European defence: from strategy to delivery

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Abstract: The new Global Strategy should provide the overall direction for the European Union’s foreign and security policy in a world of multiple and complex challenges and threats. A stronger Common Security and Defence Policy is indispensable for a secure Europe and necessary to underpin the EU’s role as a security provider. However, without credible armed forces the EU will remain a paper tiger. A CSDP White Book has to translate the Global Strategy into CSDP ambition levels, military objectives and capability needs. It should also define a new process as to how to deliver these. Voluntarism and free riding has to be replaced by political peer pressure, assessment and the accountability of the member states’ efforts to improve required capabilities for solving Europe’s shortfalls. All financial incentives should be used, including those offered by the Union budget to support the development of dual-use capacities in areas like communications, intelligence, reconnaissance and protection.

Keywords: European Union, strategy, defence, military capabilities

Introduction

“Europe should be ready to share in the responsibility for global security and in building a better world.” This is not the opening sentence of the European Union’s new global strategy of 2016, but the concluding phrase of the first section of the European Security Strategy of 2003. Today, the world is not safe and secure. On the contrary, Europe is confronted with an even more complex set of security challenges than back in 2003. Close to the EU’s borders instability and conflict have widely spread. In the East a nationalistic Russia is threatening the European security order by violating basic rules of international relations and by hybrid interventionism. To the South the Syrian war and the turmoil in Africa have resulted in a massive increase of refugees to Europe, from around 230,000 in 2014 to more than a million last year. The tragic terrorist attacks in Paris in January and November 2015 have proven that extremism in the Middle East can reach press offices, cafes and theatres in a European capital. Nobody needs to explain anymore that external and internal security are inextricably linked.

It is therefore no surprise that in 2015 the European Union has embarked on the road to develop a new Global Strategy for foreign and security policy, to be delivered to the European Council by June this year. The designated architect, the EU’s High Representative Federica Mogherini, has the challenging task of defining the goals and direction of the Union’s strategic engagement in what she had labelled as a complex, connected and contested world (EEAS, 2015). Moreover, the new strategy should also depict how the EU should use, in a coherent way, all its available instruments, from trade and development aid to crisis management tools under the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). However, the EU cannot play its role as a strategic actor without the necessary capabilities. While the Union is strong in areas like trade policy, humanitarian assistance and development, it remains rather
weak in deploying military and civilian crisis management tools. True, in 15 years a great deal of progress has been made and the EU is conducting over twenty CSDP operations and missions today in Europe, the Middle East and Africa. But equally it is a fact that Europe continues to lack military capabilities to operate across the board of the force spectrum, including at the high end. Sustaining military operations over a longer time has also become a problem due to budget cuts and reduced armed forces. So, the global strategy is most needed to set the EU’s course through the turbulent waters of the new security environment. However, sailing at the right rate of knots and reaching safe harbours will require that Europe has all the necessary capabilities at its disposal. For that purpose, the Global Strategy will have to be underpinned by sectoral policies, including a CSDP White Book. It should ‘translate’ the Global Strategy’s goals and priorities into military objectives, define new ambition levels and indicate the implications for capability development. The aim of such a White Book is not to create a European Army, but to steer and direct the member states in aligning, combining and even integrating their armed forces in order to realise more standardised, more deployable and more fit-for-purpose military capabilities for the European Union – as well as for other international organisations like NATO.

The Netherlands’ EU Presidency in the first semester of 2016 has the ambitious but equally challenging task - together with High Representative Mogherini – to start constructing the building blocks of a CSDP White Book. This article explains the background and context of the EU’s new Global Strategy, exploring its scope and desired outcome, including the need for launching the elaboration of a CSDP White Book. It then addresses the aims, and potential content of such a White Book, assessing the consequences for the CSDP, for military capability development as well as for the technological and industrial base in Europe.

The new Global Strategy

More and more complex threats

Europe is facing a deteriorating security environment. The so-called ‘ring of fire’ that is surrounding the European Union is more like a ‘crescent of complex security threats’ to the East, South-East and South. It marks a step change from the Cold War period that started in 1989 and ended in approximately 2014. In this period of more than two decades, Europe was grappling with German unification, enlargement, becoming an ever closer Union and developing its role as a crisis management actor. It was a period in which Europe was trying to find its feet under the patient tutelage of the United States, which continued to subsidise the defence of Europe through NATO. That relatively comfortable period for Europe is winding down and Europe is entering a new era. Various US administrations have made it clear that the wealthy European states have to take more responsibility for their security and in particular for crises in Europe and in its neighbourhood. Europe’s external action, its Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and its Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) should be an expression of the shared interests and values as well as of the foreign and security policy goals that follow from them. So far, despite some successes, none of these policies have lived up to expectations. It should be a wake-up call that, by now, the Americans are more supportive of a CSDP than some of the EU member states themselves.

