the media.”

\(^8\) *The main threats and challenges mentioned are the following:*

Threats:
- the economic crisis.
- the debt burden of the government and Dutch households
- the capital position of our banks.
- demographic ageing
- internationalization
- the classical post-war welfare state unsustainable in its present form
the plans of the government for the coming year. The primary responsibility for the speech lies with the Prime Minister, but all ministers are involved. However, the purpose of the Speech from the Throne is not to give an overview of all the threats and challenges ahead and it should therefore not be expected to provide such a broad and long term view.

3.3 **Regeringsverklaring of the new Dutch government**

On 13 November 2012 the new government\(^9\), based on a coalition of the center-right liberal-conservative party VVD\(^10\) and the center-left social-democratic party PvdA\(^11\), presented its plans in parliament\(^12\). The aim of a government is to govern for four years, until the next regular national parliamentary elections. The primary responsibility for the content lies with the Prime Minister, but all ministers are involved\(^13\).

However, the purpose of the *Regeringsverklaring* is to inform Parliament of the plans of the government, not to give an overview of all the threats and challenges ahead.

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- long-term care expenditures rising out of control

Challenges:
- to strengthen the Netherlands' economic growth potential.
- to foster solidarity between generations and between different income groups.
- achieving a 'prudent level of public debt'.
- develop a new system of youth care
- far-reaching reforms to long-term care
- help people receiving social assistance or with an occupational disability find work
- to work with other countries, particularly our closest neighbours.
- play an active role in the European Union.
- the establishment of a European banking union.
- concluding free trade agreements with countries like the United States and Japan.
- combating nuclear terrorism.
- an international legal order with a strong emphasis on humanitarian law.
- link traditional forms of development aid with policy to strengthen trade relations.


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\(^9\) Rutte II

\(^10\) VVD = Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie; in English: People´s Party for Freedom and Democracy

\(^11\) PvdA = Partij van de Arbeid; in English: Labour Party

\(^12\) For the full text of this *Regeringsverklaring* (Declaration of Government) see http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/regering/regeringsverklaring (no English translation available).

\(^13\) The main threats and challenges mentioned are the following:

- A well-functioning European internal market with a stable Euro
- A solid budget
- An equitable distribution of benefits and burdens
- An affordable social security system adjusting rising costs of long term care and welfare
- A well-functioning national labour market
- Reform of housing market
- Strengthening the growth potential of a sustainable and innovating economy
- Higher ambitions for clean energy and greening of the economy
- Use education to strengthen the economy.
- European cooperation that contributes to the wealth and wellbeing of the Europeans.
- Promotion of international legal order and human rights.
- Reform of public governance
3.4 National Security Strategy

The *Strategie Nationale Veiligheid*\(^\text{14}\) (National Security Strategy) of 2007 was written under the primary responsibility of the minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, but it was presented to Parliament by the Prime Minister, as a sign that it was the intention to provide a comprehensive security strategy encompassing all ministries. One of the five chapters deals with the international context. Since 2011 the responsibility lies with the Office of the National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism\(^\text{15}\) (NCTV), part of the Ministry of Security and Justice\(^\text{16}\).

Although the original intention was to provide a comprehensive security strategy encompassing all ministries, the bureaucratic tradition that forbids that one minister coordinates the work of the other ministers proved to be stronger. To prevent that the minister of Security and Justice, that took over the responsibility for national security from the minister of the Interior and Kingdom Relations would become the primus inter pares in the council of ministers, the scope of the national security strategy has been limited to counterterrorism, cyber security, national security and crisis management in the Netherlands. Although the International Security Strategy of the minister of Foreign Affairs pretends that the National Security Strategy is limited to domestic measures, it is tolerated that this requires in practice some direct international cooperation.

However, as a result of the traditional division of labour between the ministry of Foreign Affairs on the one hand and the ministries of Internal Affairs and of Security and Justice on the other, only limited attention is given to the international security context.

Another consequence of the traditional division of labour between ministries is that the National Security Strategy is mainly focused on acute threats to national security and devotes relatively little attention to threats and challenges in fields that are traditionally not considered to be part of national security, such as education, science, culture, public health, conservation of nature and social security (although chronic problems in these fields can undoubtedly threaten a country).

\(^{15}\) See: http://english.nctv.nl/organisation%5Fen/
\(^{16}\) The main threats and challenges mentioned are the following:

*Classic threats*
- Failing states
- Risk countries
- Proliferation of CBRN (chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear) weapons
- Catastrophic terrorism radicalisation (leading to terrorism)
- International crime, with increasing links with “respectable” people
- Global drugs trade

*Social-economic threats*
- Increase of (ethnic) tensions and decrease of citizenship
- Radicalization (leading to breakdown of social cohesion)
- Digital paralysis
- Extreme scarcity of energy and basic materials

*Natural threats*
- Increase of risk of flooding
- Extreme drought/heath
- Plagues
- Pandemics of known human diseases
- Zoonotic pandemics
3.5 Verkenningen (Future Policy Survey of the Ministry of Defence)

The Future Policy Survey\(^{17}\) was published by the Netherlands Ministry of Defence to provide a basis for decisions on the future of the Dutch armed forces. Other ministries that contributed to this project were the ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, the ministry of Foreign Affairs, the ministry of Justice and the ministry of Finance\(^{18}\).

It is interesting to note that this report provides a broader view on the threats and challenges of international relations than the International Security Strategy of Foreign Affairs discussed in the next paragraph. This report could possibly have been used as the basis for a government wide view on threats and challenges, but the purpose was limited to providing a basis for decisions on the future of the Dutch armed forces. The report does therefore not encompass such a government wide view. For the same reason the report pays little attention to international threats and challenges that do not fall under the primary responsibility\(^{19}\) of the ministries of Defence and Foreign Affairs.

