NATIONAL VISIONS OF EU DEFENCE POLICY
COMMON DENOMINATORS AND MISUNDERSTANDINGS
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FOREWORD

Should Europe have a Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)? One does not have to be a fervent believer in an ever closer Union to realise that a diplomatic toolbox with no instruments to project military power when diplomacy and other soft-power levers fail is incomplete and ineffective.

So much for belief. Practice has proved to be far more complicated. First, for understandable reasons democracies consider decision-making on matters of security and defence to be a core element of their sovereignty. After all, the decision might involve sending their men and women in uniform into harm’s way. Second, some EU members, given their history or geographical position, consider NATO to be the instrument of choice when it comes to military (hard) power projection. The absence of any serious EU-NATO dialogue is a major stumbling block to any division of labour between the two organisations and impacts negatively on the ambition to strengthen CSDP. The political stalemate over Cyprus – an EU member – is a case in point. CSDP would benefit from policy co-ordination with the Alliance and from being able to use NATO assets for its own independent operations.

Apart from the unique strategic cultures of the EU member states, framed as the innovative approach explored in this collection of papers, other elements should be taken into account when analysing the limited success of CSDP. Two of Europe’s leading nations also happen to be permanent members of the UN Security Council. When major crises occur, the UK and France always have the option to turn to UNSCR deliberations and their veto-wielding ‘peers’ the US, Russia and China. Germany, which considers CSDP mainly as an integration tool, for reasons explained in this volume, will not be inclined to take the lead in launching a serious debate among capitals. When the ‘big three’ all have their own arguments to go slow and most of their Central and East European colleagues display a preference for NATO, the going gets tough for CSDP.
Yet, the urgency for the EU to become a more serious actor, able to use all the tools in its political and military arsenal, is gaining momentum.

The US ‘pivot’ to Asia (our American friends prefer the word ‘rebalancing’ because they claim not to pivot away from anybody) is not a temporary affair as some Europeans might wish to believe. We have recently witnessed the US acting as ‘the reluctant hegemon’, as was the case during the NATO operation over Libya where the phrase “the US is leading from behind” was first heard. Although the operation was considered a success the European allies were incapable of acting without substantial support from the United States. In other words: it is an illusion to think that an exclusively Europe-led action outside the NATO framework would have been a serious military option.

But it is Europe’s approach to its southern neighbours that is in turmoil. Just why the recent successful French military operation in Mali did not have an EU stamp is cause for wonder. Fundamental European interests were at stake and the action was certainly not at the highest end of the military spectrum. The argument that Mali is French-speaking cannot be taken seriously. Even if we accept that European capitals have their own strategic culture we cannot be but disappointed at the lack of a cohesive European approach in a geographical area that runs the risk of exporting instability. The EU should not have the ambition to be: ‘le gendarme du monde’ but its political, and ultimately its economic interests, are of a global nature and make it imperative that a credible security strategy be in place to defend those interests – using all available instruments whenever necessary.

The days when, in the eyes of some, NATO should have ‘a right of first refusal’ in considering a military operation are long gone. Long gone too are the days when the US administration was unwilling to accept any form of CSDP for fear of weakening NATO. Under present day circumstances it is even a clear US interest to see Europe mature in matters of security and defence.

EU members do not take themselves seriously in matters of security and defence, however. And even if they should change their minds and succeed in bridging the gap between their national strategic cultures, the almost permanent and un-coordinated cuts in defence budgets across the EU make it virtually impossible to sustain high-end military operations for any considerable period; a malaise that has, unsurprisingly, already affected NATO.
The EU has proven its unique ability to make a difference where it concerns soft power projection - a key element in any diplomatic toolbox. But the 21st century is a complex and sometimes unfriendly one, where diplomacy and soft power instruments will only be credible when a hard power follow-up and a co-ordinated security strategy are at hand.

European leaders often claim that the European Union can make a difference when it comes to peace, justice and stability. By taking new initiatives in the domain of CSDP they can prove that they are taking their own words seriously.

Jaap de Hoop Scheffer

October 2013
INTRODUCTION
MEGAN PRICE AND FEDERICO SANTOPINTO

Heralded as a shining example of progress toward European integration in 2003, the European Security Strategy (ESS) has lost some of its lustre as it reaches its 10th anniversary. Some critics would even say that the strategy is past its shelf-life. Others contend that the strategy was deficient from the start; a paper tiger compromise to satisfy Brussels bureaucrats, lacking the credibility of a purposeful guiding policy. Not all are as derisive, however. Many more even-handed commentators acknowledge the strategy’s notable contribution to cementing the European project. Yet even the more gracious reviews of the ESS are offered in the general context of a parting tribute, if not a eulogy.

This disenchantment has stirred many to call once more for an attempt to articulate a collective EU strategy on defence and security. Recent developments in the European policy arena, not least of which the Treaty of Lisbon and the creation of the External Action Service, certainly facilitate (if not necessitate) a reconsideration of the EU’s tools and the expectations built around them. Conversely, global events, namely crises in Libya, Mali and Syria, press uncomfortable conclusions about Europe’s ability to respond to emergencies in real time.

Thus 2013 has been, in a way, ‘ordained’ as the year to resume a frank debate about the future vision of an EU security strategy, and the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) it is intended to guide. This deliberation is expected to be launched by the European Council in December 2013. To guide this discussion down a productive path, it is perhaps useful to address assumptions that, in prior attempts, may have led to an insufficient strategy. In our view, previous attempts to build a common European strategy were flawed from the outset: a presumption that common interests could be articulated at the Brussels level and resonate in individual state capitals. We suppose that, while well intended, this was an overly sanguine approach that contrived interests collectively,
rather than deriving them from the true driving force of the EU; its member states. This project thus aims to invert the analytical approach usually applied. Rather than starting the enquiry from the vantage point of common European interests to guide CSDP, the research analyses how each member state sees CSDP as a mechanism to serve their individual national interests.

In this book, we assert that any attempt to identify a collective EU security strategy must be premised on an understanding of what member states expect from the CSDP. Motivated by member states’ apparent confusion and existential doubts over Europe’s defence policy, the study narrows its aperture and brings Europe’s capitals into sharper focus.

France, a central pillar of the CSDP, stands as a striking example. In recent years, attitudes in Paris towards European defence policy have appeared complex and, at times, contradictory. Since 2008, France has reintegrated the NATO military commandment, revived the Weimar triangle with Germany and Poland, advocated for the creation of a European HQ, strengthened its UK alliance while giving Germany the cold shoulder, and published a new White Paper asking for more EU integration. This seemingly mercurial posture toward European defence confounds any one-dimensional understanding of France’s relationship to CSDP.

Similar, though perhaps less pronounced, observations could be made when reviewing other member states’ vacillation towards CSDP. France is certainly not the only country to have been ambiguous on the matter. With the possible exception of the UK, it is quite difficult to define what member states expect or desire from the CSDP. What role is European defence policy to play in their respective national strategies? These are the complexities and questions that we pursue in this book. In so doing, we hope to contribute to a productive discussion of what may be more corporeal underpinnings of a common EU strategy.

In order to probe more deeply into these questions, five researchers have been sent to seven research centres, each based in a prominent European capital, for a study period of approximately one month. These research missions were undertaken with the central purpose of exploring the extent to which CSDP could be or is perceived to be a multilateral instrument to serve national interests. The five researchers thus took the opportunity to be immersed in the foreign policy worlds of Paris, London, Berlin, Rome, Warsaw, Stockholm and Madrid, looking at CSDP through national lenses. In order to obtain comparable results, a shared
methodology, based on a common protocol, was developed collaboratively among the researchers before the seven studies were launched. The researchers were then able to lead semi-structured interviews with key military, administrative, foreign policy and academic experts and officials. They also made use of national policy documents, white papers, national security and defence strategies, and other relevant documentation to inform their respective analyses. In this way, the observations and analysis of each researcher drew upon both the ‘official policy’ and the candid political pronouncements of the seven capitals.

The structure of the book provides a virtual tour through Europe, exploring in each visited site attitudes toward international organisations, the desired level of strategic autonomy, and the country’s declared or tacit geographic and thematic priorities. Along the way, the authors describe their observations of the national ‘strategic culture’, or the set of norms, beliefs and ideas among elites and decision-makers regarding the legitimate use of force. The mosaic of opinions, interpretations and perceptions are ultimately assembled in the conclusion chapter, which seeks to outline both the commonalities and the traceable fault lines and tensions stretched across the overall picture.

The work has been expressly carried out in national capitals in order to maintain a strict focus on national perspectives, without the potentially distorting influence of the ‘Brussels-mentality’ or rhetoric. Following this diverted – but perhaps somewhat more realistic – path, the authors are able to offer additional perspectives to lay the groundwork for a robust EU strategic debate. In this way, the study aims to more precisely identify potential common denominators, misunderstandings and areas of deadlock among member states on this issue of CSDP. This insight is relevant to the European vision of peace operations through two main avenues. First, it seeks to provide a more realistic foundation for deriving (rather than contriving) common interests usefully and effectively pursued through the CSDP. Secondly, by exposing gaps between member states’ differing agendas for CSDP, the study can more accurately focus debate on how to bridge or reconcile national interests to better enable the effective use of this EU policy instrument.

One of the more important rifts identified in the survey relates to the unique strategic cultures of member states. From the study, it appears that

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1 Derived from the work of Christoph O. Meyer.
the member states, and in particular France and Germany, have diverging visions of what the essence of the CSDP is or should be. As Manuel Muniz describes in his chapter on France, not only does this strong military actor espouse a more ambitious agenda for CSDP, it also maintains a broader scope of acceptable military intervention beyond the borders of Europe. This perspective is contrastingly juxtaposed with the idea that CSDP is primarily an instrument of European integration, a point of view held by, for example, Germany. Christian Würzer, in his chapter on Germany, draws out how history has been embedded in the country’s culture (and its governing institutions); a steadfast reluctance to deploy military force abroad. Germany therefore underscores the added value of CSDP’s civilian power as part of a more comprehensive approach, and characterises the enterprise primarily in terms of building European partnerships for preventative action.

The conclusion of the study therefore demonstrates the need to clarify what the CSDP is, in its essence, for each member state, before launching a serious debate on a united vision a security strategy at the EU level. If CSDP is a means, what is the end? This is not to imply a false choice, surely several ends may be pursued in coordination. However, this clearly requires a graduated level of strategic thinking, arrived at through what may be difficult strategic choices.

This argument is perhaps most clearly made in the chapter on Spain, wherein Madrid’s commitment to milieu goals obscures the sharper contours of a defined strategy. Other countries present their own dilemmas. In his chapter on Italy, Giovanni Faleg explores how an amalgam of priorities, including strengthening multilateral comprehensive approaches while also relying on external allies to guarantee national defence leads to Rome judiciously balancing its role in both CSDP and NATO. Paris, as another example, is pressed to clarify the relation it wants between the ‘Europe de la defense’ and its ‘souvraineté nationale’. In its own case, Germany has to understand that in the context of the US pivot to Asia, it should be ready to take more responsibility abroad. Such evolutions within a country or its strategic culture do not contradict experience; nor do they require generational periods of glacial-pace change. In her chapter on Poland, Joanna Dobrowolska-Polak depicts how a country’s posture towards integrated European defence can exhibit remarkable shifts in as little as five years. Such dynamics emerge from a complex synthesis of long-running cultural and historical factors, as well as modern, quick-shifting economic or political developments. In his chapter on Sweden, Alessandro Marrone describes how a history of neutrality, more recent
shifts toward non-alignment, and a certain commitment to multilateral and value-driven solutions each measure out their influence on the country’s participation in CSDP.

Each of these national discussions must be grasped at an elite level in capitals, as well as invigorated through public debate in the countries’ media, streets, institutes and universities. In this way, the chapter on the UK looks closely at the current flux of the government position toward CSDP and the temperature of public debate on EU integration. At times, a country may arrive at a crossroads regarding its commitment to the EU security and defence apparatus. Such moments of national reflection, especially when they arrest such a prominent member state as the UK, are bound to weigh heavily on the ambitions and available options for any future European strategy.

Today, the launch of EU missions has dwindled compared to the surge witnessed in the previous decade. Meanwhile, the integration process in Brussels seems to be grinding down to a technical debate on how to save money through the pooling of military capabilities intended to remain under tight national control. These negotiations fail to move forward political and strategic discussion for developing a coherent CSDP policy that both captures the aspirations of and garners robust commitment from the contributing member states. As explored in the concluding chapter, emerging dialogues regarding permanent structured cooperation (PESCO), also outlined in the Treaty of Lisbon, may provide both the platform and the impetus to link technical discussions with political-strategic debate and dialogue. Clearly, these two discussions must not be distinct from one another. Yet, the fact that they so often are may very well be a case of low-hanging fruit. Technical negotiations about the various tools member states can share and collectively deploy may become a distraction from much thornier discussions about what member states think the tools assembled should be working to build. The underlying assertion here is that it appears imperative that consensus on member states’ expectations of CSDP be addressed at the national level before taking them to the European level. Until a more sophisticated discussion can be had among member states as to what ends they envision the CSDP pursuing, continued rambling discussions over collective means will amount to the tail wagging the dog.
FRANCE: THE FRUSTRATED LEADER

MANUEL MUNIZ

Abstract

In recent years France has seen CSDP fall well below the expectations it originally had for it. The European Union’s inability to agree on a new and updated security strategy (or White Paper on Defence); the unimpressive track record in terms of Battlegroup deployment and capability development through pooling and sharing, and the fact that CSDP military action receives minimal common funding are among the grievances the French have expressed publicly and repeatedly. What has been particularly frustrating for France has been the EU’s inability to act in circumstances where it thought common European interests were at stake. Examples are the crises in Libya in 2011 and in Mali in early 2013.

Having failed to tailor CSDP to French standards, and in view of its inability to execute missions at the higher end of the enforcement spectrum, France has explored different avenues in the pursuit of its interests. The return to NATO’s integrated military command, despite being an attempt to create more political space for CSDP to develop, has allowed further doubts about the future of European defence to emerge. The recent Lancaster House bilateral agreements with the UK are another example of France’s willingness to retain the ability to act outside of the CSDP framework if needed. Only a renewed effort to reform EU defence to make it more agile and better equipped to take on difficult missions in Africa and elsewhere could return it to the centre of French defence policy.

Overview

France has been the strongest proponent of a robust European defence policy since the end of the Cold War, as demonstrated by its continued support for the development of Europe’s defence institutions and through active participation in the EU’s defence initiatives. France was fundamental to the emergence of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)
in the 1990s, and the largest contributor to its missions, with over 5,500 personnel deployed between 1999 and 2009. It would be fair to say that France has been behind all the major developments in EU defence over the past few decades. A Europe of Defence is, simply put, unthinkable without French participation.

France’s central role in EU defence policy makes its loss of faith in it all the more worrying. Despite calls in France’s national security documents for stronger EU defence, the general feeling in foreign policy and defence circles is one of disappointment, and, in many cases, frustration with European allies. Time and again, be it Chad, Libya or recently Mali, France has struggled to get the EU to act decisively. It is because of these failures to act, together with a generalised collapse in defence capacities across Europe, that France has lost much of its faith in the Europe of Defence. Frustration seems to be high regarding German attitudes to defence in general and to the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) in particular. Germany’s inability to act or even to shoulder part of the costs of military action is a common topic of conversation in Paris.

Parallel to this slow erosion of French hopes for EU defence, the country has moved in directions if not opposed to then at least divergent from CSDP. France’s rapprochement to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is a relevant case in point. Although it is disputed in Paris that France had ever been distant from the Atlantic Alliance, or that rejoining NATO hurt CSDP, it should be recognised that being in its integrated military command has some symbolic value at the very least. Furthermore, it was perceived by some of France’s allies as an acceptance of the possibility that NATO will retain, sine die, its preponderance over defence matters in Europe. The Lancaster House Agreements with the UK is another example of French pragmatism and a source of confusion for its EU partners. This capacity to unabashedly pursue routes outside of the EU framework has enabled France to defend its national interests in diverse ways but also led many of its allies to question its commitment to European defence.

Perceptions aside, what seems to be the emerging trend in France is one of deep frustration with the European defence project. Not a single

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goal among those set for CSDP in France’s 2008 White Paper has been reached, leading to a sensation of collective failure. The 2013 White Paper defined the possibility of France relying on an integrated European defence to tackle its security challenges as an “illusory option”. If one could sum up the attitudes in Paris today regarding European defence it would be the following excerpt from a report to President Hollande in 2012 by the former French Prime Minister, Hubert Védrine:

“Unless there is a strong reawakening of political determination to make Europe a global power, to prevent it from becoming powerless, and dependent, all of the arrangements for the Europe of Defence will be nothing more than incomplete or lifeless words on paper”.

**Institutional structure and strategic thought**

French strategic planning is quite straightforward compared to that of other EU countries. In recent decades France has produced a small number of “White Papers on Defence” that reflect the country’s basic threat perception and key defence policy directives. Following the model of the 1972 and 1994 Papers, France undertook to produce a new one in 2008. That document was, together with the National Strategy for Oceans and the White Paper on French Foreign Policy, the most significant text on strategy in France until 2013. In mid-2013 the Hollande government released a new White Paper, which supersedes the 2008 one.

The process of reviewing the 2008 White Paper was put in motion by Hollande’s administration in 2012. Alleging significant changes in the strategic landscape, the administration started work on the matter by producing a preparatory document titled “Document Préparatoire à l’Actualisation du Livre Blanc sur la Défense et la Sécurité Nationale”, which is

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publicly available in both French and English. The 2013 White Paper on Defence was finally released in late April of 2013. Another document of reference when it comes to assessing French strategic planning is the Military Programme Law (Loi de programmation militaire), which regulates both force and defence budget planning and it is intended to cover the period 2009-14. After that, a new Military Programme Law will kick in to cover the period 2014-19.

Finally, it should be noted here that when it comes to strategic planning, it is the president of the Republic that retains full control of the process. Article 15 of the French Constitution establishes that the president is the head of the armed forces and as such he “chairs the national defence councils and higher committees”. It is within the Defence Council that decisions are made regarding the country’s defence policy. During the writing of the 2008 and 2013 White Papers, Presidents Sarkozy and Hollande established an open process with intense involvement of not only representatives from the military and the Foreign Affairs Ministry, but also the legislative and civil society. That openness led to wide participation in both instances, but it is still the case that defence policy in France is very much in the hands of the head of state.

Presidential control of the planning process is accompanied by a significant discretionary power when it comes to deciding on the use of force. Article 35 of the French Constitution establishes that declarations of war shall be authorised by parliament, but the president is allowed to initiate military action at his or her own volition, only having to inform parliament three days after the fact. Parliament in turn can only vote regarding these operations if their duration extends beyond four months, giving ample time for the president to decide upon and carry out significant military action before parliament is involved. This authority means that the French president is one of the leaders at EU Council meetings with the greatest freedom for manoeuvre when deciding on CSDP issues, including the launching of missions.

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6 Constitution of the Fifth Republic, Article 15.
France’s strategic interests and strategic culture

As indicated before, France has a long-established tradition of producing White Papers on Defence. It is in these documents that one can find the formal, or doctrinal, strategic outlook of the country. Given the focus of this study it is perhaps the 2008 Paper, the Preparatory Document for the 2013 paper, and the 2013 White Paper itself that are of most interest. Looking further back would take us to 1994, when the EU played a minimal external role and there were no CSDP missions to speak of.

The 2008 White Paper did not list France’s strategic interests. What it did do was describe the strategic landscape inhabited by France, including the major threats to the country’s security. The key development addressed by the paper was globalisation and its impact on issues of security. As indicated by President Sarkozy in the foreword of the document, “the traditional distinction between domestic security and foreign security has blurred” leading the security strategy to “treat defence policy, domestic policy, foreign policy and economic policy as part of a whole” and to provide responses to “all risks and threats that could prove detrimental to the life of the nation”. It is clear from the 2008 White Paper that France felt the world had become more interdependent, unstable, unpredictable and complex.

An analysis of the paper points to various sources of concern for France at the time. These sources are perhaps best understood if divided into the following four categories:

1. Strategic uncertainty associated with globalisation
2. A progressive shift in the strategic centre of gravity towards Asia
3. The existence of four critical areas for the security of France: the “arc of crisis” from the Atlantic to the Indian Ocean, sub-Saharan Africa, the Near East, and Asia
4. The developments of new vulnerabilities for the European territory (mostly terrorism).

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8 Ibid., p. 10.
9 Ibid., p. 59.
Each of the four points above is developed in the 2008 White Paper in more or less detail. Figure 1 shows the four trends and the threats associated with each in as schematic a form as possible.

The 2008 White Paper also lists the five strategic functions that security and defence forces must fulfil: knowledge and anticipation, prevention, deterrence, protection and intervention. Of these five broad tasks, it is perhaps intervention that is of greatest interest to us as it is precisely when thinking about intervention that France might consider CSDP structures. France recognised that intervention would take place primarily under a multilateral framework, mainly the UN, EU or NATO. Unilateral intervention would only be considered when it is required for the “protection of our [French] citizens, the application of bilateral defence agreements with certain States, and, finally, possible national response to one-off actions against our interests”.10

10 Ibid., p. 67.
Figure 1. The French White Paper on Defence 2008 - trends and threats

**Strategic Uncertainty**
- Rising Complexity of Crisis Management
- Rejection of Uniformity by Third Countries
- Growing Role of non-State Actors
- Inequality Generated by Globalisation
- Growing Demand for Energy
- Growing Demand for Natural and Strategic Resources
- Environmental Risks, including Global Warming
- Proliferation of Weapons, including WMDs
- Changing Forms of Violence, particularly terrorism
- Privatisation of Armed Violence
- Rise in Global Military Spending
- Fragile States

**Shift of Strategic Centre to Asia**
- Relative Decline of Western Powers
- Fragility of the System of Collective Security

**Critical Areas for France**
- “Crisis Arc” from Atlantic to Indian Ocean
- Sub-Saharan Africa
- Near East
- Asia

**New Vulnerabilities for Europe**
- North Africa
- The Sahel
- The Horn of Africa
- The Near East
- The Arab Persian Gulf
- Afghanistan and Pakistan
- Terrorism
- Missile Threats
- Cyber Attacks
- Espionage and Strategies of Influence
- Criminal Trafficking
- Natural and Health Risks
- Technological Risks
- Exposure of Citizens Abroad
The 2008 paper has served as the key strategic document in France for the past five years. The 2012-13 revision left in place almost all of the premises and conclusions of the 2008 document; the risks posed by globalisation, the need to remain engaged in Asia and the threat posed by new forms of war on the European continent are all there. What the 2013 paper, and its preparatory document pointed out is that there have been four major developments that require a rethink of France’s strategic priorities. The first is the so-called Arab Spring, which has changed the face of the southern Mediterranean and forced France to reconsider its presence in the region. The second is the global economic and financial crisis, which the preparatory document referred to as the “Great Recession” and which has “highlighted the increase in the economic and geostrategic weight of major emerging countries”. The 2013 White Paper was more explicit about this and pointed to the rise of China as a specific development that should affect France’s strategic planning. The third development is “the end of an American strategic sequence”, which refers to the drawing down of military campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan and, in general terms, to the slow closure of the ‘War on Terror’. France also senses that the US pivot to Asia has only just begun and is already having an impact on the geographic location of military taskforces. The preparatory document pointed out that “[m]ilitary taskforces that are deployed in Europe-Atlantic and Asia-Pacific are almost on par, and the naval resources are a little higher in the Pacific”. The fourth and final element of change has been the evolution of the jihadist terrorist threat. Indeed, France believes that al-Qaida ‘Central’ has fallen in relevance, and that a decentralisation of power to other regional organisations, such as al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) or Boko Haram in Nigeria, has taken place.

The French strategic posture has, therefore, changed little since 2008. It is fair to say that the main source of concern for France remains what it termed the “arc of crisis”, meaning essentially North Africa, the Sahel, the Horn of Africa, and the Persian Gulf. It is in this area that it sees its key interests at stake in both economic and political terms. Although France is

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one of the few European countries to have a truly global strategy that
speaks of every continent and even calls for a constant engagement in Asia,
it remains the case that Africa is the most important region for the country
when speaking of security. What is new in the 2013 White Paper is an
emphasis on the growing challenges for Europe and the need to be ready to
tackle them. Indeed, the four developments that led to the redrafting of the
White Paper are also issues that, in the eyes of France, call for greater
military strength and collaboration.\footnote{Livre Blanc de Défense et la Sécurité Nationale 2013, Direction de
l’information légale et administrative, Paris, p. 22.}

It is worth pointing out here that beyond taking a broader and more
ambitious strategic stance than other European nations, France also has a
more expansive interpretation of when military action is acceptable. If one
defines strategic culture as the compilation of beliefs and ideas a country
has regarding the legitimate use of force, then France’s is definitely
different from that of other European countries, like Germany, Sweden or
Austria. It is indeed evident to any analyst studying France that the country
is much more willing to use force than many of its CSDP partners.
Following Christoph Meyer’s breakdown of strategic culture, France would
score highly on the scale of “activism in the use of force” with the
acceptance of a broad role for the armed forces, the practice of giving
deployed forces an ample mandate, a willingness to act unilaterally, and a
low domestic threshold to approve the use of force.\footnote{C. Meyer (2006), The Quest for a European Strategic Culture: Changing Norms on
Security and Defence in the European Union, Palgrave Macmillan.}

Unsurprisingly, France wants the EU to act in ways not too dissimilar
from how it would itself behave. In an interview at the Quai D’Orsay, a
high-ranking French diplomat said quite clearly, “We are not in the
business of setting up a crisis management tool. We want a strong and
capable CSDP”.\footnote{Interview, French Foreign Ministry, 25 June 2012.} It is doubtful, however, that such an attitude will be
shared by many of his European colleagues. This gap in attitudes between
France and its European allies is exacerbated by the fact that France retains
one of the few strong militaries in Europe, meaning that it not only has the
willingness but also the capacity to act militarily abroad. As we will see,
this has set the country on a collision course with weary and weaker allies
that prefer to invest resources in matters other than defence, and that
would like to limit the scope of common military action.
French attitudes towards European defence and participation in CSDP

Past French formal strategic documents are very clear about the country’s sustained support for European integration. The 2008 White Paper said quite explicitly, “France wants to be in the front rank of this drive for progressive political unification... (and) will work for a more unified, stronger European Union, with a greater presence in the fields of security and defence”.\(^{17}\) What is extraordinary, however, is the level of detail into which that document went when it came to defining France’s desires for EU defence. Here is a list of those objectives:\(^{18}\)

1. Building an intervention capacity of 60,000 men capable of being deployed in a distant theatre, with the necessary air and naval components, for a year.

2. Having the capacity to conduct two or three peacekeeping or peacemaking operations simultaneously, for a significant duration, together with several more minor civil operations, in different theatres. This would require:
   a. Making good the currently most obvious shortcomings in Europe’s capacity to intervene in distant theatres, mainly by:
      i. Pooling and sharing key capacities like strategic and tactical transport aircraft, in-flight refuelling, air mobility capabilities, and aero-naval capabilities. Pooling of support activities, in particular for jointly built weapons systems.
      ii. Creating more robust means for the civil management of crisis, particularly regarding the capacity to provide post-conflict support.
      iii. Taking into account the growing role of reserves.
   b. Boosting capabilities for analysis and anticipation.
   c. Enhancing the capacity to plan and conduct European operations, mainly by establishing a permanent and autonomous strategic planning capability.

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\(^{18}\) Ibid., pp. 82-85.
3. Overhauling the funding of military operations, effectively ending with the ‘costs lie where they fall’ principle, and creating a significant budget for the Common Foreign and Security Policy.

4. Improving the training of EU officers and personnel through joint training programmes

5. Consolidating Europe’s defence industry, and furthering the work of the European Defence Agency (EDA).

Other specific proposals and policies France called for in 2008 were the enhancement of European cooperation against terrorism and organised crime, the development of European civil protection mechanisms, the creation of a European cyber defence capacity, further cooperation in the management of frontiers, and securing Europe’s strategic supplies. Lastly, France proposed in 2008 (and again in 2013) the drafting of a European White Paper on Defence and Security as a natural evolution of the 2003 European Security Strategy.

By 2012-13, what had come of all of the initiatives called for above? When President Hollande called for the drafting of a new White Paper, which formal French objectives for European defence had been achieved? The European intervention capacity called for by France (identical to the Helsinki Headline Goal) remained only an aspiration for the EU. The much more modest Battlegroups had been deployed not once, mostly for political reasons, and there were (and still are) serious doubts about the deployability of some of them, even if the political will was there. Pooling of military capabilities in Europe was in its infancy and France had opted for bilateral cooperation with the UK at Lancaster House when the time came to arrive at wide-ranging agreements. Permanent structured cooperation (PESCO), another area where France had high hopes in 2008, had yet to be tried for the first time. The funding for military operations remained very much unchanged, with the Athena mechanism covering around 10% of military missions (if at all) and the rest still being covered by those providing the troops, equipment and other mission fundamentals. This of course meant that there was a very perverse incentive structure in place where countries that assume the political and human risk of putting troops on the ground have to face most of the financial cost of the mission. Finally, Europe’s defence industry was faced with an important opportunity in 2012 when the executive boards of EADS and BAE Systems agreed to move forward with a merger that would have led to the creation of the world’s largest aeronautics and defence conglomerate. The deal
collapsed in the face of resistance from EADS’ public shareholders and the challenge of moving towards a fully private defence industry.

So on paper, it looked as if the Europe of Defence had not lived up to France’s expectations. The reality on the ground was not much more promising. EU missions, particularly those of a military character, had remained modest in scale and scope. Although most fulfilled their mandate, serious doubts remained about their appeal or their adequacy to deal with more significant issues such as avoiding mass violations of human rights in Libya or keeping Islamic terrorists from taking over Mali. Let us not forget that the 2003 European Security Strategy (ESS) was full of references to how the EU would fight terrorism and promote the respect of human rights internationally. Despite such calls, when push came to shove the Union failed to react.

Furthermore, in the cases where the EU acted, the lessons drawn by France had not always been positive. EUFOR TChad is one such case, and one that has not received sufficient attention from the literature on CSDP. The EU’s mission in Chad was a true learning experience for the French defence and foreign policy establishment. The force generation process was a painful experience from all points of view, ultimately forcing France to assume a greater responsibility than it ever wanted. Indeed up to five force generation conferences were required, which not only delayed the launch of the operation but also exposed the lack of will on the part of other European powers to assume part of the burden of the mission. French General Jean Philippe Ganascia, later the Force Commander of EUFOR TChad, attended the third force generation conference and described it in the following terms: “I was very impressed. General Nash [the Operation Commander] chaired the session and asked all of the representatives what each country would contribute. They kept silent one after the other.”

One needs to remember that France went into these conferences as one of the greatest contributors to the mission. Indeed, France had already offered the operation headquarters (OHQ) in Mont-Valérien, a French Force Commander, a full battalion, logistical support, as well as significant air reconnaissance and air support from Épervier, a French mission already deployed in Chad. After the failure of the first four force generation conferences, Sarkozy was faced with the dilemma of contributing even more or seeing the mission abandoned. France ended up supplying about

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56% of the force and an almost identical amount of the economic resources required, which was “not at all the original intention”. On top of that, of the 4,600 troops requested by the military, member states agreed to provide only 3,700, forcing General Bentégeat, Chairman of the European Union’s Military Committee (EUMC) at the time, to push ahead, risking the effectiveness of the operation, or put the whole endeavour in jeopardy.

Once the mission was launched it quickly became evident to French policymakers that they had lost almost all influence over its scope and mandate. General Bentégeat, who before serving as Chairman of the EUMC had led the French Armed Forces as Chief of the Defence Staff, said in an interview that French “hyper-loyalty” to the EU chain of command and to the “EU mandate” was something probably unique to French forces. “No British Officer would ever do that”, he added. This hyper-loyalty was a source of concern as it meant that French officers would completely sever ties with their former French superiors, reducing the influence of France over developments on the ground. In the case of EUFOR TChad, it looks as if this hyper-loyalty was compounded by the rigour with which the Force Commander on the ground, French General Jean Philippe Ganascia, interpreted his mandate. In an interview in Paris, General Ganascia referred to this in the following terms: “I did not have a French flag on my shoulder...The lesson for France from Chad was that having the head of the mission does not provide you with the political lead of the operation.”

The truth of the matter is that the mission behaved in a truly ‘European’ fashion, responding to the wishes of all the member states involved. So much so that officers at the French mission Épervier, confessed treating French soldiers in EUFOR TChad “as we would foreign officers”. This was alluded to by General Ganascia, who pointed out that, “[w]henever I wanted a plane from Épervier I had to request it from the French Commander there. They were not my planes”.

Not surprisingly, EUFOR TChad was a disappointment for President Déby of Chad, who had been quite keen on having an EU mission

20 Ibid.
21 Interview with General Henri Bentégeat, Paris, 3 July 2012.
22 Ibid.
24 Interview with high-ranking officer at Épervier.
deployed in the country, particularly if it was headed by a Frenchman. In the early days of the mission, when only some of the contingent had been deployed, N’Djamena was attacked by rebel forces. The Force Commander of EUFOR TChad had to decide whether to intervene or to allow events to play out without EU intervention. He opted for the latter. As he explained: “I had to be strict, we were not to be concerned by the rebels except if they attacked the refugee camps in the Eastern part of the country…That was the start of the gap that emerged between myself and some of my French officers…I still believe that if I had taken a different decision then maybe the full force would have never been deployed…I am sure some countries would have not sent their troops if they had learnt that our mission was supporting the Déby government…”.26 Shortly afterwards Déby said publicly that the EU mission was “useless”.

Despite the above, France seemed overall quite satisfied with the arrangement in the specific case of EUFOR TChad, in no minor part because it had a separate and autonomous mission in the country that could attend to direct French interests. It was evident to the defence establishment, however, that if it wanted to pursue national interests in any meaningful way it would need to go about things outside of the EU framework. The EU was not serious about defence matters, and if it was pushed to act it would do so under a tight and inflexible mandate. Furthermore, having troops deployed under an EU flag not only provides a better image vis-à-vis third parties, but also leads to an almost complete loss of influence over the mission for individual member states. If you add to this the financing arrangements typical of EU military missions, the prospect of being a key stakeholder in one loses a great deal of its appeal.

Unsurprisingly, the 2013 White Paper on Defence is much less optimistic about the future of European defence. Almost from the beginning it contains a long list of the shortfalls of CSDP including differences in objectives for the common defence, different strategic cultures, and different interests.27 It then adds:

“These differences might by a source of valuable diversity, as each member state contributes its experience to the common project. But

26 Ibid.

these can also be a source of distrust, and can render illusory any idea of rapid integration.”

The inability of Europe to integrate is explicitly addressed in the 2013 document in the following way: “Europe does not yet seem willing to assume a greater responsibility in securing the European continent and the world, despite the encouragement of the US. On the contrary, many European states fall below the bar of a defence spending of 1% of GDP”. France is clearly sceptical about the capacity of Europe to integrate and to make defence matters a priority.