A change in international relations mostly comes about through external driving forces. This is certainly true for the development of the EU as a security provider, although the influence of EU internal integration processes should not be underestimated either. The changed foreign and security priorities of the US, pivoting towards Asia, and the multitude of security threats that are piling up in the vicinity of Europe’s borders is providing an undeniable external incentive for change. At the same time, Europe is confronted with a systemic change as well. Western dominance has given way to an international system that is increasingly characterised by multipolarity (Biscop et al., 2015). States are more and more confronted with challenges of non-state actors and diffuse transnational threats necessitating a broadened concept of security. In its immediate neighbourhood, Europe has to take on security challenges on two fronts. To the East, Russian revisionism presents a challenge to both the EU and NATO as well as to the rules-based order of the post-Second World War world. With the
United States being increasingly focused on the Asia-Pacific theatre, the European countries collectively will need to step up their autonomous capacity to provide conventional deterrence and a comprehensive response to the threat of hybrid warfare. On the Southern flank, direct challenges stem from political turmoil and civil conflict, in particular in Syria and North Africa, generating regional instability, terrorism and mass refugee flows. Political and demographic trends suggest that these issues will remain a challenge for the foreseeable future.

It is clear that nothing hits home so convincingly as the direct threat to Europe that its own radicalised citizens and terrorist cells pose. The attacks on the Jewish museum in Brussels, in Copenhagen and the attacks in Paris, most notably on 13 November 2015, have brought security threats within Europe’s borders more tangibly than had been the case for decades. It is an illustration of just how much security threats to Europe’s citizens are intertwined with external conflicts and causes. The Paris attacks also reminded the member states what it means to have a common security policy and the solidarity that this entails. France invoked the mutual assistance clause within the EU Treaty (Art. 42.7, which is akin to NATO’s Article 5), obliging other member states to assist in operations in Syria/Iraq and Mali so that France would be able to focus on its acute internal security threats and beef up its campaign against Islamic State (ISIS). The quick but diverse response to the invocation of Art. 42.7, the lack of solidarity concerning the mass migration flows and the divide between prioritising the threats from the East or those from the South are testing the unity and solidarity of the European Union. This poses an existential threat, as it calls into question the very foundations of the EU.

**The Global Strategy process**
Against this complex backdrop of systemic changes and altering security threats, it is actually overdue that the EU has embarked on developing a new strategy for its foreign and security policy, dubbed the ‘Global Strategy’. The European Council tasked the High Representative in December 2013 to come up with a strategic assessment, resulting in a formal tasking at the European Council in June 2015: ‘the High Representative will continue the process of strategic reflection with a view to preparing an EU global strategy on foreign and security policy in close cooperation with Member States, to be submitted to the European Council by June 2016’ (General Secretariat of the Council, 2015). The European Vice President and High Representative Federica Mogherini laid the groundwork in her strategic assessment in which she analysed, making use of a catchy alliteration, that the world had become more ‘connected, contested and complex’. While many expected the new strategy to be a new *security* strategy as a successor to the one from 2003, it soon became clear that the Global Strategy that Mogherini was aiming for, would be a strategy to guide the external action of the EU in the broader sense.

Although formally no text has been made public as yet, some elements of the Global Strategy have seen the light of day through the public diplomacy campaign that is accompanying the process. The guiding theme of ‘pragmatic idealism’ and the five building blocks in which the EU interests precede the EU principles, betray the attempt for an interests-based approach. After some doubts as to whether security and defence will be given sufficient attention the VP/HR Mogherini has emphasised that security and defence will be an integral part of each chapter (Mogherini, 2015).

**The indispensable CSDP**
It is vital that the Global Strategy will have to underpin the CSDP as one of the indispensable tools to complete a comprehensive response to the hybridity of the security challenges that the EU faces. Without a credible hard power instrument, the EU’s other tools might not even come into play at all.