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\(^{18}\) The main relevant points are the following:

The uncertainty concerning the next two decades is linked to the following structural factors:

- the diffusion over of political, economic and military power in the global system;
- the ‘thickening’ of the international system, enhancing mutual dependencies, combined with the emergence of non-state actors;
- the development and the dissemination of new technologies;
- the increasing range of cross-border challenges, including scarcity of natural resources, global warming and the uneven growth of the world population.

The Netherlands should reckon with the possibility that in next 20 years, strategic shocks will occur that appear to be extremely unlikely at the moment, such as the following:

1. Eurozone falls apart; new fault lines in Europe.
2. Energy resources and raw materials exhausted at increased rate; no alternatives available.
3. Large-scale outage of information systems and financial transaction systems following digital attack.
4. Severely accelerated global warming; mankind faced with climate catastrophe.
5. Political Islamic radicals seize power in Middle East.
6. NATO falls apart.
7. Nuclear weapons are used in regional conflict.
8. Superpowers become embroiled in military conflict.
9. Terrorists carry out a major attack in Netherlands’ territory.
10. Europe targeted by a missile attack.

\(^{19}\) When the responsibility for the internal policy on a subject lies with a ministry specialized on the subject, it is sometimes unclear which Ministry is responsible for the international aspects. Often the specialized ministry expects the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to take the lead, whereas the Ministry of Foreign Affairs expects the specialized ministry to do so. As a result it can happen at international conferences that the Netherlands government has no position.
3.6 International Security Strategy

The International Security Strategy\(^{20}\) was presented to Parliament on 21 June 2013 by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, also on behalf of the ministers of Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation, Defence, Security and Justice, Economic Affairs, and Interior and Kingdom\(^{21}\). However the Minister of Infrastructure and the Environment, the Minister of Education, Culture and Science and the Minister of Health, Welfare and Sport were probably not involved as they are not mentioned here.

With regard to the OSCE it should be noted that, according to the Strategy (p 14) the Netherlands, together with a group of other countries, is working on standards of conduct with regard to cyber security and is also pressing the UN and OSCE to take adequate precautions. Of interest for the OSCE might also be that the Netherlands wants to “promote timely integrated analysis (‘early warning’) and strategy development (‘early action’) in current or emerging conflict zones, where possible in close collaboration with other countries and organisations.”

The Strategy states that while the National Security Strategy, that was discussed above, examines domestic measures designed to protect Dutch security interests, “this strategy focuses on what the Netherlands aims to do in and alongside other countries to safeguard its interests”. However, the Strategy fails to fulfill that promise in several respects. Dutch interests that fall primarily under the competence of ministries that were not involved are at best mentioned in passing. Very little attention is devoted to the protection of Dutch interests in the fields of climate change, infectious diseases, scientific cooperation, management of the oceans and education\(^{22}\).

\(^{20}\) Internationale Veiligheidsstrategie; Veilige Wereld, Veilig Nederland; For the full text in Dutch: http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten-en-publicaties/kamerstukken/2013/06/21/kamerbrief-over-internationale-veiligheidsstrategie.html; For the full text in English translation: http://www.government.nl/documents-and-publications/notes/2013/06/21/international-security-strategy.html

\(^{21}\) Main threats and challenges mentioned
- arms control,
- crisis management
- proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and missile technology,
- cyber security\(^{21}\),
- piracy,
- cross-border crime
- terrorism (including use of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons)
- security issues associated with water and energy
- security implications of pandemics and loss of biodiversity
- implications of nano-, bio- and neurotechnology, including for bio security
- instability caused by the exploitation of new regions like the Arctic,
- threats to international trade including fraud and corruption,
- protectionism (e.g. with regard to rare earth metals)
- degradation is a potential source of conflict.
- climate change could lead to major security problems
- ensure access to raw materials
- deepen our collaboration with our European partners.
- Let Europe take more responsibility
- make the EU an even stronger force in the area of security.
- Make Europe invest more in stability in North Africa, the Sahel, the Horn of Africa, the Middle East and the Caucasus.
- promote early warning and early action in conflict zones\(^{21}\)
- Reduction of the number of tactical nuclear weapons throughout Europe
- An integrated approach to planning involving all relevant ministries and organisations

\(^{22}\) See also How security strategies can harm our interests by Barend ter Haar, to be published in the forthcoming edition of Studia Diplomatica.
In fact the strategy covers little more than what falls under the competence of the department of Security Policy of the ministry of Foreign Affairs. The strategies with regard to Europe and Human Rights are dealt with in separate documents and although the Netherlands aims to become member of the UN Security Council, a Dutch strategy with regard to the UN system has so far not been published. More generally, the Netherlands ministry of Foreign Affairs does not seem to have a ministry-wide foreign policy strategy, let alone a government-wide foreign policy strategy.

3.7 Rijksbrede Trendverkenning (Government wide investigation of trends)

The Rijksbrede Trendverkenning (Government wide investigation of trends) published in June 2013 is an update of the first part of report published in 2010. It is meant to serve as basis for discussion, not as a policy paper. The trends are grouped in line with the DESTEP classification (Demographic, Economic, Social-cultural, Technological, Ecological and Political). The report

23 “Staat van Europa 2013: Bruggen slaan in Europa” and “Mensenrechttenna: Respect voor ieder mens”. (no English translations available).


25 The report of 2010 (full title: Rijksbrede Kennisagenda; Fase 1; Trends & Ontwikkelingen; no English translation available) was the first phase, to be followed by a Government wide Knowledge Agenda. That Knowledge Agenda was however never published.

26 Opportunities and threats according to the Rijksbrede Trendverkenning:

1 Demographic
   - How to promote employment of women?
   - How to prevent that growing employment endangers health and social cohesion?
   - Should governments become more involved in the upbringing of children?
   - How to prevent that urbanization leads to growing inequality and environmental pollution?

2 Economic
   - How to make financial systems better shock resistant?
   - How to keep the Netherlands attractive for foreign investment?
   - How to adapt education to a dynamic labour market with frequent mid-career changes of job?
   - How to promote intersectoral mobility on labour market?