The only truly new initiative regarding European defence in the 2013 White Paper is perhaps the launch of a deep strategic discussion within the Union about the future of CSDP. Although one might be tempted to equate this to the (unsuccessful) call in 2008 for a European White Paper on Defence, it seems that this time round the French are concerned not so much with starting a discussion that would “evolve naturally from the 2003 European Security Strategy”, but rather with a prior conversation about what the Union really wants CSDP to be. This ‘preliminary’ debate should lead, quite simply, to a “clearer definition of the Union’s strategic interests and objectives”. France seems to be convinced that differences in attitudes and desires for CSDP are so broad that they need to be discussed rather than tiptoed over. Another indication of this understanding comes only a few pages later when the White Paper states France’s predisposition for a discussion about the importance of the various EU geographic “visions” or perceptions. It addresses there the all-important matter of needing to strike an east-south balance between countries that consider the eastern EU border as the key to the Union’s security and those, like France, that want to have a sustained Mediterranean (and, more broadly, African) engagement. Whether that debate will be initiated is of course hard to tell, but with CSDP being highly dependent on political capital and with the

28 Ibid.
29 Ibid., p. 31.
32 Ibid. p. 54.
financial crisis absorbing all of this at present, it is doubtful it will get off the ground any time soon.

Naturally, therefore, the 2013 paper contains only vague calls for further integration but numerous references to the need for France to retain its ‘sovereignty’, which in the context of the paper means its capacity to act autonomously in defence matters or, as the text itself says, “for France to decide its future”. This desire to retain the ability to go it alone is perhaps best seen in the Chapter 5 of the 2013 White Paper titled “On France’s Engagement in the Atlantic Alliance and the European Union”. Right on its first page it is stated that France should discard three paths of action as purely fanciful: a purely unilateral defence policy, delegating all security responsibilities to the US and NATO, and waiting for a united European defence to emerge. These ideas seem to be very much in line with the opinion expressed by policymakers in France about the need for the country to remain realistic and, despite its desires for further European integration, to remain ready for unilateral action.

France’s current defence policy and European implications

Today France finds itself at a crossroads. It has seen most of its initiatives regarding CSDP flounder and has drawn major lessons (and not all positive) from European military action around the world. The experience in Africa has been particularly painful, as detailed above. This is all the more relevant when one takes into account that Africa is precisely the region where France believes it should act more forcefully.

Frustration is particularly high when it comes to Germany and its attitude towards CSDP. This not only has to do with the country’s long-running support of NATO but, above all, with its reluctance to act in Africa. As General Bentégeat explained, “Germany has always been the strongest opponent to any EU action in Africa. The reason is very simple: when it comes to intervention in Africa, Germany is very suspicious of what they see as French, British, Portuguese or Belgian post-colonial interests”. This is not a minor problem, as France tends to find itself alone precisely in the region of the world where it would most value the support of its allies.

33 Ibid. p. 61.
34 Interview with General Henri Bentégeat, Paris, 3 July 2012.
The experience in Mali in 2013 seems to demonstrate this. Europeans were once again asked to act in Africa, a region they themselves had described as being of importance. This fact was confirmed by Alvaro de Vasconcelos in a recent interview in Paris when he said, “[t]he European Union is a regional actor and that region includes Africa”. Missions beyond Africa, like the one in Aceh (Indonesia), were described by the former Director of the EU Institute for Strategic Studies as “a diplomatic coup on the part of Solana” as they took the Union well beyond its natural area of operations. The objective of a mission in Mali, on the other hand, was clear: stop the advance of Islamic jihadists and prevent the country from becoming a safe haven for terrorists. That was a clear objective that fell within the broader concept of the fight against terrorism. One only needs to go to page three of the European Security Strategy (ESS) to find terrorism defined as a key threat to European security; it is actually the very first “key threat” identified by the ESS.

However, when the Malian president called for help to contain the advance of the rebels, all the EU was willing to put on the table was a mission to train the Malian security forces that would take time to deploy, and that would only be effective (if at all) in the improbable scenario that the Malian government survived the offensive underway. It was finally France that decided to act rapidly and to go it alone, with modest help from others. The current defence minister of France expressed his views on the mission in the following terms:

“The President of Mali requested our help on the 10th of January [2013]. The decision to intervene was taken on the 11th at 12:30; I was there. Our forces began to arrive at 17:00 that day. What would you have done? Consult the 27 [member states]? All of that is blah blah blah from the opposition. 150 years will have to pass before the Europe of Defence has the capacity to act swiftly. Europe would need a united government, a European parliament and a common military authority. I do not know if we will ever see that” (author’s emphasis).

This lack of faith in a strong European defence policy is now commonplace among the French defence establishment. For an area of

35 Interview with Alvaro de Vasconcelos, Paris, 7 June 2012.
36 Ibid.
37 Interview with Jean-Yves Le Drian for La Voix du Nord, 7 February 2013.
policy where member states are of fundamental importance and where political capital is paramount, this is a bad omen.

It is also important to reference here France’s return to NATO’s integrated military command and its impact on transatlantic relations and European defence. The move clearly achieved its stated objective of reducing tensions across the Atlantic and easing the way for a further development of CSDP. Joseph Nye referred to this in an interview in the following terms:

“In the 1990s, there was a certain degree of suspicion in the US about European defence. The US was, if not negative, at least sceptical about EU missions... My impression is that this has changed considerably. The Americans now want the Europeans to do more, there is no longer the worry of France undercutting NATO. Sarkozy’s return to the integrated structure made a big difference there”.

Nonetheless, this very move also had an impact on France’s allies and on perceptions of CSDP. General Bentégeat expressed quite clearly that “[i]t is true that France’s approach has been more NATO-minded since its return to the Alliance’s integrated structure and that has a negative impact on CSDP”. The 2013 White Paper reflected this trend in that it dealt with NATO much more extensively than its 2008 predecessor. But of course other member states display the same confusing attitude towards NATO and CSDP. Indeed, striking a balance between NATO and CSDP seems to be a hard task for almost all members of both institutions. Most seem to prefer NATO as the framework to undertake hard military operations, such as the one in Libya in the summer of 2011. As Zaki Laidi put it: “When it comes to combat operations those EU member states that are willing to go forward with the use of force will probably prefer to do it under NATO.”

Some in the literature have even pointed out that after the inability to act together in Libya and the overall weakening of CSDP, EU partners should opt for a strong component within NATO.

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38 Interview with Joseph Nye, Cambridge, MA, 18 June 2012.
39 Ibid.
40 Interview with Zaki Laidi, Paris, 2 July 2012.
To put it bluntly, it is unclear today how NATO and CSDP are meant to interact and co-exist. One must interpret France’s rapprochement with NATO in the context of ambiguity and doubt about defence responsibilities in Europe. And in such a setting any action on the part of France that implies a reconsideration of the balance between NATO and CSDP in favour of the former is bound to weaken the ‘Europe of Defence’. Indeed, France’s capacity to lead on that front is diminished by what some allies perceive as its willingness to concede to NATO’s preponderance over European defence matters, as indicated by a Spanish naval officer with abundant experience in EU defence:

“Until 2008, the most pro-European were the French. Suddenly from that date onwards we seem to have lost the captain of European defence. No one seems to be pushing it forward but there are many trying to impede its progress”.42

Finally, one should mention the significant and widespread cuts that are affecting defence establishments across Europe. Other chapters in this book have touched upon this matter extensively but it is important to point out that France sees itself, and perhaps the UK, as the only European country still capable of deploying force and using it effectively beyond its borders. Cuts in some countries are so severe that they no longer represent simply a threat to specific capabilities but rather to the capacity of those countries to perform basic defence functions, let alone the ability to sustain expeditionary operations of the kind 21st century security threats will require. Some member states, such as Spain or Belgium, spend as much as 75% of their defence budget on salaries, making their militaries what some people term “unusually well-armed pension funds”. For France, this is a major source of concern and yet another argument for finding allies beyond the structures of CSDP, for example in NATO, or to try the bilateral route as it did for the Lancaster House Agreement with the UK.

Conclusions

There is a clear feeling of a turning of the tide in France. Its long-held support for CSDP is as weak as it has ever been. There is a large disparity between the high aspirations of the 2008 White Paper and the abstract and energetic calls for more integration of its 2013 successor. France is now willing to discard the European option if it believes it will require a tough

42 Interview with Captain Carlos Cordon Scharfhausen, Madrid, 29 October 2012.
fight. In the future, we are bound to see more and more French military action outside of the EU framework and under a NATO, UN or French flag. Perhaps unilateral action, ad hoc coalitions or the NATO framework will be the most attractive for more kinetic operations, while the UN might be more attractive for peacekeeping operations. What seems evident is that the EU looks less and less attractive as an option for Paris.

We seem to have reached this point due to a combination of factors. The first is quite evidently the lack of consensus in Europe regarding what CSDP should look like. France is perhaps the member state that most wants CSDP to be able to undertake almost all forms of military intervention. Others, like Germany, are much more reluctant to take on certain operations. Furthermore, there are significant differences regarding action in Africa and some member states are quite simply not willing to act in the region. When the German chancellor agreed to support EU action in Congo by providing EUFOR DRC with its operational headquarters, the news was received in Berlin with shock. Some described the news as a “bombshell”, with most in the political establishment expressing dismay at how the Belgians and the French had managed to trick the German government into supporting a mission in “their post-colonial sphere of influence”. Such shock is all the more revealing when one takes into account that both EU military missions in Congo – Artemis and EUFOR DRC – were essentially requested by the UN and not by any particular member state.

A second factor has been the slow pace of reform at EU institutions. Clearly France’s hopes for CSDP in 2008 were not at all fulfilled. They were probably set for failure, given disagreements over the scope and shape of CSDP, but it is hard to explain why the EU failed even to achieve the goals it had agreed upon, such as the Headline Goal of having two Battlegroups ready at any time. The inability to live up to previous commitments is now an all-too-familiar characteristic of CSDP.

CSDP’s incapacity to launch new and ambitious missions constitutes a third factor in France’s frustration with the Europe of Defence. Cases where France would have liked the EU to act include Libya in 2011 and Mali in 2013. Furthermore, France’s experience of CSDP missions has not been particularly promising. Overall it is fair to say that given the cost, complexity and, ultimately, diminished ambition of EU missions, France

43 Interview with General Henri Bentégeat, Paris, 3 July 2012.
will likely think twice before choosing that route rather than going it alone or perhaps opting for some other multilateral framework.

Finally, it should be mentioned that over the past few years France has witnessed a general downscaling of its allies’ military capabilities. Austerity and a long-running preference for social instead of military spending has meant that many in Europe are quite simply not capable of acting militarily abroad. This has now become a major issue in general and in particular for France, which prides itself in taking defence seriously and in providing it with sufficient resources.

However, France has not been a passive actor in the past two decades. It has interacted with CSDP and adapted to its shortfalls with agility. First of all, France has pursued other paths than EU defence with little reluctance. It acted unilaterally when it needed to, with Mali being the last case, or in conjunction with capable allies like the UK when it was appropriate, as in Libya. It moved towards a stronger integration in NATO as a means of keeping as many options open as possible for the pursuit of French national interests. France has in turn displayed a certain reluctance to lose sovereignty in the field of defence. The fact that EUFOR TChad was seen as a worrying case of French hyper-loyalty to the EU mandate only reinforces this point. If EU defence is ever going to develop fully, we need member states to be perfectly satisfied with having their officers abide by an EU mandate.

What seems unrealistic, however, is to ask for any more commitment on the part of France. It is still today a willing partner within CSDP and it is quite probable that it would support initiatives in Africa if they were brought forward by committed partners. What is doubtful is if it will invest as much as it has in the past in attempting to lead CSDP. French formal strategic documents will only reflect this shift in attitude slowly and moderately. This has to do with the country’s sense of leadership in this field and, to a certain extent, a long-lasting inertia. In this time of change, however, one should be much more attentive to French action rather than French discourse. Actions will speak for themselves and on that front, the message is quite clear: if CSDP does not get its act together, France will pursue other routes and leave the Europe of Defence to one side.
A German Vision of CSDP: “It’s Taking Part That Counts”
Christian Würzer

Abstract
Germany sees itself as one of the promoters of Common Security and Defence Policy, despite its historical reluctance to engage in the use of force and strategic thinking. Firm constraints are therefore placed on the use of force, such as legal barriers and a strong parliamentary role, resulting in lengthy, compromise-shaped procedures that can lead to the perception of Germany as being slow or unassertive.

However, Germany is willing to further participate in CSDP, even in missions that are not in its core interest. This correlates with the marked German preference for multilateral action. CSDP is thus not only perceived as another framework for military engagement, but also has a purpose in deepening cooperation and EU integration. Being part of a broader EU-approach including the whole range of civilian, military, political, diplomatic and economic measures within Common Foreign and Security Policy reflects Germany’s aspiration for a comprehensive approach rather than other frameworks of international engagement.

The regional focus for Germany in CSDP correlates with its overall foreign policy orientation; focusing on the EU’s eastern neighbourhood and the Balkans, Afghanistan and the security of trade routes and, to a lesser degree, the southern shores of the Mediterranean and Africa as a whole.

Overview
Germany likes to think of itself as one of the driving forces behind European integration. In truth, it was the German-French axis that often took the lead in pushing the European project forward. This is also the case for security and defence, where Germany took a leading role in the development of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) which,
then named ESDP (European Security and Defence Policy), came into being under the German EU-presidency in 1999.

In recent years, with the European financial crisis the most pressing issue for policymakers in Europe and Germany, CSDP slipped down the list of priorities. Still, there remains a German interest in CSDP and if security issues re-emerge then Germany might become a promoter in this policy field once again. Ongoing political actions in the Weimar triangle and the Weimar plus group\(^44\) provide evidence of this.

Germany has been one of the largest contributors of troops to CSDP missions\(^45\) and, until the withdrawal of the German contingent of EUFOR Althea in September 2012,\(^46\) participated in every mission yet deployed, together with France – the only other EU member state to do so. Consequently, Germany’s participation in CSDP missions can be seen as constant and proof of its commitment to a common security policy of the EU.

From a German perspective, the comprehensive nature of CSDP, with its civilian and military means, gives it an advantage over other forms of multinational engagement, particularly NATO, which lacks sizeable civilian instruments. Nevertheless, NATO remains the preferred framework for any robust military engagement that Germany might participate in. The CSDP is clearly not seen as an alternative to NATO, but rather as complementary to it, with the ability to deploy the whole range of civilian, military, political, diplomatic and economic measures within the broader framework of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). This correlates with the German claim on the utilisation of a comprehensive approach (‘vernetzte Sicherheit’ or ‘networked security’), first set out in the White Paper on German Security Policy (2006),\(^47\) calling for inter-agency

\(^44\) The Weimar Plus Group extends the Weimar Triangle consisting of France, Germany and Poland to Italy and Spain. It is designed as a ministerial-level forum to prepare EU summits.

\(^45\) In the first ten years of CSDP Germany was the second largest contributor of personnel, with only France shouldering a larger share, cf. Giovanni Grevi, Damien Helly & Daniel Keohane (eds) (2009), *European Security and Defence Policy, The First 10 Years (1999-2009)*, EU Institute for Security Studies.

\(^46\) The German withdrawal from EUFOR Althea does not necessarily imply a change in German policy. See below.

cooperation and a coordinated approach of political, diplomatic, civilian, economic, developmental, intelligence, police and military means.\textsuperscript{48}

Germany also views the CSDP as a vehicle for achieving further cooperation and integration among EU member states. From a German perspective, the CSDP can therefore (at least partially) be seen as an end in itself; a tool for further European integration and cooperation. In fact, this view of the CSDP appears to be much more important for Germany than using the CSDP to strengthen the EU’s military capabilities independent from NATO.

**Strategic culture**

For historical reasons, Germany today has a strategic culture that is much more reluctant to use military force than other European countries, such as the UK or France. The institutional structure used for decision-making on the deployment of military means reflects this through its compulsory legal restrictions, as specified by the Fundamental Law and the Law on Parliamentarian Participation (Parlamentsbeteiligungsgesetz – ParlBG).\textsuperscript{49} In general, German decision-makers and the German people have a deep-rooted self-restriction on the use of force, as a result of the experiences of “two brief excursions into world politics, commonly known as the First and Second World Wars”.\textsuperscript{50} Based on this experience, and on the splitting of the country into East and West Germany, a strategic culture emerged that rejected strategic thinking altogether. Instead, Germany assumed the role of a “civilian power”.\textsuperscript{51}

For these reasons, Germany’s armed forces, the Bundeswehr, were subject to strong constitutional restrictions determined by the Fundamental Law. These restrictions prevented the army from deployment in out-of-area operations and can be seen as the expression of ‘never again’ – a guiding


\textsuperscript{49}Parlamentsbeteiligungsgesetz (2005), (http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/parlbgs/BJNR077500005.html).

\textsuperscript{50} Interview with Walther Stützle, Berlin, 18 October 2012.

principle of German foreign policy (and also a means to distinguish the Federal Republic’s policies from those of Nazi Germany).\footnote{Hanns W. Maull (2006), “Die prekäre Kontinuität, Deutsche Außenpolitik zwischen Pfadabhängigkeit und Anpassungsdruck”, in Manfred G. Schmidt and Reimut Zohlnhöfer, Regieren in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Innen- und Außenpolitik seit 1949, Wiesbaden, p. 413 ff.} This remained the case until German reunification and the regaining of full and unrestricted German sovereignty in 1990. However, this new, unified, normal state of Germany was accompanied by a growing need to rethink its place in security policy, driven by demand from partners and allies in EU and NATO for stronger German engagement.\footnote{Jan Techau (2011), “No Strategy, Please, We’re German – The Eight Elements That Shaped German Strategic Culture”, NDC Forum Paper, 69-93 NATO Defence College, p. 88.}

Subsequent restrictions were softened\footnote{John S. Duffield (1994), “German Security Policy after Unification: Sources of Continuity and Restraint”, Contemporary Security Policy No. 15(3), pp. 170–198.} and the Bundeswehr’s very first deployment in a combat mission took place in 1995, during the NATO air campaign in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The legal precondition was the 1994 decision\footnote{“Decision, 2 BvE 3/92, 2 BvE 5/93, 2 BvE 7/93, 2 BvE 8/93, 12 July 1994”, Constitutional Court, 1994.} of the Constitutional court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) that the German military can be deployed in operational missions, with the approval of Parliament (Bundestag). Generally speaking, German parliamentary control over military operations is highly developed, with the Bundestag exerting far-reaching power over military deployment, as determined in the \textit{Parlamentsbeteiligungsgesetz}.

This law determines that parliamentary consent has to be given in advance of any out-of-area operation (ParlBG §1) where German troops might be involved in armed conflict (§2). Only in cases of imminent danger, i.e. of life and limb, can parliamentary consent be given after the beginning of an operation, but subsequent permission must be sought immediately (§5). Further, the government is obliged to give the Bundestag extensive information on a regular basis about already approved, ongoing operations (§6). In addition, the Parliament can always revoke its approval (§8).

Regardless of this gradual relaxation of German military policy since 1990, the general public, as well as policymakers, remain sceptical and still
perceive the unilateral use of force as virtually unthinkable.\textsuperscript{56} This extends to all political parties in the Parliament, representing virtually the whole political spectrum.

The second guiding principle of German strategic culture, expressing the requirement of a multinational approach and mission (preferably by the United Nations) for the use of German military means, might therefore be described as ‘never alone’. Together with the afore-mentioned principle of ‘never again’ it marks the two most basic guidelines of the Federal Republic’s national identity concerning the use of force.\textsuperscript{57}

However, a tendency towards stronger emphasis on the principle ‘never alone’, along with a simultaneous ‘relativisation’ of the restrictions on the use of force can be observed since German reunification.\textsuperscript{58} This also finds its expression in the 2009 coalition agreement, where it is stated that Germany’s preferred tools for preventing and overcoming international crisis are diplomatic and political ones, with military means only used in the framework of the UN, NATO, the EU and under legitimisation of international law.\textsuperscript{59}

As stated above, the ‘natural’ restraint, as well as the legal and political restrictions of Germany towards the use of force has undergone a gradual relaxation since German reunification. The zenith was reached in 2002 with the first deployment of German troops to Afghanistan. Since that time, the process has gone into partial reverse. Yet the lessons learned from Afghanistan can be seen as justifying renewed German scepticism about power projection by military means.\textsuperscript{60} On the other hand, the Balkan wars encouraged the perception among the wider international community of Germany also having a responsibility to protect universal values, particularly in its immediate neighbourhood. This came into conflict with the endemic German scepticism about the use of force and resulted in

\textsuperscript{56} There was also consensus among interviewees.

An exception on unilateral use of force might only be made for the protection of German citizens, such as in a situation of imminent danger (e.g. Operation Dragonfly (\textit{Operation Libelle}) to evacuate civilians from Tirana, Albania in March 1997).

\textsuperscript{57} Maull (2006).

\textsuperscript{58} Interview with Hanns W. Maull, Berlin, 19 October 2012.

\textsuperscript{59} Coalition agreement between CDU, CSU and FDP, 2009, p. 123.

\textsuperscript{60} Interview with Hanns W. Maull, Berlin, 19 October 2012.
several de facto compulsory preconditions governing the use of military means.\textsuperscript{61}

First and foremost, any deployment has to be permitted by the Bundestag, which is a legal precondition. Second, German participation is always part of a multinational approach, with a UN-Mandate being a political \textit{condicio sine qua non}.\textsuperscript{62} Concerning the framework under which a mission might take place, NATO is the preferred organisation when robust\textsuperscript{63} military means are required,\textsuperscript{64} purely because NATO capabilities and military structures are already in place and working. However, under circumstances in which focus does not lie (primarily) on military means, the EU – with its broader toolbox of political, diplomatic and economic means – might provide advantages from a German perspective, while a UN mission might be preferential when international legitimacy is required. Generally speaking, German priorities for whichever multilateral framework a mission is carried out are decided on a case-by-case basis, depending on the mission’s needs, with no preference for the EU or NATO.\textsuperscript{65} Germany often puts significant emphasis on building partnerships in advance of possible action, especially among European partners within the EU or NATO. In the case of France, which is the most preferred partner, Germany would probably even relax its own policy goals to achieve cooperation. For example, the significant German participation in the 2006 EUFOR RD Congo operation is widely perceived as a strong concession towards France.\textsuperscript{66} This tendency to build partnerships strongly correlates with the constant that Germany tries to


\textsuperscript{62} There is an ongoing discussion, if a UN-mandate might also be a legal precondition set by the constitution. cf. Ibid.

\textsuperscript{63} The term \textit{robust} is used to deliberately emphasise the distinction between a deployment of military means in a mission where combat operations are possible or even expected – as in a combat mission, compared to a military mission where fighting is unlikely.

\textsuperscript{64} Unanimous consent was given by all interviewees.

\textsuperscript{65} Interviews, Berlin, 22 October and 27 November 2012.

\textsuperscript{66} Interviews with Walter Stützle and Federal Foreign Office Officials, Berlin, 18, 22 and 24 October 2012.
avoid acting unilaterally wherever possible. Last but not least, Germany precludes the preventive or pre-emptive use of force altogether.67

Moreover, lessons learned from completed and ongoing missions have influenced Germany’s approach to any possible engagement in future missions. A clear view of how to achieve an exit strategy and manageable risks, as well as the implementation of benchmarks, represent the most relevant variables for Germany in the decision-making process.68 Any perpetuation of missions that have failed to achieve their goals, or are scarcely to be expected to do so – as was the impression of EU SSR Guinea Bissau and to some degree of the various missions in the DR Congo69 – is to be prevented. The same may be said of avoiding possible mission creep, as experienced in Afghanistan.70

Finally, Germany has a clear preference for using non-military means whenever possible; using force as a last resort only if it promises success. Notwithstanding this restrained approach of the Federal Republic, in a continuum of European states Germany would probably be found somewhere mid-table, clearly more reluctant than France or Britain, but more active than some smaller states that lack capabilities and are therefore broadly inactive.

In association with the German preference for non-military means, Germany developed a Comprehensive Approach (CA) known as ‘networked security’ (Vernetzte Sicherheit). First mentioned in the 2006 White paper on “German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr”,71 this called for an “all-embracing approach […] developed in networked security structures based on a comprehensive national and global security rationale”.72 The concept evolved in the following years, with the establishment of an inter-ministerial steering group73 and joint

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68 Interviews with Federal Foreign Office Officials, Berlin, October 22 and 24 2012.
69 Ibid.
72 Ibid., p. 22.
73 Ibid., p. 23.
training courses involving a broad range of actors. The CA was firmly established in German security policy within the 2011 Defence Policy Guidelines (Verteidigungspolitische Richtlinien) – although the concept’s title is never mentioned therein. Today’s discussion therefore no longer revolves around the question of whether a CA is needed but how it can be achieved, under which framework and for which aims. However, ‘networked security’ is somewhat hampered by the fact that a core concept has never been developed. This has led to the development of a variety of individual approaches by participating actors and has subsequently resulted in a lack of leadership, with the German CA remaining a vague all-purpose concept leaving the impression of “a number of actors working on a single subject without overall coordination, but still calling it a comprehensive approach.” Notwithstanding these difficulties, networked security is well-established in Germany, while still undergoing a steady process of development and further elaboration as work in progress.

**Institutional structure**

On an institutional level, the above-mentioned parliamentary prerogative of the German Bundestag concerning the use of force is quite distinct and set in the Parlamentsbeteiligungsgesetz. Nevertheless, the leadership for the actual policy lies within the administration, whereby the office of the Federal Chancellor possesses policy-making powers on the guiding policy

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74 An example of a joint training course would be “Common Effort” organised by the German and Dutch Ministries of Foreign affairs and including civilian and military actors, as well as international organisations and NGOs. See Luc van de Goor & Claudia Major (2012), “How to make the comprehensive approach work. Preparation at home is key to effective crisis management in the field”, CRU Policy Brief, Clingendael Conflict Research Unit.


77 Ibid., p. 4.

78 Interview with Defence Ministry Official, Berlin, November 2012.

principles, while the specific ministries enjoy autonomy in their respective policy field and are not formally bound to the chancellery.\textsuperscript{80} Of course, the informal political power exerted by the chancellor, who is usually also party leader, must not be underestimated. It can be subject to limitation, however, especially in the case of coalition governments, which are common in Germany.

Coordination between the parliament and administration mainly takes place in a formalised institutional way, as determined by the respective legislature. Probably more important is the interaction and coordination that takes place on an informal basis between parliamentarians and representatives of the administration. This happens from the level of ministers downwards to bureaucrats of various levels, who meet parliamentarians of the concerned committees or their chairpersons.\textsuperscript{81} Regarding foreign and European policy, there are frequent interactions – including monthly briefings of the foreign committee by the Foreign Office’s political director. On special occasions meetings also occur at a high level, for example between the foreign minister and the chairpersons of the foreign and security committee.\textsuperscript{82} Interaction also happens within political parties, such as between parliamentarians and their respective party members in the administration.

Within the ministries, the leadership on foreign and European affairs lies within the Federal Foreign Office. In the special case of CSDP, the Foreign Office also coordinates other ministries, especially the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of the Interior, which exert control over most personnel qualified for international missions. This coordination role of the Foreign Office does not imply any instruction-capability towards other ministries, except when personnel is deployed to a German delegation abroad and under the supervision of Foreign Office personnel. In the case of CSDP, most personnel deployed to Brussels are under the supervision of the PSC (Political and Security Committee) ambassador.

Generally speaking, there is a strong culture of compromise in German politics. This results from the very nature of the country as a federal state, with a strong position of the states and a federal government that is a coalition. Further, there is a strong tradition of corporatism.

\textsuperscript{80} Fundamental Law, Article 65.
\textsuperscript{81} Interview with Gerd Tebbe, Berlin, 26 November 2012.
\textsuperscript{82} Ibid.
Compromise is therefore inherent in the political system. The hierarchy is also much flatter than in a presidential system. Together with the abovementioned ministerial autonomy, this results in a strong position of bureaucracies regarding day-to-day politics. Therefore, one could state that German policy-making is more shaped by a ‘bottom up’ approach.\(^3\) This also goes for foreign policy, which is prepared extensively inside the ministerial bureaucracy before it is brought to the political level.\(^4\)

From an outside perspective, German policy-making is often seen as slow or unassertive. This impression must be put into perspective and should take into account the above-mentioned constants of the German political system. The inherent need for compromise between political stakeholders; the established processes of lengthy preparations inside bureaucracies prior to decisions; the autonomy of federal ministries and consequent need for coordination within the administration as well as within the political parties of the common coalition governments, significantly lengthen decision-making processes. This appears even more striking when a parallel is drawn to countries with a full or semi-presidential system of government, resulting in a distinct hierarchy and thus faster decision-making processes – e.g. France.

**Strategic interests**

Determining strategic interests from a German perspective is difficult due to the historical experience mentioned above; the German policy community thus appears to struggle to formulate strategic interests.\(^5\) Compared to other European countries there is a lack of strategic orientation and strategic thinking; interests often only become apparent when a situation or threat has already arisen and demands action.

Conventional threats present no current danger for German territorial integrity or for the democratic foundation of the state. Germany is “encircled by friends” as former Defence Minister Volker Rühe put it. This may partially explain the lack of strategic thinking. Remaining threats perceived for German security interests are of a more abstract nature, such as climate change or threats resulting from the recent financial crisis that impact not only upon Germany, but on the European Union as a whole.

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\(^3\) Interview with Federal Foreign Office Official, Berlin, 22 October 2012.

\(^4\) Interviews with Federal Foreign Office Officials, Berlin, 22 and 24 October 2012.

\(^5\) Interview with Ronja Kempin, Berlin, 22 October 2012.
Moreover, such threats are hardly to be tackled by means of foreign and security policy, either German or European.

A latent awareness of strategic interests is hardly distinguishable among German policymakers. But to some degree the predominant concept of further European integration as crucial to German interests is still shaping German political discourse. Therefore, one particular region can be clearly determined as in Germany’s strategic interest: Europe.

Post-war Germany passed through a complete break in its strategic culture – almost entirely renouncing strategic thinking. Multilateralism became the new cornerstone of German foreign policy and – to some extent – German identity. Furthermore, Germany also changed the core concept of the country. It renounced the concept of a nation-state (not least given the two coexisting German states), replacing it with the idea of European unification, therefore embedding Germany peacefully in the centre of Europe. This core lasts until today, although Germany has acted with more self-confidence in recent years, resulting in the impression of Berlin being less engaged in the EU.

Despite the growing self-confidence, the main driving force and goal for Germany is stability in Europe. This force culminates in an interest of further European integration which is assumed to lead to increased stability within the EU. The establishment of a European stability architecture is also a German interest. This includes the European periphery, the Balkans in the south-east; the Eastern neighbourhood, mainly Russia and – to a lesser degree – the southern shore of the Mediterranean.

With stability as the main priority, the geographic proximity of the Balkans and a considerable number of expatriate Yugoslav population, it becomes clear why Germany first overcame its natural restraint during its deployment in the Balkans, taking a more active role during the violent split in the 90s and beyond. The Balkans remain important for Germany, though the amount of progress made concerning the stabilisation of the region has enabled a reduction in efforts put into the region.

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86 Techau (2011), p. 84.

87 Ibid.

In its aim to obtain stability within Europe, Germany also recognises Russia as an actor that must be engaged to reach this goal. This insight found its expression back in the Cold War, when Germany had to perceive Russia not only as a threat towards Western European countries, but also as a necessary partner to achieve stability in Europe. A fact that led to the Helsinki Accords. As a follow-up, German efforts towards a socio-political transformation of Eastern European countries into politically stable, democratic, market-economies can be perceived after the end of the European division. With respect to Russia, this policy has clearly failed. Nevertheless, Russia remains a cornerstone for stability in Europe in economic as well as security terms and is therefore a focal point for German foreign policy.

Compared to other EU-members, Germany has directed more efforts towards the eastern neighbourhood of the EU, while leaving the policy towards the countries of the southern and eastern shores of the Mediterranean mostly to coastal EU members, notably Italy and France. With most eastern neighbour states joining the Union in 2004 and 2007 and the Mediterranean region becoming more important for the EU (migration, the Arab uprisings, etc.), German foreign policy today also focuses on the southern shore of the Mediterranean, North Africa and to some extent also Sub-Saharan Africa.89

Beyond the question of stability in Europe and its neighbourhood, Germany also has interests at the global level, especially concerning trade, which are crucial for Germany as the second largest exporting nation after China. Generally speaking, beyond the regional level, German foreign policy is determined mainly by economic aspects with security considerations playing only a minor part.90 Being a ‘giant in exports’ and a ‘dwarf in resources’91 makes the German economy highly dependent on free, reliable and safe global trade. This also finds its expression in a strong German commitment towards EUNAVFOR Atalanta and German troops account for 23% of the mission’s strength. The security of trade routes is at the centre of German strategic interests, as well as stability in and access to potential markets for German goods on a global level.92

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89 Interviews with Federal Foreign Office Officials, Berlin, 22 and 24 October 2012.
90 Interview with Ronja Kempin, Berlin, 22 October 2012.
91 Interview with Walter Stützle, Berlin, 18 October 2012.
92 Interviews with Federal Foreign Office Officials, Berlin, 22 and 24 October 2012.
Stable relations and strategic partnerships with regional powers, called “new powers in shaping globalisation” (Gestaltungsmächte) by the government Strategy Paper “Shaping Globalisation – Expanding Partnerships – Sharing Responsibility”,\(^93\) are a priority of German foreign policy. Although this concept covers a wide range of policy fields, including security aspects, the actual relations between Germany and these ‘new powers’ are mainly economic in nature, with a much less pronounced security component that still needs specification and often suffers from weak commitment.\(^94\)

Furthermore, there are several political strategies towards continents, regions and countries of specific German interest (e.g. Asia, Africa, East Asia, South Asia, and Afghanistan). However, concerning security these too need further specification and development, as they appear to amount to little more than empty phrases today (maybe with the exception of Afghanistan)\(^95\) and reflect the fact that an overall long-term global security strategy appears to be lacking.

**Participation in CSDP**

As mentioned above, until the withdrawal from EUFOR Althea, Germany took part in every CSDP Mission deployed. We have identified participation as one of the guiding principles of German policy towards CSDP; it was often more important than the specific purpose of a mission. Despite the German approach of taking part in every mission, several focal points of German engagement can be correlated with the (few) areas of strategic interest mentioned above, namely the Balkans, Caucasus and also Afghanistan.

To begin with, Germany puts a focus on Afghanistan, where the overwhelming majority of German personnel – 4,753, or more than 75%\(^96\) – in international peace operations is stationed. In EUPOL Afghanistan,

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\(^{94}\) Interview with German Diplomat, Berlin, October 2012.
\(^{95}\) Ibid.
German commitment is a result of the operation’s history. Germany took the lead in training the Afghan National Police with a German police-training mission, the ‘German Police Project Office’ (GPPO), set up in Afghanistan. Due to limitations in German personnel and funding, Germany took the initiative on lobbying for a European mission. In this way Germany managed, as it were, to ‘Europeanise’\(^{97}\) the GPPO into EUPOL Afghanistan.\(^{98}\)

As stated, an important region for German foreign policy is the Balkans, because of the significant expat Balkan population living in Germany and the deep-seated German desire for peace and stability in Europe’s periphery. Germany therefore not only participated in all EU missions set up in the region, but also managed to place a German as Head of Mission or Force Commander – at least once – in every single mission in the region.

