Peacekeeping operations in a changing world

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Clingendael Strategic Monitor Project
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Introduction

The Netherlands takes part in peacekeeping operations for reasons ranging from those of principle (maintaining the international legal order) to those based on economic (trade, raw materials) and security (the nation's own physical security) considerations. The history of Dutch involvement in peacekeeping operations shows that Dutch interests extend well beyond national and European borders. As an open society, the Netherlands is by definition vulnerable to international developments, which means that contributing to stability and security and upholding core principles that facilitate and regulate international business, particularly in terms of international trade and financial transactions, are matters of national interest. In a world of increasingly globalised challenges, it is therefore necessary for the Netherlands to contribute to stability and security in distant places in order to protect itself to the greatest extent possible against the adverse effects of conflict and instability.

At the same time, however, the Netherlands’ resources are limited. To adequately and effectively safeguard Dutch interests in a world of continuously changing threats, the Netherlands must set priorities and, of fundamental importance, cooperate with partners in multilateral and other contexts. On the basis of trends, scenarios and analyses of strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats (SWOT), this study seeks to identify options with respect to the toolbox of organisations, partners and resources available to the Netherlands.

Context

The way in which peacekeeping missions are perceived has been dominated in recent years by the stabilisation operation in Afghanistan. For now, this mission, which is rapidly being phased out, looks like it was the last major operation of its kind; an operation, that is, carried out under a UN mandate by a multinational force and involving the use of force at the higher end of the spectrum of violence. Nevertheless, the final conclusion of the Clingendael 2013 Strategic Monitor was that, in light of the many current or potential conflicts, whether internal or regional and particularly within the ‘Belt of Instability’, there is still very much a need for crisis management and stabilisation.

Different developments can be seen in this regard. Current missions are usually smaller in terms of scope and resources committed. In addition, missions of this kind tend to be led by regional organisations. In the case of Africa, for example, such organisations include the African Union (AU) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). NATO and the EU play a mainly supporting role. At the same time, many expect the EU to assume greater responsibility in its own immediate environment.

With a view to the future, this study first assesses potential hot spots in terms of crisis management and stabilisation. The geographical distribution and, above all, nature of crises and conflicts will determine the type of intervention required as well as the question as to which organisations are best equipped to carry out the given intervention. In terms of what this might mean for potential Dutch involvement, the wish to operate according to the comprehensive approach is explicitly considered. The question as to which institutional framework – UN, EU, NATO or other institution – is most suitable for such an approach is also addressed.
Definition of peacekeeping mission
There are many definitions of peacekeeping operations and similar terms like crisis management operations. To provide clarity, this study uses the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) definition as the starting point. According to this definition, a peacekeeping mission has the following objectives:
- To facilitate the implementation of a peace agreement;
- To support a peace process;
- To assist in conflict prevention and/or peace-building efforts.

The SIPRI definition of peacekeeping missions does not include activities like good offices, fact-finding and supporting elections. The definition also excludes missions that have not been sanctioned by the UN or regional organisations. The definition includes the following, however:
- Operations carried out by regional organisations and alliances;
- Operations carried out by ad hoc coalitions of states that have been authorised for the purpose by a UN Security Council resolution.

Peacekeeping missions may include the following activities:
- Monitoring and multidimensional peacekeeping operations carried out by the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), including joint AU/UN hybrid operations such as the one in Darfur (UNAMID);
- Special political and peace-building missions that are directed by the Department of Political Affairs (DPA) and meet the SIPRI definition of peacekeeping missions.

Structure of the study
This study focuses on the question concerning the types of peacekeeping missions that qualify for Dutch military involvement in terms of theatre of operations and the organisations and partners with which such missions are carried out.

To answer this question, the authors deal in detail with developments that are expected to occur in the coming five to ten years in relation to peacekeeping missions and what these developments mean for possible Dutch involvement. In addition, to ensure a proper understanding of the issues, this chapter sets out and analyses the broader context of peacekeeping missions.

Trends in conflict constitute the first element of this broader context (chapter 1). Considerations in this regard include the trends in conflict being observed and what these trends mean for possible peacekeeping missions in the future in terms of requirements. Chapter 2 discusses the most important developments in recent years in relation to peacekeeping missions. Chapter 3 discusses the role and influence that the emerging powers (BRICS) will have with respect to the future development of peacekeeping operations.

The second key element considered is Dutch membership of the most important organisations that have focused on peacekeeping operations up to the present time, namely the UN (chapter 4), the EU, NATO (chapter 5) and ad hoc coalitions (chapter 6). Their respective roles, set of instruments and suitability in terms of Dutch deployment are considered in chapter 7 from a comparative perspective in light of the trends in conflict identified earlier. Where relevant, these chapters also discuss the roles of other African/regional organisations, since these organisations are becoming increasingly active in peacekeeping operations, usually in cooperation with the UN and the EU.
Dutch soldiers of the ISAF mission on patrol heading towards the west bank at Ferosia, south of Khorma. They assist the Provincial Reconstruction Team by providing security. Photograph: Ministry of Defence, Arief Rorimpandey.

The conclusion provides a detailed summary of the national and international set of instruments required for effective deployment as a result of the trends referred to and what these trends mean for possible Dutch participation in future peacekeeping missions.

This chapter does not attempt to determine where and when the Netherlands can or should participate in a peacekeeping mission, since such a decision must be made on the basis of each mission or request for a Dutch contribution issued by the politically competent body that is responsible for policy. The authors nevertheless hope that the analyses set out in this chapter constitute a meaningful contribution to the discussion on policy and therefore facilitate a better understanding of the options available in terms of contributing to, and enhancing the effectiveness of, peacekeeping missions and the organisations that by and large carry out these missions.¹

¹ For a detailed consideration of the possible Dutch contribution in an operational sense, see, for example, Ko Colijn, Margriet Drent, Kees Homan, Jan Rood and Dick Zandee, Clingendaels visie op de krijgsmacht van de toekomst. The Hague: Clingendael Institute, February 2013
Conflict, security and emerging threats

Despite the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and the emergence of a terrorist threat with global reach in the form of Al Qaeda, the first decade of the new millennium marked a low in the number and severity of armed conflicts worldwide. No phenomenon was more expressive of this trend that the decline in inter-state conflict: once the dominant pattern of war, only three such conflicts occurred in the decade. The traditional protocols of such warfare appear increasingly remote from modern battlefield realities.

Yet the past two to three years have given serious reason to reconsider the apparent gains in peace and security that followed the initial, traumatic aftermath of the Cold War, when a wave of wars spread across the Balkans and sub-Saharan Africa. Brutal, intractable, high-casualty conflict has returned, most evidently in Syria, Iraq, Libya, the Central African Republic and South Sudan. Furthermore, it has done so in a way that often eludes the efforts of mediators and military and peace operations to end conflict, bypasses the mechanisms of the international community, and underwrites new forms of threat projection and displacement.

In an otherwise optimistic account of the reduction in conflict and violence worldwide, the Human Security Report 2013 notes that ‘the escalating carnage in Syria meant a dramatic increase in the number of worldwide battle deaths in 2012. Indeed, the Syrian battle-death toll last year was the world’s highest since the World War I-style interstate war between Ethiopia and Eritrea in 1999.’

Trends in the field of conflict: old causes and new dynamics

The novelties in the most recent conflicts, which help account for its particularly lethal virulence, should not obscure the continuities in organized violence. Modern wars do not break out for reasons that are in any way historically exceptional. Ethno-political tensions, rebel separatism and armed resistance to authoritarian regimes remain the major sources of intrastate conflict: of 136 civil wars fought since 1940, 74 aimed at gaining control of the state, and 62 at territorial separation. The one possible innovation in the field of combat is that provided by armed non-state criminal groups in Mexico and Central America, whose activities are guided
by a combination of territorial control and transnational trafficking and business logics, and whose extreme brutality owes much to high degrees of social atomization.

Modern civil war’s causes, in short, are recognizable. The Syrian civil war emerged from state repression of a popular uprising with a heavily sectarian component, based in large part on the regime’s exclusion from power and wealth of the country’s Sunni majority. Likewise, Mali’s armed crisis of 2012 can be understood as the fourth Tuareg rebellion of the country’s post-colonial era, as it was unmistakably connected to combatants belonging to this ethnic group who had once served in General Qadhafi’s military forces in Libya, and who demanded the creation of a new country, Azawad, upon their return.

Fighting in South Sudan, Iraq, the Central African Republic and Libya can also be understood in terms of armed competition for power and resources between different, largely ethnic or religious factions, and is generally presaged in each case on the acute sense of exclusion of one group rooted in perceived historical grievances. For the scholar Akbar Ahmed, it is the misunderstood and maltreated tribal peripheries of various states, such as Pakistan and Yemen, which are now engaged in escalating retaliation against central states, and with the Western military as a consequence.

Inter-state war, for its part, has undergone a marked decline, driven by a rising body of global norms against such warfare, as well as increasing economic and financial ties between nations. Even so, the far higher death-tolls that traditionally result from conflicts between the military forces of rival nations continue to make the risk of such war a compelling feature of geopolitics. Both this danger, as well as a distinct unwillingness of big states to risk military escalation, were manifested in early 2014 by the tensions between Russia and the Ukraine, and by extension between Russia and the West, over the Crimean peninsula and eastern Ukraine. A sharp increase in antagonism between Japan and China, the continuous presence of North Korea as an erratic, nuclear-armed state with a brittle leadership structure, the internationalization of African conflicts such as that of the Central African Republic (CAR), or the possibility of direct war between states affected by the widening Syrian conflict also pose real threats to international security, even if the diplomatic means to contain them are in principle available.

Yet even if the generic bases of these different sorts of intrastate and interstate represent identifiable historical continuities, which in the case of intrastate conflict can be correlated with greater or lesser precision against a set of long-term ‘root causes’ – most obviously extreme economic underdevelopment and poor or predatory governance – something does
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seem to have changed in the conduct of war. In short, it is the new dynamics of the process of fighting, and the effects of these on the evolution of the objectives that combatants and their leaders set themselves within the course of conflict, that have become outstanding features of recent wars. The main problems for the international community emerging from this most recent wave of conflicts – their intractability, the risk of an unpredictable spill-over of organized violence and the limited relevance of existing global security institutions – derive in large part from the evolutionary dynamic of modern organized violence, rather than the initial causes.

Mali in 2012 offered one of the starkest examples. Although the traditional Tuareg separatist impulse, re-assembled in the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA), provided the trigger for war, its leadership of the rebellion was soon eclipsed by supposed allies – Islamist militants grouped in three different factions. Clarity of purpose on the battlefield was obscured even further by these groups’ links to organized crime, the military coup against the Malian state, and the opaque connections between the groups and powerful neighbouring states such as Algeria.11 The battlefield itself, meanwhile, saw extremely limited use once the initial three-month rebel offensive had been successfully completed. A series of tacit understandings and withdrawals ensured there was little real fighting until January 2013, when an insurgent advance to the south of Mali dissolved before a French military riposte, Operation Serval. Northern Mali was thereby ‘recovered’.

No conflict is quite like any other, and the efforts to stabilize Mali under the auspices of a UN peacekeeping mission have until now proved more effective than the inaction over Syria’s civil war, or the drift towards chronic factionalized political violence in Libya. However, two interconnected characteristics, which are shared to a greater or lesser degree across these and other warzones, represent something of an emerging pattern. These are the drift to armed fragmentation, and the variegated internationalization of internal conflicts.

The trend of fragmentation

Studies of ‘new wars’ in the wake of the dissolution of the Soviet bloc have sought to prise apart the make-up of hybrid conflicts, in which ethnic mobilization, various transnational connections (such as to crime) and state failure tend to be constituent elements.12 But these analyses do not capture a number of the outstanding features of this latest wave of warfare.

One of these is the extreme fragmentation of armed groups, which is evident not only in the proliferation of non-state armed groups over the past decade throughout sub-Saharan Africa and the Arab world, but also in the decentralized multiplication of fronts and factions engaged in conflict. Central, vertically integrated control over armed movements, particularly insurgent ones, has never been an outstanding feature of intrastate war. Armed movements have traditionally delegated significant powers to regional commanders, or established functional divisions within their organizational structures (thereby separating political, military and fund-raising wings). Even where central insurgent command does appear to have remained in place, as in Colombia, it is not far-fetched to assume that the same dynamic will apply in the near future. Already the 70 fronts of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)
Recent conflicts, however, have been accompanied by far greater horizontal splintering between fighting groups. Five broad fronts now fight the Syrian state, though each of them also seeks purely factional objectives, and are known to have battled one another. At the extremes, both Jabhat al-Nusra and its offshoot, the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS), are dedicated to the tenets of Islamist fundamentalism, though only the former is the recognized franchise of Al Qaeda in Syria. Other cases of conflict point to the same dynamic. Four armed groups battled the state in northern Mali. Hundreds of differently positioned militia groups exercise political violence in Libya on behalf of distinct tribal, ethnic, local, separatist and religious causes. Meanwhile, in the Central African Republic, the dissolution of the Séléka rebel coalition in September 2013 by its leader and then president, Michael Djotodia, only confirmed the nature of the group as a largely ungovernable set of violent, criminalized factions with an increasingly sectarian bent.

However, the ubiquity of the trend does not lend itself to a single, simple explanation. For various reasons, the way conflict parties attach themselves to other interest groups – their hybridity, in other words – appears to exert a powerful centrifugal force on organized violence. Part of this process may be explained by their linkages to crime, with a number of armed factions allying themselves to illicit networks that are seeking their own private ‘protection’ force: this sort of tie-up appears to have accounted for the creation of the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) militia in Mali, and to growing numbers of ethnic militia groups in the trafficking zones of southern Libya. The trend towards smaller, flexible groups has been prominent in the field of organized crime for two decades, and fragmentation in armed conflict may well be obeying the same logic. In an asymmetric battlespace, centralized vertical leadership is a source of weakness; the need to control civilians and territory, on the other hand, favours smaller, localized organizations that are more able to co-opt or coerce the grassroots.