3 Social-Cultural
   - How can democracies cope with increasingly heterogeneous and individualistic societies?
   - How to stop the erosion of the authority of traditional institutes, such as science?
   - How much solidarity can governments afford to provide?
   - How to prevent erosion of social cohesion and solidarity?
   - Should governments pay for human enhancement?
   - What are long term consequences of human enhancement?
   - How to prevent that risk averse culture leads to overreaction to incidents?
   - How should democracies cope with the increasing influence of media?
   - How to protect privacy?

4 Technological
   - New technologies provide both opportunities and threats.
   - Are governmental policies ready to promote the economic opportunities?
   - Does government pay sufficient attention to the ethical and ecological aspects?
   - How to prevent misuse of these technologies?

5 Ecological
   - How to manage a peaceful transition to a sustainable economy?
   - How to make best use of the challenges provided by climate change and scarcities, e.g. by developing water management and agricultural science?
   - How to prevent that diminishing political attention for the environment prevents sustainable solutions?
   - How to prevent that growing scarcities lead to international tensions?

6 Political
   - Netherlands vulnerable for disturbance of global trade and production chains.
   - Relative high vulnerability for pandemics.
   - Protectionism is a threat for the Netherlands.
   - How to use the economic crisis as an opportunity for fundamental reform?
   - How to strengthen European decision making?
was published under the authority of the Strategiebureau Rijksbreed, i.e. the meeting of the Strategy directors or their equivalents from every ministry.

However, the document is an inventory of trends, not an assessment. Nevertheless, the list of opportunities and threats at the end of every chapter gives an impression of the questions the strategists wanted to raise.

### 3.8 Reports of independent institutes

During the interviews, our interlocutors mentioned several other publications. They are listed in annex IX. The following reports of independent, but government sponsored institutes were mentioned several times:

- Assessment of the Human Environment 2012 (PBL\(^{27}\))
- Towards a learning economy. Investing in the Netherlands' earning capacity (WRR\(^{28}\))
- The social state of the Netherlands (SCP\(^{29}\))
- Clingendael Strategic Monitor\(^{30}\) (Clingendael Institute of International Relations)

*De Balans van de Leefomgeving* (Assessment of the Human Environment) 2012\(^{31}\) states that the quality of the environment in the Netherlands has since 1990 improved in many areas, but that combating climate change and maintaining biodiversity, remain persistent problems. These two issues and our dependence on rare raw materials require a fundamental change of our production and consumption systems.

*In Naar een lerende economie. Investeren in het verdienvermogen van Nederland* \(^{32}\) (Towards a learning economy. Investing in the Netherlands' earning capacity) the Scientific Council for Government Policy recommended that the Netherlands strengthens its responsiveness, that is the ability to adapt rapidly and effectively to new circumstances, and therefore invests in good training, good people and resilient institutions.

*De sociale staat van Nederland 2013* (The social state of the Netherlands\(^{33}\)) points inter alia to the paradoxes that while the level of education of the Dutch population continues to grow, 12% of the adult population is still illiterate and that while life expectancy is growing the percentage of people with several chronic diseases is growing too.

The *Clingendael Strategic Monitor*\(^{34}\) is an update of the *Verkenningen* discussed above.

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\(^{27}\) PBL: Planbureau voor de Leefomgeving: Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency.

\(^{28}\) WRR: Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het Regeringsbeleid: Scientific Council for Government Policy

\(^{29}\) SCP: Sociaal Cultureel Planbureau: Netherlands Institute for Social Research

\(^{30}\) The large number of positive references by our interlocutors to the Clingendael Monitor might have been influenced by the fact that both interviewers are connected to Clingendael.


\(^{33}\) English summary not available.

\(^{34}\) Clingendael Strategische Monitor 2013 'Een wereld in onzekerheid; For the full text in English: http://www.clingendael.nl/sites/default/files/Strategic%20Monitor%202013.pdf
3.9 Conclusions

The six governmental documents considered above are so different in purpose, scope and approach that the threats and challenges mentioned in each of them cannot be simply added up. In two cases only we felt that an addition would make sense.

Firstly, since it can be expected that threats and challenges that have a high priority will be mentioned in both government-wide policy documents, we have counted the references to threats and challenges in the Troonrede and the Regeringsverklaring and added them up. Two subjects are clearly at the top of the list: the economic crisis (13 references) and the sustainability of the social security system (9 references). European cooperation comes at the third place with 5 references (three of them also referring to the economic crisis, because a well functioning European Union is a requirement for national economic recovery). International cooperation is mentioned three times. Other subjects such as combating nuclear terrorism, clean energy and greening of the economy, a new system of youth care, reform of the housing market and reform of public governance were mentioned only once.

Secondly, we analyzed which threats are mentioned in both the National Security Strategy and in the International Security Strategy and found, in arbitrary order, the following seven common themes:

- Failing states and instability
- Proliferation of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons
- Terrorism
- International crime
- Cyber security
- Scarcity of energy and basic materials
- Pandemics

Two conclusions can be drawn from this. The first is that the strategies produced by the ministries of Internal Affairs/Security and Justice and by the ministry of Foreign Affairs focus mainly on acute and traditional threats. The second is that at the level of the Council of Ministers these traditional security threats seem to receive relatively little attention. On the top of their lists are chronic economic and social challenges.

4. Threats according to the interviews

4.1 Method of work

As described above, the study of official governmental documents did solely provide us with a number of partial lists of threats and challenges, not with a comprehensive list, neither with a hierarchy between them. Our interviews helped to fill that gap.

We asked all our interlocutors to give their professional, but personal view on the threats and challenges confronting the Netherlands. We believe that the interviews provided us with a useful picture of the thinking among the people that are professionally involved in advising the government about threats and challenges. However, the list presented below should neither be

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35 For details see Annex VII
36 For details see Annex VIII
considered as the official view of the Netherlands government, neither be considered as the official comprehensive view of the combination of the councils and departments we visited.