So far, the CSDP’s crisis management operations have been relatively small, of limited duration and conducted against technologically less advanced adversaries. Although the need for such operations is likely to remain, the Global Strategy should reflect that the current security situation is much more demanding in several ways. ISIS taking control of large areas in Iraq, Syria and the northern coast of Libya is not only destabilising the Middle East and North Africa. By exporting terrorism and generating support within the European Union the activities of the Caliphate have a direct impact on Europe’s own territorial security. ISIS has taken on state-like features as it is claiming territory,
generating resources from it and using it as a launching pad for terrorist attacks against other countries. More than ever before, CSDP has to be interlinked with the area of Freedom, Security and Justice and to assist in managing the security of Europe’s borders. The trend of FSJ agencies and instruments being involved in CSDP operations was already ongoing. Under duress the cooperation has progressed swiftly and there is a clear need for CSDP being closely involved in Frontex or in the probably more sizeable and robust Border Security and Coast Guard Agency that is now being developed. The political will to bridge the legal divide and stove piping between the European Commission and Council instruments seems to be there and clear language in the Global Strategy can further mobilise this.

But this is not the only way in which CSDP is evolving. Moscow’s hybrid tactics do not only require a robust conventional deterrent, but a much wider range of responses. For instance, the EU and CSDP, in consultation with NATO, should prepare for contributing to cyber security, strategic communication, assistance in security sector reform, border management and various types of assistance to the non-NATO EU countries Sweden and Finland. In November 2015, it became clear that Articles 42.7 TEU and 222 TFEU² are no longer gathering dust on the shelves of the Treaty, but need further elaboration as to the requirements, procedures and political clarity. In addition, the blurring of internal and external security issues has demonstrated the obvious interlinkage and overlap of the clauses. This also needs to be addressed at short notice and the Global Strategy should indicate the urgency thereof.

The Global Strategy runs the risk of remaining a paper exercise of which the EU has already seen so many. That is why the Global Strategy 2016 should be the starting point of a strategic process in which the EU revisits its strategic priorities every five years. This would build a strategic narrative for the EU over time and gives each HR/VP the opportunity to make his or her mark at the early stages of his/her term. In addition, it is paramount that the Global Strategy is translated into a number of more practical sectoral papers that stipulate levels of ambition, capability needs and how to realise these capabilities in areas such as development aid, maritime security, counter-terrorism and CSDP. For CSDP, this could take the form of a White Book.

A CSDP White Book

Political influence, diplomacy, trade and economic power are important areas for the EU to make its mark in world affairs. But, if needed, they have to be backed up by military power in order to be effective. The EU’s Maritime Security Strategy of 2014 has clearly recognised the need for defence involvement in ensuring free access to open seas, which is crucial as 80 percent of EU trade is seaborne. Operation Atalanta off the Somalia coast, fighting and preventing piracy, has been successful in securing crucial sea lines of communication for commercial shipping. EU naval forces are also deployed in support of securing the EU’s borders (Operation Sophia in the Central Mediterranean). The cyber realm and outer space are crucial areas for transmitting information and have become critical enablers for the economy and the well-being of European citizens. All these newly emerging security challenges ask for comprehensive or integrated responses – the whole-of-government approach – but without the military element these will be weak and lacking credibility. Finally, European defence is also about maintaining the key technological and industrial capacities in Europe which are needed for autonomous action. Without a healthy defence industrial base which can deliver essential military capacities the EU has no guarantee that it can turn political decisions into action when this involves armed force.

CSDP: theory and practice

The European Security and Defence Policy – ESDP, now changed into the CSDP since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty – has been designed on the basis of the security needs of the 1990s. The conflicts in the Balkans triggered the Franco-British St. Malo agreement of December 1998. It launched defence cooperation in the EU context with a focus on external crisis management, while retaining collective territorial defence as a core task of NATO. The so-called Petersberg tasks,
originating from the Western European Union in the early nineties, had already been incorporated in the 1997 Amsterdam EU Treaty. Related ‘illustrative scenarios’, used by military force planners to assess the required European capabilities, also became the basis for collective requirements setting in the EU. In essence, ESDP would focus on peacekeeping, peacebuilding and peace enforcing tasks and on supporting humanitarian missions. However, reality shows that, over time, ESDP/CSDP operations and missions have developed according to practical needs on the one hand (demand) and available capabilities on the other (offer). On the demand side conflicts have shown a wide variety: short-term interventions to prevent humanitarian disasters (e.g. in Congo-Bunia, 2003), long-term support to stabilisation and normalisation (e.g. in Bosnia, since 2004), protection of UNHCR refugee camps (Chad + Central African Republic, 2008-09), anti-piracy off the coast of Somalia (since 2008) and, in recent years, the training of local forces (Mali, since 2013; Somalia, since 2010). On the civilian side the original focus of police and rule of law missions has shifted to security sector reform through training and assistance, in particular to the middle and higher management level (van der Laan, 2016). During the last few years capacity-building has dominated the majority of CSDP operations and missions rather than the traditional terminology of the Petersberg tasks.