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<tr>
<th>German Heads of EU-Mission at the Balkans</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>EUFOR ALTHEA</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Hans-Jochen Witthauer (Force Commander) (12/06-12/07)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>EULEX Kosovo</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Bernd Borchardt (02/13-ongoing)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>EUBAM</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Udo Burkholder (05/10-ongoing)</td>
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<td><strong>EUPM/BiH</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Stefan Feller (11/08-06/12)</td>
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<td><strong>CONCORDIA/FYROM</strong></td>
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<td>Rainer Feist</td>
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<td><strong>EUPAT</strong></td>
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<td>Jürgen Scholz</td>
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<td><strong>PROXIMA/FYROM</strong></td>
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<td>Jürgen Scholz (12/04-12/05)</td>
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\(^{97}\) As Germany was not able, or willing, to enlarge its personnel and financial commitment as demanded by its NATO Allies, Germany promoted the establishment of a larger EU-Mission to satisfy demands, especially from the US, to avoid criticism of Germany’s commitment.

It therefore appears inconsistent that Germany withdrew its contribution to EUFOR Althea in 2012. This withdrawal marks the first time ever that Germany is not participating in all ongoing EU-operations. This pullout might be an exceptional case, however, and should not be seen as a change of German approach towards universal participation in CSDP-operations.\textsuperscript{99} As it is Germany’s position that further military presence is no longer necessary for the stabilisation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Germany brought a possible termination of the mission up for discussion among EU member states. As no consensus was reached, Germany – consistent with its position – subsequently pulled out unilaterally. Thus, this reduction of German involvement should not be seen as a sign for reduced commitment towards the Balkans or EU-Missions in general. \textsuperscript{100} Germany still puts significant efforts into the less stable parts of the Balkan region, namely Kosovo, where Germany also takes part in OSCE, UN and NATO-led Missions with extensive German deployment, second only to deployment in Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{101}

Outside Europe and its immediate periphery, Germany also allocates the largest contingent in EUNAVFOR Atalanta off the African shore, in a bid to ensure open and secure trade routes. Germany was therefore a driving force behind the creation of the mission.\textsuperscript{102} The German navy has participated from the very beginning with one to four combat vessels. The country has also given a long-term commitment to deploying two frigates at a time.\textsuperscript{103}

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\textsuperscript{99} Interviews with Federal Foreign Office Officials, Berlin, 22 and 24 October 2012.
\textsuperscript{100} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{101} In terms of numbers, the German contribution to international missions in Kosovo 2012 adds up to a total of 849 personnel. cf. “Internationales und deutsches Personal in Friedenseinätzen 2012”, Center for International Peace Operations, 2012.
\textsuperscript{103} Ibid.
\end{flushright}
The significant engagement towards the security of trade routes off the Somali coast does not mean that Africa is a main priority for German foreign and security policy, however.\footnote{104}{Interview with Federal Foreign Office Official, Berlin, 24 October 2012.}

Despite Germany’s robust participation in EUFOR RD Congo (Germany provided the operational headquarters as well as about one-third of the troops deployed), this also holds true for that region and should be seen more as an exception to existing German priorities. The strong participation resulted more from a bilateral plea for stronger German participation, urged by France, at the time of the mission setup. Further, Germany was not completely satisfied with the Mission and (also for domestic reasons) was unwilling to extend the mandate’s duration.\footnote{105}{Denis M. Tull (2009), “EUFOR RD Congo: ein Erfolg aber kein Erfolgsmodell”, in Muriel Asseburg and Ronja Kempin (eds), \textit{Die EU als strategischer Akteur in der Sicherheits und Verteidigungspolitik? Eine systematische Bestandsaufnahme von ESVP-Missionen und -Operationen}, Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, p. 58. [“EUFOR RD Congo: A Success, But Not a Model” in “The EU as a Strategic Actor in the Realm of Security and Defence? A Systematic Assessment of ESDP Missions and Operations”].} In fact, it seems that German policymakers were quite happy to end a mission they had been somehow forced into.\footnote{106}{Interview with former high-ranking government official Berlin, October 2012.}

Further, when it comes to missions in French-speaking countries, Germany also faces some problems of a technical nature, because in Germany there are patently few French-speaking experts and trainers (e.g. policemen) to deploy. Moreover, it is also harder to persuade civilian experts to participate in missions as far away as Sub-Saharan Africa than it is to send personnel to regions closer to Germany, e.g. the Balkans.\footnote{107}{A similar problem arises for Germany with EUCAP NESTOR, where participation is complicated, as the necessary experts are civilians in Germany, who are both rare and hard to convince to participate in a mission based in Somalia. cf. Interview with Federal Foreign Office Official, Berlin, 22 October 2012.} In the case of the police force this is aggravated by the need to explain to German states – which exert authority over the majority of police-staff – the added value of a foreign assignment.\footnote{108}{Ibid.}

Nevertheless, continued instability in several parts of Africa is reflected in a general tendency within CSDP towards Africa. This is best
illustrated by the fact that during the last five years, six new missions were set up on African soil, or offshore, amounting to a total of eight missions versus only seven non-African missions; the latest one being EUJUST LEX-Iraq dating from 2005. Germany is aware of this drift towards Africa and will most likely contribute to future EU-missions there. In the most recently decided mission, EUTM Mali, Germany is participating with 68 personnel. Together with their support for the “African-led International Support Mission to Mali” (AFISMA) of current 90 soldiers, German troops in Mali and the region amount to 158, the largest German contingent on African soil.

**View of the CSDP**

In retrospect, the German view of the completed missions is overall a positive one, though the mission goals were not too ambitious. There are also lessons learned, however, especially from the experience in Guinea Bissau, Congo and Afghanistan, in particular concerning exit strategies when a mission cannot achieve its goals. Germany therefore began pressing for a definition of clear goals and red lines about how to end a mission prior to deployment in new missions. The feeling that it is essential to have a mission, no matter what, as in the early days of CSDP, no longer holds for the German approach. As a matter of fact, the Federal Republic is today more reticent about new CSDP missions and the use of force per se. Lessons learned from Afghanistan have been particularly decisive for policymakers, and for the general public, making it harder to communicate and politically justify CSDP missions to the latter. Justifying mission costs at a time of financial crisis and spending cuts is also difficult.

From a German perspective, the CSDP is currently not the preferential framework when a robust mission is needed; NATO would be the means of German choice. A possible exception might be an operation in the European periphery, or under circumstances when NATO – due to US-

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110 Effective April 10, 2013. Cf. “Einsatzzahlen – Die Stärke der deutschen Einsatzkontingente” [Deployment numbers – Strength of German contingents] (http://www.bundeswehr.de/portal/a/bwde//lit/p/c4/04_SB8K8xLLM9MSSzPy8xBz9CP3l5EyrpHK9pPKUVL3UzLzixNSSKiirpKoqMSMnNU- _InIrREQD2RLYK/).
112 Ibid.
restrictions – cannot, or will not take action deemed necessary, for example regarding the Middle East conflict.\textsuperscript{113} Although this is still theoretical, the ongoing US pivot towards the Pacific might also increase the expectations and need for a more independent European security policy, taking over more responsibilities, especially in its periphery, during the next decade(s). Germany shares this opinion and as Foreign Minister Westerwelle put it, “[The] time has come for Europe to take more responsibility for its own security”.\textsuperscript{114}

Notwithstanding this probable future development, for the moment Germany perceives the role of the CSDP more as part of a civilian, preventive and multilateral crisis management structure. This also corresponds with the nature of the 27 EU-operations launched by the member states so far, of which 8 missions were military, 18 civilian and one combined civil-military mission, none yet being a combat mission.

Concerning military means, a lack of capabilities and/or willingness of the EU to conduct robust missions can still be detected, although the European Security Strategy (ESS) identified a “need to develop a strategic culture that fosters early, rapid, and when necessary robust intervention” in 2003.\textsuperscript{115} Nevertheless, robust missions have not been conducted (yet). Military means are deployed to some extent under an EU framework. However, unlike NATO and its principal military approach, the EU framework provides wider scope to tackle varying challenges with different institutions and structures, like the European External Action Service (EEAS) and the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). This is in line with the ESS referring to “the full spectrum of instruments for crisis management and conflict prevention [...], including political, diplomatic, military and civilian, trade and development activities”,\textsuperscript{116} all of which the EU has at its disposal.

Germany sees this as an advantage over other forms and frameworks of multilateral engagement. This broader approach, using the whole toolbox of military, civilian, political and economic means is seen as widely

\textsuperscript{113} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{114} Transcript: Speech of Foreign Minister Westerwelle at the opening of the Berlin Foreign Policy Forum, Berlin, 23 October 2012 (\url{www.auswaertiges-amt.de/DE/Infoservice/Presse/Reden/2012/121023-B_Berl_Forum_Aussenpol.html}).
\textsuperscript{115} European Security Strategy, p. 11.
\textsuperscript{116} Ibid., p. 11.
correlating with the German security policy. An integration of these various means, such as those Germany claims for itself in the concept of ‘Networked security’, is seen positively and worth striving for.

At the moment, Germany gives the impression of neither hindering nor promoting the CSDP, as it concentrates on the financial crisis. However, when the CSDP comes up again on the agenda it seems that Germany will push once more for further integration. In line with this are remarks by Foreign Minister Westerwelle calling for more coherence in the CFSP and the possibility of deeper integration of those countries willing and able to do so – similar to the Monetary Union, or the Schengen area – on the way to a ‘political union’.

Conclusions

Since the establishment of the then ESDP, experience has shown that Germany is committed to a European approach in security policy. It is the only country, besides France, that has participated in every single EU Mission, both civilian and military. Moreover, it was the second largest contributor of troops during the first ten years of CSDP.

Nevertheless, security policy has been left largely unattended by Germany in recent years as the dominant political topic was the eurozone financial crisis. Also, German foreign and security policy suffers from one of the deep-rooted German peculiarities: a lack of strategic thinking and orientation. Admittedly, Germany often comes up with the goal of a stronger, more united, more integrated Europe, in line with repeated calls for stronger supranational institutions that are rooted in multilateralism. Germany has embraced this multilateralism as an identity-building concept after its historical experiences with nationalism, the most extreme form of which Nazism.


Notwithstanding this, it appears that beyond European integration and a safe and peaceful environment to facilitate global trade, Germany lacks a long-term strategic vision. Ultimately, this also translated into a lack of strategic vision for Europe or the further development and elaboration of the CSDP, beyond the rather empty mantra call for ‘more Europe’ and deeper integration. Given the position of other member states, ranging from reluctance to refusal – above all by the United Kingdom – this goal is far from certain.

And yet there are good reasons for stronger cooperation among European states, namely the pressure on all military budgets as a result of the financial crisis in Europe. Pooling and sharing scarce resources could be an alternative, but it is running behind its potential. Cooperation will also be needed regarding the foreseeable rise in demand for more European responsibility in security matters, given the US-pivot towards the Pacific.

For Germany, a core purpose of the CSDP is the further advancement of European integration – which serves as some kind of ‘universal remedy’.

It is therefore virtually certain that Germany will remain committed to the CSDP and probably also remain one of the leaders pushing forward integration, as well as the further elaboration of the non-military components of CFSP. This contribution will extend to both civilian and military means. Germany will nevertheless remain reluctant to deploy military means, given the restraints on the use of force firmly established in German strategic culture.

A centrepiece of German efforts towards the further elaboration of the CSDP can be expected in the additional specification of a European Comprehensive Approach of all means that are at hand, “including political, diplomatic, military and civilian, trade and development activities”,120 similar to its national efforts towards the concept of ‘Networked Security’. Not least because this broad positioning of European foreign policy is seen as a major advantage.

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120 European Security Strategy, p. 11.
Italy’s ‘Third Way’ to European Defence
Giovanni Faleg

Abstract
Drawing on fieldwork research in Rome, this chapter analyses the CSDP from the perspective of the Italian national interest and how the key elements of this interest overlap with security co-operation at the CSDP level.

The empirical findings provide new and important insights into the evolution of Italian strategic interests and culture in the first decade of this century. Against the backdrop of a changing global security landscape, Italy’s strategic posture displays a widening gap between the persistence of some traditional elements (e.g. the allegiance to the Atlantic Alliance and the enthusiasm towards deeper EU security integration) and the emergence of new shared beliefs about the use of force in response to adaptation pressures: for instance, a stronger emphasis on the integration of civilian and military tools to face peace-building challenges; and the push for more pooling and sharing of military assets.

The methodology used is based on 15 semi-structured interviews with Italian stakeholders in the field of foreign and security policy, as well as on the review and content analysis of relevant secondary sources and material available.

Introduction
Since the late 1990s Italy’s strategic posture has reflected the emergence of new shared beliefs about the use of force in response to adaptation pressures. An emphasis on the integration of civilian and military tools for crisis management to meet peace-building challenges, or the push for more
pooling and sharing of military assets have entered the national discourse on security. At the same time, the search for a compromise between the allegiance to the Atlantic Alliance and enthusiasm for deeper EU security integration continues to determine the orientation of Italy’s security behaviour, including the participation in and perceptions of the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP).

This chapter aims to shed light on Italy’s contribution to the CSDP. It argues that whereas a stronger emphasis on the consolidation of the EU’s security architecture and capacities has characterised Italy’s political discourse over the past two years, the practice of Italy’s foreign and security policy shows a much more balanced stance and a willingness to avoid escalating tensions between the Atlantic and Europeanist sides of European security. This has resulted in Italy’s reluctance to distance itself from NATO, as illustrated by the search for complementarities between the European Defence Agency (EDA) and NATO’s pooling and sharing initiatives. At the same time, however, the Lisbon Treaty’s call for a holistic approach to crisis management operations is pushing Italian policy-makers to play a greater and more visible role in setting the agenda for the institutional and operational consolidation of the EU’s comprehensive approach.121

This chapter is structured as follows. The first section briefly outlines the main features of Italy’s contribution to CSDP. The second section introduces the country’s security architecture and the key institutions shaping Italy’s strategic preferences. The third section identifies Italy’s strategic objectives and inserts the CSDP into this ‘defence map’. The fourth section outlines Italy’s participation in CSDP missions, capacity or institution-building and explains why and how selected examples have been instrumental in pursuing Italy’s national interests. Finally, the conclusion considers the nexus between Italy’s national interest and the ‘vision’ of the future of the CSDP.

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121 The “EU comprehensive approach” is defined as Civil-Military Coordination (CMCO), meaning “the need for effective co-ordination of the actions of all relevant EU actors involved in the planning and subsequent implementation of EU’s response to the crisis”. Cf. Council of the European Union (2003), Civil-Military Coordination, Doc. 14457/03, Brussels, 7 November 2003, p. 2.
Overview

Italy’s participation in the CSDP, like that of any other EU member state, must be understood in the wider context of the country’s foreign policy and, specifically, of its engagement in multilateral peace operations, only a limited part of which is carried out through the EU framework. As a middle power with global trade and economic interests but limited political and military assets, Italy has traditionally (since 1945) relied on multilateralism as a means to achieve its strategic objectives. Italian diplomats often refer to the *politica della sedia* (chair policy) as a guiding principle of Italy’s foreign policy in multilateral fora from the very foundation of the Italian nation back in the late 19th century. According to the ‘chair policy’, the constant involvement in intergovernmental summits, presence at meetings and conferences has always been considered as priority by Italy’s political élites as a means to influence decisions and counter-balance the country’s well-known structural weaknesses: material (relative weakness of its economic or military power vis-à-vis other nations) and political (highly unstable institutional system) alike. A logical corollary of this approach is the feeling of frustration that arises whenever Rome is left out of the constitution of *directoires*.

Italy’s participation in multilateral peace operations, whether in the United Nations (UN), NATO or EU frameworks, proceeds from the same logic: on the one hand, a structural weakness preventing Italy from solely ensuring stability and security in its neighbourhood or other strategic theatres; on the other, the awareness that active participation increases the capacity to control decisions or processes in areas and issues considered to be of national interest and benefit to the country’s international credibility (multilateralism as a ‘code of conduct’). Besides this ‘core’, or structural rationale driving Italy’s multilateral stance, the following intervening factors account for the strong emphasis on multilateral institutions and ensuing participation in peace operations. First, the post-Cold War

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paradigmatic shift towards a comprehensive approach\textsuperscript{125} to security and peacekeeping, which produced a change of mindset within the military. Second, the consequential need to increase interoperability and harmonisation across armed forces by means of operational learning by doing. Third, alliance politics and the reliance on NATO’s collective defence system for matters of national security and the relationship with the United States, which imposes commitments in terms of contributions, burden sharing and capacity building. Fourth and finally, the legitimacy of the UN as guarantor of global peace, coupled with the willingness to gain a more active and prominent role in the UN system to avoid being dragged onto the sidelines (cf. the debate on the reform of the UN Security Council) or loose international credibility.

Against this backdrop, what makes the Italian perspective on CSDP compelling from an academic point of view is the existence of a balancing will (resulting in a balanced act) between the Atlanticist and Integrationist drivers of Italy’s foreign and security policy. Since Italy’s inclusion in the Western bloc after 1945, both the reliance on the transatlantic defence system and the inclusion in the ‘leading pack’ of European integration, including its defence volet since 1999, are considered as vital to national interests.\textsuperscript{126}

With these general drivers in mind, the specific interest in contributing to the CSDP is fostered by the following factors. First, the CSDP’s range of action, because, since the beginning, the EU’s operational outreach has covered geographical areas regarded as in Italy’s vital interest (in particular, the Western Balkans and, more recently, the Horn of Africa and Sahel regions). Second is the relevance of community and intergovernmental initiatives shaping the progressive formation of a

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\textsuperscript{125} The way Italian policy-makers and military staff understand the comprehensive approach is consistent with, but not identical to the EU definition: comprehensive or integrated approach (\textit{Approccio Integrato}) refers to “a comprehensive, inter-ministerial and inter-institutional vision of Italy’s crisis response, originating in the awareness that the military response alone cannot guarantee a successful outcome in the long-term”. Cf. Italian Ministry of Defence: \url{http://www.difesa.it/SMD_/CaSMD/eventi/Pagine/internazionali.aspx}.

European defence market for Italy’s national defence industry. Defence market integration is a main concern for several stakeholders, from the Ministry of Defence (as a key client), to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the industrial base. Third, Italy’s propensity to engage in low-spectrum, low-risk and non-offensive, small humanitarian and state-building types of intervention (for which, it must be said, there is a growing external demand due to instability in the European neighbourhood) matches up with the features of EU missions to date, characterised by the prominence of civilian over military deployments and the rising importance of the comprehensive approach. In this regard, not only has the EU acquired a unique, and almost unrivalled, expertise in the provision of a holistic approach to crisis management, but it usually employs its missions with an explicit UN mandate, hence providing Italian decision-makers with the legitimacy and sense of correctness that is required to make a security intervention acceptable domestically, especially in times of tough austerity measures. Fourth, Italy joins and supports CSDP activities for the sake of the survival and advancement of the European integration process. As any other sector of EU affairs, integrative stimuli are seen as the only way ahead given the development of a multipolar world, the emergence of new actors, shifting security governance and the presence of multi-dimensional threats.

From a quantitative standpoint, over the first five years of deployments (2003-2009), Italy has been among the top contributors to CSDP missions, in line with its commitment to other multilateral peace operations. Out of a total of 132 missions that Italy launched or joined since the end of World War II until 2012, 96 have been within international organisations and 23 under the EU framework. Concerning military operations, Italy amounted to 14% of the total EU and ranked second in the list of the top ten contributors to the CSDP, behind France and ahead of Germany, Spain, the UK and Poland. The largest contingent was deployed in EUFOR Althea (15% of troops). Italy also occupied a prominent

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position as regards civilian missions, being the second largest contributor (after France) with a total of 272 (out of 2600) units engaged in a wide range of tasks such as police training, rule of law, border control and justice reform.\textsuperscript{130} Qualitatively, it is important to note that Italy’s contribution to civilian crisis management is not limited to deployments. The country has invested considerably in training for civilian components of peace support operations, including CSDP, with a very proactive role in the EU-wide process of harmonisation and standardisation of training courses (e.g. ETG/ENTRi).\textsuperscript{131} To this purpose, centres of excellence such as the International Training Programme on Conflict Management (ITPCM) run by the Scuola Superiore Sant’Anna and the Centre of Excellence for Stability Police Units (CoESPU) were established in the mid-2000s.\textsuperscript{132}

On that account, the table below provides up-to-date (from April 2012 to March 2013) information on the country’s contribution to EU deployments and the breakdown of EU missions:

\textit{Table 1. Italy’s contribution to the CSDP: personnel statistics (April 2012 to March 2013)\textsuperscript{133}}

\begin{tabular}{|l|c|}
\hline
EUNAVFOR SOMALIA (MIL) & 215 \\
EUTM SOMALIA (MIL) & 2 \\
EUPOL RD CONGO (CIV) & 0 \\
EUSEC RD CONGO (MIL) & 2 \\
EUJUST LEX IRAQ (CIV) & 3 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}


\textsuperscript{131} European Group on Training (EGT) and European New Training Initiative for Civilian Crisis Management (ENTRi).


\textsuperscript{133} Source: CSDP Map (http://www.csdpmap.eu/mission-personnel).
Based on this general overview, the next section will introduce the Italian perceptions of the CSDP by taking into consideration the strategic culture and institutional structure.

**Italy and the use of force: strategic culture and institutional structures**

Italy’s security architecture is built upon the following pillars: i) the armed forces, characterised by a relatively solid structure and effective apparatus but weakened by a lack of investment and scarce financial resources; ii) the defence industry, dominated by the Finmeccanica Group, and other private stakeholders, namely major corporations having a stake in influencing foreign and security policy to gain access to foreign markets or operate in unstable countries (e.g. Eni, Enel); iii) the broader security sector, which includes military and civilian police (Carabinieri, Guardia Costiera, Polizia Doganale) and is bureaucratically scattered across different ministries (Defence, Interior, Justice etc.); iv) the key political institutions retaining control over the use of military force, according to Art. 87, namely: the President of the Republic, who heads the armed forces as President of the

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135 The total of private and public security personnel in Italy is huge, 474,166, numbering more security forces than other big EU member states such as Germany (426,500), France (409,000) and the UK (391,000), see M. Nones and S. Silvestri (2009), European security and the role of Italy, Istituto Affari Internazionali, Rome.
Supreme Council of Defence and declares the state of war, the Parliament and the Supreme Council of Defence (Consiglio Supremo della Difesa), composed of the Prime Minister and Ministers responsible for Foreign Affairs, Interior, Economy and Finance, Defence, Economic Development, and the Chief of the Defence Staff.

These actors make up the internal political-operational machinery that is responsible for executing Italy’s security policy, responding to exogenous inputs through cooperative/conflictual interaction among actors. From a procedural standpoint, the Italian legal order does not provide ad hoc legislation on the deployment of armed forces in international missions. Whereas Art. 87 sets out parliamentary control over the state of war, such legal provision has never been strictly applied when deciding upon the deployment of missions, namely as part of multilateral initiatives, because these are not acts of war in legal terms. This has resulted in the government taking decisions and responsibility about Italy’s participation in international operations, mostly through law decree, and the parliament exerting political control – hence not a formal

136 Art. 87 of the Italian Constitution: “Il Presidente della Repubblica ha il comando delle Forze armate, presiede il Consiglio supremo di difesa costituito secondo la legge, dichiara lo stato di guerra deliberato dalle Camere”.

137 Ibid.


140 C.M. Santoro (1991), La politica estera di una media potenza: l’Italia dall’Unità ad oggi, Bologna: Il Mulino. Di Camillo and Tessari (2013) differentiate between the political-strategic level (the constitutional bodies, such as the Supreme Defence Council, responsible for political guidance and control), the political-military level (the Defence Minister) and the strategic-military level (the Chief of Defence Staff, responsible for planning, deployment and use of armed forces), cf. Di Camillo and Tessari (2013), p. 4.


142 Di Camillo and Tessari (2013), p. 3.

143 Ibid., p. 5.
According to some authors, lack of a significant parliamentary debate negatively affects the identification of the national interest in specific cases.\textsuperscript{145}

Besides external structural changes, the institutional evolution of Italy’s security and defence policy also affects Italy’s stance towards the use of force and its attitude towards peace operations. This is particularly true for two branches of the executive (the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs) holding control over military/civilian/financial resources and capabilities. Accordingly, it is worthwhile in the following two sub-sections to briefly outline the structural features of Italian diplomacy and military and outline the pattern of cooperation and confrontation between the two institutions.

\textit{The Ministry of Foreign Affairs after the 2010 reform}

The conduct of a country’s foreign affairs and, as a consequence, the way it frames its strategic priorities is influenced not just by pressures from the outside, but also by the changes occurring within the decision-making structure. The reorganisation of the Italian diplomatic machinery through the bill 133/2008, which entered into force on 19 May 2010, constitutes a major bureaucratic overhaul affecting Italy’s foreign policy. This reform aims at resetting the conceptual layers of Italy’s diplomacy so as to emphasise three pillars of international action (which, therefore, complement the “three circles”, cf. next section): international security, Europe, and the “country-system” (\textit{sistema-paese}). The latter can be defined as the inner functioning and dynamics of domestic governance affecting the definition of the national interest.\textsuperscript{146}

As a consequence of the reform, the previous division between thematic and geographical directorates has been replaced by a new, less sectoral matrix based on a smaller number of DGs arranged according to thematic macro areas reflecting the main priorities of Italy’s foreign policy: Political Affairs and Security, Globalisation, Promotion of the country-


\textsuperscript{145} Di Camillo and Tessari (2013).

\textsuperscript{146} Cf. also C. Jean (2010), \textit{Italiani e forze armate}, Franco Angeli, p. 129.
system, plus two pre-existing DGs (Migration/Italians abroad and development co-operation). Compared to the previous structure, a clear division is established between the systemic vision of the Directors General and the sectoral expertise and outlook of the Deputy Directors, so as to foster an effective division of tasks and an ever smoother internal coordination and cooperation. In this picture, the role of the ambassadors has also been revised so as to introduce more autonomy and managerial tasks to foster an expansion of the delegations’ own resources, activities and effectiveness.

The Ministry of Defence since 2000: increasing interoperability to face complex threats

The Ministry of Defence has also undergone some key structural transformations, in addition to the wider process of redefining the role of the military vis-à-vis political élites and society. Adjustment pressures triggered by the end of the Cold War compelled the Italian military to adapt its structures to a new security environment, both as a means to better defend national interests and comply with new strategic requirements agreed within the Atlantic Alliance (cf. NATO strategic concept, agreed upon at the Rome Summit in 1991). Since the late-1980s / early-1990s, the reform process (called “modello Spadolini/Rognoni”) of the armed forces (with the new quantitative goal set at 190,000 units) led to the redefinition of Italy’s military means. This redefinition came in the shift from conscription recruitment to voluntary service, the transformation from static, territorial defence to a dynamic and flexible power projection capacity to meet new operational requirements in distant theatres, the integration and interoperability between armed forces (cf. lessons learned from UNIFIL Lebanon) and gender integration – including at the operational level.\textsuperscript{147} The last point was particularly significant as it involved the reorganisation of the Chiefs of Staff (\textit{vertici militari}),\textsuperscript{148} with the Head of the Military Staff (\textit{Capo di Stato Maggiore della Difesa}) placed hierarchically above the three chiefs of the armed forces, complemented by the overall rationalisation of the chain of command and a significant reduction and simplification of the bureaucracy.

\textsuperscript{147} V. Briani (ed.) (2012), \textit{La revisione dello strumento militare italiano}, Osservatorio di Politica Internazionale, Approfondimenti, No. 63, November.

\textsuperscript{148} Cf. Legge No. 25, 18 February 1997.
As defence experts have noted,\textsuperscript{149} the reform of the armed forces according to the Spadolini/Rognoni model has only partly achieved the expected results. One of the crucial hampering factors has been the drastic reduction of the military budget since 2006, aggravated by heavier cuts as a result of the recent eurozone crisis. The reform project, unveiled in February 2012 by Minister of Defence Giampaolo Di Paola, aims at overcoming these shortfalls by rebalancing (financial and human) resources while at the same time increasing the efficiency of the military. The reform complements Italy’s stance towards pooling and sharing initiatives, especially at the EU level: the strategic priority for a slimmer army would in fact be to seek close cooperation with European allies and integrate swiftly into more deeply interconnected and interoperable European military forces.\textsuperscript{150}

The key points of the reform include changes in the organisation of the Ministry of Defence (different division of tasks between operational and administrative structures and the directorates general); enhanced communication and coordination between armed forces through re-shaping the organisational procedures in the technical-administrative area; a reduction of civilian personnel (amounting to circa 10,000 units); a revision of the modernisation programmes for armaments; and more flexibility in the defence budget.

In spite of this reform impetus, the main limitation of Italy’s defence structures lies in the absence of – or disconnection with – a clear assessment of the country’s strategic goals. As Briani (2012) correctly observed, the Di Paola reform risks being inhibited by the lack of a supporting doctrine outlining the targets for Italy’s defence policy, as the last White Paper (\textit{Libro Bianco}) dates back to 2001-2002 and no reflection has been carried out in the meantime, despite changes occurring on the global stage.

\textit{The main tenets of Italy’s strategic culture}

Against this backdrop, let us now turn to the main tenets of Italy’s strategic culture in the post-bipolar international system (1989-present) and identify the way the CSDP fits into this map. Strategic culture is understood here as the compilation of beliefs and ideas a country has regarding the use of

\textsuperscript{149} Briani (2012).

force. Such ideas originate and evolve as a result of the combination of external pressures (e.g. changes in the structure of the international system) and internal responses by policy-makers and security actors who are part of the ‘security black box’ (the security policy community). These come to define the institutional confidence and processes to manage and deploy military force as part of the accepted range of legitimate and effective policy instruments.151

The consequences of the fall of fascism and the defeat in World War II were arguably a primary cause of uncertainty in the conduct of Italy’s foreign and security affairs since 1947.152 The construction of a new political system after WWII resulted, in its foreign and security policy aspect, in a troublesome relationship not only between the military and civil society, but also, and perhaps most important, between public opinion and political élites whenever the notion of ‘national interest’ cropped up in the debate. Such a troubled relationship is a key constitutive element of Italy’s strategic culture. According to Shonfield,153 Italy tends to consider itself as a small power: Italian political élites behave in a way that shows their lack of confidence towards the domestic consensus that could provide the legitimacy to support Italy’s interests in the international arena. Sartori154 accounts for the traditional “sheepishness” of Italy’s foreign policy as a function of its “pluralist polarised” political system: the lack of domestic consensus being due to the presence of one or more anti-systemic parties (e.g. the Italian Communist Party), amounting to 30-40% of the electorate and systematically opposing the government’s conduct of foreign and security policy. As a result, Italy would hide behind its allies when major decisions concerning the national interest were at stake (see, for instance, the politics of mediation and equidistance towards the Mediterranean in


the 50s-60s – Suez Crisis and Six-Day War). Some of these features persisted with the shift from the First (1948-1994) to the Second Republic (1994-present).

Santoro categorises Italy’s foreign and security policy since World War II, and hence its approach to the use of force, in three phases. The first (1949-1958) is marked by the inclusion of Italy in the Western system, the choices influenced by the need to achieve economic reconstruction after the war (cf. Italy’s interest in joining the European integration process), and the consolidation of structures instrumental to pursuing the national interest. In this regard, a tension emerged between Italy’s submission to a system of influence and hegemony dominated by the US, and the uncertainty about the country’s role in a bipolar order, namely in terms of margin for manoeuvre within the constraint exerted by Alliance obligations. The second phase goes from 1959 and 1979 and is marked by a strategy of “low profile”, characterised by a general lack of initiative and willingness to passively react to external events, partly resulting from the uncertainty described above. The third phase (1979-mid-1990s) occurs as major systemic changes and a new morphology of security affairs alter state actors’ strategic and geopolitical perspectives and, as a consequence, the military and non-military means to defend the national interest, particularly in the Mediterranean. Italy develops and deploys, in this phase, a new range of actions to meet the new structural constraints, namely a renewed emphasis and more active role in multilateral/bilateral diplomacy and political and military initiatives through the participation in peace operations with other international organisations.

Italy’s participation in peace operations is perhaps the most important novelty in the country’s strategic posture since 1945, with critical political and strategic implications. The fall of the Berlin Wall and Italy’s participation in international missions made it possible to create a ‘security culture’ that struggled to emerge beforehand. This is also thanks to a


157 Cf. pioneering interventions in Lebanon (UNIFIL) in the 1980s, the Girasole Operation in the Sicily Canal in 1986-87, envoy of officials to maintain the ceasefire between Iran and Iraq (1988) and, last but definitely not least, the participation to the Gulf War in 1990-91.
process of ‘lessons learned’ (e.g. publication of the second Libro Bianco in 1985, drafted by Minister of Defence Giovanni Spadolini, whose leadership left a critical mark on the reform) pointing out weaknesses and problems to be fixed in order to enable the Italian military instrument to meet new security challenges such as terrorism, asymmetric warfare, or piracy. The internal reform of the Ministry of Defence came as a result of these lessons learned process (cf. previous section). Externally, the armed forces have found a new raison d’être, while a window of opportunity has opened to create an enlarged space for action and reformulate the relationship with public opinion (e.g. emergence of the paradigm of the ‘good soldier’ or Italy’s engagement in promoting peace overseas). This behaviour is linked to Italy’s constant need to obtain external legitimacy to balance a general discomfort towards the openly declared use of force. This need is in turn the result of both the country’s troubled political history in the first half of the 20th century and structural weaknesses dating back to the very foundation of the Italian nation. The issue of legitimacy is codified in Article 11 of the Italian Constitution.158

Concerning the broader strategic and security trends of Italy’s foreign policy since the Cold War, they can be summarised as follows:

1. Persistence of the duality between pro-NATO and pro-European posture in Italy’s official documents and diplomatic action shared by political parties across the whole political spectrum. That being said, different governments have privileged one or the other stance. For instance, the centre-right coalition led by Silvio Berlusconi adopted a markedly pro-NATO policy, which to a certain extent proved to be to the detriment of Italy’s role in EU defence. Conversely, centre-left governments have distinctly favoured a pro-European stance (especially when part of broad coalitions including left-wing and former Communist parties, such as the Prodi government);

2. Growing support for military interventions, compared to the red pacifism of the Cold War years, although pacifist rhetoric remains significant and still shapes policy debate. As a result, Italy’s military operations are usually presented as ‘humanitarian’ and kept on a low

158 “Italy rejects war as an instrument of aggression against the freedom of other peoples and as a means for the settlement of international disputes. Italy agrees, on conditions of equality with other states, to the limitations of sovereignty that may be necessary to a world order ensuring peace and justice among the Nations. Italy promotes and encourages international organisations furthering such ends”. 
profile (e.g. 1997 Operation Alba in Albania) and the substance or duration of the commitment can be easily reconsidered, especially in the aftermath of an event producing casualties among military or civilians (e.g. attacks at Nasiriyah);

3. As a consequence of point 2, there is a strong tendency to participate in missions with non-combat and non-expeditionary components, or, when military action is required, upon endorsement of the UN or another multilateral framework (e.g. Operation Unified Protector in Libya and involvement of NATO);

4. The so-called “three circles”, which define the area of interventions considered in Italy’s primary interests and consisting of the Maghreb, Afghanistan, the Western Balkans, the Middle East, the Horn of Africa and the Gulf.