One of the challenges we were confronted with in this project was to prevent, as far as possible, any bias in the way we conducted the interviews, e.g. by selecting respondents who look at the world from a certain angle or by preselecting a number of threats and challenges to choose from. To prevent a bias in the selection of our interlocutors, we requested interviews with representatives of all eleven ministries\textsuperscript{37} and of the advisory bodies that are mentioned on the website of the Netherlands Scientific Council for Government Policy (WRR)\textsuperscript{38}. A disadvantage of widening the choice of our interlocutors was that most of them were not sufficiently familiar with the OSCE to give a well-founded advise on the possible role of the OSCE.

In total we interviewed officials of ten ministries, a representative of Rijkswaterstaat (a division of the Dutch Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment responsible for the construction and maintenance of the main infrastructure in the Netherlands) and representatives of thirteen advisory bodies\textsuperscript{39}.

In a note explaining the purpose of the interview\textsuperscript{40} and during the interview itself, we asked our interlocutors not to limit themselves to addressing the threats and challenges in their domain, but to give their view on the overall hierarchy of priorities.

In order not to prejudge the answers, during the first twelve interviews we did not present the interviewee with a list of threats to choose from. On the basis of these first 12 interviews we drew up a list of the threats mentioned so far that we presented to the other 12 interviewees with the request to name the five most important current threats and the five most important threats in 10 to 20 years time, giving them the opportunity to name other threats. This resulted in a list of 49 threats and challenges.

4.2 Threats and challenges mentioned during interviews

In this report we have clustered slightly differently formulated answers when they were in essence the same, e.g. the danger of growing inequality and the threat of a growing dichotomy in society, but in this list we have kept comparable answers separate when clustering would lead to a loss of information, e.g. we have kept transnational crime separate from cybercrime, although it can be argued that cybercrime is a special case of transnational crime. Neither did we combine cybercrime with the vulnerability of the ICT infrastructure, although it could be argued that these are two sides of the same coin, because it was felt that the vulnerability of the ICT infrastructure is a risk in itself, even without actions of malicious hackers.

In the following list the threats are placed according to the frequency they were mentioned. It should be noted that the figures cannot be simply added up. The number of respondents that mentioned cyber security is not 16 (7 people mentioning Cybercrime and 9 mentioning Vulnerability of ICT infrastructure), because a few people mentioned both and are therefore counted twice.

\textsuperscript{37} See Annex III
\textsuperscript{38} See http://www.wrr.nl/en/raad/adviesraden-in-nederland/overzicht-adviesraden/; This list proved to be neither up to date, nor complete, but there is no reason to suspect a bias with regard to the OSCE. We considered to interview representatives of all the advisory bodies not mentioned in this list and added the Health Council of the Netherlands to our list, but quickly learned that the number is so large that it would be impossible to do in the limited time available
\textsuperscript{39} See Annex IV
\textsuperscript{40} See Annex X
1. Growing social-economic and social-cultural inequality  
   mentioned 17 times
2. Climate change
3. Geopolitical change
4. Vulnerability of ICT infrastructure
5. Diminishing legitimacy of institutions such as government and science
6. Short-term perspective of governments
7. Spillover from instability and failing states
8. Cybercrime
9. Vulnerability of national and international infrastructures
10. Scarcity of raw materials, including water
11. Infectious diseases
12. Energy supply
13. Lack of sustainability
14. Extreme weather including flood disasters
15. Lifestyle diseases
16. Transnational crime
17. Risks of new technologies such as climate engineering
18. Political and ideological reaction against globalization
19. Nuclear proliferation
20. Food security
21. Lack of cooperation between ministries
22. Lack of trust in European and international cooperation
23. Decline of solidarity (both national and international)
24. Threat to western values
25. Disintegration of European cooperation
26. Sustainability of the national welfare state
27. Freedom and privacy endangered by quest for security
28. Loss of biodiversity
29. Inability of public to tolerate risks
30. Terrorism
31. Emergence of antibiotic resistance
32. Misuse of biotechnology
33. Population growth (outside OSCE area)
34. Industrial accidents
35. Aging populations

mentioned once:
36. Strengthening responsiveness to unknown threats and challenges
37. Migration
38. Conflict between generations
39. Collapse of capitalist system
40. Growing power of non-state actors
41. Impact of an asteroid
42. Traffic accidents
43. Decline of Russia
44. Low esteem of crafts
45. Neglect of cultural heritage
46. European banking crisis
47. Narrow-mindedness of governments
48. Earthquake in Groningen
49. Crisis in China
4.3 Perceived hierarchy of current threats and challenges.

Although not too much importance should be attached to the frequency reported above, both because the number of respondents is small and because our interpretation and clustering of the answers might be debatable, it does probably provide a fair overview of the thinking in the policy planning or general policy departments of the ministries and in the advisory boards and institutes.

On the basis of the above list we have arranged the threats that were mentioned more than once into twelve categories. (Most of the threats that were mentioned only once would also fit in one of these categories.) These twelve categories can be divided in two broad categories: (1) The adverse consequences of technological development and economic growth and (2) the lack of adequate responsiveness of governments and public to these adverse consequences.

