Gender, peace and security
Evaluation of the Netherlands and UN Security Council resolution 1325
Preface

For at least 20 years, gender equality has been an important theme for the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ policies on fragile and conflict-affected states. This is clear from a range of policy statements, letters and frameworks and, most prominently, the establishment of two Dutch National Action Plans (NAPs) to implement United Nations Security Council resolution 1325 on women, peace and security.

This resolution, unanimously adopted in 2000, was the first to address the disproportionate and unique impact that armed conflict has on women. It is deliberately oriented towards women (and girls) as a clear signal that a more activist approach to putting women on the peace and security agenda was necessary. The resolution is definitely not only about women as victims – but stresses the importance of women’s equal and full participation as active agents in the prevention and resolution of conflicts, peacebuilding and peacekeeping.

This report aims to assess what progress the Netherlands in putting this resolution into practice. In order to make this assessment, the report examines the two NAPs that were agreed in 2007 and 2011, and the activities undertaken by the signatories to these Plans, and it presents a picture of how issues concerning gender/women were mainstreamed in projects and programmes in fragile states and what results were obtained.

The report is a co-production of the Conflict Research Unit (CRU) of the Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael in The Hague and the Policy and Operations Evaluation Department (IOB) of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands. It was written by Rosan Smits, Deputy Head/Senior Research Fellow of the CRU and Paul G. de Nooijer, evaluator at IOB, with inputs provided by Kirsten Mastwijk, researcher at IOB. Internal quality control was ensured by IOB evaluators Marijke Stegeman and Margret Verwijk. External quality control was provided by a reference group, chaired by myself, comprising of Mirjam Krijnen (Head of the Task Force Women’s Rights and Gender Equality, Ministry of Foreign Affairs), Wendy Janssens (Amsterdam Institute for International Development, Vrije Universiteit), Marleen Dekker (Africa Study Centre, Leiden University) and Serena Cruz (Social Research and Gender Consultant, SCT – Development Solutions International). Comments were also received from the Dutch gender platform WO=MEN. The report has been edited by Jane Carroll.

Final responsibility for the report rests with IOB.

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List of acronyms and abbreviations

3D  Development, Diplomacy and Defence
ABA  American Bar Association
ARTF  Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund
CEDAW  Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
DDR  Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration
DRC  Democratic Republic of Congo
EKN  Embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands
FLOW  Funding Leadership and Opportunities for Women
GBV  Gender-based violence
IOB  Policy and Operations Evaluation Department (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands)
ISAF  International Security Assistance Force (Afghanistan)
ISSS  International Security and Stabilisation Support Strategy (DRC)
KST  Parliamentary Paper
LOTFA  Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (UNDP)
M&E  Monitoring and evaluation
MDG  Millennium Development Goal
MDRP  Multi-country Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme (Burundi)
MENA  Middle East and North Africa
MONUC  United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (renamed MONUSCO in 2010)
NAP  National Action Plan
NATO  North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NGO  Non-governmental organisation
NSP  National Solidarity Programme (part of ARTF, Afghanistan)
ODA  Official Development Assistance
OECD/DAC  Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development/ Development Assistance Committee
PBF  United Nations Peacebuilding Fund
SfCG  Search for Common Ground
SRFF  Stabilisation and Recovery Funding Facility (DCR)
SSD  Security Sector Development
SSR  Security Sector Reform
UN  United Nations
UNDP  United Nations Development Programme
UNFPA  United Nations Population Fund
UNSCR  United Nations Security Council Resolution
WILPF  Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom
WPP  Women Peacemakers Programme
Main findings and considerations for future policies
Almost fifteen years ago, on 31 October 2000, the United Nations Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 1325 on women, peace and security (UNSCR 1325). Although a series of other resolutions that build upon it has followed over the years, UNSCR 1325 remains essential for putting women on the global peace and security agenda. The resolution recognises that women are not only victims that need protection but that they are also important actors in conflict prevention and resolution, peace negotiations, peace-building, peacekeeping, humanitarian response as well as in post-conflict reconstruction. Including women in these processes not only reflects their human rights and corresponds with what was agreed upon in the Beijing Platform for Action (1995), but also makes these processes more effective and sustainable.

For many years, the Dutch government has made it clear that it supports this agenda. This is also evident from the two National Action Plans (NAPs) to implement UNSCR 1325 that were agreed upon in 2008 and 2012. For these NAPs, the Netherlands’ government has adopted an instrumental approach of the resolution, which was translated into the notion of ‘smart security’ in its international gender policy of 2011, even though the assumptions underpinning this paradigm are based on academic quicksand. In doing so, there has been a tendency to use the words ‘gender’ and ‘women’ almost interchangeably, though the term ‘gender’ in peace and security documents is overtly focused on women and neither term was truly conceptualised in relation to peace and security objectives. At the same time, attention for the role of women in peace and security has not been systematically pursued: while it is included in recent documents on the Dutch development cooperation and human rights policy, there are, with few exceptions, minimal references to women and gender in recent policy documents on foreign affairs and international security.

Evolution of the Dutch National Action Plans

The NAPs are the Dutch response to UN Secretary General requests to the UN member states to develop such implementation plans. Resulting from recommendations of a governmental advisory body on women, peace and security in 2006 and the multi-stakeholder Schokland Agreements of 2007, they are co-signed by an ever-increasing number of governmental and non-governmental actors. This multi-stakeholder partnership has been one of the key features of the Dutch approach and one in which it differs from other countries. It is based on an emerging understanding that for the gender equality agenda to take hold in conflict-affected environments, all policy and intervention levels should be covered, i.e. from support given to local women’s organisations to gender diplomacy and incorporating a gender perspective in peacekeeping operations. The NAP network, with its variety of stakeholders working at these different levels in a complementary manner, was seen as critical for the successful implementation of UNSCR 1325.

As in other countries, preparation of the NAPs has been a matter of learning by doing and learning from international experiences and assumptions underlying UNSCR 1325, and consequently the NAPs, were tested along the way in an innovative, and sometimes challenging, multi-stakeholder context.
The first NAP (2008-2011) was broad, covered the different pillars of UNSCR 1325, with no clear prioritisation in terms of interventions or countries to focus on, it had neither an earmarked budget nor an overall monitoring and evaluation (M&E) framework. It was a laudable attempt to mainstream attention for gender and the special roles and needs of women throughout the Dutch ‘3D’ (Defense, Diplomacy, Development) policy priorities for engagement with fragile states. Its ambition was to facilitate the multi-stakeholder partnership by creating a framework for cooperation to strengthen each other’s ongoing activities in relation to women/gender and peace and security. The stakeholders were to operate with existing resources and to use their own M&E systems.

This broad approach changed under the second NAP (2012-2015) which came with a focus on women’s political participation and female leadership, confining the Plan to Afghanistan, Burundi, Colombia, DRC, Sudan and South Sudan plus the MENA region. In addition, the second NAP was accompanied by an earmarked budget that has become the equivalent of the Ministry’s stand-alone budget for women’s rights and gender equality in the area of peace and security. These changes have come with a more explicit ambition to relate UNSCR’s 1325 orientation towards women and to broader insights on gender, peace and security, by making gender mainstreaming a NAP objective in its own right. More specifically, the aim was to effectively incorporate gender analysis and measures to protect women from violence and to counter gender inequality, into all components of the signatories’ peace and security policies, as well as raising internal awareness and support for UNSCR 1325’s Women, Peace and Security agenda. Contrary to the first NAP, the second NAP provides an approach to UNSCR 1325 implementation instead of detailed action plans, as this would allow for a more flexible and needs-based planning and operation process.

In terms of NAP financing, the Ministry had made available a budget of EUR 16 million for the period 2012-15 to support joint projects on women’s political participation and leadership. This NAP funding has been applauded worldwide. Making these resources available was in line with global priorities outlined in, for example, the UN’s Seven Point Action Plan. It also responded to civil society requests in the Netherlands and in the NAP’s focus countries.

Focusing on the role of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the evaluation has addressed three main aspects of the National Action Plans and assessed these in relation to the main evaluation criteria of relevance, effectiveness and efficiency. In doing so, the NAP was assessed as:

- a framework for multi-stakeholder cooperation;
- a women, peace and security ‘project’; and
- an incentive for gender mainstreaming in the peace and security policy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Main findings and considerations for future policies

The NAPs as a framework for multi-stakeholder cooperation

While the NAP-I lacked a formal coordination structure and incentives for collaboration, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Dutch gender platform WO=MEN have taken on a central coordinating role under NAP-II. Different working groups were set up and meet regularly for the NAP’s focus countries, M&E and communication. This was consistent with the need for strategic collaboration and coordination that is at the basis of the Plan. However, the fact that the partnership has come to resemble a donor-implementer relationship between government and civil society actors may have complicated the more critical monitoring role the latter are expected to play.

The evaluation shows that the country working groups have become a key forum for cooperation among the NAP stakeholders. This has contributed to the development of a series of joint projects, financed from the NAP budget, as well as to broader cooperation outside the NAP projects through joint initiatives concerning several of the NAP’s focus countries. The introduction of this budget has at the same time – unintendedly – influenced the functioning of the working groups: (i) it has turned them into forums that prioritised joint project design and implementation over content development and strategic collaboration; and (ii) created competition and increased tension between the bigger development organisations and the smaller women’s organisations and diaspora groups. On the other hand, intense discussions and collaborations also led to closer mutual contacts, resulting, in some instances, in new joint initiatives. To a certain extent this development finds its origin in earlier governmental austerity measures for the Dutch development NGOs and uncertainty about the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ selection procedures and criteria.

As explained, the budget initially did little to promote a more level playing field in which also the smaller organisations had a say. To address this, the Ministry had made funds available since 2012 to compensate them for their time and effort, i.e. EUR 24,500 per year which was not fully used because some organisations were unable to meet the Ministry’s financial rules. It also agreed to the establishment of a new Rapid Action & Pilot Fund to support small-scale pilot projects that is operational since January 2015.

The evaluation found little trace of the announced involvement of the knowledge institutes and universities. These were foreseen to undertake systematic research, to develop gender-sensitive analytical instruments and indicators or to provide emerging insights in the area of gender, peace and security that could be used for the development of the NAP projects. The ‘knowledge working group’ that was planned never convened. At the same time, there was little collaboration with the Knowledge Platform on Security and Rule of Law that could potentially feed the work of the NAP network. Moreover, opportunities to incorporate the strategic diplomatic position of embassies in the focus countries were not seized either.
Although M&E was seen as a key element of NAP-II, the system that was promised has not entirely been put in place. The quantitative monitoring framework never became reality and, as a consequence, systematic data on number and type of partnerships and the budgets involved is not available. A qualitative mid-term review was undertaken in 2013 but is process-oriented and only reports on actions and initiatives and the process of cooperation. This state of affairs in M&E, which has limited the scope for learning and accountability, is similar for many other countries with a NAP.

The NAPs as a women, peace and security ‘project’

The evaluation shows that since late 2012, a series of ten projects (as per December 2013) has been implemented in the NAP’s focus countries. Funding for these projects was provided from the NAP budget, at times supplemented by resources of the organisations involved. Two projects are implemented by an organisation outside the NAP network; for the other eight projects only 9 out of the total 57 current NAP-II signatories are involved. Across the board, there is little strategic involvement of embassies and knowledge institutes. It is too early to assess their results or outcomes.

The existing literature neither substantiates the assumed relationship between women’s participation in decision-making bodies and gender-equality, nor shows that there is a causal (direct or indirect) relationship between gender equality and peace and security. Nevertheless, most NAP projects aim to capacitate women and women’s organisations to act as leaders (political or otherwise) and peace builders. They concern the ‘participation pillar’ of UNSCR 1325, i.e. the resolution’s least developed aspect. While studies have made clear that a focus only on ‘women’ is unlikely to effectively address the causes of their political exclusion or social and physical abuse, examining the project proposals shows that only one case looks at the broader gender dynamics inhibiting female leadership.

In terms of the NAP as a women, peace and security ‘project’, the evaluation finds furthermore that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and primarily the Dutch development NGOs have also undertaken:

- other activities together, both nationally and internationally, with the mobilisation of women around the peace negotiations in South Sudan and Syria as key examples; and
- many joint lobby and advocacy initiatives to ask attention for the issue of women, peace and security in general and UNSCR 1325 in particular. It is in lobbying and advocacy, especially at the level of the UN (e.g. through side events), that NAP signatories have made strategic use of each other’s complementary roles and functions and operate on the basis of equality.

Other areas of intervention mentioned in the NAP (i.e. law and policy development and the development of NAPs outside the focus countries) have received little attention.
Main findings and considerations for future policies

The lack of systematic M&E and the attribution challenges that are intrinsic to these types of activities, make it difficult to acquire reliable information on results achieved. Again, the knowledge institutes were scarcely visible in this area.

The NAPs as an incentive for gender mainstreaming

The status of the NAP with regard to Dutch peace and security policy is best described as opaque: within the Ministry, it has gained the status of the Dutch policy document on implementing UNSCR 1325 as well as for gender mainstreaming in the area of peace and security, making its mainstreaming objective almost irrelevant. However, civil society stakeholders see things differently and consider the NAP as a framework for joint cooperation on one specific area of the resolution rather than the Dutch overall policy on women, peace and security.

There is no Dutch policy reflecting and framing a broader understanding of gender equality objectives in relation to conflict-sensitivity and peace and security strategies. Also, the NAP provides little guidance on this issue. There is little consideration for the gender dimensions of both women-oriented activities and activities focused on men. The question remains whether a mere orientation towards women will indeed help to transform the gender norms that inhibit those women from participating in society.

The evaluation makes clear that the NAPs have contributed to increased awareness and support for the women, peace and security agenda of UNSCR 1325. This also relates to its focus on female leadership and women’s political participation.

Still, NAP implementation has been seen a somewhat isolated undertaking of the Ministry’s gender unit, even though there are UNSCR 1325 focal points in other departments. The strong policy orientation towards UNSCR 1325 has been to the detriment of the objective to mainstream gender in peace and security. In peace and security policies, attention to gender tends to be put on a par with UNSCR 1325 and, as a result, focuses only on women. Since not much was prescribed in great detail, there have been different and not always consistent interpretations of the notion of gender mainstreaming. This also applies to the UNSCR 1325 focal points. Their functioning has not been without problems as a result of high staff turnover, and the nomination of junior staff that had to learn on the job and did not always have the time to fulfil their tasks. Also, the gender experts of the Ministry’s gender unit were not always best positioned to access peace and security discussions inside the Ministry itself.

Effective gender mainstreaming in the Ministry’s most prominent peace and security financing instruments, i.e. the Stability Fund and the Reconstruction Fund, has only taken place to a limited extent. UNSCR 1325 and gender equality were given a more prominent position among the eligibility criteria and assessment tools of these funds. In some cases, this has resulted in stronger support for projects focused on women and, in some exceptional cases, on gender. Nevertheless, a review of the projects that were financed from these facilities reveals (i) that project objectives were not always gender-sensitive, and
(ii) a lack of systematic attention to gender in the M&E. Use of the so-called gender marker to identify interventions that have gender equality as a prime or important objective has been variable and not very consistent either.

In terms of results, the evaluation makes clear that mainstreaming of the core elements of UNSCR 1325 into projects and programmes (co-) financed by the Netherlands in Afghanistan, Burundi and DRC has been less than expected. Most of the Ministry’s assessment memorandums of projects financed under the Stability Fund in these countries show a focus on ‘women only’ and the issue of how projects link to objectives in the field of gender equality is not taken into account systematically. The situation is not too different for the Reconstruction Fund, though it seems to be improving in recent years.

However, these critiques apply to other peace and security initiatives as well. World Bank-managed programmes in Afghanistan and the Great Lakes region, which received substantial Dutch contributions, lacked a gender-sensitive design as well and here too women’s participation was largely symbolic. To some extent this was corrected, but only late in the implementation process. Even then, gender was generally seen as a women’s issue and interventions did little to systematically address gender issues. In the Great Lakes region, eligibility criteria were set in such a way that only few women benefited and the results regarding demobilisation of female ex-combatants were ‘disappointing’. The situation was found to be similar for the United Nations Peace Building Fund. Research done in the DRC furthermore questions the ‘women only’ approach taken by the sexual violence pillar of the Stabilisation and Recovery Fund Facility and the Gender and Justice programme in Maniema, and their lack of attention to addressing the interlocked nature of gender relations, or the problem of sexual violence in the DRC. With the exception of the National Solidarity Programme in Afghanistan and the bilateral Security Sector Development programme in Burundi, little information is available on what happened after the implementation of these interventions, e.g. in terms of changes in living conditions or in terms of combating sexual violence, let alone about changes in gender relations.

**Considerations for future policies**

The evaluation findings must be understood in relation to the context in which the NAPs were developed: (i) strong political interest and pressure to show the government’s commitment to achieving progress in implementing UNSCR 1325; (ii) scarcity of academic insights into the relationship between women’s empowerment, gender (equality) and peace and security objectives; (iii) a declining aid budget that affected many of the signatories of the NAP; and (iv) an international debate over the utility of such Plans for countries where there is no real danger of armed conflict and the potential risk that such Plans may isolate women’s issues from broader peace and security policy considerations. The assumptions underlying UNSCR 1325, and accordingly the NAPs, were tested along the way in an innovative, and sometimes challenging, context involving various stakeholders. This has generated insights that can help identify avenues for the NAP network’s – and the Ministry’s
Main findings and considerations for future policies

— future policy and programming for gender, peace and security, keeping in mind that ‘action plans are simply that – action plans’ (Swaine 2009: 420), which serve to implement a certain policy.

An operational UNSCR 1325 agenda requires a separate policy for gender, peace and security

The Netherlands, not unlike many other countries, has no separate gender-relevant peace and security policy. Instead, the NAPs have been presented as such, reflecting the Dutch government policy for both its UNSCR 1325 commitments and its objective of gender mainstreaming in a broader peace and security policy, a topic that is at the centre of the Beijing Platform of Action of twenty years ago. The issue is that while UNSCR 1325 sets the agenda, it also has limitations in terms of providing operational directions for robust and sustainable policy and programming in contexts of conflict, instability and problematic gender norms. It is important that these limitations are acknowledged and a clear strategic Dutch vision and guidance is developed on addressing the gender dimensions of conflict, instability and violence, as well as the potentially harmful impact of gender-equality strategies on peace and security objectives.

A NAP partnership requires a focus on strategic complementarity and differences

Apart from gaining policy status for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the NAPs have been considered as a tool to implement the Government’s policy commitments through Dutch civil society, with the Ministry as its donor and civil society as the implementing partners. The initial focus on strategic complementarities within the NAP partnership following the introduction of the NAP budget, has become obscured. A lesson to be drawn is that for a budget to add value to a multi-stakeholder partnership, an assessment of the varying strategic agendas, capacities, roles and responsibilities that are represented in the network is needed. Transparency in this regard helps to tailor eligibility criteria to existing agendas. At the same time it is realised that, even though all signatories adhere to the same principles of UNSCR 1325, these agendas do not necessarily overlap, approaches to the women, peace and security agenda vary and that capacities and roles are not necessarily complementary. The NAP partnership has too easily sidestepped this reality, and with the budget there came funding criteria that were based on stereotyped roles and responsibilities of the different stakeholders. A reassessment of agendas, roles and responsibilities will also help to appreciate areas of agreement as much as those of conflicts, and to accept the diversity of the NAP network members. The diversity present in this network may help to initiate a critical debate on the assumptions underlying the resolution. Too great a focus on joint action, especially when linked to accessing a budget, encourages compromises and reduces the space for such a debate, questioning voices and innovation.

Focus on quality of results instead of quantity of the NAP network

Over the past eight years, the NAP network has been successful in generating interest in the objectives of UNSCR 1325 through its agenda-setting lobbying and awareness-raising activities among policy makers and politicians. This has gone hand-in-hand with expansion of the NAP network signatories over the years. Time has come for the NAP network to translate this momentum into a successful strengthening of the position of women in conflict-affected environments (i.e. achieving the objective of the resolution), and to move
beyond the agenda-setting focus of the network. It is time to use the network strategy to advance the quality of UNSCR 1325 work worldwide.

**Budgeting for NAP UNSCR 1325**

The NAP earmarked budget is only a fraction of the available resources for the Dutch overall peace and security policies. A risk associated with such a stand-alone budget is that gender concerns are ignored in mainstream projects and programmes as happened in the past and that such a budget becomes an excuse for little or no attention for gender equality concerns in broader programmes. A separate fund at international level is likely to share the same fate. There is a need to continue, if not step up, efforts at this level to make sure that these concerns are addressed at an early stage of programme identification and design – and later on at the time of programme and/or implementation.
Main findings and considerations for future policies
1

Introduction
1.1 **Background**

Gender equality has been an important theme for the policies of the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs on fragile and conflict-affected states since 1995. This has been reflected in multiple policy statements, letters and frameworks and, most prominently, in the establishment of two Dutch National Action Plans (NAPs) to implement United Nations Security Council resolution 1325 on women, peace and security (UNSCR 1325, adopted in 2000). Since this perspective was not covered by the recent policy evaluation of the Dutch fragile states policy (IOB 2013), this stand-alone evaluation focuses on the NAPs and the broader theme of gender, peace and security. It aims to give an account of the investment of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs into the NAPs and the efforts undertaken to mainstream gender into its peace and security policies over the period 2007-13. The evaluation is one of the building blocks for the overall gender equality evaluation that will be undertaken by the Ministry’s Policy and Operations Evaluation Department (IOB).

1.2 **Evaluation purposes and criteria**

As per the terms of reference (a summary is provided in Annexe 2), the aim of the evaluation was to ascertain: (i) the main features of the Dutch NAPs – how they were formulated, and how they have been put into practice over the years, as well as their relation to the overall Dutch policy on fragile states, peace and security; (ii) the extent to which gender figures in this overall Dutch policy and how it has been made operational in the main instruments used to implement it; and (iii) what is known of the results achieved in Afghanistan, Burundi and Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). In addition to fulfilling this function as a tool for accountability, the evaluation has an emphasis on lessons learnt.

Correlating with the main objectives of the two NAPs, the evaluation covers the following main themes and evaluation questions:

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<tr>
<th>Theme</th>
<th>Key questions</th>
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<tr>
<td>1. The relevance of the NAP</td>
<td>• What have been the main features of the Dutch NAPs for implementing UNSCR 1325?</td>
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<td>2. The NAP as a framework for multi-stakeholder cooperation</td>
<td>• How have the NAPs been operated over the years? • What has been achieved through this cooperation?</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. The NAP as a Women, Peace and Security ‘project’</td>
<td>• What results have been achieved by NAP-related projects in terms of improving the position of women?</td>
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<tr>
<td>4. The NAP as an incentive for gender mainstreaming in the peace and security policy</td>
<td>• What has been the relation of the NAPs to overall Dutch policy on fragile states, peace and security? • To what extent have UNSCR 1325 and gender featured in policies of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs regarding fragile states, peace and security? • How has this incentive been made operational in the main instruments used to implement this policy?</td>
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These different elements also provide the structure of this report as further explained below.
The evaluation has used the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development/Development Assistance Committee (OECD/DAC) evaluation criteria relating to policy relevance and effectiveness; with regard to the efficiency criterion, the focus is on issues of cooperation and management.

In relation to relevance and effectiveness, it is important to realise that the overall Dutch gender, peace and security policy is informed by two elements. The first element is UNSCR 1325, which focuses on women, peace and security. This focus reflects the political context of the year in which the resolution was adopted: given the limited progress in putting the gender-oriented Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action (1995) into practice, it was found necessary to focus on women (rather than on gender) in the international peace and security agenda. The second element consists of the Dutch NAPs to implement UNSCR 1325 and other policy documents that combine a focus on women with a gender-mainstreaming objective. The notion that ‘gender’ and ‘women’ are intertwined is reflected in the objectives of the two NAPs. This demonstrates a Dutch policy interest in actively pursuing policy engagements that focus on women and gender in the international peace and security arena.

Therefore the relevance and effectiveness of the NAPs – both as a stand-alone women, peace and security project and as an incentive to gender mainstreaming – will be assessed according to a gender, peace and security framework that will be further discussed in Chapter 2.

1.3 Evaluation scope and focus

At present, the NAP network consists of 57 signatories. These include various governmental departments, knowledge institutes and universities, development organisations and voluntary (diaspora) organisations. While the engagement and investment of all these stakeholders is critical to the success of this network, the evaluation focuses on the role played by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, without disregarding issues of cooperation and the projects that the network has undertaken jointly. When it comes to gender mainstreaming, the evaluation has dealt with only those interventions undertaken and/or supported by this ministry and therefore does not reflect all the work done by the members of the NAP network.

In terms of joint projects and gender mainstreaming, the evaluation focuses on Afghanistan, Burundi and DRC, since these countries (i) have been among the focus countries of the NAPs since 2010, and (ii) are among the top five recipients of the Stability Fund and the Reconstruction Fund, which were identified as the ministry’s prime financial

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Policy relevance is defined as ‘the extent to which the objectives of an intervention are consistent with beneficiaries’ requirements, country needs, global priorities and partners’ and donors’ policies’. Effectiveness assesses ‘the extent to which the direct results, or output, of an intervention contributed to the objectives, or outcomes’. Efficiency can be defined as ‘a measure of how economically resources/inputs (funds, expertise, time, etc.) are converted into results’. (OECD/DAC (2002)).
Introduction

Instruments for gender mainstreaming in peace and security. Moreover, already before the adoption of the first NAP, they were mentioned as examples of countries where UNSCR 1325 was progressively implemented.

Within these countries, the evaluation has looked at a selection of projects including both activities financed under the second Dutch NAP and interventions that were financed through the other financing instruments mentioned above. The main reason for including these interventions was that they were mentioned by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in its communication to parliament on how the Netherlands had implemented UNSCR 1325 and/or gender and conflict-related activities. In addition, the evaluation has taken account of Dutch support to the UN Peacebuilding Fund (PBF), given the size of the Dutch contribution (approximately EUR 60 million) and the fact that the ministry regards this contribution as critical to the implementation of a gender-responsive approach to ‘inclusive political processes’, one of the building blocks of Dutch policy on Security and Rule of Law (KST 32605-114 2012: 17).³

Finally, it is worth recalling that policies on, for example, human rights or reproductive and sexual rights and health, that also include elements relevant for the area of peace and security, were already covered by other IOB evaluations. With respect to emergency aid, one of the topics of UNSCR 1325, an evaluation of Dutch humanitarian assistance is forthcoming in 2015.

1.4 Evaluation methods

The evaluation is primarily based on desk study of documents and interviews. Documents include policy documents and communications with the Dutch Parliament. They also include evaluation reports and documentation concerning the projects and programmes that were selected for review as well as academic literature (see Annexe 4). To supplement and validate desk study findings, semi-structured interviews were conducted in the period December 2013 to August 2014 with representatives from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; staff members of the WO=MEN secretariat; representatives of the signatories of the NAPs, representatives of organisations that are directly involved in the implementation of Dutch co-funded actions in the above-mentioned three countries, and external experts (see Annexe 3). A focus group discussion was held with representatives of organisations that are signatories to NAP-II. Participatory observation techniques were used during the discussion about the mid-term review of the NAP-II (2013) to get a better understanding of the functioning of the NAP network and its monitoring and evaluation system.

³ Moreover, when reporting on the implementation of its human rights policy in 2009, the ministry made reference to PBF-financed programmes that aimed to promote women’s rights in Burundi and Sierra Leone (Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken (2010d): 106).
1.5 Limitations of the evaluation

First of all, incorporating a gender perspective in peace and security interventions is a complex, long-term and qualitative process. As a consequence, this evaluation has had to deal with a significant problem regarding attribution: it is not really possible to track the results chain from input to outcome and impact. This also applies to the awareness-raising, lobbying and advocacy that have been a focus of the NAPs: linking these activities to outcomes is complex at best, and envisaged gains are subjective and prone to adjustment during the evaluation period. It is also difficult to attribute one specific action (for example a conference or a letter to parliament) to policy changes, as there are often multiple tracks used by multiple players for influencing policy. Here, too, change can be slow and incremental, making attribution even trickier (Tsui et al. (2014): 9). Second, assessing effectiveness of specific NAP-II-financed projects was impossible as most of these projects started only in late 2012 or in 2013. Finally, given the resources available for the evaluation, assessing effectiveness of the mainstreaming track of the NAPs was carried out for a limited number of interventions. Use was made of existing documentation; however, this was hampered by (i) a scarcity of evaluation material and (ii) the fact that this material moreover tended to focus – in line with the projects and programmes that were evaluated – on women and not so much on gender. Furthermore, with one exception in Afghanistan, no impact evaluations were carried out.

1.6 Structure of the report

The report is structured along the main themes and evaluation questions presented above, after introducing a conceptual framework for categorising and assessing policy approaches to women and/or gender, peace and security in Chapter 2.

Chapter 3 then outlines the international legal framework relating to gender, peace and security and discusses the Dutch policy landscape in this regard. It concludes with an assessment of the position of UNCSR 1325 within these policies and the implications thereof for policy coherence.

Chapter 4 explains the approach taken in the NAPs and discusses the theory of change and intervention logic at play. In combination with findings from Chapter 2, this chapter will assess the relevance of the NAPs.

The effectiveness of the NAPs as frameworks of cooperation is the focus of Chapter 5. It describes the objectives of cooperation and the architecture put in place to achieve them. It assesses to what extent the set-up of the NAP cooperation framework has indeed facilitated successful cooperation among the signatories.

Chapter 6 concentrates on the achievements of the two NAPs and specifically looks at: (i) NAP-funded projects implemented in Afghanistan, Burundi and DRC; (ii) NAP-related joint projects and ad hoc collaboration; and (iii) joint activities in the area of lobbying, advocacy
and awareness-raising. Focus is on interventions in which the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has played a role.

Central to Chapters 7 and 8 is the success of the commitment to mainstreaming UNSCR 1325 and gender into policies and actions of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In Chapter 7 the ministry’s organisational infrastructure to mainstream gender in peace and security interventions is discussed. The evaluation will then look into the key instruments in the area of peace and security in which UNSCR 1325 and gender is to be mainstreamed. Chapter 8 deals more in depth with a series of projects and their results in Afghanistan, Burundi and DRC, as explained above. Additionally, the chapter provides an assessment of gender mainstreaming under the UN Peacebuilding Fund. Finally, in Chapter 9 the evaluation’s final conclusions are provided.
Conceptual framework – Why gender in peace and security?
2.1 Introduction

Policies in the area of gender, peace and security are based on the assumption that gender – as a concept – is of relevance to engagement in fragile and conflict-affected environments. This section discusses the meaning and policy implications of concepts that are often used in peace and security policies, such as gender equality, women’s empowerment, and protection of women. It will do so adopting the following three approaches that are often used to argue for the relevance of incorporating a gender perspective in the field of peace and security:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Instrumentalist approach</th>
<th>This approach prioritises peace and security objectives: incorporating a gender perspective helps to increase the effectiveness and impact of peace and security interventions.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agenda-setting or normative approach</td>
<td>This approach prioritises gender-equality or women’s empowerment objectives: since inclusivity and equality are fundamental values and form the backbone of peace and security interventions, these interventions should promote these values, including gender equality and human rights.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protection approach</td>
<td>Women and men face different types of violence and risks in conflict and crisis settings. Military and humanitarian protection mandates must be based on an understanding of those differences and be implemented in a sex-specific way. The protection approach combines instrumentalist objectives with humanitarian principles.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The following paragraphs explain in greater detail these approaches, with their underlying assumptions and implications for peace and security policies, and relevant interventions, using the limited scientific literature that has connected the domains of conflict and gender studies in fragile settings.4

2.2 The instrumentalist approach: improving peace and security interventions

According to the instrumentalist approach, peace and security interventions benefit from a gender-responsive approach (also referred to as gender-sensitivity or a gender lens). Two premises tend to dominate this approach: (a) gender analysis helps to inform prioritisation, programme design and implementation; and (b) promoting gender equality is a prerequisite for the advancement of stabilisation objectives.

4 Attention is drawn to the fact that the studies that have informed this debate were generally conducted in more stable developmental contexts and with an institutional environment that had at least some capacity to promote social change. Key to understanding the political economy of fragile systems and conflict-affected environments, however, is that ‘the disjunction between formal rules and the underlying, more informal structures of power and practice, renders the formal structure ineffectual’ (Evans (2004): 34). Insight into the nexus connecting women, gender dynamics and conflict remains scarce for conflict settings that are characterised by serious institutional deficit.
First, as an analytical concept, gender is regarded as helpful when determining criteria for intervention and programme design, as well as for monitoring and evaluation (M&E) of the intervention. Existing gender norms determine what kind of behaviour for men and women is socially acceptable, which role is to be taken by whom at household, community and state level, and how this role is to be performed.\(^5\) Hence, undertaking a gender analysis to examine gender norms and the roles of both women and men helps in understanding a given political and social context, its related power dynamics and the rationale behind this violence. This understanding contributes to the design of intervention strategies.

It should be emphasised that this type of analysis does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that strengthening the position of women vis-à-vis men is a priority, even if gender equality is the ultimate objective (El-Bushra (2012): 17). Instead, an analytical approach to gender ‘is, on the one hand, broader in the sense that it moves away from equating gender with women (and girls) and, on the other hand, deeper in that it examines, for example, the interplay between gender and other identity markers, such as age, social class, sexuality, disability, ethnic or religious background, marital status or urban/rural setting’ (Myrttinen et al. (2014): 5). In fact, gender analysis may show, for example, that in contexts where male feelings of disempowerment and vulnerability are presumed to be resolved through exerting force, primarily focusing on women’s empowerment may be counter-productive in terms of both stabilisation and gender equality objectives and may reinforce vulnerabilities of both women and men.\(^6\) Another outcome could be that men should be the focus of a gender, peace and security programme, for example ‘by finding ways of discouraging their recruitment in militias’ (El-Bushra (2012): 19).

Within the context of the instrumentalist approach, a case is often made for the positive relation between gender equality and stability. Dutch policy documents sometimes refer to this as ‘smart security’ (KST 32735-39 (2011): 3). There is indeed an argument to be made that without women and girls being safe from violence and subordination, a country is not fully at peace.\(^7\) However, often the idea is that (i) the inclusion of women in peacebuilding processes renders those processes more inclusive, because the priorities put forward by men are complemented by those identified by women; or that (ii) women tend to be more war-averse than men and are therefore more inclined to promote inclusion, participation and consensus-building (NAP-II (2011): 13).