**Italy’s national interests in a changing world: Is the CSDP ‘fit for purpose’?**

The end of the ‘low profile’ phase and the renewed activism of Italy on the international scene from the mid-1990s provided Italian political élites with a new push to further define (and implement) the strategic objectives. According to former NATO Deputy Secretary General Ambassador Minuto Rizzo, the turning point was in 1994, when Italy operationally supported NATO’s intervention in the Bosnian war through air strikes in coordination with the UN. From that moment onward, Italy has participated actively in international missions, very rarely refusing to provide its support or assistance to international efforts in the field of crisis management. Italy’s public opinion has remained apprehensive of the possibility that Italian soldiers may die in the field, and are not always supportive of openly pushing for the use of force. In this picture, the participation in missions continued to be, and to a certain extent still is, justified and legitimated as internationally bound (“vincolo internazionale”), that is, under the terms of Italy’s commitment to abide by alliance or security cooperation responsibilities.

Having assessed the change of attitude towards the participation in international missions as a main feature of foreign and security policy, Italy’s strategic objectives have remained more or less stable over the past 20 years. This implies sticking to the geopolitics of the three circles, the

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159 Interview with Alessandro Minuto Rizzo, Rome, 24 October 2012.
search for a third way between Europeanists (France) and Atlanticists (UK) as concerns the design of EU security cooperation and integration, and some diversions, such as the markedly pro-US stance during the second Berlusconi cabinets II and III (2001-2006) and the pro-Israeli bias favoured by former Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Gianfranco Fini (2001-2005).

Exogenous factors – the transition towards a multipolar world, and upheaval in Europe’s and Italy’s southern neighbourhood – pushed Italian policy-makers to redefine the geographic and thematic areas of strategic interest. Fieldwork interviews with multiple stakeholders carried out in October 2012 in Rome led to the findings summarised below:

1. Geographical areas of strategic interest

   Answers to the question “What are Italy’s priority areas – that is, places where the national interest is at stake and where therefore intervention by means of force is desirable, sought or necessary, even as a last resort?”, were similar, with no significant variation among interviewees’ understanding of Italy’s national interest. The areas below are listed according to the importance assigned by interviewees:
   - Mediterranean
   - Russia
   - United States – transatlantic relations
   - Horn of Africa
   - Balkans
   - Sahel

   It must be noted that the Sahel figures as a new entry and is due to both the expansion of al-Qaeda in that region and, most importantly, the possible repercussions that might have on Libya’s fragile reconstruction.

2. Thematic areas of interest

   Regarding thematic areas of national interest, the questions put to interviewees aimed to unpack those areas more closely related to EU defence. The following answers are not in order of priority:
   - Defence industry (associated with solutions to overcome defence budget cuts: cf. pooling & sharing);
   - EU military and civilian capacity building, including training programmes, as well as EU mentoring and monitoring missions in third countries;
• CSDP Institutions and structures for crisis management response (e.g. EEAS);
• Comprehensive approach and integration of defence capacities.

More generally, it should be noted that since the early 2010s Italy’s national interest has become intrinsically linked to the gap between Europe’s weaknesses and the transition towards what is fast becoming a multi-polar balance of power. To tackle these challenges effectively, a medium power such as Italy firmly supports deeper integration in the EU and the consolidation of the instruments for economic and fiscal governance (e.g. the Fiscal Compact). This approach is intended to cope with austerity constraints, but also to pursue a more consistent and solid political union, able to maintain standards of living in Europe and bring stability to areas or regions outside it.

**Italy and the CSDP: More than this?**

We conclude this chapter by analysing how the post-Lisbon CSDP fits into the mapping of Italy’s current strategic culture and national interest.

First, it is important to note that participation in the CSDP is not limited to missions. As with any other policy field, security entails not just operational commitments, but also institutional processes (creation of new structures for crisis management or reform of existing ones) and capacity-building (such as the Headline Goal process), both to be associated with a specific vision of the shape and tasks of CSDP. In that respect, Italy’s role in the CSDP since its creation has been characterised by strong support for the creation of integrated civil-military structures for crisis management. This has been demonstrated, for instance, in the case of the Civil-Military Cell\(^{160}\) or Italy’s proactive engagement in the reform of the EEAS crisis structures for the planning and conduct of crisis management, in view of the 2013 European Council’s session on Defence.\(^{161}\) The Italian MFA and MoD consider the EU comprehensive approach a priority to bring coherence and effectiveness in CSDP initiatives from the planning phase all the way down to the theatres of operation.\(^{162}\) These concerns are reflected in a document titled “More Europe”, jointly drafted by the Italian MFA and MoD in

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\(^{160}\) Quille et al. (2006).

\(^{161}\) Interview, 11 October 2012.

\(^{162}\) Interview, 18 October 2012.
The paper delineates Italy’s commitment to the advancement of the security and defence dimensions of EU integration through the enhancement of military structures, operations and capacities. The document served as a basis for the discussions leading to the 15 November 2012 Paris Declaration of the Weimar Plus group (France, Germany, Poland, Spain and Italy).

Italy’s rationale for supporting a CSDP based on comprehensive structures and procedures can be accounted for on two endogenous levels, a technical and a political one. First, as far as the technical motivation is concerned, Italy’s emphasis on the comprehensive approach results from the progress made over the past ten years by the Italian military. This progress has been towards creating better synergies and integration among the three components of the armed forces, to cope with changed operational needs (cf. first section). Italy welcomes a holistic CSDP because it fits in well with its own multidimensional and integrated tools for crisis management – whereas a hardcore-military or purely civilian CSDP would not be in line with the MoD agenda.

Secondly, this attitude proceeds from a diplomatic and political balancing act, the choice to find a ‘third way’, or mediation between the French vision (a militarily integrated Europe) and the UK’s pro-Atlantic stance (refusal of any duplication or decoupling of European defence and soft or civilian understanding of the CSDP). Italy’s strategic culture and preferences are somewhat in the middle ground, although it must be said that over the past four years the discourse has turned markedly toward the EU. Beyond this rhetoric, however, Italy’s foreign and security policy remains well balanced between the two organisations. As one official put it, Italy uses the same assets for both NATO and the EU, which makes coordination and effective synchronisation of multilateral efforts across these two actors desirable, in order to avoid mismanagement and waste of

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163 Interview, 17 October 2012.
164 Cf. also Speech of Minister of Defence Giampaolo di Paola to the Italian Parliament, 6 December 2012 (http://www.difesa.it/Primo_Piano/Pagine/Difesa_europea.aspx).
resources. A clear consequence is that Italy rejects the notion of a neat divide between a soft-power CSDP and a hard-power NATO as advocated by other countries.

Against this backdrop, interviews confirm that under the leadership of Minister of Defence Di Paola, Italy’s CSDP agenda has moved in the direction of more assertive political action aimed at achieving a higher degree of Europeanisation in the defence sector. This is seen in three respects: i) capabilities (pooling and sharing), ii) structures (command and control) and iii) interoperability (at the operational level). This is also an explicit message contained in the agenda “More Europe” (cf. above), which was reportedly inspired by the experience gained through Italy’s participation in previous multilateral operations (UNIFIL) and by the structure of the UN Department for Peacekeeping Operations (DPO), considered more suitable to deal with multidimensional and integrated requirements than the current design of the EEAS.

As far as Italy’s attitude towards CSDP missions and, in general, the participation to the EU’s operational efforts overseas, interviews show that a clear trend in the Italian governments’ foreign policies has been one of restraining from blocking the launch of EU missions when Italy’s national interest was not at stake and playing this cooperative behaviour as diplomatic leverage when deciding on missions in areas where the national interest is affected. All interviewees (hence both representatives of government agencies and corporate actors) agree that the Horn of Africa, the Western Balkans, the Middle East and North Africa region (MENA) and the Sahel are regions where Italy’s concerns are more significant. They also concur that when deciding to intervene in these areas, there is no “a priori” choice between the EU and NATO; quite the opposite, Italy’s official stance is to find complementarities between the two (cf. Horn of Africa, where maritime control and capacity building are implemented through a partnership between NATO and EU missions). And, if a choice is needed, it is decided on the basis of appropriateness (e.g. privilege NATO in those cases where established planning and conduct structures are required, cf.

166 Interview, 11 October 2012.
167 Interview, 22 October 2012.
168 Interview, 17 October 2012.
169 Interview, 22 October 2012.
Libya). Some, however, criticise the fact that Italian administrations have been unable, thus far, to push EU partners to prioritise the Mediterranean basin as the core ‘business’ for CSDP, and EU foreign policy in general. The Neighbourhood policy, for instance, has mostly gone East, whereas Italy’s interests are southward. Furthermore, Italy’s lack of strategic and political leadership in the case of the Libyan intervention is seen as an échec, both before (diplomatic efforts to avoid military intervention) and after the campaign (cf. Italy has for a long time supported the establishment of an SSR mission in Libya, without getting the Council and EU partners to agree on anything concrete). This criticism and the claim that Italy could “do more” with regards the strategic direction of the CSDP is perhaps too harsh. Sahel makes a good case. Italy has, since the beginning, stressed the need for a strategic approach to EU security policies in the Sahel region. It has drawn particular attention to the synergies between the EU, the Maghreb and the Sahel, a triangle seen as a matter of national security by Italian policy-makers. Initially very careful about the ‘defence’ dimension, and having strong reservations about putting boots on the ground, Italy’s attitude eventually changed to strongly advocating for a substantial EU commitment to capacity building, training, mentoring, which now constitutes the cornerstone of the Strategy for the Sahel and related missions such as EUCAP Sahel or EUTM Mali. The EU stabilisation and post-conflict interventions in the Balkans (Macedonia, Bosnia, Kosovo), and in particular CSDP’s ‘test’ missions to learn by doing have also received wide support in Rome.

Two final aspects of Italy’s role in the CSDP worth spending a couple of lines on are the reform of EEAS structures for crisis management and the issue of pooling and sharing of military capabilities. These aspects are as important as missions and geopolitical considerations insofar as they

170 Ibid.
171 Interview, 17 October 2012.
172 Interview, 22 October 2012.
174 Asked why activities such as capacity building, training and mentoring occupy such an important role in EU missions, an Italian diplomat answered quite bluntly that “these solutions make a consensus among 27 member states possible – it would be much harder in the case of traditional military interventions (read Battlegroups deployment)”.


significantly determine the shape and future effectiveness of CSDP and are currently on top of member states’ agendas in view of the December 2013 summit.

Let us start from the problem of structures. Interviews with officials at the Italian MoD and high ranking diplomats in the MFA reveal that the Italian government would be in favour of a revision of the institutional structures in charge of developing a comprehensive approach-based security policy. As the Paris Declaration states:

“The European Union should be willing and able to shoulder its responsibilities in areas where its security interests and values are at stake (...) The ongoing reform of the crisis management procedures and the forthcoming EEAS review should enable the EU to act timely and effectively on the whole spectrum of crisis management actions (...) We are convinced that the EU must set up, within a framework yet to be defined, true civilian-military structures to plan and conduct missions and operations and build a higher degree of synergy between the EEAS and the Commission in order to ensure their success”.

In a nutshell, it means that current structures (the Crisis Management and Planning Directorate above all) are not judged by Italian policy-makers to be sufficiently reliable to implement a comprehensive approach in the way an integrated command and control structure could do.

Concerning pooling and sharing, Italian policy-makers are balanced. On the declaratory level, all interviewees recognise the need to rationalise defence spending and see initiatives under the EDA as the most appropriate means to achieve this goal. When going into detail, there seems to be no clear or shared understanding about how to frame pooling and sharing in the EU (islands of cooperation, permanent structured cooperation, and the increased role of the Commission), besides the commonsensical awareness that carrying out P&S projects among all 28 member states is nearly impossible. Similarly, there seems to be no apparent common preference for NATO Smart Defence programmes and EU/EDA pooling and sharing, but the awareness that complementarity between the two is crucial to the success of industrial development in European defence.

Conclusion

For a country that published its last version of the *White Paper* more than ten years ago, Italy has a relatively clear vision of its role within the CSDP framework. Its vision for the future of the CSDP is spelled out in the 2013 “More Europe” initiative designed to convince European and Atlantic partners that a stronger European defence would make it easier to fulfil the obligations coming from the Atlantic Alliance. Italy’s vision of European defence includes a strong emphasis on the comprehensive approach, featuring the integration and coordination of civilian and military structures for the planning and conduct of crisis management. Italy seeks a balanced division of labour between NATO and the EU as regards the use of military force in complex theatres and, in particular, in terms of capacity-building (complementarity between EU-pooling and sharing and NATO-Smart Defence), from R&D to procurement and investments in high tech and dual use production. Most importantly, Italy acts as a ‘moderator’, seeking a third way between hard-liners, Europeanist member states willing to establish a military core to move forward with defence integration (e.g. France) and Atlanticists looking to the EU as an organisation that could provide a ‘soft-power’ value added to complement NATO’s provision of hard security (e.g. the United Kingdom).

Beyond that official rhetoric, however, a critical overview of Italy’s involvement in European security shows that more could be expected by the fourth largest military in the EU, both in terms of contribution to missions and overall support for defence integration efforts. Furthermore, the practical implications of Italy’s third way, and the way this balanced approach can serve the refinement of Europe’s security architecture, are far from evident, given the country’s political and diplomatic record thus far. This is especially true in those areas where the national interest is at stake, as shown by the EU inaction in Libya and Mali and, more generally, the lack of prioritisation – and impact – of the EU’s strategic interests in the southern Mediterranean. In this sense, more Italy could plausibly serve as an impetus to achieve more Europe.
POLAND: AN ACTIVE NEOPHYTE AT THE EU COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY
JOANNA DOBROWOLSKA-POLAK

Abstract
Poland stands as a new, active and responsible CSDP stakeholder. In the last five years, the Polish government has transformed the country’s approach to the Common Security and Defence Policy and decided to increase the country’s engagement in CSDP development, with a view to creating effective common defence and strengthening Europe’s capabilities in crisis management operations.

Prior to its accession to the EU and in the early years of its membership, Poland was extremely sceptical about the idea of developing Europe’s defence capabilities, which were presented as an alternative to NATO’s manner of ensuring security in the region. Due to changes in the Polish security environment and a concurrent refocusing of US foreign policy priorities, which could have impacted NATO’s role in transatlantic area, Poland recognised the need to develop and strengthen an alternative security system to NATO. The Polish government appreciated the opportunity to cooperate within the CSDP framework and began to engage in building Europe’s defence and security capabilities, aspiring to a leading role in its development.

The purpose of this chapter is to define the role of the EU Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) in ensuring the security of the Polish state and its citizens; to identify the most likely evolution of Poland’s activity within the CSDP, and to specify the type of actions that Poland might undertake while implementing the provisions of the policy.
Introduction

Poland is a relatively new member of western integration structures. Throughout the Cold War, the country was part of the Eastern Bloc and its organisations – the Warsaw Pact and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA). In 1989, the Polish state started to undergo a systemic transformation. Poland gained its independence from the Soviet Union and contributed to the collapse of the communist bloc, with the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the CMEA.

During the transformation period, the structure of Poland’s foreign policy – including the goals and methods for ensuring national security – underwent major changes. Poland adopted new principles upon which its policies were based and by which the main issues were defined. Subsequent governments were equally focused on pursuing the main goals of Poland’s foreign and security policy and establishing a place for the nation in political and economic organisations, and in transatlantic alliances. In 1999 and 2004, Poland fulfilled the most important goals of its policy by joining the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU), respectively. During the accession processes, the government had to adjust its national security policy to the general approach and strategy of the two organisations. Over the years of its NATO and EU membership, Poland has made efforts to influence the content and shape of the two organisations’ security policies and to shift its role from user of the common security system to active participant in the process of enhancing effective security within the alliance structure.

The purpose of this study is to define the role of the EU Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) in ensuring the security of the Polish state and its citizens, to identify the most likely evolution of Poland’s activity within CSDP, and to specify the type of actions that Poland might undertake while implementing the provisions of the policy.

Fulfilling these aims requires the delineation of the key assumptions and main characteristics of Poland’s national strategic culture and the identification of strategic national interests. It is also necessary to analyse Poland’s approach to CSDP thus far, and to consider the scope of Poland’s involvement in actions ensuring peace and security in the world (mainly peacekeeping operations and stabilisation missions), which are one of the EU member states’ undertakings within CSDP.
National strategic culture

Polish security interests are based on the assumption that there is a need to build a cohesive Western security system consisting of complementary organisations, namely the EU and NATO, in which the US – Europe’s transatlantic partner – plays a stabilising role. Poland is in favour of an integrated approach to shaping the security of European countries. Such an approach implies viewing transatlantic area security comprehensively and striving to develop effective military capabilities of European countries within CSDP, implemented both within the framework of the EU and of NATO. To ensure Poland’s security, it is essential to preserve and strengthen the defence potential of both NATO and the EU, while efficiently reacting to contemporary asymmetric threats. For this reason, Poland is calling for close cooperation between the two organisations, as well the formation of ‘dual purpose’ armed forces trained both to defend member state territories and to react in crisis areas.

Evolution of Poland's strategic security assumptions

After the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, Poland and other Central and Eastern European countries were left without any treaties of alliance. By 1999, Poland was in a so-called ‘security void’. Due to the country’s historical experiences, Polish governments accorded the highest priority to ensuring national security against external threats and decided do this mainly through integration with western political, military and economic structures (i.e. NATO and the EU), and by establishing regional and local initiatives to stabilise security (e.g. the Weimar Triangle, the Central European Initiative, the Visegrád Group and the Council of the Baltic Sea States).

The main reasons Poland strove for integration with Western structures were to ensure the inviolability of its territory and to secure its sovereignty. Since joining NATO in 1999, Poland has therefore largely been in favour of reinforcing the obligations that lie at the foundation of the alliance and has lobbied for enhancing the defence capabilities of member

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states. According to the latest National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland,

“it is in Poland’s interest to see the North Atlantic Alliance remain as an instrument of collective defence of member states, while at the same time adapting its civilian and military capabilities to counteract new threats”.\(^{177}\)

When Poland joined the Western integration structures, it saw NATO as the chief guarantee of security. The EU was considered less important in establishing guarantees within the traditional (political and military) dimensions of security. Alongside the intensification in the development of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy, followed by CSDP, and in parallel with the changes taking place in the international arena, Poland began to recognise the potentially important role of EU security guarantees. The process was reinforced when EU member states adopted the Lisbon Treaty and its mutual assistance clause (Article 42.7).

Changes in how the involvement of the US was judged worldwide played an important role in the way Poland saw NATO and the EU as providers of security guarantees in Europe. During the Cold War and in the first decade of systemic transition, Poland saw the US military presence in Europe as a guarantee of stability and considered this transatlantic partnership to be a key element in establishing the security of European countries. Changes in US policy after the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks – including the increase of its involvement in the Middle East, but also in the Asia and Pacific region – led Poland to conclude that US intervention in these key regions could use up so much of their capacity (and will for international engagement) that European countries (including Poland), if in danger, might not receive the support they had expected. “Whether the United States will be able to come to our aid in every situation is uncertain”.\(^{178}\) At the same time, it was observed that the US ‘war on terror’ had led to cooperation with Russia, about which Polish diplomats were sceptical (especially in the early years of the 21st century) and in which they perceived a threat of the post-Soviet area falling under Russia’s ‘counter-terrorist’ control. Poland also feared the long-term effects


of taking Russian interests into account – more often than necessary, from Poland’s point of view – during NATO debates on security. Also, US intervention in Iraq as part of its war on terrorism, though supported by Poland, actually led to a redefining of Polish policy values. The divisions in NATO caused by the intervention, as well as German-French opposition to the action, revealed the divergence in interests of the two transatlantic partners, and were interpreted as a threat to alliance cohesion, which is so important for Poland. ‘Alliance cohesion’ and ‘meeting treaty obligations’ to the US were the main reasons for Poland becoming involved in the operations in Iraq. The same reasons were given when supporting the idea to deploy a missile defence system in Europe.

The change in US foreign policy under Barack Obama’s administration, chiefly an improvement in relations with France and Germany and the relinquishment of plans for deploying a missile defence system, spurred Poland to reflect on the desirability of its reliance on the US as the overriding NATO ally. Poland modified its perceptions of the US and started to see it as a main ally, but one of many in NATO.

Currently, Poland’s security is still based on three pillars: active participation in NATO (as the main guarantee of territorial defence), developing the EU’s capacity for effective defence and crisis response, as well as a strategic partnership with the USA (according to the Polish government, the US “will remain a crucial actor in the area of international security”\(^\text{179}\)). The weight attached to each pillar has changed, though.

**Use of armed forces out-of-area**

Changes in the international environment have resulted in changes in Poland’s national strategic culture, as has the evolution of key principles of this culture. As a member of alliance structures, Poland initially planned to use force in situations defined in *casus foederis* (the Washington Treaty) and was sceptical about out-of-area operations. EU missions were also seen as an additional activity of secondary importance.\(^\text{180}\) Although Poland


stressed the importance of providing aid to the victims of massive attacks and stabilising areas of crisis, it concentrated its activities mainly within the framework of the UN.

Despite taking part in NATO’s and the EU’s out-of-area missions, for a long time Poles have opposed the two organisations’ enhanced involvement outside their areas. They have argued that these operations impair the implementation of the collective defence principle. Today, this belief is shared by most military decision-makers. In their opinion, the main role of armed forces is to defend the territory of a state (and its allies) against external attacks. They accept the idea of out-of-area crisis response operations in the event of asymmetric threats to security and allow for the use of armed forces in peacekeeping operations and humanitarian interventions in which civilians experience (or are threatened with) violence that results (or may result) in massive violations of human rights or humanitarian law. Yet they stress that these response operations should be restricted to the immediate vicinity of Europe. Polish politicians (irrespective of which political party they belong to) are more inclined than military officials to send Polish troops on an out-of-area mission. They believe that currently there are no direct political, military or societal threats to the territory of Poland, and they that it is necessary for Poland to meet treaty obligations, which they regard as offering support for their allies in reinforcing their security through promoting Western values and beliefs abroad, defending an ally against terrorist attacks by taking control of weak and failing states' territories, preventing the proliferation of instability outside the crisis area, and preventing attacks on civilians and massive migrations. They also stress the need to achieve the goals that are desirable not only in Western states but in the international arena, such as promoting democracy, human rights and self-determination, which are presented as main motivations for undertaking out-of-area action. In the case of Afghanistan, for example, where Poland undertook military intervention to meet its alliance obligations and eliminate the threat to (primarily US) security, politicians declared the need to defend Afghans (especially Afghan women) against violence from the Taliban as the major motivation for the operation. However, prior to 2001, there was no talk in Poland about the need to help the Afghans. Even now, politicians rarely mention the situation of underprivileged Afghan women.

The internal dispute between military decision-makers (who wish to limit out-of-area missions and highlight the need to improve the skills of soldiers in the defence of Polish territory) and politicians (who opt for training rapid reaction forces used in out-of-area operations) has been
resolved with a temporary compromise: the government has taken a decision on developing ‘dual purpose’ forces, ready to take on both actions. This solution does not mean that the internal dispute is coming to an end, however. Representatives of the military still claim that in the current situation of limited military funding, Poland should restrict its out-of-area missions because they are conducted at the expense of reforms to the Polish army. According to Polish Foreign Policy Priorities (PFPP) 2012-2016: “Poland, which will maintain its spending at the level of 1.95% of GDP for the next few years, should be – in NATO and EU – an advocate of preserving defence potential in Europe”. The clauses generally provide for crisis management operations and the deployment of military forces in Europe, Asia and Africa. However, due to the beliefs of political and military elites, and for practical (mainly financial) reasons, the use of armed forces is restricted to regions close to the EU and NATO, i.e. the Balkans, the South Caucasus and the Middle East, which are regions of key importance for Polish national interests.

Poland has participated in international missions to maintain or restore international peace and security since 1953, and has been an active contributor to peacekeeping missions since 1973. To date, more than 80,000 Polish soldiers, police officers and civilian and military observers have taken part in peacekeeping missions. Until 1999, Poland mainly concentrated its peacekeeping activities within the framework of the UN. Over the last decades, due to its accession to NATO and the EU, the country has changed this view. In 1997-99, Poland was top of the list of UN member states engaged in peacekeeping operations (as of 31 November 1998, 1,053 uniformed and civilian Poles were working in UN missions), despite having a sizeable contingent concurrently involved in NATO’s SFOR and KFOR operations. As of 31 December 2012, ten representatives of Poland were working in UN missions. This decrease is a consequence of an evaluation of the usefulness of UN, NATO and EU peacemaking missions that was carried out in the context of pursuing Poland’s national interests. As a result of this process, missions have been organised into a hierarchy. NATO and EU missions were given precedence for ensuring the state’s security. These were followed by missions carried out under the banner of the UN, and then by the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in

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181 Council of Ministers of the Republic of Poland (2012), op. cit., p. 14 (translation from Polish). The official English version states that: “Poland (…) should advocate preserving Europe’s defence potential”.

Europe (OSCE) missions. Anti-terrorist missions and interventions, dependent only on current political will, were not included in the prioritisation process. The gradation of peacekeeping missions has proved to be decisive in deciding on the deployment of Polish military units outside the country over the last decade.

Concurrently with UN and NATO operations – under NATO missions over the last ten years, Poland has deployed its main contingents within ISAF Afghanistan (up to 2600 soldiers) and KFOR (up to 285)\(^\text{182}\) – Poland has also been contributing personnel to EU missions. The country expressed its willingness to participate in EU operations even before it joined the Union, partly as a way to confirm that it was ready to take on the obligations as an ally. The main reason for this, however, can be seen in the scope of the operations to which Poland contributes (Poland supports democracy changes, respect for human rights and political, societal and economic transitions) and their locations (stabilisation of Europe was one of Poland’s national interests). These two elements were decisive for Poland taking part in the first EU operations.

More precisely, Poland took part in the following completed CSDP operations: EUFOR Concordia (EU military operation in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia), EUPOL Proxima (EU Police Mission in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia), EUPM Bosnia i Hercegowina (EU Police Mission), EUJUST THEMIS (EU Rule of Law Mission in Georgia), EUFOR RD Congo and EUFOR TCHAD/RCA. Of the completed missions, the most difficult was EUFOR TCHAD/RCA, not only due to the scope of tasks included in the mandate, but also the extremely demanding climate and infrastructure conditions in the mission area. As of 31 December 2013, Poland was still engaged in the following missions: EUFOR-Althea (EU military operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina) with up to 50 soldiers, EUBAM Moldova/Ukraine (EU Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine) with 16 experts on missions, EUMM Georgia (EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia) with 25 experts on missions, EUPOL Afghanistan (European Union Police Mission in Afghanistan) with 3 policemen, EULEX Kosovo (EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo) with around 100 policemen in a Formed Police Unit and about 10 experts, and

\(^{182}\) The source for data on Polish engagement in NATO and EU operations is the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland.
EUNAVFOR ATALANTA Somalia (European Union Naval Force ATALANTA) with 2 officers in Command in Northwood.

From an institutional point of view, in accordance with formal and legal regulations, Polish armed forces can be deployed abroad in order to defend a state and its allies (by doing so, Poland meets the obligations covered by Article 5 of the Washington Treaty and Article 42.7 of the Lisbon Treaty) and to restore stability in a crisis area through crisis response operations and anti-terrorist operations carried out by NATO, the EU, the OSCE, the UN and coalitions of “willing states”. The Polish Ministry of Defence allows for involvement in the following out-of-area operations: peacemaking, conflict prevention, peacekeeping, peace-building, peace enforcement, humanitarian relief, support to humanitarian operations, support to disaster relief, search and rescue, support to non-combatant evacuation operations, extraction operations, military aid/support to civil authorities, enforcement of sanctions and embargoes.\(^{183}\) The Ministry of Defence also allows the following operations against terrorism: anti-terrorist, consequence management and counter-terrorism.\(^{184}\) The use of armed forces overseas is allowed both on a long-term basis (with troop rotation) and in the short term (no rotation), in accordance with the perceived need. The rules concerning the use of force by the Polish army outside the country (in out-of-area missions) are restrictive, however. In practice, stabilisation missions and peacekeeping operations may only involve reactive measures, in proportion to the needs of the local population and with full respect for humanitarian law.

The deployment of Polish troops in missions abroad is precisely governed by the instruments of the country’s national law. The legal basis for the use or stationing of the armed forces of the Republic of Poland was set by the Act on Principles of Use or Stay of Polish Armed Forces outside the Country as of 1998. Under its regulations, the use of military forces in armed conflicts, alliance operations, peacemaking operations and anti-terrorist operations outside Poland is authorised by the president at the request of the government (in the first three cases) or the prime minister (in the last case). The stationing of armed forces outside Poland during search,


\(^{184}\) Ibid.
rescue or humanitarian operations is authorised by the minister in charge of the units that are to take part in the operation (the foreign minister or the defence minister).  

Although in 1999 Poland participated in a humanitarian intervention in Kosovo that had no authorisation from the UN Security Council, followed by the 2001 (Afghanistan) and 2003 (Iraq) abuses of the right to military intervention, it also limited its support for humanitarian intervention. The 2005 World Summit confined the “responsibility to protect” formerly proposed by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty to actions authorised by the UN Security Council, and Poland accepted that restriction. The 2007 Polish National Security Strategy declared support for the development of the “responsibility to protect” concept, and its readiness to make efforts to “adapt the UN to the changing international situation”. Poland is also in favour of strengthening the role played by the UN Security Council in preserving peace and security. Thus, Poland is currently in favour of cooperation on the basis of laws, treaties and rules, within the framework of the UN, NATO and the EU. Furthermore, with regard to NATO, Poland attaches special weight to instances of all allies acting in concert, perceiving NATO as a basis for the collective defence of European countries, while in the EU Poland accepts – in accordance with the Lisbon Treaty – cooperation between individual states willing to enhance CSDP.

Main national interests

Contemporary national interests – as perceived by state authorities and political and military elites – are based on an overall concept of state security. The set of values that must be preserved and protected includes vital national interests, such as state independence and sovereignty, territorial integrity and inviolability of borders, freedom, security, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and democratic political order. The national interests of importance for Poland also comprise: protection of the natural environment in sustainable civilisation and

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187 Ibid.
economic development, the growth of a more prosperous society and the protection of national heritage and identity. Other significant Polish national interests involve efforts to ensure that the state maintains a strong international position and is capable of effectively promoting Polish interests abroad, strengthening the effectiveness of the international organisations and institutions in which Poland participates, and the development of international relations based on respect for law and multilateral cooperation in line with the goals and principles laid down in the UN Charter. Basic documents on national security also call for “building an integrated social community” involving the state and its institutions and the nation as a whole, but also socio-economic growth and the well-being of individual citizens. The pursuit of these national interests and goals is accomplished through measures the state undertakes at home and in the international arena.

In accordance with the Polish Foreign Policy Priorities 2012-2016, adopted by the Council of Ministers in 2012, it is in Poland’s interests to:

1. Strengthen the European Union by:
   a. pursuing deeper European integration, both in area of politics and security (“hopefully, the European Union will eventually become a political union”);190
   b. enhancing EU economic competitiveness;
   c. maintaining solidarity among member states (especially with respect to eliminating disproportion in development levels, common energy policy and climate change); and
   d. implementing the policy of openness, with special respect to:
      i. continuing the processes of EU enlargement, which even at the stage of preparing for future membership of the EU, create favourable conditions for expanding the sphere of stability in Europe and its neighbourhood. Poland especially supports the accession aspirations of Ukraine, Moldavia, the western Balkan states, the South Caucasus and Turkey.


ii. strengthening the process of political and socio-economic modernisation in the EU’s immediate neighbourhood (especially in the Eastern Partnership countries) and stabilising the neighbourhood within the framework of the European Neighbourhood Policy. At the same time, Poland emphasises that Mediterranean countries must not be supported at the cost of Eastern Europe and South Caucasus.

iii. emphasising the global role of the EU (with an effective instrument: the European External Action Service),

iv. developing CSDP, as a result of which the EU should acquire military and civil capabilities that will “beneficially complement the transatlantic security system”. Developing CSDP is regarded as crucial; Poland sees it as an important contribution to the main goal of strengthening the EU.

v. developing the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice.

2. Reinforce a stable transatlantic order by:

   a. maintaining NATO’s reliability as a defence alliance;

   b. developing the EU’s autonomous capabilities with respect to resource and security-building measures – independent and complimentary to those of NATO;

   c. preserving close relations with the US, which is still viewed by Poland as a “crucial actor in the area of international security”;

   d. participation in mutual confidence-building measures between the west and Russia;

   e. close cooperation with Ukraine and other countries in eastern Europe and South Caucasus; and

   f. counteracting the so-called new threats to security, such as terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, cyber attacks, manipulation of energy supplies, and risk of destabilisation from countries recognised as failed or fragile.

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191 Ibid. p. 12.

192 Ibid., “For the EU, the development of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice – which will be a prolonged process – are crucial.”

3. Increase the level of dynamics in regional cooperation and maintain positive results with neighbours by:
   a. maintaining the high level of bilateral relations with Germany and France (Poland’s key partners in Europe), also thanks to the Weimar Triangle, which “is intended to add substance to CSDP” (in the frame of Lisbon Treaty’s willing states coalition) and “to formulate a cohesive EU eastern policy”;\(^\text{194}\)
   b. supporting reform-oriented measures in eastern Europe (mainly in Belarus, Ukraine, Moldavia) and in the South Caucasus (especially in Georgia), increasing the dynamics of bilateral relations with Ukraine and maintaining good, pragmatic relations with Russia;
   c. developing relations with Sweden, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, supporting measures taken by the Council of the Baltic Sea States;
   d. fostering the cooperation of the Visegrad Group countries (Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary) and extending the Visegrad Group to include Baltic States (Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia) as well as Bulgaria, Romania and Ukraine; and
   e. supporting modernisation and democratisation efforts in North Africa by sharing systemic transformation models.

4. Promote democracy and human rights:
   a. in the Eastern Partnership states, which will receive over 60% of development aid funds;
   b. by supporting the operations of the European Endowment for Democracy;
   c. by supporting the operations of the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe. This element of the national interests is strongly influenced by values, which are a cornerstone of Polish culture:
      i. the need for respect for human dignity, basic human rights and freedoms,

\(^{194}\) Ibid., p. 17.
ii. the importance of providing individuals, groups, societies and nations with the freedom to choose their own way of development,

iii. the necessity to support those who find themselves in a difficult situation (facing mass violations of human rights and living under non-democratic rule), which is connected with the idea of solidarity and recognising Poland’s obligation to make symbolic repayment for the aid it received during the Cold War.

5. Build a positive image of Poland in the world.

6. Support the Polish diaspora and Poles living abroad.

7. Modernise Polish diplomatic posts. Current parameters of the state’s security interests mentioned above are still heavily influenced by Poland’s traumatic and tragic war-time and Cold War experiences (markedly different from those of western states). In Poland’s thinking about national interests, the following are therefore still present:

a. A fear of being the subject of an agreement between other countries, resulting in a strong aspiration to continue to develop the European and transatlantic strategic culture and the security-building measures taken on the continent.

b. A belief that it is essential to create multiple guarantees in terms of national security.

c. A strong belief that alliance obligations must be kept.

d. A conviction that it is essential to form multilateral agreements on security, regarded as being more effective and more reliable than bilateral ones.

e. A fear of particular member states’ interests taking priority over the common interests of the EU, which implies the breach of solidarity within the Union.

f. A fear of approval being granted to spheres of influence being established by superpowers (mainly a fear that western European states will view the area of eastern Europe as within the Russian

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sphere of influence) and a fear of Russia regaining its superpower status.

g. Strong pro-Americanism (which has been declining in the past few years).