**CSDP: coming home**

The new security environment already has its impact on CSDP operations. Operation Sophia involving European navies in the Central Mediterranean is in direct support of the EU’s border security activities. In 2014 Italian proposals for a comparable EU naval operation were rejected by most member states arguing that the CSDP was not designed to help protect European borders. It is difficult to find a clearer example of how old-school thinking has been overtaken by current events – in this case the influx of hundreds of thousands of migrants crossing the sea from Libya to Italy. The launching of a European Border Security and Coast Guard organisation to replace the existing Frontex agency is also proof of a quickly changing reality. Coast guards are composed of a mix of civilian and military personnel and assets. In many countries they form part of the national navy. Thus, the military are becoming more involved in EU (internal) security, either through supporting CSDP operations at Europe’s borders or directly by contributing to Frontex and the future Border Security and Coast Guard Agency. Another trend is the increasing dual use of assets and equipment. Satellite observation and air reconnaissance by manned and unmanned aircraft are already serving both military and civilian security actors. Again, the maritime sector is leading the way, for example by developing a cross-sector, civil-military maritime surveillance data exchange system. It will connect shore-based radars, air and space-based reconnaissance systems and naval assets – thus creating a network of networks for exchanging information on maritime trafficking. (Drent, Homan, Zandee, 2014).

**CSDP new style**

It is crystal clear that the CSDP of the outdated Petersberg tasks has to be replaced by a new CSDP. Three core tasks can be defined, based on already emerging practice and international security forecasts pointing to the continued existence and even widening of the arc of instability around Europe:

1. **Intervention and stabilisation:** CSDP’s classical task of crisis management but adjusted to modern requirements. The proliferation of arms, including heavy weapons, across the arc of instability implies that the EU military will have to be able to engage stronger opponents than in the past when rebels had the Kalashnikov as their key weapon. European intervention or initial entry capabilities have to be able to escalate to the high end of the spectrum in order to stop the fighting and force armed groups to turn in their weaponry. Unfortunately, European countries are still lacking adequate forces and, more particularly, key enablers like intelligence, strategic reconnaissance (ISR), air-to-air refuelling, precision munitions and medical evacuation. This traditional task is not limited to intervention. The long-term effort, based on the comprehensive approach of deploying all required civilian instruments in a coherent way with the military, will remain essential to move from ending fighting to stabilisation and normalisation. Here, European countries with a track record in contributing to the comprehensive approach will have to play a front role, but certainly all need to come on board as stability and normalisation operations have to be sustained over a long period of time. That requires the rotation of forces which should be distributed over all EU member states, reinforced with contributions from non-EU troop
contributors. Increasingly, handing over responsibilities to regional or local military actors will have to be part of this effort and, thus, there is a clear link here with the third task (see below).

2. **EU territorial protection**: CSDP is coming home and this needs to be reflected in the new set of tasks. Firstly, it requires concepts and doctrine as to how the military can support those actors who bear the prime responsibility in securing European borders. The comprehensive approach has been developed for civil-military interaction in crisis management; now, it also has to apply to the protection of the EU borders. Clearly, this is not territorial defence in the classical sense. This will remain NATO’s core business and is particularly relevant for the challenges posed by Russia’s armed forces. However, there is certainly a complementary role for the EU to play: in the areas of energy policy, sanctions and neighbourhood strategies, but also for CSDP in supporting state-building in countries like Ukraine. At its southern borders Europe is not so much challenged by military power, but by mass migration, terrorism and international crime. Here, the EU has to play the front role in protecting European interests and securing European borders. Recent times have shown that without military contributions the EU is not capable of handling the problems at its borders. So, this asks for a more structural and more fundamental approach, to be incorporated into the CSDP.

3. **Capacity-building**: the shift towards training and assisting regional organisations and nations in building their own capacities for crisis management is likely to continue. It is desirable in view of speeding up ‘local ownership’ of conflict resolution; it is needed as European forces are shrinking due to budget restraints and demographic trends. The current landscape of capacity-building is rather hazy as other organisations (such as NATO and the UN) and Western countries through national programmes are carrying out such programmes in an uncoordinated manner. Within the EU there is a lack of proper synchronisation between CSDP and Commission-funded activities. So, what is needed above all here is that all actors sit around the table – in a strategic capacity-building conference – to sort out ‘who could best do what’ to avoid duplication, overlap and a waste of resources. This conference should also be used to develop common policies on ‘train & equip’, which is another area of diverging behaviour, in particular among individual countries. Rules about the ‘what and how’ of equipping third parties with military materiel should be agreed and applied by all.