The role of internationalized local wars
At the same time, not all of this fragmentation comes down to illicit linkages, or to a close similarity with the behaviour of criminal groups. In fact, it is the variegation and intensity in transnational involvement in intra-state wars which are the most compelling aspects of

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14 These are the Free Syrian Army, the Islamic Front, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS), Jabhat al-Nusra and armed groups affiliated with the Democratic Union Party of the Kurds (PYD). Each of these in turn is divided into numerous fronts and units, over which central control is not always assured.
17 Djotodia resigned in January 2014, and was replaced by Catherine Samba-Panza.
19 According to Lacher, ‘rivalry over the control of smuggling routes has led to a spillover of armed activity into the border areas of northern Niger, where clashes related to smuggling convoys are increasingly common.’ (WolfArm Lacher, ‘Libya’s Fractious South and Regional Instability.’ In: *Security Assessment in North Africa, a project of the small arms survey*. Geneva: February 2014).
modern conflicts, and which drive much of the process of armed group fragmentation. International economic ties, including links to the arms trade, have long been connected with the entrenchment of armed conflict in countries with large natural resource endowments, such as the Democratic Republic of Congo or Angola. In the more recent case of Syria, the battlefield owes its extreme fragmentation largely to linkages between armed groups and a trans-national support network based on shared ideological or sectarian affinities, or as a result of ties with supportive foreign governments in the Gulf States, Turkey or the West. Criminal and oil revenues have certainly been captured by rebel groups, but are of lesser significance in accounting for the high levels of factionalization. Instead, the three years of conflict have been marked by splintering into numerous groups on the rebel side, each with their respective foreign backers, illicit revenue sources and volunteer recruits. On the government side, the war effort has been marked by ever closer reliance on foreign states or quasi-states for military support (Iran, Iraq and Hizbollah in Lebanon), or for diplomatic protection and support (Russia, Venezuela).

The current condition of Syria’s war fits the category of ‘internationalized intrastate conflict’, whereby an internal battle has become dependent on weapon, troop and financial contributions from foreign states, and is now expanding into Iraq through the actions of ISIS. Indeed, by 2011 there were nine such conflicts recorded across the world, more than at any time since the end of World War II.\(^\text{21}\) Conflict analysts tend to regard this class of conflict as one of the most deadly (with examples including the ‘long wars’ in the DRC since 1998 and in Afghanistan since 1979), although the precise causal chain that would explains its lethal character is hard to establish.\(^\text{22}\)

However, internationalization has many other forms aside from direct military implication by foreign parties in support of a conflict partner. Globalized Islamist extremism has prompted the emergence or consolidation of new fronts for armed violence, such as that of Boko Haram in Nigeria. Yet unlike the early days of Al Qaeda as a centrally controlled transnational terrorist network, the organization has been restructured into a franchise operation, handing out its blessing and insignia to preferred local groups.\(^\text{23}\) While this may have diminished the ability to project violence into the highly securitized developed world, including Europe, it has made the extremist cause much more responsive to local grievances and discontents, exactly as intended by the Al Qaeda’s leaders according to internal correspondence.\(^\text{24}\)

Franchised jihadist activity has thus grown ever closer to zones of existing conflict and tension, and particularly to populous lower to middle income countries, including India, Nigeria, Russia and Thailand.\(^\text{25}\) Its mobility and flexibility has made it highly responsive to weak spots for international security, in precisely the same ways that narco-trafficking has managed to adapt to successive waves of law enforcement by decamping to new and accessible routes. Moreover, the emergence of various sub-groups competing in the Islamist eco-system has also seemingly furthered state linkages to these groups, particularly where these groups are active in poorly governed cross-border territories, and can be controlled

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and exploited for national strategic purposes. The case of Pakistani intelligence support for the Taliban, Yemeni regime links to Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, and foreign backing for insurgent and Islamist forces operating in the Sahel all suggest that internationalization of current terrorist activity may take on many different forms.

**Understanding new threats and risks**

As mentioned above, many conflicts continue to stems from deep rooted ethnic grievances or territorial tensions. Both the conflict in South Sudan, and the friction between Russia and Ukraine, are easily recognizable within these classical paradigms of war. But at the same time, there is evidence to suggest that a number of recent conflicts have assumed a more decentralized, fragmented structure, in which cross-national influences operating along various dimensions have been accentuated.

One insightful account of the ways in which war has been transformed in certain contexts in the early years of the 21st century has been offered by the former British army officer Emile Simpson. His interpretation of modern conflict, grounded in his campaign experience in Helmand, Afghanistan, underlines the use of organized violence as part and parcel of ongoing political competition in contexts where state legitimacy is contested. In particular, he draws attention to two crucial developments. Armed factions in a ‘kaleidoscopic political configuration’ may adhere to a broader insurgency, though their choice to do so may simply be a temporary calculation based on self-interest (as appears to have been the case in the Taliban’s support network).

And, second, the need for rebels, the state and foreign forces to appeal to fragmented ‘strategic audiences’ in multiple domains and countries challenges the notion that military victory followed by peace can now be achieved in a straightforward way, since not every audience will be satisfied with a domestic political settlement. This is above all the case for ‘audiences’ of religious extremists or transnational crime.

In combination, armed fragmentation and the variety of international linkages in current conflict make calculations regarding military or peacekeeping interventions by foreign governments much tougher and riskier. As mentioned above, three particular risks stand out for the international community, and have become highly visible in the cases of Syria, Libya and the Sahel.

The first of these is the intractability of conflict. Statistics point to the way conflicts tend increasingly to reignite in territories previously affected by warfare, although there is some debate over whether these second or third generation conflicts are anything more than residual wars. However, there is little doubt that regions where transnational armed or criminal groups currently operate are more liable to witness the recurrence of conflict, albeit in different places. One reason is that armed activity may easily be displaced to areas away from the initial epicentre of conflict if security conditions for insurgents change. No better example came in the response of an offshoot of Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) to the French offensive in northern Mali, in the shape of a mass hostage-taking in the In Amenas

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gas facility in neighbouring Algeria. Islamist elements from the Malian conflict since appear to have regrouped in Niger, southern Libya and remote areas of Mali.

This ‘balloon effect’ in certain vulnerable regions – particularly the Sahel, although the phenomenon is also apparent among Syria’s neighbours – is facilitated by the difficulties in establishing peaceful norms for political competition, and the opportunistic way violent entrepreneurs step in to exploit the grievances of marginalized groups across a number of countries. Libya now provides the clearest illustration of a bumpy and violent post-conflict transition, which has been upset by the historically grounded fears of tribal, ethnic and ideological groups (particularly the Muslim Brotherhood) that they will be excluded from the spoils of power. One reaction has been to extort the state, as the Zintani militia and federalist groups did in blocking oil pipelines in 2013. Eastern Islamist groups such as Ansar al-Sharia and southern tribes, for their part, appear to be forming closer strategic ties with the regional jihadist cause.

A second concern derives in part from this transnational mobility, and the way it can be exploited in mediatized asymmetric warfare. The attack in September 2013 on a shopping mall in Nairobi carried out by al-Shabaab marked the latest of a series of such transnational projections from a conflict zone – in this case Somalia – to a major urban centre that provides a local support network, global media coverage, and a patently infidel target. As in previous terrorist actions in Mumbai, Istanbul, Kampala, and more recently Volgograd and Karachi, these attacks defy conventional battle logic, granting no gain in territory nor a victory over enemy combatants, but instead propagating amorphous civilian fear; in this respect, they may be distinguished from the more localized attacks on enemy targets led by organizations such as Abu Nidal, whose fighting methods in the 1970s and 1980s were otherwise not dissimilar. Suicidal attacks under conditions of displaced warfare, whether on major cities or economic infrastructure, remain extremely unpredictable risks. Evidence suggests they will also encourage states at risk of such violence to back proxy groups in the source conflict, thereby aggravating internationalized civil war.

Lastly, it is questionable whether the current institutional mechanisms for dealing with extremely fragmented and internationalized internal conflicts fall short of what is required. The sheer variety of stakes in the Syrian conflict, whether this involves the end of the Assad regime, the future of Arab democracy, the regional rise of extreme Islamism, the geo-strategic footprint of major powers or the future of Sunni-Shia or other ethnic relations in numerous countries, is overlaid by a complex geometry of foreign parties, among them neighbouring states, superpowers, non-state organizations and volunteer fighters. The multiplicity of interests and actors do not seem so far to have been able to agree on any solid basis for negotiation, nor shown much wish to do so, beyond the minimal commitment not to use chemical weapons or to provide limited humanitarian access. As a result, a genuine risk exists in Syria, as well as in other internationalized civil wars, that unresolved internal conflict might eventually expand into even more lethal interstate war.

**Conclusion**

The national and regional displacement of conflict, the use of potent symbolic attacks on urban and economic centres as a means to wage asymmetric warfare, and the proliferation of stakes and actors in key conflicts, such as that of Syria, together represent a complex array of security threats. Although these are not characteristic of all current and emerging conflicts, they stand out as threats for which conventional, institutionalized responses are largely absent.
At the root of these new threats are trends that have become a distinctive feature of intra-state conflicts in the Sahel, the Middle East and North Africa, as well as the Horn of Africa and in the criminalized zones of extreme violence in Latin America. Fighting groups are growing more dispersed and fragmented, seeking local territorial control as a primary means of exerting influence on the course of conflict, and over their own prospects of political leverage and economic accumulation. At the same time, various dimensions of external influence, whether through illicit business, Islamist ideology, proxy influence from nearby states or cross-border sectarian alliances, are internationalizing a rising number of civil wars. In such contexts, without organized national counterparts to negotiate with, and in the face of risks of contagion of violence or instability along various transnational transmission routes, the international community appears to be facing the toughest tests for its mediation and peacekeeping architecture.
2 Trends in peacekeeping operations

The most important developments in recent years with respect to peacekeeping operations are described below in terms of trends in figures and other trends. A number of conclusions are then drawn.

The trends in figures presented below concern developments in terms of number of operations, number of personnel deployed, the largest operations and most important mission areas, the largest troop contributors, risks to personnel deployed and the costs of operations.

**Number of peacekeeping operations**

The number of multilateral peacekeeping operations averaged between 50 and 60 a year in the past decade. A substantial number were carried out by regional organisations like the EU, NATO and the OSCE. As an individual organisation, the UN handled the highest number of operations. Although the number of operations started to decrease in 2008, this trend reversed in 2011. The number of peacekeeping operations increased in recent years. A total of 53 peacekeeping operations were launched in 2012. This number rose further to 57 in the past year (see Figure 1). As Figure 1 shows, the UN was always the organisation with the most operations in the field. In 2012, UN missions accounted for 20 of the total of 53 operations (38%).

![Number of peacekeeping operations](image)

Figure 1  Number of multilateral peacekeeping operations per type of conducting organisation, 2003-12

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Number of personnel in peacekeeping operations

The number of personnel – troops, military observers, civilian police and other civilian personnel – deployed in peacekeeping operations increased sharply in the second half of the 2000s as a result of the surge in Afghanistan. This number started to decrease in 2010 and did so sharply especially from 2011 as a result of the withdrawal of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). The number of personnel deployed in peacekeeping operations as at 31 December 2012 was 233,642, a number which had again decreased sharply by the end of 2013.\(^{30}\)

It is striking that, if ISAF is not taken into account, the total number of personnel deployed, which decreased slightly after 2008, started to increase slowly in 2012 to 131,590. This number increased more rapidly in 2013, mainly as a result of new operations in Mali and the Central African Republic and the expansion of existing operations in Africa like the United Nations Organisation Stabilisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO).\(^{31}\) Following ISAF’s withdrawal, its share in the total number of personnel deployed decreased. It accounted for over half of the total number in the period 2010-11. In 2012, its share fell to 44% and decreased further in 2013 (see Figure 2). Although NATO was the organisation with the highest number of personnel in the field in 2012 (107,186, or 46%), the UN again took the lead in this regard in 2013.\(^{32}\)

![Figure 2 Number of personnel deployed in multilateral peacekeeping operations, 2003–12\(^{33}\)](image)

The numbers of personnel deployed used here are estimates as at 31 December or on the date on which an operation was ended. They are not maximum numbers or total numbers of personnel deployed during a year.\(^{30}\) This quantitative analysis is based on data collected by SIPRI for the purpose of identifying trends in peacekeeping operations carried out in the ten-year period 2003-12. Only peacekeeping operations that meet the SIPRI definition of the term have been taken into account. The 2012 data concerning current peacekeeping operations is intended to enable a comparative analysis between 2012 and preceding years.\(^{31}\) The UN data in this figure concerns peacekeeping operations led by the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the UN Department of Political Affairs and UNAMID.\(^{32}\) SIPRI Multilateral Peace Operations Database 2014, see footnote 29.\(^{33}\)
ISAF’s withdrawal will be completed at the end of this year and it is therefore likely that the total number of personnel deployed will decrease further as a result. Nevertheless, since it is quite likely that personnel will remain in Afghanistan as part of a new NATO mission and some European countries will in all likelihood follow the example of France and the Netherlands and contribute more to UN operations in Africa, this decrease will probably be less than the 58,129 troops currently stationed in Afghanistan.

Largest operations and most important mission areas
The Multi-National Force – Iraq (MNF-I) and ISAF operations were far and away the largest in the past ten years. They have therefore had a considerable influence on both the figures and perceptions concerning peacekeeping operations. ISAF has been the largest operation by far since 2007. MONUSCO and the AU/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) are second and third respectively. In total, there were ten operations in 2012 that involved the deployment of over 5,000 personnel: seven were led by the UN, two by NATO and one by the AU.

At the end of the Cold War, Europe became a region in which usually smaller peacekeeping operations were carried out. The number of such operations decreased in the past ten years. The number of operations in the Middle East remained relatively stable. The number of operations in Africa, which had already witnessed a sharp increase in the number of operations in the 1990s, increased further during the same period. The increase in the number of African operations was clearly visible in the past year. As a result, Africa has been the most important mission area in terms of number of peacekeeping operations since 2010, followed by Europe and the Middle East (see Figure 3).

![Figure 3](image)

**Figure 3**  Number of peacekeeping operations per region, 2003–12

34 Idem.
Because of the exceptional size of the MNF-I and ISAF operations, the figures regarding personnel are different when viewed in terms of region. According to SIPRI data, the MNF-I ceased to meet the SIPRI definition of a peacekeeping operation in 2006, as a result of which the Middle East lost its dominant position to Africa. In its turn, Africa lost its dominant position to Central and South Asia in 2009. If the MNF-I is deemed to have been carrying out a peacekeeping operation for the full duration of its presence in Iraq, however, the Middle East would remain the most important mission area in terms of personnel up to and including 2009. ISAF accounted for all of the increase in personnel in Central and South Asia. The clear downward trend in the region can therefore be attributed to its withdrawal. Africa was therefore the most important deployment area in 2013 also in terms of personnel (see Figure 4 and Table 1).