Adverse consequences of technological development and economic growth:

1. Growing inequality, social-economic, social-cultural and educational; Decline of solidarity (both national and international); Sustainability of the national welfare state
2. Climate change and loss of biodiversity; Lack of sustainability; Extreme weather including flood disasters;
3. Geopolitical change and instability; Threat to western values; Spillover from instability and failing states; Vulnerability of national and international infrastructures
4. Cyber security: Cybercrime; Vulnerability of ICT infrastructure
5. Scarcities: Energy supply; Scarcity of raw materials and of water; Food security
6. Public Health: Infectious diseases; Life style diseases; Emergence of antibiotic resistance
7. Risks of new technologies such as climate engineering; Misuse of biotechnology; Nuclear proliferation
8. Transnational crime
9. Population growth (outside OSCE area)

Lack of adequate responsiveness to these adverse consequences:

1. Diminishing legitimacy of institutions such as government and science; Lack of trust in European and international cooperation; Disintegration of European cooperation
2. Short-term perspective of governments; Lack of cooperation between ministries
3. Political and ideological reaction against globalization; Terrorism; Inability of public to tolerate risks; Freedom and privacy endangered by quest for security

4.4 Perceived hierarchy of threats in 10 to 20 years.

As most of our interlocutors did not consider it useful to make a distinction between current threats and threats in 10 or 20 years time, we have not made separate lists of current and future threats. Most argued that although the consequences of some threats might not be fully felt until later this century, these threats should figure on the list of current threats. Examples of threats that will probably become more urgent over ten years are the risks of new technologies and the emergence of antibiotic resistance, but it can also be argued that all of the nine main direct threats mentioned in the paragraph above, with the possible exception of organized crime, will probably only become really urgent, at least for the Netherlands, in 10 to 20 years.
5. Summary and conclusions

5.1 What are the perceived threats and challenges?

On top of the list of priorities for the current Dutch government are two challenges: the economy and social security. The economic challenge is to overcome the current economic crisis and to strengthen the earning capacity of the Netherlands. The main social security challenge is to find a solution for the rising costs of health care, that almost doubled from slightly more than 8% of GDP in 1972 to almost 16% in 2012, forcing government to economize on education, defence, development cooperation, diplomacy etc. A third priority is European cooperation, partly because a demise of the Euro would have negative consequences for the Dutch economy.

Apart from what is being said in official statements like the Speech from the Throne, the Netherlands government has not published a government-wide view on what it considers to be the main threats and challenges. The security strategies of the ministries of Internal Affairs, of Security and Justice and of Foreign Affairs focus on traditional security threats, such as in particular failing states and instability, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, international crime and cyber security. It is noteworthy that they include scarcity of energy and basic materials and pandemics, but that makes it even more striking that for example climate change, loss of biodiversity and non-contagious diseases are not included. We certainly would have found these threats in the documents of other ministries, but that would not have given us a government wide list of priorities.

We had to make that list ourselves on the basis of our interviews. Because they were spread evenly over strategic advisors or their equivalents of all ministries and advisory boards, we believe the outcome gives a trustworthy overview of their thinking. It is not surprising that the list of threats mentioned in the interviews is much wider than the lists in the documents we studied, because we explicitly asked our interlocutors not to limit themselves to the traditional threats. What is noteworthy is that terrorism was mentioned only twice as a major threat. If terrorism was mentioned it was usually because of the negative consequences of an overreaction to terrorism.

The threats and challenges that were mentioned most often could be ordered in four categories:

1. The threat mentioned by a majority as the most important threat: inequality
2. Four threats ending more or less ex aequo on the second place:
   - Climate change and loss of biodiversity
   - Geopolitical change and instability
   - Cyber security
   - Scarcities
3. Two threats ending on the third place:
   a. Public health
   b. Risks of new technologies
4. Lack of responsiveness of governments

Growing inequality was on top of many lists. The forces that during the last century made society more equal, now seem to work in opposite direction, leading to a widening gap between highly educated, healthy and wealthy citizens that benefit from globalization and lower educated citizens with little change for upward mobility who feel victimized by globalization. The difference in average number of healthy years of life between the highest and the lowest educated segment of Dutch society is now 20 years.
**Climate change and loss of biodiversity**: Most respondents felt that the direct impact on the Netherlands and Europe will probably remain manageable, but that climate change and loss of biodiversity will probably lead to disasters and instability in other parts of the world.

**Geopolitical change and instability**: International cooperation in a time of changing power relations requires great skills of all parties involved. The combination with climate change, scarcities and failing states such as South Sudan and Syria, makes this challenge even greater.

**Cyber security**: The vulnerability of our ICT infrastructure is underestimated, not only for attacks and cybercrime, but also for human mistakes. It is unclear which minister in the Netherlands has the overall responsibility for ICT-issues.

**Scarcities**: Our interlocutors were more optimistic about finding technical solutions than about the political handling of these problems. If managed wisely at local, national, regional and global level, growing scarcities of water and raw materials do not have to lead to armed conflict and disaster. However, policies and actions directed at short term unilateral gain could have such unintended consequences.

**Public Health**: New infectious diseases can result in acute crisis situations in particular with growing antibiotic resistance. Life style diseases will however probably remain more deadly;

**Risks of new technologies** are larger than before, both because of the unprecedented amount of scientific research and because of the fast spread of new technologies over the world.

**Lack of responsiveness**. Many of our respondents pointed to the difficulty governments have to react adequately to new threats, either overreacting, as in the case of terrorism, or postponing necessary changes of policy year after year. The shortsightedness of governments might be provoked by the capriciousness of voters, but threatens to undermine the trustworthiness and legitimacy of governments.

### 5.2 Which threats require international action?

The purpose of our study is to look at *transnational* threats and challenges and to look at other threats only in order to find out whether there is a need for additional research on human and social security-related threat perceptions. However, this raises the question whether transnational threats and challenges can be distinguished from non-transnational threats and challenges. The broad consensus among the people interviewed was that very few, if any, of the threats confronting us are of an exclusively national character. Not one of the threats and challenges mentioned above can be addressed efficiently and effectively by the Netherlands in isolation, although the type of international action needed will vary from case to case.

To answer the question what type of international action might be required, it seems useful to divide threats in three categories: global threats, transboundary threats and national or local threats.

Global threats are threats that express themselves at a global scale irrespective of state boundaries. Examples of such threats are rising sea levels, cybercrime, loss of biodiversity and the spread of infectious diseases. Addressing these threats in an effective and efficient way is impossible without international action. States have a legitimate interest that all other states contribute their part in addressing these threats, even if the necessary measures will often have to be taken at the local or national level.

Transboundary threats are threats that, although not necessarily at a global level, have effects that cannot be contained within national borders and therefore require international action.
Examples are transnational crime, industrial accidents, resistance against antibiotics and environmental pollution.