Nevertheless, a comprehensive review of academic literature, exploring the evidence of links between gender equality, peacebuilding, and state-building concludes that ‘there is very little literature looking explicitly at the causal linkages between gender inequality and conflict’ (Domingo et al. (2013): 6; Hudson et al. (2012): 99). Evidence on how in practice

\(^5\) Depending on the setting, gender norms about militant masculinity may, for example, contribute to the phenomenon of unemployed men joining armed groups or that of disarmed ex-combatants committing sexual violence. Likewise norms about ‘ideal womanhood’ may inform public opinion about whether or not women are perceived to be in a position to have political ambitions. See e.g. Baaz and Stern (2010) and UNDP/BCPR (2011).

\(^6\) On this issue see Smits and Cruz (2011), Lwambo (2011) and Baaz and Stern (2010).

\(^7\) This argument is comprehensively supported by data presented by Hudson et al. (2012).
gender responsive peace processes affect state building goals is missing (Domingo et al. (2013): 18). The few scholars who have addressed the issue found, however, an empirical correlation between the level of gender equality and the chances of armed conflict. Caution has been advised in enthusiastically embracing this finding since (i) the nature of the correlation is unclear: gender inequality may be a symptom of other root causes leading to instability, violence and conflict, such as state failure, poverty, overpopulation or mass unemployment; and (ii) gender inequality often coincides with broader horizontal or structural inequalities, based on race, ethnicity, religion or class, that are connected to the manifestation of systemic violence and intra-state conflict. Hence, the causality in the relation between gender equality and state security is inconclusive, as is the argument claiming that promoting gender equality has consequences for security.

Promoting gender equality is thus not necessarily just a matter of ‘smart security’. The little (academic) research that has been conducted in this field confirms, however, that gender equality is a significant though under-explored variable in the mix leading to conflict or peace. By taking into account the complexity of this correlation, a substantial gender and conflict analysis may help to shed new light on this variable and help to strengthen the effectiveness of interventions in fragile and conflict-affected environments.

2.3 The agenda-setting approach: gender equality as an objective of peace and security policy

The agenda-setting approach is based on an ambition to achieve gender equality within, among other things, peace and security interventions, as a normative objective in itself. This approach has focused on promoting gender equality and women’s empowerment. It has informed international legal frameworks promoting the position of women in peace and security, such as the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW – 1979), the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action (1995) and UNSCR 1325 and its follow-up resolutions (see Chapter 3).

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8 Caprioli found that gender inequality (measured by the percentage of women in the formal labour force and fertility rates helps to predict violent conflict, because ‘states characterized by gender discrimination and structural hierarchy are permeated with norms of violence that make internal conflict more likely’ (Caprioli (2005): 171). Melander’s statistical research confirms the correlation between gender equality (measured by the percentage of women in parliament and higher education enrolment of girls), but warns that ‘(the) results are more ambiguous when it comes to determining how the causal mechanism connecting gender equality and peace operates’ (Melander (2005): 711).

9 For an in-depth study of the link between horizontal inequalities and conflict, see for example Steward et al. (2005) and Snyder (2000). See Castillejo (2014) for a detailed analysis of the correlation between inclusive political settlements and the sustainability of peace agreements.

10 See e.g. Hudson et al. (2012), who state that ‘(...) the body of empirical work demonstrates that the promotion of gender equality goes far beyond the issue of social justice and has important consequences for international security’ (Hudson et al. (2012): 102).

The gender equality objective is based on an understanding that unequal gender relations lead to the subordination of women. This understanding is translated into a more activist approach to gender in peace and security interventions, inspired by the notion that the ‘average’ security domain is unwittingly characterised as masculine (Blanchard (2003)) – or, more simply put, that insecurity is about young men with guns. The paradoxical effect of this orientation on promoting the emancipation of women is that it ultimately risks fostering policy-making and programming that is ‘gender-blind’. A mere focus on women, either as a ‘special needs group’ or as a group that needs support to be able to play its role in peace processes, does not automatically make a policy or programme gender-responsive. In this approach, women are often portrayed as a single group, whereas men are seen as ‘perpetrators to be excluded, as ‘gatekeepers’ whose support has to be sought, or as potential champions of women’s causes’ (El-Bushra (2012): 9). This narrows the scope for a substantial gender and conflict analysis and may inhibit more effective policy-making and programming.

Nonetheless, because armed conflict always affects power relations in society, including those between men and women, the attention to gender equality in a peace and security framework is understandable. Conflict has been shown to require that women take on bigger responsibilities in their communities, either because men leave for the front or because original male authority erodes as a result of the conflict. This window of opportunity, characterised by a sudden space to establish new gender roles, explains why advocates of women’s emancipation feel a sense of urgency about the opportunities that arise in the aftermath of a conflict and they start, for example, demanding women’s political participation in peace processes.

Several studies have revealed, however, that there does not seem to be a direct relationship between the shifting of gender roles during conflict and its immediate aftermath and the transformation of gender norms in the post-conflict period. Instead, the drastic change in roles of individual men and women should be regarded as a crisis management response (El-Bushra (2012): 8). For any lasting significant changes in social norms around masculine and feminine behaviour this change needs to be institutionalised (El-Bushra and Sahl (2005): 96, 103).

2.4 The protection approach: sex-specific military and humanitarian strategies

The protection approach focuses on sex-specific military and humanitarian strategies. It mixes instrumentalist arguments (sex-specificity increases the reach and impact of protection responses) with normative ones (the intervention is based on humanitarian and human rights principles). There is little controversy among scholars over the idea that the gendered-dimensions of violence are a ‘security issue in itself, which can serve particular

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12 See also Voorhoeve (2007): 71-72.
13 See e.g. Melander (2005: 710-711) and El-Bushra and Sahl (2005): 96, 103.
Conceptual framework – Why gender in peace and security?

purposes in conflict’ (Domingo et al. (2013): 9). Whereas men are often more at risk of being killed in conflict, women are more likely to suffer sexualised violence\(^\text{14}\) – the high frequency of women’s exposure to such violence is also one of the reasons behind UNSCR 1325 and several of the follow-on resolutions, as explained below.

The prerequisite of a differentiated approach to the sex-specific vulnerabilities of men and women in conflict is often highlighted in military and humanitarian aid circles responsible for executing protection mandates (Smits et al. (2010)). However, to implement such an approach effectively and to maintain the humanitarian and human rights principles that it holds in high regard, substantial analysis of the interdependencies between the gendered vulnerabilities of men and women (i.e. gender analysis) is important. Often what is observed is that only the specific needs and vulnerabilities of women are highlighted. This makes the response less sensitive to specific male needs and vulnerabilities, and ignores the (potential) impact of a women-only approach on these male needs and vulnerabilities.

A women-oriented protection approach thus not only inhibits non-discrimination norms, it also reaffirms gender norms that contributed to the gender-based violence in the first place: ‘Ignoring male rape not only neglects men, it also harms women by reinforcing a viewpoint that equates ‘feminine’ with ‘victim’, thus hampering our ability to see women as strong and empowered. In the same way, silence about male victims reinforces unhealthy expectations about men and their supposed invulnerability.’\(^\text{15}\)

2.5  Implications for policy

Literature on the topic of this evaluation shows that:

- Little is known about how strategies aimed at gender equality or women’s empowerment are actually received by both men and women living in a context shaped by conflict, instability and problematic gender norms.
- It is often unclear how gender equality policies or policies focused on women, peace and security affect existing gender relations.
- As a result, and irrespective of the objective of incorporating gender in peace and security policies or the approach taken in doing so, it is essential to get a better understanding of: (i) how gender norms shape behaviour of both women and men; (ii) what interdependencies exist between those gender norms; (iii) how gender inequality intersects with other contexts of exclusion and marginalisation in society; and (iv) what inequalities and hierarchies prevail between men and women and within same-sex groups.

Most policies are not necessarily grounded in a fundamental analysis of these issues. As a result of political choices made or because of limited gender expertise, these policies tend

\(^{14}\) The same is true for perceived emasculated/feminised men, such as men who can no longer protect and care for their families as the result of conflict, gay men or men who refuse to partake in the violence that is expected of them.

to mix normative approaches focusing on women exclusively with instrumentalist arguments. To convince the peace and security community of the importance of incorporating gender equality objectives, the idea put forward in these policies is that promoting women’s empowerment leads to more gender equality, which in turn improves the effectiveness of peace and security interventions. As a side effect, objectives and strategies to reach these objectives tend to get blurred.

Juxtaposing specific policies targeting women with a gender, peace and security agenda is not only conceptually confusing. A more serious consequence is that it also recycles the idea that security interventions mainly targeted at men are merely ‘gender neutral’. Mixing instrumentalist arguments with normative approaches to promote the role of women on the peace and security agenda risks turning ‘(...) gender into a fairly marginal subject in light of the ‘gender neutral’ stability objectives that are being given priority. Instead, and optimally, an authentic gender analysis could have functioned as the analytical lens with the capacity to bring out the gender dimensions of instability and violence’ (Smits (2010a): 4-5).

It is precisely this confusion between the use of a gender analysis to maximise the impact of peace and security strategies and the more normative agenda to promote gender equality in fragile and conflict-affected states that makes it difficult to gauge which objectives, policies and programmes in the area of gender, peace and security are actually pursued and which can be assessed. Nevertheless, as concluded above, irrespective of the ultimate policy goal – whether this be gender equality or sustainable peace and security interventions – gender-responsiveness (i.e. gender analysis underpins the chosen strategy) is critical.

Therefore, when looking at gender, peace and security issues, it is important to distinguish gender-responsive approaches from those only focused on women in isolation from the broader political context. The discussion above emphasises that gender-responsiveness requires an in-depth focus on both women and men. It calls for account to be taken of the extent to which women’s and men’s agency is instrumental in transforming gender norms. Also, it highlights the need for recognising male and female vulnerabilities as well as acknowledging and addressing the way in which they relate to violent conflict, regardless of the target group of the intervention (El-Bushra (2012): 19).

This distinction between, on the one hand, gender-responsive approaches to peace and security policies and/or women’s empowerment strategies and, on the other, women-oriented measures, will help to assess Dutch policies in relation to gender and/or women (Chapter 3), the approach proposed in the NAP (Chapter 4), its related projects (Chapter 6) and the way gender has been mainstreamed within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Chapters 6 and 7).
Conceptual framework – Why gender in peace and security?
The international legal framework and the Netherlands’ policy landscape on gender, peace and security
3.1 Introduction

The Dutch National Action Plans on UNSCR 1325 do not stand in isolation from the broader international legal framework. They were developed, moreover, concurrently with evolving Dutch policies on gender, peace and security. Before discussing the NAPs and their implementation in greater detail, this chapter delineates the international framework and this policy context in the Netherlands. It concludes by assessing the Dutch approach to gender, peace and security in relation to the conceptual findings presented in the previous chapter.

3.2 The international framework

As discussed in Chapter 2, the policy focus is often on women rather than women and men. This is not surprising: international legal frameworks that have been the prime sources for governmental and non-governmental organisation (NGO) policies on women, peace and security, such as UN Security Council resolution 1325 (2000) and its follow-up resolutions 1820 (2008), 1888 (2009), 1889 (2009), 1960 (2010), 2106 (2013) and 2122 (2013), indeed call for such an orientation towards women’s specific needs. The following paragraphs illustrate the orientation of these resolutions, which do not stand alone but reinforce existing global commitments, treaties and conventions on women’s rights (see text box 3.1).

At the same time, a report of the UN Secretary-General in 2010 on women’s participation in peacebuilding observes that ‘our response must be based on an understanding of the distinct priorities and capacities of women and men. To relegate consideration of gender issues to later phases of peacebuilding is to ignore their centrality to everything from institutional design to funding allocations to programme execution. A gender-responsive approach is required’ (United Nations (2010c): 5).
Text box 3.1  Relevant global commitments, treaties and conventions on women’s rights

1) The Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW 1979), which was the first international convention to define discrimination against women and set up an agenda for action to end such discrimination. It laid the groundwork for future resolutions on women and gender.

2) The Nairobi Forward-Looking Strategies for the Advancement of Women (1985), which, in its chapter on ‘Peace’ highlighted for the first time how violence against women in everyday life was detrimental to efforts to achieve peace.

3) The Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action (1993), which explicitly recognised many violations of women’s rights as human rights violations and declared that violations of such rights in situations of conflict were violations of international human rights and international humanitarian law.

4) The Beijing Declaration and the Platform for Action (1995), which identified women in armed conflict as one of its 12 Critical Areas of Concern and included a global commitment to incorporate gender perspectives in peace and security issues. Under the heading of ‘Women and armed conflict’, strategic objectives were formulated, such as ‘to increase the participation of women in conflict resolution at the decision-making level and protect women living in situations of armed and other conflicts or under foreign occupation; to promote women’s contribution to a culture of peace; to provide protection, assistance and training to refugee women, to other displaced women in need of international protection and to internally displaced women’.


6) The 1998 recommendations by the 42nd session of the Committee on the Status of Women for increasing women’s participation in conflict prevention, peacekeeping, and post-conflict peacebuilding and reconstruction as part of the review of the Beijing Platform’s 12 Critical Areas of Concern. It also highlighted the need for increased advocacy on women and peace and security issues.

7) The Rome Statute for the International Criminal Court (1998), which includes crimes against humanity and war crimes specifically against women and children.

8) Section 2 of the Millennium Declaration of 2000, focusing on peace, security and disarmament and making reference to ‘gender-aware conflict prevention and peace building’.

\[17\] On the link between the Millennium Development Goals and the issues of security, gender-based violence or conflict transformation, see Hendricks (2012): 11.
**UN Security Council resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security** (UNSCR 1325) was unanimously adopted in 2000 and was the first resolution to address the disproportionate and unique impact of armed conflict on women. It is important to realise that UNSCR 1325 is an agenda-setting resolution, deliberately oriented towards women (and girls). This focus must be viewed against the political context at the time it was adopted, in which a more activist approach to putting women on the peace and security agenda was deemed necessary. UNSCR 1325 builds on three pillars: participation, prevention, and protection, later called the ‘3P approach’. The resolution stresses the importance of women’s equal and full participation as active agents in the prevention and resolution of conflicts, peacebuilding and peacekeeping. It calls on member states to ensure women’s equal participation and full involvement in all efforts for the maintenance and promotion of peace and security, and urges all actors to increase the participation of women and incorporate a gender perspective in all areas of peacebuilding. The resolution provides less guidance, however, on how to implement its priorities in a gender-responsive way or for gender mainstreaming in peace and security policy.  

**UNSCR 1889** was adopted in 2009 and calls for further strengthening of the UNSCR 1325 pillar on participation and for the development of indicators to measure progress on UNSCR 1325. Those indicators were presented in the report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council on Women, Peace and Security in April 2010 (S/2010/173). The report proposes 26 indicators in the thematic areas of prevention, protection, prevention and relief, and recovery. These indicators are mostly geared towards retrieving sex-disaggregated data on the number and percentage of women participating in, as well as reached by, peace and security interventions.

To further track progress on the implementation of women, peace and security commitment, a Seven-Point Action Plan was developed and presented in the report of the Secretary-General on Women’s Participation in Peacebuilding in the same year (S/2010/466).

Table 3.1 gives the sequence of the different resolutions between 2000 and 2013. It shows that the Security Council has used the resolutions that were adopted after UNSCR 1325 mainly to highlight its concerns in the area of sexual violence against women (UNSCR 1325’s protection pillar).

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18 See Smits (2010b): 517-521 and Henry (2007): 75. Consequently, ‘significant questions can and should be asked about the enthusiasm with which the Resolution has been embraced as a guideline for gender sensitive policy development in fragile states. (...) As a result of the one-sided focus on women’s emancipation over the last decade, international fragile state policies may have been side-tracked where gender is concerned’ (Smits (2010b): 520. For an overview of ‘questioning voices’ about UNSCR 1325 see Myrttinen et al. (2014): 12.
Table 3.1 Overview of United Nations Security Council resolutions and reports on women, peace and security

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>The legal framework on prevention, protection and participation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **UNSCR 1325**  
(2000) | Stresses the importance of women’s equal and full participation as active agents in the prevention and resolution of conflicts, peacebuilding and peacekeeping. |
| - Indicators to measure progress on the implementation of UNSCR 1325 (S/2010/173) |
| - Seven-Point Action Plan (S/2010/466) |
| **UNSCR 2122**  
(2013) | Urges all UN agencies to consistently integrate all aspects of UNSCR 1325 in its own work. |
| **UNSCR 1820**  
(2008) | Demands that parties to armed conflict immediately take appropriate measures to protect civilians from sexual violence, including training troops and enforcing disciplinary measures. |
| **UNSCR 1888**  
| **UNSCR 1960**  
(2010) | Focuses on sexual violence in armed conflict and argues that sexual violence should be seen as a criterion for targeted sanctions against guilty parties. |
| **UNSCR 2106**  
(2013) | Requests more detailed information on conflict parties that commit sexual violence and calls for deeper investigation into sexual violence crimes. |

Specific Resolutions on women’s participation

| **UNSCR 1889**  
(2009) | Calls for further strengthening the UNSCR 1325 pillar on participation and for the development of indicators to measure progress on UNSCR 1325. |

3.3 Policy development in the Netherlands

This section will describe how UNSCR 1325 came to inform the Dutch policy on women and gender, peace and security.

Issues related to gender, peace and security have been on the Dutch agenda for development cooperation since the early 1990s. When UNSCR 1325 was adopted in 2000, it pushed these issues even higher on the agenda of the Dutch government. While the resolution and related topics started to feature in different policy notes on peace and security from 2000 onwards, several initiatives were undertaken to identify new avenues for policies in these areas. In March 2003, a working group involving the ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defence presented a joint policy note about the situation regarding the implementation of UNSCR 1325, with specific actions to be taken in relation to Dutch foreign policy. This proved sufficient grounds for the establishment of a Task Force Women, Security and Conflict, in November of 2003, by the ministries of Social Affairs and Employment, Foreign Affairs, Defence, and Interior and Kingdom Relations.

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The mandate of this Task Force was to increase the role of women in conflict prevention, resolution and post-conflict reconstruction on the basis of a set of recommendations made by the Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael (Bouta and Frerks (2002)). The closing document of the Task Force was presented to parliament on 10 November 2006. It highlighted, among other things, the need for increasing decision-makers’ commitment to pay attention to gender issues, building gender-awareness among staff, gender-sensitising policy instruments, including a gender perspective in peacekeeping operations, and increasing the role of local women in peacebuilding activities. The attention for gender, peace and security was further anchored in policies developed during the evaluation period 2007–13, which will be the focus of the following paragraphs.

3.3.1 Cabinet Balkenende IV (2007-2010)
In 2007 the policy note Een zaak van iedereen – Investeren in ontwikkeling in een veranderende wereld (KST 111245 (2007)) was written. It combined an ambitious agenda for engagement in fragile states with a strong focus on gender and sexual and reproductive rights. At the time there was a widespread sense of disillusion about the fact that the gender mainstreaming discourse informed by the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action (1995) had failed to make much headway. This prompted the allocation of additional means for activities focusing on, among other things, combating sexual violence, developing a Dutch National Action Plan to implement UNSCR 1325, and promoting gender equality within the international aid agenda (KST 111245 (2007): 32-33). By complementing gender mainstreaming with a policy targeted at women explicitly, the two-track approach to gender, peace and security was re-introduced after several years of an exclusive focus on gender mainstreaming.

A year later, in 2008, the ministers of Foreign Affairs and for Development Cooperation further elaborated their strategy for peace and security in a letter to parliament, Veiligheid en ontwikkeling in fragiele staten – Strategie voor de Nederlandse inzet 2008-2011 (KST 124834 (2008)). In this letter, the approach to gender (in relation to peace and security) is clearly inspired by UNSCR 1325: it is oriented towards women and is explicitly related to the ‘soft’ areas of human security, such as maternal health, education for girls, and the prevention of sexual violence against women. Women are also mentioned in relation to areas of ‘hard security’, such as security sector reform and disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration strategies, but mainly as a target group for the peace dividend. Gender remained largely a consideration for the development angle of the government’s ‘3D approach’ in its engagement with fragile states. It was underlined that ‘(fundamental) human rights play a

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20 The themes peace and security and gender and sexual and reproductive rights, represent two of the four priority areas.
21 ‘The Netherlands sought to (...) work towards ensuring that socio-economic programmes in fragile states focus on an equal role for women in accordance with the action plan to implement UNCSR 1325. In keeping this agenda policies included tackling the issue of sexual and reproductive rights and health. To this end, the Netherlands continues to provide substantial funding to the UN Population Fund (UNFPA) and support its activities in fragile states’ (KST 124834 (2008)).
22 For example, ‘DDR programmes should not focus exclusively on former combatants but should embrace all social groups, including women and children’ (KST 124834 (2008): 7 and 11).
23 For a detailed account of Dutch policy development in this area, see IOB (2013): 36–59).
key role in Dutch policy on fragile states’, with the fragile states policy focusing ‘particularly on the position of women and children, as well as issues like the right to protection from violence, combating impunity and equal access to basic public services such as health care and education’ (Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken (2009a): 52-53).

To gain more insight into concrete action undertaken to implement UNSCR 1325, parliament adopted a resolution in 2008 (Motie Diks\textsuperscript{24}). The government was asked to include a paragraph on the situation of women in all relevant ‘state-of-affairs’ letters to parliament that outline political, security and developmental progress in focus countries of the Dutch government and indicate the Dutch contribution to this progress. The parliamentary resolution, however, was not implemented consistently during the period that followed. On many occasions, parliament returned the letters because the ‘women paragraph’ was omitted. In general, it was concluded that for the resolution to be implemented effectively, clear guidance and internal monitoring and evaluation needed to be developed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Jansen (2011)).

The assessment framework for military deployment in crisis situations (Toetsingskader), adopted in July 2009, was another milestone in the development of the government’s ‘3D’ approach. The framework combines diplomatic, developmental and military instruments to achieve a maximum effect in fragile and conflict-affected states. It includes a separate criterion on gender, stating that ‘women’s participation and the impact on women and other aspects of gender policy are taken into account in all considerations regarding the deployment of Dutch troops in crisis situations, as long as they are relevant and in line with international agreements in this regard’ (translation IOB) (Ministerie van Defensie (2009): 5). However, at the same time, the framework does not provide entry points for actually doing so, by setting ‘the position of refugees and women’ aside from, for example, security sector reform and socio-economic development, i.e. areas that merit a separate gender perspective and analysis. Furthermore, gender aspects are included neither in the paragraph describing the political aspects of conflict nor among the criteria for conflict analysis, which should be the starting point for any other activity focusing on gender equality.\textsuperscript{25}

\section*{3.3.2 Cabinet Rutte I (2010-2012)}

In 2011, the new state secretary for European Affairs and Development Cooperation re-positioned gender as a cross-cutting theme in Dutch development cooperation policy and its four priority areas (referred to as ‘spearheads’) (KST 32605-2 (2011). For the security and rule of law spearhead, this meant a special focus on the various roles of women in conflict and in post-conflict reconstruction and economic development. UNSCR 1325 is again the guiding principle for designing and supporting concrete activities in this field (KST 32605-2 (2011): 6).

\begin{tiny}
\footnotesize\textsuperscript{24} Motie Diks c.s. 31 700 V, nr. 53, 2008

\footnotesize\textsuperscript{25} A joint letter to parliament from the ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defence and the state secretary of Foreign Affairs dated 24 January 2012 nevertheless states that with the updating of the framework in 2009, attention to gender in the design and implementation of crisis control operations is secured.
\end{tiny}
In the parliamentary debate following this new focus, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the state secretary were requested to further elaborate their vision on gender. In response, the international gender policy note was released in November 2011 (KST 32735-39 (2011)). This policy note is based on the assumption that promoting gender equality – understood as ‘equal opportunities and rights for women and their full participation in society and in decision making processes’ (translation IOB) – is instrumental for overall policy effectiveness (KST 32735-39 (2011): 1, 2).

This policy note – which clearly reflects the instrumental approach referred to in Chapter 2 – reconfirms the two-track approach that has a long history in Dutch international gender equality policy: a stand-alone gender policy and gender mainstreaming in the priority areas of foreign affairs and development cooperation. For security and rule of law, the stand-alone track is equalled with the implementation of UNSCR 1325 and focuses on strengthening the role of women in peace building and democratisation (KST 32735-39 (2011): 3). The overall assumption that promoting gender equality will have a positive impact on policy effectiveness is summarised here as ‘promoting the role of women in peace processes and reconstruction increases the sustainability of peace; it is a matter of ‘smart security”’ (translation IOB) (KST 32735-39 (2011): 3). Gender mainstreaming is understood as ‘applying a gender-responsive 3-D approach; promoting a stronger position of women as actors in reconstruction and peacebuilding processes in fragile states; improving gender equality for the law and equal access to formal and informal justice systems within a local context; improving access to safe education, especially for girls; and addressing the specific humanitarian needs of women and girls’ (translation IOB) (KST 32735-39 (2011): 6).

In the same period, the Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs Rosenthal and the United States Secretary of State Hillary Clinton issued a joint statement on ‘Supporting women’s political empowerment in emerging democracies’ (Office of the Spokesman 2011). This reconfirmed the new focus on women’s political participation in peacebuilding and democratisation by reasoning that ‘integrating women into transition, reconciliation and peacebuilding processes from the start, helps promote long-term peace and security by ensuring a focus on critical broader priorities and needs’.

The gender, peace and security approach in the policy note on the ‘Spearhead Security and Rule of Law’ of 2012 (KST 32605-94 (2012)) builds on the assumptions and priorities that are defined in the international gender policy, the NAP-II, and reconfirmed the above joint statement. The objectives of the stand-alone gender track, linked to the implementation of the NAP, are reflected in the same focus on female leadership and the economic and political role of women in peace processes. In addition, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs aims to contribute to increasing the gender-responsiveness of peacekeeping operations under the EU or NATO flag by supporting gender trainings for the military. This is seen as another element of implementing UNSCR 1325. Gender mainstreaming is specified in relation to conflict analysis: ‘gender is an important element of conflict analyses that aim at getting a better understanding of the nexus between conflict, fragility, gender and poor performance of the Millennium Development Goals’ (translation IOB) (KST 32605-94 (2012): 8). However,
to date, there are no guidelines on how to make peace and security objectives and intervention strategies gender-responsive, no directives on how to advance gender-equality objectives and, specifically, UNSCR 1325, in a gender-responsive way, and no policy based on an understanding of how these agendas intersect.

### 3.3.3 Cabinet Rutte II (2012 - present)

By making women’s rights and sexual and reproductive health and rights (SRHR) one of the four key priorities in Dutch development cooperation, the recent policy note on aid and trade ‘A World to Gain’ (KST 33625-1 (2013)) re-introduces the separate gender equality agenda that was started in 2007. This policy note is based on a distinct effort to focus on women’s rights, and is contrary to the broader term ‘gender’ that previously was used interchangeably with ‘women’. For the spearhead security and rule of law this means a continuation of the focus on promoting the positive role of women in conflict resolution, reconstruction and peacekeeping and combating sexual violence against women.

However, this renewed attention to women’s rights in the overarching development policy on aid and trade is reflected hardly at all in the three key policy notes concerning the Dutch 3D approach to fragile and conflict-affected states, which followed in 2013, i.e. (a) the note on the international security strategy ‘A Secure Netherlands in a Secure World’, issued by the Minister of Foreign Affairs; (b) the joint letter to parliament about the Budget International Security from the ministers of Foreign Affairs, Defence and for Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation; and (c) the policy note on the future of the armed forces (Voortgangsnota over de toekomst van de krijgsmacht) that outlines the vision of the Minister of Defence on the deployment of the Dutch military.

### 3.4 Conclusions

This chapter has shown that UNSCR 1325 of October 2000 has been important for putting women on the peace and security agenda worldwide and that the Dutch government has clearly and consistently made a political choice to support this agenda. This started with the establishment of a Task Force Women, Security and Conflict in 2003 and eventually resulted in two National Action Plans, in 2008 and 2012, to implement UNSCR 1325 (which will be the focus of the next chapters).

Increasingly, it has been recognised that women are not only a group that needs protection but that they are also key actors in peace and security processes. The rationale for this focus on women is that by including them in these processes will positively impact the sustainability thereof (i.e. instrumental approach). It is best described by the Dutch international gender policy of 2011, which promotes the role of women as ‘smart security’

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26 The Dutch Security Strategy mentions UNSCR 1325 once, together with the Dutch commitment to ‘the responsibility to protect’. KST 33694-1 (2013)
27 ‘Kamerbrief over Budget Internationale Veiligheid’, DSH-593/2013, 12 July 2013. This letter makes no reference to gender, women or UNSCR 1325.
28 This note (undated, no reference number) only refers to UNSCR 1325 in relation to a NATO initiative.
even though the assumptions underpinning this paradigm are based on academic quicksand.

At the same time, the attention given to the role of women in peace and security is not systematically pursued. While the issues of gender and ‘women’ are touched upon in recent development cooperation documents such as the international gender policy (KST 32735-39 (2011)), the policy note A World to Gain (KST 33625-1 (2013)) and the Dutch international human rights policy of 2013, they are little discussed in recent policy documents on foreign affairs and security such as the Dutch international security strategy and the ‘Budget International Security’ of 2013. Exceptions in this regard are the Toetsingskader (Ministerie van Defensie (2009)) and the policy note on Security and Rule of Law (2012).

The chapter also makes clear that throughout the period 2007–13 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has maintained a two-track approach to gender, peace and security, consisting of:

- A stand-alone track that is increasingly focused on female leadership and the economic and political role of women in peace processes, which has been supported by a National Action Plan since 2008. Implementation of UNSCR 1325 has gradually become the cornerstone of the Dutch stand-alone policy on women, peace and security and has also become the guiding principle for gender mainstreaming in the ministry’s overall policy on peace and security.
- A gender-mainstreaming track, with a focus on gender and/or promoting the role of women in conflict resolution, reconstruction and peacekeeping as well as combating sexual violence against women. Nevertheless, a coherent framework connecting gender to these broader peace and security objectives and positions with UNSCR 1325 is absent.

While policy documents tend to use the words ‘gender’ and ‘women’ practically interchangeably, the term ‘gender’ in peace and security documents is overtly focused on women – both as victims, requiring support, and as key actors in peace and reconstruction processes. ‘Gender’ and ‘women’ are discussed in isolation from men or broader gender dynamics. Moreover, neither term has been truly conceptualised in relation to peace and security objectives.

In the following chapter, we will see what the Dutch National Action Plans for the implementation of UNSCR 1325 have to say on these matters and how these plans have evolved over time in different political contexts.
The Dutch National Action Plans for implementing UNSCR 1325
4.1 Introduction

Responsibility for implementing the various UN Security Council’s resolutions on women, peace and security lies primarily with the UN and UN member states, in partnership with a range of stakeholders including civil society and international and regional security organisations. International legal experts differ as to whether these member states must abide by these resolutions. Some consider that these resolutions ‘lack the muscle’ to compel states to comply (see e.g. Swaine (2009): 409-410; Dornig and Goede (2010): 8; Willet (2010): 143; Moosa et al. (2013): 455). Others are of the opinion that they are legally binding (see e.g. Valenius (2007): 512; Shepherd (2008): 383; Shepherd (2011): 505; Hudson (2013): 10).

In practice this has led to ‘varied measures and different kinds of emphasis and implementation strategies’ (Jukarainen and Puumala (2014): 9). NAPs are in this respect one of the ‘key methods through which national governments are supporting the implementation of UNSC Resolution 1325’ (Popovic et al. (2010): xv). Though UN Women developed basic guidelines in 2012, there are no minimum standards or templates for their development. The many studies that are available make clear that such plans differ considerably.

This chapter provides background information on the Dutch National Action Plans (NAPs) that were developed in 2008 (NAP-I) and in 2011 (NAP-II). It discusses their characteristics, describes how the choices made in NAP-II arose from lessons learnt during NAP-I and analyses the basic assumptions that underlie the approach to their implementation. It also provides information on NAPs from other European countries to benchmark the approach taken by the Netherlands in terms of partners involved, the role of civil society and the topics covered by the NAPs.

The development of the NAPs was the Dutch response to repeated international requests to do so following the adoption of the UNSCR 1325 in 2000. A successful mix of political will, positive examples provided by the Nordic countries and the UK, and parliamentary insistence that was supported by civil society advocacy efforts paved the way for the NAPs to become an established element of Dutch policy on gender, peace and security.

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29 Some consider that these resolutions ‘lack the muscle’ to compel states to comply (see e.g. Swaine (2009): 409-410; Dornig and Goede (2010): 8; Willet (2010): 143; Moosa et al. (2013): 455). Others are of the opinion that they are legally binding (see e.g. Valenius (2007): 512; Shepherd (2008): 383; Shepherd (2011): 505; Hudson (2013): 10).

30 See Swaine (2009); Beetham and Popovic (2009); Popovic et al. (2010); Dharmapuri (2011); Zakharova (2012); Kuonqui and Cueva-Beteta (2012); Pasquinelli and Potter Prentice (2013); Hudson (2013); Swaine (2013); Hoewer (2013); Ormhaug (2014); Hinds and McMinn (2014); Jukarainen and Puumala (2014); Miller et al. (2014).


32 Denmark was the first country with an NAP in 2005, followed by Norway, Sweden and the UK in 2006.

33 Several studies have identified the main factors prompting the development of an NAP 1325 that in fact mirror the situation in the Netherlands. For a summary see Miller et al. (2014): 17.
Today, the NAPs are the flagship project of the Dutch stand-alone policy track on gender, peace and security. They have gradually also guided the gender-mainstreaming objectives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs which, in turn, have come to echo priorities set in the NAPs. According to the ministry, the Netherlands is a front-runner for its integrated approach to the implementation of UNSCR 1325, binding a variety of governmental and non-governmental actors to a single overarching goal, which is the improvement of the position of women in conflict situations (KST 32605-121 (2013): 1-2).

4.2 National Action Plan 1325-I: ‘Taking a stand for women, peace and security’

Following the commitments made in the policy note Een zaak van iedereen (2007), the first National Action Plan 1325, ‘Taking a stand for women, peace and security’ (2008-2011), was launched and endorsed by 18 signatories from Dutch government, civil society and knowledge institutes on 4 December 2007. The Netherlands was the seventh UN member state to prepare such a NAP (currently there are 46 other states with a similar plan) and the first one to do so together with civil society – and to have civil society not only participate in developing the Plan but to also sign it.

Implementing UNSCR 1325, the main objective of the NAP, was ‘both an end in itself, and a means of achieving the various security and development objectives’ (NAP-II (2011): 9-10). A recent comparative study on National Action Plans worldwide, considered the Dutch NAP-I to be ‘the most comprehensive NAP of its time’ (Miller et al. (2014): 116), including as it does, substantial background analysis and detailed actions.

The NAP is explicit about the status of the document: it is not a policy framework but should be regarded a starting point for more integrated, coordinated and, therefore, more effective cooperation between the Netherlands government, civil society and knowledge institutes on the implementation of UNSCR 1325 (NAP-I (2007): 11).