![Figure 4](image-url)

**Figure 4** Number of personnel deployed in multilateral peacekeeping operations per region, 2003–12

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35 Idem.
Table 1  Number of multilateral peacekeeping operations and personnel deployed per region and per type of organisation, 2012

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conducting organisation</th>
<th>Africa</th>
<th>America</th>
<th>Asia and Oceania</th>
<th>Europe</th>
<th>Middle East</th>
<th>World</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>United Nations*</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional organisation or alliance</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ad hoc coalition</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number of operations</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number of personnel</td>
<td>94,351</td>
<td>9,938</td>
<td>103,892</td>
<td>9,784</td>
<td>15,552</td>
<td>233,642</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a The UN figures include operations led by the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the UN Department of Political Affairs and UNAMID.

b These figures include ISAF in Afghanistan, where 102,052 troops were stationed in 2012.

The trends regarding numbers of operations will probably continue in the future. Africa will continue to have the highest number of operations, the number of operations in Europe will decrease further and there will be fewer operations in the Middle East than in Africa, even if the number of operations in the Middle East may rise. The trends look set to continue because, as the spectrum of conflict discussed in chapter 1 of this study shows, Africa is the continent in which there will be permanent and possibly increasing instability, particularly in North Africa, the Sahel and the Horn of Africa. There will therefore be a permanent need for stabilisation in these regions. Africa is also the continent that has the most opportunities for engaging in peacekeeping operations. It is more difficult to identify the trend with respect to personnel, since it can change as a result of a single operation. Based on the current situation, however, the number of personnel deployed in Africa may be expected to increase further, while the number of personnel deployed in Central and South Asia may be expected to decrease after 2014 to the level of the other regions or somewhat above that level. This would confirm Africa's dominance as a mission area. A possible operation in Somalia would only strengthen this position. At the same time, a decision to launch an operation in Syria, which seems unlikely, however, would again increase the importance of the Middle East.

Largest troop contributors
The personnel contributions of European and North American countries to UN operations have decreased sharply since the middle of the 1990s. If ISAF is taken into account, the United States has been the largest contributor of troops to peacekeeping missions for many years. When ISAF was at the peak of its deployment, different European countries were among the top ten troop contributors. Far fewer were in this category following the phasing out of ISAF. In 2012, only two European countries were in the top ten, namely the United Kingdom and Italy (see Figure 5). Although European troop numbers in Afghanistan decreased further in 2013, France returned to the top ten in place of Italy. This was the result of France’s Operation Serval in Mali and Operation Sangaris in the Central African Republic. If ISAF is excluded, South Asian and African countries top the list of contributors. Pakistan, Bangladesh and India were the largest troop contributors in 2012, for example. Countries that are in the top ten contribute the lion’s share of troops in UN missions. In 2012, however, Uganda, Burundi and Kenya were also among the top ten because of their contributions to

36 Idem.
37 Idem.
the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). In addition, France would have returned to the top ten in 2013 even without ISAF. South Asian and African countries, in this case joined by Middle Eastern ones, are also the top ten contributors of civilian police personnel (see Figure 6).

As a result of the decreasing number of European troops being deployed on missions, there is a European and American reserve of troops that may not be used and, given the current economic climate, may therefore be subject to cutbacks. Consequently, in order to preserve the legitimacy of the armed forces, there might be greater willingness to use part of this reserve for new operations in regions in which Western interests are at stake. In light of the spectrum of conflict discussed earlier, obvious regions in this regard are the Sahel, the Middle East and Somalia. Since large-scale NATO interventions are less likely in the regions referred to, the likelihood is that such operations will take place under the auspices of the EU, ad hoc coalitions or, more likely still, the UN.

**Risks to personnel deployed**

Contrary to what is often assumed, the number of victims demonstrates that Africa is not the most dangerous continent in which to deploy troops. Figures collected in the SIPRI Multilateral Peace Operations Database indicate that in recent years the risk of fatalities was significantly higher in the Middle East and in Central and South Asia (see Figure 7). The probability of fatalities was also slightly higher in North and South America. ISAF and the MNF-I engaged more in combat operations than the other peacekeeping missions, however. Nevertheless, even if neither of these counterinsurgency operations are taken into account, Central and South Asia and the American continent remain more dangerous than Africa.

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38 Idem.
Figure 6  Top ten contributors of civilian police personnel to multilateral peacekeeping operations, 2012

![Bar chart showing number of police officers from different countries contributing to peacekeeping operations.]

- Bangladesh
- Jordan
- India
- Nigeria
- Senegal
- Nepal
- Pakistan
- Rwanda
- Egypt
- Burkina Faso

Figure 7  Fatalities in peacekeeping operations per region, 2000-10

![Bar chart showing fatalities per 1,000 personnel years by region, including and excluding ISAF and MNF-I.]

- Africa
- North and South America
- Central and South Asia
- East Asia and Oceania
- Europe
- Middle East

UN missions are considered to be risky because the command and control structures and security measures are often experienced as being ‘substandard’. The data shows, however, that UN peacekeeping operations are relatively less risky and have a more cautious mandate than NATO and NATO-led operations and operations carried out by ad hoc coalitions (see Figure 8). This is partly due to the difference in nature of the missions in that non-UN missions often operate at the higher end of the spectrum of violence (see also below). UN operations remain relatively less risky also if ISAF and MNF-I are not taken into account.

It seems that factors other than the region in which personnel are deployed or the organisation under which deployment takes place play a far greater role in determining how dangerous an operation is. These factors include:

1. The nature of the mission. The most decisive factor in terms of risk to personnel deployed is the degree to which combat operations are part of the overall mission. This is the

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39 Idem.
40 Idem.
difference between the ISAF and MNF-I missions and also explains why there have been so many AMISOM casualties in recent years. Casualty numbers are much lower in operations that are based on a peace agreement or are clearly supported by the local population and the conflicting parties.

2. **The context of the mission.** Casualty numbers are proportionally lower in mission areas that are characterised by stability (frozen conflicts) or low-intensity conflict. This probably explains the low figures for OSCE and EU missions.

3. **Safety and security measures.** The less stringent security measures of UN political and peacebuilding missions probably explain why these operations have been more dangerous than normal UN peacekeeping operations.

![Figure 8 Fatalities in peacekeeping operations per conducting organisation, 2000–10](image)

**Figure 8** Fatalities in peacekeeping operations per conducting organisation, 2000–10

### Costs of operations

It is not easy to determine the total costs of peacekeeping operations. The costs reported by the organisations that carry out the missions provide a distorted picture. The total costs reported by the UN, NATO, the EU and other regional organisations in 2012 amounted to USD 9 billion. The UN accounted for USD 7.2 billion, or 80%, of this amount. The costs of non-UN operations are actually much higher, however, because in EU, NATO and other operations the costs of personnel and equipment are borne by the contributing country. The actual costs of deploying personnel in the case of UN operations are also much higher for many countries, certainly for Western states, than the amount paid by the UN.

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41 Idem.
In practice, the costs of EU and NATO operations are many times higher per individual deployed than those of the UN or African regional organisations. This is due to the fact that the UN mainly deploys cheaper, non-Western troops. It is also the result of measures taken in recent years that have made UN operations more efficient by, among other things, placing a greater emphasis on cooperation between different missions and between missions and UN Country Teams.

Other trends regarding peacekeeping operations
In addition to the trends expressed in figures above, other developments are affecting the future of peacekeeping missions.

Expansion of mandates
Since the end of the Cold War, peace operations have evolved from more traditional peacekeeping ones that monitor truces into what are referred to as multidimensional operations, in the context of which peacebuilding tasks are performed and efforts are made to deal with the causes of conflicts. Traditional peacekeeping operations consisted almost entirely of military personnel (troops and observers), whereas current multidimensional operations include large numbers of civilian personnel in addition to the military component. Traditional peacekeeping operations are still carried out in this multidimensional context.

In 2013, the UN Security Council concluded that such multidimensional operations may be given a mandate for the following activities:

1. Contributing to security by means of Security Sector Reform (SSR) programmes;
2. Enabling national governments to set up disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) programmes;
3. Strengthening the institutions of a state under the rule of law;
4. Providing rapid support in mine action;
5. Supporting peace and political processes by providing good services, advice and assistance;
6. Contributing to the security required by providing humanitarian assistance and creating the conditions required for the return of refugees and displaced persons;
7. Contributing to international efforts aimed at protecting human rights, including in terms of monitoring;
8. Protecting civilians, particularly those under imminent threat of physical violence;
9. Cooperating and coordinating efforts with UN agencies, funds and programmes and other relevant partners in the field of economic development;
10. Supporting the participation of women in conflict prevention, conflict management and peacebuilding.

In addition, peacekeeping operations now often include organising elections, monitoring sanctions and monitoring and training civilian police personnel. At times, those involved in

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42 Although the Netherlands, for example, would also receive a payment of USD 1,028 per soldier deployed in a UN context, this amount is not proportional to the costs that the Netherlands would incur.


Peacekeeping operations also monitor transitional regimes (like in Cambodia) or, in exceptional cases, even temporarily assume some or all of the tasks of government (like in Bosnia and Herzegovina and East Timor). Moreover, it is not only the UN that has assumed a greater number of responsibilities. Missions carried out by other organisations like the EU and NATO have likewise increased in scope.

Precisely because the mandates have expanded, however, the question as to whether they are sufficiently realistic is being asked with increasing frequency. For example, are comprehensive multidimensional operations actually capable of turning a country like Afghanistan or Sudan into a properly functioning state? Is this a realistic expectation within the time frames of those missions? Nation-building and state-building are often criticised because they appear to take a socially engineered society as the starting point. The notion that all aspects of a given society can be structured or transformed on the basis of a top-down approach does not seem to be realistic. It could be argued, for instance, that the nation-building process in Bosnia and Herzegovina is not succeeding in creating a Bosnian national identity because the Croats, Serbs and Bosniaks are all adhering to their own respective identities, a circumstance that the international community, for all its efforts, can do very little to change. This is a factor in many regions characterised by ethnic and religious differences.

**Mandate for the use of force**

Traditional peacekeeping operations are based on the following principles: consent of the parties, impartiality and the use of force only in the case of self-defence and to protect the mandate. These principles were already deviated from in the 1960s in the context of the United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC, 1960–64) when, in 1961, the operation was mandated to take ‘all appropriate measures to prevent the occurrence of civil war in the Congo, including arrangements for ceasefire, the halting of all military operations, the prevention of clashes, and the use of force, if necessary, in the last resort.’

In the 1990s, a number of peacekeeping operations, such as the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) and the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Yugoslavia, ended up in a twilight zone between peacekeeping and peace enforcement. Although these operations were given a peace enforcement mandate, or parts of such a mandate, they were ultimately not given the right resources. In response to the UN’s failure, the Security Council started giving several regional organisations the mandate to carry out enforcement operations from the middle of the 1990s. Well-known examples in this regard are the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) in Liberia and Sierra Leone, the NATO Implementation Force (IFOR) and Stabilisation Force (SFOR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan.

The term ‘robust peace operations’ was introduced by the ‘Brahimi Report’ (Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations chaired by Lakhdar Brahimi) of 2000, after which operations were usually mandated under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations to

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48 *Walking the Tightrope*, see footnote 45.
make it easier for force to be used if necessary for the purposes of self-defence and to implement the mandate.\footnote{United Nations, \textit{UN Security Council Document 809}, 21 August 2000.} In addition, earlier in 2000, the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) became the first peacekeeping operation to be given a mandate under Chapter VII for the ‘protection of civilians under imminent threat of physical violence’.\footnote{United Nations, \textit{UN Security Council Resolution 1289}, 7 February 2000.} Since then, the UN Security Council has applied the UNAMSIL example virtually as a matter of standard procedure when mandating.

In 2013, the Security Council took additional steps that may indicate a further relaxation of the rules governing the use of force in peacekeeping operations. The interventions in Mali and the Central African Republic (Operation Serval and Operation Sangaris, respectively) supported by the Security Council, as well as the subsequent African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA) and African-led International Support Mission to the Central African Republic (MISCA), were given very robust rules governing the use of force for the purpose of stopping the rebels in Mali and ending the ethnic violence in the Central African Republic. The MONUSCO Force Intervention Brigade was also given the mandate ‘to prevent the expansion of all armed groups, neutralise the groups, and to disarm them’. However, with respect to both MONUSCO and the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), it was stated that the decision was one that had been made on an ‘exceptional basis’ and did not set a precedent, and that the mandate must be carried out without ‘any prejudice to the agreed principles of peacekeeping’.\footnote{United Nations, Security Council, \textit{‘Security Council press statement on Mali’}, SC/10878, 10 January 2013; \textit{UN Security Council Resolution 2085}, 20 December 2012; \textit{UN Security Council Resolution 2127}, 5 December 2013; \textit{UN Security Council Resolution 2098}, 28 March 2013, and \textit{UN Security Council Resolution 2100}, 25 April 2013.}

\textbf{More for less}

As a result of the economic crisis that began in 2008, many Western governments have had to take drastic austerity measures. This reality has also changed the way in which peacekeeping operations are viewed. Even though, in the same year, the budget for UN operations and the number of personnel deployed in peacekeeping missions increased sharply in overall terms because of the surge in Afghanistan, the question as to whether or not such operations actually provided value for money became more relevant than ever. The demand for evaluations, indicators and benchmarks of success therefore became more pertinent. Particularly with respect to UN operations, this development led to a further improvement in efficiency through, among other measures, the strengthening of cooperation between different operations being carried out in the same region. In addition, more often than was previously the case, the Security Council now tends to establish benchmarks and indicators for the evaluation of operations and link evaluation outcomes to mandate extensions.

As a result, the budget for UN operations has been decreasing since 2012 while the number of personnel deployed has remained the same. The UN budget per individual deployed has been decreasing since 2008. Moreover, the UN payment for personnel deployed has remained virtually the same since 2009/10. At the same time, as stated above, mandates for operations like MONUSCO and MINUSMA have become more intensive and robust.