Poland’s approach to CSDP

Poland has changed its approach to CSDP considerably over recent years. Prior to its accession to the EU and in the early years of its membership, Poland was extremely sceptical about the idea of developing Europe’s defence capabilities, presented as an alternative to NATO’s manner of ensuring security in the region. Poland was more in favour of the European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) concept, proposed within the framework of the North Atlantic Alliance. The proposals to create a common security system of EU states – outlined in the 1993 Maastricht Treaty, designed in the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty and specified in the conclusions of the 1999 Cologne and Helsinki European Council and the Feira Council of 2000 – were seen as a threat to the cohesion of the transatlantic union and received no support whatsoever from Poland. Poles were against the idea of creating parallel military structures to NATO or building independent military capabilities in the EU. They saw them as an attempt to minimise US involvement in actions taken on the European continent, which they found to be at odds with the national raison d’état.

While negotiating its accession to the EU, the Polish government, obliged to approve the assumptions of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) outlined by the EU member states in 1998, formally adopted the CFSP common positions while remaining sceptical.196 Poland approved of the EU crisis management operations (in 2000, the country contributed a considerable contingent of more than 1,500 soldiers to the EU Rapid Reaction Force), but was reluctant to build a European security system as an alternative to the transatlantic one.197 In 2000, Poland’s National Security


197 “Common European Security and Defence Policy should not duplicate the role of NATO or weaken the transatlantic alliance", President A. Kwasniewski's
Strategy incorporated the idea of establishing a place for the state in the EU’s political and military structures (as a consequence of the accession process). This did not change the Polish viewpoint, however. During the implementation by the EU of the 2001 Nice Treaty provisions, and the EU-NATO negotiations on EU access to NATO’s planning and command facilities, Poland (like Turkey) remained sceptical about the idea. Although Poland backed the launch of the EU’s first CSDP military mission (Concordia in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia), this was not a guarantee of full approval of CSDP, but was an expression of Poland’s willingness to take joint action with its partners. While working on the treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe (signed in 2004), Poland – in line with the national security assumptions at the time – opted for the North Atlantic Alliance to have primacy over the EU in developing European countries’ security. Neither the new CSDP regulations outlined in the Constitution for Europe (including the mutual defence clause and solidarity clause, desirable under the Polish raison d’état), nor the initial provisions of the 2007 Lisbon Treaty changed Poland’s position on this matter.198

Poland has changed its view on CSDP and expressed its political will to take advantage of its solutions following events in the international arena in parallel with the evolving CSDP concept. Among these were, in particular, conflicts in the immediate neighbourhood of the EU in the Caucasus in 2008, and then in the Middle East and Maghreb. However, the new hierarchy of US foreign policy priorities can be seen as the main reason for this reorientation of Polish national policy. The change at the helm of the Polish state was also not without significance. The new government, headed by Donald Tusk, appreciated the opportunity to cooperate within the CSDP framework and began to actively engage in building Europe’s defence and security capabilities, aspiring to a leading role in its development. Poland supported France’s efforts to effectively reform CSDP and in 2010, together with France and Germany acting within the framework of the Weimar Triangle, urged EU Foreign Relations Chief


198 Scepticism has been expressed by, among others, K. Marcinkiewicz (in, for example, the Exposé of the prime minister on 10 November 2005) and J. Kaczyński (in, for example, the Exposé of prime minister on 10 July 2006).
Catherine Ashton to boost the efficacy of the Lisbon Treaty implementation.

In his 2011 annual address, Poland’s Foreign Minister, Radosław Sikorski, articulated Poland’s goal to develop the Common Foreign and Security Policy, including CSDP, so that

“when blood is shed yet again in our neighbourhood – like it was in the Balkans in the 1990s, Europe should speak the language of diplomacy, backed by force”.\(^{199}\)

In 2012, the Polish government repeated this goal, adding that EU diplomacy must be backed with “efficient force”.\(^{200}\)

Boosting the effectiveness of the EU defence capabilities was also one of the priorities of the Polish presidency of the EU in the second half of 2011 and many of the presidency’s tasks focused on CSDP. Polish diplomacy still proposes to reform command structures, develop advance planning, boost the potential to carry out operations at the strategic level, improve the mechanisms of information exchange and harmonise the civil-military cooperation, reform battle groups, develop EU defence cooperation (pooling and sharing), continue to harmonise NATO-EU relations, enhance cooperation between the EU and the OSCE, promote closer cooperation on CSDP between the EU and its eastern neighbours (especially the Eastern Partnership and Russia), and improve cooperation with North African countries.\(^{201}\)

Since subsequent presidencies (Danish and Cypriot) showed no interest in developing CSDP, and due to ineffective reform actions taken by the EU High Representative in this area, Poland decided to enhance its cooperation for security with countries that express such a will. Efforts to this effect were pledged by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Radosław Sikorski, in April 2012 in his annual address on Polish foreign policy:

“The experiences of the Polish Presidency show us that EU Common Security and Defence Policy is unfortunately impossible to implement in a group of 27 countries, and that we must initiate

\(^{199}\) MFA 2011 Annual Address, p. 7.  
\(^{200}\) Council of Ministers of the Republic of Poland (2012), op. cit., p. 18.  
tighter cooperation between willing countries, in line with the provisions of the Lisbon Treaty.”

As result, Poland has taken steps to strengthen CSDP in partnership with France and Germany (within the framework of the Weimar Triangle which, since 15 December 2012, has also comprised Italy and Spain and is now referred to as ‘Weimar Plus’). Taking into account Poland’s security interests, it is essential to anchor the cooperation at the level of European law and to ‘leave the door open’ for all EU members wanting to cooperate. Poland views any particularistic policy (national or bilateral) in the field of defence that excludes other countries (such as UK-French military cooperation) as a threat to the cohesive defence and security of the EU. In their military relations, the UK and France avoid any reference to developing permanent structured cooperation within the framework of CSDP. Both countries’ military interventions in Libya (2011) and Mali (2013) have shown that these states prepare operations tapping into the capacity of their own armed forces and that of the North Atlantic Treaty. Although Poland has limited military capabilities and has not taken part in the interventions in Libya and Mali, the country is opposed to minimising the role of CSDP.

**Conclusions**

Poland stands as a new, active and responsible CSDP stakeholder.

In the last five years, the Polish government has transformed the country’s approach to Common Security and Defence Policy and decided to increase the country’s engagement in its development, considering the creation of an effective common defence and strengthening European capabilities for crisis management operations. Due to changes in the Polish security environment (conflicts in the Caucasus in 2008 and the Arab Spring in 2011) and a concurrent refocusing of US foreign policy priorities, which could have effects on NATO's role in transatlantic area, Poland recognised the need to develop and strengthen an alternative security system to NATO.

Currently, Poland perceives the efforts to develop effective defence capacity and out-of-area stabilisation in a comprehensive manner, treating its own capacity as an element of a wider capability (that of NATO allies

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and EU member states). According to the Development Strategy of National Security System 2022 adopted by the government in 2013, Poland intends to pursue the goal of “shaping a stable international security environment on a regional and global scale” by “strengthening collective defence within the framework of NATO” and “developing the European Union’s capacity for comprehensive crisis management operations”. From a Polish point of view, NATO and the EU can complement each other in terms of defence capabilities. NATO should focus on defending member states’ territories and deploying stabilisation missions, while the EU should concentrate on the deployment of crisis management missions in the neighbourhood of Europe. However, the EU should maintain its territorial defence capacity to maintain peace, stability and security of its member states, and develop it to be ready to replace NATO’s actions if the need arises. The development of both aspects of CSDP (common defence and crisis management) constitutes the aim of the ‘Weimar Plus’ initiative, in which a partnership between Poland, Germany and France was joined by Spain and Italy.

Poland has not been actively engaged in all EU peace missions. Although in 2009 the country resigned from active participation in UN operations, it has focused its commitment – according to the accepted hierarchy of out-of-area missions – on NATO’s missions and not those of the EU. Polish participation in the ISAF mission in Afghanistan (and in non-treaty international intervention in Iraq) was a significant burden for the Polish army. Therefore while Polish contingents have participated in several EU operations, these have primarily been operations conducted in Europe.

In the future, one can expect increased Polish participation in European CSDP operations. However, in coming years Poland’s involvement in CSDP missions will be curbed by financial concerns, which might determine the scope of its involvement in particular operations.

Development of CSDP out-of-area missions remains compatible with Polish national interests. The EU’s immediate neighbourhood is seen by Poland as the area in need of CSDP crisis management operations. However, Poland diversifies its operational involvement there. The country pays special attention to the stabilisation of countries lying beyond the EU's eastern border, offering support to the ongoing democratic transition there.

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and strengthening the respect for human rights and the rule of law. In its Eastern Partnership, in the Balkan states and in Afghanistan, Poland plans to adopt an array of CSDP practices, including civilian and military missions. In the case of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership states, Poland accepts its participation in civilian missions and focuses chiefly on promoting democracy, respect for human rights and positive models of systemic transition. Such apportionment of engagement is confirmed in the government's most important strategic documents (such as the national strategies and lists of foreign policy priorities), and by the practice of the state. For example, in the last EU operation in Mali, Poland limited its participation to sending 20 instructors and offering logistical support.

Outside of the key regions of interest, for example in North Africa and the near and central east, Polish military engagement seems to be possible only in situations where an ongoing crisis may result in security threats to an EU ally. In this situation, Poland would act under its obligations as an ally. Out of the area of its main interests, Poland can also engage in the 'conscience-shocking situation' of strong and massive human rights abuses, when the country would act in favour of 'more Europe' in the global responsibility to protect civilians under the shadow of the war.
SPAIN: THE DON QUIXOTE OF EUROPEAN DEFENCE
MANUEL MUNIZ

Abstract
The two defining features of Spanish policy towards CSDP have been loyalty and commitment. Spain’s political elite is entirely convinced that it is in the country’s interest to assume responsibilities in the CSDP equivalent, at least, to its weight in the EU as a whole. This has resulted in Spain taking part, either through the deployment of personnel, the assumption of command responsibilities or the contribution of financial resources, in almost all of the EU’s missions and operations, especially those of a military nature. Overall, Spain believes it should cover between 8% and 10% of CSDP’s various requirements.

What has been missing in Spain is an overarching strategy that justifies this commitment. The specific reasons that led Spain to participate in each mission are almost always unclear or non-existent. The country is basing its defence policy, and its relation with CSDP, entirely on the pursuit of the milieu goal of a stronger EU. As valid as this goal may be, it is insufficient if the meaning of a ‘stronger EU’ is not spelled out. Here again, Spain shows a lack of clarity or strategic guidance. As with the fictional character Don Quixote, Spanish policy towards CSDP displays both loyalty and confusion, in an attitude that is both honourable and extremely risky.

Overview
Spain has been an active member of the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) over the past decade. Madrid deployed close to 800
troops and personnel in CSDP missions from 1999 to 2009. Over 700 were assigned to missions of a military character, such as Althea in Bosnia or EUFOR DRC in Congo. This made Spain the sixth largest troop contributor to EU military operations overall, and one of the very few member states to participate in all missions of this character. Furthermore, Spain is a key player in the EU’s current military operations. It very recently gave up the Force Command of EU NAVFOR Atalanta, the first EU naval mission to fight piracy off the coast of Somalia, to which it has contributed significantly in terms of staff and equipment. Spain is also a key player in efforts underway to train Somali security forces within the framework of EUTM Somalia. As a high ranking naval officer, the current Director General of Defence Strategy and Planning at Spain’s Defence Chiefs of Staff (with the Spanish acronym of DIVESPLA), said when interviewed, “Spain feels comfortable contributing to EU operations. It feels like a valued partner and it allows it to fulfil its role as a soft power.”

Spain’s strategy documents have reflected this commitment to European defence since the early 1990s. Europe plays a predominant role in all of them, including the 2011 National Security Strategy where the EU is cited in almost every page. Interviews in Spain with top defence and foreign policy officials confirmed this widespread support for the emergence of the EU as a foreign policy and defence actor.

However, finding the specific reasons that led Spain to support specific missions is a difficult task. Simply put, Spain supports CSDP in almost all its manifestations, and it seems to do so out of a conviction that such a policy will strengthen EU integration more broadly. It is nevertheless hard not to feel that this fuzzy pursuit of milieu goals amounts to a lack of strategy, particularly if one is talking about defence. When faced with straightforward questions such as “Why did Spain deploy troops in Congo in 2006?” or “What were the strategic interests Spain was defending by deploying military personnel in Chad in 2008?”, most interviewees responded by saying that it was where our allies were going and we had to be there with them. This lack of strategic guidance has given this chapter its title. Don Quixote was a fictional Spanish knight known for


205 Interview with Admiral Juan Francisco Martínez Nuñez, Madrid, 30 October 2012.
his commitment to the defence of causes in which he rarely had a direct stake. That noble and tragic ability to get into harm’s way for a purpose ‘higher’ than protecting one’s own interests seems to have survived the four centuries that separate Don Quixote and Spain’s current defence policy.

It should also be pointed out that Spain today faces significant challenges, particularly when it comes to the health of its public finances and its ability to direct sufficient resources towards its defence. These difficulties, compounded by security risks derived from the Arab Spring and the US’s pivot to Asia, will force the country to make long-lasting decisions about its defence posture.

If Spain’s past strategic doctrine and defence policy are to serve as guidance, then it should be expected that the country will look for ways to cooperate with European allies in these difficult times. Indeed, tighter cooperation with the EU seems to be the default reaction for this strongly pro-European nation. The fact that this is the case is almost certainly a consequence of deep support for EU integration in Spain, elite and popular belief in the benefits of membership for Spanish citizens, and the generalised perception that the country will only be able to further its interests in the future from within a strong Europe. It might indeed be the case that such wide support has prevented deep reflection about what Spain wants to achieve with its participation in CSDP and, most importantly, about the country’s agenda for the future of European defence.

**Institutional structure and strategic doctrine**

Spain has been extremely prolific in terms of documents containing its strategic vision. This is particularly true from the year 2000 onwards. Indeed, Spain, like France, is one of the few countries in the world that has a White Paper of Defence (LBD, or “White Paper”), a Spanish Security Strategy (EES or “Security Strategy”), a Strategic Defence Review (RED or “Defence Review”) and lower-level strategic planning documents such as a National Defence Directive (DDN) and a Spanish Military Strategy (EME). Some of these documents, such as the Defence Review, are meant to have a lifespan of 15 years; others, such as the Security Strategy should last about a decade, while a new National Defence Directive is approved by the Spanish prime minister every four years. As we will see, the most significant of these documents are drafted and approved by either the prime minister or the defence minister, meaning that the government
retains control over strategic planning. This fact, however, has not led to significant shifts in strategic outlook with changing governments. As developed below, Spain has had quite a stable, albeit undetailed, strategic vision.

The military in Spain normally refers to the classic model of the three-level strategic pyramid to explain the country’s planning process (Figure 2).

*Figure 2. Spain’s strategic pyramid*

Based on the model above, the National Security Strategy would be at the very top of the strategic pyramid, addressing broad issues of security, including defence. The EES should be approved by the government and should clearly delineate the country’s interests as well as the goals of its security and defence policy. The Security Strategy of 2011 remains the sole document of this nature in Spain. It should be pointed out, however, that despite the original intention of leaving the EES unchanged for at least ten years, it is now being reviewed by the government that was elected in November 2011. It is expected that this process will be completed in 2013 and, although the review that is taking place is thorough and involves many branches of government, it is expected that the final outcome will leave “almost 80% of the current strategy’s content unchanged.”

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206 Interview with General Miguel Ángel Ballesteros, Madrid, 30 October 2012.
The one-off White Paper on Defence of 2000, together with the longer-term Defence Review from 2003 and the shorter-term National Defence Directives, would then constitute the second level of the pyramid, that of “National Defence Strategy”. It is the defence minister who is mostly responsible for the drafting of these documents and in charge of their implementation. Since its transition to democracy in the late 1970s, Spain has produced nine DDNs: in 1980, 1984, 1986, 1992, 1996, 2000, 2004, 2008 and 2012. At this second level of planning we should see a depiction of Spain’s defence policy objectives, which will of course be linked to the broader goals set in its Security Strategy.

The National Defence Directives are of particular importance as they are the expression of the government’s desired defence policy for the next four years and the starting point of the planning process at the Ministry of Defence, which will ultimately lead to the approval of the force structure and defence budget. The norm that regulates this “defence planning process” is the Ministerial Order 37/2005. This Order delineates the process in detail, all the way from the approval of the DDN to the drafting by the secretary general of defence policy (SEGENPOL) of the Defence Policy Directive (DPD) to the initiation and completion of the Military and Resource Planning processes. Most documents below the National Defence Directive are classified, however, and deal with issues pertaining to force requirements and to technical budget issues that in and of themselves, have little strategic relevance.

Finally, the third and last level of the pyramid depicted in Figure 2 would be constituted by the Military Strategy. The Spanish EM is drafted and approved by the head of the joint chiefs (JEMAD) and should contain clear military objectives as required by the country’s defence policy. The last available Military Strategy, titled “New Challenges. New Responses”, was approved in 2003 and de-classified in the summer of 2004. Below the Military Strategy, we find no more strategic documents but only “plans” and other documents of a tactical nature that take us too far from our object of study to be of interest.

This cascade of documents seems clear enough and we should see a certain specification of strategic interests, from the broader concepts contained in the EES to the much more specific EM. Each level of the process sets new goals that should enable the achievement of those set in higher levels of strategic planning (Figure 3).
Spain’s strategic interests

A rigorous analysis of the documents indicated in the section above should enable us to understand Spain’s formal strategic thought and to discern some of its interests. It might be most interesting to proceed in a chronological order to better understand how Spain’s strategic thought has evolved over time. In this regard, one should start with an analysis of Spain’s National Defence Directives (DDN) which, going back to the 1980s, represent the only truly stable and recurrent element of Spain’s strategic planning since the country’s transition to democracy. For a study of this nature it is most appropriate to look at the 1996, 2000, 2004, 2008 and 2012 DDNs, as this enables us to cover both of José María Aznar’s governments (1996-2000 and 2000-04) as well as Jose Luis Rodríguez Zapatero’s entire tenure as premier (2004-12). On the other hand, the 2012 DDN, adopted by Spain’s current Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy, is an interesting window into the country’s defence policy until the year 2016.

The 1996 DDN is a short document that, given the fact that Spain lacked a full Security Strategy, is to some extent forced to define the broader objectives of Spain’s security policy before it can tackle the specifics of the country’s defence. In terms of objectives for Spain’s defence policy, the 1996 DDN enumerates three:

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1. Consolidate Spain’s presence in international security and defence organisations, assuming the responsibilities and commitments derived from membership.\(^{208}\)

2. Improve the efficiency of the Spanish Armed Forces so as to make them fully capable of assuming the responsibilities the Spanish Constitution assigns to them, of contributing to collective security with our allies, and of cooperating in the effort to keep international peace and stability, particularly in areas of cultural and geographic proximity.\(^{209}\)

3. Succeed in making Spanish society more supportive and participatory in the task of keeping a defence establishment appropriate for current needs, responsibilities and national strategic interests.\(^{210}\)

The three objectives listed above are developed in further sections of the DDN and lines of action are established for each of them. For our current analysis, it is of interest to point out the prescriptions of the first Aznar government for consolidating “Spain’s presence in international security organisations”. The first of those prescriptions is to “participate fully in the Atlantic Alliance including in its decision-making bodies”. The second is to “contribute to the emergence of a defence policy in the European Union, compatible with NATO” as well as to “actively participate in the development of the Western European Union, increasing its political and operational capacities”.\(^{211}\)

In 2000, Spain set out to complete a deep exercise of reflection on its defence and its armed forces. As expressed in its Prologue by the then Defence Minister, Eduardo Serra, Spain’s White Paper on Defence was a required document given “the social evolution of Spain, strategic changes in the international environment, and the important transformation of the Armed Forces”.\(^{212}\) Serra was referring mainly to the transition of Spain from an isolationist dictatorship under General Franco to a democracy, the change (improvement) in perceptions about the defence establishment in Spain, the recent professionalisation of the armed forces, the country’s


\(^{209}\) Ibid.

\(^{210}\) Ibid

\(^{211}\) Ibid, p. 3.

integration into both NATO and the EU, the change in the international order brought about by the fall of the Berlin Wall and, lastly, the impact of globalisation and interdependency on the provision of security. The White Paper was therefore meant to take stock of all of those developments and to arrive at recommendations regarding Spain’s future defence policy and armed forces.

The White Paper’s 264 pages were divided into eight chapters with the following titles: “The Strategic Landscape”, “The West’s Response to the Landscape”, “Spain’s Defence Policy”, “Armed Forces for the 21st Century”, “Professionalisation”, “Modernisation”, “Rationalisation and Adaptation of Defence Structures” and “The Economic Footing of Defence”. For the purpose of our study, the second chapter is perhaps of most interest as it contains Spain’s perceptions of NATO and the newly born European Foreign and Security Policy (EFSP). The White Paper points to Spain’s commitment to NATO, to its 1999 new Strategic Concept and, in particular, to the development of the European Defence Identity (EDI) within the Alliance. It also insists on Spain’s commitment to the emergence of a truly European defence capability. Despite its abstract and reflective nature, the White Paper remains an interesting reference document when studying Spain’s changing perceptions of the security landscape at the turn of the millennium.

It was, however, the task of the 2000 National Defence Directive to set out some of the steps Spain’s defence would need to take at such a critical time. Some of the most significant were the “completion of a Strategic Defence Review”, “supporting the processes of creation of European political and military structures” as well as “participating in arms control and disarmament operations”, and “completing the process of professionalising the Armed Forces”. Of all of these objectives, the drafting of a Strategic Defence Review (RED), which was to take more than three years and was only completed in 2003, was the most important as it would lead to the turning of the broader ideas put forward by the White Paper into concrete policy recommendations.

At over 350 pages, the RED remains one of the most comprehensive reviews of defence matters Spain has ever undertaken. The intention was for the document to be valid at least until 2015 when, presumably, another RED would be undertaken. Perhaps the greatest contribution of this

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document to Spain’s strategic thought is its breakdown of the country’s national interests into three categories: “vital interests”, being those upon which the survival of the state depends; “strategic interests”, being those that contribute in a significant way to the protection of the nation’s vital interests; and “other interests”, being those derived from Spain’s belonging to the international community and from its solidarity towards others. The RED dedicated its entire Annex A to the development of this division of the national interests. As we will see, this approach has remained almost unchanged for close to a decade and is still present in Spain’s 2011 National Security Strategy.

The 2003 RED also listed the main threats to Spain’s security and, once again, these would remain unchanged for most of the following ten years. Terrorism (both internal and external), the proliferation of WMDs, the protection of the national territory (including Ceuta and Melilla in the north of Africa), and the recuperation of sovereignty over Gibraltar are all there. The Review also mentions threats linked to globalisation such as environmental degradation, cyber-attacks, or mass migrations.

The publishing of the RED in 2003 led to the drafting of Spain’s Military Strategy. This 2003 document remains the only one of its kind and, as indicated in Figure 1, is the lowest level strategy document in Spain. It contains a somewhat more detailed analysis of the threats faced by the country, but adds little to the analysis of the RED.

By 2004, Spain had been in a constant process of strategic reflection for close to five years; first with the White Paper, then the RED, and lastly with the drafting of the Military Strategy. It was therefore not surprising that the 2004 National Defence Directive was one of the most detailed documents of its kind to be produced and, perhaps, the one that for the first time captured not only Spain’s defence policy for the next four years, but also broader strategic trends in the country’s defence outlook. The document begins by mentioning the all-important fight against terrorism, which is not surprising given the events in Madrid earlier that year when al Qaida blew up a commuter train, taking the lives of 191 and wounding

215 Ibid., p. 51.
close to 2,000. It is, however, the document’s “seven vectors for Spain’s defence policy”\textsuperscript{217} which are of most interest:


2. Take part in the initiatives of an expanded and transformed NATO; particularly the Capability Commitment agreed in Prague and the Response Force, with the goal of contributing to conflict prevention and, if needed, crisis management.

3. Strengthen relations between the EU and NATO, given our conviction that a strong, robust and balanced transatlantic link is a key element of international peace and stability.

4. Contribute to security in the Mediterranean, strengthening CSDP’s Mediterranean dimension, in the broader framework of the Barcelona Process and the Mediterranean Dialogue within NATO.

5. Prioritise the construction of a solid and balanced relationship with the US, based on the ‘Agreement of Defence Cooperation’ and guided by the objectives contained in the Joint Declaration of the 11\textsuperscript{th} January 2001.

6. Tighten security and defence relations as well as military cooperation with countries of Latin America.

7. Intensify military diplomacy, promoting trust between our armed forces and those of countries within our areas of strategic interest.

These seven goals delineate with precision the areas where Spain believes it should develop its defence policy still today: the EU, NATO, the Mediterranean, and the broader Atlantic and its neighbourhood (meaning, mostly, the Maghreb).

The 2008 DDN did little more than reiterate what was stated in its 2004 predecessor. It did, however, formally call for the drafting of a Spanish Security Strategy. It would take three years for this Strategy to see the light of day, but once drafted it could be said that it completed Spain’s

strategic framework. Indeed, from 2008 onwards it has been clear that Spain will have a Strategic Defence Review every 15 years, a Security Strategy every ten years (or earlier if the government sees fit) and a National Defence Directive every four years.

Be that as it may, let us now move to an analysis of the 2011 Spanish Security Strategy, which, as indicated before, remains the only one of its kind and the very top piece of Spain’s strategic pyramid. Oddly enough, the document begins by listing the threats to Spain’s security rather than by delineating its interests, which is common practice elsewhere. Nevertheless, those threats are:

1. Armed conflict
2. Terrorism (with a special emphasis on the Basque separatist group ETA)
3. Organised crime
4. Economic and financial insecurity
5. Energy dependency
6. Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs)
7. Cyber threats
8. Migratory flows
9. Emergencies and natural disasters

The country’s interests are defined in page 8 of the EES, and are divided into the same three categories used in the 2003 RED (Figure 4). The first of these categories is “vital interests”, which in this case are in turn divided into two subcategories: those related to “fundamental rights”, such as “the right to life, liberty, democracy or the prosperity and development of Spain’s citizens”, and those related to the “constitutive elements of the State”, such as “sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity, the constitutional order, and economic security”. The second category is “strategic interests” and contains interests of importance for “the attainment of a peaceful and secure environment” such as “the adequate functioning of the EU, the consecution of a stable, just, peaceful and safe international order where human rights are respected, the preservation of free exchange and free communications”, and, lastly, “the construction of good relations with our neighbours”. The third category is “values”, which

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includes issues such as “the defence of democracy, the rule of law, peace, liberty, tolerance, solidarity, sustainability, global progress and the welfare state”. Although this latter list seems to be a category of interests in its own right, it is also a set of norms Spain should abide by when acting internationally; as the EES points out, “the defence of our interests should always be undertaken in full respect of our values...which are contained in the Spanish Constitution and the UN Charter”.

Figure 4. Spain’s interests according to its 2011 Security Strategy

The EES, with its 90 pages, is a long document for its kind and touches upon many different aspects of Spain’s defence aspirations. There

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219 Ibid., pp. 8-9.
is a lot of emphasis put on developing an “integral approach” to defence matters involving all the branches of government and not just the armed forces or the security forces. It remains, for the most part, a well thought-out text that captures most of the issues addressed in previous strategic documents.

Finally, we arrive at the 2012 National Defence Directive, issued by the Rajoy government only a few months into its first year in power. There is nothing truly revolutionary about this document beyond the fact that it calls for the drafting of a new Security Strategy, only months after the first one had been published, and that it also demands a fresh Strategic Defence Review. It seems, therefore, that the next two to three years will resemble those of a decade ago, in that Spain will undertake a deep process of reflection on its defence policy and the adequacy of its armed forces. Another interesting aspect of the 2012 DDN is that it cites the following three issues as defining elements of Spain’s defence policy: the increase in instability in the country’s neighbourhood (meaning mostly the Arab Spring), the need to build a stronger transatlantic link, and the negative impact of the economic crisis on its defence capabilities.

We see in the documents listed above a clear development in Spanish defence policy. In the mid to late 1990s, Spain’s fundamental concerns were the reform and modernisation of its armed forces, and the full integration of the country into NATO. Those concerns were left behind due to the successful professionalisation of Spain’s armed forces and the active role played by the country in the reshaping of NATO through a new Strategic Concept and a new eastern outlook. At the turn of the millennium, we see Spain being very supportive of an EU defence capacity and wanting to behave like a responsible stakeholder in the international arena. The areas in which it considers itself to have the most significant strategic interests were clearly defined at the time: Europe, the Atlantic partnership, the Mediterranean and Latin America. Today, the Mediterranean continues to be of paramount importance to Spain, particularly in terms of dealing with the effects of the Arab Spring, as is the transatlantic partnership. The economic crisis, and its impact on Spain’s finances, has crept into its defence planning, however, and has become one of its greatest concerns. This will surely be reflected in future doctrine, quite possibly in the new Security Strategy and the next RED.

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Spanish attitudes towards European defence and participation in CSDP

It is fair to say that Spain’s support for a stronger European defence policy has been strong and constant throughout the years. Even before the CFSP was formally launched in the early 1990s, Spain was already calling for the development of a common defence capacity in Europe, and for the transfers of Western European Union (WEU) commitments to the EU.

It is true that the EU was not widely mentioned in the 1996 and 2000 DDNs, but that is of course because the Union’s defence policy was almost nonexistent. Spain limited itself to calling for the emergence of a true European defence policy. The 2004 and 2008 DDNs seem to be the documents that truly capture Spain’s European ambitions and that set the tone for Spanish defence in the longer term. That tone is none other than a clear desire for a strong and united European defence, in cooperation with NATO. These objectives are indicated in the 2004 document and have remained in Spain’s DDNs, with very little alteration, since.

It is also important to point out that the 2003 RED started with a long analysis of the new strategic landscape Spain inhabited. Some of the most momentous changes mentioned in the section are directly related to the emergence of a European Security and Defence Policy. In fact, the text says that “[w]ith this new institutional capacity the EU becomes a truly strategic actor, altering to some extent the strategic landscape: there is now not only an Atlantic dimension to security, manifested in NATO, but also the possibility of the Europeans developing their own missions autonomously.”  

A few pages later, the RED touches upon this point once again: “Spain is actively committed to the development of autonomous military capabilities within the European Union so as to consolidate the Union as a global actor in its own right.” So the most significant review of Spain’s defence to date was undertaken to a large degree in response to the emergence of CSDP and with the clear intention of supporting its development.

It is well known that the former High Representative of the EU, Javier Solana, actively participated in the drafting of Spain’s 2011 Security Strategy, and his input is clearly felt throughout it. The EU is mentioned 66

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221 Ministry of Defence (2003), Revisión Estratégica de la Defensa, p. 38.
222 Ibid. p. 43.
times in this text, meaning that you can almost find it on every page. The US, on the other hand, is referenced 11 times and the UN 19. However, it is not just the number of times Europe is mentioned, but how and where it is cited that matters the most. One only need go to page 2 of the document to read that “this strategy is drafted from the conviction…that Spain is a medium-sized power and that its capacity to act is strengthened by its membership of the European Union”.223 On page 13, it is again stated that “[t]he defence of Spain and its interests is enhanced from within an EU that strengthens its influence in the world”.224 This same idea is reiterated a few pages later when the Security Strategy cites the size of the EU in terms of population and percentage of world GDP, to then add: “Spanish interests are better served with an EU that increases the role in plays in the world.”225

The EES has an entire section dedicated to European defence and its relation to that of Spain. In a matter of three pages, a clear picture of Spain’s commitment to European defence is painted. Here is a short list of excerpts from this section, titled “The European Union, identity and influence”:

“If Europe wants to remain relevant in the Concert of Nations it must provide itself with the necessary political will to act abroad in a united manner, and with a true European defence policy with the necessary capabilities, among them a strategic transport capacity.”

“...it will be necessary to advance efforts towards common capability planning, and to realise the potential of the European Defence Agency...”

“Spain defends the enlargement of the EU as a factor that will contribute to the stability and security of Europe. With the progressive incorporation of candidate countries such as Turkey, Croatia, Iceland and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), we will enrich the different visions and capacities of the European project”.226

224 Ibid., p. 13.
225 Ibid., p. 17.
226 Ibid., pp. 17-19.
The EES’s list of threats to Spanish security is, on the other hand, almost identical to that contained in the 2003 European Security Strategy (ESS). Indeed, the ESS lists five key threats to European security – terrorism, proliferation of WMDs, regional conflict, state failure and organised Crime\textsuperscript{227} – all of which are reflected in the Spanish Security Strategy. Not surprisingly, the Spanish document concludes that “Spain fully supports the European Security Strategy”.\textsuperscript{228}

This formal support for CSDP, and for the CFSP more broadly, was ratified by numerous interviews performed in Spain during the months of October and November 2012. Not a single person from a list of over a dozen selected interviewees expressed any doubt that Spain had an interest in seeing a strong EU defence policy (see Annex 1 for a list of interviewees). The Defence Minister himself clearly stated that “Spain wishes for CSDP to develop the necessary capabilities to take on a comprehensive approach to security that brings together both civilian and military elements”.\textsuperscript{229} It is therefore fair to say that Spanish support for CSDP is widespread. Furthermore, the country’s participation in EU missions is almost the default scenario. This default participation was quantified by Spain’s Deputy Director for Defence Planning and International Relations, who said in an interview that “our European allies expect us to assume between 8 and 10\% of all obligations derived from CSDP operations”.\textsuperscript{230} In his opinion, this is a natural thing as membership of the EU brings with it the obligation of being a “general net provider of security instead of a consumer”.\textsuperscript{231}

That broad support for European defence is, however, not accompanied by a structured argument regarding the specific interest Spain has in participating in specific missions. Time and time again, interviewees had to refer to the broad concept of “support for European integration” when asked about the reason(s) why Spanish troops had been sent to fight under the EU flag to places such as the Democratic Republic of Congo or the Republic of Chad. Simply put, it seems that Spain has

\textsuperscript{227} European Council (2003), European Security Strategy. A Secure Europe in a Better World, pp. 3-5.

\textsuperscript{228} Ibid., p. 18.

\textsuperscript{229} Interview with Defence Minister, Pedro Morenes, Madrid, 31 October 2012.

\textsuperscript{230} Interview with Admiral Ignacio Horcada Rubio, Madrid, 07 November 2012.

\textsuperscript{231} Ibid.
assumed its obligations at the European level out of a desire to construct “more Europe”, but without clear and concise strategic goals.

In the case of EUFOR DRC Congo, for example, it is clear that Spain provided troops only because it was requested to do so by its allies, mainly France and Belgium. When asked what were the Spanish strategic interests at stake in Congo, the reply of a Spanish Captain and former member of Spain’s delegation at the European Military Committee (EUMC) was clear: “None”.232 This lack of a concise strategy was confirmed by retired Admiral Fernando Lista Blanco, a former Deputy Director of the EU’s Military Staff (EUMS), who said quite clearly, “membership of the EU and NATO has been the cornerstone of Spain’s defence policy since it joined both organisations...Participation in many EU missions was not the result of direct interest but rather of solidarity and compromise with partners”.233 This issue of a lack of direct strategic interest in certain missions came up regularly when discussing EUFOR Althea in Bosnia. Not only did Spain take on the Force Command of that mission, but for a certain period of time it was the largest troop contributor. People involved with the mission could not find an explanation for this over-commitment other than Spain’s desire to be a responsible and loyal ally.