The Plan built on the work of the Women, Security and Conflict task force and on the Clingendael report described above. It was considered a ‘logical follow-up, since it fleshed out the recommendations contained in the report and anchored them in Dutch society’ (NAP-I (2007): 9). On the basis of these recommendations and the so-called Schokland Agreement35

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34 The input from civil society was consolidated in the so-called Pink Notes, coordinated by the Dutch gender platform WO=MEN.
35 The ministers for Development Cooperation, Defence, and Education, Culture and Science, NGOs and knowledge institutes signed this ‘Schokland Agreement on women, peace and security’ on 30 June 2007. With this agreement, the signatories agreed to prepare a national action plan for the implementation of UNSCR 1325 to secure ‘systematic attention, recognition and support for the role of women in conflict situations’.
The Dutch National Action Plans for implementing UNSCR 1325

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs drafted the Plan together with the Ministry of Defence and representatives of Dutch civil society and knowledge institutes.36

The development of the NAP and the NAP network has been described by ministry staff as a process of ‘pioneering’ or ‘building the boat, while sailing’.37 Political momentum for the women, peace and security agenda was optimal, but knowledge of how to implement this agenda, and experience of doing so, were still limited and were gathered along the way.

At the core of the NAP-I is an analysis of the multifaceted roles of women in conflict and peace. Its underpinning rationale is that women and men are differently affected by conflict, and women have a different role in influencing conflict, in both ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ ways. The signatories to the NAP-I agreed to support far-reaching improvements in the position of women in (post-) conflict countries by using the instrument of human rights, by embedding the role of women in aspects of the peace process and reconstruction, through international cooperation, and, above all, by giving local women and men the lead in their further development (NAP-I (2007): 46). To this end, the document argues, it is necessary to obtain ‘systematic attention for, recognition of and support for the role of women in post-conflict situations’, and to identify ‘different organisations’ responsibilities for this process’ (NAP-I (2007): 5-6). The Plan set out 19 policy goals and 72 detailed activities – ‘specifically oriented towards’ women – that are grouped in five thematic focus areas (see Annexe 5 for more details):38

- the (international) juridical framework;
- institutionalisation of the role of women in conflict prevention, mediation and reconstruction;
- international cooperation;
- peacekeeping missions;
- alignment and coordination among the signatories.

The decision to choose a broad range of signatories to join hands for the purpose of reaching those objectives is based on the notion that ‘getting results requires an integrated policy in the fullest sense of the word’ (NAP-I (2007): 9). The unique partnerships that developed during NAP-I were recognised as a key factor for the successful implementation of UNSCR 1325, which required activities at international, bilateral and, especially, the local

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36 These included Amnesty International, the Centrum voor Conflictstudies of Utrecht University, the Dutch NGOs ICCO, Kerk in Actie, Nederlandse Organisatie voor Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek (NWO), the coalition People Building Peace Nederland, Platform Vrouwen Duurzame Vrede (VDV), SNV Netherlands Development Organisation, and WO=MEN/Dutch Gender Platform.

37 A similar position is reflected in Hudson (2013): ‘… it is clear that no action plan gets it right the first time around. These are living and evolving documents that can and should be improved upon over time and revised as priorities change and needs shift’ (Hudson (2013): 14). See also Dharmapuri (2011): 2.

38 Some claim that these 72 activities were merely a collection of individual activities that the signatories had already scheduled. Others in turn, state that the simple fact that those activities were, for the first time, consistently related to the different priority areas of peace and security policy, is to be regarded as an important step in mainstreaming UNSCR 1325 in Dutch peace and security policy.
level. Account was to be taken of the respective roles and strengths of the different NAP stakeholders:

- Civil society operates at the local level through its local networks; it supports advocates of gender justice and has a watchdog capacity.
- The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, acknowledging the special needs of women in conflict-affected environments, engages in ‘gender diplomacy’ both at UN level and in its partnerships with governments of fragile and conflict-affected states.
- The Ministry of Defence focuses on building up the percentage of women in the Dutch armed forces to 12%, and to increase the inclusivity of its peacekeeping operations.
- Research and knowledge institutions have a key role in filling the gap in knowledge about gender and conflict and of how gender norms and relations interact with the dynamics of conflict and other forms of inequality.

As the NAP’s intervention logic is based on the assumption that all signatories already have ongoing activities related to implementation of UNSCR 1325, a separate budget for implementation of the NAP was not needed: activities were supposed to be undertaken with already existing budgets for peace and security. This also concerned the NAP’s research pillar, for which the NAP indicated that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs would decide whether or not additional funding could be released (NAP-I (2007): 43).

Text box 4.1 shows that the process of developing the NAP in the Netherlands has not been too different from what has happened in like-minded countries such as the Nordic countries and the UK.
Text box 4.1  Comparing the Dutch NAP with the NAPs of like-minded countries

The leading role of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, plus the involvement of other ministries, makes the Dutch NAP not very different from what has happened in like-minded countries such as the Nordics and the UK (see figure 4.1). This pivotal role also explains the focus on the international arena and on ‘how foreign aid should support the four pillars of UNSCR 1325 in developing and conflict-torn countries’ (Miller et al. (2014): 11).39

Figure 4.1  Government involvement in the NAPs in like-minded countries

Also in terms of involving civil society organisations, the situation in the Netherlands is quite comparable to the Nordic countries and the UK. In all cases, civil society is recognised as an important actor, though views have differed on how and at what stage to include national civil society partners in the NAP development process and whether to give them a role in formal monitoring structures as is the case in, for example, Finland, the Netherlands and the UK. By carving out a role for the academic world, the situation in the Netherlands is comparable to that in, for example, Finland and Sweden as well as Belgium.

4.3  Mid-term review of NAP-I

Implementation of NAP-I was assessed twice. First by the NGO-commissioned evaluation ‘1 year NAP: Evaluating the Dutch National Action Plan on UNSCR 1325 after one year of implementation’ (2008) and, secondly, in the unpublished mid-term review of the NAP-I (2010) that was commissioned by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

40  Adapted from: EPLO (ed.) (2010); EPLO (ed.) (2013); Jukarinen and Puumala (2014).
Both reports found first of all that there had been little actual cooperation or joint projects and that few data were available on the progress made in carrying out the envisaged activities. This was partly explained by a lack of clarity regarding the responsibilities, roles and tasks of the various stakeholders. Contrary to what was agreed initially (NAP-I (2007): 44), a formal coordination mechanism was lacking. Eventually, some sort of ‘co-coordination’ system emerged, in which the Ministry of Foreign Affairs focused on coordination among ministries and knowledge institutes and the Dutch gender platform WO=MEN on coordinating the NGO 1325 network. However, the mandate of the coordinators and the contribution, organisational support and commitment expected from the participants remained unclear. Much depended on individual commitments, there was no consensus about the number of meetings needed for smooth cooperation and the participation of most signatories in meetings became irregular (Mid-Term Review (2010): 11).

Second, there was strong financial interdependence between the signatories. The larger development organisations obtained major part of their funding from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and financed some of the smaller voluntary and diaspora organisations. This created an unequal playing field among the signatories (Mid-Term Review (2010): 12-13). At the same time, these smaller organisations used the network meetings to lobby for funding to compensate for their time and travel costs to attend the meetings and to be able to execute projects jointly with the bigger ones.

The review furthermore found that most signatories preferred to address the ‘active roles’ of women in conflict and post-conflict environments and that there was little trace of the involvement of the knowledge institutes, Wageningen University or the Centre for Conflict Studies (CCS) of Utrecht University.41

In response to the mid-term review, it was decided to narrow the focus of the NAP to a single pillar of UNSCR 1325: female leadership and political participation in Afghanistan, DRC, Burundi, Sudan, Colombia and the MENA region. Three task groups were established to concentrate efforts on: (i) female leadership and political participation; (ii) awareness-raising on UNSCR 1325 within the signatory organisations as well as at national and international level; and (iii) strengthening the internal organisation and management of the network. This development also paved the way for the choices made in the NAP-II, ‘Women: powerful agents for peace and security’.

4.4 National Action Plan 1325-II ‘Women: powerful agents for peace and security’

The second National Action Plan 1325 (NAP-II) was published simultaneously with the presentation of the international gender strategy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2011). Much like its predecessor, NAP-II is characterised as ‘a tool for exchanging information,

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41 This is partly explained by the initial lack of a budget for research. The Dutch organisation for academic research NWO prepared a EUR 500,000 call for proposals on gender and conflict, but eventually the call was never published. Clingendael was not a signatory to NAP-I.
inspiring discussion and increasing joint action among all actors working on the implement-
mentation of UNSCR 1325’ (NAP-II (2011): 3).

It was reconfirmed that a multi-stakeholder partnership was critical and the Plan stresses
the importance of establishing the broadest Dutch support base possible. More emphasis
was at the same time put on the role of local women and women’s organisations, or smaller
organisations with strong networks, within the fragile and (post-) conflict countries
concerned. They are key stakeholders of the NAP: ‘Individual local women and women’s
organisations and movements are the real drivers of change and their opinions as to what
actions are needed are decisive’ (NAP-II (2011): 8-9).

With the NAP-I experiences fresh in mind, the signatories agreed to change the nature of
the partnership in three ways: (i) a coordination structure was established; (ii) the
partnership was oriented towards a specific focus and a clear target (NAP-II (2011): 19); and
(iii) a budget was made available to promote joint action. A small budget was also set aside
from 2012 onwards (see text box 4.2) to address the problem of a lack of operational budget
that faces smaller organisations.

Text box 4.2  Compensating smaller organisations

To balance the inequality between the development organisations and the smaller
voluntary organisations represented in the NAP, the ministry started subsidising the
Platform Vrouwen & Duurzame Vrede (VDV) from April 2012 onwards (EUR 24,500 per
year) ‘to support members of the VDV platform and several small NGOs in their
unpaid efforts for implementation of the NAP 1325’. The support was meant for
travel expenses, overheads, and the costs for organising meetings. Financial
reporting was not required, but from internal correspondence it appears that the
subsidy was never fully exhausted, because the organisations concerned did not
comply with the basic administrative rules when submitting their invoices.

The main objective of NAP-II which, like many other gender policy documents of the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, uses the terms ‘women’ and ‘gender’ almost interchangeably, is
‘to jointly facilitate the creation of an enabling environment for women’s leadership and
political participation in fragile states and transition countries, allowing for more inclusive,
just and sustainable peace and reconstruction processes’ (NAP-II (2011): 21). However, a
number of signatories had warned that such a focus on women’s leadership risked
compromising the NAP’s previous orientation on gender. As a result, gender mainstreaming was maintained as one of the NAP-II core objectives, which are (see Annexe 6 for more details):

- Establish the NAP as a framework for effective and efficient multi-stakeholder cooperation. To this end, the signatories aimed to: exchange ‘knowledge, ideas and strategies (…) resulting in tangible and realistic plans and constructive collaboration’; seek international cooperation; conduct ‘demand-driven and needs-based research on gender, peace and security’; actively involve ‘diaspora, migrant, women’s and peace organisations’; and strengthen the M&E of the NAP (NAP-II 2011: 35-38).

- Increase the impact of the NAP as a stand-alone women, peace and security initiative, by:
  1. supporting ‘equal participation by women and men in peace and reconstruction processes at all decision-making levels’ (NAP-II 2011: 22) in Afghanistan, Burundi, Colombia, DRC, Sudan and South Sudan, and in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. This is to take the form of joint programmatic action in legal reform processes, affirmative action and capacity-building; and
  2. raising awareness of the importance of gender and conflict and increased public support for UNSCR 1325 in the Netherlands, the EU, the UN and other regional and international bodies and their member states. This is primarily to be realised through joint lobby and advocacy efforts.

- Commit to the ‘consistent integration of gender and UNSCR 1325 into all Dutch signatories’ policies and actions on fragile states and (DAC) countries in transition and or peacebuilding and reconstruction efforts in these states’ (NAP-II (2011): 28). The idea is to bring this integration about while the broader policies regarding fragile states is made ‘gender-just and compliant with UNSCR 1325’ (NAP-II 2011: 28) so as to better support female leadership and political participation in general terms. Results shall include gender analyses, and measures to protect women from violence and to counter gender inequality in peacebuilding, security and defence policies, while maintaining internal awareness-raising and advocacy within the NAP signatories’ organisations to enhance implementation of these analyses and measures.

Whereas NAP-I included a comprehensive list of policy interventions for all its objectives, NAP-II did not contain details of how to enhance ‘women’s leadership and participation’ in peace and reconstruction processes. Rather, detailed action plans were ‘omitted intentionally’ as the signatories sought to ‘instead work flexibly’ in order ‘to have the possibility and scope to respond quickly to new developments worldwide and to make use of sudden opening windows and opportunities’ (NAP-II (2011): 8). NAP-II thus provided an approach to the implementation of UNSCR 1325’s policy goal on political participation and female leadership, rather than a plan of action.

43 For example, in response to the draft NAP strategy focusing on female leadership, Cordaid and WO=MEN state in a policy brief: ‘The ’new focus’ strategy of the NAP (working group) risks falling into the trap of a single focus on increasing the number of women in decision-making and leadership, without sufficiently addressing the gender stereotypes that sustain gender inequalities, and that are reproduced by the society as a whole: by men and women, by power holders and subordinates’ (Cordaid and WO=MEN 2010: 21). See also: Minutes ’Breed NAP overleg’, 12 October 2011.
4.5 Assumptions underlying the NAP-II approach

To understand and value the approach taken in NAP-II, it is helpful to distil its main underlying assumptions when translating UNSCR 1325 into action, i.e.:

- **Premise 1**: Success in the NAP-II defined result areas – law reform, affirmative action, capacity-building and awareness-raising – helps to promote female leadership and women’s participation in decision-making bodies.
- **Premise 2**: Promoting female leadership and women’s political participation helps to achieve gender equality objectives.
- **Premise 3**: Promoting gender equality will lead to more sustainable peace.

The following paragraphs discuss the relevance and validity of these main assumptions.

**Premise 1: Success in result areas promotes female leadership and women’s participation**

The choice to support female leadership and women’s political participation in peace and reconstruction processes implies that the signatories selected one of the three intervention areas set out by UNSR 1325.44 Within this domain, most international efforts have focused on electoral politics, supporting the introduction of quotas for women in political bodies and building up women’s leadership skills.45 NAP-II follows this trend, suggesting activities that range from supporting the gender sensitising of constitutional frameworks, promoting gender quotas, and skills trainings for women (and men) to act as leaders and peacebuilders (NAP-II (2011): 22-24).

These sorts of activities are typically undertaken in the immediate aftermath of conflict, aimed at expanding and consolidating a sudden space to establish new political roles for women. As was discussed in Chapter 2, reaching a positive impact in this regard requires addressing the underlying social norms around (typical) masculine and feminine behaviour, which do not necessarily alter following a superficial change of roles. To effectively address problems surrounding these social norms two findings in particular need to be kept in mind: (i) technical measures to promote participation and female leadership need to be combined with gender-responsive activities;46 (ii) transformative change occurs at the grass roots.

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44 Article 8b of UNSCR 1325 refers to ‘measures that support local women’s peace initiatives and indigenous processes for conflict resolution, and which involve women in all of the implementation mechanisms of the peace agreements’.


46 Gender-responsiveness in this regard means addressing how norms around masculinity and femininity shape social standards of acceptable political behaviour of both men and women. This requires an understanding of the individual and social impact that redressing those norms will have on women and men.
Regarding the first finding (gender-responsiveness), the question is to what extent the Plan actually promotes gender-responsiveness and encourages an approach that acknowledges the grey area between formal politics and informal authority structures that characterise fragile or conflict-affected environments. To assess this aspect in relation to the NAP’s approach to female leadership and women’s participation, it is helpful to see what the NAP-II has to say on gender analysis and the role of men in its strategy:

- Gender analysis is a result area, but used only in order to remove the concern that ‘(…) ‘soft’ female ways will remain unnoticed’ in ‘male-oriented (peacekeeping) operations’ (NAP-II (2011): 28). In other words, gender analysis is presented as a tool to highlight women’s concerns in peacekeeping operations, instead of a lens to understand the impact of promoting women’s emancipation in a context characterised by problematic gender-norms for both men and women. To be clear, contrasting ‘soft female ways’ with ‘male-oriented operations’ is in itself a highly gendered construction that perpetuates gender stereotypes, contributing to the ongoing inequality.

- Men, in turn, are portrayed as, at best, potential allies in the push for gender-equality: ‘The NAP signatories will support and facilitate training for men. They will try to convince them of the importance of including women in decision-making processes at all levels of society’ (NAP-II (2011): 25). At the same time, little attention is paid to existing gender norms that may inhibit men from supporting and benefiting from the women’s empowerment agenda.

The above makes clear that the NAP-II provides little guidance on how to implement activities in a way that is responsive to local gender norms.

Regarding the second finding (focus on the grass roots), the NAP approach scores much better. For effectively promoting women’s participation in decision-making bodies, it appears more important to focus on the process of decision-making – connecting formal decision-makers (regardless of their sex) to informal gender champions and work on the transformation of social norms about leadership and leadership styles. This is more important than concentrating on increasing the number of women holding a seat of power. This position is supported by broader social change analysis in the context of fragile and conflict-affected environments, underlining that ‘imposing new sets of formal rules, without simultaneously reshaping the distribution of power that underlies prior institutional arrangements is a dubious strategy’ (Evans (2004): 34). Hence, in such environments, a purely state-oriented approach to peace and security is never sustainable.

Since gender norms are being reshaped at local level, connections with grass-roots initiatives for social change and gender equality become an absolute strategic prerequisite.

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47 Research has shown that across 70 countries ‘the autonomous mobilization of feminists in domestic and transnational contexts – not leftist parties, women in government, or national wealth – is the critical factor accounting for policy change. Impact of global norms on domestic policy-making is conditional on the presence of feminist movements in domestic contexts, pointing to the importance of ongoing activism and a vibrant civil society’ (Htun and Weldon 2012: 548-69). See also Domingo et al. (2013): 24, 25.

48 See for example Boege et al. (2009).
when promoting gender equality objectives (Arutyunova and Clark (2014): 30). These insights indeed support NAP-II’s strong emphasis on the role of local women’s organisations: supporting them is relevant when pursuing a socio-political change agenda in conflict-affected environments.

**Premise 2: Female leadership and women’s political participation promote gender equality objectives**

On the second assumption, the document states that ‘the mere presence of women can change the culture and focus of politics’ (NAP-II (2011): 23), provided that the listed short-term actions in the policy are flanked by longer-term capacity-building of those women to participate in ‘meaningful and substantial’ ways that are the result of training activities for both women and men (NAP-II (2011): 24). A vision of the concepts of political participation and leadership of women was never fully developed, however, despite the acknowledged need to do so.50

Findings from a study on this topic conducted by Villellas Ariño (2010) claim that ‘it is not by simply adding women that justice, equality and inclusion will impregnate peace processes. But without them justice, equality and inclusion remain absent and peacebuilding approached only through one perspective’ (Villellas Ariño (2010): 44). However, the notion that by promoting female leadership and women’s participation in peace and reconstruction processes will help to advance a gender equality agenda is not conclusively substantiated by experience and academic findings.51 A key point is that ‘participation does not ensure women’s influence in decision making or that women in politics will give priority to a gender equality agenda’ (Domingo et al. (2013): 24; Villellas Ariño (2010): 44-45). Female politicians can provide a role model at best, which may have a positive impact on gender equality in the future (Miller et al. (2014): 5). While this potential impact can be discussed in relation to the complexity and fluidity of gender norms in the wider political economy of post-conflict transition, it has not been proven. Indeed, new roles and responsibilities can intersect with new forms of inequalities that have been normalised by armed conflict (Domingo et al. (2013): 8, 24-25).

**Premise 3: Gender equality leads to more sustainable peace**

Both NAPs combine elements of the instrumental, the agenda-setting and the protection approach referred to in Chapter 2. In the case of NAP-I this reads as ‘improving the position of women is an absolute precondition for achieving the MDGs and ensuring observance of the most fundamental human rights’ (NAP-I (2007): 9-10). This aspiration is made more

49 Another comparative study on the impact of women’s participation in peace processes finds: ‘For women to have a significant impact on the peace process, they may need to participate on many dimensions’ (McCarthy (2011): 121-122).

50 See Minutes NAP signatory meeting, 24 April 2012 and Minutes NAP 1325 Coordination meeting, 29 June 2012.

51 With respect to Burundi, El-Bushra, for example, observes that ‘women have guaranteed places in parliament and state institutions, yet this has made little difference so far to the lives of ordinary women who have divergent identities and interests’ (El-Bushra (2012): 14). Likewise in Rwanda, the country with the highest percentage of women in parliament (56%), following the introduction of a constitutional quota system, gender parity in formal decision-making bodies has not (yet) resulted in any improvement in the daily lives of women in the broader society (Domingo et al. (2013): 24).
explicit in NAP-II: ‘Arguments for the participation of women and the incorporation of a gender perspective into peace and reconstruction processes are both normative and instrumental. From a normative perspective women’s leverage is both a fundamental human right and a goal in itself. From an instrumental point of view it is important to bear in mind that women constitute half the world’s population, and thus provide half of the world’s human capital. Women also have experience and perspectives that may differ from those of men, as a result of their specific social roles. Their opinion and participation are essential to the success and sustainability of any social change’ (NAP-II (2011): 22).

The assumption underlying both NAPs, that the presence of women will help to advance peace and security objectives, is anchored in UNSCR 1325 itself. There is indeed reason to assume that gender analysis helps to improve peace and security interventions. There is also a correlation between gender equality and peace and security (i.e. states that score badly on gender equality indexes are also more likely to be affected by conflict). However, as was discussed in detail in Chapter 2, evidence confirming the assumption that promoting gender equality will strengthen the sustainability of peace processes is inconclusive. So in this case, there are questions about the causality of this relationship.

As an action plan to implement UNSCR 1325, NAP-II has thus rightly connected UNSCR 1325 objectives to broader gender-mainstreaming objectives. However, the implications of this regarding the implementation of UNSCR 1325 have yet to be fully thought through.

4.6 Conclusions

The main reason for initiating the NAPs is straightforward: it was the Dutch response to repeated requests from the UN Security Council to the member states to develop implementation plans following the adoption of UNSCR 1325. This was widely supported by the government, parliament and civil society and in line with the recommendations of the task force Women, Peace and Security that were published in 2006.

The way in which this was done tallied with the multi-stakeholder approach of the Schokland Agreements of 2007. This multi-stakeholder partnership has remained at the core of the Dutch approach to implementing UNSCR 1325. It is an approach in which a pivotal role is played by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which explains the external focus of the NAPs, and it is a model that has also been used in like-minded countries such as the Nordics and the UK. The Dutch NAPs, however, are the only ones to be co-signed by both governmental and non-governmental actors.

Initially, the ambition of the NAP-I was simply to facilitate this multi-stakeholder partnership by creating a framework for cooperation to strengthen each other’s ongoing activities in relation to women/gender and peace and security. The Plan was broad and covered the different pillars of UNSCR 1325, with no clear prioritisation in terms of interventions or countries to focus on. It had neither an earmarked budget – the
stakeholders were to operate with existing resources—nor a joint M&E framework, as this was seen to belong to the domain of the individual signatories.

When it became clear in 2010 that this framework of cooperation had not led to tangible results, the NAP signatories decided jointly to narrow the NAP’s focus to one pillar of UNSCR 1325 (political participation of women and female leadership) and to restrict its geographical scope. At the same time, the ambition in terms of connecting UNSCR’s 1325 women, peace and security agenda to a broader gender framework and a gender-mainstreaming objective became more explicit: gender mainstreaming became an objective in its own right under NAP-II. The multi-stakeholder approach was reconfirmed and, to promote cooperation among the different type of signatories and support the smaller women’s organisations in their role, a budget was made available. Contrary to the first NAP, NAP-II provides an approach to UNSCR 1325 implementation instead of detailed action plans, as this would allow for a more flexible and needs-based planning and operation process.

Regarding the relevance of the assumptions underlying this NAP-II approach, the picture is mixed. The emphasis in NAP-II on the role of local women and their organisations in this process is relevant, as is confirmed by broader insights into political and social change in conflict-affected environments. However, the existing literature neither substantiates the assumed relationship between women’s participation in decision-making bodies and gender-equality, nor shows that there is a causal relationship between gender equality and peace and security.

As in other countries, the Dutch NAPs were devised and adjusted through a process of trial and error. Assumptions underlying UNSCR 1325, and consequently the NAPs, were tested along the way in an innovative, and sometimes challenging, multi-stakeholder context.

How this multi-stakeholder partnership has functioned and what it has meant in terms of coordination and cooperation is the focus of the next chapter. Particular attention will be paid to the influence the introduction of the earmarked budget has had on cooperation among its different stakeholders.
The NAP as a framework for cooperation
5.1 Introduction

This chapter discusses the NAP as a framework for enhanced cooperation among its different stakeholders, whether such cooperation has been effective, and what results it has brought about. It will start with a factual description of the cooperation objectives and structure. This is followed by an assessment of the implications of the introduction of a NAP earmarked budget in 2012. Finally, particular attention is paid to the monitoring and evaluation arrangements that were put in place.

5.2 Cooperation objectives and structure: an overview

As mentioned in Chapter 4, at the heart of the NAPs is the notion that a demand-driven multi-stakeholder agenda is necessary to promote women’s leadership and participation. To make such an approach operational, a lot of time and thinking was invested in the process of collaboration. This was especially the case after the mid-term review (2010) had found that, so far, there had been little actual cooperation. Moreover, while it was decided to redirect the focus on women’s leadership and political participation to a limited number of countries, the number of signatories increased from 18 in 2008 to 57 at present. This made cooperation and consultation even more important. A more formalised organisational structure was therefore agreed upon to facilitate stronger cooperation in order to achieve the five results related to the Plan’s fourth objective: ‘Effective and efficient cooperation between NAP signatories and other relevant stakeholders to ensure worldwide implementation of UNSCR 1325’ (NAP-II (2011): 35-36):

| (1) Realistic plans and constructive collaboration | ‘The exchange of knowledge, ideas and strategies between Dutch NAP signatories and other stakeholders, resulting in tangible realistic plans and constructive collaborations.’ |
| (2) International cooperation | ‘NAP signatories to actively seek to initiate and participate in international cooperation between like-minded Western actors (…) and actors in fragile states (…)’ |
| (3) Research on gender, peace and security | ‘Demand-driven and needs-based research on gender, peace and security in fragile states and countries in transition in collaboration with local partners. Research results to be shared with all NAP partners and all other relevant stakeholders, particularly in the focus countries.’ |
| (4) Involvement of diaspora organisations | ‘Diaspora, migrant organisations, women’s and peace organisations to be actively involved in the implementation of this NAP and provide information on local situations, actors and possible partnerships.’ |

There are no criteria against which aspiring signatories can be assessed and there is no formal body that decides on whether or not to accept applications to become signatories. Aspiring signatories do, however, have to agree to terms of reference, by which they declare their support for the objectives of the NAP, their intention to cooperate with other signatories where possible and to maximise the integration of gender in their own organisation. They are also asked to describe how the objectives and activities of their organisation contribute to implementation of the NAP. See “Terms of reference nieuwe ondertekenaars Nationaal Actieplan 1325.”
Figure 5.1 shows the organogram for NAP-II and can be explained as follows:

- **NAP signatories coordination.** The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has taken on a central coordinating role in conjunction with the gender platform WO=MEN. As the co-chairs of the NAP network they are responsible for, among other things, convening the signatories three times a year. In addition, the ministry plays a coordinating role vis-à-vis the other ministries that have signed the NAPs (i.e. the ministries of Defence, Security and Justice, and Education, Culture and Science).

- **Country working groups.** A series of working groups was established to organise signatories around their joint interests. They bring together representatives from different stakeholder groups – mostly development organisations, women’s organisations, voluntary networks and diaspora groups – and have developed proposals for joint actions in selected country cases (three of which will be discussed in Chapter 5). Each group is facilitated by two (rotating) co-chairs from different civil society organisations.

- **M&E working group.** The M&E working group consists of the two co-chairs of the NAP network plus the Sundjata Foundation, which represents smaller signatories to the NAP. The primary task of the M&E working group is to implement the M&E system, which was designed ‘to be able to learn from our work and improve it in the future’ (NAP-II 2011: 39).

- **The communication working group.** The communication working group consists of 20-25 people, mostly from communication departments from a wide range of organisations. The working group convenes around annual NAP public events that serve to showcase results achieved by the NAP network.

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1. The issue of international cooperation between like-minded actors between the NAP signatories is dealt with in the following chapter on awareness raising.
The NAP as a framework for cooperation

5.3 The impact of the NAP budget on cooperation dynamics: an assessment

The country working groups have been a key forum for cooperation among the NAP stakeholders. Development NGOs, diaspora, migrant organisations, women’s and peace organisations are involved at this level, provide information on local situations and have opened up their partner networks to the country working groups. This has resulted in a set of joint projects (to be further discussed in the following chapter).

In understanding the dynamics of cooperation within the NAP network it is important to examine the implications of the budget that was set aside by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for NAP-II in response to the lobbying by civil society organisations.

The claim put forward in NAP-II – and by the NGOs during several meetings preceding the decision to pledge EUR 16 million to NAP activities – is that government resources were provided for the NAP network to develop a multi-stakeholder intervention logic.\textsuperscript{54} This

\textsuperscript{54} Unpublished Mid-Term Review of NAP-I (2010): 12-13; Minutes NAP signatories meeting, 18 October 2011.
made the Netherlands one of the few countries with such an earmarked budget (see text box 5.1). The ministry allocated a total of EUR 16 million for the lifetime of NAP-II, i.e. some EUR 4 million per year, to be distributed over six focus countries and the MENA region, in order for the multi-stakeholder intervention logic to be put into practice and to create a level playing field among the different signatories (NAP-II (2011): 19, 43). This budget came without a separate formal subsidy framework linked to NAP-II’s implementation.

Text box 5.1  Earmarked funding for NAPs elsewhere

Though often the assumption is that NAP-specific funding could improve the effectiveness and outcomes of NAP implementation, most European NAPs lack an earmarked budget. Usually, NAP-related activities are to be ‘mainstreamed’ into existing offices, activities and budgets (Dharmapuri (2011): 3; Zakharova (2012): 8; Hudson (2013): 32), in particular the budgets for development cooperation, as is the case in e.g. Finland and Sweden. Tracing the amounts set aside and whether these have been effectively used is difficult (Jukarainen and Puumala (2014): 35, 37). In the Nordic countries, NGO funding of work related to the UNSCR 1325 agenda is variable but limited. The little funding that there is for NAPs tends to focus on women’s empowerment and women’s participation themes. The most frequently cited gap identified in the survey sample was participation and inclusion of women in the security sector and security sector reform, followed by access to justice for survivors of sexual violence (Hudson (2013): 32).

Even though the NAP budget is relatively small, it changed the dynamics of the NAP network and affected the scope for different stakeholders to play their complementary roles, as analysed below. This development must be seen against the government’s austerity measures of 2011 which have resulted in substantial financial cuts for the Dutch development organisations that are also signatories to the NAPs and they have also influenced the capacity of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the embassies to manage projects. The main issues identified in relation to the introduction of the budget are the following.

55 NAP-II also contains a detailed list of individual signatories’ financial or time commitments to implement the NAP-II objectives. The overview of individual budgets was incomplete and was to be reassessed on an annual basis. This was not done, however, and it is impossible to track the actual spending on NAP-II implementation outside the NAP-II-earmarked budget. The ministry mentioned also that another EUR 70 million was available through the programme ‘Funding Leadership and Opportunities for Women’ (FLOW). This programme provides 35 grants for projects of NGOs and other women’s organisations in the areas of security (including violence against women), economic empowerment (with an emphasis on food security, land, water and economic rights) and political participation. The fund was also linked to efforts to follow up on the aims of UNSCR 1325 with regard to women and violence and women and politics (Letter Minister of Foreign Affairs, 7 November 2011, ref. BSG-239/2011). Given the diversity of projects funded and countries and themes covered, considering FLOW as an instrument for consistently implementing NAP-II seems less appropriate.


The eligibility criteria to access the budget were loosely formulated, open to interpretation and prone to several adjustments. The minutes of the inaugural meeting of NAP-II in February 2012 indicated that to get access to the budget funds (i) a project proposal had to be submitted by at least two members of the NAP network; (ii) the larger development organisations such as Oxfam Novib or Cordaid were not eligible but they were invited to co-sponsor proposals; (iii) the proposal had to meet standard funding requirements of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. However, until the Ministry of Foreign Affairs finally approved the eligibility criteria and procedures in 2013 (see text box 5.2), different criteria were identified and/or communicated in the period that followed.  

**Text box 5.2  NAP-II budget project selection guidelines (2013)**

The guidelines indicate that project proposals should: (i) show that concrete results will be achieved with respect to the strategic theme of the Dutch NAP 1325: political participation and leadership of women in peace and reconstruction processes; (ii) preferably be written by multiple NAP signatories and, in all cases, involve local partners, given the importance of ownership of local organisations; smaller NAP signatories are encouraged to form an alliance with other signatories, given their potential added value in e.g. their networks with smaller (grass-roots) organisations; teaming up with the larger development organisations was seen as an added value, given their financial and organisational strengths; larger development organisations can submit proposals; (iii) obtain a ‘no-objection’ from the NAP country/regional working group and an approval from the Embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands (EKN) and/or the relevant department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; and (iv) meet criteria of feasibility and financial soundness; multi-annual programmes are preferred, in order to, among other things, enhance impact and sustainability; an organisational assessment is made as well, looking at the organisation’s technical capacity and the appropriateness of its financial management and M&E systems; moreover, project budgets cannot exceed the annual financial turnover of the implementing organisation in previous years.

Moreover, since the ministry did not want to handle a large number of small projects, also because it was thought that bigger projects would have bigger impact, it decided that projects should have a sizeable budget (an exception is VOND’s programme ’Women’s Leadership for Peace Building in Darfur’ with a budget of EUR 47,470). It hoped that this would also encourage signatories to work in partnership through larger consortia. However,

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58 E.g. the minutes of the meeting of the Burundi working group of April 2012 mention that a local women’s organisation was to be in the lead and that the contract was to be signed between this organisation and the Embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands.