Particularly in countries of the Global South that are major troop contributors to UN operations and regional organisations like the AU, there is a feeling that the contributions of these countries and organisations are not sufficiently respected, since they are expected to
perform an ever increasing amount of tasks for an ever decreasing amount of money, while at the same time the question of effectiveness is being asked more explicitly and the quality of their troops is increasingly criticised. There is also a feeling that the West pays while countries of the Global South bear the brunt in terms of casualties. The counterargument that the West’s troops are deployed in the ISAF mission makes little impression. Nevertheless, it would appear that these countries will continue to contribute at current levels to peacekeeping operations in the future in spite of feelings of being wronged.\textsuperscript{52}

**Conceptual developments**

With increasing frequency, questions are being asked in the West, Russia, China and countries of the Global South about the implementation of concepts like the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) and the Protection of Civilians (POC). Although the principles themselves are supported, countries like Russia, China and India are concerned about violations of national sovereignty in the context of implementation. There is doubt, particularly in countries of the Global South, about whether such concepts are implemented fairly and it is often argued that they are brought to the fore mainly when Western interests are at stake. In addition, the need for further operationalisation is broadly acknowledged.\textsuperscript{53}

Peacekeeping operations have indeed not always been able, and have sometimes been unwilling, to adequately contribute to the protection of the civilian population. Operations often do not have sufficient capacity and commanders are often reluctant to risk the lives of troops. Nevertheless, when a peacekeeping force is present, both the international community and the local population expect the troops deployed to provide protection. When this expectation is not met, the result is often frustration and criticism.\textsuperscript{54}

As regards R2P, NATO’s interpretation of UN Security Council Resolution 1973 concerning the enforcement of a no-fly zone and the protection of civilians in Libya caused concern among the emerging powers (BRICS).\textsuperscript{55} Russia and China now claim that the NATO intervention supported regime change and that NATO had not been mandated to do so. Partly to prevent a repeat, great restraint is being exercised with respect to action against the Syrian regime. At the same time, however, both China and Russia were quite aware of the implications of the Security Council Resolution and their restraint cannot entirely be explained by the current ideological argument against regime change. The current position of both countries is also

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\textsuperscript{53} Idem.


the result of disappointment that the intervention in Libya did not bring them the gains they had been hoping for and the fact that ties between Syria and Russia are much closer.\textsuperscript{56}

In the hope of further operationalising R2P, Brazil launched the concept of ‘Responsibility While Protecting’ (RWP).\textsuperscript{57} It is by no means certain, however, that the further operationalisation of RWP will provide a solution, since the decision to intervene in a given theatre or refrain from doing so is based primarily on national interests. In addition, the operationalisation of R2P will not make it clear whether or not intervention must take place in conflicts like the one in Syria. At present, in spite of the support for R2P as a principle, Western nations also do not appear to be in favour of a military intervention in Syria.\textsuperscript{58}

It must also be noted that qualifications are now being applied more frequently to the original liberal peace paradigm, which is based on the assumption that democracy and a market economy prevent conflict and that both must therefore serve as the guiding principles in peacebuilding. Most of the criticism remains within the existing paradigm, its thrust being that unintended or suboptimal results are either the consequence of action on the part of the government, rebels or population in the receiving country or the consequence of technical implementation problems on the part of the intervening parties. Some critics, for example, describe how certain policy interventions aimed at providing short-term solutions within peacekeeping operations can have negative effects in the short term that actually make conflict more likely. Short-term solutions can also create a risk for peace in the long term. A well-known example in this regard is the dilemma between security and development. Nevertheless, based on such arguments in the literature on policy, it may be concluded that, with enough tweaking, it will ultimately be possible to develop successful missions.\textsuperscript{59}

There are also critics who are outside the paradigm, however. Some are critical of the state-based and neoliberal nature of the current peacebuilding agenda. Others focus more on the way in which Western actors claim to be promoting peace while pursuing antiterrorism and trade policies that actually make conflict more likely. Yet others advocate local or, in some cases, more ‘exotic’ solutions. Their criticism is that the international approach does not focus enough on local conflict management mechanisms.\textsuperscript{60}

This spectrum of criticism in the Western subject literature also resonates outside the West. Although non-Western countries do not feel the need to modify the current concepts or return them to an earlier state and usually respond to Western ideas without introducing their
own concepts, it would appear that the trend of more far-reaching and force-based action is slowly continuing to decrease. There is increasing opposition to this trend outside the West. In addition, Western countries are themselves increasingly realising that this aim is not always better, and is certainly not cheaper.  

**Conclusion**

In the future, the focus in the context of peacekeeping operations will probably shift further away from Central Asia towards Africa, and will perhaps return to some extent to the Middle East. This shift is likely because most of the world’s armed conflicts are taking place in the two regions referred to. Moreover, the focus of efforts is largely determined by the level of cooperation between the permanent members of the UN Security Council (P5). In an increasingly multipolar world, the great powers are less willing to allow peacekeeping operations to take place in their own backyards. Africa is an exception in this regard. In addition to gaining from stability in the region, the great powers have other, common interests like combating terrorism and international criminal networks. African countries themselves also advocate robust operations and the great powers prove capable of taking decisive and effective action when they agree. This development is reflected in the number of operations and, above all, in the number of personnel deployed.

Possible missions in the Middle East will probably be less robust in nature. Much more than is the case in Africa, the region is home to the fault lines separating spheres of influence and, consequently, there is far less agreement among the great powers. It is precisely fault lines of this kind, however, that are the province of traditional peacekeeping operations. Such operations may in the future perhaps help in maintaining the status quo in conflicts that arise from the Arab Spring.

The current increase in the robustness of operations will probably level off. In addition to opposition to a further increase outside the West, the resources required to take more forceful action are limited. Moreover, the question as to whether more is always better is also being asked in Western countries. It is unlikely, however, that conceptual developments in the field of peacekeeping operations will be reversed. Global South countries and the BRICS do not wish to change peacekeeping operations, since they prefer the status quo. It is mainly Western actors that wish to further modify peacekeeping operations in conceptual terms. They are the driving force behind developments like a greater focus on the protection of civilians, the increasing robustness of operations and the use of intelligence in UN operations, whereas the use of intelligence was previously viewed as a threat to national sovereignty. For countries of the Global South and the emerging powers, developments are usually viewed as having gone far enough, whereas Western nations usually wish to go further, particularly in the case of UN operations.

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61 See footnote 52.
3 The BRICS and the future of peacekeeping operations

The BRICS countries are becoming more prominent on the world stage. They are also increasingly expected to contribute to maintaining international security and stability. This chapter discusses the expected relevance of the BRICS countries in the coming five to ten years with respect to peacekeeping operations, particularly in terms of the expeditionary deployment of uniformed personnel for the purpose of contributing to a) a peace process aimed at preventing an armed conflict, b) the implementation of an existing peace agreements or c) the enforcement of a truce, peace agreement or UN Security Council Resolution adopted for peacebuilding. The following analysis focuses on the views of the five BRICS countries regarding trends in threats, conditions for deployment in peacekeeping operations and the multilateral organisations that should engage in peacekeeping operations. Special attention is given to China in this regard, since it seems quite likely that this country will be very influential in the coming ten years and will become considerably more active in the field of international security and stability than has been the case so far.

The BRICS

The BRICS group consists of five countries: Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa, the leaders of which have attended an annual summit since 2009. These countries have set up a joint BRICS Forum and are working to establish a BRICS development bank. What these countries have in common is that they are not part of the international core group consisting of the West and Japan that has dominated the multilateral system for the past decades. All five BRICS countries are great powers in their respective regions and members of the G20. Their share in the world economy is expected to increase in the coming decades. According to recent reports, China will overtake the United States as the largest economy this year and all BRICS countries will rise in the rankings of the world’s largest economies.

Unlike the traditional group of the West and Japan, a group led by the United States, the BRICS are not a tight-knit group. They are not linked by military alliances, for example. Indeed, border disputes and geopolitical rivalry are a key element in Sino-Indian relations. Three BRICS countries are members of the IBSA Dialogue Forum, a partnership between India, Brazil and South Africa that focuses on development issues and in the context of which...

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64 South Africa has been a member since 2010.

65 Grootmachten, see footnote 63, p. 50.

the three countries emphasise, among other things, that they all have a democratic political system.  

Russia and China are permanent members of the UN Security Council, whereas the other three BRICS countries are not. As long as this remains the case, Russia and China will have greater potential to influence the UN peacekeeping operations agenda. This is not to state that these two countries are currently making full use of this potential. Up to now, China in particular has tended to be reticent. At the same time, India is a leading contributor of troops and both Brazil and South Africa actively participate in the peacekeeping operations debate, having introduced the concepts of, respectively, responsibility while protecting and non-indifference. Although permanent membership of the UN Security Council is an aim of India, Brazil and South Africa, such membership is unlikely to be secured within the foreseeable future. Nevertheless, it is not possible to predict developments in this area in the long term and a change in the composition of the UN Security Council cannot be excluded. The analysis set out below is based on the current composition and role of the UN Security Council remaining the same in the coming ten years.

Table 2 Contributions of BRICS countries to UN peacekeeping operations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>BRICS Country</th>
<th>Share in UN peacekeeping operations budget in 2013</th>
<th>Contribution in terms of personnel to UN peacekeeping operations (number of military/police personnel and experts), December 2013</th>
<th>Position in terms of number of personnel contributed to UN peacekeeping operations, December 2013</th>
<th>Permanent membership of the UN Security Council</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>6.64%</td>
<td>2,078</td>
<td>#15</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>3.15%</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>#65</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>0.13%</td>
<td>7,849</td>
<td>#3</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>0.59%</td>
<td>1,748</td>
<td>#19</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>0.07%</td>
<td>2,173</td>
<td>#13</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Russia

The Russian government generally attaches great importance to the primacy of the UN Security Council when it comes to the use of force. However, as shown by the war in Georgia in 2008 and recent developments in Ukraine, this does not apply in cases of Russian action within what Russia considers to be its own sphere of influence, namely its ‘near abroad’, a term usually used to refer to a range of countries in Central and Eastern Europe, the Caucasus, Central Asia and the Baltic region. Like India, Russia makes an exception for military interventions it carries out unilaterally in bordering regions, regardless of whether

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or not such interventions are classified as peacekeeping operations. Russian consent for UN operations within what Russia deems to be its sphere of influence is unlikely.\textsuperscript{70} Like China, Russia is a permanent member of the UN Security Council. Both countries make a substantially larger financial contribution than the other three BRICS countries. At the same time, however, Russia contributes hardly any troops to UN operations, something that is unlikely to change in the near future.\textsuperscript{71} Russia’s interest in peacekeeping operations is limited to preventing such operations from becoming instruments for the exertion of Western influence.\textsuperscript{72} Russia is opposed to armed intervention without the consent of the receiving country’s government, which is often seen as pro-Western, but supports current UN operations such as those being carried out in Africa. Although Russia supports the R2P concept in principle, it is critical when it comes to the operationalisation of the concept.\textsuperscript{73}

\textbf{China}

Because it is possible that China in the coming ten years will develop into an international actor that, with the exception of the United States, has far more influence than any other\textsuperscript{74}, it is important to look more deeply into the Chinese position regarding peacekeeping operations. Since the mission in Libya, China has attached the following conditions to peacekeeping operations: they must have the permission of, or a mandate from, the UN Security Council and the consent of the government of the country in which they are to take place.\textsuperscript{75} Although China has traditionally preferred impartial operations in which force is used only in self-defence, it appears to be becoming more flexible with respect to these principles. In its capacity as a member of the UN Security Council, China rarely takes initiatives and applies sovereignty as the guiding principle. In addition, China has so far exercised its veto power only rarely. On the occasions that China has done so, the issues involved were often indirectly related to Sino-Taiwanese relations, a sensitive matter to Beijing.\textsuperscript{76} Even when not acting as a member of the UN Security Council, the Chinese government prefers to remain in the background in international security crises that are not taking place in China’s own region.

\textsuperscript{70} The New Geopolitics of Peace Operations: A Dialogue with Emerging Powers, see footnote 52, p. 3.
\textsuperscript{71} Idem, p. 6.
\textsuperscript{72} The New Geopolitics of Peace Operations: Mapping the Emerging Landscape, see footnote 69, p. 20.
\textsuperscript{73} The New Geopolitics of Peace Operations: A Dialogue with Emerging Powers, see footnote 52, p. 4.
\textsuperscript{74} Grootmachten, see footnote 63, p. 60.
Around 230 Chinese soldiers are involved in MONUSCO in the DRC. Among the permanent members of the UN Security Council, China is the largest contributor of personnel in uniform to UN missions.

Photograph: MONUSCO, Myriam Asmani

China’s position is changing in a number of ways. Although the nation only started participating in UN peacekeeping operations at the beginning of the 1990s, its contribution in terms of personnel has increased rapidly since 2003.77 China is now the largest financial contributor to UN peacekeeping operations outside the West/Japan78 and, among the permanent members of the UN Security Council, is the largest contributor of personnel in uniform to UN missions (see Table 2).79 Although China often voices objections to multidimensional peacekeeping and peace enforcement, it is adopting an increasingly pragmatic stance and usually supports such missions in practice.80 The principle of sovereignty remains important but is being interpreted less strictly than was previously the case.81 The issue of Taiwan is also less dominant than it was in the 1990s. China took part in the UN mission in Haiti in spite of the fact that Haiti maintains diplomatic relations with Taiwan, for example.82

It looks likely that these trends will continue in the coming years. In outline, the trends are greater involvement and a stance that is increasingly being determined by ad hoc factors. Although there is a lot of criticism of R2P in China, a number of Chinese experts believe that

77 Chinese and European Engagement in UN Peace Operations, see footnote 75, p. 165.; International Crisis Group, China’s Growing Role in UN Peacekeeping, Asia report 166, 17 April 2009, appendix B.
80 China’s Growing Role in UN Peacekeeping, see footnote 77, pp. 2-3.
82 China’s Growing Role in UN Peacekeeping, see footnote 77, p. 18.
China should distance itself more explicitly from its traditional opposition to interventions. An internationally known example of such an expert is Wang Yizhou, a professor at Peking University and a former deputy director at the influential Chinese Academy of Social Sciences who launched the concept of creative involvement.83 According to this concept, China must play an active role on the world stage and make a greater mark on international political discourse by providing public goods. There is a lot of debate in China also in a more general sense about the question as to whether the country should be considerably more active internationally than has been the case so far. It therefore seems only a matter of time before Beijing steps more to the fore in international politics and plays a more active role in the UN Security Council.

Ad hoc factors concern both China’s local interests and the relationship between China and the other great powers. The extent of China’s local interests is increasing rapidly in many parts of the world. There were over 35,000 Chinese nationals in Libya at the start of its civil war in 2011. These individuals were evacuated by the Chinese government. There are also large numbers of Chinese entrepreneurs and employees of large companies in many other African countries. China has become one of the most important trading and investment partners for many African, Latin American and Middle Eastern countries. This development makes it more likely that China will adopt a more active stance in the event of a crisis. In addition, the direction in which Beijing’s relationship with the United States is developing will probably influence China’s stance in the UN Security Council more strongly than in the past. From 2010, the geopolitical rivalry between China and the United States in East Asia became more pronounced and open more rapidly than had previously been the case. The general expectation is that tensions will increase if China’s economic growth continues, making armed incidents between China and a few of its neighbouring countries (Japan, the Philippines and Vietnam) more likely. Because of this situation, China may consider it necessary to coordinate action in the UN Security Council with Russia to a greater extent than it did in the past. This dynamic is clearly visible in the context of the Syrian crisis, in respect of which the Russian position in the UN Security Council seems to influence the Chinese one to a large extent. Even in cases in which Russia openly supports separatism in neighbouring countries like Georgia (2008) and Ukraine (2014), China adopts a very cautious stance and does nothing in the UN Security Council that could harm Russian interests.