Indeed, Spain’s involvement in EU missions seems to respond to exogenous factors such as the importance of having the placet of the country where troops are deployed. Its participation in EUTM Somalia, for example, was prompted not so much by Spain’s direct interest in the mission as by the EU’s need to have troops on the ground from a country without a colonial past in the region. A similar logic was behind Spain’s involvement in and, ultimately, it’s taking on the command of EUSSR Guinea-Bissau. Furthermore, there is now a clear consensus that France made efforts to make EUFOR TChad as European as possible in order to reduce the association of the mission with historic French interests in the country/region. Once again, Spain agreed to participate there as a “means of demonstrating its support to a relevant ally”.234

The arguments above are of great importance because they point to a paradoxical characteristic of European military intervention. It is sometimes useful for countries to abstain from participating in missions

232 Interview with Captain Carlos Cordon Scharfhausen, Madrid, 29 October 2012.
233 Interview with Admiral (ret) Fernando Lista Blanco, Madrid, 31 October 2012.
234 Interview with Admiral (ret) Fernando Lista Blanco, Madrid, 31 October 2012.
where they have a direct interest but where their participation could be highly controversial, and to see others lead. If there was ever the need for a CSDP mission in Morocco, it is hard to picture it being led by a Spaniard given Spain’s historical ties to the region, and despite its almost natural interest in seeing an operation there succeed. This point was explicitly made by Admiral Horcada Rubio when referring to how we might even see a negative correlation in Europe between a country’s strategic interests and its direct involvement in missions launched to protect those interests.

Although the argument above is compelling, it is still possible to see some correlation between the missions France or the UK insisted upon launching and the national interest of those countries. That willingness and capacity to successfully escalate national defence policy concerns to the EU level, even if it results in modest operations, is hard to find in the case of Spain. The most significant exception to this dynamic is perhaps Spain’s support and active involvement in EUFOR Atalanta. This mission seems to respond quite directly to French and Spanish strategic concerns, given that piracy in the Horn of Africa has a very negative impact on both fishing in the region and trade coming through the Red Sea and into the Mediterranean. Although the mission’s mandate is formally formulated as an operation in support of the activities of the World Food Program in Somalia and of sea lanes in general terms, it is clear that it was designed to tackle the problem of piracy head on and to prevent further damage to the European fishing interests in the region. In the case of Spain, it is particularly important to mention that its support of the mission was also shaped by news of the Alakrana, a Spanish shipping boat, being taken hostage by pirates in the Indian Ocean in October 2009.

**Spain’s current defence policy and European implications**

As indicated before, the 2012 Spanish National Defence Directive asked for the drafting of a new Security Strategy and for the undertaking of a new Strategic Defence Review. Both processes are bound to reflect some of the new realities Spanish defence has to deal with.

The first of those new circumstances is, of course, the economic crisis Spain is suffering. It is important not to forget the effect this is having on the country’s defence spending. Defence policy spending peaked at €8.149 million in 2008; that figure had gone down to €6.261 million by 2012 and it
is expected to fall to €5.786 million in 2013. This means that Spain has reduced its defence-related outlays by over 25% in nominal terms over the last four years. Of that reduced budget, over 75% is used on salaries and other personnel-related expenses. Further cuts to the budget would necessarily mean cutbacks in the size of the force (currently at 80,000 soldiers and marines), or significant reductions in investments in equipment and modernisation programmes. When interviewed, Spain’s Defence Minister pointed to the health of the economy as one of Spain’s major challenges, and as one of the most significant factors affecting its defence policy. This is of course not dissimilar to what was stated back in 2010 by the then Head of the Joints Chiefs of Staff of the United States regarding his own country’s defence: “The single biggest threat to national security is the national debt.”

It is as yet unclear what effect the reduction in defence spending will have on Spain’s participation in CSDP. On the one hand, there will be a clear incentive to pool and share and to look for ways to cooperate on defence matters. On the other hand, it will quite simply reduce Spain’s ability to sustain long and costly deployments. This latter fact might lead Spain to support missions in which it has more of a direct interest, such as Atalanta, and to direct fewer resources to others where its interests are less defined, such as Althea.

A second significant development in Spain’s security landscape has of course been the Arab Spring. Events in Tunisia, Libya and Egypt have changed a region considered of importance by Spain not only because it obtains a substantial portion of its energy imports from it, but also because of its proximity to Spanish shores. It is this proximity that has made security and stability in the southern rim of the Mediterranean a key objective for Spain. Although Spain retains its full capacity to engage in the region, which it does regularly, the EU and its External Action Service have taken the lead on many fronts. In a recent interview, Bernardino Leon, the Special Representative of the EU for the Southern Mediterranean and former Deputy Foreign Minister during the Zapatero presidency, stated that, “the EU is the most important actor in the region at the moment…and it is performing very well…all thanks to the fact that the Union’s member

235 Source: Spanish Ministry of Finance.

236 Interview with Defence Minister, Pedro Morenes, Madrid, 31 October 2012.

states are giving it space to act”. That interview took place only days before the EU announced a €5 billion aid and investment package to Egypt in what was one of the most significant moves in the region since the beginning of the Arab revolts. Spain seems satisfied with the role played by the EU in this field and it is therefore doubtful that the Arab Spring will produce anything other than a doubling down of Spain’s pro-European stance, and a further attempt to Europeanise security in the Mediterranean.

The third and final issue Spain will need to grapple with in the coming years is the health of the transatlantic alliance, and of NATO, in light of the much-touted US pivot to Asia. The 2012 Spanish National Defence Directive defines the Atlantic Alliance as “Spain’s most appropriate framework for collective defence”. This is not too dissimilar from the way the issue is addressed in other Spanish strategic documents. When asked about the shift in US priorities towards Asia, Spain’s Defence Minister interpreted it as a “respectable decision in terms of defence policy on the part of the US” and added that it would be mistaken to see it as equivalent to “leaving the European strategic theatre.”

Still, there is a growing concern in Europe’s defence establishment that a decreasing importance of Europe for American defence planners will lead to growing demands on Europe’s already stretched defence capabilities.

Here it should also be noted that many in Spain’s defence and foreign policy leadership positions believe that the country carries more weight in EU bodies than in NATO. Given its relative size, active participation and general pro-European stance, Spain is regularly consulted on matters of EU security and defence. The following quote puts this into sharp contrast with its role in NATO: “The role played by Spain in NATO is truly a secondary one. When it comes to building big European consensus Spain is amongst the big players... This means that every time an issue of security and defence is discussed in Europe the other partners expect Spain to express its opinion. In NATO, however, we are rarely taken into account.”

Changes in the Atlantic security architecture are bound to affect Spain and

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238 Interview with Bernardino Leon, Madrid, 28 October 2012.
241 Interview with Defence Minister, Pedro Morenés, Madrid, 31 October 2012.
242 Interview with Captain Carlos Cordon Scharfhausen, Madrid, 29 October 2012.
its defence policy, however, but it is unlikely they will reduce its support for the further development of CSDP.

Conclusions

Spain has been and will continue to be a strong supporter of CSDP. This support for a strong European defence policy has been in place since the early 1990s. The EU figures prominently in all of the country’s strategic documents and is bound to continue to do so in future documents. This formal commitment to the European cause has led Spain to assume great responsibilities within CSDP. It has participated in all of the EU’s military missions to date, including the most demanding of these such as EUFOR Althea, EUFOR TChad and EUNAVFOR Atalanta. Spain is without doubt one of the key actors in CSDP.

What seems to be lacking in Spain’s European approach is a concise strategy regarding participation in specific missions. Participation seems to be haphazard and in response to abstract arguments in favour of “more Europe” rather than to some harder strategic logic. The source of this deep desire to further EU integration is surely to be found outside of the realm of defence. It quite probably has to do with the country’s turbulent past, its many decades of isolation under the Franco regime, and the promise of democracy and prosperity that EU membership brought. Furthermore, although probably unsustainable, it is true that the pursuit of milieu goals on the part of Spain is not totally deprived of reason. It is in response to the country’s belief that in the long term it will profit from a stronger CSDP and a stronger Europe. For a self-declared medium power on the very frontier of the EU, the world looks much safer if you belong to a strong alliance.

Furthermore, and in all fairness to the Spanish defence establishment, this lack of strategy seems to be shared by other member states. Indeed, the challenge of defining a country’s strategic interests is one faced by all the other European actors. The field of defence is plagued by problems of priority-setting and resource allocation. EU defence is no different in this regard from other forms of military cooperation, and Spain’s participation faces the same challenges when it comes to defining clear strategic goals as that of other actors.

Ad hoc arrangements and a reliance on almost disinterested contributions seem to be at the very heart, and are perhaps the greatest weaknesses, of European defence. When asked about the origins of the
strategic content of CSDP missions, the former High Representative of the EU, Javier Solana, said the following:

“You are going to find little order in that process. The objectives of the missions were decided as they were required by circumstances on the ground…our missions were in essence a response to situations that emerged at a given point in time.”

This reactive process led to ad hoc coalitions being formed for each mission. Action preceded strategy, even at the highest European level. Participation in those coalitions therefore seems to have been only loosely correlated to the strategic interests of those participating, and Spain was no exception to that rule.

For the EU, launching a mission is a statement in itself as it reaffirms the legitimacy and capacity of this emerging actor. In fact, Solana is known for having set the goal of launching a CSDP mission every six months as a means of keeping the CFSP alive and evolving. Spain has always been aware of this dynamic, and that is one of the reasons why its support for European integration translated over the years into its direct participation in missions it would have otherwise not undertaken. Europe might, therefore, need a few Don Quixotes if it is to prosper in this field. What would surely be desirable is for member states to have a clearer idea of their interests and, above all, to be well aware of why they undertake the responsibilities they do within CSDP. Broad and unclear references to European unity are unsatisfactory when they lead to the deployment of troops with a mandate to use force. If one is willing to commit its armed forces for the pursuit of high milieu goals, it should be clear what those goals are. Spain should therefore express a clear view of what it wants CSDP to become, of the kind of actor it wants the EU to develop into, and how such an actor can further the interests of Spain and its citizens.

SWEDEN: AN ACTIVE, NORMATIVE, NON-ALIGNED COUNTRY

ALESSANDRO MARRONE

Abstract

Sweden’s strategic culture and its participation in CSDP have been substantially shaped by the heritage of the country’s neutrality. However, active engagement in UN peacekeeping, mediation and humanitarian assistance, coupled with constant advocacy on human rights, rule of law and democracy values, have been and continue to be an important part of Swedish strategic culture, influencing its participation in the CSDP.

At the same time, the national interests of Sweden in the post-Cold War period have been, and continue to be, grouped into two main categories both influencing Swedish approach to CSDP. First, there is a strategic interest in the peace, security and stability of the neighbourhood – including not only the Baltic states but also Eastern European countries and the Arctic – as a vital condition for Swedish national security, particularly vis-à-vis Russia. The Swedish national interest in the stable functioning of the global economy based on free trade and access to markets falls in the second category. That implies a free, safe and reliable flow of goods, from raw materials to manufacturing products, services and information, through both physical and cyber infrastructures and lines of communication.

Although Sweden joined the EU only in 1995, the country has actively participated in CSDP conceptual development, institution-building and operations, to the point that it has been present in every single CSDP mission launched by the EU up to 2012. Overall, Sweden can be considered an active, normative, non-aligned country, and these characteristics are likely to remain in place in the years to come.
Overview

Sweden’s strategic culture and its participation in the Common Security Defence Policy (CSDP) have been substantially shaped by the heritage of the country’s neutrality. Sweden was not involved in either World War I or World War II and it remained a neutral country during the Cold War, albeit substantially West-oriented. However, active engagement in UN peacekeeping, mediation and humanitarian assistance, coupled with constant advocacy on human rights, rule of law and democracy values, have been and continue to be an important part of Swedish strategic culture, influencing its participation in CSDP. Sweden only joined the EU in 1995 and it is not a member of NATO. In this context, it is worth noting that Sweden has actively participated in CSDP conceptual development, institution building and operations, to the point that it has been present in every single CSDP mission launched by the EU up to 2012. Considering its heritage of neutrality and the fact that its population in 2013 amounts to just 9.8 million, Sweden’s participation in CSDP is noticeable. Overall, Sweden can be considered an active, normative, non-aligned country.

Strategic culture

Swedish strategic culture has been largely shaped by two centuries of neutrality. This implies a lack of recent collective memory of wartime on the national territory. But being neutral during the Cold War in Scandinavia also meant relying only on national forces to defend its eastern border from a Soviet invasion. In this context, for decades Sweden adopted the concept of a ‘people’s defence’, implying the possible total mobilisation of the Swedish male population\(^{244}\) and 800,000 deployable soldiers. At the same time, since the 1950s there has been a strong commitment to UN-led peacekeeping. The combination of these elements led to a multi-faced situation. Indeed, until 2010 Sweden retained a large conscript army, theoretically able to mobilise 500,000 troops on the eastern border within three months\(^{245}\) while at the same time championing and participating in UN-led peacekeeping operations worldwide.


\(^{245}\) Interview, 30 November 2012.
The basic tenet of Swedish strategic culture has been – and continues to be – that the use of force is legitimate in only two cases: either for the country’s territorial defence from an armed attack, or with the consent of the host nation or a resolution from the UN Security Council authorising the use of military force for purposes other than territorial defence. This basic assumption has so far not been questioned in Sweden.

Nevertheless, the evolution of the Swedish political discourse from a position of ‘neutrality’ during the Cold War to a position of ‘non-alignment’ in the post-Cold War period is notable. This process led to the elaboration by Sweden of the so-called ‘unilateral solidarity clause’. The resolution, adopted in 2009 by a unanimous vote of the Swedish parliament, affirmed that:

The government supports the Declaration of Solidarity presented by the Defence Committee and covering EU Member States together with Norway and Iceland. It is impossible to see military conflicts in our immediate surroundings that could affect one country alone. Sweden will not remain passive should a disaster or an attack afflict another member country or Nordic country. We expect that these countries will act in the same manner should Sweden be afflicted. Sweden should therefore be able to both give and to receive military support.246

This document can be considered an evolution of Sweden’s strategic culture towards a more active role in the case of conflicts in Europe. However, such evolution does not imply that Sweden has signed up to a kind of collective defence obligation similar to the Article 5 of the Washington Treaty that established NATO. Moreover, there is no willingness in the country to seriously and openly consider the possibility of joining NATO and thus subscribe to a collective defence obligation. Sweden does not want the EU to undertake such obligations, but would rather keep the focus of CSDP on crisis management operations.

However, neutrality or non-alignment did not and does not imply a passive or silent position for Sweden on world affairs, as has been the case for other neutral countries such as Switzerland. On the contrary, Sweden often took normative-led positions on a number of issues, including a

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constant emphasis on the protection and spreading of human rights, rule of law and democracy. It has been rightly argued that Swedish foreign and defence policy has often demonstrated a clear preference for multilateral, value-driven solutions rather than a need to satisfy purely material, national interests.\textsuperscript{247} Sweden has also been a steady supporter of the development and enforcement of international law.

Moreover, Swedish strategic culture is marked by a strong attitude towards international cooperation. This regards, in particular, its long-standing activities with other Nordic countries, which have led to the establishment of the Nordic Defence Cooperation (NORDEFCO).\textsuperscript{248} Cooperation in the Nordic region has increased in the post-Cold War period. In 2008, the foreign ministers of the five countries tasked Thordvald Stoltemberg\textsuperscript{249} with the preparation of the Report on the Nordic Cooperation on Foreign and Security Field, delivered in 2009 and commonly known as the Stoltemberg Report. It put forward 13 proposals ranging from airspace surveillance to a maritime monitoring system, including defence procurement and the joint agreement of a “Nordic Solidarity Clause”.\textsuperscript{250}

Swedish attitudes towards cooperation in the post-Cold War have been also demonstrated by the active participation in the NATO Partnership for Peace (PfP). It included a military contribution to the Alliance’s operations in the Balkans, Afghanistan and Libya, as well as the modernisation of the Swedish armed forces to achieve NATO interoperability. In other words, Sweden has never considered joining


\textsuperscript{248} The Nordic countries include Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden. In 1964, they created a joint peacekeeping military stand-by force called the Joint Nordic Committee for Military United Nations Matters (NORDSAMFN). In 1997 it evolved into a forum for broader cooperation on peace under the umbrella of the UN, NATO, the EU and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), called the Nordic Coordinated Arrangement for Military Peace Support (NORDCAPS). In 2009, NORDCAPS was subsumed into the Nordic Defence Cooperation (NORDEFCO).

\textsuperscript{249} Thorvald Stoltenberg is a Norwegian politician who served in several Norwegian governments as defence minister and foreign minister.

NATO, but has progressively developed a constant and deep cooperation with the Alliance at the operational level, particularly in crisis management operations. At the same time, since the mid-1990s, Sweden has shown its activism in the EU and particularly within the CSDP framework.

Finally, over the last six decades Sweden has maintained an active role within the UN system, particularly with regard to peacekeeping. According to some, the first example of Swedish peacekeeping was the inter-positioning force deployed to maintain the ceasefire between two German kingdoms in the 17th century. In the 1920s, Sweden was an active member of the League of Nations. Since the 1950s, and particularly when Swedish diplomat Dag Hammarskjöld held the position of UN secretary general, Sweden began to constantly deploy troops to UN-led peacekeeping operations. It has been calculated that 12% of the 530,000 troops deployed to UN missions up to 1997 came from Sweden. Moreover, as of 2004, the total of Swedish soldiers and police officials who had participated in UN missions amounted to roughly 80,000. The temporary peak in Swedish contributions to UN peacekeeping occurred in the early 1990s – partly due to the Balkan wars – when the total contributions amounted to 2,000 units. There has been no geographical focus in this regard; for Sweden, the engagement in peacekeeping is rather a matter of principle. It took part in CSDP missions in Congo and Chad because these countries belonged to the category of those needing the international community’s intervention for conflict resolution. In this context, a military option is seen only as the last resort, while preference is given to non-military ways of solving international disputes.

This commitment to peacekeeping has been traditionally coupled with a pro-active role as mediator or honest broker within diplomatic

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251 Interview, 28 November 2012.
256 Interview, 2 December 2012.
crises. This is also due to Sweden’s globally positive reputation as a neutral country during the Cold War. Sweden has also maintained a good track record of providing relatively large funds for development aid and humanitarian assistance – it currently devotes 1.1% of GDP to international aid, directed towards more than 30 countries in Africa, Central Asia and Latin America. As a whole, the commitment to international peace and security reflected a strategic culture with a strong normative character.

Swedish policymakers and public opinion generally perceive Sweden as a sort of ‘force for good in the world’, or ‘conscience of the world’, which is keen to support the international community’s efforts to maintain or restore peace as well as to alleviate human suffering.

In this context, Sweden has been a staunch supporter of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) principle as a natural follow-up to its normative stance. According to the Swedish view, R2P is based on three pillars: first, it is the responsibility of the local government to protect its citizens; second, if the local government fails, the international community has the responsibility to assist through capacity building, security sector reform, and means other than the use of force; third, only as a last resort may the international community intervene militarily by the use of force to enforce R2P. It should be noted that policymakers consider R2P only one among several guidelines for Swedish foreign policy. Public support for this normative approach is very high: according to a 2012 Transatlantic Trends survey, 81% of the Swedish population supports the R2P principle, which is higher than the EU average of 67%. The same survey shows that Sweden has the highest percentage in Europe of people endorsing military intervention in Libya (68%), Afghanistan (62%) and even Iraq (56%), based on the assumption that it was “the right thing to do”.

258 Which was reflected, inter alia, in the generous funding of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) over the last five decades.
260 Interview, 19 November 2012.
262 Ibid.
Such a normative stance seems in contrast to some of Sweden’s external actions. For example, Sweden is a net exporter of defence equipment, has a tradition of arms manufacturing dating back to the 17th century, and maintains a strong defence industrial base with large industries such as Saab producing the Gripen fighter aircraft. In 2012, the Swedish defence minister had to resign because of a scandal over the building of an arms factory in Saudi Arabia – not exactly a democratic and peaceful country – by the Swedish defence industry with the involvement of government agencies. This deal had been kept secret for several years, away from public opinion scrutiny. Swedish normative rhetoric also implies that when national troops are involved in serious fighting abroad, the policymakers try to not emphasise this in the public discourse. At the same time, they wish to demonstrate to the EU and US partners that Swedish troops are able to fight when there is a UN mandate, such as in the case of CSDP Artemis operation and the NATO International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). This is related to the importance Sweden attaches to long-standing relations with partners, which are – based also on the country’s credibility and reliability – maintained and enhanced over time.

The current global outlook of the Swedish international vision recognises the rise of new powers such as China, India and Brazil, and the resurgence of old ones such as Russia. In addition to the concerns over Russia discussed below, China is seen by many policymakers as a dangerous economic competitor because of its unfair trade competition based partly on reduced workers’ rights. Sweden therefore favours a strong and united EU in order to ensure that the European voice carries sufficient leverage in an increasingly multi-polar world vis-à-vis other powers. Furthermore, Sweden shares the view that an effective CSDP can contribute to this goal. In particular, it is believed that Sweden can put forward its policy on many issues, including advocacy of human rights and democracy, better through the EU than on its own. In other words, Sweden believes it is stronger together with other Europeans. Indeed, during the debate on the observer status of the Palestinian National Authority at the UN General Assembly, Sweden was ready to adapt its vote to a united EU

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264 Interview, 2 December 2012.
position on abstention,\textsuperscript{265} which Europeans were at the end unable to forge. This is an example of the Swedish pragmatic approach, traditionally keen to reach a compromise at the European level in order to achieve EU support in the international arena for at least part of the country’s agenda. The current trend towards multi-polarity is also seen as a potential source of increased global instability, including in the EU neighbourhood. This was epitomised in Syria, where the international community has proven ill-equipped to quickly adopt a common approach to the crisis.

The transition undertaken by some Arab countries is predominantly considered a positive process, somewhat similar to the transition undertaken by Eastern Europe after the collapse of the Soviet Union. However, Swedish policymakers are aware that the direction of transition in Arab countries is highly uncertain. In addition, Sweden has strong ties with the region because of the number of refugees from countries such as Syria that are hosted on Swedish territory. So far, Sweden has prided itself on its relatively permissive asylum and immigration policy, also because this fits well in the normative approach to international cooperation and assistance to people suffering worldwide. At the same time, addressing security and development challenges in countries from which asylum-seekers and immigrants originate, such as the Balkans, contributes to a strategy of managing the situation better before it reaches Sweden’s borders.

\textbf{Institutional framework}

The Swedish political system\textsuperscript{266} is parliamentary, without the direct election of a prime minister. It is characterised by the presence of several political parties forming coalition governments, which often lack a majority of seats in the parliament. This has implied a constant dialogue between governing and opposition parties, which traditionally take decisions on foreign and defence policy by consensus, including those on the use of force. In other words, the Swedish government acts militarily only when it obtains the consensus of the main opposition parties. This ensures the strong continuity of the Swedish approach to crisis management operations over the years, despite changes in the ruling coalitions. For example, the shift

\textsuperscript{265} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{266} As are other European countries, Sweden is a constitutional monarchy whereby the king has no political power.
from a progressive to a conservative government in the 2000s did not significantly alter Sweden’s position in this regard.

Within Sweden’s institutional framework, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) plays an important role in decision-making related to the deployment of armed forces abroad, particularly by initiating and framing the proposal for joining crisis management operations. In general, the parliament has the final say on the launch of every military operation before it is deployed. The government can deploy troops without the parliament’s authorisation only in exceptional cases of self-defence, to put up to 3,000 troops on stand-by, or to implement a decision taken on the basis of an international agreement previously approved by the parliament. Even when parliament approval is not mandatory, informal consultations between government officials and lawmakers usually take place. In particular, the Foreign Affairs Committee is an important venue where political decisions are taken. Parliament also exercises oversight through its budgetary power. Moreover, every five years a special commission appointed by the parliament reviews the position of the Swedish armed forces. The 2008 review involved the shift from a conscript to a professional army, and the current review is scheduled for completion by 2013.

The decision over the participation in a specific mission is often informally shared between government officials, usually officials from the MFA, parliamentarians and the parliament’s civil servants on the Foreign Affairs Committee. This is in order to ensure the smooth approval of the formal government proposal when it is presented. Meanwhile, the government tasks the armed forces to manage preliminary military planning, which in turn feeds the elaboration of the government's proposal to the parliament. Formally, in the case of Swedish participation in the NATO Operation Unified Protector (OUP) in Libya, it took only three days to go from government decision to parliament approval to the deployment of Swedish fighter aircraft to the Italian base of Sigonella.

Within the aforementioned context of broad and cross-party consensus on foreign and defence policy, the relative influence of the prime minister regarding crisis management operations, CSDP and, generally speaking, the use of force partly depends on his personality and that of the

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267 Ruffa, op. cit.
268 Interview, 3 December 2012.
foreign minister. Indeed, the prime minister has the overall responsibility for the government’s actions and the power to influence the country’s foreign policy, but often the lead is left to the foreign minister, as happened in recent years with Carl Bildt. The Ministry of Defence obviously play a significant role in planning and implementing CSDP missions. The Ministry of Justice also makes an important contribution concerning, in particular, civilian missions involving the police, border guards, judges and prosecutors, while the Ministry of International Development Cooperation is also involved, albeit to a lesser extent. Finally, it should be mentioned that the Council on Foreign Affairs, composed of parliamentarians and government officials and formally chaired by the king, has an advisory role in the decision-making process.

At the operational level, government agencies such as the Swedish Defence Research Agency (Totalförsvarets forskningsinstitut, FOI) and the Folke Bernadotte Academy (FBA) have specific tasks as a strategic research centre and a training centre for civilian and military personnel involved in crisis management operations, respectively. This institutional and organisational arrangement contributes to keeping the MFA core structure relatively small and cohesive with strong interpersonal relations, thus increasing its agility at the strategic level.

Regarding the Swedish military, in 2012 the armed forces amounted to roughly 20,000 units and the defence budget accounted for $6.21 billion. It should be noted that the defence budget for 2012 remained stable with respect to 2011, and increased in comparison to 2010 when it was $5.6 billion. In a time of severe defence budget cuts in several EU countries, Sweden, together with Poland, is one of the few EU countries where no substantial austerity measures were needed and no additional financial constraints have affected the country’s military capabilities. In fact the country, which is not part of the eurozone, has experienced relatively low government debt and enjoyed a solid economy in recent years. However, the decision to move from a conscript to a professional army obviously

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269 In Sweden, the Ministry of Justice includes competencies and capabilities which in other countries, such as Italy and France, are under the responsibility of the Minister of Interior, and thus has often participated in CSDP operations providing human resources for security sector reform, training, law enforcement, institution building, etc.

270 Interview, 23 November 2012.

271 Heldt, op. cit.
affected the quantity of available troops: Sweden currently plans for an army composed of seven professional battalions.

**Strategic interests**

The national interests of Sweden in the post-Cold War period have been, and continue to be, grouped into two main categories. First, there is a strategic interest in the peace, security and stability of the neighbourhood – including not only the Baltic states but also eastern European countries and the Arctic – as a vital condition for Swedish national security, particularly vis-à-vis Russia. Sweden joined the EU in 1995 partly because it believed that securing and stabilising the former communist countries was in its strategic interest and considered the Union a powerful tool in this regard, mainly through its enlargement.\(^{272}\) At the same time, Sweden welcomed the NATO enlargement to Eastern Europe, particularly to Poland and the Baltic states, because it saw this as contributing to the security of its neighbourhood and, thus, its territory. A substantial portion of Swedish policymakers are worried about the growth of Russian military expenditure and the authoritarian backlash experienced in Russia under Vladimir Putin’s leadership.\(^ {273}\) The war between Russia and Georgia in 2008 was a case in point. In this context, Sweden is in favour of the US commitment to NATO and European security, a strong cooperation among Nordic countries, and the EU’s stabilisation and outreach efforts in its eastern neighbourhood. In particular, Sweden is one of the greatest supporters, together with Poland, of the EU Eastern Partnership,\(^ {274}\) and is the biggest donor to countries such as Moldova and Ukraine.

The Swedish national interest in the stable functioning of the global economy based on free trade and access to markets falls in the second category. The Swedish economy is highly globalised and dependent on the free, safe and reliable flow of goods, from raw materials to manufacturing products, services and information, through both physical and cyber infrastructures and lines of communications. In this context, it is not by accident that Sweden has contributed to EU and NATO counter-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden, and has supported the Barcelona Process to

\(^ {272}\) Interview, 3 December 2012.

\(^ {273}\) Interview, 19 November 2012.

\(^ {274}\) The Eastern Partnership was established in 2009 between the EU and Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine.
sustain security and economic integration of the Mediterranean. Sweden also has a strategic interest in promoting an effective multilateral governance system. Like other countries that are not sufficiently powerful to shape global politics, Sweden feels that its national interests are better protected by rules-based multilateral institutions. For example, Sweden believes that security can be built and guaranteed only with others, through NATO and the EU as part of wide web of world security. Swedish strategic culture envisages that not only conflict resolution but also global security challenges are better dealt with by a global governance system. This is the case even if security challenges are not threats in a strict military sense, for example, terrorism, climate change, pandemics or migration. Moreover, there is strong normative value attached to international law and cooperation within global and regional institutions. In this context, a strong and active EU is seen as an important building block of the global governance system and CSDP is, in this regard, considered a significant tool within the EU toolbox.

**Participation in CSDP**

Sweden joined the EU in 1995 through a referendum in which only a tiny majority of the population voted in favour of membership. In this sense, the country is a ‘recent’ EU member with a previous, long-standing tradition of neutrality, like Finland and Austria. However, Sweden has taken an active role in shaping CSDP and contributing to EU civilian and military missions.

The Swedish government was pro-actively involved in the decision-making that culminated in the establishment of CSDP. In particular, Sweden – together with Finland – encouraged other EU members to focus CSDP on crisis management operations and not on the Union’s territorial defence. The reason was three-fold. First, a significant share of Swedish public opinion at that time feared a kind of ‘militarisation’ of the EU.

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275 Interview, 2 December 2012.
276 Interview, 20 November 2012.
277 An attempted terrorist suicide attack took place in the centre of Stockholm in December 2010, but the bomb did not detonate.
Second, the country’s neutral status implied the refusal of any kind of EU approach to collective defence similar to NATO Article 5. Third, Sweden believed that the post-Cold War security environment required a range of peacekeeping, peace-enforcing and peace-making operations to conduct crisis management through a comprehensive approach, rather than conventional state-to-state warfare. Sweden understood this as essential in order to support peace and security worldwide.\textsuperscript{279} Generally speaking, Sweden has been and continues to be an explicit supporter of this understanding of the comprehensive approach.

The Swedish engagement resulted \textit{inter alia} in a strong focus on civilian capabilities for crisis management operations alongside the traditional military ones. For example, the idea of Civilian Response Team came from Sweden. At the same time, the country lobbied to move the set of Petersberg Tasks from the Western European Union – of which Sweden was not a member – to the EU in order to perform such peacekeeping tasks within CSDP, where Sweden played an active role.\textsuperscript{280} In the negotiation of the Lisbon Treaty, Stockholm took a cautious approach to Article 427 on the EU security guarantee, while it strongly supported Article 422 on the solidarity clause.\textsuperscript{281} In recent years, Sweden has put greater emphasis on human rights, including gender issues, within the CSDP framework.

Since the early 2000s, the Swedish government has contributed to every CSDP mission with varying numbers of troops, ranging from a few units to several hundred. It did so for two main reasons. First, it considered CSDP important \textit{per se} as a tool for international peacekeeping. Second, Sweden wanted to be perceived by other EU members as a reliable partner in order to increase its credibility and influence in CSDP. Additionally, there were reasons specific to the operations in question. In particular, Swedish participation in missions in the Balkans was mainly due to the geographical proximity of this crisis to the EU, while its contribution to the CSDP monitoring mission in Georgia is mostly related to Sweden’s interest in securing and stabilising the neighbourhood and demonstrating EU engagement in international law \textit{vis-à-vis} the behaviour of Russia.\textsuperscript{282} The Swedish participation in EUPOL Afghanistan and ISAF, on the other hand,

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{279} Interview, 19 November 2012.
  \item \textsuperscript{280} Interview, 3 December 2012.
  \item \textsuperscript{281} Interview, 23 November 2012.
  \item \textsuperscript{282} Interview, 19 November 2012.
\end{itemize}
was mostly related to the need to maintain transatlantic solidarity and its partnership with the US (also achieved through being an active partner of NATO) and thus ensure the US commitment to European security.

Swedish armed forces also engaged in complex military missions, for example in Operation Artemis in Chad, where there was good Franco-Swedish cooperation both at the operational level – in particular, among the respective special forces – and at the strategic level between the two foreign ministers, Hubert Vedrine and Hanna Lindt. Moreover, Sweden has a good track record of deploying judges, prosecutors, police officials and civilian experts in CSDP operations, in line with the traditional Swedish emphasis on civilian capabilities. The national representatives to CSDP institutions in Brussels, from the Ministries of Defence, Foreign Affairs and Justice, are relatively proactive and show a noticeable degree of internal coordination from the working level to the politico-strategic level.283

The Swedish perception of CSDP has evolved over time. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, two different views were widespread among policymakers and public opinion. On the one hand, there was the aforementioned fear of a ‘militarisation’ of the EU and a strong emphasis on civilian aspects and capabilities for CSDP, in common with Finland. On the other hand, there was much enthusiasm about the EU’s potential capacity to be an effective peacekeeper and peace-maker in Europe, its neighbourhood and worldwide, in close relation with the UN. After more than a decade of CSDP commitment, both views have changed in Sweden. The fear of a ‘militarised’ EU has lessened and almost disappeared, given the path undertaken by CSDP and greater Swedish understanding of EU dynamics. At the same time, the initial enthusiasm and expectations have also decreased, particularly in the light of the stalemate of CSDP missions between 2009 and 2011.

However, Swedish attitudes towards CSDP remain positive, and there is a general belief among policymakers that in the security and defence domain it is important to do things together at the EU level. Consensus on CSDP is still strong in Swedish public opinion, despite the EU having lost part of its appeal as a result of the eurozone crisis, and no EU mission has been the object of explicit opposition. Nevertheless, support for crisis management operations – within the EU or other

283 Interview, 28 November 2012.
frameworks – has decreased from an average of 75% in the mid-1990s to an average of 60% in 2007-12.\textsuperscript{284}

Only two serious criticisms have been raised from left-leaning public opinion and policymakers. The first concerns the decline of Sweden’s commitment to peacekeeping missions led by the UN or the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), which was the perceived result of the shift of resources to CSDP operations.\textsuperscript{285} This trend is related to the fact the EU as a whole has become a major institutional framework through which to channel Swedish foreign and defence policy, including its commitment to crisis management operations, although the UN remains a fundamental terms of reference. However, the limited size of CSDP operations – and thus the small number of personnel provided by Sweden – is notable, as is the fact that until 2012, an overwhelming share of Swedish personnel abroad was committed to the NATO operation in Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{286}

The second criticism has pointed to the fact that the EU Battle Groups have been an expensive capability never yet used by CSDP operations, thus questioning the value-for-money of the investment.\textsuperscript{287} This is not to say that Sweden is against Battle Groups, but rather that if the EU has to maintain this capability it is worth using it when necessary. Indeed, Sweden was a framework nation for the Battle Groups in 2008 and 2011, and despite the critical views expressed by the social democrat-opposition, it will remain a framework nation in 2015.