At first sight it may seem that threats that are not global and have no direct transboundary effects can do without international action. There are, however, several reasons why also in these cases some type of international action might be required.

- **to honour international obligations**
  Even when there are no direct transboundary effects, the Netherlands is not free to do whatever it likes with its nature, its culture, its minorities etc., A large number of treaties forbid that and oblige the government to give account to the international community of the way it deals with human rights, with the protection of nature, with its sites inscribed on the World Heritage List, etc. etc.

- **to make use of economies of scale**
  Development of new medicines, for example, is not cost-effective on a national scale.

- **to prevent unnecessary interference with free trade**
  Even when countries are free to set their own rules and standards for food security, they have to take into account that interfering with free trade can make food more expensive.

- **to facilitate freedom of movement and establishment**
  A growing number of citizens studies, works and lives part of his life in another country. Governments should facilitate this by conferring with other countries to coordinate and attune rules and regulations.

- **to learn from the experiences of others**
  Even in cases where not one of these arguments is valid, it is likely that one can learn from the experience of others, even if the context is different.\(^{41}\)

### 5.3 What role for the OSCE?

In order to prevent a bias in favour of the OSCE, we interviewed a wide range of people. Instead of interviewing the usual suspects and getting the usual answers, we interviewed people that, for the most part, were not familiar with the OSCE. Although they were usually not able to give concrete advice to the OSCE, their views on social, economic, scientific and ecological challenges can be of great relevance for the second and third dimension of the OSCE.

Of the documents we studies only the *International Security Strategy* mentions two subjects where the OSCE might play a role: cyber security and early warning and early action in conflict zones, both typical security subjects. Although the OCSE undoubtedly has a role to play in the field of traditional security, it seems that other opportunities for the OSCE to play a constructive role are systematically overlooked.

The states that signed the Helsinki Declaration in 1975 had the wisdom to add the human dimension and the dimension of economics, science and technology and of the environment to the CSCE process. This broad view was confirmed in the Paris Charter of 1990.

It will be clear from what has been said above, that, although traditional security threats remain on the agenda of the government of the Netherlands, social, economic and ecological challenges have moved to the top of that agenda. If this is also true for other OSCE Member States, then the OSCE might consider a more active role in its other dimensions.

Although the mandate of the OSCE is sufficiently wide to do so, it would seem that it has so far not played a major role in these fields. As far as this is the result of the fact that the government

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\(^{41}\) A surprising outcome of the interviews was that some of our interlocutors believed it makes no sense to look at the experience of other countries, because we can learn nothing from them.
departments that deal with OSCE matters are not competent in these fields, it is a problem that could and should be solved by involving the relevant governmental departments directly in the work of the OSCE. A more fundamental question is what the advantage of the OSCE is in these fields in comparison with the work done by i.a. the United Nations, the Council of Europe and the European Union, e.g. the unique membership of the OSCE.
Acknowledgements

We thank our colleagues at Clingendael, and in particular Louise van Schaik and Peter van Ham for their support and good advice. The responsibility for the paper lays of course solely with the authors.

Annexes

Annex I Project Proposal Threat Perceptions in the OSCE Area

1. Introduction

The present proposal concerns a project addressing a broad spectrum of threat perceptions by Participating States’ governments, including those related to
- military threats,
- transnational threats and
- other threats.

*Perceptions of military threats:* Since the beginning of 2013, there has been an ongoing debate on conventional arms control (CAC) in Europe, consisting of a number of Track II and mixed Track I/Track II events. NATO’s High Level Task Force is working on an initial proposal for starting new CAC negotiations. For the first time, this debate is now also happening within the OSCE. Because the underlying motivations and concerns are frequently not discussed, a study of military threat perceptions in the OSCE area would be helpful for the current CAC debate.

*Perceptions of transnational threats:* Transnational threats and challenges currently represent the area within the OSCE where the participating States most easily achieve consensus on joint documents and common action. The withdrawal of most of the armed coalition forces from Afghanistan after 2014 will probably lead to specific challenges for parts of Central Asia. This is why studying transnational threat perceptions in the OSCE area is relevant at the current stage.

*Other threats:* The analysis of other threats does not represent a full-fledged element of the project, but primarily serves the purpose of finding out whether there is a need for additional research on human and social security-related threat perceptions. The analysis of a broad spectrum of threat perceptions that governments have and the comparison among them will provide background information to and thus facilitate discussions in the OSCE’s Helsinki + 40 process.

2. Objectives of the Project

The objective of the project is to analyze the threat perceptions of relevant state actors in the OSCE area in the two categories mentioned above. Including the threat perceptions of the broader population would have been desirable, but would clearly have gone beyond what is possible in this project. The study will analyze only threat perceptions that governments have and not “objective threats” as seen by any author. There will also be no analysis of whether the threats perceived by this or that government are “true” or “realistic”. However, explanations by government officials and experts on the nature and quality of threat perceptions, as given in interviews, will be taken into account. The study will map threat perceptions in order to give a more solid background for current and future debates within the OSCE. On this basis, the study will compare the states’ main threat perceptions to find out which are shared and where they diverge.

3. Level and Geographical Scope, Output

The analysis will deal with the level of government. Each expert of the network, who participates in the project, will analyze the threat perceptions of its own government. The rationale for this proposal is that the very first project by the OSCE Network of Think Tanks and Academic Institutions should be as inclusive as possible and, therefore, no member of the network who wishes to participate should be refused. Although this approach will not cover every participating State, it seems to be the best approach...
under the current circumstances. It is intended to address states that represent all sub-regions of the OSCE. In accordance with the discussion at the network meeting in Vienna on 30 October 2013, experts of about 20 institutes will participate in the project. Each institute will contribute a country study on the threat perceptions of the government of its country with no more than 15-20 pages and an executive summary of two pages. The aggregate final product, drafted by the project co-ordinator, should not exceed 25 pages. In drafting and further revising the study, the co-ordinator will be supported by an editorial group (see pt. 5).