59 Minutes of meeting between DSO/EM and WO=MEN on trends within the NAP network, 18 June 2013. The one exception is VOND’s ’Women’s Leadership for Peace Building in Darfur’ programme, accounting for EUR 47,470.
the ministry was not consistent in its communications about what the minimum size of projects should be.\textsuperscript{60}

A side effect was that even the larger women’s organisations from the NAP network could not meet the criteria that were eventually set for managing big project consortia this big.\textsuperscript{61} As a consequence, although the intention was to encourage alliances and bigger consortia in which women’s organisations were to be in the driver’s seat, in practice this has meant that women’s and diaspora organisations ended up in the position of sub-contractor to the development organisations (1325 Dutch NAP Partnership (2013a): 21). Against this background, it is not surprising that the decision taken in 2012 to finance projects run by the Washington/Brussels-based organisation Search for Common Ground (SfCG) – which is not a member of the Dutch NAP network – was controversial.\textsuperscript{62}

As a result, introducing the budget did little to change the inequalities between the different organisations that were observed earlier and that were claimed to have negatively affected joint action under NAP-I. The mid-term review of 2013 indicated that women’s organisations still felt they had a subordinate position, with little influence on prioritisation and decision-making (1325 Dutch NAP Partnership (2013a): 21). They have since voiced their concerns about the threat of their networks being co-opted by bigger NGOs, which can be seen as an international trend against a background of declining aid resources.\textsuperscript{63} To address this concern and seeing that the smaller organisations had been unable to access the resources set aside for NAP-II, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and WO=MEN agreed in mid-2013 to develop a Rapid Action & Pilot Fund, that would allow for funding small-scale rapid action (in the range EUR 5,000-25,000) as well as innovative projects (EUR 25,000-100,000). In November 2014, a joint Cordaid and St VOND proposal for the Rapid Action & Pilot Fund called ‘Small seeds for big baobabs’ was approved. This fund will be operational in the period January 2015 to October 2016 (NAP communication, 17 November 2014).

In addition, the introduction of the budget and the widely held belief that project proposals would be accepted on a first come, first serve basis, caused a time-consuming ‘proposal-writing rush’, especially in 2012 and 2013. Today, these projects have become the centre of

\textsuperscript{60} In the case of the MENA working group, the information available indicates that the threshold level for a project budget was first set at EUR 400,000 but that this was later increased to EUR 600,000. See also the minutes of the meeting of 18 June 2013.

\textsuperscript{61} Women’s organisations in Western Europe have the capacity to generate a median annual income of about EUR 75,000 (Arutyunova and Clark (2014): 108).

\textsuperscript{62} The ministry’s decision to finance an SfCG project proposal was eventually approved by the working group, albeit not full-heartedly. This resulted in a project structure in which SfCG is in the lead, supported by three implementing partner organisations of ICCO and Cordaid. The smaller women’s organisations from the NAP network were incorporated, but only as a project target group (training and the development of female leadership action plans at grass-roots level) and without compensation for their time. The 2013 guidelines address the issue of external contracting by stating that ‘(another) option could be that the Country Group invites another (non-signatory) organization with a recognized track record to formulate and implement the project together with the local partners and the Dutch signatories’.

\textsuperscript{63} See e.g. Arutyunova and Clark (2014): 19.
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gravity for those signatories that have a stake in the project and the country working groups have increasingly turned into coordination mechanisms for the implementing organisations on the Dutch side (1325 Dutch NAP Partnership (2013b): 3). This development furthermore has taken place with the virtual absence of Dutch knowledge institutes and universities that have signed the NAP.

Attempts to convene a ‘knowledge working group’ failed, and today the knowledge institutes scarcely even identify themselves as NAP stakeholders. The effect of their contribution to the joint projects is nil, also because of lack of concrete demand for their expertise and funding within the joint projects. As a result, the 2013 mid-term review found that most projects lacked a joint analysis (1325 Dutch NAP Partnership/Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2013): 7). Even though some of the research institutes (and NGOs) that belong to the NAP network also participate in the multi-stakeholder Peace, Security and Development Network (PSDN, 2008-1264) and its successor, the financially well-endowed Knowledge Platform on Security and Rule of Law,65 there is little coordination or exchange between these different forums and obvious potential synergies are not explored.

Another issue is that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs itself is absent as an actor from these joint projects. Non-governmental signatories have questioned the lack of strategic involvement of the Dutch embassies. Their role is so far limited to giving their consent for NAP-II projects and providing administrative support, though at the same time NAP signatories are advised to consult the embassies, and many do so. The limited role of the embassies is partly explained by the fact that management of the NAP projects is handled in The Hague as the ministry did not want to burden the embassies with activities that were beyond the scope of their own direct responsibilities.

Some interviewees fear that the prioritisation of project design over analysis and an understanding of each other’s strategic complementarity has (maybe temporarily) reduced the potentially unique multi-stakeholder partnership into a donor–implementer relationship, in which the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, NGOs and women’s groups are the main players. In practice, however, the picture is less gloomy – though the available data indicate that the level of cooperation has been variable (see the examples included in text box 5.3.

64 The PSDN was, like the National Action Plan 1325, an outcome of the Schokland Akkoorden and aimed to bridge research and policy. One of the research groups, consisting of the Clingendael Conflict Research Unit, Center for Conflict Studies, Oxfam Novib and Women’s Global Network on Reproductive Rights and Health, focused on gender and conflict specifically.
65 For more information on the Knowledge Platform Security and Rule of Law, see the website: http://www.kpsrl.org/.
In 2013, the Dutch NGO HIVOS initiated a project on Syria, financed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, supporting Syrian women’s organisations to establish a platform for dialogue among them and with the UN. Cooperation was sought with ICAN, a US-based organisation, as well as with the NAP signatories WILPF and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. A series of preparatory meetings was held in Beirut and Washington and a side-event to the UN General Assembly was organised by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. A series of follow-up meetings has taken place and advocacy activities were organised, as is evident from HIVOS’s narrative report of 2013. With Dutch funding, UN WOMEN continued this initiative during 2014. In South Sudan, because of regular contact and cooperation among its members, the working group was able to quickly respond to the sudden escalation of violence in the country at the end of 2013. Within a month, it had proposed an initiative to promote the inclusion of women in the peace negotiations. With support from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ICCO and Cordaid, women are now present at these negotiations.

In Afghanistan, Oxfam Novib works on a campaign to incorporate women into the Afghan police force, the ministry supports police reform and Cordaid has a monitoring project focusing on women’s rights. Though these are essentially UNSCR 1325 initiatives, they are kept outside the scope of the NAP during the country group meetings, as is evident from the minutes of the Afghanistan working group meeting of 13 April 2011. In theory, the country working group would be the place to discuss these projects and identify the strategic complementarity; however, this is not the case, as they are not marked as ‘NAP projects’. The DRC working group runs the project ‘Femmes au Fone’ to increase local women’s access to the media by providing them with mobile phones to share information about their local (security) concerns with the media. The Embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands in Kinshasa, in turn, supports a project run by the Congolese organisation UCOFEM that works to incorporate a gender perspective in the media and increase the rate of active female journalists in the country. Though both projects are based in Goma, little has been done to explore possibilities for cross-fertilisation. There is also little strategic collaboration between the ‘Femmes au Fone’ project and the NAP-financed SfCG project, despite their geographic and thematic overlap.

In addition, although interviews indicate that the competition over funding in a context of shifting criteria and increased budget austerity has contributed to increased animosity between the bigger development organisations and the smaller women’s organisations, some nuancing is necessary. It is at this stage unclear whether this will affect the work of the local women’s organisations that are seen as key partners under the NAP. First of all, since there is no vetting system to assess the legitimacy of aspirant members, it is not always clear...
what the local constituency of these diaspora organisations and women’s groups is, and to what extent they represent the voices of ‘gender champions’ in the countries where they work. Second, the Dutch development organisations already support local women’s groups in the NAP’s focus countries. They do not always need the Netherlands-based diaspora organisations and women’s groups to fulfil the demand-driven requirement as stipulated in the NAP. Third, the development organisations – unlike the smaller voluntary and diaspora groups – are professionals in developing and implementing development strategies. This can increase project effectiveness and sustainability and help to build the capacity of the smaller organisations in this regard when they develop projects jointly. Finally, even when Netherlands-based smaller organisations were brought on board this did not always work out well, as is evident from what happened in Afghanistan (see text box 5.4).

Text box 5.4  NAP 1325 project in Afghanistan

Oxfam Novib, Cordaid and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had organised a side-event to the International Conference on Afghanistan which was held in Bonn in 2011. This event aimed to collect input from youth, women and men on themes such as gender and reconciliation through a social media strategy, and provided the basis for the above-mentioned ‘Bayan’ project. However, with the launch of the NAP budget, a women’s organisation, Gender Concerns International, was brought on board to reflect the NAP’s goal of putting women’s organisations in the driver’s seat. Cooperation was delayed as a result of different working methods and disagreement about project scope: maintaining a broad perspective (i.e. to address women’s rights in relation to broader human rights issues that also affected men) versus a focus on women only. In this process, the bigger organisations felt that the natural partnership building on previous successful collaboration was undermined by having to meet the criterion to include women’s organisations in the project.

5.4 Monitoring and evaluation of the NAPs

Both NAP-I and NAP-II underline the importance of monitoring and evaluation (M&E), though neither has an agreed on a joint M&E framework. According to NAP-I, it is essential that there are regular M&E stages that specifically target the role of women before, during and after conflict situations.

Specific reference in this respect is made to:

- attention given to gender aspects and UNSCR 1325 in the evaluation of and reporting on peacekeeping missions and other types of efforts in (post-) conflict situations supported by the ministries of Defence and Foreign Affairs;
- the role of the Dutch NGOs that would develop instruments to measure the impact of peace and reconstruction and of their partner organisations’ projects on women and
women’s rights. They would also collaborate internationally to develop monitoring systems to keep track of the implementation of UNSCR 1325;
• the role of Dutch research institutions in terms of developing ‘gender-sensitive’ analytical instruments and indicators and of evaluating government policy and the implementation of (inter) national treaties and agreements (NAP-I (2007): 25-26, 41 and 46).

Despite the acknowledgement of the importance of M&E in NAP-I, no joint M&E framework was established to monitor the implementation of the NAP itself as a joint project. There is also little trace of the new analytical instruments that had been envisaged.

In relation to NAP-II, reference is made to ‘new, stricter, monitoring and evaluation mechanisms’ that would accompany the flexible approach that was advocated, i.e. having ‘the possibility and scope to respond quickly to new developments worldwide and to make use of suddenly opening windows of opportunities’ (NAP-II (2011): 8). WO=MEN and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs were made responsible for coordinating M&E. Since ‘the desire for clear evaluation should not undermine the flexible character of the NAP’, signatories decided to use ‘flexible methods to monitor and evaluate the outcome and impact of their activities’ and agreed to introduce a ‘two-tier monitoring and evaluation system’, without, however, setting fixed indicators for the Plan’s lifetime (NAP-II (2011): 19, 38 and 40).

M&E would consist of two levels: quantitative and qualitative.

For the quantitative level a monitoring matrix (Annexe 1 to the NAP) was designed to collect annual data in all focus countries and the MENA region on the type of partnership in relation to the NAP’s four specific objectives and the budget involved per partnership (NAP-II 2011: 40). For the qualitative level, reference is made to exploring the impact and outcome of the NAP activities using qualitative and participatory methods and inform on ‘whether and how the actions arising from our cooperation contribute to positive changes in the lives of women and men in the focus countries’ and whether they bring about ‘changes in the behaviour and attitude of people and of societies as a whole’ (NAP-II (2011): 40). The plan was to conduct a mid-term review in 2013 and a final (external) evaluation in December 2015.

M&E at quantitative level has not been put into practice so far: data were not collected on joint partnerships and joint activities (e.g. in terms of lobbying and advocacy) and reporting has not taken place. Main reasons were: (i) the original matrix was found to be too complicated but at the same time did not reflect the diversity within the NAP network; (ii) there was no agreement about the data to be collected; (iii) it was found to be too complicated and time-consuming to develop a matrix that was relevant for all stakeholders. In terms of M&E at the qualitative level, the mid-term review was carried out as planned and conducted by an external consultant (1325 Dutch NAP Partnership (2013a)). The M&E working group decided that the review had to focus on successes and be forward-looking; the report thus primarily deals with a range of activities and initiatives taken by the signatories but is not about outcomes or impact in the NAP’s focus countries. The report was presented to the NAP network in November 2013 and indeed served as a basis for
discussions on strategies to overcome the difficulties that had emerged from the introduction of the budget (1325 Dutch NAP Partnership/Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2013: 8). Not surprisingly, the review recommended, among other things, to ‘(develop) indicators for more effective monitoring and evaluation and include a stronger focus on results’ (1325 Dutch NAP Partnership (2013a): 6).

The struggles with monitoring and evaluation in the Netherlands are not exceptional: it is an international phenomenon. Though the importance of M&E is recognised at the level of the UN and the EU (see text box 5.5), NAP implementation worldwide has not been well monitored and evaluated, in the absence of specific and time-bound indicators and benchmarks, especially at the level of outcomes and impact. Monitoring remains limited to measuring input or activity-related numbers: numbers of women trained, involved in peacekeeping operations, amounts of money set aside, etc. There is, furthermore, a focus on process matters and issues such as who is involved in preparation, implementation, coordination and oversight structures, what timelines and resources are allocated, as well as M&E arrangements. Very little is known of the effects and impact for the populations in (post-) conflict countries or of what works and what does not — and the little information that is available indicates that there is a gap between objectives and results.

Although reporting requirements exist, few reports on implementation are available, the exceptions being the reports issued by Estonia, Germany and Ireland and the reports issued by the Global Network of Women Peacebuilders. In the Netherlands, the ministers of Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation reported to parliament on the implementation of NAP-II in February 2013 (KST 32605-121 (2013)); the letter reports on the NAP-financed projects that have started and other national and international initiatives taken by the stakeholders to the NAP – but does not (yet) report about results, which is understandable, given the long-term character of some of the initiatives.

66 See Swaine (2009); Beetham and Popovic (2009); Popovic et al. (2010); Dharmapuri (2011); Zkaharova (2012); Koonqui and Cueva-Beteta (2012); Pasquinelli and Potter Prentice (2013); Hudson (2013); Swaine (2013); Hoewer (2013); Ormhaug (2014); Hinds and McMinn (2014); Jukarainen and Puumala (2014); Miller et al. (2014).

67 See Beetham and Popovic (2009): 11, 14; Dharmapuri (2011): 3; Pasquinelli and Potter Prentice (2013): 7; Hinds and McMinn (2014): 14. An exception in this respect is the attempt made by three NGOs to assess the impact of Sweden’s efforts to implement UNSCR 1325 in Afghanistan. The report demonstrates a focus on advocacy, recruitment and training aspects, and Swedish actions to promote UNSCR 1325-related issues in national, European and global forums, increase the number of women involved in relevant institutions and missions and to spread knowledge on the resolution and what it means in practice. Nevertheless, ‘the bulk of the action is centred on Sweden itself and the international fora in which Sweden is active’ (Wilkens 2012: 35). There is little reporting on what happens at the level of women’s protection and participation in the areas of conflict and ‘(in) the few cases where such effects are actually reported, they tend to be bordering on the trivial’ (Wilkens 2012: 35). The difficulty is in putting the Swedish NAP into practice on the ground (Wilkens 2012: 36).
5.5 Conclusions

In relation to result areas 1 and 4 concerning the exchange of knowledge and ideas among NAP stakeholders and the involvement of diaspora organisations, the evaluation shows that the country working groups are a key forum for cooperation. Development NGOs, diaspora organisations and migrant organisations, women’s and peace organisations are involved at this level, provide information on local situations and have opened up their partner networks to the country working groups. This has resulted in a set of joint projects financed from the NAP-II earmarked budget (to be further discussed in the following chapter) and in broader cooperation outside the NAP projects through joint initiatives in relation to several NAP-II focus countries.

Nevertheless, another impact of the introduction of an earmarked budget with NAP-II to stimulate joint action is that these working groups increasingly have turned into forums for project preparation and coordination. To a certain extent this was also caused by a lack of...
clarity in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ selection procedures and criteria. Evaluation findings show that the budget: (a) generated competition among the signatories and resulted in a more tensed relationship between, on the one hand, the bigger development organisations, facing strong budget cuts in 2011, and on the other, the women’s organisations and diaspora groups; and (b) transformed, at least temporarily, the NAP partnership into a donor–implementer relationship, in which the ministry as a donor, and civil society organisations as implementers, are the main players.

Furthermore, introducing the budget initially did little to promote a more level playing field and reconfirmed the limited room for the smaller organisations to influence the direction of joint activities. To address this the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has been making finance available since 2012 to compensate the smaller organisations for their time and effort – even though they have not always made maximum use of this – and has approved the establishment of a new Rapid Action & Pilot Fund to support small-scale pilot projects (which were envisaged to be operational by January 2015).

Uncertainties about procedures and criteria to access the NAP-II budget and the need for different NAP stakeholders to work together have made the process of joint project development time-consuming. This was also one of the reasons for the ministry financing projects of organisations that are not part of the NAP network. It also implied that less attention was being paid to more strategic cooperation. On a more positive side, members of the working groups indicate that the intense discussions and collaborations also led to closer mutual contacts, resulting, in some instances, in new joint initiatives.

In relation to result area 3, the evaluation has found little trace of the involvement of the knowledge institutes: they conducted no systematic research in support of the joint NAP objectives, and nor did they contribute to gender-sensitive analytical instruments and indicators. The focus on project development and funding was the final blow for their already waning interest. At the same time, during the evaluation period, the NAP network has missed opportunities to collaborate with the Knowledge Platform on Security and Rule of Law that could potentially feed the work of the NAP network.

Although M&E of NAP implementation was identified as an increasingly important element of NAP-II (result area 5), the two-tier system that was promised has not been entirely put in place. The quantitative monitoring framework was dismissed at an early stage and, as a consequence, systematic data on numbers and type of partnerships and volumes of budgets involved are not available. The qualitative mid-term review was indeed undertaken in 2013 but it is process-oriented and only reports on actions and initiatives and the process of cooperation. The problematic state of affairs in M&E is reported to be similar for many other countries with a similar national action plan.
The NAP as an instrument to promote female leadership and political participation
6.1 Introduction

This chapter assesses a selection of activities undertaken to promote female leadership and political participation of women at two levels. These activities were selected on the basis of the involvement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, either as funder or as actor. First of all it provides information on the NAP-II projects that were financed from the NAP earmarked budget in 2012-13 in support of equal participation of women and men in peace and reconstruction processes at all decision-making levels. Particular attention is in this respect paid to what has happened in Afghanistan, Burundi and DRC, keeping in mind that many projects are still ongoing and at this stage little is known of their results. This is followed by information on the different joint lobbying and awareness-raising initiatives that were taken by the NAP signatories, both nationally and internationally, including the diplomatic efforts made by the Netherlands at the level of the UN.

6.2 Direct programmatic support: joint projects

While NAP-I attempted to combine individual signatories’ activities in the field of UNSCR 1325 into one action plan, NAP-II has identified four result areas designated for joint impact in relation to its second objective that reads as ‘Equal participation by women and men in peace and reconstruction processes at all decision-making levels (NAP-funded projects)’  
(NAP-II (2011): 22-27):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Result Area</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1) Law reform and gender-sensitive policies</td>
<td>‘Local and national laws and policies to be gender-sensitive, provide extra protection for women if necessary, and enhance equal opportunities for women and men to participate politically and socially. These laws to be implemented.’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) National mechanisms</td>
<td>‘Local and national mechanisms (e.g. quotas) that demand and secure the presence of women at all decision-making levels, especially in peace and reconstruction processes, to be in place and institutionalised.’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) Capacity-building</td>
<td>‘Women and men have the required skills and knowledge to enable them to act actively as leaders (political or otherwise) and peacebuilders.’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(4) National Action Plan development</td>
<td>‘National Action Plans to be developed and implemented in the focus countries and region and in other conflict and post-conflict states.’</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6.2.1 NAP-funded joint projects

Out of the EUR 16 million that were set aside by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, by the end of 2013 some EUR 8 million had been used to finance 10 projects spread over the six focus countries and the MENA region, as is shown in the project overview in table 6.1.

This overview shows that:

- except for the pilot project in Afghanistan (Bayan) and the project on women’s political participation in Sudan, these projects started in late 2012 or in 2013 and are still ongoing; their outcomes are not yet known;
nine projects concentrate on capacity-building, two deal with law reform, one pays attention to participation mechanisms and another aims to promote the development of a NAP;

of the current 57 signatories to NAP-II, only nine are involved in NAP projects;
in four cases, Ministry of Foreign Affairs funding is supplemented by the budget of the Dutch contractors; and that
four projects are implemented by organisations that are not signatories of the NAP, i.e. Search for Common Ground, running two projects in DRC and Burundi on its own and Voices for Change which manages projects together with NAP-signatories in Sudan and South Sudan.

<p>| Table 6.1 Overview of joint NAP projects (2012-16) |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Result areas</th>
<th>Organisations</th>
<th>NAP budget in EUR</th>
<th>Additional budget in EUR</th>
<th>Period</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>Bayan (pilot phase)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Oxfam Novib, Cordaid, Gender Concerns International</td>
<td>632,442</td>
<td>137,558</td>
<td>1/2013 - 1/2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>Supporting women’s participation and effective leadership in democratic institutions in a pre-election environment</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Search for Common Ground</td>
<td>599,996</td>
<td></td>
<td>12/2012 - 12/2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Enabling women’s political participation in the DRC through capacity-building, advocacy, and participatory communication</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Search for Common Ground</td>
<td>599,450</td>
<td></td>
<td>12/2012 - 5/2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Femme-au-Fone</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Cordaid, Sundjata Foundation</td>
<td>885,766</td>
<td>50,220</td>
<td>8/2013 - 7/2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td>Women’s participation and female leadership in South Sudan</td>
<td>1, 2, 3</td>
<td>ICCO, IKV Pax Christi, Voice for Change</td>
<td>1,323,636</td>
<td></td>
<td>9/2012 - 12/2015</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It must be noted that 14 of them joined the NAP network only in December 2013, after most proposals were already developed. According to the ministry’s guidelines, they were not yet eligible for project funding.
The NAP as an instrument to promote female leadership and political participation

Table 6.1  Overview of joint NAP projects (2012-16)

| Country | Title                                           | Result areas | Organisations                                                                 | NAP budget in EUR | Additional budget in EUR | Period       |
|---------|------------------------------------------------|
| Sudan   | Women's political participation Sudan           | 1            | ICCO, Kerk in Actie, Voice for Change                                          | 43,501            |                           | 4-8/2013    |
| Sudan   | Women’s leadership in Darfur                    | 3            | Stichting VOND                                                                | 47,470            |                           | 6-12/2013   |
| MENA    | Amplifying the voices of women in the MENA region | 3            | Oxfam Novib, Hivos, WPP                                                      | 1,550,000         |                           | 10/2013 - 4/2016 |
| Colombia| Supporting Colombian women contributing to peace and security | 1, 3 | Cordaid, ICCO                                                                 | 587,076           | 44,885                    | 9/2013 - 2/2016 |

Totals  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NAP budget in EUR</th>
<th>Additional budget in EUR</th>
<th>Period</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8,068,779</td>
<td>319,689</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: non-NAP signatories receiving NAP funds are shown in italics.

With respect to the focus countries of this evaluation, only for the Bayan project in Afghanistan is a final report available (see text box 6.1 for more details).

Text box 6.1  The Bayan project in Afghanistan

The project ultimately aimed to strengthen the position of Afghan women as active participants and leaders in peacebuilding and conflict-resolution processes. It intended to do so by stimulating dialogue among young, highly educated men and women about the role of women in society through an SMS-based blogging platform. Funding was provided for a one-year pilot phase of the three-year project ‘to establish the technical framework and build the effective partnerships needed to promote enhanced public support for human rights, peace building and women’s leadership, with a specific focus on facilitating greater engagement of Afghan youth’ (Jansen (2012): 6). It was also to give ‘an opportunity to test the value of Bayan as a tool for dialogue, awareness raising, networking and consider the effectiveness of initial efforts by CSO partners to inform and mobilise their constituencies around women's rights, participation and leadership’ (Oxfam Novib (2012): 10). The project ended in December 2013. Its final report (Oxfam Novib (2014c)) provides quantitative information on: (i) the number of people reached through SMS messaging (200,000), the number of people registered with Bayan...
Looking at the proposals for the different projects in the three case countries, it becomes clear that only the Bayan project has embraced a broader outlook on the dynamics between young men and women – in this case in Afghanistan. For the other projects, it is not clear how responsive they are to gender dynamics on the ground, how an understanding of these dynamics is incorporated into project design, how indeed they are likely to result in an improved position of women.

Against this background, the following paragraphs summarise the information available on the projects in Burundi and DRC.

Both Search for Common Ground projects in Burundi and DRC aim to promote women’s political participation and leadership, which in the case of Burundi is linked to the elections of 2015. In both cases, SfCG collaborates with local partners as well as popular radio stations through the training of journalists and the development of gender-sensitive local broadcasts (e.g. in Burundi through Radio Isanganiro, Radio Bonesha, and Radio-Télévision nationale du Burundi). In DRC there is collaboration with organisations that are also partners of organisations of the NAP network.69

Both projects provide training for staff of the implementing partners in the target provinces and deal with capacity-building of local women leaders and women politicians. In Burundi, training sessions were conducted on leadership (144 participants) and counselling and legal defence techniques (64 participants) while in DRC 86 women leaders were trained in leadership, lobby and advocacy, campaigning and strategy. They furthermore include advocacy initiatives and support for campaigns to increase women’s (political)

69 According to members of the DRC Country Working Group one issue has been that women’s groups that receive training and help to identify beneficiaries are not compensated for their time investment and travel expenses as there is no budget for this.
The NAP as an instrument to promote female leadership and political participation. In Burundi, public outreach was realised through (i) two town hall meetings bringing national and local leaders together with communities; (ii) 16 radio quiz programmes; (iii) the production of a documentary about positive models of women leaders; and (iv) and 16 episodes of the radio programme Umwanya ni Rwawe (Women it is your choice). In DRC, this entailed the organisation of nine advocacy-oriented events (two Tribunes d’expression populaire, four Journées portes ouvertes, and three women-led advocacy actions) and the production of 13 gender-sensitive radio programmes that were broadcast countrywide.

The projects are still ongoing and information on results is very limited in the progress reports available. In its evaluation of 2014, SfCG provides some anecdotal impressions of an increased interest among women to vote in 2015 and with some individuals indicating that they would like to get elected. A problem during the first 18 months of the project was the fact that public figures and female parliamentarians were unable to attend the training activities, reportedly because of time constraints. None of the coaching sessions for ‘female leaders’ in national institutions has taken place (SfCG (2014c): 9). This has led to postponements and delays.

The Femme au Fone project of Cordaid and the Sundjata Foundation is a follow-up/scaling-up from the Kivufoon project (2011-13), which introduced an early warning system by using SMS messages to map the threats faced by the local populations in the Kivus. The thinking behind the project is based on the assumption that by increasing the access of women to the local media and by feeding their daily concerns into broader lobby and advocacy networks, the political participation of women in the Kivus will improve. The project aims to: (i) mobilise women’s groups to put forward their concerns on issues of security; (ii) increase their access to radio and telephone services in order to communicate their daily situation and give their point of view on issues that are of particular interest to them; (iii) connect local women to regional and (inter) national forums that can bring their concerns about peace and security issues to policy-makers; and (iv) connect (inter) national forums to regional, provincial and local women so they feed information back to the local women. Activities implemented in the first half-year (November 2013 - June 2014) of the project are:

(i) 80 local women’s radio listener groups were organised and sent SMS messages about their local peace and security situation to the Maendeleo radio station; (ii) 30 radio programmes, made by local (female) journalists, about peace, security and women’s issues are being broadcast; (iii) the website for women peace activists is developed in four different languages (English, French, Spanish and Dutch).

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70 Search for Common Ground (2014a), (2014b) and (2014c). In the case of the project in Burundi, the evaluation was done internally and has limited value for an objective view on project realisations.

71 The evaluation reports indicate that in the provinces of Kirundo, Muyinga and part of Cankuzo, the population could not get the radio programmes Umwanya ni Rwawe and Duhane Ijambo on the radio; moreover, even direct beneficiaries were not informed that these broadcasts were taking place within the framework of the project (SfCG (2014c): 15).

72 Worldcom Foundation (2014): 4-6, 14.
6.2.2 NAP-related joint initiatives and ad hoc collaboration

In addition to the projects funded from the NAP budget, other initiatives by two or more signatories have taken place, both internationally and in the Netherlands – however, without an overarching strategy having been put in place to link the NAP network to broader international initiatives.

In the absence of a functional M&E system, information on these activities is limited. An attempt made during the NAP-II 2013 mid-term review to collect information on such initiatives yielded results for only 20 out of the 57 signatories which responded. Table 6.2 gives an overview, based on the response obtained and focuses on initiatives that have involved the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. These were primarily undertaken in cooperation with the Dutch development NGOs.73

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>NAP signatories (result areas)</th>
<th>Result area</th>
<th>Activities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>Oxfam Novib, Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
<td>1, 2</td>
<td>A joint effort was made to put women on the agenda of the Burundi security sector development programme. Both parties also gave support for incorporating women in the Burundi police force and adjusting the police barracks to that end, and the deployment of a gender focal point in every large police station, the organisation of meeting days between the police, the military, the government and civilians.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ICCO, Cordaid</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>This was a joint effort through the Joint Donor Office (including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs) for the organisation of first national conference on NAP 1325 (January 2013) and of NAP strategy sessions and for the presentation of a civil society statement to the National Steering Committee on NAP 1325. It was conducted together with the Global Network of Women Peacebuilders (GNWP), the Ministry of Gender and Social Welfare, local civil society organisations and UN Women.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td>ICCO, Cordaid, Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Promote the inclusion of women in the peace process.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

73 Other joint initiatives, in which the ministry did not participate, included a two-week summer school programme with the Grotius Institute of International Law to enhance theoretical knowledge of the participants about women, peace and security and building networks to advance the women, peace and security agenda (involving Oxfam Novib, Clingendael, WO=MEN, WPP, and Women’s Initiative for Gender Justice) and the project ‘Peace, religion and female leadership’ for people coming from Angola, Burundi, DRC, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Liberia and Somalia (involving the Platform Women for Sustainable Peace; Burundi Women for Peace; Women for Peace on the Moluccas; and Oxfam Novib).
The NAP as an instrument to promote female leadership and political participation

Table 6.2 Overview of NAP-related joint projects

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>NAP signatories (result areas)</th>
<th>Result area</th>
<th>Activities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>HIVOS, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, WILPF</td>
<td>3 + lobbying and diplomacy</td>
<td>Joint effort, together with ICAN, to ensure the voice of Syrian women in the transition process through: (a) capacity-building of Syrian women’s organisations; (ii) facilitating the dialogue these organisations; (iii) organisation of a side-event to the UN General Assembly; (iv) dissemination, lobbying and advocacy of outcomes side-event.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional</td>
<td>WPP, Cordaid, Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Regional education and training programme on men and masculinities and the impact of gender-sensitive peacebuilding.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The mid-term review of 2013 furthermore makes clear that: (i) context is crucial, as illustrated by what happened in South Sudan where the resumption of civil war disrupted the efforts undertaken by the NAP consortium; (ii) the difference in backgrounds, knowledge and skills of the various organisations can make the collaboration time-consuming; and (iii) that it is difficult to assess whether the initiatives mentioned in the review were actually prompted by the Dutch NAP 1325 or whether they were a continuation of already existing relations.

6.3 Indirect support: national and international advocacy and awareness-raising for gender and UNSCR 1325

Joint project activities aimed at promoting women’s political participation are complemented by the third objective of NAP-II, i.e. ‘Increased awareness in the Netherlands, the European Union, the United Nations and other regional and international bodies and their member states of the importance of gender and conflict and of increased public support for UNSCR 1325’. This objective covers the following result areas:

(1) National-level advocacy and awareness-raising

‘Successful advocacy and awareness-raising activities to take place in the Netherlands to convince a larger segment of the Dutch public, opinion leaders and politicians of the importance of UNSCR 1325 and to inform them about common efforts to implement this NAP.’

(2) International lobbying, advocacy and awareness-raising

‘Successful lobbying, advocacy and awareness-raising within the EU, UN, other regional and international bodies (including NATO) and their member states to promote implementation of UNSCR 1325 at all levels and in all relevant sectors.’

(3) NAP 1325 development in non-NAP focus countries

‘Development and implementation of National Action Plans for 1325 by governments other than the six focus countries to be actively promoted by the Dutch NAP signatories.’

Based on the NAP mid-term review 2013, annual reports of WO=MEN, internal diplomatic correspondence of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and input received from NAP signatories for this evaluation, table 6.3 gives an overview of activities that have involved the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs together other NAP signatories. The overview is primarily descriptive, indicating what was done, who was involved and what contributions were made. Attributing any changes observed to the efforts of the Dutch UNSCR 1325 network is, however, impossible. First of all, M&E has not been consistent; second, also other countries and organisations have undertaken and/or supported similar lobbying, advocacy and awareness-raising activities (e.g. at the level of the European Union and NATO).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 6.3 Lobbying, advocacy and awareness-raising activities related to UNSCR 1325</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Result 1: National-level advocacy and awareness-raising</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WO=MEN, WPP, Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WPP, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, (Humanity House)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Result 2: International-level advocacy and awareness-raising</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cordaid, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, (GNWP, UN WOMEN)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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74 This is in line with the evaluation’s focus on the role of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The overview thus excludes the initiatives taken without ministry involvement by e.g. the NGO lobby group 1325, WO=MEN and others.

75 The findings of the Financing Discussion Group are included in the draft 1325 report of the Secretary-General and will be used for the UN WOMEN Global Study on Women Peace and Security to be presented in 2015. One of the initiatives being prepared is the establishment of a global acceleration fund for Women Peace and Security.
The NAP as an instrument to promote female leadership and political participation

Table 6.3 Lobbying, advocacy and awareness-raising activities related to UNSCR 1325

| Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defence with NGO partners | Support for the NATO 1325 review, aimed at refining future policies, action plans and military guidelines in relation to UNSCR 1325. Together with Cordaid and IKV Pax Christi, an effort was made to involve local NGOs in Afghanistan and Kosovo in the follow-up to the review (October 2013). The review represented an important step in the institutionalisation of NATO’s work on women, peace and security issues.76

The ministries of Defence and Foreign Affairs, together with WO=MEN, IKV Pax Christi, BWPD and Foundation African Sky, collaborated to include gender issues in the military exercise ‘Peregrine Sword’ of the Dutch–German army corps (September 2012). It is reported that gender is now a fixed component of military exercises of the corps.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs collaborated with HIVOS and the International Civil Society Action Network to make the voices of Syrian women heard at the UN General Assembly in 2013. This laid the groundwork for a Dutch-supported initiative to engage Syrian women in the peace negotiations mentioned above.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has incorporated references to women’s political participation and the Dutch NAP 1325 in keynote speeches and diplomatic instructions on multiple occasions, including the 3rd Commission, open debates on UNSCR 1325 in the UN Security Council, side-events to the Committee on the Status of Women, and in its recent lobbying for a seat on the Security Council.77 For many years, the Netherlands has also been a member of the informal ‘Group of Friends of 1325’ that meet regularly in New York with the purpose of generating further momentum for UNSCR 1325 implementation (Swaine 2009: 416).