CSDP, and generally speaking the EU, is largely perceived by policymakers as a vehicle to promote Swedish interests and values worldwide, through cooperation with other EU members. For example, CSDP missions are considered a useful tool to implement the Swedish traditional commitment to peacekeeping. CSDP is also considered a useful tool to enhance EU influence in the neighbourhood of the Union, including to the east and the south, as well as in the candidate countries in the western Balkans (for example, through the EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia). In this sense, the EU as a whole can represent a stronger and more attractive model than just Sweden alone for the former Soviet

\textsuperscript{284} Heldt, op. cit.

\textsuperscript{285} Interview, 19 November 2012.

\textsuperscript{286} Heldt, op. cit.

\textsuperscript{287} Interview, 19 November 2012.
Republics as they choose their future paths. As mentioned previously, the Swedish strategic interest in the free and safe flow of goods is served by the Atalanta anti-piracy mission.\textsuperscript{288} Sweden has also supported the establishment of the EU task force on cyber security in order to involve the EU in this aspect of international flows, which the country deems of interest. Moreover, there is a widespread belief that the EU can do more than CSDP operations on a broader security agenda, by mobilising multiple tools such as aid and humanitarian assistance, trade policy and advocacy on human rights, including the status of women.\textsuperscript{289}

CSDP missions are considered an important component of the broad EU toolbox, as well as a valuable asset to increase EU external action and its status in the world. In turn, EU external action is conceived as one of the most useful frameworks to increase Swedish influence in the international arena beyond the limited capabilities that a country like Sweden can leverage. In particular, Stockholm is interested in pursuing, through the EU, its goals on a broad range of issues, including not only crisis management operations but also international trade and climate change. Finally, according to the Swedish view, the EU should play an active role in spreading the values of human rights, rule of law and democracy worldwide and particularly in its neighbourhood. This is one of the reasons behind Sweden being one of the initial supporters of the European Global Strategy process,\textsuperscript{290} jointly launched by the Italian, Polish, Spanish and Swedish governments in 2012 to stimulate strategic thinking on EU external action.\textsuperscript{291}

At the same time, Sweden is aware of the limits of using CSDP as a tool to pursue national strategic interests. For example, there is no ambition, at least in the medium term, to make CSDP – and the EU solidarity clause – a way to ensure the security of Sweden and Nordic countries against an increasingly assertive Russia. Cooperation with NATO and the US, and a strong American commitment to European security, are deemed more useful in this regard. While NATO membership is currently not an option for Sweden, close cooperation with the Alliance and long-

\textsuperscript{288} Interview, 23 November 2012.
\textsuperscript{289} Interview, 3 December 2012.
\textsuperscript{290} Interview, 23 November 2012.
\textsuperscript{291} Further information can be found at \url{www.europeanglobalstrategy.eu}. 
term integration in the NATO framework are deemed particularly important.\footnote{C. Wünderlich (2010), “Moving beyond neutrality: Sweden’s changing attitude towards the military use of force”, paper presented at the 7th Pan-European International Relations Conference of the Standing Group on International Relations (SGIR) of the ECPR, 9–11 September, Stockholm.}

Concerning crisis management operations, in the Swedish view, the EU should aim to be able to intervene in a broad range of crises, including in the case of the US not contributing. However, CSDP should not be built in opposition to NATO or the US. The Atlantic Alliance maintains a unique resource for crisis management operations, and there is no unanimous consensus for replicating NATO military structures within the EU. Complementarity and synergies between the two organisations are favoured by most. Indeed, in 2001 the exchange of letters between Swedish Foreign Minister Hannah Lindt – acting as Sweden held the Presidency of the EU – and NATO Secretary General George Robertson established the first formal relations between the two actors. Some policymakers defined Sweden as the only “non-NATO Atlanticist EU member.”\footnote{Interview, 3 December 2012.}

In this context, the participation in \textit{ad hoc} coalitions is less favoured than NATO or EU frameworks for conducting crisis management operations. In the case of the Mali crisis, since 2012 Sweden has supported the launch of a robust EU training mission to build up Malian armed forces and institutions in order to deal with the situation in the northern region of the country. In early 2013, Sweden also provided some air capabilities for a strategic airlift to move France’s troops and equipment from Europe to Africa, along with other European countries such as the UK, Germany, Belgium and Denmark. However, Sweden did not take any active part in the French-led military operation in Mali.

Generally speaking, there is no formal Swedish preference for NATO or the EU framework in dealing with crises, the choice is mainly made on the basis of a case-by-case evaluation. Clearly, for the time being only NATO is able to provide the military framework needed to conduct high-intensity, large-scale military operations. In any case, the UN remains extremely important in this regard. A UN Security Council mandate is a \textit{conditiosine qua non} for the use of force abroad under Chapter VII of the UN
Charter, while for operations falling under Chapter VI a clear sign of support from the UN Security Council is aimed for.\textsuperscript{294}

With regards to military capabilities, Sweden was among the first supporters of the EU Pooling and Sharing (P&S) initiative with the Ghent document signed with Germany in November 2010. Stockholm is not against NATO’s Smart Defence, but the fact that the country is not a NATO member obviously does matter in this regard. Sweden has also been member of the Letter of Intent/Framework Agreement (LOI/FA) and the Organisation Conjointe de Coopération en matière d'ARmement (OCCAR) because of its significance to the Swedish national defence industry. Nowadays, there is widespread belief that P&S should be a bottom-up approach, whereby EU institutions act as a facilitator to map opportunities for cooperation and to encourage it, so that bilateral, regional or other kinds of projects commence among interested EU member states. Sweden is accustomed to defence cooperation within NORDEFCO, including both trilateral initiatives with Norway and Finland and bilateral initiatives.\textsuperscript{295} In the context of Nordic cooperation, Sweden and the other Nordic countries took a long-term approach based on the convergence of respective national approaches, for example with regard to standards, procedures and procurement plans.\textsuperscript{296} Defence cooperation, including P&S, is generally seen as long-term process with little expectation of immediate radical changes in this regard.

Sweden has also been one of the most active supporters of the comprehensive approach. This is also rooted in the fact that the Swedish conscript army envisaged, by default, a number of soldiers with civilian employment, and thus civilian skills, who are extremely keen to also perform non-military tasks – from material reconstruction to institution building – as part of missions in operational theatres such as the Balkans and Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{297} Today, the link between security and development is well recognised in Sweden, up to the point that some civilian CSDP missions are co-funded from the Swedish government budget for

\textsuperscript{294} Heldt, op. cit.

\textsuperscript{295} Interview, 19 November 2012.


\textsuperscript{297} Interview, 2 December 2012.
international aid. Official government documents confirm that Sweden links together different policies (foreign, development, security and defence) in crisis management operations. However, as happens in other EU countries, formal claims about applying a comprehensive approach are not always matched in practice.

Finally, following the deterioration of the situation on the ground and the military intervention initiated by France in January 2013, the EU has launched the EU Training Mission (EUTM) Mali aimed at training and assisting Malian armed forces. Sweden supported this decision and provided 15 military trainers to EUTM Mali.

**Conclusion**

The Swedish approach to CSDP is rooted in the country's history and strategic culture, and largely reflects the strategic interests pursued by Sweden as well as the normative stance it asserts in the international arena. The approach is therefore likely to remain in place in the coming years. That means that Sweden will likely remain an active partner of CSDP operations, a supporter of normative-based EU advocacy at the global level, and a non-aligned country with several constraints and a strong reluctance when it comes to collective defence obligations. However, this does not necessarily mean that all the current characteristics of Swedish relations with CSDP will remain exactly the same.

Two endogenous factors may affect Swedish foreign and defence policy. At the strategic level, there is a three-fold shift in Swedish strategic culture: from neutrality to non-alignment including a “unilateral solidarity clause”; from the priority of “territorial defence” to the one of “defence of national interests”; and from participation only in UN-led crisis management operations to only in UN-mandated crisis management operations, which therefore can be conducted through EU or NATO frameworks. The direction of this shift is clear, but it is not certain if it will continue or if so, at what pace.

At the operational level, there may be long-term effects, including unintentional ones, of the recent Swedish decision to move from a conscript to a professional army. On the one hand, Western countries with

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298 Interview, 21 November 2012.
299 Ruffa, op. cit.
professional armies are more ready for crisis management operations than
countries where conscription implies closer public scrutiny of the direct
link between a military operation and national defence or interests. On the
other hand, the reduction in size of the armed forces and the fact that the
military will have to compete in the Swedish job market may affect the
availability of a variety of skills among Swedish troops. These potential
shortcomings will be mitigated, at least in the coming years, by the fact that
the gradual withdrawal of a large proportion of Swedish troops from
Afghanistan by 2014 will probably ensure the availability of well-trained
capabilities for crisis management operations.

In addition, three exogenous factors will be particularly important at
the strategic level for Swedish foreign and defence policy in the next years.
First, the evolution of Russian domestic politics and its external projection
will have an impact. If an internal authoritarian backlash in Russia is
coupled with a more assertive attitude towards Moscow’s ‘near abroad’,
Sweden will be more focused on the security of its neighbourhood and on
territorial defence. On the other hand, a more peaceful, stable and
cooperative situation in the region to the east of EU borders will allow and
push Sweden to focus on issues primarily related to global security. In both
cases, there will likely be implications for the Swedish approach to CSDP,
for example, regarding the regional priorities for crisis management
operations and, generally speaking, for EU external action.

Second, the so-called US pivot towards Asia may have different
impacts on Europe and thus on Sweden’s strategic outlook. If it will require
greater European action in the EU neighbourhood – either through NATO,
the EU or other multilateral frameworks – while maintaining transatlantic
solidarity and a certain US commitment or European security, it will not
necessarily lead to radical changes in Sweden’s foreign and defence policy.
It may well favour an increase in Sweden’s commitment to crisis
management operations led by Europeans, primarily but not exclusively
through CSDP. In contrast, if the US pivot will imply a substantial
disengagement from European security, it may lead to a new situation in
the Europe whereby Sweden – as well as other EU countries – reconsiders
the fundamentals of its foreign and defence policy, including the purposes
of CSDP.

Finally, the evolution of the EU will obviously play a significant role
in shaping Sweden’s position towards it. An analysis of possible scenarios
regarding EU membership and patterns of integration is beyond the scope
of this chapter. Suffice to say that – ceteris paribus the Russian and American
variables of Swedish strategic calculus – Sweden would prefer a sufficiently robust CSDP, integrated and effective in dealing with the full spectrum of crisis management operations. However, it would not favour an evolution of CSDP towards collective defence obligations, nor its decline as a tool for addressing crises and threats abroad.
UNITED KINGDOM: 
THE ELEPHANT IN THE ROOM
GIOVANNI FALEG

Abstract

Drawing on fieldwork research in London (King’s College, Department of European and International Studies), this chapter analyses the CSDP through the lens of the British national interest. It accounts for the key elements of Britain’s national interest and how they are criss-crossed with security cooperation at the CSDP level.

Unquestionably, the UK has a leading role in European defence. Since Saint-Malo, the UK has recognised the value of a capable CSDP within the limited scope of crisis management or ‘Petersberg’ operations, with a clear focus on humanitarian tasks, peacekeeping and peacebuilding. It thus invested in the build-up of CSDP, both in the military (e.g. Headline Goal process, Battlegroup concept, creation of the European Defence Agency) and civilian dimension. Yet, as this chapter shows, the UK’s stance towards European defence has never been so uncertain. In response to austerity hitting public defence spending, the Coalition Government has privileged bilateral cooperation with France (e.g. Franco-British defence agreement) to the detriment of multilateral initiatives within the EU framework. Furthermore, the possibility of an opt-out makes Britain not just the engine, but also the elephant in the room for the CSDP: Is a common defence policy conceivable without the UK? The analysis presented in this chapter answers that question by showing that opting out of the CSDP would make British defence weaker and is unlikely to occur; but also that an ‘à la carte’ approach is what may allow the UK to get best value for money, given the growing frustration with cumbersome CSDP instruments and decision-making procedures.

The methodology is based on semi-structured interviews with British officials, diplomats and members of parliament, and experts in the field of foreign and security policy, as well as on the review and content analysis of relevant secondary sources and material available.
Of course Britain could make her own way in the world, outside the EU, if we chose to do so. So could any other Member State. But the question we will have to ask ourselves is this: Is that the very best future for our country? We will have to weigh carefully where our true national interest lies.

Prime Minister David Cameron’s EU Speech, 23 January 2013

Introduction

The United Kingdom’s participation in the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) is at a crossroads. Since 2010, David Cameron’s coalition government has reversed the multilateralist approach pursued by the Labour governments over the previous 12 years, ending an era of assertive UK engagement in shaping and implementing CSDP. The practice of British foreign and security policy has therefore seen a return of ‘exclusive’ bilateralism with selected worthy and like-minded partners (namely France – note the signature on 2 November 2010 of the Lancaster treaties) combined with a growing ‘malign neglect’ vis-à-vis the EU. This shift calls into question the assumption that austerity constraints lead to greater multilateral cooperation to save and pool resources, as Britain’s role in the CSDP is increasingly uncommitted and political uncertainties over its presence in the EU are on the rise.

This chapter attempts to shed light on the UK’s contribution and vision of CSDP, bearing in mind that, at such a peculiar and critical juncture, understanding the way a strategic culture or national interest affects behaviour is somewhere between problematic and impossible. It argues that some clear red lines still characterise the UK’s political discourse on CSDP, namely as regards the division of labour with NATO (the privileged partner for hard-security tasks) and the vision of CSDP as a ‘soft’ provider of conflict prevention, crisis management and peace-building through the comprehensive approach. Accordingly, this chapter demonstrates that this very specific vision of CSDP, which partly emanates

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from British strategic culture, has not changed much; what has changed, however, is a broader and ideological foreign policy orientation of the coalition government, linked to the emergence of the bilateral posture. This new orientation, combined with a longstanding sense of frustration towards Brussels-based, ineffective crisis management structures, has caused Britain to start drifting away from the CSDP.

The chapter is structured as follows. The first section briefly outlines the main features of the UK contribution to CSDP. The second section introduces the country’s security architecture shaping strategic preferences. The third section sketches out the main elements of the UK’s national interest and strategic objectives. The fourth section outlines Britain’s participation in CSDP missions, capacity or institution-building and explains why and how selected examples were instrumental to pursuing the UK national interest. Finally, the conclusion provides scenarios of the UK’s future relationship with the EU and their security implications.

Overview

The United Kingdom unquestionably adopts a leading role in European defence, due to the size of its armed forces, defence industry and experience in high-intensity warfare. In the late 1990s, Tony Blair’s support for the launch of the Common Security and Defence Policy at Saint Malo (1998) marked the end of an age-old opposition to the development of autonomous European military capabilities outside the NATO framework. The implications of Saint Malo were twofold, in the sense of being both a preservation and an advancement of the UK security interests to cope with adaptation pressures. On the one hand, in fact, the UK government sought to maintain intact the cornerstone of British strategic posture, namely the reliance on the US as a primary security partner and on NATO as guarantor of UK territorial defence (for example the ‘three Ds’ shaping EU-NATO relations). On the other hand, and as a response to pressures from Washington and the lessons from Kosovo, Britain started to recognise the value of a militarily autonomous CSDP within the limited scope of

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crisis management or ‘Petersberg’ operations, with a clear focus on humanitarian tasks, peacekeeping and peacebuilding. It is with this vision in mind that Labour governments continued to invest in the build-up of CSDP, both in the military (e.g. the Headline Goal process, the Battlegroup concept, the creation of the European Defence Agency) and civilian dimensions (as of February 2013, British civilian experts and police were seconded to 7 out of 12 CSDP civilian missions). Consistent with this vision, the CSDP main ‘deliverables’ are unmistakably perceived in London as contained within the soft dimension of security. Accordingly, the EU is seen as having an added value at the low end of the spectrum, which entails conflict prevention, stabilisation and those crisis management operations where borders between hard and soft security are blurred and a comprehensive approach is needed (e.g. in the Horn of Africa). Instead, 

303 The “Petersberg tasks” (Article 42 TEU) define the range of missions that may be carried out by the European Union. These are: humanitarian and rescue tasks, conflict prevention and peacekeeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management (including peacemaking) joint disarmament operations, military advice and assistance tasks, post-conflict stabilisation tasks. They were first set out in the 1992 Petersberg Declaration by the Western European Union (WEU) Council of Ministers, meeting at the Hotel Petersberg, near Bonn. The text of the declaration is available from [http://www.weu.int/documents/920619peten.pdf](http://www.weu.int/documents/920619peten.pdf).


305 These missions are: EUPOL Afghanistan, EUMM Georgia, EUJUST LEX Iraq, EULEX Kosovo, EUPOL COPPS, EUCAP Nestor and EUAVSEC South Sudan.

306 The UK doctrine for the implementation of the comprehensive approach is developed in the House of Commons Defence Committee’s Seventh Report of Session 2009-10 “The Comprehensive Approach: the point of war is not just to win but to make a better peace”, published on 18 March 2010. According to the Report, the UK understanding of the comprehensive approach coincides with the definition used by the Ministry of Defence as an approach “with commonly understood principles and collaborative processes that enhance the likelihood of favourable and enduring outcomes within a particular situation” (p. 1).

307 The EU Comprehensive Approach (CA) is defined, instead, as Civil-Military Coordination (CMCO), meaning “the need for effective co-ordination of the actions of all relevant EU actors involved in the planning and subsequent implementation of EU’s response to the crisis”. Cf. Council of the European Union (2003), Civil-Military Coordination, Doc. 14457/03, Brussels, 7 November 2003, p. 2. It is inferred,
there continues – and will continue – to be no appetite in London for high-end capabilities or such things as an EU operational headquarters, as long as NATO provides planning structures, procedures and resources for hard defence. Institutions and permanent planning and conduct structures are clear red lines for UK interests. That being said, whereas the transatlantic and European partnerships are justified as a way to pursue British national interest “in collaboration with others”, the special relationship with the US seems more ideological than rational given the changing realities of the international system.

The 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR) has left the approach to CSDP unchanged, despite the impact of systemic transformations (growing uncertainties and the changing nature of conflicts) on the UK’s strategic posture. The SDSR links the future role of CSDP to the promotion of stability, the reinforcement of conflict prevention tools (possibly leading to an EU conflict prevention strategy), the support to integrated missions and military ones where NATO is not willing to intervene and where action through the EU can provide good value for money (e.g. counter-piracy efforts in Somalia, Operation Atalanta). This is confirmed by the 2011 Building Stability Overseas Strategy (BSOS) jointly drafted by Department for International Development (DFID), the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) and the Ministry of Defence (MoD).

Despite the existence of clear red lines and an unambiguous understanding of what CSDP means to British national interest, the UK’s stance towards European defence has never been so uncertain, mostly and confirmed by interviews, that the support to the EU comprehensive approach is compatible and, in some cases, beneficial to the improvement of the UK comprehensive approach.


because of David Cameron’s coalition government euro-sceptic attitude.\footnote{312} In response to austerity hitting public defence spending, Britain has privileged bilateral cooperation with France (e.g. the Franco-British defence agreement) to the detriment of multilateral initiatives\footnote{313} within the EU framework, for instance regarding pooling and sharing or operational deployments (witness Libya). Finally, uncertainty is on the rise as the UK’s future relationship with the EU is called into question. The possibility of an opt-out makes Britain not just the engine, but also the elephant in the room for the CSDP: is a common defence policy conceivable without the UK?\footnote{314}

**UK strategic culture and institutional structure**

*Elements of Britain’s strategic culture*

There is no consensual view in the academic literature that the UK holds a clearly identifiable ‘strategic culture’. Having said that, observable exogenous stimuli, as well as the dynamics of domestic politics and institutional structures, affect the role and self-perception of the UK in the world. This, in turn, influences the way Britain conceives the use of force and behaves in the security realm.

\footnotetext{312}{On top of that, Sven Biscop correctly points out that Britain’s approach to the CSDP has been “consistent only in its orthodoxy, defending the primacy of NATO against the upstart CSDP which it parented”; however, “the power which that orthodoxy aims to please no longer cares”, as the US attitude to European defence is now one of benign neglect. Cf. S. Biscop (2012) “The UK and European defence: leading or leaving?” (http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/International%20Affairs/2012/88_6/88_6Biscop.pdf).}

\footnotetext{313}{Interview, 5 December 2012. Note that according to the SDSR, the intensification of UK bilateral defence and security relationships on a range of security issues is a key priority. In particular, it is stated that in the field of capabilities, “bilateral equipment collaboration arrangements are potentially more straightforward and more fruitful than complex multilateral arrangements, which have delivered mixed results for us in the past” (SDSR, p. 60).}

Externally, the UK is perceived as a middle power. To British policymakers, however, the UK is a global hub or a pivotal power ‘punching above its weight’, meaning a country whose power and energy, and ability to preserve its influence on the global stage, goes beyond the limits imposed by geography, population and means.\(^{315}\)

With transformations in world politics proceeding at a fast pace all through the 19th century,\(^{316}\) Britain’s loss of power on the global stage has therefore created a widening gap between the country’s domestic ambition to act as a great power, which influences the political rhetoric, and the real capacities or resources to live up to this ambition, combined with external perceptions. This ‘ambition-capability’ gap affecting the UK’s level of ambition concerning the use of force is viewed by the academic literature as one important feature of the British strategic culture based on a self-image of a great and global actor, in the transition from the imperial/colonial past to the new shape of the international system post-1945.\(^{317}\)

All in all, the spectrum of the British strategic approach to security and defence matters is broad, with a focus on general strategies linking foreign policy to other security related areas such as home affairs or development aid, with military issues addressed in broad, security terms. Arguably, British strategic culture tends to be broader and more holistic than continental ones.\(^{318}\)

The UK remains a global trade power, the fifth in the world in terms of trade volumes. This undoubtedly influences British security policy orientation towards a tendency to provide a proactive contribution to multilateral organisations and maintain a wide network of bilateral partnerships. A clear example is the world-wide net of relationships with former colonies, now institutionalised in the Commonwealth of Nations.

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Another example is the shared British understanding that membership of the UN, the OECD and other forms of multilateral cooperation is vital to protect and advance UK commercial, trade, economic – and, as a consequence, security - interests.

Concerning the willingness to use the military force and the inclination towards interventions overseas, Britain has a long record of large-scale and high intensity deployments, involving a wide range and number of combat and non-combat operations since 1945. However, according to Cornish, despite such propensity and extent, the willingness to use force is constrained by the declining level of military spending (see following section), by the broadening definition of security and by the relationship between the armed forces, the government and society.319

In more recent times, the development of an integrated approach to security provision, through the conceptualisation of the comprehensive approach, marked a turning point and heavily influenced the UK strategic culture and security posture, as both the SDSR and the BSOS make apparent. The commitment to identifying the root causes of conflict and implementing effective and sustainable peace-building and conflict prevention policies is a result of the country being, at the same time, a key global security actor and a major international donor. Preventing conflict and seeking long-term, durable solutions to address fragility have become something of a dogma in the UK’s post-Cold War foreign policy orientation. This attitude resulted, on the one hand, in the quest for better internal coordination between the Department for International Development (DFID), the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO and the Ministry of Defence (MoD; and, on the other hand, it resulted in a rather persuasive advocacy undertaking that has produced tangible results in many multilateral fora – the UK has been a fierce promoter, together with other like-minded countries (i.e. the Netherlands, Sweden, Finland and Denmark), of the emerging peacebuilding and state-building agendas that have progressively been institutionalised within different international organisations.

Concerning the behaviour of British military, a determinant of the UK strategic culture is that the political control over the armed forces has never

319 Ibid., p. 379.
been challenged.\textsuperscript{320} The military officer is seen and behaves ‘unpolitically’, loyal to the authority of the state and reluctant to intervene in domestic politics,\textsuperscript{321} despite the influential position military leaders occupy in British society.\textsuperscript{322}

A final element shaping the evolution of the strategic culture since the end of the Cold War is the consolidation of expeditionary forces to counter threats (in particular, international terrorism since 9/11) away from UK borders. This ‘expeditionary’ approach to warfare eventually led Britain to support the concept for NATO’s ‘out of areas’ interventions.\textsuperscript{323} These key elements of the strategic puzzle are complemented by the fact that over the past 60 years, Britain has accumulated unmatched (if compared to its European partners) operational experience in a wide range of military and civil-military deployments.

\textit{Control over the use of force}

Let us now turn to the institutional structures involved in decision-making about the use and deployment of force. As the UK constitution is a combination of statute, common law and unwritten convention, constitutional practice concerning the use and deployment of force, as with any other decision, is flexible and evolving.

Under the royal prerogative powers, the government can declare war and deploy armed forces to conflicts abroad without the backing or consent of parliament. The royal prerogative dates back to a constitutional settlement at the time of the Bill of Rights of 1688, by which ministers obtained a set of rights that were previously a prerogative of the monarch. These rights included decisions concerning the deployment and use of the armed forces overseas, including involvement in armed conflict or the declaration of war.\textsuperscript{324} Concerning the exercise of the royal prerogative, it is commonly accepted that the deployment power is in the hands of the prime minister, who therefore has personal discretion and is not legally

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\textsuperscript{322} Cornish (2013).

\textsuperscript{323} Interview, 5 December 2012.

\textsuperscript{324} Cornish (2013).
\end{footnotes}
bound to consult others. Parliament has no formal role in approving deployments, although governments usually keep parliament informed about a decision leading to military campaigns and certain constitutional constraints exist – e.g. general principle of government’s accountability to parliament, or budgetary arrangements to ensure financial provision for military deployments, for which parliament’s agreement is necessary. The government’s decision to call for a parliamentary vote on the Iraq war in 2003 established an important precedent, leading to requests for a statutory amendment so as to require parliament’s approval whenever the use of military force in conflict situations is considered. However, the 2009 Review of the Executive Royal Prerogative Powers Final Report and other proposals for reform of the control mechanisms concerning armed forces are still undergoing an evolutionary process, widely considered by experts and policymakers as a highly complex and lengthy undertaking. Thus far, no significant results have been produced, although the debate remains open and the executive is showing no sign of willingness to give up. In sum, the prerogative is mediated by the fact that several bodies are in the end involved in the formulation of the UK national security policy besides the prime minister and the Cabinet Office (e.g. the Treasury, the FCO, the MoD, DFID). However, the margin of manoeuvre of the executive remains significant, with important implications for how the UK strategic culture and interests are translated into practice.

325 On the debate on the use of the royal prerogative power after 2003 and Parliamentary approval for the deployment of British forces overseas, see Waging war: Parliament’s role and responsibility, Volume I Report, House of Lords, Select Committee on the Constitution, 27 July 2006.
It can be concluded that the UK strategic culture is characterised by the following factors:\textsuperscript{329} i) a high level of ambition observable in the declaratory level and resulting in the UK’s willingness to play a leading role in international security, namely by means of the use of military instruments to enforce the national interest; ii) a wide room for manoeuvre for the executive in decision-making concerning the use of force, under the ‘royal prerogatives’ granting the government capacity to make decisions to deploy British troops outside of parliamentary control; iii) a greater emphasis, since the early-2000s, on a wide spectrum of instruments for intervention (from long-term conflict prevention to short-term crisis management; from high to low intensity operations) as well as on the integration of military and non-military tools to enhance the coherence and effectiveness of crisis response.

**UK national interests: good value for (little) money**

As Kissinger noted, perhaps the most basic feature of the UK national interest is British leaders’ traditional reluctance to elaborate it.\textsuperscript{330} References to national interest are considered rare in political discourse. Notable exceptions include the current coalition government, and particularly the vision for the FCO outlined and implemented since 2010 by Foreign Secretary, William Hague. According to Hague, the purpose of the UK diplomatic network is to “retain and build up Britain’s international influence in specific areas in order to shape a distinctive British foreign policy geared to national interest”,\textsuperscript{331} that is to “help build Britain’s prosperity by increasing exports and investments, opening markets, ensuring access to resources and promoting sustainable global growth”.\textsuperscript{332} Going through relevant document analysis, it appears that national interest figures several times in the official policy documents on the UK’s national defence and security, delivered since the coalition government was formed: the National Security Strategy (2010), the Strategic Defence and Security Review (2010) and the Building Stability Overseas Strategy (2011). In a way,

\textsuperscript{329} Cf. also A. Jonas and N. von Ondarza (2010).


\textsuperscript{331} “The Role of the FCO in UK Government”, *Response of the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs*, Seventh Report from the Foreign Affairs Committee Session 2010-12, July 2011.

\textsuperscript{332} Ibid.
the new government has been much more assertive in explaining to the public what strategic guidelines they expect in times of austerity.

This renewed emphasis should not be overestimated, but not neglected either. On the one hand, notwithstanding changes in the strategic landscape since the early 1990s, the core elements of UK interests persisted, with some ‘add-ons’ such as counter-terrorist measures implemented in the wake of 9/11. These core elements relate to the nation’s ambition to think and act globally, due to the imperial heritage and in response to globalisation pressures. In this regard, the bedrock of the UK security interests remains NATO and the United States. Since the end of World War II, systemic adaptation pressures have pushed UK elites to centre the strategic posture on the special relationship with the US. Cooperation has been fostered by the compatibility of the two armed forces, which have shared similar equipment, joint training programmes and intelligence. Last but not least, the US has acted as a key enabler in the development of Britain’s nuclear deterrent.

On the other hand, a shift did occur in the handover from the New Labour era to the coalition government, affecting the roots of the UK’s perceived priorities for foreign and security policy as well the way the country thinks globally. Without entering a thorny debate on the pre-1990s security debates, transformation concerns the increasing relevance and necessity of bilateralism to the detriment of multilateral diplomacy. Tony Blair’s New Labour oriented its foreign and security policy according to the ideology that security and prosperity could be advanced through the institutionalisation of global values in a multilateral setting, functional to face common threats. The Coalition Government, instead, acknowledges the limitations of multilateralism vis-à-vis the rise of multipolarity, and the benefits resulting from bilateralism in international relations. In the words of Christopher Meyer, former British Ambassador to the United States, the new approach implies trying to create de facto alliances in the capitals, hence adopting a foreign policy-led understanding on national interest, with significant resources devoted to strengthening diplomatic missions in key capitals placed at the heart of the debate.\footnote{C. Meyer (2010), “Britain’s Role in the World”, Speech at the Morehead-Cain Foundation, March, available on podcast (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o55x7buOFKo).} The shift was forced, to a large extent, by the severe deficit in Britain’s defence budget and the need
to revise military spending. The realisation that Britain’s defence budget was insufficient to support the UK’s global ambition created momentum for members of the new government to advocate for the pursuit of selected and targeted bilateral cooperation, and drop what was seen as ineffective and wasteful multilateral ventures (e.g. delays in the delivery of the A400M). Perhaps the most dramatic example of the implications of this new course on UK security policy is the signature of the Franco-British defence agreement (cf. next section).

In conclusion, the UK national interest features a broad spectrum of goals (global outreach of UK trade, commercial, security and geopolitical interests), limited resources (especially in times of austerity) and a wide scope of action for the executive to shape the security policy and strategy (as outlined in the previous section). On that account, a major shift has occurred from a values-based vision under New Labour to a value-added one under the coalition government, justified by the obsession to achieve better value for less money. In light of these elements, the tables below summarise the key strategic objectives outlined by the Strategic Defence and Security Review (2010) and by the Building Stability Overseas Strategy (2011).

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Table 2. UK strategic policy framework: elements of the “adaptable posture”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategic objectives vis-à-vis “highest priority risks” (next five years)</th>
<th>Strategic objectives vis-à-vis long-term risks and threats</th>
<th>Strategic objectives vis-à-vis low probability risks / high impact risks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Counter-terrorism</td>
<td>Preventing conflicts and associated risks before they materialise in the UK; build local capacities.</td>
<td>Nuclear deterrent to counter large-scale military attack by another state.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyber-security</td>
<td>Broad spectrum of defence capabilities to deter, contain, and engage on-the-ground threats.</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natural hazards</td>
<td>Develop capabilities with In-built flexibility to adjust in case of future changes.</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crisis prevention and rapid response</td>
<td>Strengthen mutual dependence with key allies and partners.</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--</td>
<td>Coordinate and integrate approach across government, combining defence, development, intelligence and other capabilities.</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3. Elements of the UK strategic response, Building Stability Overseas Strategy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pillars for tackling the causes of instability, fragility and conflict upstream</th>
<th>Capacity-building for comprehensive approach</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Early Warning  
Target: anticipate instability and triggers for conflict | Intelligence and assessment  
Target: underpinning political analysis and spot emerging risks and opportunities |
| Rapid crisis prevention and responses  
Target: take fast, appropriate and effective action to prevent a crisis or stop it spreading or escalating | Diplomacy  
Target: influence events in countries and across regions, build understanding of what is happening, generate international consensus to act |
| Upstream prevention  
Target: build strong, legitimate institution and robust societies in fragile countries to manage tensions so as to reach a lower likelihood of instability and conflict | Development  
Target: re-build critical institutions, support security and justice, generate jobs and public confidence |
| | Defence engagement  
Target: support security sector reform and develop accountable security services that can win the trust of their people |
| | Promote trade and open market  
Target: create economic opportunities |
| | Stabilisation Unit  
Target: respond rapidly to conflict or pre-conflict situations on behalf of the government and in partnership with other key players |


Finally, it is useful to briefly look into the ‘black hole’ and provide a quick overview of the UK defence budget cuts. In current financial circumstances, Britain’s capacity to deploy armed forces in defence of the national interest cannot be decoupled from the debate on military
spending, to address the so-called ‘black hole’. This indicates the identification by the coalition government of a large and unaffordable liability of inherited defence spending plans, amounting to an estimated ten-year funding gap of £74 billion. The current (2012) total defence spending of £39 billion is the result of the progressive 7.51% cut over a period of four years (2011-15). Cuts have affected the Harrier jump jet (retired), the Nimrod spy plane (cancelled), fewer warheads for replaced Trident submarines, one aircraft carrier (of two previously planned) no longer entering service. Cuts also heavily impacted military personnel (5,000 RAF personnel axed over five years, 5,000 Navy personnel cut, 7,000 army personnel cut, 25,000 civilian MoD staff axed).  

If one considers the defence climate characterised by overcommitted and unaffordable forces, and the new coalition government’s approach stressing the return of bilateral diplomacy as a result of the failure of multilateralism, it is hardly surprising that the UK has decided to gradually withdraw from a CSDP. Few in Europe believe CSDP can really offer good value for money: CSDP is in fact perceived in the UK as an intricate net of bureaucratic structures lacking ability or willingness to deploy capabilities, and underperforming as a crisis manager.

Some questions arise in this regard: To what extent has the UK reduced its commitment to the CSDP beyond the political rhetoric? Would withdrawing from the CSDP serve the British national interest – or would it make its pursuit more difficult? Last, but not least, is mild or lack of support to multilateral cooperation within the CSDP a clearly identifiable trend in Britain’s strategic culture, or shall we understand current events as an anomaly, resulting from rising euro-scepticism and Conservatives’ opposition towards European initiatives, including the defence sector?