A greater focus on ad hoc factors in Chinese policy does not mean, however, that certain principles or ideological factors no longer play a role. Greater Chinese influence on the international agenda could mean that, in the long term, the basic principles adhered to by Beijing will play a greater role in the development of international standards than is currently the case. In this context, it is unlikely that China will come to view the principle of sovereignty and the issue of Taiwan as non-essential interests in the coming decades. In addition, China will most likely continue to adhere to the condition that peacekeeping operations may only take place with the approval of the UN Security Council. An increase in China’s international influence may decrease the political scope for countries to initiate peacekeeping missions without referral to the UN Security Council.

Moreover, the Chinese government is waging an ideological war (soft war)\(^\text{84}\) at both national and international level against liberal political influences.\(^\text{85}\) China considers this war to be a zero-sum one in which the United States is the principal adversary. In addition to protecting itself against liberal political influences from outside (China’s leaders believe that the United States is still applying the Cold War strategy of peaceful evolution; that is, attempting to effect democratisation in communist states by peaceful means), the Chinese government also wishes to secure a strong international position in terms of legitimacy and morality. As far as China is concerned, developing countries constitute the main international battleground of this ideological soft war. China may also use its increasing influence in multilateral organisations to limit liberal influences.\(^\text{86}\) A further increase in military and strategic tensions between China and the United States, which seems likely particularly in East Asia,\(^\text{87}\) would make it more urgent for Beijing to intensify this soft war in other parts of the world like Africa, the Middle East and Latin America. In the context of peacekeeping operations, this may mean that the Chinese government will implicitly or explicitly try to exclude the nature of the political system of a given country as a consideration when deliberations are taking place to determine whether or not an intervention must take place in that country. In other words, China may take the position that human rights violations by governments or the absence of a democratic system do not constitute a reason to intervene.\(^\text{88}\) Beijing may instead emphasise, as it already does, the link between peacekeeping operations and socioeconomic development.\(^\text{89}\)

**India, Brazil and South Africa**

India has traditionally been a major contributor of troops to UN peacekeeping operations (see Table 1) and views making such contributions as, among other things, a way of securing a permanent seat in the UN Security Council.\(^\text{90}\) It is dissatisfied, however, about the limited degree of influence that it currently has as a troop contributor.\(^\text{91}\) The principle of sovereignty

\(^{84}\) Nicholas Dynon, ‘China’s Ideological “Soft War”: Offense is the Best Defense’, in *China Brief*, Jamestown Foundation, 20 February 2014. Available at http://www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=41965&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=25&cHash=7cc753436f4657b3e9216e8ac89d3a3e9.


\(^{86}\) Russell Ong, *China’s Security Interests in the Post-Cold War Era*. Abingdon: Routledge, 2013, chapter 6;

\(^{87}\) Frans-Paul van der Putten, ‘Harmony with Diversity: China’s Preferred World Order and Weakening Western Influence in the Developing World’, in *Global Policy*, 4:1, February 2013, pp. 53-62; China’s Ideological ‘Soft War’, see footnote 84.

\(^{88}\) Grootmachten, see footnote 63, p. 50.

\(^{89}\) Nevertheless, China may in specific cases support initiatives aimed at democratisation or improving the human rights situation, especially if such initiatives contribute to greater stability. In addition, at least in the current situation, China does not generally object to the use of the terms democracy and human rights. The Chinese government’s main interest lies in the formulation of international standards and it therefore devotes considerable attention to the context in which these terms are applied and the definitions used.

\(^{90}\) The New Geopolitics of Peace Operations: Mapping the Emerging Landscape, see footnote 69, p. 22.


is extremely important to India. Nevertheless, the Indian government stresses the importance of military intervention in the event of large-scale human rights violations and at times takes very "robust" action in the context of UN missions. India opposes the use of UN peacekeeping operations in South Asia, certainly in Kashmir, where it has repeatedly and unilaterally initiated its own 'peacekeeping missions'. When it comes to other regions, however, Delhi insists that peacekeeping missions take place in a multilateral context and with the UN's permission.\textsuperscript{93} India has major economic interests in Africa and in parts of the Middle East and the Indian government, like the Chinese one, considers it necessary to become more involved in the security of these regions, from Delhi's perspective for the purpose of countering China's growing influence. R2P is considered to be a simplistic and ineffective concept in India.\textsuperscript{94} In addition, India does not favour the outsourcing of peacekeeping operations to regional organisations.\textsuperscript{95}

The principle of sovereignty is also important to Brazil, which, other than in self-defence, has traditionally exercised restraint in the use of force during peacekeeping missions. Nevertheless, it adopted a more robust stance in Haiti. Brazil proposed the concept of Responsibility While Protecting as an operationalisation of R2P. RWP includes criteria that should be applied by the UN Security Council prior to initiating military interventions for the purpose of operationalising R2P. Some consider the concept to be a way of limiting the use of military interventions.\textsuperscript{96} The IBSA group supports the RWP proposal.\textsuperscript{97} Although Brazil is currently contributing mainly to the UN mission in Haiti, it is playing an increasingly larger role outside the region, mainly in Africa, where Brazilian companies are more and more active, and the Middle East, where Brazil is in charge of a maritime task force of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL).

South Africa is seeking to position itself as a regional leader in Africa. Because it hopes to keep France out of Africa to the greatest extent possible, it prefers peacekeeping operations in an AU context. The South African government does not criticise African leaders\textsuperscript{98} and considers sovereignty to be of paramount importance. It would rather have R2P implemented without the use of sanctions or military means. Nevertheless, in terms of R2P, South Africa applies the principle of non-indifference rather than that of non-intervention.

**Conclusion**

In terms of BRICS peacekeeping operations, Africa and, to a lesser extent, the Middle East appear to be the most likely deployment regions. A number of regions are expressly deemed to be unsuitable for deployment. India would object to deployment in South Asia, Russia and China would object to deployment in Central Asia and China would object to deployment in East Asia. Peacekeeping operations could take place in the border zones between these spheres of influence, however. Relevant future threats differ per BRICS country. Nevertheless, security threats to economic interests and citizens abroad are becoming more important to all of the BRICS countries, particularly China, which has a major economic presence in Africa.
and the Middle East. Terrorism arising from or made more potent by Islamic radicalism is particularly relevant to China and Russia because of their problems with Islamic minorities in Xinjiang and the Caucasus, respectively. The possible loss of regional influence to geopolitical rivals may become a key concern in the coming years mainly for China (Africa and the Middle East) and Russia (the Middle East) in relation to the United States, and India (Africa and the Middle East) in relation to China. For South Africa, the main potential danger is instability in its own region (Africa).

All of the BRICS countries are of the opinion that peacekeeping operations may only take place with the UN's permission unless, particularly in the case of Russia and India, the matter concerns missions in their neighbouring countries. In addition, the BRICS countries believe that regional organisations should play a major role to ensure that the local sense of involvement is as strong as it can be and local cultural factors are incorporated into the mission to the greatest extent possible. Given the importance of Africa as a potential deployment area, the AU and regional African organisations are viewed as important in terms of legitimising missions, though not necessarily in terms of carrying them out. There are no indications that the three BRICS countries that are not permanent members of the UN Security Council intend to reduce their support for UN peacekeeping operations, possibly because, among other reasons, they do not wish to compromise their chances of obtaining that status.99

A second common position of the BRICS countries is that respect for sovereignty is a key principle and interventions may never be automatic responses. Each case must be considered individually and economic sanctions and military force may only be used selectively as a means of last resort. Indeed, the BRICS countries maintain the view that each case must be considered individually even against the backdrop of more robust mandates being given for UN operations. Both individually and as a group, the BRICS countries present themselves in relation to the West as representatives of developing countries. A direct consequence of that position, and of their own historical experiences, is a continuously critical attitude with respect to Western initiatives that could lead to interventions. At the same time, however, the BRICS countries seem to be becoming more flexible in their handling of actual interventions. The West appears less willing to carry out interventions and to believe less strongly in nation-building. Interventions against governments may therefore decrease, since, in addition to less willingness on the part of the West, the emerging powers have more power to block such interventions. As a point of principle, however, non-intervention is becoming somewhat less important as a distinction between the West and the BRICS countries.

BRICS influence is unlikely to lead to major changes in the near future regarding the way in which peacekeeping operations are conducted. A growing divide between, on the one hand, crises in respect of which there is general agreement about the approach to be taken and, on the other, cases in which no agreement can be reached or can be reached only to a very limited extent may emerge as a trend in the coming years. In a crisis of the first kind, the direct interests of the great powers are limited and/or are not in conflict. At present, the interests referred to are least likely to conflict in Latin America and Africa. Using more or less the current model, peacekeeping operations could therefore be organised and launched relatively quickly in those regions.

99 Idem, p. 20.
In a crisis of the second kind, a greater number of direct interests are at stake and/or are at variance with each other. At present, this is often the case in East, Southeast, South and Central Asia, the Middle East and Eastern Europe. In such cases, peacekeeping operations mandated or carried out by the UN are very difficult or even impossible to organise and launch. Moreover, even if an operation is launched, it is subject to numerous restrictions. At the same time, the influence of the emerging powers will probably reduce the scope for peacekeeping operations without UN involvement. Because of the same process, the number of parties involved, and therefore the likelihood of conflicting interests, is increasing. The number of regions in which the great powers have direct and conflicting interests is also more likely to increase rather than decrease. The US-China, US-Russia, EU-Russia, Japan-China and India-China conflicts of interest are of particular relevance. As stated elsewhere in this report, while intrastate conflicts will more often be protracted and amorphous in nature and will probably not be limited to a specific area, and there is a greater need for stability, the conflicts of interest referred to in the preceding sentence may reduce rather than increase the number of effective peacekeeping operations.

This aspect concerns actual deployments relative to the total number of crises in which peacekeeping operations could potentially have been carried out. In other words, the number of peacekeeping operations may increase in absolute terms. The relative increase in the number of crises in respect of which peacekeeping operations are, for whatever reason, not an option may lead to a greater international focus on counterterrorism (both preventive measures and the use of military means) in unstable areas (mainly in the West and maybe gradually also in the BRICS countries, and mainly in a preventive sense) in combination with a greater emphasis on the importance of socioeconomic development as a long-term strategy (as most of the BRICS countries are already emphasising). However, the BRICS countries do not yet seem to have a clear idea about how they can serve their increasing interest in stability outside their own regions in the case of crises in respect of which peacekeeping operations are not a solution.

Regarding the international agenda on peacekeeping operations in the medium and long term (five to ten years and beyond), it is likely that China in particular will play a more explicit role. This development will probably affect both the conduct of individual operations and the evolution of relevant standards and definitions. The possibility that China will staunchly defend the principle that liberal values may not play a formal role in justifying interventions that have the permission of, or a mandate from, the UN Security Council must therefore be taken into account. If this does indeed happen, it is likely that Russia will support China’s position. This process will be of key importance to the use of peacekeeping operations in general and, above all, to the West’s ability to exert influence in terms of determining the type of crisis in respect of which launching peacekeeping operations is an option and the objectives of such operations. The positions that the other three BRICS countries will adopt in the normative debate is still unclear. On the one hand, as democracies and like the West and Japan, they support the most important liberal political values and consider democratisation to be a positive process. On the other, they see themselves as leaders or representatives of developing countries and therefore attach great importance to sovereignty and the principle that democratisation processes may not be imposed from the outside.

100 Idem, pp. i and 27.
4 United Nations

Trends in the recent past
Although the UN established monitoring missions like the United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans (UNSCOB) in Greece and the United Nations Consular Commission (UNCC) in Indonesia immediately after the Second World War, according to the organisation itself, the United Nations Truce Supervision Operation (UNTSO) established in the Middle East in 1948 was its first peacekeeping operation. A few months later, in 1949, the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) was established in Jammu and Kashmir. It subsequently remained quiet on the peacekeeping front because the UN Security Council was paralysed by vetoes. In 1956, however, the General Assembly took matters into its own hands by mandating the first armed peacekeeping operation, the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF I) in the Middle East. A further nine operations, including the United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC), which had a peace enforcement mandate, were established until 1974. It then remained quiet until the end of the Cold War, the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon being the only new operation.

The end of the Cold War changed the nature of both international politics and peacekeeping operations. In a renewed spirit of cooperation, as explained above, a series of multidimensional UN operations that performed a broad range of tasks, including non-military ones, was established. In contrast to the traditional operations, these new peacekeeping operations were also given peacebuilding tasks. The new type of operation often infringes national sovereignty to a greater extent. Many of these operations were initially viewed as successful and the success of Operation Desert Storm, a war mandated by the UN and waged in response to Iraq’s invasion and annexation of Kuwait, boosted the international community’s confidence. Facing humanitarian crises and driven by the idea that ‘something must be done’, operations with humanitarian tasks were established under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations. The best-known examples in this regard are the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Yugoslavia and the United Nations Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM II).

These operations failed, however, because they lacked the resources to keep the peace, let alone enforce it. The UN was heavily criticised and, gradually, Western nations largely withdrew from UN operations, leaving the organisation in a crisis. Partly in response to this situation, regional organisations started becoming involved in peacekeeping operations more often from 1995. In many cases, these regional organisations provided the military component (see the following chapters).