4. Sources and Methodology
The study will be based on official documents and semi-standardized interviews. Documents will include state security policy and defence strategies, white books, official statements, including those from international organizations, governmental statements in parliamentary records, and articles by and interviews with officials in the media. Individual interviews will be conducted with government officials and with experts who are familiar with governmental thinking. About ten interviews for each state would be required. The project co-ordinator will provide a guideline for these interviews.

5. Co-ordinator, Editorial Group, Working Mode and Timeline
The network meeting on 30 October agreed on Wolfgang Zellner as the project co-ordinator. In this capacity, he will apply for the necessary funds. The same meeting also established an editorial group comprising Jim Collins, Barend ter Haar, Walter Kemp, Andrei Zagorski, Wolfgang Zellner and, in a supporting role, Ursula Froese from the OSCE Secretariat.

The following timeline was decided upon:

a) The deadline for the country reports will be 31 January 2014.

b) The deadline for the draft final report will be 15 March 2014.

c) A meeting of all institutes participating in the project will take place in late March 2014. Its purpose will be to discuss the draft report.

d) Subsequently, the editorial group will revise and complete the report. The final product has to be approved by all institutes participating in the project.

e) The co-ordinator will arrange design, layout and printing of the final report.

The report should be finalized by the end of April 2014 and could be presented subsequently at a special event.

Annex II  List of Project Participants as of 30 October 2013

<table>
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<th>E-mail</th>
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Annex III  List of ministries that were visited

Ministry of General Affairs (Prime Minister’s Office)
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Ministry of Defence
Ministry of Economic Affairs
Ministry of Finance
Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment
Ministry of Education, Culture and Science
Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment
Ministry of Security and Justice
Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sport
Annex IV  List of advisory bodies that were visited

Advisory Council for Science and Technology Policy (AWT)
Advisory Council on International Affairs (AIV)
Council for Culture
Council for Public Administration [Raad voor het openbaar bestuur – ROB]
Council for Public Health and Health Care (RVZ)
Council for Social Development (RMO)
Education Council
Health Council
National Institute for Public Health and the Environment (RIVM)
Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis (CPB)
Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency PBL
Netherlands Institute for Social Research (SCP)
Scientific Council for Government Policy (WRR)

Annex V  List of persons that were interviewed

Dr. W. Asbeek (Director, Scientific Council for Government Policy)
Drs. B.D. Baks (Senior Advisor Directorate of Emancipation, Ministry of Education, Culture and Science)
Dr. J.A. Bartelse (Secretary, Council for Culture)
Dr. R.V. Bijl (Deputy Director, Netherlands Institute for Social Research)
Dr. C.J.M. Breed (Secretary, Council for Public Administration)
Drs. J.D. Brilman (Senior Coordinator Cluster Economy, Organization of Markets and Strategy, Ministry of Finance)
Dr. D.J.M. Corbey (Secretary, Advisory Council for Science and Technology Policy)
Drs. J.K. Eenhoorn (Senior Strategy Advisor, Rijkswaterstaat)
Drs. R. Gans (Director International Affairs, Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment)
Drs. A.M. Gielen (Councillor, Ministry of General Affairs)
Prof. dr. G.M.M. Gelauff (Deputy Director of the Management Board, Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis)
Ir. B.M.E. Geurts (Councillor, Ministry of General Affairs)
Prof. dr. W.A. van Gool (President, Health Council of the Netherlands)
Drs. J.H. Heres (Senior Advisor Directorate of Knowledge, Ministry of Education, Culture and Science)
Mr. drs. T.F.M. Hooghiemstra (Management, Council for Public Health and Health Care)
Dr. R. Janssens (General Secretary, Dutch Council for Social Development)
Dr. M.M. Kommer (Deputy Director Strategy, Ministry of Security and Justice)
Ms. M.E. Kwast-van Duursen (Secretary Peace and Security Committee, Advisory Council on International Affairs)
Ir. H. Leeflang (Director Strategy, Knowledge and Innovation, Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment)
Dr. M.G. Mennen (General Secretary, Dutch Safety and Security expert network at the National Institute for Public Health and the Environment)
Drs. T.D.J. Oostenbrink (Executive Secretary, Advisory Council on International Affairs)
Dr. A.C. Petersen (Deputy Head of Department/Chief Scientist Department of Information, Data and Methodology, Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency)
Drs. A. van der Rest (Secretary Director, Education Council)
Mr. drs. B.F. Steur (Senior Strategy Advisor, Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations)
Drs. F.W. Suijker (Deputy Director General Economic Policy)
Drs. A.P. Venema (Director International Affairs and Operations, Ministry of Defence)
Dr. ir C.M. Vos (Advisor research policy and knowledge management, Ministry of Health Welfare and Sport)
Dr. R.C.P.M. Went, (Senior Scientific Staff Member/Project Coordinator, Scientific Council for Government Policy)
Mr. dr. J. Wiers (Director Strategy Advisory Unit, Ministry of Foreign Affairs)
Annex VI  Leading risk factors for public health

It is very instructive to have a look at the interactive website of the Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation (IHME). Its estimate of global risk factors in 2010 is the following:

1. High blood pressure
2. Smoking
3. Household air pollution
4. Low fruit
5. Alcohol use
6. High body-mass index
7. High fasting plasma glucose
8. Childhood underweight
9. Ambient PM pollution
10. Physical inactivity
11. High sodium
12. Low nuts and seeds
13. Iron deficiency
14. Suboptimal breastfeeding
15. High total cholesterol
16. Low whole grains
17. Low vegetables
18. Low omega-3
19. Drug use
20. Occupational injury
21. Occupational low back pain
22. High processed meat
23. Intimate partner violence
24. Low fiber
25. Lead

Annex VII  The main threats and challenges in Troonrede en Regeringsverklaring

It can be expected that threats and challenges that have a high priority will have been mentioned in both the Troonrede en de Regeringsverklaring. We have therefore clustered the references to threats and challenges in both documents. Two subjects are clearly at the top of the list: the economic crisis (13 references) and the sustainability of the social security system (9 references). European cooperation comes at the third place with 5 references (three of them also referring to the economic crisis, because a well functioning European Union is a requirement for national economic recovery).