What does CSDP mean to the UK? An absent leader of EU security and defence co-operation

Contrary to commonly held views, Britain has been a very positive and active player since the beginning of institutionalised European security co-operation, which we trace back to the Cologne Summit of 1999 launching the Common Security and Defence Policy. The UK’s significant contribution to early military operations, such as Concordia, Artemis (in which Britain was the second largest contributor, with 111 units) and, particularly, EUFOR Althea (the largest British contingent in CSDP missions, 691 units, the largest British contingent in CSDP missions is the third-largest among EU member states and the largest UK contribution to CSDP missions) was all-important for the launch of CSDP. Since 2008, much of the UK support to military CSDP has been directed towards counter-piracy and maritime operations off the coast of Somalia (EUNAVFOR). This support has been carried out through the provision of the operational headquarters in Northwood, the Operation Commander – since January 2013, Rear Admiral Bob Tarrant – and in synergy with NATO-led Operation Ocean Shield, to which the UK also contributes. Between 2004 and 2010, the UK ranked fifth among the top ten contributors to military CSDP, with its contribution amounting to 7.8% (of the total EU), the last of the ‘big 3s’ below France (16.2%) and Germany (13.6%). On the civilian side, the UK contribution to CSDP missions is also considerable. The total number of personnel deployed between 2003 and 2009 amounted

336 This statement refers to the UK contribution to the CSDP in absolute terms. If compared to NATO deployments in Afghanistan or Kosovo, the importance of these figures decreases markedly.


338 Ibid.

to 125 units (66 seconded, 59 contracted) out of a total EU personnel of 2,334.\textsuperscript{340}

The table below shows the current (since April 2012) UK contribution to CSDP missions in terms of deployed personnel.

Table 4. UK contribution to CSDP missions (personnel) since April 2012\textsuperscript{341}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Missions</th>
<th>UK contribution (total EU)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EUNAVFOR SOMALIA (MIL)*</td>
<td>69 (1154)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUTM SOMALIA (MIL)*</td>
<td>2 (117)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUPOL RD CONGO (CIV)</td>
<td>0 (29)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUSEC RD CONGO (MIL)</td>
<td>4 (44)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUJUST LEX IRAQ (CIV)</td>
<td>5 (27)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUPOL AFGHANISTAN (CIV)</td>
<td>18 (237)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUBAM RAFAH (CIV)</td>
<td>0 (5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUPOL COPS (CIV)</td>
<td>3 (36)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUFOR ALTHEA (MIL)*</td>
<td>4 (955)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUBAM MOLDOVA-UKRAINE (CIV)</td>
<td>0 (0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUPM BiH (CIV)</td>
<td>2 (19)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EULEX KOSOVO (CIV)</td>
<td>34 (855)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUMM GEORGIA (CIV)</td>
<td>17 (252)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUTM MALI (MIL)*</td>
<td>40 (500)\textsuperscript{342}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>158 (3775)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of TOTAL MISSIONS' PERSONNEL BY EU MEMBER STATES</td>
<td>4.19%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{340} Grevi et al. (2009), p. 415.

\textsuperscript{341} Source: CSDP Map (http://www.csdpmap.eu/mission-personnel). Missions marked by an asterisk are from June 2011 and relevant statistics are not counted in the total figure at the end of the table. UK contribution to EUTM Mali is approximate and therefore also not counted in the total figure.

Reversing decades of opposition to European defence cooperation, in 1998 Tony Blair’s government opened an unprecedented era of proactive UK involvement in EU security initiatives. It of course maintained a very clear attitude concerning the UK ‘red lines’ for CSDP, namely blocking the duplication of NATO structures (such as the creation of an EU OHQ), and the CSDP involvement in hard security operations (where, again, NATO was considered as the key partner). At the same time, however, Britain invested considerable resources in the emerging CSDP structures and contributed as a leader to shape the debate in a wide range of situations: the Helsinki Headline Goal (1999), the EU Battlegroup concept (2003), the European Security Strategy (2003), the creation of the European Defence Agency (2004), not forgetting the number of missions launched in 2005 under the UK Presidency.

As some authors have pointed out, Britain’s frustration started rising as it became clear that such investment was not to provide any significant ‘value for money’, mainly due to the inability of CSDP to overcome the inefficiencies and sluggishness of a governance model based on consensus among 27 member states, combined with poor impact on the ground. This exacerbated divergence across UK institutions on the perception and assessment of the value added of CSDP cooperation. Whereas in the FCO the rationale for Europe remained quite clear, in the MoD, holding control of resources for military operations, and most importantly in the Parliament, scepticism started rising. Undoubtedly,


346 Interview, 5 December 2012.
the fall of New Labour and the formation of the coalition government in 2010, placing a new emphasis on exclusive bilateralism, did worsen the situation. However, the seeds for a change of attitude are ascribed to a long-standing sense of disappointment arising from over-emphasis on bureaucratic talk and the “purchase of new building in Brussels” rather than ways to enhance EU impact on the ground.\(^{347}\) Interviews with policymakers in London reveal that for the UK it is capital to make capabilities available for missions; along similar lines, mission evaluation is considered pivotal as a way to assess which missions provide value added and which ones do not. Examples of missions considered “unsatisfying” by the UK are EUBAM Rafah (few results despite long operational span), Althea (sluggish political progress in Bosnia), EUSEC/EUPOL Congo (UK is not against it, but is careful as to what can or must be delivered); virtuous examples, instead, are EULEX Kosovo (although local actors still value the US role on the ground through KFOR), the implementation of the comprehensive approach in the Horn of Africa, and planned engagement in the Sahel.\(^{348}\) The Horn of Africa is, in particular, a reality check for the EU’s capacity to deliver on the promise of an effective use of its crisis response toolbox, drawing together security, political, civilian, military and development tools to prevent and resolve conflict, working hand-in-glove with other international actors like NATO or the African Union.\(^{349}\) In the Sahel, CSDP multi-disciplinary action covering security, policing and border management is judged urgent to help countries secure their borders and manage the threat from terrorism.

It is interesting to note that such a pragmatic attitude vis-à-vis CSDP initiatives is part of a cultural approach to British foreign policy based on money and utility, which very much characterises the country’s strategic posture in many other areas – e.g. the whole debate on defence spending.

Therefore, despite some clear responsibilities, it would be misleading to hold the coalition government fully responsible for the UK’s progressive withdrawal from CSDP. Prime Minister Cameron has boosted a sea change in Britain’s foreign policy, switching from a global value-based, multilateral vision to exclusive bilateralism. However, the pragmatic aspects of British

\(^{347}\) Interview, 5 December 2012.

\(^{348}\) Interview, 12 December 2012.

strategic culture and the complexities and inefficiencies of the CSDP system are also the causes of frustration perceived in London when dealing with its EU partners over security matters.

Having said that, since the St Malo declaration, the UK vision for CSDP has been focused on the consolidation of the comprehensive approach, with a clear understanding that the benefits of EU security cooperation concern soft security, stabilisation and conflict prevention tasks. There is an unmistakable orientation in the UK towards a humanitarian, Petersberg-focused and integrated CSDP. This vision excludes high security dimensions or engagement in the fighting end of the spectrum of intervention. For those, the EU is considered too sluggish or ineffective due to the configuration of its decision-making and the lack of planning and control structures. An efficient division of tasks with NATO therefore remain a strong concern for the UK, which for instance affects London’s views on pooling and sharing: according to a British diplomat serving in the FCO, a key concern for the UK national interest is to avoid duplication between NATO smart defence and the EU pooling and sharing agendas – with the latter potentially more suitable in low-end spectrum assets (training facilities, communication), thus leaving aside high spectrum/pricey technologies. In operational terms, this logic foresees the development of an EU comparative advantage delivering comprehensive security solutions, for instance where a regional and holistic approach is needed (e.g. in the Sahel), whereas NATO would keep a flexible expeditionary capacity to counter threats beyond Article 5.

It can be concluded that for the UK, CSDP is a comprehensive toolbox whose comparative advantage vis-à-vis other institutions (e.g. NATO) is to tackle crises in a comprehensive and flexible manner, mixing soft and hard power tools for conflict prevention and crisis management, but with no ambition to engage in high intensity or combat operations. This vision has remained intact in the shift from the New Labour to the coalition government. What changed, instead, is the premise, or the ideology surrounding UK investments in CSDP and the forethought, that is, the implications for future UK commitment to consolidate security cooperation. Ideology has, as previously mentioned, shifted from the belief that multilateral cooperation was possible and desirable, to exclusive

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350 Interview, 10 December 2012.
351 Interview, 8 December 2012.
bilateralism overshadowing cooperation with non-key EU partners and bypassing the Brussels-based bureaucratic machinery. Forethought has to do with the broader problématique of the UK’s role in post-austerity Europe: How would an opt-out affect the future of CSDP?

**Conclusion: Is disaster inevitable?**

It has been argued that the budgetary crisis and the US pivot to Asia could push the UK government to move away from a rigid US-UK partnership to closer and more open cooperation with European countries. The Obama administration has itself made clear that their interests lie in a strong UK presence in a stronger EU. However, the security policy intentions of coalition government do not seem to be moving in the right direction: quite the opposite; the exact trajectory of UK security policy in the next decade may not necessarily follow the same path as the CSDP. Let us provide three scenarios.

Should Britain remain in the EU, but should exclusive bilateralism continue to be the mainstream approach in Whitehall, a rift may emerge between a continental CSDP and Britain’s refashioned ‘splendid isolation’. This scenario would entail a progressive UK withdrawal from the very common structures it crucially contributed to establishing. Growing hostility towards EDA-led pooling and sharing initiatives and procurement policies is an example. However, a disengagement from the CSDP could convince continental partners to move forward with cooperation even without the UK, which could result, in the end, in Britain having less political leverage to influence CSDP from within and could provoke its exclusion from important cost-effective multilateral projects. Negative implications would also affect the British defence industry and its competitiveness in the transatlantic defence market. Furthermore, it would mean that UK financial and diplomatic support to initiatives aimed at consolidating CSDP over the past ten years have been vain, if CSDP is left wasting away. Under austerity circumstances, a splendid isolation could easily turn into self-locking.

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Should Britain leave the EU, its involvement in the CSDP is difficult to predict, although it is possible to imagine that EU partners would continue to cooperate, with very similar outcomes to the previous scenario. Logic and political good sense would suggest a third, ‘pragmatic’ scenario for future UK involvement. This third scenario would neither see a drastic disengagement from the CSDP, nor a return of New Labour’s multilateral enthusiasm – which seems implausible, also considering the sluggish progress and questionable value of EU defence cooperation in recent years, especially after Libya and Mali. The UK could in this sense opt for an approach ‘à la carte’: maintaining a passive or active attitude depending on the circumstances and favouring multilateral cooperation through EU structures over bilateral arrangements only in those cases where the national interest is clearly affected – joint procurement and armaments programmes could be an example.

Curiously enough, should the latter scenario apply, a conclusion could be drawn that a strong orientation towards ‘muddling through’354 is, arguably, a key common denominator existing between the UK and CSDP.

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CONCLUSION
FEDERICO SANTOPINTO AND MEGAN PRICE

The relevance of the 2003 European Security Strategy has been frequently questioned in recent years. The debate over the adoption of a new grand European security strategy nevertheless remains a source of fundamental division among member states and scholars alike. Does the EU need another abstract paper in the field of security and defence, in such a rapidly evolving environment? Is it really a priority at this stage of the European integration process?

According to some, any formal negotiation of such a grand strategy could risk opening the Pandora’s Box on which the CSDP is currently sitting. Furthermore, such an exercise could lead to a vague or inconsistent compromise or, alternatively, to a highly detailed but unheeded document, with no chance of serious implementation.355 On the other hand, several experts and European countries are arguing strongly that now is the time for such a document. In their view, the EU desperately needs to identify a common long-term vision in order to give guidance on its defence policy, which is facing serious international and financial constraints.356

355 Among the most critical points of view see:

356 See, for example:
To some extent, both points of view have merit: a grand European security strategy could indeed represent a step forward. However, any serious negotiation on the matter would carry risks, with no tangible guarantee of success. For this reason, some preconditions need to be set before launching such a complex debate. From the case studies presented in this volume, it would appear that the pursuit of such preconditions is especially relevant at the national level.

The first precondition is to understand what each member state really wants from the CSDP. If CSDP is a means, what is the end according to the most prominent European capitals? This was the aim of the seven chapters of this book, written from seven related field missions in Paris, London, Berlin, Rome, Madrid, Warsaw and Stockholm. Let us compare their outcomes.

At first sight, the results of this survey might appear surprising. To begin with, almost all member states’ officials interviewed for this study, except those representing the UK, shared the view that the CSDP needs urgent improvement to avoid strategic irrelevance. One could even ask why European defence integration is not already a much stronger policy. More surprisingly, it appears that the member states see the CSDP as a tool to serve similar national interests, focused towards more or less the same geographic areas, in the name of comparable values and visions. The few divergences that do exist between them with regard to these issues, although important, cannot alone explain the EU’s systematic paralysis when facing an international crisis, such as those in Libya, Mali or Syria.


357 This study is based, among the others, on interviews to high level diplomats, militaries, civil servant and experts carried out in the seven targeted European capitals.
Beyond the rhetoric, of course, things get more complicated. When looking more closely at the member states’ approaches towards CSDP, the survey indeed highlights two fundamental disagreements. The first is related to their strategic cultures, characterised most forcefully by France and Germany. This problem is certainly not new and has already been analysed in other studies. Nevertheless, if taken alone, the divergences between states’ strategic cultures, as important as they are, do not explain everything. In fact, they are deeply related to another key element of opposition that emerges from this study, namely member states’ attitudes towards EU integration when dealing with defence policy.

Consequently, despite all the common denominators identified, member states appear to be divided over how they see the role of CSDP in the overall integration project. Before coming back to this existential problem, the first section of this chapter focuses on the converging elements identified in the study, which deserve to be highlighted. The second section will then move to analyse the two main misunderstandings referred to above: strategic culture and attitudes toward European integration. The third and fourth sections present two suggestions for prompting progress: launching national debates prior to any new debate at the European level and, finally, linking the European strategic debate to the possible creation of a “permanent structured cooperation” in the field of defence, as foreseen by the Treaty of Lisbon.

**Common denominators**

From a theoretical point of view, the European countries targeted by the survey tend to converge on their geographical priorities. These appear to be North Africa and the Middle East, the Sahel region and the Horn of Africa, the Balkans and Eastern Europe. As seen in the related chapter, France identifies an ‘arc of crisis’ from the Atlantic to the Indian Ocean. This consensus is also to be found among scholars and experts, according to whom the EU should focus on its neighbourhood and the most unstable areas related to it (the so-called “neighbourhood of neighbourhoods”). The need to secure maritime routes (e.g. the Indian Ocean, South-East Asia maritime corridors, and the Gulf of Guinea) and access to the natural

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359 G. Giovanni (2012), op. cit.
resources of the Artic also seems to have become a new strategic priority for several countries featured in this study. Around these points a consensus may be built.

Of course, the geographical security interests of the member states do not align perfectly. For example, Poland, Germany and Sweden are expressly more concerned with Eastern Europe and the Balkans, while France and Spain have their attention more focused on Africa. In the past, such differences have proven problematic. Germany has shown reluctance to act in post-colonial Africa, thus provoking a certain irritation in Paris. Nevertheless, although relevant, such divergences do not appear to be insurmountable.

Indeed, when looking at how the member states rank the regions according to importance, there is a more general coherence. Priority divergences, where they do exist, are not that far apart. That is, a region listed as the top priority for one country could be a second-tier priority for another. For example, if Poland and Germany look mainly to the east of Europe, it does not mean that they ignore Africa, as Berlin and Warsaw proved with their respective participation in EUFOR DR CONGO in 2006 and EUFOR CHAD in 2008. Moreover, if France looks mainly towards Africa, this does not mean that it is uninterested in promoting stability in Eastern Europe. It is therefore reasonable to speculate that compromises could be reached in the negotiation of a grand strategy, if member states show some political good will. As a matter of fact, a quick glance at where the most important CSDP missions are deployed today (the Balkans, Sahel, the Horn of Africa) would already show this to be the case.

The attitude to adopt towards Russia, however, appears less straightforward. Poland and Sweden are clearly more concerned by the political evolution of the Kremlin than Germany or Italy. Although relevant, this divergence cannot be considered a paralysing issue for CSDP. Room for compromise exists, as was demonstrated in the case of the Ossetia conflict. Moreover, despite the fact that Sweden and Poland tend to be more critical of Moscow they clearly recognise Russia as a central actor that must be engaged.

Member states also appear to strongly converge on main thematic priorities. All of those reviewed for this study claim to be strong promoters of democracy, human rights and the rule of law. Moreover, CSDP is often seen to be a tool for the promotion of these values. Sweden is the country most patently involved in spreading such values worldwide. Member states strongly converge again when it comes to threat perception: failed
states, terrorism, incursions on global trade routes, cyber security, and environmental degradation are iterated in each capital as primary threats. Such issues, moreover, were already identified in the 2003 European Security Strategy.

Few differences among member states are apparent when considering their attitudes towards international organisations. The need for a UN mandate before undertaking military actions remains quite a sensitive issue. Germany and Sweden are very clear in that respect: any military action must be authorised by the UN. On the other hand, France and the UK appear less cut-and-dried on the matter. Nonetheless, all the countries covered by this study consider UN Security Council approval as highly desirable, if not absolutely necessary. Here again, the converging elements are much stronger than the opposing ones. Compromises could easily be found, and were also already partly identified in the 2003 Strategy.

Concerning the Atlantic Alliance and its relation to the CSDP, it is interesting to note how the member states’ positions have moved closer in recent years, thanks also to the recent evolution of the international context. The French reintegration of NATO military structures on the one side and the US demand for more European responsibility on the other have favoured closer convergence on the issue. With slight variations, the need for complementarity between the EU and NATO is now fully recognised by a core group of states (Germany, France, Italy, Spain and Poland), including Sweden (which is not a NATO member) and, to some extent, the UK. The UK position, however, remains distinct from the rest, particularly when it comes to issue of the creation of autonomous European structures for military command and control. Yet, all the other member states recognise the need to have an operational headquarters in Brussels.

**Misunderstandings**

Apparently, the declared national interests of the member states do not reveal too many glaring inconsistencies that might explain why, almost 15 years after being launched, the CSDP remains an embryonic policy. Attention must be drawn to two more existential problems highlighted by this study: divergences on strategic culture (use of force) and differing attitudes towards the European integration process.
Strategic cultures

The lack of a common strategic culture is frequently pinpointed by scholars and experts as the main obstacle to the development of a global vision and coherent action by the EU. Such a problem is echoed in this study, particularly when looking at Germany and France, ostensibly the two driving powers behind the European integration process. As mentioned, a rich body of literature exists around the topic. However, it is interesting to note that the disagreements on strategic culture seem to have a different impact when they occur within the EU rather than within NATO.

The German reluctance to use force, indeed, did not prevent Berlin from supporting robust military action in Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan. And even in the Libyan conflict, Germany refrained from imposing its veto in NATO. This *de facto* allowed the Alliance to bomb Gaddafi’s troops, despite Germany’s relative intransigence within the EU over the same issue. Why is it that, when facing large-scale international crises, strategic culture divergences appear so dramatic within the EU, though not so paralysing in NATO?

Two reasons may explain Berlin’s different stance within the EU and NATO. Of course, the traditional German attachment to the transatlantic relationship must be cited first. But such an attitude may also be seen from another point of view. Despite its reluctance to use force, if Germany tends to accept NATO carrying out robust missions, though not the EU, this could also be due to the fact that Germans see themselves at the heart of the EU, but not necessarily at the heart of NATO. If Berlin chooses to abstain from using force in a given crisis, it will tend to impose this decision on the EU. In the end, in the case of military action, it may be easier for Germany, politically, to leave the floor to others in NATO than in the European Council, where Berlin asserts its leadership role more robustly.

The second reason may be even more straightforward. At this stage, most European member states, including Germany and France, cannot even conceive of the idea of using CSDP to carry out large-scale combat missions, such as the Libyan intervention. The EU is simply not ready to accept it, and this is probably not just a matter of military capabilities. Therefore, the problem seems to be at the heart of what the EU is and what it represents for its member states. The EU and NATO are indeed two different organisations, as their name clearly states: the latter is an alliance, which does not challenge the national sovereignty of its members, while the first is supposed to be a political integration project. This brings us back
to the different attitude that member states have towards the European integration process, and how they understand CSDP fitting in that process.

**European integration**

The link between the CSDP and the integration process has been less emphasised by recent literature than the debate over strategic cultures. Yet, the disagreements on this matter illustrate the existence of crucial misunderstandings over the essence of the CSDP, which strongly influence the national attitudes towards and expectations of EU defence policy. As a matter of fact, the interviews carried out in the European capitals and the national documents analysed only implicitly suggest that member states have different opinions over the role of CSDP in the larger framework of the integration process. However, what is not made explicit can sometimes be more instructive than what is clearly claimed.

Firstly, in this regard it is interesting to note that Germany, Italy and Spain consider CSDP integration as a strategic goal in itself. By contrast, Sweden, Poland, France and the UK tend to perceive European defence policy more as an instrument to pursue well-defined national interests. So, again, while the two supposed driving powers of European integration, France and Germany, appear most visibly divided on this existential matter, their split may simply be anchoring a deeper divide among member states.

As seen in the related chapter, France has always presented itself as a strong supporter of EU integration in the field of defence, even if, in recent years, and perhaps since the 2008 Chad mission, the country has lost faith in the project due to the passivity of its European partners. Overall, what France really wants now from the European integration process in the field of defence remains unclear.

From a general point of view, indeed, supporting CSDP does not automatically imply supporting the EU integration process, if this process is understood as a qualitative step-by-step integration towards a political union. On this last point France has always maintained a certain ambiguity, which, in the end, can be retraced to 1953, when the French Parliament scuttled the European Defence Community project. If in the past France has frequently called for more political unification, at the same time it has always remained deeply attached to what in Paris is considered as a sacred ‘souveraineté nationale’. Ultimately, when it comes to defence matters, France never really abandoned the old Gaullist vision of a ‘concert of nations’,
based on the principle of unanimity and on the marginalisation of the EU supranational institutions.

Consequently, for France the so-called ‘Europe de la défense’ appears to be, first and foremost, a tool to coordinate European nations’ collective military power outside the continent, before being a tool for European integration. This vision is confirmed by the last French White Paper published in May 2013, specifying that the country must maintain its capacity to enter first in a military crisis, as it did in Mali and Libya. ‘To enter first’, that is, before others, including of course the European Union. As seen previously and analysed in the chapter on France, such a declaration has to be seen as the fruit of the growing French disenchantment with the CSDP since 2008. Yet, it also should be read as the product of a historical ambiguity never really resolved, harking back to the failed European Defence Community in 1953.

As demonstrated in the respective chapters, Spain, Italy and, in particular Germany, among other EU countries, do not necessarily share the same vision. Indeed, the Germans historically see CSDP as a step forward in the European integration process, and secondarily as a tool to exert military power outside Europe. The same appears true for Italy and Spain. This vision has not always been supported coherently, as opposition to the BAE-EADS (British Aerospace System and European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company) merger has demonstrated. However, the link between the European defence policy and the integration project still appears strong in Berlin’s discourse today, even in the current context of crisis.

Consequently, German scepticism about robust military actions abroad should not be seen as synonymous with disengagement from CSDP, as frequently lamented in Paris. Put simply, when they think of the CSDP, the two driving forces of the EU integration process tend to look in two different directions: France looks outside Europe, while Germany looks to Brussels.

What about the other member states targeted by this study? Where do they look? As elaborated in their respective chapters, Spain and Italy are definitively closer to the German point of view. They both clearly support a more qualitative EU integration in the field of defence, while remaining reluctant (though less so than Germany) over the use of force. The chapter on Spain is enlightening on this matter, especially as it demonstrates how Spanish participation in certain EU military missions, for example EUFOR DRC or EUFOR Althea, was not driven by any particular national interest.
Rather the ‘milieu’ goal was to strengthen the CSDP and support European partners. Similar conclusions can be drawn for Italy, which shares with Spain the status of a ‘middle power’, characterised by relevant global economic interests but limited military and political assets. Rome’s support for EU integration is traditionally strong, even if Italy has shown more attention for pursuing compromises between CSDP’s and NATO’s roles in the European security architecture (this attitude is identified in the related chapter as the Italian ‘third way’).

Sweden and Poland, for their part, appear to have more specific and clear strategic goals identified in their doctrines and official documents. And in such frameworks, the CSDP is presented as a tool to follow these guiding goals. Sweden, which claims to pursue, in particular, the promotion of democracy, international law and a viable global economy, is more willing to undertake military action under certain conditions (which may differ from French provisos). In such a context, the EU is seen by Sweden as a useful power multiplier. The country nevertheless remains vague over its position on the integration process as an end in itself. The US pivot toward Asia and the Russian domestic evolution may have an impact on the matter. Nevertheless, as of today, Stockholm remains opposed to any CSDP role in collective and territorial defence. This could be seen as proof of a certain coldness toward the integration process. Concerning Poland, the CSDP is presented as an important forum, alongside NATO, to protect the country’s independence. Here too, European defence policy thus appears as a means to achieve a concrete and well-established strategic goal, rather than as an end in itself. The Polish position has nevertheless evolved in recent years, as spelled out in the related chapter. Warsaw has shown a growing interest in strengthening the CSDP, mainly through the Weimar initiative alongside Germany and France. According to Warsaw’s viewpoint, NATO should maintain its primacy over territorial defence, while the EU should concentrate its action on crisis management missions, mainly in the European neighbourhood, in order to stabilise the Old Continent.

As stated above, the UK stands apart. French and British positions have drawn closer to one another in recent years. Both countries have proven willing and able to use force, and they are both deeply attached to their national sovereignty. However, it is also fair to recall that France is not opposed to the CSDP in principle, while the UK remains steadfast in its more narrow, soft-power vision for potential EU action. Indeed, the country (cited in the related chapter of this book as the “Elephant in the
room”) sees the European defence policy essentially as a complementary tool for stability promotion and conflict prevention, with limited, though relevant, value added. Yet, London’s intransigent opposition to the creation of an EU operational headquarter speaks volumes about its attitude towards EU integration. Ultimately, regarding CSDP, if France and Germany look in different directions, the UK’s gaze remains on Washington.

**Between integration and strategic culture**

The French frustration over Germany’s unwillingness to exert military power has provoked a feeling in Paris that Berlin is not a serious partner for defence matters. This in turn appears to have generated a loss of confidence in the overall CSDP project. But given the nuances outlined above, and in the chapters of this book, this perception is incomplete. The recent German reluctance to use force does not imply that the country is averse to CSDP in itself. The problem is that Berlin and Paris simply do not share the same idea about what the CSDP should be. And the same can be said also for the other countries targeted in this study.

In closing, it may be interesting to sketch two axes, one representing the member states’ willingness to use force and the other representing their attitude towards the EU integration process, as these appear to be two primary factors of difference arising from the case studies. The image that emerges in the chart below certainly should not be considered as a scientific metric. Rather, it is provided to help illustrate a tension within European defence policy, existing since its creation: the apparent distance between the ‘Big 3’ over these two existential issues of the CSDP.
National debates before a European debate

The fact that the most prominent member states do not share the same idea over the CSDP does not mean that they have a clear idea about what they really want from it, or that their stance is fixed. In fact, with the possible exception of the UK, almost all the member states have, at one point or another, changed or contradicted their stance toward European defence policy. On one side they claim to support EU integration in this area, but simultaneously they do not seem ready to accept what this implies in real terms. They thus remain torn between aspirations towards a stronger Europe in the world, and the desire to keep their national sovereignty intact.

Hence, before launching into a huge debate at the European level about what the EU should collectively do, member states should clarify at the national level what they really want from the CSDP. Stemming from this, several points should be elucidated:

- Is the CSDP primarily a tool to improve the European integration from a political point of view, or is it fundamentally a tool to improve European national capabilities?
- Is it a tool for post-conflict stabilisation missions or should it also be built and relied upon for high intensity combat missions?
- To what extent are member states ready to transfer part of their national sovereignty to Brussels and in what form? To what extent is this necessary, given the declared purposes of the CSDP?
- Should the EU itself act as an international actor or should it remain a coordination forum for its member states?
- Is a two-speed EU in the field of defence an option? How could the historical reluctance of the UK be dealt with on the matter?

These questions must be answered, and priorities must be balanced, first and foremost at the national level. Only then can a fruitful debate be pursued at European level. Reversing this sequence would likely condemn the debate to stagnate at the point reached in the 2003 European Security Strategy.

So far, the country with the clearest and most coherent position on the CSDP is also the most euro-sceptical state, the UK. London, at least, says what it thinks and does what it says. Before launching such a complex
and delicate negotiation over a European grand security strategy, the other member states should strive to do the same.

**Linking the strategic debate to permanent structured cooperation (PESCO)**

On 3 July 2013 the French Senate adopted a rather curious report entitled “Pour en finir avec l’Europe de la défense. Vers une défense européenne” [Ending the Europe of defence. Towards European defence]. As usual, the report does little to clarify what French decision-makers want from the CSDP. Indeed, after having published the 2013 White Paper stating that France must keep its capacity to enter first in a crisis, the Senate report, which has been adopted by all the main political forces represented, bemoans the fact that the CSDP is not guided by a ‘European brain’. It goes so far as to mention the need to jump towards a more federal model.

However, the document contains a new and interesting idea that deserves highlighting. The French Senate calls for the creation of a ‘Eurogroupe de la défense’ which would gather the most willing and capable member states, including the UK. The idea of a two-speed Europe is certainly not new. However, the report goes further in establishing a link between such an idea and the debate over the redaction of a European white paper, suggesting that such a strategic document could be adopted only at the ‘Eurogroup of defence’ level.

The permanent structured cooperation (PESCO) foreseen in the Lisbon Treaty could provide the legal background necessary to create a core group of states willing to deepen their defence cooperation in the EU framework. Nevertheless, it should also be noted that the timid debate over the PESCO has remained, so far, based purely on technical matters, without displaying any political ambition. As a matter of fact, during the last few years the overall debate around the CSDP appears to be completely detached from the broader issue of EU political integration and limited to merely a technical discussion on how to pool and share military capabilities in order to save money.

Yet, the euro saga and the debt crisis have proven that the creation of common tools inevitably require the establishment of shared policies for their management. The CSDP will not escape this common sense rule. In other words, after having launched a single currency without a joint

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360 French Senate (http://www.senat.fr/notice-rapport/2012/r12-713-notice.html).
economic policy, the EU should now avoid creating common military capabilities without common ‘political capabilities’. The example of the BattleGroups constitutes a sharp lesson on this. Operational since 2007, the EU BattleGroups have, to date, never been used, arguably because the EU does not have a shared policy on how to use them.

The missing link between the European defence policy and the European foreign policy (the CSDP and the CFSP) has been stressed by several scholars and experts. Nick Witney, for example, notes that according to the European treaties, the CSDP should be an integral part of the CFSP, not disconnected from it as it seems in reality. Calling for a stronger EU common foreign policy, however, is another way of identifying the lack of progress in the European integration process.

Linking a strategic debate to the PESCO initiative could therefore represent an opportunity to restore the link between the CSDP and the integration process, or between the debate on capabilities and the need to strengthen the EU common foreign policy. In order to do so, however, the PESCO would require at least two conditions. First of all, it should gather the most willing states, not simply the most capable ones. In other words, the PESCO should not be sterilised as an exclusively technical cooperation project. It should have a political soul, embodied precisely by a collective strategic ambition and clear shared vision outlined in an official document, adopted by all its members.

Another condition would be to clarify where the UK stands in such a scenario. Each time the EU has progressed on matters affecting national sovereignty (the euro, Schengen visas), it has always done so through a pioneering coalition... and without the participation of the UK. It is most likely that the same will be true in the area of defence. Although London is an essential partner in any project addressing military capabilities, at some point a different type of cooperation between the EU and the UK will have to be considered at the institutional level.

The common path between the Old Continent and its main island will never be in doubt, but its form should be rethought. London and Brussels can work and act closely together as security providers in the world, without necessarily sitting in the same EU structures. In the end,

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this was the desire of Winston Churchill, one of the greatest visionary minds of the 20th century.

In this regard, it is interesting to remind ourselves that one of the most striking characteristics of the PESCO is the option to create it through a qualified majority vote by the EU Council even if, once created, the new core group will have to work on the basis of unanimity among its participants.362 Such a characteristic should be seen as an opportunity for those member states willing to go forward, should any exist.

Frequently evoked, the two-speed Europe scenario is also feared, particularly in the military field. It would risk dividing the Old Continent, more than unifying it. This may be partially true in the short term. Nevertheless, generally the most relevant reforms that have marked history have rarely been adopted unanimously. The idea that the EU should evolve only through perfect consensus, always working hand in hand, systematically avoiding any decision that may be temporarily divisive, will condemn Europe to eternal stagnation.

362 Art. 46 TFEU.
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**LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AFISMA</td>
<td>African-led International Support Mission to Mali</td>
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<td>BAE-EADS</td>
<td>BAE = British Aerospace System and EADS = European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company</td>
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<td>BSOS</td>
<td>Building Stability Overseas Strategy</td>
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<tr>
<td>CA</td>
<td>Comprehensive Approach</td>
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<tr>
<td>CFSP</td>
<td>Common Foreign and Security Policy</td>
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<td>CSDP</td>
<td>Common Security and Defence Policy</td>
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<tr>
<td>DFID</td>
<td>Department for International Development</td>
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<td>EEAS</td>
<td>European External Action Service</td>
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<td>ESDP</td>
<td>European Security and Defence Policy</td>
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<td>ESS</td>
<td>European Security Strategy</td>
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<td>FCO</td>
<td>Foreign and Commonwealth Office</td>
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<td>MoD</td>
<td>Ministry of Defence</td>
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<td>PSC</td>
<td>Political and Security Committee</td>
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<td>SDSR</td>
<td>Strategic Defence and Security Review</td>
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<td>WEU</td>
<td>Western European Union</td>
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NATIONAL VISIONS OF EU DEFENCE POLICY
COMMON DENOMINATORS AND MISUNDERSTANDINGS

Inspired by the confusion about EU defence policy in most European capitals, the premise of this study is simple: before discussing what defence strategy the EU should adopt at Brussels-level, member states should clarify what they expect individually from the EU Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP).

With the possible exception of the UK, it is difficult to grasp what member states really want from CSDP, so any debate about a possible European grand strategy would appear to be premature.

This authoritative study inverts the usual analytical approach applied to the debate on European strategy. Rather than initiating the enquiry from the perspective of common interests guiding CSDP, it analyses how seven prominent member states see CSDP as a tool to pursue their strictly national interests. Five researchers took the opportunity to immerse themselves in the foreign policy worlds of Paris, London, Berlin, Rome, Warsaw, Stockholm and Madrid, looking at CSDP through national lenses and away from the potentially distorting influence of ‘Brussels’ rhetoric.

This book does not set out to analyse European defence policy as an end in itself or as a collective project, but rather as a vector of individual – indeed self-interested – visions for the member states studied. By following this rather more pragmatic path, the study aims to identify the common denominators, misunderstandings and rigid deadlocks in the strategic debate around CSDP, with a view to enriching it.

Coordination: Federico Santopinto (GRIP) and Megan Price (Clingendael).