Ministry of Foreign Affairs | The ministry lobbied, together with the US and UNIFEM, for the participation of women in, and for putting the theme of women’s rights on, the agenda of the international conference on Afghanistan that was held in January 2010. A plea was also made for ensuring women’s participation in political processes and representation in government.78

WPP, GPPAC, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Conciliation International) | Event: ‘Taking UNSCR 1325 to the next level: Gender, peace and security mainstreaming and movements’, aimed at highlighting the need for a holistic gender perspective (including attention given to men and masculinities) in gender, peace and security policy (October 2013).

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76 For more details on the various initiatives taken by NATO since 2007 see Reeves (2013): 6–7.

77 It is worth mentioning that the Netherlands and France have been initiating resolutions on the ‘Intensification of efforts to eliminate all forms of violence against women’ in 2007 and, since 2009, every other year. In 2008, this was done by the Netherlands together with Belgium. This has a long history, going back to the late 1990s, as is evident from KST 48648 (2000): 47). These resolutions pass the Social, Humanitarian and Cultural Affairs Committee of the United Nations Economic and Social Council and are adopted without debate by the General Assembly.

The overview makes clear that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the representatives from the NGO community have been involved in lobbying and advocacy. This is an area in which the two sides collaborate on an equal basis, benefiting from and complementing each other’s different capacities and networks.

In addition to the above, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has consistently called for attention to be given to the active and political role of women in peacebuilding and reconstruction processes at the level of the UN. The NAP 1325 is crucial in this regard and provides it with legitimacy and a unique position in the international debate on women, peace and security. Table 6.4 shows the focus of the speeches delivered at sessions of the UN Security Council in the period 2007-13 in relation to UNSCR 1325 (2000) and gender. In general, it can be stated that most speeches served to:

- reiterate Dutch support for the various UNSCR resolutions that were adopted over the years – in particular, 1325 (2000), 1820 (2008), 1960 (2010) and 2122 (2013));
- provide information on the Dutch NAPs and their main features, with the second NAP ‘fully dedicated to the enhancement of female leadership and the political participation of women in conflict-affected societies’ (S/PV.6642 (2011); and
- provide information on Dutch support for women’s organisations in (post-) conflict countries as well as specific initiatives sponsored by the Netherlands in e.g. Afghanistan, Burundi, Mali and DRC and in the field of training of peacekeepers on preventing harm to civilians.

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Table 6.3 Lobbying, advocacy and awareness-raising activities related to UNSCR 1325

| Ministry of Foreign Affairs | The ministry has reported that support had been provided to Ireland, Argentina, the European Commission and Germany for the development of their respective national action plans.⁷⁹ |

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⁸⁰ With the exception of 2007, when the speech was delivered by the Minister for Development Cooperation, the speeches were given by staff of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The speeches are reflected in the following UNSCR documents: S/PV.5766 (2007); S/PV.6411 and S/PV.6453 (2010); S/PV.6642 (2011); S/PV 6877 (2012); S/PV.6948, S/PV.6984, S/PV.7019 and S/PV.7044 (2013).
The NAP as an instrument to promote female leadership and political participation

Table 6.4 Focus of speeches of the Dutch government at the UN Security Council

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Main topics</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Recognition of the active role women (can) play before, during and after post-conflict situations, including formal peace processes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict-related (sexual) violence against women in (post-) conflict states as a violation of human rights as well as a development and security issue</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support for women’s civil society organisations that support women who have suffered from such violence to deal with trauma and reintegration as well as women human rights defenders</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support for security sector reform disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) programmes (to ensure that violence against women does not continue after a conflict has ended)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Addressing impunity of perpetrators, with an important role for the International Criminal Court (ICC) and other relevant tribunals in addressing gender-based and sexual violence</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The importance of female leadership and political leverage in (post-) conflict countries (a focus of NAP-II), allowing women to play a leading role in society, the economy and political decision-making – i.e. women’s leadership as ‘smart security’ as well as ‘smart development’</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women’s economic empowerment</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strengthening of accountability mechanisms to ‘systematically monitor commitments by parties to conflict so as to prevent and address conflict-related sexual violence’</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support for the rule of law and transitional justice in (post) conflict countries</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6.4 Conclusions

The chapter shows first of all that NAP signatories have developed a series of projects that, directly or indirectly, focus on building the capacity of women (and men) ‘to enable them to act actively as leaders (political or otherwise) and peacebuilders’. Law and policy development and the development of NAPs outside the focus countries have received little attention.

Funding for these projects was made available by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, supplementing at times the resources provided by the organisations involved. With a few exceptions, these projects started in 2013 and it is too early to assess their results. Looking at the project proposals, it is often unclear whether an understanding of gender dynamics on the ground is incorporated into project design and whether the project is likely to result in an improved position of women. The information available moreover makes clear that: (i)
also organisations from outside the NAP network have received funding and that this has been the subject of much debate; and (ii) that only 9 of the current 57 NAP-II signatories are involved, even though today these projects are seen as forming the main links in the network.

The chapter shows, furthermore, that apart from these projects, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and primarily the Dutch development NGOs have also undertaken other activities jointly, both nationally and internationally. These joint initiatives show a focus on training and sensitisation.

The same is true for the many joint lobbying, advocacy and awareness-raising initiatives that were conducted within the framework of the NAPs. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, together with several other NAP signatories, has been active in raising the issue of women, peace and security, in particular at the level of the United Nations. It is in lobbying and advocacy that NAP signatories make strategic use of each other’s complementary roles and functions in the Dutch and international policy theatre. It is more difficult, however, to trace the results of these many activities, as monitoring and evaluation are not well catered for. Attributing outcomes at either national or international level to these many initiatives is therefore impossible.
The NAP as an instrument to promote female leadership and political participation
Mainstreaming gender and UNSCR 1325
7.1 Introduction

While the NAP’s gender-mainstreaming objectives relate to all signatories, this chapter concentrates on how the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has implemented, organised and managed its commitment to integrate gender and UNSCR 1325 into its policies and actions on fragile and conflict-affected environments. It focuses on:

- the relation of the NAPs to the overall Dutch policy on fragile states, peace and security;
- the organisational structure within the ministry to mainstream gender and UNSCR 1325 in peace and security policy during the evaluation period; and
- how this gender aspect has been made operational in the main instruments to implement this policy, i.e. the Stability and Reconstruction Funds and the expert pool, focusing on Afghanistan, Burundi and DRC. How this has worked out in practice in these three countries is addressed in the next chapter of this report.

7.2 The relation of the NAP to overall Dutch policy on fragile states, peace and security

While the specific focus of NAP-II is on female leadership and women’s political participation, another objective is to integrate gender and UNSCR 1325 into all Dutch signatories’ policies. These policies address the actions on fragile states and countries in transition and on peacebuilding and reconstruction efforts in these states (NAP-II (2011): 28). This mainstreaming objective of NAP-II is based on the intentions that were already present in NAP-I, which sought to mainstream UNSCR 1325 into all focus areas of the Dutch integrated ‘3D’ approach to peace, security and development.

The gender-mainstreaming objective of NAP-II reads as ‘consistent integration of gender and UNSCR 1325 into all Dutch signatories’ policies and actions on fragile states and countries in transition and on peacebuilding and reconstruction efforts in these states’. It comprises the following two result areas (NAP-II (2011): 28-30):

| (1) Gender analysis and gender equality measures | ‘Gender analyses and measures to protect women from violence and to counter gender inequality to be integral components of the peacebuilding, security and defence policies, programmes and activities of all NAP signatories.’ |
| (2) Internal awareness-raising | ‘Successful internal awareness-raising and advocacy within the NAP signatory organisations to ensure that all their policies, programmes and activities support the implementation of UNSCR 1325.’ |

Both NAPs are seen, on paper, as a broad framework of cooperation to implement UNSCR 1325 or ‘as a tool for exchanging information, inspiring discussion and increasing joint

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81 This section of the report is primarily based on interviews as there is little written documentation on the topic.
action among all actors working on the implementation of UNSCR 1325’ (NAP-II (2011): 3). Nevertheless, interviews indicate that the move from NAP’s-I broad framework of cooperation to implement UNSCR 1325 towards a NAP-II that concentrated its cooperation on a specific domain of UNSCR 1325 as well as on gender mainstreaming, has made the status of the plan within Dutch peace and security policy more diffuse, and that opinions differ on what the Plan actually represents. For the ministry’s Gender Division, the NAP constitutes the Dutch policy for implementing UNSCR 1325, reflecting policy choices that are now resonating in all domains of Dutch peace and security policy. Others within the ministry regard it, however, as a ‘tool’ or a ‘mechanism’ to fund UNSCR 1325 activities in one specific domain of the resolution, whereas the resolution itself guides and informs gender, peace and security policy. A focus group discussion with representatives of civil society stakeholders of the NAP network showed that they still regard the NAP as a framework for complementary cooperation in one specific area of the resolution. For them, the NAP is one of the tools to implement their own policies on gender, peace and security, rather than the overall leading policy, as the ministry’s Gender Division perceives it.

7.3 Organisational structure for integrating UNSCR 1325 and gender mainstreaming

7.3.1 Main ministry entities and their responsibilities

Within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, several entities share responsibility to ensure that the mainstreaming of UNSCR 1325 and gender is put into practice. During the evaluation period, they were the following:\(^{82}\)

- The Gender or Emancipation Unit is responsible for developing, implementing and monitoring the stand-alone gender, peace and security track, embodied by the National Action Plan 1325 and its budget. The NAPs, and to a lesser extent the Dutch International Gender Policy (2011), guide its actions in relation to the peace and security policy. The position of the Unit within the ministry has changed over the years – as will be explained in more detail in the overall gender equality policy evaluation (see also text box 7.1).
Mainstreaming gender and UNSCR 1325

Text box 7.1  The Task Force Women’s Rights and Gender Equality

As part of the ministry wide ‘modernisation of diplomacy’ project, a Task Force Women’s Rights and Gender Equality (Task Force vrouwenrechten en gendergelijkheid – TFVG) was established in March 2014. The Task Force focuses on women’s rights and gender equality and brings together gender advisers from the Gender Unit and the staff members acting as gender focal points of other departments, including those dealing with peace and security. Depending on the focus of the Task Force’s activities, other relevant departments can be invited. In addition, an external Gender Resource Facility was set up to provide advice on gender issues to ministry departments and embassies. It is too early to assess to what extent these measures will indeed solve the issues in relation to gender mainstreaming.

• The Stabilisation and Humanitarian Aid Department (DSH)\textsuperscript{83} bases its activities primarily on the policy note for the Security and Rule of Law Spearhead (2012), which connects an explicit focus on women to inclusive political processes, human security and peace dividend. Since 2012, the department consists of two divisions. One is the Security and Rule of Law division (DSH/SR), responsible for (i) spearheading objectives related to security, rule of law and legitimate governments; (ii) the integrated ‘3D’ approach; (iii) good governance; and (iv) coordination of the Stability Fund and the good governance funds. It has a part-time focal point\textsuperscript{84} to ensure implementation of UNSCR 1325 within its focus area mentioned above. The second is the Humanitarian Aid and Reconstruction division (DSH/HO), responsible for: (i) spearheading the objectives related to inclusive political processes and peace dividends; (ii) developing a conflict-sensitive approach to development cooperation; and (iii) coordination of the Reconstruction Fund and the budget for humanitarian aid (IOB (2013): 68). This division also has a gender focal point.

• The Security Policy Department (DVB) is responsible for (i) the Dutch international security strategy and related policy; (ii) the oversight and civilian contribution to ongoing peacekeeping operations; (iii) counter-terrorism and national security; and (iv) monitoring and countering weapons proliferation. The divisions that deal with security and defence policy have assigned a ‘1325 focal point’ to the Afghanistan Task Force. The main focus is on including gender in peacekeeping operations by, for example, deploying civilian gender experts in peacekeeping operations. There is less room for incorporating gender into policy development within this Department, as is clear from its ‘gender-blind’ International Security Strategy (2013). DVB in turn refers mostly to the military

\textsuperscript{83} In 2007, the Department of Human Rights and Peacebuilding (DMV) coordinated the fragile states policy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This responsibility was transferred to the newly established Fragility and Peacebuilding Unit (EFV) in 2008. In mid-2012 the EFV was integrated into the newly established Stabilisation and Humanitarian Aid Department (DSH). All reported to both the Director-General International Cooperation (DGIS) and the Director-General Political Affairs (DGPZ). See also ‘Investeren in stabiliteit. Het Nederlandse fragiele statenbeleid doorgelicht’, IOB evaluatie, nr. 379, IOB: The Hague, pp. 61-68.

\textsuperscript{84} This was the equivalent of 0.25 fulltime-equivalent (FTE) in 2008, 0.5 in 2013 and 0.75 FTE in 2014.
assessment framework of 2009 and to a lesser extent the International Gender Policy and NAP-II.

- The Dutch embassies adjust general policies on gender, peace and security to the country context in which they work within the framework of their Multi-Annual Strategic Plans (MASP). These plans outline priorities, intervention logics and related budget lines, and most MASPs on fragile states pay attention to the special role of women in peacebuilding and recovery, in line with the Spearhead Security and Rule of Law of DSH. The embassies also play an important role in gender diplomacy, encouraging attention to be given to the active political role of women and lobbying for comprehensive approaches to gender, peace and security. Although most staff members of the Embassies of the Kingdom of the Netherlands (EKN) are familiar with the Dutch NAP 1325 and have to consent the NAP-funded projects, though without controlling the budget, it is not considered relevant to their day-to-day operations but seen more as a framework for cooperation in the Netherlands.\(^86\)

### 7.3.2 Key issues with respect to gender mainstreaming

The evaluation makes clear that civil servants in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs have a good understanding of the linkages between gender equality objectives, UNSCR 1325 and peace and security goals. In interviews, UNSCR 1325 is often referred to as the basis for concrete activities in the field of women and/or gender, peace and security. An effort has also been made to incorporate the principles of the resolution in concrete objectives for specific peace and security policies (as in the case of the Security and Rule of Law Spearhead (2012) and the Toetsingskader of 2009). Still, in putting the gender-mainstreaming policy into practice, several obstacles are encountered, as is explained in the following paragraphs.

**Gender policy.** As discussed in Chapter 2, there is no overall policy on gender, peace and security. What exists in terms of policy is coloured by UNSCR 1325 and, therefore oriented towards women only. This is partly done to avoid using the term ‘gender’: ‘women’ (or ‘women’s rights’) is seen as a politically less controversial term, easier to understand and appreciate. Interviews held at the ministry indicate moreover that this women-oriented approach also stems from a mix of parliamentary pressure to show tangible results and some mild internal resistance to the use of ‘gender’, as the term invokes ideas of activism. It is important, however, to reiterate two points that were made earlier in this report. First of all, a women, peace and security approach is not necessarily gender-responsive. Second, as various studies have shown,\(^86\) mixing terminology and approaches brings with it the risk that a women-only approach, in isolation from an acknowledgement of related male vulnerabilities, may generate resistance and undermine the realisation of broader peace and security objectives.

**Coordination between stand-alone gender track and gender mainstreaming.** Though ministry-wide there exists a support base for its agenda, not least because of internal awareness-raising by

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\(^{85}\) This also links to the division of labour between DSO and the embassies regarding the NAP-1325, which was established in response to the austerity measures taken in 2011; see Chapter 4.

\(^{86}\) See e.g. UNDP/BCPR (2011); Baaz and Stern (2010); Smits and Cruz (2011); Lwambo (2011); and Dolan (2010).
the Gender Unit, the NAP is at times seen as a somewhat isolated undertaking of this Unit. Separating out responsibilities for the NAP and for mainstreaming its women/gender, peace and security agenda has meant that, outside the Gender Unit, less priority has been given to thinking through the implications of a gender perspective in the ministry’s overall peace and security policy and programming and to connecting gender equality objectives to more mainstream peace and security objectives. This state of affairs was reinforced by the decision made in 2012 to transform the Unit from a department that reported to both the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Minister for Development Cooperation to one of the ministry’s development cooperation departments, thereby reducing its influence in the broader areas of foreign affairs and peace and security. Note that this situation has been changed once more in early 2014 (see box 7.1).

**Gender as an analytical tool and gender analysis.** One of the consequences is that the idea of gender as an analytical tool is hardly entertained and that gender analyses are rarely done, even though e.g. the policy note on the spearhead Security and Rule of Law (2012) emphasises its relevance and there is broad acceptance of the importance of integrating a gender perspective. Whether such an analysis is carried out depends mainly on personal affinity with the subject and, when it is, the focus is on women’s roles and needs. Key issues are furthermore the lack of relevant frameworks and tools that can be used for this purpose, and the absence of clear criteria to assess a gender analysis once it is has been completed. As was observed in interviews, ‘gender mainstreaming is based on a good deal of assumed common sense’.

**Assessment of the gender-responsiveness of project proposals.** Although the Stability and Reconstruction Funds make reference to UNSCR 1325 in their guidelines (see section 7.4 below), there are no uniform criteria to assess the gender-responsiveness of project proposals that are submitted for funding to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the embassies. With the exception of the Reconstruction Fund, there is also no consistent guidance on how proposals can demonstrate the potential impact on gender norms or men’s gendered vulnerabilities and roles. Ultimately, interviews show that the gender agenda is still widely regarded as a normative one that is regularly sidelined when ‘more urgent issues like stabilisation or humanitarian aid are at stake’.

**Individual interpretation of roles and responsibilities.** With so little outlined and detailed, it is not surprising that individuals have increasingly defined their own roles and responsibilities. This state of affairs is reinforced by a tendency among senior management of the ministry to refrain from systematically insisting on putting gender-mainstreaming into practice in the overall peace and security domain. At the level of the Gender Unit, some staff considered that it should strictly focus on the stand-alone gender track, assuming that the other departments had their own gender expertise and responsibilities (as embodied by the staff acting as focal points – see below). Others have opted for a broader advisory role on gender mainstreaming and integrating UNSCR 1325 in other areas of peace and security. The success in gender mainstreaming depended mainly on the proactivity and networking skills of individual staff members tasked with the gender, peace and security portfolio and the gender and UNSCR 1325 focal points within relevant departments. The absence of gender in
the latest policy notes on the International Security Strategy and the Budget International Security are examples of the consequences of this individualised and opportunity-driven organisational structure to mainstream gender in all peace and security policies.

**Reliance on focal points.** However, while the staff acting as focal points on UNSCR 1325 and/or gender indeed made an effort to incorporate gender in the daily operations of these departments, the evaluation makes clear that:

(i) these positions were often held by government trainees or junior staff, an exception being DVB (currently DSH/HO); (ii) only the 1325-focal point of DSH/SR had time allocated to deal with gender and UNSCR 1325, while elsewhere gender was an add-on to daily work and was frequently sidelined as a result; and (iii) focal points are trained in gender, but mostly after their actual assignation. At the same time, the existence of a focal point has, on some occasions, limited the room for the more experienced gender advisers of the Gender Unit to directly engage in daily operations of the department, as doing so would mean bypassing the focal point.

### 7.4 Instruments for the integration of UNSCR 1325 and gender mainstreaming

Against the above background, the following paragraphs assess how gender and UNSCR 1325 have been mainstreamed in the ministry’s main (financing) instruments that were used to put the peace and security policy into practice in Afghanistan, Burundi and DRC. The focus is on the Stability Fund and the Reconstruction Fund, and the secondment of Dutch experts to peacekeeping missions.

#### 7.4.1 Financing for integrating UNSCR 1325 and gender mainstreaming

In the period 2007-13, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has spent some EUR 890.5 million on a total of 390 country-level interventions in Afghanistan (559.8 million), Burundi (136.9 million) and the DRC (193.8 million) (see table 7.1).98 These funds were managed by various departments of the ministry in The Hague and the embassies in these countries, depending on which financing instrument was used.99 Of these interventions were funded from the Stability Fund and 10 from the Reconstruction Fund.

These interventions include both those that are related to UNSCR, and ‘other’ women’s rights/gender equality interventions, like the construction of a school for girls or ‘general’ human rights interventions, which are relevant for women’s rights, but not specifically

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97 In this respect, the state of affairs is not too different from what has been reported in other research on the functioning of such gender focal points. See e.g. Mehra and Gupta (2006): 5.

98 Note that these 390 interventions only included single-country projects and programmes. Multiple-country or regional interventions which were also implemented in Afghanistan, Burundi or the DRC are not taken into account because they have received a separate entry in the financial system, which cannot be assigned to individual countries.

99 Until July 2012, since the Netherlands did not have a fully fledged embassy in Burundi, the embassy in Kigali (Rwanda) was budget-holder for all aid activities in Burundi. With the establishment of an Embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands in Burundi on 1 July 2012, this embassy became the budget-holder for these activities. Source: Staatscourant Nr. 20222, 8 October 2012.
related to UNSCR 1325. What is more, there is considerable variation at country level: while in Burundi only 0.2% of the total spending was earmarked for gender, the proportions in the case of Afghanistan and DRC were 2.8% and 7.9% respectively. In theory this means that the remaining 360 interventions were not relevant for either women’s rights or gender equality.

However, the reliability of the use of the gender marker is questionable – also in the area of peace and security – and there are at least another 14 interventions, which are not gender-marked, but to which the ministry refers when talking about the implementation of UNSCR 1325. Adding these interventions changes the picture and, in theory, makes 27.4% of overall expenditures relevant for either women’s rights or gender equality and 28.3% in the case of Afghanistan, 19.5% in Burundi and 30.4% in DRC.

### Table 7.1 Women/gender-relevant interventions in Afghanistan, Burundi and DRC (2007-13), expenditures in EUR million and percentages

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Afghanistan</th>
<th>Burundi</th>
<th>DRC</th>
<th>Totals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EUR</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>EUR</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>EUR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women/gender-related</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>31.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>interventions</td>
<td>2.9%</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
<td>7.9%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interventions not related to women/gender, but relevant for UNSCR 1325</td>
<td>142.5</td>
<td>26.5</td>
<td>43.3</td>
<td>212.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>25.5%</td>
<td>19.3%</td>
<td>22.3%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interventions with no relation to women/gender or UNSCR 1325</td>
<td>401.3</td>
<td>110.2</td>
<td>135.2</td>
<td>646.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>71.7%</td>
<td>80.5%</td>
<td>69.8%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>559.8</td>
<td>136.9</td>
<td>193.8</td>
<td>890.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: totals may not add up due to rounding of numbers.

### 7.4.2 Gender-sensitising the Stability Fund

The Stability Fund combines official development assistance (ODA) and non-ODA budgets. This allows it to support quick and high-impact stabilisation activities such as demining, civilian crisis response, or disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR). In the period 2007-13, Afghanistan, Burundi and DRC were among the top five recipients, accounting for a total amount of EUR 229.7 million (see table 7.2).
| Table 7.2 Stability Fund expenditures in Afghanistan, Burundi and DRC (2007-13) in EUR million |
|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| Country         | Number of projects | Expenditures (2007-13) |
| Afghanistan     | 38               | 125.4            |
| Burundi         | 26               | 35.6             |
| DRC             | 27               | 68.7             |
| **Total**       | **91**           | **229.7**        |

A policy evaluation of the first two years (2004-05) of the Stability Fund observed that ‘gender-blindness was one of the shortcomings of the fund. Almost all projects lacked a deliberate gender perspective, which defies the criteria of the fund as well as general policy (…)’ (Klem and Frerks (2007): 8). In their response, the ministers of Foreign Affairs and for Development Cooperation expressed their disagreement with this firm conclusion, arguing that in some activities support for gender was not necessary as there was no ‘gender issue’ to begin with (KST 106927 (2007)). Nevertheless, the revision of the Fund’s criteria focused mostly on the eligibility criteria on the role that women can play in post-conflict stabilisation, seeking the input from gender experts in assessing submitted proposals, and proactively lobbying international partners to submit project proposals in this area (KST 124834 (2008): 16). Indeed, the assessment framework of the Stability Fund regards adherence to UNSCR 1325 as a sufficient, though not obligatory, criterion for gaining access the Fund. Moreover, advisers from the Gender Unit are now formally part of the consultative body advising the Stability Fund steering committee.

Until 2010, the Minister of Foreign Affairs sent an annual report to parliament on the implementation of the Stability Fund. Since 2011, however, information on the Stability Fund’s spending on gender, peace and security has no longer been generated separately. Instead, this type information is included in letters to parliament on the progress realised under the spearhead Security and Rule of Law.

To assess the extent to which the Stability Fund has garnered a stronger focus on gender and the participation of women in peace and reconstruction processes from 2010 onwards, a review of available project assessment memorandums (BEMOs) of projects supported by the Fund in Afghanistan, Burundi and DRC was carried out. This overview makes clear that 9 of the 14 available memorandums do not refer to gender and/or women even though, in

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90 See also Cordaid and WO=MEN (2010), observing that ‘it comes as no surprise that in the subsequent reports on the execution of the Stability Fund in 2006, 2007, 2008 and 2009, nothing is reported on the promised incorporation of gender in the Fund’ (Cordaid and WO=MEN (2010): 17).
91 Their involvement has become more sporadic, however, since 2011 and limited to occasions when projects are discussed that have a strong focus on women.
93 For the 20 projects supported in Afghanistan, Burundi and DRC in the period 2010-13, only 14 assessment memorandums were available at the ministry in The Hague. Such memorandums are concise in nature and therefore tend to give only a limited reflection of the reality on the ground.
Mainstreaming gender and UNSCR 1325 retrospect, this would seem highly relevant. For the remainder, they refer to gender and/or women, in relation to existing gender guidelines, to outreach to civil society including women’s organisations, or to sex-specific target groups (see figure 7.1).

Figure 7.1  Gender in Stability Fund projects in Afghanistan, Burundi and DRC (2010-13)

To conclude, gender, as well as giving attention to the position of women in peacebuilding processes, remains on the agenda of the Stability Fund and the Fund is no longer blind to these issues, as was the case earlier on. However, gender is not taken into account systematically and the assessments made by the fund lack expert insights into how project objectives link to objectives in the field of gender equality.

### 7.4.3 Gender-sensitising the Reconstruction Fund

The Reconstruction Fund is smaller than the Stability Fund and focuses on capacity-building of government institutions and civil society. In the period 2007-11, eight projects were funded in Afghanistan and two in Burundi for a total amount of almost EUR 134 million. An analysis of the assessment memorandums shows that gender equality in relation to the proposed interventions is not discussed. Moreover, in five cases no attention is paid to the different roles of men and women in relation to the project objectives while the other five are sex-specific in their description of the target group and mention women as a target.

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94 For example, in the case of an access to justice programme in Afghanistan (DVB AF/GTZ/EUPOL Pol. Training), one would expect an analysis of how such a project plays out differently for women and men. Or when a baseline study is conducted on the security sector in Burundi, gender should be of key concern (EFV Burundi CIP-ISSAT-CRU).
group in their own right. In the first phase of the Fund, gender was thus reduced to sex-specificity and/or oriented towards women.

The framework and criteria of new Reconstruction Fund Tender for the period 2012-15 (total budget EUR 120 million) has sought to encourage proposals containing a gender perspective. In line with this, its grant policy framework and the call for proposals include the following selection criterion: ‘the extent to which the activities strengthen the position of women as actors in reconstruction and peace processes’ (criterion 3b, page 15). Gender markers (see text box 7.2) were introduced to assess the proposals.

**Text box 7.2 Gender markers used by the Reconstruction Fund (2012-15)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Score</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0 – Gender-blind</td>
<td>Proposals that do not recognise ‘the special position of women in reconstruction processes’.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 – Weak</td>
<td>Proposals that recognise the special position of women as victims.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 – Medium</td>
<td>Proposals that recognise the position of women as victims and actors in reconstruction processes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 – Strong</td>
<td>Proposals that ‘clearly describe the interventions that will meaningfully contribute to the reduction of systematic gender inequality and that will lead to the active participation of women, women’s empowerment and more equal power relations between women and men’.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Out of the 60 proposals received, 52 (i.e. over 85%) scored (2) or higher, four did not recognise the special position of women in reconstruction processes (0) and four more recognised the special position of women, but without going into detail on what this position entailed (1). The picture is quite similar for the 16 memorandums written for approved projects in Afghanistan, Burundi and DRC: only 3 do not discuss gender, women and/or UNSCR 1325 in relation to the project objectives. For the other projects, as figure 7.2 shows, the position of women and their actual involvement in peace and reconstruction is recognised (13 projects) but reducing gender inequality is not always a specific aim. The analysis also clearly revealed that the proposals did not always describe in detail any concrete activities that were to be carried out.

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95 In the case of Afghanistan, findings are briefly as follows: (i) A project on saffron and vegetable production training pays special attention to women; (ii) a sub-regional project for treatment of drug-addicted Afghan refugees includes training of medical staff in gender issues; (iii) the use of gender-segregated data is announced in relation to the ARTF; and (iv) one project aims to establish the building of a business incubator for women. In the case of Burundi, reference is made to increasing the share of women voters in the 2010 elections.
Data on results of these interventions are limited – contracts were signed in late 2012 and implementation started in 2013 in most cases. A review of related progress reports indicates first of all that projects that do not pay any attention at the outset to women’s participation and/or reducing gender inequality, do not report on these issues at a later stage either. This is different for projects that have formulated ideas on what will be done in this domain; in these cases, reports provide information on women-focused inputs that were provided – such as the recruitment of female teachers and the involvement of civil society organisations with a track record on gender and equal participation of women – and provide information on a broad range of activities in which women were (also) reported to have been involved (see text box 7.3 for some examples of such activities in the three focus countries of this evaluation).
A remaining challenge is how to put into practice the attention to gender that the Reconstruction Fund tender clearly calls for, into systematic M&E at Fund level.

7.4.4 Civilian expertise

Dutch civilian gender experts play a big role in building the gender expertise within peacekeeping operations. This expertise comes from a pool of approximately 300 Dutch external experts (including gender experts) which the Ministry of Foreign Affairs can make use of. Although their placement is arranged by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, they are not government employees. The total available budget for the pool is EUR 6 million per year, which is funded through the Stability Fund. Particular attention is given to gender issues when new experts are recruited to the pool; they are given a rating and if they can demonstrate gender expertise, ‘extra credits’ are awarded. A placement generally will last one year, which may be followed by a one-year extension. The maximum duration of a placement is three years.

Experts from the pool are placed with peacekeeping missions such as MONUSCO or within the UN system. In the case of peacekeeping missions the placements are often (though not always) made on request by the missions, whereas the ministry actively seeks openings for the placement of Dutch civilian experts within the UN system.\(^{96}\) Table 7.3 shows the gender-related placements for the period 2012-14.\(^{97}\)

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\(^{96}\) According to the ministry’s report on the implementation of the human rights strategy in 2009, ‘(in) de uitzendingen uit de korte missiepool wordt actief gekeken naar inzet van mensen op het gebied van gender in conflictgebieden’ (ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken (2010b): 107).

\(^{97}\) Information about placements prior to 2012 (e.g. there has been a placement with the EUPOL mission in Uruzgan, Kunduz and Kabul since 2007) was not collected systematically and is therefore not incorporated into this overview. Reports on the implementation of Dutch human rights policies in the period 2008-11, make reference to e.g.: (i) a gender expert for the UN peacekeeping mission in Chad (2008); and (ii) a gender expert seconded to the European Union Security (EUSEC) in DRC in 2010; as well as (iii) a Dutch human rights expert, active in the areas of women’s rights and youth delinquency; (iv) a gender expert seconded to the EUPOL mission in Afghanistan in 2009/10; and to (v) gender advisers seconded to ISAF’s Strategic Command in Kabul and Operational Command in Uruzgan in 2010.
Table 7.3  Gender-related placement of civilian external experts (2012-14)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Organisation</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Function</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>EUPOL</td>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>Rule of Law Mentor to Ministry of Interior, Gender and Human Rights (GHR)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>MONUSCO</td>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Coordination Officer Sexual Violence Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>EUPOL COPPS</td>
<td>Palestinian Territories</td>
<td>Field Police Adviser</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>EUPOL</td>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>Rule of Law Mentor to Ministry of Interior, Gender and Human Rights (GHR)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>MONUSCO</td>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Coordination Officer Sexual Violence Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>EUPOL COPPS</td>
<td>Palestinian Territories</td>
<td>Field Police Adviser</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>UNODC</td>
<td>Seychelles</td>
<td>Prison Mentor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>EUPOL</td>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>Rule of Law Mentor to Ministry of Interior, Gender and Human Rights (GHR)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>Brussels</td>
<td>Personal Adviser to the Special Representative on Women, Peace and Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>UN WOMEN</td>
<td>New York</td>
<td>Communications and Advocacy Specialist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>MONUSCO</td>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Sexual Violence Expert</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In addition to the civilian expert pool, the ministry also uses the instrument of strategic placements of diplomats, the so-called strategic secondments. Since 2011 there have been at least (once again, data were not complete) three of such gender-related strategic secondments:

- 2011-14: Spanish Ministry of Defence – Adviser for implementing UNSCR 1325
- 2012-16: UNFPA
- 2014–18: NATO (Brussels) – Special representative on Women, Peace and Security

Finally, it is worth recalling that the ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defence of the Netherlands and Spain organise jointly the bi-annual Dutch-Spanish training course, ‘A comprehensive approach to gender in operations’, aimed at EU, NATO and UN peacekeepers, mid-career diplomats and civilian experts (KST 32605-121 (2013)). This five-day training programme aims to train participants on gender mainstreaming at all levels of peacekeeping activities and processes, including negotiations and mediation, the protection of civilians against sexual violence, and civilian and military perspectives on incorporating gender in peacekeeping. It also provides practical tools for incorporating gender in disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) and security sector reform (SSR) processes. After two successful pilot editions in 2012, the training is to be certified by the European Security and Defence College (ESDC) in 2015. By making use of the venues of the Dutch and Spanish ministries of Defence, and the available expertise among the participants, the costs of the training are relatively low. Agreement was reached between the two sides to continue funding the training. A joint executive committee, including staff of
the ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defence of the Netherlands and Spain, ensures that the course remains linked to contemporary challenges in the field of gender, peace, and security.