This new CSDP requires a wide set of capabilities: from low to high in the spectrum; at sea, in the air and on land; in the cyber realm and in outer space; and it has to incorporate civil-military connectivity.

**Capabilities**

This ambitious capability agenda is unlikely to be realised at 28 (or at 27, taking the Danish defence opt-out into consideration). Fifteen years of capability development in the CSDP context – the same applies to NATO - have taught us that speed is too slow. Taking decisions based on unanimity results per definition in the lowest common denominator. The flexible formula of the European Defence Agency – the géométrie variable which allows for varying membership of projects – has resulted in some progress but, overall, member states continue to carry out their defence planning and acquisition nationally. In the meantime the combination of budget austerity and the rising costs of defence equipment have reduced capabilities in all European countries. Many capitals have come to the conclusion that national capabilities can only be maintained by stepping up defence cooperation with other armed forces. In recent years this has resulted in a series of bilateral or regional defence cooperation agreements, such as the Franco-British Lancaster House Treaty, the Benelux defence cooperation, NORDEFCO,

The German-Dutch integration of Army units (air mobile and tanks) and many others. These clusters of trusted and like-minded neighbouring states have the best potential for deepening defence cooperation (Valasek, 2011; Drent, Zandee, Casteleijn, 2014). Would there be a role for the EU and its dedicated agency (EDA)? Certainly. This is exactly the gap that has to be filled, using the Global Strategy and a CSDP White Book as the context for change. Five elements should be part of the effort:
• Firstly, clusters are fine but they have to be connected in order to ensure that they do not float around without any direction. Their efforts to maintain and improve defence capabilities have to fit in the overall efforts to reduce European shortfalls. They should focus on the right priorities, which is not necessarily the case as cluster interests might be different, in particular when the industrial factor comes into play. Clearly, there is a role for the EU institutions here in terms of steering, monitoring and assessing the defence efforts of the member states.

• Secondly, member states should move from ad hoc multinational projects towards a systematic and structural alignment of their defence planning. This has never happened in the EU (or at NATO either). Both organisations only become involved once decisions have been taken nationally. The first attempts to align defence plans are now being undertaken in clusters. That is fine, but again it also has been done at the higher level. For this purpose EU Ministers of Defence approved the Policy Framework to foster systematic and long-term defence cooperation in 2014, but it is too weak and too generic. What is needed is a system which bridges the gap between voluntarism and the transfer of defence authority to the EU level, which for the moment remains a bridge too far. The Netherlands’ Presidency has opened the debate on issues like peer pressure, accountability and benchmarking. Hopefully, real progress will be made before the end of the first semester and, if so, the results should be incorporated into the CSDP White Book.

• Thirdly, the scope for deepening defence cooperation in smaller groups is incorporated in the Lisbon Treaty, in particular in the articles on permanent structured cooperation (PESCO). So far, these provisions remain a dead letter as member states prefer to operate outside the EU Treaty context. By bringing clusters with more clearly defined aims and programmes under PESCO the linkage with solving European shortfalls and with improving EU capabilities would become stronger. The controlling role of the EDA, as foreseen in the PESCO Protocol to the Lisbon Treaty, would ensure this connectivity to overall EU capability objectives. Article 42.7, already invoked by France, could also be used for other situations, for example in case of hybrid interventionism by Russia in the Baltic States.

• Fourthly, military and civilian capacities have to be linked more structurally than in the past. Dual use is a given in areas like communications, reconnaissance, transport, medical and logistics. Just like military assets are quite often deployed – nationally and internationally to assist civilian actors in case of disasters, in humanitarian missions or for counter-terrorism – equally it should be the other way around in applicable cases. This applies in particular to expensive, high-technology assets such as communication and earth observation satellites – in EU programmes like Copernicus and Galileo – and to medium-altitude long endurance unmanned aircraft systems (MALE-UAS). Resistance by civilian security actors against the ‘militarisation’ of their sectors – more based on emotions than facts – should be overcome. The same applies to legal obstructionism, coming into play particularly in the EU institutions.