Following the publication of the Brahimi Report in 2000, member states regained their trust in the UN, the organisation regained its confidence and, based on the report’s recommendations, robust and integrated operations were launched more frequently. Although these new operations often had tasks that were similar to those established immediately after the Cold War, they were now mandated under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Operations could therefore protect themselves and their mandate. In addition, under Chapter VII of the

101 Walking the Tightrope, see footnote 45.
102 Idem.
103 Idem.
UN Charter, operations were mandated to protect ‘civilians under imminent threat of physical violence’.\textsuperscript{104} The UN gradually regained its place as the leading organisation in the field of peacekeeping operations. With approximately 120,000 individuals, almost 100,000 of whom are in uniform, the UN even appears to be on the verge of being overstretched like it was in the middle of the 1990s (see Table 3 for an overview of personnel per UN mission). At the same time, Western nations, the largest financial contributors, have been paying ever closer attention to the UN’s spending pattern since the start of the economic crisis in 2008. In addition, the main troop contributors feel marginalised because they do not have the level of influence that they would like on the mandates of operations and, in spite of a financial payment, feel that they are not taken seriously.\textsuperscript{105} 2013 may prove to be a new turning point for the UN. With increasingly robust, almost counterinsurgency mandates like the ones given to the Force Intervention Brigade in MONUSCO and to a lesser extent MINUSMA, and the first use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the UN seems to be entering areas that were previously taboo to the organisation.\textsuperscript{106}

The deployment of personnel has been relatively stable since 2008: approximately 120,000 individuals, almost 100,000 of whom are in uniform. It is striking that some political and peacebuilding missions are larger than some peacekeeping operations. The type of operation carried out is therefore determined by the department that is responsible within the UN Secretariat, and of course by the mandate, rather than by the size of the mission.

To enable a comparison with other organisations, a list of UN peacekeeping operations classified according to the spectrum of violence (from high to low) is presented below.\textsuperscript{107}

\textsuperscript{105} See footnote 52.
\textsuperscript{107} The classification of an operation is based on an estimate of the operation’s main focus. Multidimensional operations may also perform tasks that are stated elsewhere in the list. Although traditional peacekeeping operations may also have additional tasks, they were assigned to this category if their main focus is clearly on monitoring a ceasefire.
Table 3  Current UN peacekeeping operations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name (location)</th>
<th>Duration</th>
<th>Strength at the end of 2013</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MINURSO (W. Sahara)</td>
<td>1991-present</td>
<td>502</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MINUSMA (Mali)</td>
<td>2013-present</td>
<td>6,704</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MINUSTAH (Haiti)</td>
<td>2004-present</td>
<td>10,408</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MONUSCO (DRC)</td>
<td>2010-present</td>
<td>25,739</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNAMID (Sudan, Darfur)</td>
<td>2007-present</td>
<td>23,866</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDOF (Syria)</td>
<td>1974-present</td>
<td>1,373</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNFICYP (Cyprus)</td>
<td>1964-present</td>
<td>1,083</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNIFIL (Lebanon)</td>
<td>1978-present</td>
<td>11,380</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNISFA (Sudan and South Sudan)</td>
<td>2011-present</td>
<td>4,287</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMISS (South Sudan)</td>
<td>2011-present</td>
<td>10,294</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNOCI (Ivory Coast)</td>
<td>2004-present</td>
<td>11,290</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMIK (Kosovo)</td>
<td>1999-present</td>
<td>362</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMIL (Liberia)</td>
<td>2003-present</td>
<td>8,970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMOCIP (India-Pakistan)</td>
<td>1949-present</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNTSO (Middle East)</td>
<td>1948-present</td>
<td>386</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subtotal</td>
<td></td>
<td>116,755</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political and peacebuilding missions</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BINUCA (CAR)</td>
<td>2010-present</td>
<td>147</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNAMA (Afghanistan)</td>
<td>2002-present</td>
<td>1,820</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNAMI (Iraq)</td>
<td>2003-present</td>
<td>1,086</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNIPSIL (Sierra Leone)</td>
<td>2008-present</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSMIL (Libya)</td>
<td>2011-present</td>
<td>241</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSOM (Somalia)</td>
<td>2013-present</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subtotal</td>
<td></td>
<td>3,380</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>120,135</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Political and peacebuilding missions that meet the SIPRI definition of multilateral peacekeeping operations

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108 This quantitative analysis is based on data collected by SIPRI in the SIPRI Multilateral Peace Operations Database, [http://www.sipri.org/databases/pko/](http://www.sipri.org/databases/pko/). Data concerning UN political and peacebuilding missions that do not meet the SIPRI definition of peacekeeping operations were drawn from the UN Political and Peacebuilding Missions Fact Sheet, 31 December 2013.
Table 4  UN peacekeeping operations: list of the most important military and civilian operations classified according to the spectrum of violence (from high to low) and type of mission\(^{109}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Spectrum of violence</th>
<th>UN peacekeeping operations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intervention by air power (military intervention)</td>
<td>none</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robust peacekeeping force on the ground + armed action during the operation</td>
<td>ONUC, MONUSCO (FIB)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robust multidimensional peacekeeping force – initial entry and stabilisation</td>
<td>UNOSOM II, MINURCA, UNAMSIL, MONUC, UNMISET, UNMIL, UNOCI, MINUSTAH, ONUB, MONUSCO, MINUSMA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robust support for humanitarian assistance</td>
<td>UNAMID</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robust support for the Protection of Civilians (POC)</td>
<td>MINURCAT, MINUSCA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-piracy</td>
<td>none</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peacekeeping force to support humanitarian assistance</td>
<td>UNOSOM I, UNPROFOR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multidimensional peacekeeping force (not robust)</td>
<td>UNTAG, MINURSO, UNAVEM II, ONUSAL, UNTAC, UNOMIZ, UNOMIL, UNMIH, UNAMIR, UNAVEM III, UNMIBH, MINUGUA, MONUA, UNOMSIIL, UNMIS, UNMIT, UNMISS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police mission</td>
<td>UNSF, UNCP, UNSM, UNP, UNMIH, MIPONUH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monitoring operation</td>
<td>UNTSO, UNMOG, UNEF I, UNOGIL, UNYM, UNICYP, DOMREP, UNIPOM, UNEF II, UNDOF, UNIFIL, UNGOMAP, UNIIMOG, UNAVEM I, ONUCA, UNIKOM, UNOMUR, UNOMIG, UNASOG, UNMOT, UNCRO, UNMOP, UNMEE, UNISFA, UNSMIS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preventive deployment</td>
<td>UNPREDEP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training of military personnel</td>
<td>none</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rule of law, justice, border management and SSR</td>
<td>none</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transitional authority</td>
<td>UNTAES, UNMIK, UNTAET</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Broad civilian mandate</td>
<td>BINUCA, UNAMA, UNAMI, UNIPSIL, UNSMIL, UNDOM</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The list above shows that UN operations differ mainly in terms of scope and robustness.

In terms of scope, operations vary from relatively specialist missions with a limited mandate to much broader multidimensional operations. Multidimensional operations have a broad range of tasks that may include monitoring ceasefires and peace agreements, training military and police personnel, supporting humanitarian assistance, supporting the Protection of Civilians and establishing a transitional authority. More specialist operations focus on one of these aspects. A traditional peacekeeping operation in which military personnel monitor a ceasefire is an example of a more limited mission. Other operations, such as different missions in Haiti and the United Nations Civilian Police Support Group (UNCPSG) in Bosnia and Herzegovina, focused solely on police training, while the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT), for example, focused on POC tasks.

\(^{109}\) The classification of an operation is based on an estimate of the operation’s main focus. Multidimensional operations may also perform tasks that are stated separately in the list. Although traditional monitoring operations may also have additional tasks, they were assigned to this category if their main focus is clearly on monitoring a ceasefire. See also [http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/current.shtml](http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/current.shtml).
The second major distinction between the different operations is the degree of robustness. The UN focuses mainly on a broad range of tasks in the middle and lower sections of the spectrum of violence.110 The organisation does not carry out air strikes, does not have any anti-piracy missions at sea and usually leaves initial entry, which tends to involve the use of force, to others, in part because it often takes an excessively long time to organise the deployment of a UN mission in the context of initial entry. It is striking that only one robust mission was carried out during the Cold War (ONUC). This was followed by UNOSOM II in 1993 and, from 1995, there was a sharp increase in the number of robust operations. Initially, such operations were usually carried out by regional organisations like NATO. Since 1998, however, robust mandates have been the rule rather than the exception also at the UN. From the deployment of the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic (MINURCA), 12 of the 21 operations were given a robust mandate. This figure does not include the mandates of many other operations that, as standard, include a clause allowing the use of force also for POC purposes.

**SWOT analysis**

Regarding UN peacekeeping operations, an analysis of strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats (SWOT analysis) can be made based on the number of military personnel deployed, the nature of the most important operations and other considerations.

**Strengths**

- **Political effectiveness:**
  a) The UN is the only organisation that has a global support base because of the membership of virtually all of the world’s nations.
  b) The UN only operates with a mandate of the UN Security Council and resolutions are rooted in international law.
  c) UN missions enjoy relatively broad support in crisis areas because the broad range of actors and interests involved conveys impartiality.

- **Organisational efficiency:**
  a) As an organisation, the UN does not have an extensive military bureaucracy. Because of its lean and mean structure, the tooth-to-tail ratio of the UN DPKO in New York is very high in comparison with other organisations.
  b) The costs of UN operations are relatively low because of the continuous focus on efficiency on the part of the countries that contribute the most financially, as well as by low personnel costs because of the deployment of soldiers from developing countries.
  c) At the UN, mission commanders ‘in the field’ have many of the decision-making powers. Operations are therefore relatively flexible in tactical terms.
  d) Because of the concept of integrated operations and the Delivering as One concept, close cooperation exists within the UN between the political, military, development cooperation and humanitarian branches of missions.
  e) With its funds, programmes and specialised agencies, the UN is usually already active in host countries prior to the arrival of an operation and remains active in such countries following the end of an operation. This provides greater scope for a long-term approach that is also rooted in- and informed by the past.

110 It should be noted in this regard that in the case of robust peacekeeping operations, it is not the principle but the scale of the use of force that differs from action taken at the highest end of the spectrum.
f) As an organisation, the UN has a considerable amount of historical experience. This experience is being used as a foundation to develop, albeit slowly, an increasingly effective approach.

g) The UN has an extensive network in different, often neighbouring countries. This network can make it easier to implement a regional approach. Time and again, the UN Security Council stresses the need for regional approaches and inter-mission cooperation.

- **Capabilities and operational possibilities:**
  a) The UN has the right set of capabilities for operations in the middle and lower sections of the spectrum of violence, operations ranging from traditional peacekeeping operations that monitor ceasefires and peace agreements to robust multidimensional or stabilisation ones in which force may be used. In addition, reconstruction and peacebuilding tasks can be performed under the auspices of the UN.
  b) Even more than the EU, the UN has a broad range of instruments at its disposal that can be used to achieve an integrated approach (military, police, development cooperation, governance, humanitarian) in different phases (pre-conflict, conflict and post-conflict).
  c) The UN is the organisation *par excellence* when it comes to long-term commitments. In the field of traditional peacekeeping operations, it has established operations that have been trying to maintain the status quo since the end of the 1940s. In terms of peacebuilding processes, which require a lot of time, the UN has established several operations that have been trying to improve the situation since the 1990s.

**Weaknesses**

- **Political effectiveness:**
  a) The UN is completely dependent on the permanent members of its Security Council and therefore requires the consent of countries like Russia and China. Other organisations are capable of intervening without the involvement of the UN Security Council and have indeed done so.
  b) As shown by the operations in Sierra Leone, Liberia, Cambodia, El Salvador, and so on, the UN is very bad at ‘selling’ its successes.
  c) Because of the current positions of Russia, China and the non-aligned countries, the UN struggles to pass measures that compromise national sovereignty. This limits the organisation mainly to areas like intelligence gathering (including UAVs) and inter-mission cooperation. Although not an insurmountable obstacle, this situation slows down the UN considerably when it is seeking to introduce measures in these areas.

- **Organisational efficiency:**
  a) Because of the greater distance between theatre and central level in New York, particularly the UN Security Council, it is more difficult to make major strategic decisions regarding the actions of UN operations in the short term. The UN Security Council must adopt a new mandate for the purpose.
  b) The force generation process is relatively slow at the UN, which means that full deployment usually takes up to half a year.
  c) Despite – and probably because of – the greater degree of integration, there is a relatively high level of organisational infighting and stovepiping at the UN. Relations between the UN DPKO and the UN DPA are poor. In addition, there is
usually friction between the Secretariat and the UN’s other funds, programmes and organisations.

d) The UN’s planning and mission analysis capability is limited, as a result of which UN operations are still overtaken by events too often.

Capabilities and operational possibilities:

a) The UN does not have the capabilities required to take action in the higher sections of the spectrum of violence. The UN Security Council’s permanent members and most of the troop contributors are certainly not in favour of the UN taking such action, however.

b) Partly because of the slow force generation process, it is difficult for the UN to secure the high-tech capabilities required (examples in this regard include air transport capability, attack helicopters and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance assets) for operations in the middle of this spectrum (the robust operations). In addition, although no longer taboos, terms like ‘intelligence’ and the use of UAVs still arouse the suspicion of many non-Western member states.

c) Because of the variety in the contributions, there is a lack of unity and coherence between the military units deployed. There are not many partnerships and as yet only a few joint exercises are conducted.

d) Despite the fact that the UN is making efforts to raise the standards of personnel deployed and contingent owned equipment, this aspect often remains a problem due to the fact that many troops come from low-income countries. The training and equipment of some troops are sometimes substandard and discipline is at times dubious.

e) Although mandates of UN operations are devoting increasing attention to international organised crime and cooperation usually takes place in this regard with, among other agencies, the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), the challenge remains one to which the international community as a whole has no effective answer. Given that links between organised crime and extremist groups are becoming more common in conflict areas and constitute a source of instability (see chapter 1 of this study), this is a matter of concern.

Opportunities

- Political effectiveness:
  When international relations deteriorate, the UN is one of the few organisations that, with the support of the UN Security Council, remains capable of establishing peacekeeping operations.

- Organisational efficiency:
  a) Despite the already high degree of integration within the UN system, there is still room for improving cooperation between the UN’s different funds, programmes and organisations.

  b) Improvements can also be made in the field of inter-mission cooperation. Although it is becoming easier to share troops and assign them to different missions when there is a pressing need to do so and cooperation in other areas is also increasing, much can still be done to develop overarching regional strategies. At present, however, efforts in this direction are limited by imperatives of national sovereignty.

- Capabilities and operational possibilities:
  a) The high-tech capabilities (examples in this regard include air transport capability, combat helicopters and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance assets) currently
deployed by Western nations in Afghanistan can be used for force generation in the context of robust UN operations following their withdrawal from service in that country.

b) Much can still be done to improve cooperation between troop contributors and the quality, discipline, training and equipment of their troops through current and future training and joint exercise programmes and projects that give these contributors the capabilities that they require.