International cooperation is mentioned three times. Combating nuclear terrorism, clean energy and greening of the economy, a new system of youth care, reform of the housing market and reform of public governance only once.

1. The economic crisis; the debt burden of the government and Dutch households; the capital position of our banks; Strengthening the growth potential of a sustainable and innovating economy, to strengthen the Netherlands' economic growth potential; achieving a 'prudent level of public debt'; A solid budget; Use education to strengthen the economy; concluding free trade agreements with countries like the United States and Japan; the establishment of a European banking union (2x); traditional forms of development aid with policy to strengthen trade relations (2x); a well-functioning European internal market with a stable Euro (2x); European cooperation that contributes to the wealth and wellbeing of the Europeans (2x).
2. The classical post-war welfare state unsustainable in its present form; long-term care expenditures rising out of control; far-reaching reforms to long-term care; An equitable

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distribution of benefits and burdens; An affordable social security system adjusting rising costs of
long term care and welfare; to foster solidarity between generations and between different income
groups; help people receiving social assistance or with an occupational disability find work;
demographic ageing; a well-functioning national labour market.

3. To work with other countries, particularly our closest neighbours; play an active role in the
European Union; the establishment of a European banking union (2x); a well-functioning
European internal market with a stable Euro (2x); European cooperation that contributes to the
wealth and wellbeing of the Europeans (2x).

4. Promotion of international legal order and human rights; an international legal order with a strong
emphasis on humanitarian law; link traditional forms of development aid with policy to
strengthen trade relations (2x);

5. Combating nuclear terrorism.

6. Clean energy and greening of the economy

7. Develop a new system of youth care

8. Reform of housing market

9. Reform of public governance

Annex VIII Main threats according to the National and International Security
Strategies

Classic threats
- Failing states and instability (2)
- Risk countries
- Proliferation of CBRN (chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear) weapons (2)
- terrorism (2)
- international crime (2)
- global drugs trade
- piracy
- instability caused by the exploitation of new regions like the Arctic,
- threats to international trade including fraud and corruption

Social-economic threats
- increase of (ethnic) tensions and decrease of citizenship
- radicalization (leading to breakdown of social cohesion)
- cyber security (2)
- scarcity of energy and basic materials (2)

Natural threats
- Increased risk of flooding
- Extreme drought/heath
- Plagues
- Pandemics (2)
- loss of biodiversity
- degradation is a potential source of conflict.
- climate change could lead to major security problems

Other threats
- implications of nano-, bio- and neurotechnology, including for bio security
- protectionism (e.g. with regard to rare earth metals)

Challenges:
- arms control,
- crisis management
- ensure access to raw materials
- deepen our collaboration with our European partners.
- Let Europe take more responsibility
- make the EU an even stronger force in the area of security.
- Make Europe invest more in stability in North Africa, the Sahel, the Horn of Africa, the Middle East and the Caucasus.
- promote early warning and early action in conflict zones
- Reduction of the number of tactical nuclear weapons throughout Europe
- An integrated approach to planning involving all relevant ministries and organisations

Threats mentioned in both strategies:
- Failing states and instability (2)
- Proliferation of CBRN (chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear) weapons (2)
- terrorism (2)
- international crime (2)
- cyber security (2)
- scarcity of energy and basic materials (2)
- Pandemics (2)

Annex IX List of publications recommended in interviews and/or used for this report


De sociale staat van Nederland 2013 (in Dutch) *Netherlands Institute for Social Research (SCP) 2013*


Publieke Kennisinvesteringen en de waarde van wetenschap (in Dutch), *Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences*, (2013).


Background for the interview about threats and challenges

The objective of the project of about 20 think-tanks and academic institutions in OSCE-countries is to analyse the perceptions of relevant state actors in the OSCE area of military threats and of transnational threats. The analysis of other perceived threats, that is threats that are not military or transnational, “primarily serves the purpose of finding out whether there is a need for additional research on human and social security-related threat perceptions”.

However, whether a specific non-military threat is transnational or not will often be a question of debate, as very few threats and challenges are of a completely national character. The concept of threats should, in our view, therefore be interpreted in the widest possible sense. We furthermore note that the terms non-military threats and challenges often refer to the same problems.

The participating institutes agreed that interviews should be conducted as semi-structured interviews in a fairly open manner with the following key objectives:

1. What is in your view the hierarchy of current threats?
2. What will in your view be the hierarchy of future threats (in 10 to 20 years)?
3. Are, in your view, these threats sufficiently addressed by activities of states and international organizations?
4. (a) which threats are, in your view, not sufficiently addressed?
   (b) could the OSCE play a role in addressing them better?

In addition we might pose the following questions:

5. Are there any official documents that you would like to recommend?
6. Are there any government officials or experts you would recommend to interview?

Each of the institutes that participate in the OSCE project will contribute a country study on the threat perceptions of the government of its country of no more than 15-20 pages and an executive summary of two pages. The aggregate final product should not exceed 25 pages.

The study will be based on official documents and semi-standardized interviews. Documents will include state security policy and defence strategies, white books, official statements, including those from international organizations, governmental statements in parliamentary records, and articles by and interviews with officials in the media.
The interviews will be conducted with government officials and with experts who are familiar with governmental thinking. In order to get a balanced view, we aim to conduct interviews with representatives of all ministries and of all official advisory boards.

We will make a report of each interview for our own internal use. For that purpose we might ask your permission to make use of a voice recorder.

We will combine the results of our interviews in a general non-attributable overview that will be part of our national report. In the annexes of our national report we will mention both the institutes and ministries that we have visited and the names of the persons we have interviewed.
In case we would like to quote you in our report, we will explicitly ask for your consent.