• Fifthly, investment in technology – in particular where military and civilian requirements overlap – needs to be streamlined systematically between the EU (Commission) and the member states. Up until now, dual-use technology research is synchronised between the Commission and EDA (including sometimes the European Space Agency) on an ad hoc basis. In the discussions on the successor to the current Horizon 2020 programme – which will be concluded by 2019 – defence research has to be taken on board. The results of the Preparatory Action of the Commission on CSDP-related research (2017-2019) will be important, but the boat should not be missed by waiting for the final results.

Industry
Without a further consolidation of the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB) deepening defence cooperation at the EU level has little chance to succeed. The same applies to clusters of countries with sizeable defence companies on their national territory. Fragmentation of demand and fragmentation of supply have to be ended in parallel; if not, one of the two will block the
other. Large defence industries constructing complete weapon platforms – in the industrial jargon known as Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs) – have already started to merge as the market of their traditional national customers has become too small. In the aerospace sector Dassault, Airbus Defence and Finmeccanica have agreed to develop together a future European MALE-UAS. The French Nexter and the German Krauss Maffei Wegmann established in 2015 a common holding company, called KANT. It is the start of French-German industrial cooperation in building a common fleet of armoured vehicles in the future. The Dutch naval shipyard De Schelde is planning to build new submarines together with Saab-owned Kockums in Sweden. But the big challenge will be to create a level playing field for the tens of thousands of Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (SMEs). They are located all over Europe, including in smaller countries from where they face industrial protection walls to supply OEMs in bigger countries. The further development of European law to dismantle these barriers – still existing despite the Commission’s Directive on Defence Procurement – as well as programmes to assist SMEs in cross-border activities will be required. The full involvement of SMEs in defence market reform is all the more important as they are key in developing and supplying technologies. In order to maintain or acquire key technological and industrial capacities for European non-dependency on others, it is essential to have SMEs incorporated in the consolidation of the EDTIB.

Conclusion

Europe is at cross-roads: either it falls back to national approaches to deal with the huge security challenges of the 21st century or European countries make a big step in deepening defence cooperation. The first option will automatically lead to losing importance and influence on the international chess-board as a fragmented Europe will not be able to play a serious role against rising Kings and Queens. The second option provides the EU with the capacity to back up its international role in diplomacy, trade and economics as well as in contributing to conflict management. Without more defence cooperation the EU will not be able to act as a security provider or have the capacity to protect its own security.

The High Representative should avoid a ‘business as usual’ tone in the Global Strategy and point to the risks the EU runs in losing its ability to be of influence in international affairs. The Global Strategy should provide the overall guidance for the EU’s foreign and security policy, underlining the importance of the Common Security and Defence Policy and the need to adapt it to the new requirements. Consequently, a CSDP White Book should define more precisely what the Global Strategy means in terms of ambition levels of operations, in required capabilities and how to realise these. Defence has only one choice due to the rising costs of equipment, limited budgets and national markets which are too small: a deepening of cooperation with other European countries in order to maintain and modernise military capabilities which will otherwise be gradually lost. Certainly, this will not result in an EU Army in the foreseeable future. Bilateral and regional clusters will provide key building blocks. At the same time, overall political steering, coordination and assessment is needed, which can only be arranged at the higher EU level. In addition, the potential offered in the EU context for dual-use investment should be fully exploited and the European Commission’s agendas for further opening up the defence equipment market and reforming the defence industrial and technological base have to be implemented. In other words, the Global Strategy process should not remain limited to a paper exercise, but should be the catalyst for much needed delivery.

Notes

1. Art. 42.7, the ‘mutual assistance clause’ reads: “if a member state is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other member states shall have towards it an obligation of aid and
assistance by all the means in their power, in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations charter. This shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain member states.”

2. Article 222 (TFEU): “The Union and its Member States shall act jointly in a spirit of solidarity if a Member State is the object of a terrorist attack or the victim of a natural or man-made disaster. The Union shall mobilise all the instruments at its disposal, including the military resources made available by the Member States(…).”

3. In the EU jargon the word ‘operations’ is used for military deployments while ‘missions’ refers to civilian deployments.

4. The increase in defence equipment costs is higher than the inflation rate, which is related to investment needed for research & development and relative small markets (compared to the commercial sector). This implies that defence procurement budgets shrink adjusted to the inflation rate. As a result, the number of platforms (ships, aircraft, vehicles) to be procured will fall automatically.

5. Nordic Defence Cooperation (Denmark, Finland, Norway, Sweden)

6. Copernicus is the name of the EU programme for satellite earth observation services, led by the European Commission. Previously it was known as GMES (Global Monitoring for Environment and Security). Galileo is the name of the EU’s global satellite navigation system.

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