**Threats**

- **Political effectiveness:**
  a) If the UN Security Council is paralysed by increasing tensions with primarily Russia and China, the situation in terms of peacekeeping operations will probably return to one similar to that which existed during the Cold War. In such a scenario, the number of UN operations will decrease and the mandated range of tasks may also be reduced.
  b) Because of the tension between, on the one hand, the desire to conduct inexpensive operations by, among other things, deploying an insufficient number of personnel and troops who do not operate at the level of the West and, on the other, the use of Western normative criteria under which operations are expected to adhere to high standards and achieve results, the UN is always exposed to the risk of scandals and failing operations.
  c) The absence of Western countries in UN peacekeeping operations and the lack of financial contributions from the Global South are threatening the solidarity in the current system on which the launching of peacekeeping operations is based. Western countries are of the opinion that the costs are becoming excessively high, whereas the troop contributors believe that they ‘pay in lives’ and are not paid and respected enough, and also that they are criticised too heavily by countries that, as far as they are concerned, have no real idea about realities on the ground. This divide may undermine the legitimacy of the current system and ultimately erode force generation from the Global South.

- **Organisational efficiency:**
  a) The UN has arguably bitten off more than it can chew, since its current organisational structures are struggling to support and direct approximately 120,000 personnel in the field. The term overstretch is being heard with increasing frequency.
  b) Further cuts in the budget for UN peacekeeping operations will increase the probability of failure, since the UN is already efficient. Further cuts would probably necessitate more limited mandates for operations.

- **Capabilities and operational possibilities:**
  a) Because the UN has a broad range of instruments (military, police, development cooperation, governance, humanitarian) and is also active in different phases (pre-conflict, conflict and post-conflict), it is at risk of losing sight of the wood for the trees and thereby diluting its effectiveness.

The SWOT analysis shows that the UN has many advantages as compared to other organisations because of its broad mandate and operational deployability. It has the most legitimacy and experience, it is relatively well integrated in terms of cooperation between different parts of the UN system (which strengthens a coherent approach), it can operate relatively inexpensively and it can handle operations ranging from the low end to the middle of the spectrum of violence. On the other hand, the organisation is incapable of rapidly establishing
peacekeeping operations in the field, it has experienced failures in the past that undermined trust in the organisation, its integrated approach is also a source of friction and bureaucracy, inexpensive operations do not necessarily provide the best troops and solutions and the organisation cannot handle operations in the highest section of the spectrum of violence. Moreover, the organisation is currently struggling to manage the 120,000 individuals currently deployed in 15 peacekeeping missions and a total of 13 political and peacebuilding missions.\textsuperscript{111} In addition, current discussions in New York between the countries that contribute financially and those that contribute troops regarding financial payments to troop contributors and influence on operations are polarised and rather unproductive. These conflicts are threatening the functioning of the organisation.

The UN is usually put forward for an inexpensive operation in the lower to middle sections of the spectrum of violence if the interests of the West are limited or if the legitimacy of the conducting organisation is important in terms of preventing disagreement among the permanent members of the UN Security Council. If the involvement of the Global South is not desired and the West prefers to control the outcome itself, it implements its own solutions in an EU and NATO context. In recent years, many Western countries have therefore opted to deploy their troops under the auspices of these organisations in the Balkans (end of the 1990s-early 2000s), Iraq (middle of the 2000s) and Afghanistan (middle of the 2000s-present). It is too early to say whether these Western countries will return to the UN in a situation in which large-scale operations are not being carried out.

The general impression is therefore that the UN can take action on a fairly large scale in conflicts in the low to middle sections of the spectrum of violence and is very well equipped to implement what it calls an integrated approach on a long-term basis. The UN does not intend to carry out large-scale operations at the higher end of the spectrum of violence.

**Future trends**

The importance of the UN in peacekeeping operations looks set to continue in the short to medium term. There is certainly no indication that UNAMID and MONUSCO, the two largest operations, will be downscaled in the near future. For now, troop numbers are also unlikely to be reduced with respect to UNIFIL, the UN Mission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS) and the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali (MINUSMA). Withdrawal is more likely with respect to MINUSTAH and UNOCI, in which a total of over 20,000 personnel are involved. At the same time, however, the Central African Republic and Somalia, and ultimately also Syria, will request a UN operation at the appropriate time. Plans for these operations are currently being drawn up in New York.

\textsuperscript{111} In addition to the 6 UN political and peacebuilding operations referred to that meet the SIPRI definition of peacekeeping operations, there are 7 in which a total of 404 individuals are involved that do not meet the definition.
It seems likely that the UN will continue to carry out stabilisation operations in Africa in the medium term. An allocation of roles appears to have taken place in which European, usually French, or African troops handle the initial entry phase while the UN performs the subsequent stabilisation tasks. In addition to preventing the UN from becoming too involved in the conflict, something that some permanent members of the UN Security Council and troop contributors are wary of, this allocation of roles gives the organisation time to make sufficient progress in its force generation. Moreover, the UN's integrated approach is most effective when the situation in conflict areas is already reasonably stable.

At the same time, the UN will probably remain the organisation to which the international community has recourse when there is no alternative. Sending in the UN to at least mitigate the effects of a given conflict, such as was done with respect to the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Darfur, remains a favoured strategy in cases where the court of public opinion is insisting something must be done while the reality is that an actual solution cannot be achieved in the short term. Operations of this kind usually have a limited humanitarian or POC mandate that is often also aimed at starting or supporting a peace process.

Finally, the UN will remain the organisation that has the most support and offers possible solutions, certainly with respect to conflicts in which the permanent members of the UN Security Council are indirectly involved. This consideration concerns more traditional peacekeeping operations, which will remain relevant in the future.

Since its roles have expanded in recent decades, it is unlikely that things will quieten down for the UN in the short and medium term. In light of the spectrum of conflict described, it is
also unlikely that the UN’s roles, particularly in Africa, will decrease in the longer term. This consideration is significant because most future operations will probably take place in Africa. In the context of peacekeeping operations, although the training and equipment of African troops are improving with the help of donor funding from the West, the AU and African Regional Economic Communities (RECs) lack the capabilities (logistics, for example) required to establish and finance operations. In addition, these organisations are currently unable to bring together all of the elements required for multidimensional operations in the way the UN is capable of doing. It is therefore likely that operations being carried out by African regional organisations will be transformed into UN missions once they reach the stabilisation phase and a greater focus on peacebuilding is required.

In addition, the UN’s role in peacekeeping operations will probably become relatively more important in the long term, since the Cold War is no longer disguising the reality of a multipolar world in which tensions are rising between the West on the one hand and China and Russia on the other. In such a scenario, the number of peacekeeping missions is likely to decrease in absolute terms and mandates will probably be limited. In other words, although the number of missions may decrease, the UN’s importance within them will increase in relative terms.

The robustness of UN peacekeeping operations in Africa is unlikely to decrease in the short and medium term. Robustness will in fact probably increase. With the introduction of the concept of robust operations, the greater robustness of MINUSMA and the introduction of the Force Intervention Brigade in MONUSCO in 2013, the UN moved towards the higher end of the spectrum of violence. Although traditional operations continue to be conducted side by side and the increasing robustness of operations is causing concern on the part of Russia, China and some troop contributors, it is unlikely that this development on the supply side will be reversed. These operations are always carried out at the invitation of national governments and therefore do not infringe national sovereignty. In principle, such operations are therefore acceptable to countries like Russia and China.

In addition, the increasing robustness of recent years has primarily been a response to three developments on the demand side. The first two, international organised crime and terrorism, are viewed as new security threats and are therefore being given increasing attention (see also chapter 1 of this study). Although certainly not new, both challenges have become facets of peacekeeping operations in recent years. These challenges will probably remain within the scope of peacekeeping operations in the future, since the permanent members of the UN Security Council have the same interests in terms of countering them. All parties benefit from the containment of international organised crime and terrorism, particularly of the jihadist kind, and peacekeeping operations are therefore becoming more active in these areas. The third development is the increasing call for the protection of the civilian population (POC). A POC task under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations has been a virtually standard part of peacekeeping operations since 2000. Although the capabilities required to perform this task are often lacking, it is unlikely that it will be dropped from peacekeeping operations, since the UN Security Council wishes to prevent dramatic events of the kind that took place in Srebrenica and Rwanda from recurring, in part to preserve its own legitimacy. Since all three areas of focus will continue to require attention in the short and medium term, the demand for robust operations will not decrease.
Conclusion

- The UN will remain important for peacekeeping operations in the future.

- The UN will retain this role in the short and medium term, probably for both traditional and multidimensional operations. The duration of such operations will remain long. Multidimensional operations in particular tend to be established following the entry operations of other organisations.

- Whether the UN will continue to focus on multidimensional operations to the same extent in the long term is less certain. It is less likely that it will do so if tensions increase between the West on the one hand and Russia and China on the other. If tensions do indeed increase, most peacekeeping operations outside Africa will mainly be traditional in nature. The UN’s focus on Africa and the likelihood of multidimensional UN operations in Africa will probably not decrease.

- The extent to which the UN will be capable of delivering what is expected according to Western standards will largely depend on what the West is prepared to invest in UN operations, both financially and in terms of personnel and materiel.
5 European Union and NATO

Trends in the recent past
The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), an alliance of North American and European countries, has been working to promote global stability since 1949. In 1992, NATO launched its first out-of-area operation in the Adriatic Sea. This was followed by a long series of NATO crisis management operations. The focus in the 1990s was on the Balkans, where the organisation carried out air and ground operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia and Kosovo. Following 9/11, the focus shifted to the Middle East and Central Asia. The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, which numbered approximately 130,000 troops at the height of the mission, became the largest operation ever carried out by the alliance. The number of operations is now rapidly decreasing. The ISAF operation will conclude at the end of 2014. The remaining operation in Europe, the Kosovo Force (KFOR), is now reduced to only one-tenth of its original strength (50,000). Unified Protector, NATO’s operation in the 2011 Libya crisis, was the first to be led by Europe with US support. NATO remains active at sea. Operation Ocean Shield, for example, is aimed at countering piracy in the Gulf of Aden and off the Horn of Africa. In addition, NATO has an Article 4 operation (the deployment of Patriot missile batteries in Turkey) and a non-Article 5 operation (Operation Unified Protector, a counterterrorism operation in the Mediterranean Sea).

The European Union (EU) launched the first military operations and civilian missions under the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) in 2003. It took over NATO’s SFOR operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina at the end of 2004. The number of troops deployed in Operation Althea, the EU’s operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, was reduced from 7,000 to 600. Within Europe, the civilian EU missions are currently much larger. Over 2,200 individuals are involved in EULEX Kosovo alone. The EU is conducting a number of smaller civilian or hybrid (a mix of military and civilian personnel) missions elsewhere in Europe. In terms of the deployment of military personnel, the geographic focus has shifted to Africa, particularly the Sahel and the region south of it. Training missions are being carried out in, among other places, the Horn of Africa and Mali and military operations are being conducted to protect humanitarian assistance efforts (Chad and the Central African Republic in 2008-2009 and currently in the Central African Republic/Bangui).

Table 5 Current NATO and EU peacekeeping operations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Duration</th>
<th>Maximum strength</th>
<th>Strength at the beginning of 2014</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ISAF Afghanistan</td>
<td>2003-present</td>
<td>130,000</td>
<td>57,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KFOR Kosovo</td>
<td>1999-present</td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td>5,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ocean Shield Gulf of Aden and the Horn of Africa*</td>
<td>2008-present</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>1,000*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>181,000</td>
<td>63,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The size of Ocean Shield varies strongly between 3 and 6 vessels.

Peacekeeping operations in a changing world | Clingendael Strategic Monitor Project, Publication: June 2014

### EU military operations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Duration</th>
<th>Maximum strength</th>
<th>Strength at the beginning of 2014</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EUFOR Althea Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>2004-present</td>
<td>7,000</td>
<td>600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUNAVFOR Atalanta Somalia*</td>
<td>2008-present</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>1,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUFOR CAR Bangui</td>
<td>2014</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUTM Mali</td>
<td>2013-present</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>550</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUTM Somalia</td>
<td>2010-present</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Subtotal</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>10,225</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,775</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### EU hybrid operations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Duration</th>
<th>Maximum strength</th>
<th>Strength at the beginning of 2014</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EUCAP Nestor*</td>
<td>2012-present</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUCAP Sahel Niger</td>
<td>2012-present</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUSEC DR Congo</td>
<td>2005-present</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Subtotal</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>279</strong></td>
<td><strong>209</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### EU civilian operations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Duration</th>
<th>Maximum strength</th>
<th>Strength at the beginning of 2014</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EULEX Kosovo</td>
<td>2008-present</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>2,2503*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUPOL Afghanistan</td>
<td>2007-present</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>5,111*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUBAM Rafah</td>
<td>2005-present</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUPOL COPPS Palestinian Territories</td>
<td>2005-present</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUPOL DR Congo</td>
<td>2007-present?</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUBAM Libya*</td>
<td>2013-present</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUBAM Ukraine/Moldova*</td>
<td>2005-present</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Subtotal</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>4,251</strong></td>
<td><strong>3,421</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>14,785</strong></td>
<td><strong>6,405</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The operation does not meet SIPRI’s definition of a multinational peacekeeping operation.
* Including local staff.

The number of military personnel deployed by each organisation is decreasing. To a lesser extent, the same applies to the number of civilian personnel deployed by the EU. In this context, ISAF is the decisive factor for NATO while the phasing out of EUFOR Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina is the decisive factor for the EU. New EU military operations like EUFOR CAR/Bangui are fairly limited in size. Following the end of the ISAF operation, the EU (civilian and military) and NATO (military) will be deploying approximately the same number of personnel. In addition, it is striking that the EU currently has a higher number of personnel deployed in civilian missions than in military operations.
Operations can only be compared to a limited extent, since NATO does not conduct civilian and hybrid missions of the kind carried out by the EU. Nevertheless, EU and NATO military operations can be compared in terms of their nature. Based on practice in the period between the end of the Cold War and the present, a list of the most important military and civilian operations of both organisations classified according to the spectrum of violence (from high to low) and type of mission is given below.

Table 6 EU and NATO military operations: list of the most important military and civilian operations classified according to the spectrum of violence (from high to low) and type of mission

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Spectrum of violence</th>
<th>NATO</th>
<th>EU</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intervention by air campaign (military intervention)</td>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina (1993-1995), Kosovo (1998), Libya (2011)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robust peacekeeping force on the ground + armed action during the operation</td>
<td>ISAF (2003-present)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robust support for humanitarian assistance</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>EUFOR Chad/CAR (2008-2009), EUFOR CAR/Bangui (2014)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robust support for the Protection of Civilians</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-piracy</td>
<td>Ocean Shield (2009-present)</td>
<td>Atalanta (2008-present)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peacekeeping force to support humanitarian assistance</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multidimensional peacekeeping force (not robust)</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preventive deployment</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

113 Although NATO operations usually include civilian experts like political and legal advisers, these individuals operate under the military command of the operations. NATO also supports other organisations that provide humanitarian assistance or handle reconstruction issues in the carrying out of their activities.