Post-training evaluations reveal that participants value the training for its comprehensive approach, in terms of both the training’s material, and of the selected trainers and audience. Within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the training is seen as ‘best practice’ in the Dutch efforts to incorporate gender in the policy domain of security and rule of law, as well as in pursuing an integrated approach to these efforts. The literature makes clear that relatively similar training initiatives exist elsewhere. These range from a UN-sponsored ‘Gender and Peacekeeping Operations Generic Training’ module, and training sessions in Sweden on Resolutions 1325 and 1820 with the Folke Bernadotte Academy, to training sessions run by the German Centre for International Peace Operations, the Austrian Study Centre for Peace and Conflict Resolution, the tri-departmental Stabilisation Unit (SU) in the UK, the United Nations Training School Ireland and the Nordic Centre for Gender in Military Operations. A call has been made for documentation and sharing of best training practices, harmonisation of training efforts – e.g. by making standardised training modules on gender aspects and UNSCR 1325/1820 available to all EU member states – and increasing opportunities for joint training courses.98

7.5 Conclusions

This chapter has shown that the policy status of the NAP is unclear, including within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Some see it as the Dutch policy for implementing UNSCR 1325 and reflecting policy choices that are now resonating in all domains of Dutch peace and security policy, while others see it more as a mechanism to fund UNSCR 1325 activities related to one specific domain of the resolution. For example, civil society stakeholders regard the NAP as a framework for joint cooperation on one specific area of the resolution rather than the Dutch overall policy on women, peace and security.

The NAP, however, created ample awareness of the importance of UNSCR 1325 and the issues it aims to address within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. As a result, efforts have been made to incorporate the general principles of the resolution in objectives for specific peace and security policies. The evaluation also found that the strong policy orientation towards UNSCR 1325 has been to the detriment of the objective to mainstream gender in peace and security. In peace and security policies, attention to gender tends to be put on a par with UNSCR 1325 and, as a result, focuses only on women.

The unclear status of the NAP in combination with the lack of vision and strategy on gender, peace and security implies that activities are developed in a policy void. This has made the translation into practice of UNSCR 1325 and gender principles problematic. The evaluation

98 See a draft paper prepared by the Folke Bernadotte Academy, Sweden, for the seminar “Strengthening ESDP missions and operations through training on UNSCR 1325 and 1820” compiled by Louise Olsson and Martin Åhlin (undated).
Mainstreaming gender and UNSCR 1325

highlights in this respect the following main issues: (i) the focus on a women-oriented approach – which is not necessarily gender-responsive and may therefore be counterproductive for addressing the needs of women in conflict-affected environments; (ii) a lack of gender analysis and of agreed guidelines and criteria to assess the gender-responsiveness of projects; (iii) an organisational set-up that often relied on relatively junior staff, with many other responsibilities, and the proactivity and networking skills of individual staff members, but with little support from senior management to consistently pursue an agenda that effectively ensures consistent to gender/women. Use of the so-called gender marker to identify interventions that have gender equality as a prime or important objective has furthermore been variable and not very consistent.

Though this seems an improvement in comparison with the past, perusal of the assessment memorandums of projects financed under the Stability Fund in Afghanistan, Burundi and DRC clearly reveals that in most cases, gender is not taken into account systematically. There is a strong focus on ‘women only’ and the assessments lack expert insights into how projects link to objectives in the field of gender equality.

The situation is not very different for the Reconstruction Fund, though it seems to be improving, with an increasing number of project documents recognising the importance of the position of women and their actual involvement in peace and reconstruction. Still, reducing gender equality is not always specifically targeted, while concrete activities are not always spelled out. A remaining challenge is: (i) how to put into practice the attention to gender that the Reconstruction Fund tender clearly calls for; and (ii) how to incorporate the attention to gender into systematic M&E at Fund level.
Integrating gender and UNSCR 1325 in peace and security activities
8.1 Introduction

Over the years, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has informed the Dutch Parliament on how UNSCR 1325 and gender has been put into practice. A series of projects and programmes was specifically mentioned in this respect, with a focus on what was happening in Afghanistan, Burundi and DRC. Hopes were also set by the Ministry on the UN Peacebuilding Fund (PBF). This chapter recapitulates what is known of the results of a selection of these interventions, which were funded primarily through the Stability and Reconstruction Funds. This selection is based on two criteria: (i) they were singled out by the ministry as examples of gender mainstreaming in the implementation of its peace and security policy; and (ii) the volume of resources involved. In the case of Afghanistan, Burundi and the PBF, the research relies on available evaluation material; this implied a focus on whether the interventions did indeed realise what had been envisaged. The case of DRC on the other hand is built around academic research, and concentrates on the appropriateness of a women-only approach for the projects focusing on violence against women.

8.2 Afghanistan

According to the ministry the following main interventions in Afghanistan demonstrated how it had put UNSCR 1325 into practice in the period 2007-13:

- The Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF), a multi-donor fund, managed by the World Bank, to which the Netherlands’ contribution was EUR 335 million in the period 2002-14, making the Netherlands the fourth-largest contributor.
- The UNDP-managed Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA), to which the Netherlands contributed the equivalent of some EUR 72 million in the period 2006-12.

Particular reference, furthermore, was made to the 3D approach that was used by the Netherlands as a member of the International Stabilisation Force in Afghanistan (ISAF) (see text box 8.1).

Text box 8.1  The International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan

Incorporating gender expertise in peacekeeping operations, balancing a male/female presence, and keeping an eye on the needs and demands of women and girls in the area of operations have been elements of the integrated 3D approach, which was pursued by the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). These PRTs were sent to Uruzgan to support the reconstruction process as part of the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission and included military staff from the Ministry of Defence and civilians from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Their

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Based on available evaluation reports, the following paragraphs provide information on the results obtained under the ARTF and LOTFA.

Objective was to provide security and to support reconstruction and development in Uruzgan while helping to strengthen the government in Kabul. According to one of the Article 100 letters of 2007, gender was one of the cross-cutting themes to be considered in the reconstruction process. The letter also made clear that protection of the population and improved access to basic facilities were an important point of departure for the Dutch mission. Critical sentiments were offered in response to some of the aspects of the PRTs (see Kesselaar and Hoenen (2009)). The Ministry of Defence’s evaluation of 2009 made clear that specific, although modest, activities targeting women had indeed been undertaken (Ministerie van Defensie (2009a): 18-19. This was partly as a result of the 3D approach, regular development aid projects undertaken in Uruzgan, the use of tribal expertise and, at times, of female interpreters. Still, this was not an easy task and required continual talks with community and tribal leaders and the governor. What helped was also the undertaking of small, demand-driven civil–military cooperation (CIMIC) projects to win the hearts and minds of the people. With funds from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 882 CIMIC projects were undertaken for a total budget of EUR 4.2 million.

At the same time, IOB’s evaluation, ‘Investeren in stabiliteit’, shows that, according to the Embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands (EKN) in Kabul, because the PRTs lacked a female interpreter, they had little access to women in Uruzgan. This limited the possibility of doing more to improve the position of women (IOB 2013: 114). Nevertheless, they did not contribute to reconstruction in a structural manner (Aker (2009): 16).

The report specifically mentions the setting up of a women’s wing at the Tarin Kowt hospital and the training of midwives and female teachers, the provision of chicken and vegetable seeds to 550 widows and poor women, a less successful project with the Afghan’s Women’s Business Council in Tarin Kowt, preferential treatment of women when issuing micro-credits, literacy training and sewing courses and the provision of 250 sewing machines. The number of women participating in economic activities was very limited, however, and ‘the situation of women remains difficult, also by Afghan standards’ (Ministerie van Defensie (2011a): 61, 77). By developing such ‘quick and visible’ projects it was possible to win the minds and hearts of the population (Ministerie van Defensie (2009a): 34), to get support for the military and to improve their intelligence position and thus to contribute to the success of a military operation. Nevertheless, they did not contribute to reconstruction in a structural manner (Aker (2009): 16).
8.2.1 Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF)

The ARTF was set up in May 2002 in response to the Afghan government’s request ‘for a single, predictable, accountable source of un-tied funding for the recurrent budget’ (Bennet et al. (2009): 21). Initially the ARTF was to end in 2006, but this was extended first to 2010 and then again to June 2020. The ARTF pays for (i) the government’s recurrent costs (such as salaries) – the ‘recurrent window’ (85%); and (ii) an investment window (15%), to finance the National Solidarity Programme (NSP), the Education Quality Improvement Programme (EQUIP), the Microfinance Investment Support Facility for Afghanistan (MISFA), and the provincial Helmand Agriculture and Rural Development Programme (HARDP). An external evaluation of 2008 concluded that ‘there was a clear lack of gender in the policy for the ARTF’ and that it was not paying sufficient attention to ‘gender, conflict sensitivity and distributional outcomes’ (Scanteam (2008): 65, 67, 112). This changed in 2012, when it was noted that ‘(gender) had become a more visible dimension in some projects, with social sector activities providing more gender-disaggregated reporting’ (Scanteam (2012): 23). Instrumental in this respect had been the fact that the Netherlands, other donors, and the country’s ministry of Women’s Affairs had approached the World Bank to signal the absence of a gender policy and focus, and a lack of information on how ARTF addressed gender issues (Bauck et al. (2011): 21). What follows is a discussion of some of the main components of the ARTF’s investment window mentioned above.

The purpose of the NSP was to help develop a community-level system of governance. It was also seen as a means to demonstrate that the government was capable of delivering peace dividends, and the reconstruction and development of rural communities were given priority (Bennett et al. (2009): 42). The NSP provided block grants to locally elected Community Development Committees (CDCs) to improve access to basic services such as power, roads, drinking and irrigation water, and education. In 2008, women’s representation was ‘largely symbolic’ and women were ‘generally not included in the decision making processes’ (Scanteam (2008): 112). Four years later it was found that there was an ‘increased engagement of women, and in some places roles of women had improved, while men were being more open to female participation in local governance’ (Scanteam (2012): 68). The ARTF evaluation of 2012 found that by the end of 2011, 35% of CDC members were women and that female membership had increased from 90,000 in 2009 to over 122,000 in 2012. Yet only 4% of CDC members holding office were female and there was considerable variation in the share of women’s CDC membership, which was close to zero in conflict zones (Scanteam (2012): 68). By ‘seeing gender as a women’s issue’, gender programming was often limited to a number of small capacity development projects centred around women’s participation in meetings – ‘an important first step, but only a first step’ (Scanteam (2012): 66). Still, the NSP was seen as ‘the only project that systematically addressed gender issues by way of raising awareness about gender equality and women’s rights’ (Scanteam (2012): 66; IEG (2012): 164). An independent randomised impact evaluation of the NSP, completed

104 Others were USAID, Sweden, Norway, EU, Denmark, Finland, Australia, Germany, Italy and Canada.
in 2013, explored how the programme had changed perceptions of gender roles by identifying the impact that programme ideas were having on attitudes towards female participation in economic, educational, social and political spheres (see text box 8.2).

Text box 8.2  NSP impact

Female participation in local governance and broader political participation. The evaluation found a positive impact on the proportion of male villagers who believed it appropriate for women to vote in national elections, seek national elected office, or become members of the village council, and who reported that women were involved in dispute mediation. There was no change in the proportion of male villagers who believed it appropriate for women to participate in the election of the provincial governor. On the other hand, there was no evidence that the NSP had impact on the proportion of female villagers who believed it appropriate for women to seek national elected office or become members of the village council, and who believed that most men in the village would consider this appropriate. There is evidence of some impact on the proportion of female villagers who reported that women were generally involved in dispute mediation; still it did not change their perception of whether male villagers believed women should be doing this.

Women’s broader economic or social participation. The evaluation found only a weak impact on the proportion of male villagers who accepted women working in government and NGOs. Additionally, it found no evidence of the NSP having an impact on ideas concerning (a) the proportion of female villagers who accept women working with government and NGOs or who believe that a majority of male villagers accept women working in government and NGOs; and (b) the proportion of men who would accept a female relative being treated by a male doctor or the proportion of women who would be willing to be treated by a male doctor in the absence of alternatives. No evidence was found that the NSP in the end (a) increased intra-village female mobility or the proportion of women travelling outside their compound without a male chaperone; (b) had any impact on female socialisation or on women’s participation in economic activity or household decision-making.

105 The evaluation (Beath et al. (2013)) was a multi-year, randomised control trial designed to measure the effects of implementation of the second phase of the NSP on a broad range of economic, political and social indicators. It covered 500 villages of which 250 were randomly selected to participate in the NSP (treatment group) with the remaining villages assigned to the control group. Both quantitative and qualitative research methods were used and a series of surveys was administered between August 2007 and October 2011. Data summarised in the text box were obtained from Beath et al. (2013): 83-97 who state, moreover, that ‘the effects on gender norms and outcomes are durable. These results provide a strong vindication of NSP’s policy of mandating female participation in CDC elections, CDC composition, and the selection and management of sub-projects. That is, despite the cultural constraints imposed by the context, NSP’s approach to ensuring substantive female participation has resulted in changes in social norms and in women’s lives that extend beyond both the scope of program activities and the lifecycle of programme implementation’ (Beath et al. (2013): 97).
The aims of the Education Quality Improvement Programme (EQUIP) were: mainstream and encourage girls’ enrolment in education by prioritising girls’ schools; motivate local communities to send girls to school; female representation on committees; and recruitment and training of female teachers. According to the ARTF review of 2012, regular payment of teacher salaries together with EQUIP had contributed to the rapid expansion of the education system over the previous ten years. This resulted in an increase in gross enrolment in primary school from 4.9 million pupils in 2004/05 to 8 million in 2011/12 and an increase in the percentage of girls to 40%. The percentage of female teachers rose from 26% in 2006/07 to 30% in 2010/11, with women accounting for 31% of the 190,000 teachers enrolled in teacher training. At the same time, the review found that ‘little is thus so far documented about the quality of education, progression/drop-out rates including regional/gender differences in performance, functional literacy levels, etc.’ (Scanteam (2012):14).

By 2012, IEG, quoting data from 2007/08, stated that the Microfinance Investment Support Facility for Afghanistan (MISFA) had supported 15 micro-finance institutions with 385,000 clients, of whom 70% were women, and distributed 880,000 loans worth USD 282 million. Using a 2007 impact assessment, IEG refers to ‘a positive impact on the lives of women borrowers and their families’, with women clients pointing to ‘improved roles in contributing to business decisions and a positive impact on women clients’ participation in the household economic decision-making on food, utilities, health, education and clothing’ (IEG (2012): 163). However, as observed by Thomson et al. (2012), ‘there has been no specific overall targeting of the poor, and an evaluation of ARTF brings forth an important question to resolve: does continuing investment in what has become a commercial venture seem consistent with poverty reduction objectives’ (Thomson et al. (2012): vi).

### 8.2.2 Law and Order Trust Fund (LOTFA)

The Netherlands has been one of the top five contributors to this UNDP-led Security Sector Reform (SSR) initiative, which was set up as a multi-donor trust fund in 2002 for the payment of Afghan police salaries, training, non-lethal police equipment, rehabilitation of police facilities and institutional development. In brief, LOTFA ‘was intended to strengthen law and order institutions and thereby increase the level of public trust in these institutions and reduce the perception of corruption’ (Thompson et al. (2012): 30). Gender-related initiatives under LOTFA – with ‘gender orientation’ a priority in the fourth phase of the Fund – are two-pronged, with efforts: (a) to increase the representation of women within the police services; and (b) to strengthen the overall ability of the police to deal effectively with

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**Education of girls.** The evaluation found no evidence that the NSP had impact on male or female views on the value of female education or female perceptions of men’s views in this regard. Still, it contributed to an increase in girls’ school attendance and performance.

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106 Other evaluations, too, are critical in their assessment; see NORAD evaluation department (2012): 58, 64; and IEG (2012): 160-162.
gender issues. Recruitment of women into the police is not only seen as ‘a mechanism for the reintroduction of women into the public sphere, but also a critical point of access for women to the wider justice system’ (Atos Consulting (2012): 33). The evaluations of 2009 and 2012 report the following with regard to results:107

- **Organisational development.** Establishment of (a) a structured gender programme to focus on recruitment of 300 policewomen; (b) a Gender Mainstreaming Unit in the Ministry of Interior; (c) the Afghan National Police Women’s Association; and (d) a statistical framework for monitoring and evaluating gender issues. The number of Family Response Units108 was expanded into new areas (through funding of logistical support costs and renovation of infrastructure).

- **Female police officers.** An increased number of female police officers from 232 in 2005/06, to 1,387 by November 2008 by using a targeted recruitment strategy that included incentive pay for females. The increase was primarily among non-commissioned officers and patrol officers patrolman, while the number of female senior officers remained stagnant with only a few women moving up the chain of command. By the end of 2010, however, the number had fallen again to 1,001.109

- **Awareness-raising.** This included the development of a policy brief on gender-sensitive police reform, training and workshops on UNSCR 1325 and gender budgeting. According to the 2009 evaluation, ‘(strengthening) the ability of the police to deal effectively with gender issues is an important intervention by LOTFA’ but one on which relatively little was spent (Atos Consulting (2012): 40).

### 8.3 Burundi

According to the ministry, the following main interventions in Burundi demonstrated how it had put UNSCR 1325 into practice in the period 2007-13:110

- The Multi-country Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme (MRDP) for the Great Lakes region, with a Dutch contribution of EUR 94.9 million in the period 2004-08 through the World Bank.
- The bilateral Security Sector Development (SSD) programme, with a contribution of EUR 20 million for the period 2009-11 and EUR 15 million for 2012-13. Apart from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, key partners are the Dutch Ministry of Defence, the Burundian Ministère

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108 These Units were set up to deal with domestic violence and potentially play a ‘valuable role’ in ‘sensitising the police to issues of domestic violence’ (Atos Consulting (2009): 40). They were identified as ‘successfully accomplishing twin goals of providing positions particularly well-suited to female police personnel and aiding in broader goals of providing women with access to broader and formal police services’ (Atos Consulting (2012): 34).


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de la Défense Nationale et Anciens Combattants (MDNCA) and the Ministère de la Sécurité Publique (MSP); the Belgian Technical Cooperation (BTC); and the German GIZ.

Based on available evaluation reports, the following paragraphs provide information on the results obtained.

8.3.1 Multi-country Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme (MRDP)
Until the end of 2008, the Netherlands was a major donor to the MDRP. Its mandate was to support governments in the greater Great Lakes region for the formulation and implementation of national demobilisation and reintegration programmes. Programmes included the following main components: (i) demobilisation; (ii) reinsertion; and (iii) reintegration support to special groups. After 2008, the programme was turned into national programmes in the DRC, Rwanda and Burundi.  

Although IOB’s evaluation ‘Investeren in stabiliteit’ refers to the Burundi part of the MDRP as a success on the whole (IOB (2013): 154), when one looks more specifically at gender, clearly this is not really the case. Though female ex-combatants were supposed to be a particular target group, the issue was taken on board late into the Programme, and only after partners in the Programme, including the Netherlands, had repeatedly asked that the MDRP’s gender dimension be properly addressed. While the Learning for Equality, Access and Peace (LEAP) programme was launched in August 2007 to deal with the issue,  the 2010 evaluation observed that the MDRP’s gender dimension ‘was not translated into practical approaches within most of the programmes’ (Scanteam 2010: 33). In the end, female ex-combatants received some targeted assistance, such as separate living areas in demobilisation centres for female ex-combatants and their children, specialised medical screenings, gender sensitisation for implementing agency personnel, promotion of female associates and the involvement of spouses during reintegration activities. Nevertheless, even with these benefits there were still problems surrounding their eligibility for support. Women were rarely given the status of ex-combatant and in the end only 516 adult female combatants (compared with over 22,500 adult males, so only 2.2% of the total amount of ex-combatants) were demobilised and received targeted medical assistance and socio-

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111 In the case of Burundi this is the World Bank Emergency Demobilization, Reinsertion and Reintegration Project (USD 75 million). The Netherlands supports this country programme as well.
112 LEAP included technical assistance to mainstream gender; pilot projects to strengthening demobilisation and reintegration and gender approaches; and related studies and knowledge dissemination. According to the World Bank, LEAP, though it started only towards the end of the Programme, had made ‘important strides in identifying ways to strengthen gender approaches in DDR’ (World Bank (2010): 2).
113 See also Cordaid and WO=MEN (2010) observing that ‘(what) may have contributed to this rather late implementation was that although gender had been defined as focus area, it was not mainstreamed in the program’s key objectives and key principles. Gender was instead addressed under the heading ‘special group’, which may have it more liable to be regarded as ‘an extra’ or ‘a luxury’’ (Cordaid and WO=MEN (2010): 11).
economic reintegration support. The final programme evaluation considered the results regarding demobilisation of female ex-combatants as ‘disappointing’. It was found that women had received insufficient support, were marginalised in the reintegration process and that insufficient attention was paid to their special needs, especially in rural areas (Scanteam (2010): 32, 33, 129). According to the report, a key lesson learnt was that ‘(particular) beneficiary groups, such as child soldiers and female ex-combatants, require identifiable targeting, funding and action plans, and management held accountable to results’ (Scanteam (2010): 1). Also inadequate attention had been paid to trauma suffered by female ex-combatants as a result of gender-based violence (World Bank (2009): 23).

### 8.3.2 Bilateral Security Sector Development programme

The Dutch Security Sector Development (SSD) programme (2009-17) is based on a memorandum of understanding signed by Burundi and the Netherlands in April 2008. It envisaged support for: (a) the Force de Défense Nationale through the Burundian Ministère de la Défense Nationale et des Anciens Combattants, (b) the Police Nationale du Burundi, through the Ministry of Public Security and (c) governance of the security sector, including support for NGOs that were to play an oversight role to make sure that security arrangements were respectful of human rights and the rule of law. Within these pillars, the programme operated in the areas of strategic planning, training, internal control, operational capacity and gender.

The first phase of the programme (2008-11) included some 35 projects to strengthen the institutional capacity of the Ministry of Public Security, the police, the Ministry of Defence and the army through training and strategic advice and provision of materials in order to better guarantee the safety of Burundi’s citizens. The budget covered among other things the costs of technical assistance, studies, and training of the army and police force on ‘Sécurisation des Élections’ and ‘Moralisation’. A training of trainers programme was supported in the period 2009-13 with a budget of EUR 1.6 million. In the training, implemented together with the Belgian Technical Cooperation, attention was paid to human rights, military ethics and the position of women. Strategic advisers from the Netherlands Ministry of Defence

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114 World Bank (2009): 5, 16, 51. Figures were also very low in Rwanda (with women representing 0.2% of the ex-combatants demobilised) and DRC (2%) but better in Uganda and the Central African Republic (13.2% and 15.6% respectively) (Scanteam (2010): 33). Among the demobilised child soldiers there were 3,212 male and 49 female beneficiaries. Similar findings and low numbers of women reached and the issue of their eligibility for disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration programmes are reflected in Ospina (2010): 9, 23; Dharmapuri (2011): 62 and Channel Research (2011): 81.

115 This was also recognised in the World Bank’s final report on the Programme (World Bank (2010): 4).

116 See, on this issue, Coopération Burundo Néerlandaise (2011): 42.


118 ‘Sécurisation des élections’ is about training of the police force to provide security during elections; ‘Moralisation’ is about training in ethics for the police force (e.g. on respect for human rights) and the establishment of Comités Communaux de Sécurité involving police and community. Outside the programme, the Netherlands also supported the Commission Nationale Indépendante des droits de l’homme (October 2011–March 2012) and contributed EUR 2 million from the Reconstruction Fund to a UNDP basket fund to support the elections of 2010, with one the components dealing with women as candidates and as voters.
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The programme’s second phase covered 2012 and 2013 and focused on strengthening the institutional capacity of the MDNCA and MSP, as well as enhancing the integrity and internal and external control of the Burundian security forces in order to increase confidence in the functioning of the security sector in line with the security needs of the population.

Gender mainstreaming was incorporated into the relevant government SSD programme documents. One of the reasons for doing so – despite the overall improvements in the security sector as observed in IOB (2013): 155 – was the necessity to cultivate sufficient responsiveness on the part of the police to complaints made by the female population (Coopération Burundo Néerlandaise (2011): 21). The Dutch budget linked to this programme included: (a) EUR 400,000, especially for making sure that the gender dimension was incorporated into national defence policies, programmes and budgets; (b) EUR 50,000 to integrate the gender dimension into the mission of the police force and to strengthen the role of female staff within the police in order to increase the quality and efficiency of services for the population – keeping in mind that less than 3% of the police force was female at the time; and (c) EUR 150,000 for gender as a cross-cutting issue for the strengthening of gender focal points.

In terms of results, the Ministry of Defence’s interim evaluation of 2012 refers to some 1,200 officers being trained and a decline in the involvement of the army and police force in human rights violations. This decline is partly attributed to a critical political dialogue with the authorities led by the Netherlands (Ministerie van Defensie (2012): 19). According to IOB (2013), Burundi’s authorities expressed their appreciation for this capacity-building (IOB (2013): 155). Also the Dutch Sustainability Unit stated in a recent report (2013) that ‘some results have already been achieved in the field of security and justice’ with gender aspects integrated among all SSD programme activities and Dutch support for ‘a number of important changes in the security sector of Burundi over the past decade, and including

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119 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs provided funding for a programme officer at the Unités de Gestion of the ministries of Public Security and Governance, a strategic adviser to the Ministry of Public Security and an SSD programme manager.

120 On this issue, see also IOB (2013): 153. The importance of stepping up the effectiveness of the police in handling cases of sexual and gender-based violence and addressing impunity was also underlined in ICCO and Novib’s briefing note on SSD development in Burundi (Oxfam Novib and ICCO (2010): 3, 5).

121 Reference is made to, inter alia, efforts to step up recruitment of women to the Force de Défense Nationale (FDN/army) (among other things to allow Burundi to participate in international peacekeeping missions), the establishment of separate water and sanitation infrastructure for men and women in military barracks and camps and ‘une sensibilisation du militaire masculin sur la nécessité d’intégration du genre à la FDN’. One issue observed is that ‘(les) activités d’augmenter le nombre des femmes militaires dans la FDN sont très limitées à cause de la décision de la Banque Mondiale qui ne donne pas l’approbation de recruter des candidats sous-officiers et hommes de troupe’. (Coopération Burundo Néerlandaise (2011): 40).

122 Reference is made in this respect to increasing the number of female police officers and improving infrastructure to take care of women’s specific needs as well as ameliorating police statistics on gender-based violence (Coopération Burundo Néerlandaise (2011): 22). Particular attention is also promised for female prisoners.
those related to achieving gender equality and improving conditions for women’. Nevertheless, what the report fails to discuss are some of the issues that have not yet been fully resolved, such as: sexual harassment of female members of the security forces (who are still few in number), the absence of a gender needs assessment for the police force and the army, the absence of a strategy on addressing gender-based violence, and information about the poor working conditions of women in the army (although Dutch funding has contributed to the construction or renovation of facilities and training institutes in a gender-friendly manner). The report concludes that while a lot has been done to put ‘gender and women’s leadership in the spotlight in the context of post-conflict Burundi’, there is still an ‘awareness that needs to be widened and at the practical level a lot of work needs to be done’.

8.4 Democratic Republic of Congo

According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the following main interventions were considered as examples of how UNSCR 1325 was put into practice in the DRC in the period 2007-13:

- The Stabilisation and Recovery Funding Facility (SRFF), that was established as the financial instrument linked to the International Security and Stabilisation Support Strategy (ISSSS) that aimed to support the Congolese government’s plan for stabilisation in the east of the country. The SRFF ran from 2009 until 2014 and was sourced with an overall amount of EUR 16.6 million, of which nearly EUR 2 million came from the Netherlands as one of four donors. Its main recipients were a range of UN agencies (such as UN Women, UNFPA, FAO and UNHCR) implementing their programmes through international NGOs. SRFF’s sexual violence pillar is illustrative of the international approach to the issue.
- The programme Gender and Justice (Genre et Justice), run by Heal Africa and the American Bar Association in Maniema, which was an ambitious effort by the Embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands (EKN) in Kinshasa to support a programme in a province that tends to get sidelined, while the Kivu provinces get the international attention. The contribution of the Netherlands was some EUR 6.9 million in the period 2008-11.

8.4.1 Stabilisation and Recovery Funding Facility: Combating sexual violence in the DRC

The sexual violence pillar of the SRFF sought to coordinate all UN agencies and NGO activities that were conducted under the UN-led comprehensive strategy for combating sexual violence (2009). The focus of this strategy was on multi-sectoral responses (e.g. health care, psycho-social assistance and social and economic reintegration), prevention and protection, fighting impunity, data collection and security sector reform. A variety of

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124 Ibid. (Annexe 1: 5).
studies\textsuperscript{126} have begun to question the approach of this strategy on combating sexual violence and the programmes funded by the SRFF sexual violence pillar, for a number of reasons:

- The programmes have been criticised for their women-centred approach in which women are portrayed as victims and men as (potential) perpetrators.\textsuperscript{127} This dichotomy leaves little room for addressing the interlocked nature of gender relations, or the problem of sexual violence in the DRC. Furthermore, the approach perpetuates gender stereotypes that may have contributed to the problem in the first place.
- As a result, their success is tied to ‘a dependency on quantifiable efforts, such as tracking the number of (female) rape victims receiving medical, psycho-social, legal, and economic assistance. Conversely, it also pushes for higher conviction rates for sexual assault offenders and monitoring the number of (male) perpetrators incarcerated’ (Smits et al. (2011): 4). A joint evaluation of conflict prevention and peacebuilding in the DRC found that sexual violence-related interventions in general score exceptionally well at delivering results, which are formulated with a view to beneficiaries’ direct needs (Channel Research (2011): 77, 78). However, although these numbers demonstrate the great need for services as well as services delivered, they do not demonstrate any success in combating sexual violence. Indeed, ‘gender approaches are poorly considered (…) for SGBV in particular. There are limitations in analysing the disaggregated impact of interventions on women and men. (...) It is difficult to ignore the heavy concentration of programming towards women, and victims in particular’ (Channel Research (2011): 81).
- This increases the problem of under-reporting by male victims of sexual violence, as (i) ‘the vast majority of interventions around SGBV are structured in terms of women and children as the only victims, making it difficult for men to access the services’; (ii) ‘the stigma is possibly even greater (for men) than for women’, and the focus on female victims and male perpetrators only reinforces this norm; and (iii) in instances of men having been raped by women, men under-report ‘as there is a risk that the woman will reverse the accusation’ (Dolan (2010): 53).
- The orientation on quantifiable results in supporting female victims of sexual violence also resulted in a large number of Congolese and international organisations working in this area, all competing over the registration of victims, thereby ‘outbidding each other with promises of assistance’ (Douma and Hilhorst (2012): 7). Another unintended consequence is that claiming rape has become a coping strategy for vulnerable women in extremely poor conditions and/or in need of gynaecological care so as to access the abundant sexual violence funds available (Douma and Hilhorst (2012): 9).

\textsuperscript{126} See for example Dolan (2010), Smits et al. (2011), Lwambo (2013) and Douma and Hilhorst (2012).
\textsuperscript{127} See also the report on the joint evaluation of conflict prevention and peacebuilding in the DRC: ‘Gender approaches are poorly considered in general, and for SGBV (sexual and gender-based violence) in particular. There are limitations in analysing the disaggregated impact of interventions on women and men. Whereas SGBV programming could be quite rich in terms of innovation, it is difficult to ignore the heavy concentration of programming towards women, and victims in particular’ (Channel Research (2011): 81).
\textsuperscript{128} In North and South Kivu alone, an estimated 300-400 Congolese and international organisations are active in the field of sexual violence assistance (Douma and Hilhorst (2012): 7).
There are also doubts about the impact of the programmes that were supported:

- **Prevention – awareness raising and training.** Activities in the field of prevention were mostly in terms of awareness-raising and training of military and civilian men on sexual violence. While men are the primary target group of these activities, they are predominantly sensitised to support gender equality; no account is taken of men’s needs and male identity issues. As a result, men miss the chance to tackle the complex nature of sexual and gender-based violence (Lwambo (2013): 49; Dolan (2010): 53). Moreover, research into the success of these behavioural change programmes hasn’t been able to discover any indications of success. Most efforts appear to be one-sided and impractical, from the viewpoint of Congolese men (Lwambo (2013): 49). This can lead to men feeling disempowered, and ‘left unattended, these feelings may impede the progress of combating sexual violence’ (Smits et al. (2011): 3).

- **Socio-economic empowerment.** Sexual violence response programmes most often accompany health care and psycho-social support with socio-economic empowerment, which typically entails training and micro-credit for female victims of sexual violence. This support is often offered without the consent of male family members. ‘Promoting women’s economic activities without combating men’s unemployment or even responding to their feelings of disempowerment is a recipe for male resistance against “gender-sensitive programmes”’ (Lwambo (2013): 61).

- **Fighting impunity.** The strategy reflects a strong belief that the problem of sexual violence will disappear by putting perpetrators of sexual violence behind bars. However, questions arise as to the potential impact that this strong focus on punishing perpetrators will have on the fairness of the legal system prosecuting them.

### 8.4.2 Project Gender and Justice in Maniema

The EKN wanted this programme (being implemented between 2008 and 2015) to take place in Maniema, a province which, unlike North and South Kivu, has received little attention from the international aid community. The EKN put the programme out to tender among NGOs, and many organisations with an established presence in Maniema submitted a proposal (including e.g. Oxfam Novib). In the end, the EKN selected Heal Africa and the American Bar Association (ABA), both newcomers to the province, to develop a project with the EKN during a joint scoping mission in Maniema. The result was a programme aiming to sensitise communities about gender equality and laws on sexual violence, and to offer medical, psycho-social and economic assistance to victims of gender-based violence, while also helping victims get access to the court system. A Clingendael study of January 2011 specifically explored the Gender and Justice programme as part of a broader assessment of...
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the gender-responsiveness of sexual violence assistance in DRC. Its main findings are in brief as follows:

- Although the original project proposal contained a clear gender component, in reality the programme was exclusively oriented towards female victims of sexual violence. Men were not considered under the definition of victim, and male family members of the programme’s beneficiaries were not involved. The gender component of the programme was based on the assumption that by prosecuting perpetrators of sexual violence, gender norms in the community would change. However, this was not the case.
- Questions arose about the programme’s sustainability, one reason being the documented lack of cooperation and failure to cross-reference the approach with local organisations, while the programme partners gained a monopoly on sexual violence assistance in Maniema. Through their well-resourced sensitisation programme, their services were widely known in the region. In addition, Heal Africa at the time seemed to offer the most beneficial support package for victims of sexual violence, which included health care, education and economic assistance. As a result of these attractive offerings, most women reported to Heal Africa’s clinics, which in turn solely referred their clients to the ABA. And while Heal Africa monopolised the health response to female victims of sexual violence, the ABA, as a result of its close connections with regional magistrates and local police (rehabilitating their offices, for example), was able to secure an exclusive right to review legal files.
- The implications of the Heal Africa - ABA monopoly of services are twofold. First, local legal organisations, with a long-term presence in the region, have less clout in doing their daily work. Second, their client base has decreased dramatically, and if they handle cases that make it to the level of the magistrates, they are not allowed to review files needed to monitor the process, because this right is granted exclusively to ABA. There is a ‘catch 22’ to the substantial funding of Heal Africa’s sexual violence programme. While health care services for sexual violence have developed much further than other local health services, it has been allowed to do so at the expense of inclusivity and sustainability. Funding this particular programme, and with such a large amount, has meant that only women who claim to be victims of sexual violence will have access to the assistance provided by Heal Africa and the ABA.

8.5 United Nations Peacebuilding Fund

The United Nations Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) was set up to support (i) interventions of direct/immediate relevance to early peacebuilding processes and address critical gaps where no other funding is available; and (ii) countries that find themselves at a later stage of their peacebuilding processes where no Multi-Donor Trust Fund has been established and/or where critical peacebuilding interventions remain underfunded (UNDP (2010)). Since 2010, the PBF has had two funding facilities:

113 Unpublished field notes. General findings of the study are summarised in Smits et al. (2011).
• The Peacebuilding and Reconstruction Facility (PRF) – which allocates a funding envelope to a country to support ‘a structured peacebuilding process, driven by national actors based on a joint analysis of needs with the international community’ that is focused ‘on objectives that have direct and immediate relevance to peacebuilding’ within one or more of the four priority areas of the PBF (UNDP (2010): 2).

• The Immediate Response Facility (IRF) – which finances critical, urgent interventions on a one-off basis for which other funding sources are not available and is designed to jump-start immediate peacebuilding and recovery needs (UNDP (2010): 2).

The Fund obtains its resources from over 50 donors, including the Netherlands, which together had come up with USD 518.9 million by the end of 2012. The Netherlands contributed the equivalent of USD 46.5 million in 2007 and USD 14.3 million in 2012, making it the third-largest contributor after the UK and Sweden by the end of 2012.

The PBF’s basic architecture encompasses a two-tier decision-making process, involving a central allocation of funding to countries eligible for Fund support and, at the country level, a joint review by the government and senior UN representatives in the country concerning the disbursement of funds against agreed programme and project activities (United Nations (2009b)). While funds must be channelled through a UN entity, national authorities, UN agencies, other international organisations and/or NGOs implement PBF projects. By the end of 2012, UNDP was the largest recipient of PBF funds, followed by UNICEF, UNOPS and UNHCR. Burundi, the Central African Republic, Liberia and Sierra Leone were the largest recipients in the period 2007-12 (about 80% of the budget).

Implementing the UN’s women, peace and security agenda is one of the objectives of the PBF. Importantly, the PBF was to enact the Secretary-General’s promise to double the share of funding for projects that promote women’s specific needs, advance gender equality, and/or empower women, by October 2012. To meet this promise, a target was set to allocate 15% of all funds to women’s empowerment programmes, using a gender marker that was adopted in 2009. The PBF has been further encouraged by its donors to be proactive in this regard. Among them was the Dutch government, urging the Fund to acknowledge ‘the importance of involving women in all peacekeeping and peacebuilding measures, both in policy and practice’, in line with UNSCR 1325 ‘with which the Dutch have committed

132 The Peacebuilding Support Office supports the Peacebuilding Commission (of which it is the secretariat), administers the PBF, and supports the Secretary-General’s efforts to coordinate the UN System in its peacebuilding efforts. The Peacebuilding Commission is an intergovernmental UN advisory body that supports peacebuilding in countries emerging from conflict. It consists of the Organisational Committee, the Country Specific Configurations (the Netherlands sits on the one for Burundi) and the Working Group on Lessons Learned. For the PBF there is also an advisory group to provide advice and oversight of fund allocations and to examine performance and financial reports.

133 The PBF review of 2014 is critical about this 15% target, since ‘what is needed is a systematic focus on how PBF’s country portfolios respond to women’s peacebuilding needs’ (Kluyskens and Clark (2014): 75).

themselves to include women in peacebuilding and to focus on participation, protection, prevention, and mainstreaming of a gender perspective’.  

To increase gender-responsive programming, a Gender Promotion Initiative was launched in June 2011. It aimed at ‘addressing gender equality concerns in the PBF’s programmes and stimulating learning in the UN system about how to design and implement gender-responsive peacebuilding projects’ (PSO (2011): 8; Kluyskens and Clark (2014): 74). The countries that were eligible to receive PBF funding were invited to compete in a call for proposals for innovative projects that was launched. This resulted in an increase of PBF funds allocated to female beneficiaries and/or addressed specific cases of hardship from 6% in 2010 to 10.8% in 2012. However, according to the PBF Review, while this demonstrates ‘the usefulness of such proactive approaches’, the disappointing 2013 figure of 7.4% shows ‘that additional measures and support are needed to help UN Country Teams address gender’ if PBF is to meet the target of spending 15% of its total resources for gender programming (Kluyskens and Clark (2014): xix, 76, 79).

Using the gender marker, figure 8.1 gives an idea of the extent to which gender/women has been incorporated into PBF project design over the years.

### Figure 8.1 PBF resources devoted to gender equality (%)  

PBF progress reports indicate that the Fund worked on a broad range of topics in relation to women/gender equality in the years 2007-13. These range from gender-related legal reform, conflict-related gender-based violence, training of security forces on gender issues and human rights, and the integration of women into national security forces, to women’s

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135 Statement by the Permanent Representative of the Kingdom of the Netherlands to the UN Peacebuilding Fund – High-Level Stakeholder Meeting. New York, 24 June 2014. See also Kluyskens and Clark (2014): xxv, 77.

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access to basic services and economic development initiatives, and the training of women as political leaders and peacebuilders in conflict resolution and women’s rights.

Nevertheless, an independent thematic review in 2014 regarding gender and peacebuilding (O’Gorman 2014) raises concerns about insufficient consideration of ‘gender’ in the selection and allocation of PBF funds, and in the UN policy dialogue with government counterparts and civil society (see text box 8.3). Also the 2014 PBF review touched upon the issue and found that gender is ‘not systematically reported upon, making it difficult to assess the impact of programmes’, while few UN agencies have a ‘strong and explicit ‘gender and peacebuilding’ approach’. Moreover, the Fund focuses predominantly on ‘women as beneficiaries’ but less so on ‘women as peace builders’, though some good examples of ‘gender sensitive local programming’ were identified (Kluyskens and Clark (2014): xix, 76).

Text box 8.3 Main elements of the PBF gender review (2014)

The review was carried out to capture good practice in implementing ‘gender-responsive peacebuilding’ and to analyse PBF efforts and achievements to date. With respect to the Peacebuilding Support Office’s experience and learning on gender responses to peacebuilding since 2010, the review finds ‘very positive space opening up and opportunities to build on the drive of the Secretary-General’s 2010 Report, the Gender Promotion Initiative (GPI)’. Also momentum comes from the 15% target for funds dedicated to ‘address women’s specific needs, advance gender equality and/or empower women as their principal objective’ (O’Gorman (2014): 10). The review identifies a need to:

• develop a theory of change for gender-responsive peacebuilding in project design;
• address the gender marker and for underpinning it with a thorough gender-sensitive analysis;
• step up organisational capacity of the PBSO and for PBSO to provide improved operational learning, more structured communications with and operational guidance to ‘the field’;
• move away from ‘relying on targeted projects for women by raising the spending levels on gender-responsive peacebuilding’: such projects ‘can be catalytic if linked to driving larger areas of engagement such as SSR, land reform, conduct of elections, national dialogue’ and should be ‘complementary to mainstreaming efforts’ (O’Gorman (2014): 10, 11, 49, 56, 64).

The review recommends, among other things, the development of a Gender Strategy and Action Plan, to step up M&E, as well as gender reporting practices, and, finally, to seriously consider ‘direct funding to international NGOs and CSOs to promote innovation and learning on gender-responsive peacebuilding’ (O’Gorman (2014): 14, 53). 138


A desk review of PBF evaluations undertaken as part of this evaluation indicates that the evaluations on Guinea (Quick (2009)), Guinea Bissau (Larrabure and Vaz (2011)) and Sierra Leone (Larrabure et al. (2011)) have nothing or little to say on either gender equality or women. The other evaluation materials give a mixed picture (see the country-specific overview in Annex 8) which is generally limited to numbers of women participating in or benefiting from the interventions that were financed. Issues of gender equality are not addressed; information on women’s actual benefits is lacking.

8.6 Conclusions

This chapter shows that the picture of how UNSCR 1325 has been mainstreamed in Dutch-funded interventions in Afghanistan, Burundi and DRC is less rosy than might have been assumed from the ministry’s information flows to parliament.

The World Bank-managed programmes in Afghanistan (ARTF) and Burundi (MDRP) lacked a gender-sensitive design, making women’s participation largely symbolic; to some extent this was corrected, but only late in the implementation process and only after pressure from other donors, among which the Netherlands. Even then, gender was generally seen as a women’s issue and interventions did little to systematically address gender issues. This situation was found to be similar for the UN PBF. An external evaluation of the PBF in 2014 recommended the development of a theory of change for gender-responsive peacebuilding in projects, which would entail moving away from targeted projects for women.

Evaluations give information on numbers of women reached through a broad range of interventions. The case of the MDRP in Burundi makes clear that, because of the eligibility criteria that were set, women benefited far less than was originally planned and that the results regarding demobilisation of female ex-combatants were considered ‘disappointing’. Research done in the DRC furthermore questions the ‘women only’ approach taken by the sexual violence pillar of the SRFF and the Gender and Justice programme in Maniema, and their lack of attention to addressing the interlocked nature of gender relations, or the problem of sexual violence in the DRC. While these interventions score well in terms of delivering much needed results, and demonstrate the need for such services, they do not show any success in actually combating sexual violence.

Overall, little information is available on what happened after the implementation of these interventions, e.g. in terms of changes in living conditions or in terms of combating sexual violence, let alone about changes in gender relations. One exception is the NSP in Afghanistan. An evaluation of how the programme had changed perceptions of gender roles found a mixed impact among women and men on whether they considered it appropriate for women to vote in national elections, seek national elected office, become members of the village council, or to work with government or NGOs. Little impact was found in terms of changed views on increased independent female mobility, women’s participation in economic activity or on the value of female education. Another exception is the bilateral SSD programme in Burundi, with an evaluation carried out by the Ministry of
Defence indicating that the political dialogue and training had contributed to a decline in the involvement of the army and police force in human rights violations.
Integrating gender and UNSCR 1325 in peace and security activities
Evaluation conclusions
This evaluation centred on the Dutch National Action Plans 1325 (NAPs) on Women, Peace and Security in relation to the broader theme of gender, peace and security in the period 2007-13. This concluding chapter presents the findings in relation to the evaluation questions of the Terms of Reference. It will discuss the overall results of the NAPs in terms of relevance, effectiveness and efficiency, and will outline potential avenues for building on the successes already achieved in this field.

9.1 Understanding the NAPs

Two Dutch NAPs (NAP-I: 2008-11 and NAP-II: 2012-15) were developed following the adoption of the United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325 in 2000. Resulting from recommendations of a governmental advisory body on women, peace and security in 2006 and the multi-stakeholder Schokland Agreements of 2007, the NAPs were co-signed by an ever-increasing number of governmental and non-governmental actors. This has been one of the key features of the Dutch approach and one in which it differs from other countries.

The Dutch NAPs are thus owned by the Dutch government as well as NGOs, women’s organisations, diaspora groups, universities and knowledge institutes, which makes them unique worldwide. This multi-stakeholder pact was based on an emerging understanding that for the gender equality agenda to take hold in conflict-affected environments, all policy and intervention levels should be covered, i.e. from support given to local women’s organisations to gender diplomacy and incorporating a gender perspective in peacekeeping operations. The NAP network, with its variety of stakeholders working at these different levels in a complementary manner, was seen as critical for the successful implementation of UNSCR 1325.

This strong emphasis on collaboration and grass-roots change was maintained during the entire evaluation period (2007-13). However, when comparing in more detail the two NAPs developed during this period, important differences appear.

NAP-I (2008-11) can be considered an attempt to mainstream attention for gender and the special roles and needs of women throughout the Dutch ‘3D’ (Defence, Diplomacy, Development) policy priorities for engagement with fragile states. The action plan provided a framework for cooperation to strengthen the individual signatories’ ongoing activities in these domains. The Plan effectively covered all the pillars of UNSCR 1325, did not have a particular geographical focus and was accompanied neither by a budget, nor by a joint M&E framework, as these issues were regarded as belonging to the domains of the individual signatories. However, two years into the NAP-I process, several internal reviews concluded that this had not produced the desired results.

In response to these findings, NAP-II (2012-15) was built around a focus narrowed to one pillar of UNSCR 1325 – women’s political participation and leadership – to a limited number of countries (Afghanistan, Burundi, Colombia, DRC, South Sudan and Sudan) and the MENA region. This focus was simultaneously connected to a more explicit ambition to relate
UNSCR’s 1325 orientation towards women and to broader insights on gender, peace and security, by making gender mainstreaming a NAP objective in its own right. To promote cooperation among the different types of signatories and to support voluntary women’s organisations and diaspora groups in their role as drivers of the NAP agenda, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs made a budget available. Contrary to its predecessor, NAP-II provides an approach to UNSCR 1325 implementation instead of detailed action plans, focusing its objectives on three areas:

- the NAP as a framework for multi-stakeholder cooperation;
- the NAP as a Women, Peace and Security ‘project’ (NAP projects in focus countries and lobby activities);
- the NAP as an incentive for gender mainstreaming in the peace and security policy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

This structure of NAP-II has guided the structure of the present evaluation report. Using the framework for gender, peace and security that was developed to address the entangled nature of concepts like ‘women’ and ‘gender’, and to appreciate point up the Dutch interest in actively pursuing a gender-responsive Women, Peace and Security agenda (Chapter 2), the following paragraphs provide an assessment of the NAPs’ results in terms of relevance, effectiveness and efficiency.

9.2 Evaluation findings

9.2.1 The NAP as a framework for multi-stakeholder cooperation

NAP-I was intended as a framework for coordination, but a formal coordination structure and incentives for collaboration were missing. This changed under NAP-II, when the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in conjunction with WO=MEN, accepted a central coordinating role. To strengthen cooperation in concrete projects, the NAP signatories furthermore organised themselves into three working groups – on the focus countries of the NAP, M&E and communication. In addition, the ministry launched two funds: (i) a NAP budget of EUR 16 million for the period 2012-15 to support joint projects promoting women’s political participation and leadership; and (ii) a small budget of EUR 24,500 per year to compensate voluntary organisations for their time and expenses related to their involvement in the NAP network.

Relevance

Establishing such a coordination framework was consistent with the Dutch approach to implementing UNSCR 1325. The NAP aimed to convene meetings of stakeholders for the purpose of collaborating strategically at all intervention levels, which required guidance and coordination from a mandated body. Making financial resources available was furthermore in line with global priorities outlined in, for example, the UN’s Seven Point

139 A ‘knowledge working group’ was also foreseen but was never convened.
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Action Plan as well as numerous civil society requests in the Netherlands and in the NAP’s focus countries.

Effectiveness

The effectiveness of the coordination, or the extent to which the coordination resulted in more strategic collaboration, is debatable. The availability of funds was an important incentive for the country working groups to convene frequently, as they were expected to develop joint proposals in order to access those funds. This resulted in a series of concrete NAP-funded projects implemented by two or more NAP signatories. On the other hand, over 10% of the budget went to non-NAP signatories, thereby defeating its initial purpose of promoting collaboration among the signatories around concrete projects.

In some instances the working group structure has also led to additional ad hoc collaboration on advancing a women, peace and security agenda in contexts outside the NAP projects. Examples include the mobilisation of women around peace negotiations in South Sudan and Syria. Finally, NAP signatories have also been very active in lobbying, advocacy and awareness-raising at the national and international levels.

The downside of this project-oriented coordination was that project design and the division of funds became the main priority of the country working groups in the first two years of NAP-II (2012-13). This has had an impact on the other NAP goals: involvement of diaspora organisations, facilitating research and M&E. The – perhaps unintended – prioritisation of project design and implementation over content development and strategic collaboration was a direct result of the way in which the budget was made available.

In understanding the network dynamics that followed the announcement of the budget, it is important to consider two facts: a) the earlier governmental austerity measures for development cooperation organisations; and b) there was uncertainty about the exact eligibility criteria for the NAP budget. This resulted in some sort of competition for funding between two types of NAP members: on the one side the larger development organisations and on the other, the small(er) women’s organisations and the diaspora groups. Thus, rather than promoting cooperation and equality among members, the creation of a budget actually led to tension-filled relations between these two categories of implementing organisations. The smaller organisations complained they were not able to compete with the larger development organisations, which in turn felt that their professionalism in project development and their local networks of women’s organisations remained unacknowledged.

Another development was that while the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Dutch development NGOs increasingly became engaged in a donor-implementer relationship, other strategic partners, such as embassies, knowledge institutes and universities, drifted away from the NAP network. Although some examples of linking learning and action can be cited, it was often found that opportunities to incorporate the strategic diplomatic position of embassies in the focus countries, and to embed the emerging insights of knowledge
institutes in the area of gender, peace and security, were not seized during the development of projects under the NAP.

Finally, the results of the monitoring and evaluation of the NAP activities are mixed. Although a qualitative mid-term review was conducted in 2013, consciously focusing on cooperation within the network rather than on results, the envisaged essential quantitative monitoring framework was never implemented and no comprehensive picture exists on the number and type of partnerships and the budgets involved. This has certainly limited the scope for learning and common accountability, which was the objective of the M&E process in the first place.

**Efficiency**

Two budgets were established to promote collaboration among the different stakeholders: (i) the EUR 16 million NAP budget, and (ii) the EUR 24,500 support fund to compensate smaller voluntary NAP signatories for their expenses.

While the NAP budget did eventually fund concrete projects implemented by NAP signatories, uncertainty about eligibility criteria sparked an inefficient project development process that lasted two years and rendered collaboration within the country working groups time-intensive and tension-filled.

The support fund for voluntary organisations has to some extent succeeded in putting an end to complaints from the small organisations about the lack of resources for their involvement in the NAP network. However, there was still a problem about some of these organisations failing to get access to the support fund because they did not comply with basic administrative rules, such as presenting train tickets or invoices when requesting reimbursement of costs incurred. As a result, the fund was not fully exhausted.

**9.2.2 The NAP as a Women, Peace and Security ‘project’**

The NAP-II has provided a framework for developing activities that aim to promote women’s political participation and female leadership. This has resulted in ten dedicated NAP projects (as of December 2013) in the focus countries and the MENA region, with a total budget of some EUR 8 million, in addition to ‘flanking’ projects on many other fronts and a range of related national and international lobbying, advocacy and awareness-raising initiatives.

**Relevance**

All NAP projects correspond to one of the four result areas described under the NAP objective ‘promoting equal participation by women and men in peace and reconstruction processes’. By focusing on the ‘participation pillar’ of UNSCR 1325, the NAP-II projects and activities build on the least developed aspect of the resolution. In doing so, they fill an international gap, and this underscores their relevance in the international policy land-

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129 I.e. law reform and gender-sensitive policies; national mechanisms; capacity-building; National Action Plan development.
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Scape. The same can be noted with regard to lobbying, advocacy and ‘gender diplomacy’ activities, which have been consistent with the national and international priorities on the women, peace and security agenda. In addition, all projects emphasise support to local organisations and the need to promote gender equality from the grass-roots level upwards.

On a more critical note, while the NAPs have been developed to further the implementation of UNSCR 1325, it remains questionable to what extent the projects and activities are indeed relevant for advancing the situation of women living in conflict-affected environments. The fact is, if activities are to promote female leadership and women’s participation, they must adhere strongly to basic principles of gender and gender analysis. The NAPs have not provided guidance, however, on how to translate the resolution’s objectives into actions that are responsive to contextual gender realities.

This lacuna is reflected in the projects studied for this evaluation, most of which aim to build capacity of women and women’s organisations to act as leaders and peacebuilders, but only one case looks at the broader gender dynamics inhibiting female leadership. Studies have revealed that a mere focus on ‘women’ alone, be it as a special needs group in a protection strategy or indeed as a category in need of a leadership skill set, is unlikely to effectively address the causes of their political exclusion or social and physical abuse. Therefore, this evaluation questions the relevance of the NAP projects for the needs of the women in the focus countries.

Effectiveness
Most of the joint NAP projects were approved only in mid-2013, and it is too early to assess their outcomes and impact for the women living in conflict-affected areas. Regarding the joint programmatic activities that have taken place without support from the NAP budget or the joint lobbying actions, the lack of systematic M&E and the attribution challenges that are intrinsic to these types of activities, make it difficult to acquire reliable information on results achieved.

Efficiency
The available data make clear that only 9 of the 57 NAP signatories are involved in joint projects financed from the budget made available by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. These projects are all led by larger development NGOs, also including a few from outside the NAP network, and local partners of these organisations as well as diaspora groups and women’s organisations are involved in their implementation. Across the board, there is little strategic involvement of embassies and knowledge institutes, implying that the strategic resources of the network as a whole are not being used to their full potential.

The situation is different for the lobbying and awareness-raising activities conducted under the NAP. While key players, such as knowledge institutes, are again scarcely visible in this area, it appears that the multi-stakeholder approach of the NAP is deployed more efficiently in lobbying and advocacy than in the NAP projects. It is in the area of lobbying and awareness-raising that Dutch civil society organisations and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs cooperate on the basis of complementarity and equality.
9.2.3 The NAP as an incentive for gender mainstreaming in peace and security policies of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Integrating UNSCR 1325 and mainstreaming gender into all signatories’ policies and actions on fragile states was an objective of both NAPs. While NAP-I was founded on the intention to mainstream UNSCR 1325 and gender into all focus areas of Dutch policy on fragile states, NAP-II made this an objective in its own right. More specifically, the aim was to effectively incorporate gender analysis, and measures to protect women from violence and to counter gender inequality, into all components of the signatories’ peace and security policies, as well as raising internal awareness and support for UNSCR 1325’s Women, Peace and Security agenda.

Relevance

The status of the NAP with regard to Dutch peace and security policy is best described as opaque. On paper, the NAP is a framework for cooperation among a wide variety of signatories that all have their own policies on UNSCR 1325 and gender. Within the ministry, however, the NAP-II has gained the status of the actual Dutch policy on implementing UNSCR 1325. The NAP-II focus on women’s leadership is consistently reflected in policy documents across the board, and it is furthermore spelled out in the eligibility and assessment criteria of the two most important peace and security funding facilities, the Stability Fund and the Reconstruction Fund, and is echoed in diplomatic interventions at international level.

As a result of this situation where the NAP is seen as actual government policy with regard to women, peace and security as well as to gender mainstreaming, it is not possible to mainstream gender in other policies. For this reason, the NAP’s objective to mainstream gender in peace and security policies has become obsolete, and therefore is no longer relevant. This is underscored by the finding that when analysed in more detail, it appears that the NAP itself scarcely provides any guidance in relation to gender-sensitising peace and security policies; instead, it mainly adopts an approach that focuses on women, while important gender dimensions of both women-oriented activities and activities focused on men are not considered. What is more, there is no Dutch policy reflecting and framing a broader understanding of gender equality objectives in relation to conflict-sensitivity and peace and security strategies. This has consequences for the relevance of the policies for the final intended target group: the women actually living in fragile and conflict-affected areas. To what extent will a mere orientation towards women foster activities that actually help to transform the gender norms that inhibit those women from participating politically?

Effectiveness

The NAPs have been helpful and effective in raising internal awareness and support for the Women, Peace and Security agenda of UNSCR 1325, and more specifically for the focus on female leadership and the political participation of women in decision-making bodies. Although implementation of the NAP is still considered a somewhat isolated undertaking of the ministry’s gender unit, tangible results can be found in the appointment of UNSCR 1325 focal points in key departments, incorporating attention given to women in both policy and results frameworks, and consistent attention to this focus in Dutch gender diplomacy.
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However, these results have come at the expense of broader strategies on gender, peace and security, which have been replaced by the NAP itself. As a consequence, critical conditions for achieving results in the area of gender mainstreaming are not yet in place: the available individual gender expertise within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is not yet anchored in consistent policy and programme guidance. It also means that any down-to-earth guidance on gender analysis, gender-responsiveness assessment methods and incorporating gender in M&E tools has been scattered and one-dimensional at best.

This has hampered the effective mainstreaming of gender in peace and security strategies in the ministry's most prominent peace and security financing instruments, i.e. the Stability Fund and the Reconstruction Fund. Throughout the evaluation period, UNSCR 1325 and gender equality have become a more prominent part of the eligibility criteria and assessment tools of these funds. In some cases, this has resulted in stronger support for projects focused on women and, in some exceptions, gender. Nevertheless, a review of the projects that received funding from these facilities reveals that project objectives are not always gender-sensitive and also there is a lack of systematic attention to gender in the M&E of these projects.

These conclusions are confirmed by the case studies conducted for this evaluation focusing on Dutch bilateral aid in Afghanistan, Burundi and DRC and Dutch support to the UN Peacebuilding Fund. In each of these cases it was found that ‘gender’ was equated with women. And even then this ‘women only’ approach led to disappointing results for the women involved, as has been shown by cases from Burundi and DRC. What is more, there is only limited information available on the longer-term results of these interventions, such as changes in living conditions or gender relations.

Efficiency

The above-mentioned lack of gender mainstreaming has also influenced the way in which attention to gender is organised within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Attention to gender is not systematically embedded within the organisation, thereby hampering the ministry's use of available gender expertise.

First of all, with so little outlined and detailed, individuals have been setting out to interpret their own roles and responsibilities, resulting in an inconsistent approach to gender mainstreaming throughout the evaluation period. Second, the strong reliance on focal points, without policy guidance on how these focal points are to carry out their role, has not been without problems: rotation in these positions has been frequent, individuals give the task of representing focal points were often trained on the job, and they have not always had sufficient time allocated to fulfil their task. Due to the position of the Gender Unit within the ministry, gender experts were not always best positioned to access peace and security discussions inside the ministry.
9.3 Avenues for future policy and programming for gender, peace and security

The evaluation findings must be understood in relation to the context in which the NAPs were developed. There was strong political interest and pressure to show the Netherlands government’s commitment to achieving progress in implementing UNSCR 1325. However, academic insights into the relationship between women’s empowerment, gender (equality) and peace and security objectives were scarce and provided little guidance on how to make the resolution operational. As a result, the assumptions underlying UNSCR 1325, and accordingly the NAPs, were tested along the way in an innovative, and sometimes challenging, multi-stakeholder context. The preceding paragraphs indicate the implications that this state of affairs has for putting the NAPs into practice and for the overall gender, peace and security policy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Nevertheless, this process of trial and error has also generated important insights that can help identify avenues for the NAP network’s – and the ministry’s – future policy and programming for gender, peace and security.

The Dutch NAPs were developed in the midst of an international debate over the utility of such a plan for countries where there is no real risk of armed conflict. Critics warned about the potential isolation of women’s issues from broader peace and security policy considerations by means of a NAP: ‘The ‘stand-alone’ nature of NAPs (…) may position the NAP as simply a political tool whereby the completion of a NAP is in itself considered to be the end goal, with little consideration of the impact of the plan or its substance’ (Swaine 2013). Nevertheless, given the poor track record worldwide on mainstreaming women’s issues and gender, NAP advocates stressed the value of a NAP as a method to enhance coordination, raise awareness and create accountability (Frieyro de Lara and Robles Carrillo 2012: 74).

The Dutch NAP-II chose the middle road, by promoting targeted actions to improve both women’s political participation and leadership and gender mainstreaming as two of its objectives. In this process the NAP signatories have indeed managed to maintain momentum for the women, peace and security agenda and for gender in general. It has also promoted accountability on the subject – of which this evaluation is an example. Yet it is important to appreciate that ‘action plans are simply that – action plans’ (Swaine 2009: 420), which serve to implement a certain policy.

9.3.1 An operational UNSCR 1325 agenda requires a separate policy

In the Dutch context, such a separate gender-relevant peace and security policy has been missing. Instead of the NAP being an action plan to implement policy, the NAPs have been presented as Dutch government policy for both its UNSCR 1325 commitments and its objective of gender-sensitising a broader peace and security policy, for which the original resolution has served as a basis. The issue is that while UNSCR 1325 sets the agenda, it also has limitations in terms of operational directions for robust and sustainable policy and programming in contexts characterised by conflict, instability and problematic gender norms. It is important that these limitations are acknowledged and a clear strategic Dutch
vision and guidance is developed on addressing the gender dimensions of conflict, instability and violence, as well as the potentially harmful impact of gender-equality strategies on peace and security objectives.

9.3.2 A NAP partnership requires a focus on strategic complementarity and differences

Not only has the Dutch NAP gained the status of policy for the Dutch government, it has also been used – for many reasons discussed in the evaluation – as a tool to implement these policy commitments through civil society partners. As a result, the focus on strategic complementarity of the partnership became obscured by a division between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as a donor, and civil society as implementing organisations. The fact that the partnership has come to resemble a donor–implementer relationship between government and civil society actors may have complicated the more critical monitoring role the latter are expected to play.\textsuperscript{141} It has also reduced incentives for embassies and knowledge institutes to actively engage in the NAP work in the focus countries. The availability of funding for NAP-II has been applauded worldwide,\textsuperscript{142} but it has also accelerated this donor–implementer dynamic at the expense of more strategic collaboration between the different stakeholders.

A lesson to be drawn from this is that for a budget to add value to a multi-stakeholder partnership it must be preceded by an assessment of the strategic agendas, capacities, roles and responsibilities that are represented in the network. Transparency in this regard helps to tailor eligibility criteria to existing agendas, whether complementary or discordant. The Dutch experience has revealed that these agendas do not necessarily overlap and that capacities and roles are not necessarily complementary – despite the fact that all signatories adhere to the same principles of UNSCR 1325. Approaches to the women, peace and security agenda range, for example, from instrumentalism, to activism and protectionism, as was described in the conceptual framework of this evaluation; on the basis of these varying approaches, different or maybe even competing activities can be developed. Capacities and roles can, in turn, differ according to which approach is emphasized. The NAP partnership has too easily sidestepped this reality. As a result, funding criteria were based on stereotyped roles and responsibilities of the different stakeholders involved, without an explicit reference to the approach in question, which led to the definition of these roles and responsibilities. This meant that a framework was created which left out a large group of signatories, such as the embassies or knowledge institutes.

A reassessment of agendas, roles and responsibilities will also help to appreciate areas of agreement as much as those of conflicts. It is important to acknowledge that the NAP signatories are not only complementary in terms of capacity, but also in terms of approaches to the women, peace and security agenda. As we have seen, furthering the common goals of UNSCR 1325 requires a critical debate on the assumptions underlying the resolution, and herein lies the value of diversity present in the network. Too great a focus

\textsuperscript{141} See also Swaine (2009): 417 for a more detailed discussion on this dynamic.
\textsuperscript{142} See for example: EPLO (2013), Pasquinelli and Potter Prentice (2013) or Dharmapuri (2011).
on joint action, especially when linked to accessing a budget, encourages compromises and reduces the space for questioning voices and innovation.

9.3.3 Focus on quality of results instead of quantity of the NAP network
The outcome of such a critical reflection relates to the final observation. A more complex understanding of the interlocked nature of concepts like peace, security, gender and women, and of the various stakeholders’ attitudes towards these concepts, would also require the NAP network to move towards an international engagement focused on shaping the criteria for the UNSCR 1325 agenda to succeed.

Over the past eight years, the NAP network has focused on generating interest in the objectives of UNSCR 1325. Like the resolution itself, the nature of the lobbying and awareness-raising activities has been predominantly agenda-setting, justifying the strategy of network expansion that has been witnessed in recent years. This has proved to be successful in the sense that UNSCR 1325 is on the agenda of policy-makers and politicians alike. In order to translate this momentum into a successful strengthening of the position of women in conflict-affected environments, the NAP network now has to broaden its scope to include a gender perspective and adjust its network strategy to advance the quality of UNSCR 1325 work worldwide. In other words, it is time to move beyond an agenda-setting focus and start to lobby for, and raise awareness of, criteria and targets that help to achieve the objectives of UNSCR 1325.

9.3.4 Budgeting for NAP UNSCR 1325
In comparison to the available resources for the overall peace and security policies, the earmarked funding for the implementation of the NAPs has been small. One problem with small-scale, separate funding is that it may risk gender concerns receiving little attention in mainstream projects and programmes. The evaluation shows that this has indeed happened in the past, including in multilateral programmes to which the Netherlands has contributed (e.g. Afghanistan and Burundi and the UN Peacebuilding Fund). A separate fund created at international level, in addition to already existing funds, would share the same fate. There is a clear need to continue, if not step up, efforts at this level to make sure that these concerns are addressed from the start, rather than being included only at a (too) late stage of programme design and/or implementation. In other words, steps must be taken to avoid NAP funding becoming an excuse for little or no attention being given to gender in broader programmes.
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Annexe 1  About IOB

Objectives
The remit of the Policy and Operations Evaluation Department (IOB) is to increase insight into the implementation and effects of Dutch foreign policy. IOB meets the need for the independent evaluation of policy and operations in all the policy fields of the Homogenous Budget for International Cooperation (HGIS). IOB also advises on the planning and implementation of evaluations that are the responsibility of policy departments of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and embassies of the Kingdom of the Netherlands.

Its evaluations enable the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Minister for Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation to account to parliament for policy and the allocation of resources. In addition, the evaluations aim to derive lessons for the future. To this end, efforts are made to incorporate the findings of evaluations of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ policy cycle. Evaluation reports are used to provide targeted feedback, with a view to improving the formulation and implementation of policy. Insight into the outcomes of implemented policies allows policy-makers to devise measures that are more effective and focused.

Organisation and quality assurance
IOB has a staff of experienced evaluators and its own budget. When carrying out evaluations it calls on assistance from external experts with specialised knowledge of the topic under investigation. To monitor the quality of its evaluations IOB sets up a reference group for each evaluation, which includes not only external experts but also interested parties from within the ministry and other stakeholders. In addition, an Advisory Panel of four independent experts provides feedback and advice on the usefulness and use made of evaluations. The panel’s reports are made publicly available and also address topics requested by the ministry or selected by the panel.

Programming of evaluations
IOB consults with the policy departments to draw up a ministry-wide evaluation programme. This rolling multi-annual programme is adjusted annually and included in the Explanatory Memorandum to the ministry’s budget. IOB bears final responsibility for the programming of evaluations in development cooperation and advises on the programming of foreign policy evaluations. The themes for evaluation are arrived at in response to requests from parliament and from the ministry, or are selected because they are issues of societal concern. IOB actively coordinates its evaluation programming with that of other donors and development organisations.

Approach and methodology
Initially IOB’s activities took the form of separate project evaluations for the Minister for Development Cooperation. Since 1985, evaluations have become more comprehensive, covering sectors, themes and countries. Moreover, since then, IOB’s reports have been submitted to parliament, thus entering the public domain. The review of foreign policy and a reorganisation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1996 resulted in IOB’s remit being
extended to cover the entire foreign policy of the Dutch government. In recent years it has extended its partnerships with similar departments in other countries, for instance through joint evaluations and evaluative activities undertaken under the auspices of the OECD-DAC Network on Development Evaluation.

IOB has continuously expanded its methodological repertoire. More emphasis is now given to robust impact evaluations implemented through an approach in which both quantitative and qualitative methods are applied. IOB also undertakes policy reviews as a type of evaluation. Finally, it conducts systematic reviews of available evaluative and research material relating to priority policy areas.
Annexe 2  Summary Terms of Reference

The evaluation of gender equality within the framework of the overall Dutch policy on peace and security and vis-à-vis fragile states and of the Dutch National Action Plan on UN Security Council resolution 1325 (NAP 1325) is one of the building blocks for IOB’s overall gender equality policy evaluation. Arguments for undertaking this evaluation are the following: (a) gender, conflict and peace, with particular reference to fragile states, have been important themes in Dutch aid policies since 1995; (b) the Dutch approach to its NAP 1325 makes it different from other countries, with the involvement of both government institutions (in particular the ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defence) and civil society organisations; (c) gender equality was not covered by IOB’s evaluation on the Dutch fragile states policy of 2013.

Evaluation Purpose and Questions

The overall objective of the evaluation, which translates into a series of key evaluation questions below, is to find out: (i) what the main features have been of the Dutch NAPs—the way they have come about, and have been run over the years, as well as their relation to the overall Dutch policy on fragile states, peace and security; (ii) the extent to which gender figures in this overall Dutch policy and how it has been made operational in the main instruments used to implement it; and (iii) what is known of the results accomplished by this policy and the NAPs in Afghanistan, Burundi and DRC. The table below provides an overview of the main research questions to be addressed.

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<th>Theme</th>
<th>Key questions</th>
<th>Sub-questions</th>
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<tr>
<td>1. Relevance of the NAPs</td>
<td>What have been the main features of the NAPs for implementing UNSCR 1325? What is the relation of the NAP to overall Dutch policy on fragile states?</td>
<td>Why did the Dutch government initiate the development of the NAP 1325 and what explains the way in which this was done (i.e. together with civil society and knowledge institutions but without a specific budget to finance its implementation)? What are the main characteristics of the two Dutch NAPs 1325 and what are the main differences between the two documents? What explains commonalities and differences? What has been the approach to the implementation of the NAP?</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. The NAPs as a framework for multi-stakeholder cooperation</td>
<td>How have the NAPs been run over the years? What results have been accomplished by this cooperation?</td>
<td>Has cooperation among the Dutch signatories of the NAPs 1325 been realised? What has been the added value of this collaboration? How was implementation of the NAP organised and has this been adequate? What have been the roles of the different stakeholders that have involved in the development of the two NAPs since 2007? What were the costs incurred in implementing the Plan?</td>
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These are based on the usual OECD/DAC evaluation criteria of policy relevance, effectiveness and efficiency that are linked to the specific characteristics of the Plan.
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<th>Theme</th>
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<td>3. NAP implementation and results in the focus countries</td>
<td>What results have been accomplished by NAP-related projects in improving the position of women nationally, internationally and in selected case countries, i.e. Afghanistan, Burundi and DRC?</td>
<td>General What resources were set aside (retroactively) for implementation of the NAP 1325 in the period 2007-12 by the signatories of the NAP 1325 and how were these used? What explains the level of funding made available? What explains accomplishments and which (external) factors have been of influence? To what extent did the NAP achieve its goals? Projects Which activities have shown how the Netherlands implements its NAPs 1325? What were the priority areas of intervention and why were these selected? What was effectively done by the Government of the Netherlands and what was done by the other stakeholders concerned? What have been the results of the activities and who has benefited? What is known of the outcomes of the projects that have been financed: has the situation for women suffering from violence, conflict and war effectively changed? Lobbying and awareness-raising What have been the main diplomatic interventions undertaken by/together with the Netherlands at the level of the UN Security Council on increasing the gender-responsiveness of peace and security policies and operations? What coalitions were formed and for what reasons? What is known of the results of these interventions and how are these assessed by the Netherlands and other like-minded states (such as the Nordics, France, Belgium)?</td>
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4. The NAP as an incentive for gender mainstreaming in the Dutch peace and security policy

What has been the relation of the NAPs to the overall Dutch policy on fragile states, peace and security?
To what extent have UNSCR 1325 and gender figured in policies of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs on fragile states, peace and security?
How has this been made operational in the main instruments used to implement this policy?

At policy level, how does the NAP 1325 relate to other elements of Dutch general foreign policy, including the policies pursued in the field of human rights and fragile states and specific instruments such as the Stabiliteitsfonds as well as the Wederopbouwfonds?
To what extent have gender issues been incorporated into the relevant peace and security programmes of the Netherlands – in particular in the Stabiliteitsfonds and the Wederopbouwfonds and what has been the approach to implementing gender issues?
What resources were set aside to address gender issues?
What projects were financed from these funds and were these projects financed on the basis of a comprehensive conflict and gender analysis?
What role does the NAP 1325 play in connection with other Dutch bilateral aid in Afghanistan, Burundi and DRC and with the interventions of other Dutch signatories?
What has been the Dutch position vis-à-vis gender and the UN Peacebuilding Commission and the UN Peacebuilding Fund (to which the Netherlands contributed some USD 46.5 million from the Stability Fund) and operations financed under this Fund? Using existing evaluation material on operations financed by the Fund: what has been the level of gender-responsiveness of these operations and what is known of their results?
What is known of the results of these projects as far as gender is concerned?

Evaluation approach and methodology

The evaluation will be based on a desk study and interviews. Desk study will concern documentation and reports on the Dutch NAPs, the Stability Fund and the Reconstruction Fund; policy documents and evaluations concerning Dutch policies on peace and security; documentation, evaluation reports and other studies of relevant interventions supported by the Netherlands and Dutch NGOs in Afghanistan, Burundi and DRC, including projects financed under NAP-II; documents on the Dutch interventions at the level of the United Nations (in particular the General Assembly and the Security Council) and on the United Nations Peacebuilding Fund; selected academic and grey literature. Semi-structured interviews will be held to supplement and validate findings from the documentation with, inter alia: civil servants of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; staff members of other signatories to the NAPs; staff of organisations that are/were directly involved in implementation of Dutch (co-) funded actions in these three countries; as well as external experts (e.g. Clingendael, and the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs).
**Organisation and quality control**

Implementation of the evaluation is the responsibility of Paul G. de Nooijer at IOB together with Kirsten Mastwijk. Both will play an active role in the various phases of the evaluation process; an external expert will be contracted to support IOB’s work. Internal quality control and peer review of draft reports will be ensured by IOB. External quality control will be ensured by the reference group established for external quality control of IOB’s overall gender equality policy evaluation. Internal quality control will be ensured by IOB inspectors Marijke Stegeman and Margret Verwijk.
Annexes

Annexe 3  Persons interviewed

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Function</th>
<th>Organisation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Anten, L.</td>
<td>Policy officer/board member PBF</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Besant, R.</td>
<td>Regional Director East &amp; Southern Africa</td>
<td>Search for Common Ground</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delos Santos, A.</td>
<td>Policy officer DMM (former NAP coordinator)</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geuskens, I.</td>
<td>Executive Director</td>
<td>Women Peacemakers Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goudsmit, T.</td>
<td>Secretary Stability Fund</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hilhorst, D.J.M.</td>
<td>Professor</td>
<td>Wageningen University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hoenen, J.</td>
<td>Former NAP coordinator</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kaasjager, S.</td>
<td>Gender focal point DVB</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kant, E.</td>
<td>Gender adviser</td>
<td>ICCO</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kesselaar, S.</td>
<td>NAP coordinator</td>
<td>WO= MEN</td>
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<tr>
<td>Klein, F.</td>
<td>Programme officer</td>
<td>Oxfam Novib</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Klugt van der, F.</td>
<td>Gender focal point DSH/HO</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Krijnen, M.</td>
<td>Head Task Force Gender, Peace and Security (former NAP coordinator)</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laan van der, C.</td>
<td>Head DSH/HO</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meyboom, C</td>
<td>Member</td>
<td>Platform Vrouwen &amp; Duurzame Vrede/ Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moalim, I.</td>
<td>Gender focal point DSH/SR</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>Peters, M.</td>
<td>Policy officer DSH/HO</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>Slettenhaar, R.</td>
<td>Embassy Kinshasa</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strop - Von Meijenfeldt, T.</td>
<td>Head</td>
<td>Platform Vrouwen &amp; Duurzame Vrede</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suralaga, D.</td>
<td>Policy officer</td>
<td>Cordaid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Verbaken, K.</td>
<td>International Cooperation consultant</td>
<td>Consultora</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wormgoor, R.</td>
<td>Strategic policy officer DSH</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zaat, A-M.</td>
<td>Programme officer</td>
<td>Stichting Sundjata</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
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## Legal framework

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Ministry of Foreign Affairs</th>
<th>Ministry of Defence</th>
<th>Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations</th>
<th>NGOs</th>
<th>Women’s organisations</th>
<th>Knowledge institutions</th>
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<tr>
<td>Encourage fragile states to bring national legislation into line with the internationally applicable human rights agreements (such as CEDAW)</td>
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<td>Call to account states to observe international laws and conventions where needed</td>
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<td>Promote the protection of women’s rights where unofficial legal systems prevail</td>
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<tr>
<td>Promote and monitor training in legal procedures for local employees of the legal sector</td>
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<tr>
<td>Encourage training on women’s legal rights within the juridical system for personnel who are involved in multilateral UN operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>Condemn generalized impunity and encourage the punishment of perpetrators of all forms of gender-related violence against women and girls as well as men</td>
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<tr>
<td>Maintain dialogue with local NGOs and women’s networks that are committed to prosecution of human rights violations and, where needed, encourage training and education</td>
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<tr>
<td>Support local organisations that provide support to victims of human rights violations</td>
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<tr>
<td>Monitor the protection of women both as victims and as witnesses and in jails</td>
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<tr>
<td>Provide support to victims, stimulate local female leadership and create the conditions for recovery of social cohesion on the basis of gender equality</td>
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<tr>
<td>Promote access to media to address human rights violations and violence against women</td>
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<tr>
<td>Use international networks to give women a voice to expose human rights violations and articulate their specific needs</td>
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</table>
### Conflict prevention, mediation and reconstruction

Inform the relevant ministries in the Netherlands, through the embassies, general policy dialogue (at country level) and early warning indicators on alarming (gender) developments in various societies abroad.

Annual exchange on stability issues through working group at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Stimulate the exchange of knowledge on prevention issues.

In case of involvement in negotiations, directly or as facilitator, pay attention to a more equal representation of men and women in mediation and decision-making processes and advocate explicit affirmation of women’s role in all aspects of reconstruction.

Consult each other to determine the role of women within the framework of specific mediation efforts and subsequent steps to be taken.

### Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR)

Consider the different interests and needs of men and women in DDR programmes and promote the separate registration of women, the destruction of arms and the involvement of gender expertise.

Promote the introduction of non-military DDR processes, targeting women who did not participate actively in the armed struggle but were involved in the conflict in some other way.

Develop programmes specifically targeted at the reintegration component of DDR.

Support UN organisations to develop programmes specifically targeted at the reintegration component of DDR.

Conduct labour market assessments, identify innovative forms of businesses and promote training and retraining of men and women, guided by the views in the local society as regards reintegration, provided that these are not stigmatising.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Security sector reform (SSR)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aim for integration and training of more women in all security institutions of the states</td>
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<tr>
<td>concerned</td>
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<tr>
<td>Play a facilitating role in the contacts with other ministries and civil society so that</td>
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<tr>
<td>the voice of women is heard in all activities</td>
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<tr>
<td>Make available experience, expertise and knowledge of civil society to people who have to</td>
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<tr>
<td>put gender-related aspects into practice</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reconciliation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Develop projects and activities that support women in conflict areas to play a bigger</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>role in the reconciliation process</td>
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<tr>
<td>Develop activities that enable local women and their social networks to form women’s</td>
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<tr>
<td>groups that are dedicated to reconstruction</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ensure, in the case of (financing) of reconstruction programmes, that gender-specific</td>
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<tr>
<td>needs analysis and likewise gender-specific implementation takes place and access of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>women to these programme is guaranteed</td>
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<tr>
<td>Actively identify and support projects in the area of women, peace and security, in</td>
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<tr>
<td>particular in the regions that are priorities for the Netherlands (western Balkans,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan, Horn of Africa and the Great Lakes area)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Where possible, create budgetary space to employ gender expertise at embassy level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Where possible, appoint staff as focal points for local NGOs that deal with violations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>of human and women’s rights at embassy level</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pay special attention to gender and gender perspective of projects, especially in the</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>above-mentioned priority regions in the use of the Stability Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support efforts that enhance and improve the skills of women for participation in political and administrative decision-making processes, reform of state institutions, peacekeeping and (socio-economic) reconstruction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Make attempts to improve the socio-economic position of women by pressing for equal property rights, land rights and inheritance rights in the countries concerned</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pay attention to education of girls and women in the provision of humanitarian assistance in crisis areas as well as to the protection of their sexual and reproductive rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promote awareness-raising on family planning and sexually transmitted diseases</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**International cooperation**

| Use international, bilateral and multilateral contacts to actively promote implementation of resolution 1325 and on active participation of women in prevention, humanitarian aid, reconciliation and reconstruction, SSR and DDR process and the operationalisation of these in their programmes |
| Improve the information flow on progress in the field of women, peace and security to the Netherlands permanent representatives to multilateral organisations |
| Ask for the European Commission to pay greater attention to the theme of women and armed conflict and further insist on the formulation of a European Action plan 1325 – including indicators |
| Support development of a European Action plan 1325 and closely monitor the recently established 1325 EU partnership |
| Collaborate with countries with a national action plan and like-minded countries to promote the preparation of national action plans in those countries where they are still absent, in particular within the EU |
| Play a supporting role to introduce or improve the gender perspective of the international and multilateral organisations (through e.g. technical assistance, the formulation of resource packages and policy support) |
| Promote international scientific research and exchange in the field of women, peace and security |
| Support the reform of the UN gender architecture |
## Peacekeeping missions

### Mandate

- Advocate for incorporation of resolution 1325 in all relevant resolutions and mandates (and Terms of Reference for missions) of the UN Security Council and peacekeeping and reconstruction assignments.
- Emphasise the role of women in operational guidelines for peacekeeping missions of the UN, EU and NATO.
- Ensure that 1325 is incorporated into operations that are supported or implemented by the Netherlands, through operational instructions, master plans, reports and evaluations.

### Codes of conduct

- Develop codes of conduct for peacekeepers when operating abroad, where this has not yet taken place.
- Staff will strictly adhere to codes of conduct that are given for their peacekeeping missions.
- Address foreign partners in the context of UN or NATO on compliance with the codes of conduct of peacekeeping missions, specifically related to gender-related violence and sexual exploitation.
- Promote the creation of focal points in international military or police missions where peacekeepers as well as local women and men can report sexual intimidation or worse.

### Expertise

- Conduct, where possible context specific, training on the roles and possibilities of women participants of peacekeeping missions.
- Support the position of gender specialists at Dutch military bases.
- In consultation with the Ministry of Defence, send short-term gender experts to (post-) conflict areas for technical support.
- When involved in peacekeeping missions, insist with international institutions that are responsible for assessments and training, on increased attention to the specific role of women in the development process. NGOs will do this also with international NGOs that are dealing with assessment and training.
### Internal relations within the peacekeeping forces

- Promote a greater and, where possible, equal, share of women in decision-taking positions in international organisations that focus on conflict and reconstruction
- Promote efforts to increase the number of women participating in peacekeeping and observatory missions and military roles in the framework of UN, OSCE, EU and NATO
- To meet the set percentages for female military participation, examine whether for their recruitment and involvement in peacekeeping missions special measures can be taken
- Support the civilian peacekeeping missions of international NGOs
- Support this NGO effort where possible, provided there is equal participation of women, also in management positions, and there is a targeted policy to strengthen the position of women in the conflict areas concerned

### Harmonisation and coordination

#### Research

- Examine whether additional resources can be made available for scientific research on the role of women in (post-) conflict situations and for practical case studies in particular, which will improve current insights into the roles and capacities of women in conflict situations
- Develop knowledge and research strategy on the theme of women, conflict and reconstruction
- Increase cooperation with research institutions that conduct research on the theme of women, conflict and reconstruction
- Develop related research programmes where relevant
- Produce an agenda with priority research themes that will contain topics that are relevant from a policy and an academic point of view
Harmonisation

Signatories will incorporate 1325 into their policy and business plans, exchange knowledge and coordinate their efforts as closely as possible. Establish a mechanism to enable the institutions concerned to maintain an ongoing dialogue about implementation of 1325.

Introduce a mechanism/coordination structure to maintain continuous dialogue on the implementation of 1325 and for the implementation and monitoring of resolution 1325 and the National Action Plan. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs will assume responsibility for organisation and coordination.

Ensure that the position of women in post-conflict situations, as well as a general gender perspective, is addressed in policy frameworks, notes, country strategies and any other documents.

Monitoring and evaluation

Examine the possibility of conducting a baseline that determines the financial and human resources for the implementation of 1325.

Pay attention to gender issues in the evaluation of peacekeeping missions and other types of efforts in post-conflict situations and collect separate data on the roles and positions of women and in their reporting.

Continue the development of instruments to determine the impact of conflict, of reconstruction and of projects of their partner organisations, on women and women’s rights, and regularly report on this.

Collaborate internationally to develop monitoring systems to track international progress of the implementation of 1325.

Communication

Ensure open communication on progress on the implementation of 1325.

Work on an international media strategy on women in conflict situations to press for attention to be paid to the role of women.
## Annexe 6  Objectives and results NAP-II 1325

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Specific objectives</th>
<th>Results</th>
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</table>
| **1. Equal participation by women and men in peace and reconstruction processes at all decision-making levels.** | Result 1: Local and national laws and policies to be gender-sensitive, provide extra protection for women if necessary, and enhance equal opportunities for women and men to participate politically and socially. These laws to be implemented.  
Result 2: Local and national mechanisms (e.g. quotas) that demand and secure the presence of women at all decision-making levels, especially in peace and reconstruction processes, to be in place and institutionalised.  
Result 3: Women and men to have the required skills and knowledge to enable them to act effectively as leaders (political or otherwise) and peacebuilders.  
Result 4: National Action Plans 1325 to be developed and implemented in the focus countries and region and in other conflict and post-conflict states. |
| **2. Consistent integration of gender and UNSCR 1325 into all Dutch signatories’ policies and actions on fragile states and countries in transition (DAC countries) and/or peacebuilding and reconstruction efforts in these states.** | Result 1: Gender analyses and measures to protect women from violence and to counter gender inequality; these to be integral components of the peacebuilding, security and defence policies, programmes and activities of all NAP signatories.  
Result 2: Successful internal awareness-raising and advocacy within the NAP signatory organisations to ensure that all their policies, programmes and activities support the implementation of UNSCR 1325. |
| **3. Increased awareness in the Netherlands, the European Union, the United Nations, and other regional and international bodies and their member states of the importance of gender and conflict and of increased public support for UNSCR 1325.** | Result 1: Successful advocacy and awareness-raising activities to take place in the Netherlands to convince a larger segment of the Dutch public, opinion leaders and politicians of the importance of UNSCR 1325 and to inform them about common efforts to implement this NAP.  
Result 2: Successful lobbying, advocacy and awareness-raising within the EU, UN, other regional and international bodies (including NATO) and their member states to promote implementation of UNSCR 1325 at all levels and in all relevant sectors.  
Result 3: Development and implementation of National Action Plans for 1325 by governments other than those of the six focus countries to be actively promoted by the Dutch NAP signatories. |
### Specific objectives

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Specific objectives</th>
<th>Results</th>
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</table>
| 4. Effective and efficient cooperation between NAP signatories and other relevant stakeholders to ensure worldwide implementation of UNSCR 1325. | Result 1: Exchange of knowledge, ideas and strategies between Dutch NAP signatories and other stakeholders, resulting in tangible, realistic plans and constructive collaboration.  
Result 2: NAP signatories to actively seek to initiate and participate in international cooperation between like-minded Western actors (such as governments and international NGOs) and actors in fragile states (such as national governments, national NGOs and local women’s organisations).  
Result 3: Demand-driven and needs-based research on gender, peace and security in fragile states and countries in transition in collaboration with local partners. Research results to be shared with all NAP partners and all other relevant stakeholders, particularly in the focus countries.  
Result 4: Diaspora, migrant, women’s and peace organisations to be actively involved in the implementation of this NAP and provide information on local situations, actors and possible partnerships.  
Result 5: Monitoring and evaluation of the implementation of this NAP (an annual self-evaluation and an external evaluation after four years). |
## Annexe 7  Other NAP-II 1325 projects financed

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project topic</th>
<th>Result areas</th>
<th>Organisations*</th>
<th>Budget in EUR</th>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Objective</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td>1, 2, 3</td>
<td>ICCO, IKV Pax Christi, Voice for Change and five local women’s organisations</td>
<td>1,323,635</td>
<td>09/2012-12/2015</td>
<td>The project aimed to promote women’s participation and female leadership in political decision-making processes as well as in the security sector, with a focus at state level in four selected states. Target groups consist of both current and potential female leaders and local women’s organisations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>ICCO, Kerk in Actie, Voice for Change</td>
<td>43,501</td>
<td>04/2013-08/2013</td>
<td>Funding was provided to allow for the formulation of a programme for the period September 2013 to December 2015 on enhanced effective participation of women in decision-making in Sudan, focusing on Khartoum and its surroundings.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Stichting VOND</td>
<td>47,470</td>
<td>06/2013-12/2013</td>
<td>The project primarily aimed to mobilise and strengthen women’s leadership in lobbying for peace and to increase women’s participation in public and political activities for promoting peace and security in Darfur.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project topic</td>
<td>Result areas</td>
<td>Organisations*</td>
<td>Budget in EUR</td>
<td>Period</td>
<td>Objective</td>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td><strong>MENA</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Women and youth against violence</td>
<td>3, 4</td>
<td>Cordaid, Human Security Collective, Women Peacemaker Programme, IKV Pax Christi</td>
<td>NAP budget: 1,799,442 Additional budget: 87,026</td>
<td>10/2013-09/2016</td>
<td>Project aimed to improve and monitor the security of women in local communities in Iraq, Syria, Libya and the occupied Palestinian Territories through training women’s networks and young leaders and by exchanging experiences with local and international stakeholders on this issue.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amplifying the voices of women in the MENA region</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Oxfam Novib, Hivos, Women Peacemaker’s Programme</td>
<td>1,550,000</td>
<td>10/2013-04/2016</td>
<td>Funding was provided to establish partnerships between Dutch NGOs and Iraqi, Yemeni, Syrian and Palestinian NGOs in order to strengthen the understanding and capacities of stakeholders regarding UNSCR 1325 and to pilot innovative techniques altering attitudes and beliefs to create acceptance of gender equality and women’s rights.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Colombia</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Supporting Colombian women contributing to peace and security</td>
<td>1, 3</td>
<td>Cordaid, ICCO and nine local human rights and/or women’s organisations</td>
<td>NAP budget: 587,076 Additional budget: 44,885</td>
<td>09/2013-02/2016</td>
<td>Two separate projects implemented by Cordaid and ICCO and their local partner organisations in Colombia which focus on achieving equal participation of women and women’s organisations in the Colombian peace negotiations between the government and insurgent groups, and improving the implementation of local and national policies related to women’s human rights.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Non-NAP signatories receiving NAP funds are shown in italics.
### Annexe 8  Main findings of PBF evaluations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>Project Rehabilitating women’s roles in the process of community reconciliation and reconstruction (2007-09). According to the evaluation, there were close to 900 micro-projects developed by women’s associations and 1,667 women received emergency kits that helped them to participate in micro-credit projects. However, these projects had variable results, and helped only a small proportion of the population in need of assistance, without building the capacity of institutions that could have had a greater reach (Campbell et al. (2010): 44, 53, 66, 151-52). Project impact was reduced because of too short a time frame, a lack of focus, and inadequate beneficiary identification. The lack of monitoring made it difficult to judge its overall contribution (Campbell et al. (2010): 153). The contribution of gender-based violence related initiatives was unclear from the data available (Campbell et al. (2010): 45, 150). On the project Youth participation in social cohesion at community level (2007-09), the evaluation indicates that girls participated in reforestation and land protection (41%), infrastructure rehabilitation (42%) and sanitation (53%) but that the selection of participants was not always done carefully, leading to support being given to some who did not meet vulnerability criteria and to some who may not have been young girls. Small numbers of girls and women also benefited from training in plant production (47%), professional training (35%) and micro-credits (33%). The project Support to social reintegration of displaced families living in barracks (2008) helped some 700 families to live independently from the barracks and to reintegrate in their communities. The position of widows, with many refusing to leave because they had no place to go and would not be welcomed into a community, was not adequately dealt with (Campbell et al. (2010: 162). On the other hand, project implementation was characterised by ‘important gender innovations’ (Campbell et al. (2010): 181), with women selected as construction workers to rehabilitate the barracks.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Central African Republic | Overall, the evaluation finds that the programme had contributed to the disarmament of 6,518 ex-combatants, of whom 442 were women (6.8%). At the same time, it does not provide gender-disaggregated details on a range of projects that were financed under the PBF, since project progress reports did not contain such data. For the remainder, the evaluation provides information on the numbers of women and girls reached by the various projects that made up the programme, including:  
  • Support for capacity-building and networking for women leaders in conflict zones in the planning and implementing of initiatives to advocate for the promotion and protection of women’s rights. The project reached 668 women through awareness-raising and 127 elected women leaders through training.  
  • Training of 850 community leaders, staff of the judiciary and prison system, plus 350 officiers de police judiciaire on human rights and the protection of vulnerable groups, women and children.  
  • Training of 432 women on women’s rights and gender issues, in 18 women’s associations in l’Ouham-Pende and le Bamingui-Bangoran. In addition, juridical clinics were opened, leading to increased case loads on gender-based violence in the local courts.  
  • Support for community radio stations that broadcast on issues like the protection of vulnerable groups, especially women, sexual and reproductive health and rights (SRHR) and the fight against HIV/AIDS, demobilisation of ex-combatants, etc. Though the radio stations ‘ont fait leur preuve’ in terms of contribution to peace consolidation and social cohesion, it was too early to observe catalytic effects and their sustainability remains open to question. The project d’appui à la promotion... |
des droits de l’homme et à l’accès aux droits aimed to strengthen the state of law and the fight against violence against women by strengthening civil society. It trained 3,000 people on human rights and especially women’s rights and reached some 9,750 women through radio broadcasts on women’s rights and women’s role in society, and almost to 700 women through awareness-raising on domestic violence, forced marriages, etc.

• Within the framework of the project Autonomisation des femmes affectées par les conflits pour la reconstruction communautaire et la consolidation de la paix members of 64 women’s associations were trained in e.g. the setting up of projects and management of micro-credits. The project entailed also the establishment of a savings and credit institution and the provision of ‘kits de maraichage, saponification, etc.’ and helped women to participate in community reconstruction activities. In the second phase, the focus was on strengthening the technical and managerial capacities of these associations. Activities were affected by mounting insecurity in the project area and it was too early to assess overall project performance owing to implementation delays. The project Accès des communautés rurales aux services financiers de proximité succeeded in establishing financial service providers in parts of the country, with over 5,100 new people getting access (including 3,963 women) in addition to over 2,500 existing borrowers (77% women). However, uptake of credit is slow, given the historical absence of financial services in the project areas. In terms of the results of the project Appui à la redynamisation socioéconomique des femmes et des jeunes affectées par les conflits dans la sous-préfecture de Markounda, the evaluation refers to the organisation of 30 groups of people in conflict-affected communities, including 17 women’s groups, who were provided with kits, plus 19 trained on civic and human rights, SRHR, HIV/AIDS, violence and peace issues. Though some people reported that funds or reserves in kind had been set aside, measuring outcomes is not possible, given the short duration of the project.

• In the area of education and training, evaluation reports refer to the training of 253 young people, of whom 65 girls, in different trades. The project Education à la Citoyenneté et Promotion de la Culture de la Paix pour la Coexistence Pacifique dans les communautés et les écoles managed, among other things, to get almost 17,500 children back to school, of whom 6,900 were girls. The project Formation socioprofessionnelle et réintégration des jeunes grâce à l’emploi entailed the setting-up of a training centre with training organised for over 200 people, of whom 48% were women. The evaluation refers to case studies demonstrating the emergence of small-scale entrepreneurship in some sectors.

Comoros

Results of interventions aimed at the economic integration of the spouses of the former Forces de Gendarmerie d’Anjouan were less good than expected – in terms of both numbers (200 women instead of 500) and the (quality of the) inputs provided. Other projects for youth and women’s employment suffered from limited scope, and lacked gender-segregated data. On a more positive note, the evaluation mentions that three mediation centres were constructed and that some 500 female community leaders (‘médiatrices’) were trained to solve community-level conflicts. By September 2011, these médiatrices had solved over 150 cases of local conflicts and had ‘made an important contribution to peacebuilding throughout the country’ (Larrabure and Ouledi (2011): 14).

DRC

Although the projects that made up the programme were relevant, the evaluation could not identify any project with significant outcomes in terms of contributing to peace: they were facing considerable delays and several were judged to have had no
positive outcome. The results in terms of beneficiaries reached (including femmes associées aux groupes et forces armées) were well below expectation and in the area of gender were judged as ‘weak’ (Vinck (2013): 4, 32, 59).

**Kyrgyzstan** Empowering women to contribute to peacebuilding was one of the elements of the programme. However, little analysis was done to understand women’s multiple roles and the programme saw women as a homogeneous group (Zapach and Ibraeva (2012): 5, 21, 32). Many practical activities had ‘served to reinforce women’s traditional roles’ (e.g. with vocational training focusing on traditional trades in low-paying sectors) and ‘reinforced images of women as mothers, childcare providers, and housekeepers’ (Zapach and Ibraeva (2012): 21). Still, the programme created momentum ‘to address some of the key structural causes of the conflict’, i.e. women’s ‘exclusion from political and economic spheres’ (Zapach and Ibraeva (2012): 5). In this respect reference is made to support for two legal support centres and mobile clinics that provided women with legal advice, and the financing of 20 local women’s peace committees in undertaking training in conflict management, mediation, etc. This has created an inclusive (women, youth, different ethnicities) cohort of people with basic knowledge on conflict prevention, with some good examples of how such knowledge is being utilised to spread good practices’ (Zapach and Ibraeva (2012): 33). Interventions such as the provision of identification documents, and of psychological and social assistance, stabilisation of food security, and enforcement of overall personal security were also ‘in line with practical gender needs’ (Zapach and Ibraeva (2012): 17).

**Nepal** The review (ODC 2011) observes that that the issue of gender has been taken on board in the United Nations Peace Fund for Nepal (NFPFN). Out of the 18 projects approved since 2007, 4 were ‘gender-focused’ and women are specifically referred to in the aims of the programme’s three priority areas of community recovery, conflict prevention and reconciliation (ODC 2011: 28). Particular attention was paid to implementing activities in the area of gender-based violence (GBV): training, counselling, legal and medical support and prosecution of GBV perpetrators. According to O’Gorman (2014), ‘(the) UNPFN in Nepal has done a very credible job in how it has worked with programme teams to undertake gender budgeting and to critically examine their project design and assumptions’ (O’Gorman (2014): 54). More specifically, reference is made to the following results:

- The establishment a Nepalese National Action Plan to implement UNSCR 1325 and the use of UNSCR 1325-related criteria in the project proposal review and selection process (ODC (2011): 45, 64).
- A rehabilitation package for discharged members of the Maoist army was implemented, that included ‘gender specific and basic health services and variety of training and education support for verified minors and late-recruits’ (ODC (2011): 53).

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144 Main causes according to the report included a focus on short-term results that failed to address ‘les causes et facteurs catalytiques des conflits, surtout les problématiques d’exclusion sociale et politiques liées par exemple à l’accès à la terre, à la nationalité, et à l’appartenance ethnique’, weak government structures, lack of M&E, inadequate project design, and a lack of consultation and coordination at all levels between the implementing agencies (Vinck (2013): 4).

145 For more details see ODC (2011): 64, 83.

146 This was done by, for instance, ‘identifying the special needs of female Maoist army personnel during the verification that included reproductive health programmes, provisions for child-care and nutrition support for pregnant and nourishing mothers’ and by using ‘the PBF ‘gender marker scoring’ system to determine the extent to which women and gender are mainstreamed into projects’ (ODC (2011): 45).
- Nearly 11,200 people (98.5% women) were provided with health services and gynaecological support (ODC 2011: 54)
- Women were also reached through the rehabilitation packages for Verified Minors and Late Recruits in terms of vocational skills and health training, support for micro-enterprise development and basic education.\(^\text{147}\)

### Uganda

The programme was not specifically designed to enhance women’s role in peacebuilding and ‘made a weak contribution to peace building in the area of empowering youth and women to act as catalysts in peace building’. For the most part, interventions for women were part of existing or planned programmes of the agencies involved, without adjustments to ensure that this support would contribute to enhancing women’s roles in peacebuilding (Wielders and Amutjojo 2012:14, 20). Still, women are reported to have benefited from various interventions targeting gender-based violence that reached some 3,900 women. Women obtained some peace dividends, even though the provision of such dividends ‘will not, in and of itself, ensure a prevention of social disintegration or conflict, without further, more specific peace building targeted focus in interventions’ (Wielders and Amutjojo 2012: 51) but the sustainability of many of the livelihood interventions was questionable, mainly because of the short time frame of the programme. Over 800 female-headed household benefited from interventions that specifically targeted the reintegration of female former abductees through livelihood recovery interventions (capacity-building in sustainable agriculture, animal management, seed multiplication) and by addressing gender based violence (Wielders and Amutjojo 2012: 5, 13, 20).

\(^{147}\) For details see ODC (2011): 43.
Evaluation and study reports of the Policy and Operations Evaluation Department (IOB) published 2011-2015

Evaluation reports published before 2011 can be found on the IOB website: www.government.nl/foreign-policy-evaluations or www.iob-evaluatie.nl.

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United Nations Security Council resolution 1325, which was unanimously adopted in 2000, was the first resolution to address the disproportionate and unique impact that armed conflict has on women. This evaluation report aims to assess what progress the Netherlands has achieved in putting this resolution into practice. In order to make this assessment, the report examines the two National Action Plans that were agreed in 2007 and 2011, and the activities undertaken by the signatories to these Plans, in particular by the Netherlands’ Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It also addresses the issue of gender-mainstreaming in the area of peace and security. It shows that translating commitment into operations in conflict and fragile states has been challenging.