Spectrum of violence | NATO | EU
---|---|---
Transitional authority | – | –
Broad civilian mandate | – | –

The classification of an operation is based on an estimate of the operation’s main focus. Operations may also perform tasks that are stated elsewhere in the list.

The list shows that NATO is active at all levels of the spectrum of violence. Its operations range from air campaigns to training activities. In a relatively short time, the EU has developed into an organisation that can carry out a broad range of civilian missions. These missions differ strongly in terms of size and impact (from a mission of eight people, for example, to thousands in Kosovo). As regards military missions, the EU focuses mainly on the middle and lower sections of the spectrum of violence. It should be noted in this regard that in the case of robust peacekeeping operations, it is not the principle but the scale of the use of force that differs from action taken by NATO at the highest end of the spectrum. EU military personnel fought against rebels during Operation Artemis, for example.

**SWOT analysis**
An analysis of the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats of both organisations has been made based on the number of military, police and civilian personnel deployed, the nature of the most important operations and other considerations.

**EU**

**Strengths**
- **Political effectiveness:**
  In general, the EU secures UN Security Council mandates fairly easily, possibly because of the low political and strategic profile of EU operations. The fact that both military and civilian personnel are deployed may also be a factor in this regard. In addition, as shown by the Somalia, Mali and Central African Republic cases, the increasing geographic focus on the African continent is fostering consensus in the UN Security Council. It also seems that there is often political support for the broad nature of EU action in theatres of operations, certainly when such action involves a combination of intergovernmental (CSDP) and communitarian elements like humanitarian assistance, development cooperation, financial support and reconstruction.

- **Organisational effectiveness:**
  The EU does not have a standing military organisation and uses the lead nation concept for autonomous military operations. Responsibility for the practical structure of operations therefore rests to a large extent with the government of the leading member state, which, unless it is dependent to a significant degree on contributions from other countries, the
government concerned can organise relatively quickly. The Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC) within the European External Action Service (EEAS) has been available for civilian missions since 2007. The management of, on average, 10-15 simultaneous civilian missions is becoming more effective.

- **Capabilities and operational possibilities:**
  The EU can generate, coordinate and deploy the civilian and military capabilities and communitarian resources required. The organisation has the potential for a comprehensive approach in-house, so to speak, and is not dependent on other international organisations. Military capabilities are limited because of the absence of the US from operations. This makes the EU mainly suitable for operations at sea and on land (with limitations at the highest end of the spectrum) and less suitable for air operations, certainly when such operations are carried out in the airspace of an adversary that has advanced air defence systems. One of the EU’s strengths is that it can act in all conflict phases by deploying a broad range of political, diplomatic, economic, financial, military and other assets. An additional strength is its ability to conduct hybrid missions. Such missions, which involve a mix of military and civilian personnel, are particularly suitable for security sector reform. Part of the EU budget can be used to fund civilian missions and increase regional capabilities for operations (the AU, for example).

**Weaknesses**

- **Political effectiveness:**
  The EU is unable to launch military operations without a UN mandate. The requirement of such a mandate is enshrined in the constitutions of a number of member states or has been made a condition for agreement and participation by a number of member states. This limits the EU’s ability to act in situations in which UN Security Council members block a mandate. Additionally, the fact that no single member state can dominate decision-making, like the US in a NATO context, means that the EU’s decision-making ability is weak. Agreement between at least three of the largest member states (Germany, France and the United Kingdom) is the most pressing priority to achieve a consensus among all member states. In other words, one of these three member states can in effect block decision-making on EU operations. Different national views on security interests and priorities can also adversely affect the decision-making process. This is especially true when it comes to urgent operations in the higher sections of the spectrum of violence. This makes the EU less suitable for this type of operations.

- **Organisational efficiency:**
  As an organisation, the EU has a complicated structure at strategic level (Brussels) because of the separation of intergovernmental and communitarian powers. The Treaty of Lisbon (2007) improved the functioning of the EU by, among other things, introducing the double mandate of the High Representative, who is also Vice-President of the European Commission, and establishing the EEAS. Nevertheless, friction continues to occur between the CSDP and communitarian actors. A weakness with respect to military operations is that the military and strategic command level (Operational Headquarters in a member state) remains geographically separated from the political and civilian level (Brussels). The temporary nature of such Operational Headquarters (OHQ) is also not conducive to interaction with other EU actors, such as the European Commission, civilian elements of the CSDP and agencies, during the planning and execution of operations. Brussels also lacks a permanent military planning node, which makes rapid deployment difficult.
Capabilities and operational possibilities:
The EU does not have the capabilities required to mount operations at the highest end of the spectrum, particularly in terms of air operations (reconnaissance and intelligence, precision weapons, air-to-air refuelling and so on). The quick reaction forces that are on standby, the EU Battlegroups, have so far never been deployed. As regards civilian assets (police, rule of law and so on), build-up remains slow and the number of police personnel and civilian experts, who must largely be supplied by the member states, available for deployment is limited. This is in spite of improvements like the build-up of national expert pools.

Opportunities
Political effectiveness:
Since Africa will remain the most likely theatre of operations for the EU, securing legitimacy based on UN Security Council mandates is not a major problem. Experience in recent years has shown that the UN Security Council is willing to grant mandates for operations in Africa. Good bilateral cooperation between the large member states, especially between France and the United Kingdom, will be beneficial to EU decision-making. German willingness to assume more responsibility, as indicated by the new government, may likewise have a positive effect.

Organisational efficiency:
The lead nation concept makes it possible to launch operations aimed at temporary intervention relatively rapidly. In view of current developments, further improving the effectiveness of the comprehensive approach (planning, preparation) would be a logical course of action. The further development of the EEAS the professionalisation of the CPPC and forceful action on the part of the HR will strengthen the efficiency and effectiveness of operations and missions.

Capabilities and operational possibilities:
Strengthening European military cooperation would further improve the deployment of capabilities and the coordination of civilian and military assets in the CSDP with humanitarian capabilities. Being more flexible with the use of EU Battlegroups could have a positive effect on the rapid deployment of EU capabilities. Significant improvements could be achieved in terms of interoperability, standardisation and cost savings by developing, devoting attention to and using civil-military capabilities (for enablers like reconnaissance, intelligence, transport, medical support, personal protection and so on).

Threats
Political effectiveness:
A further increase in Euroscepticism would make it more difficult to decide on EU operations. The United Kingdom in particular remains a limiting factor in the context of the CSDP. Excessive French dominance also has the potential to undermine support for CSDP operations. These factors make operating outside an EU context more attractive.

Organisational efficiency:
Funding and the availability of troops are the main limiting factors. The more countries prove to be unwilling to contribute a substantial number of troops and unwilling to increase the joint funding of EU military operations under the Athena mechanism, the more solidarity is questioned.
– **Capabilities and operational possibilities:**
  Unless European military capabilities are improved, EU-led operations will remain limited. This consideration concerns a quantitative aspect (a further reduction in the size of the armed forces reduces the sustainability of operations) and a qualitative aspect (the risks associated with taking action at the higher end of the spectrum of violence remain if shortcomings are not resolved).

**NATO**

**Strengths**

– **Political effectiveness:**
NATO is dominated by a single member country, the United States. This implies that decision-making is determined to a large extent in Washington, DC. If the United States wants NATO to act, the alliance usually acts. Although NATO prefers to operate on the basis of a UN Security Council mandate to ensure broader political support, it will intervene without such a mandate (Kosovo air campaign, 1998) in extreme cases (humanitarian crisis, violation of human rights on a large scale).

– **Organisational efficiency:**
The North Atlantic Council (NAC) is the principal decision-making body and can meet at any time. In addition, as an intergovernmental military alliance, NATO has a clear chain of command. It is the only international organisation that has a permanent headquarters for separate or combined land, sea and air operations. NATO is flexible in terms of the participation of third countries in its operations and can build on experience gained in this regard (especially ISAF).

– **Capabilities and operational possibilities:**
  When the United States participates in operations, the alliance can take action on a large scale at the highest end of the spectrum. The availability of advanced American capabilities in terms of, among other things, intelligence and reconnaissance, precision weapons, networking and cutting-edge technology, make it possible for NATO to carry out high-risk operations in both conventional and asymmetric conflicts against countries or groups that maintain regular or irregular forces. NATO can even make use of a limited number of shared assets like the Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS).

**Weaknesses**

– **Political effectiveness:**
The dominance of the United States can also make it more difficult for NATO to operate, particularly when a substantial number of European countries do not support the American position. At best, such a situation delays decision-making. In the case of urgent interventions about which the allies are deeply divided, NATO does not provide a suitable international framework for action. In most situations, a UN Security Council mandate is therefore required to ensure consensus in NATO. Blocks in the UN Security Council by non-NATO members can likewise hinder NATO action.

– **Organisational efficiency:**
NATO has a large military bureaucracy in which the long lines of the command structure usually mean an excessive number of links between the decision-making level in Brussels and the theatres of operations. These links have a delaying effect and cause information filtering. In addition, the major role of the permanent military organisation means
that ‘military thinking’ dominates the planning and execution of operations. The use of the (national) areas of responsibility concept, according to which each ally that is in charge of a given area can conduct its own policy in that area, in large-scale operations leads to different approaches and therefore inconsistency (see ISAF).

- **Capabilities and operational possibilities:**
  Because it depends on other organisations to perform non-military activities, NATO itself is limited when it comes to implementing the comprehensive approach. In military terms, the organisation is less effective at carrying out operations at the highest end of the spectrum when the United States is not a participant. Since NATO focuses on military action, it is not really equipped as an organisation to deal with pre-conflict and post-conflict situations. There are also limits with respect to hybrid missions because civilian personnel are placed under military command in NATO operations and, consequently, there is no mix of civilian and military personnel.

**Opportunities**

- **Political effectiveness:**
  If the security situation in the proximity of NATO territory deteriorates, the dominance of the United States will rapidly return and differences among the allies will recede to the background. As the largest political and military alliance, NATO can continue to play an important role in emerging conflicts (political and diplomatic pressure).

- **Organisational efficiency:**
  Further reduction of NATO’s bureaucracy, particularly in terms of the permanent military organisation and the international staffs in Brussels, may lead to greater efficiency and make it easier for the organisation to adapt to the changing security situation.

- **Capabilities and operational possibilities:**
  Improved European capabilities will also be beneficial to NATO. The renewed attention being given to comprehensive training and exercise programmes will improve preparedness, deployability, communication and cooperation. A further deepening of NATO capabilities in terms of training armed forces in current and former conflict areas is possible. Maintaining practical cooperation with third countries through joint training exercises is also important.

**Threats**

- **Political effectiveness:**
  If NATO becomes less of a priority to the United States, decision-making in the NAC may become more difficult, since differences of opinion among members could more easily dominate proceedings. The non-application or only limited application of Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty may make NATO less relevant as a consultative forum for the trans-Atlantic partners. Different views regarding priorities (Article 5 versus non-Article 5) may paralyse the alliance. If this happens, and also if large-scale operations are not carried out, support for NATO operations and improving the organisation’s capabilities may decrease.

- **Organisational efficiency:**
  A large, permanent military bureaucracy contrasts sharply with more small-scale operations, certainly when it comes to training programmes in current and former conflict areas. This mismatch can lead to excessive organisation and a conflict of interests regarding the retention of parts of the command structure on the territory of a given country. The new NATO headquarters will be too large for a smaller organisation.
Capabilities and operational possibilities:

If European capabilities are not improved, possibilities for NATO deployment will decrease. In addition, if (large-scale) operations are not carried out, the interoperability built up during the ISAF mission may be lost. A decreasing willingness to fund and maintain joint capabilities, partly because of the increasing tendency on the part of many countries to deepen cooperation as members of smaller groups (NORDEFCO, Anglo-French cooperation, Benelux cooperation and the Visegrad Group, for example), is likewise a threat.

The SWOT analysis shows a certain ‘division of labour’ between the EU and NATO that is determined more by political and military reality than by strategies and conceptual thought. Some European countries have been reticent with respect to EU operations for political reasons. Although they support civilian and hybrid missions, they give priority to NATO when it comes to military operations. The EU cannot do as much in military terms as the European Security Strategy and concepts suggest. The air campaign in Libya could only take place because of capabilities provided by the United States (intelligence, reconnaissance, air-to-air refuelling) and was carried out in a NATO context. The lack of a permanent military planning capability is also increasingly coming to be seen as a limitation with respect to EU operations, especially in terms of rapid intervention, not least because a national headquarters must first be augmented by an international staff. The location of the temporary Operational Headquarters far away from Brussels also limits the comprehensive approach. Although NATO has proven that it can carry out operations at the highest end of the spectrum, it depends on American capabilities to do so. In addition, the number of allies that contribute to such NATO operations is limited. Solidarity in terms of military and/or financial contributions is limited in both organisations. The EU is far better suited to the comprehensive approach than NATO, which can only deploy military capabilities.

In general, NATO can carry out large-scale operations across the entire spectrum but is not really equipped for the long-term implementation of a comprehensive approach. Although the EU is limited in terms of large-scale operations at the highest end of the spectrum, it is well equipped to implement a comprehensive approach, and has been doing so with increasing success, because it has virtually all of the capabilities required to do so.

Future trends

Legality and legitimacy will continue to impose limits on NATO and EU operations. Legality in the form of a UN Security Council mandate is required by the constitutions or other legal provisions of some EU member states. In the case of NATO, although military intervention without a UN mandate has proven to be politically possible in an exceptional case (Kosovo), an intervention of this kind will become less likely if the number of member countries increases and emerging powers make themselves heard more loudly in such a situation. In the future, both organisations will increasingly have to take into account the position and views of other powers in the world, particularly those of UN Security Council members Russia and China. Humanitarian considerations or the violation of human rights on a large scale will probably remain important in terms of legitimacy (the declaration that military action is justified). Considerations regarding internal security (limiting migration flows, organised crime and terrorism) will likewise continue to be important. Economic motives (trade interests, energy and raw materials) can also give military intervention legitimacy.

115 See the study on the relationship between external and internal security in this regard.
Both legality and legitimacy seem to create fewer problems on the African continent than in the Middle East and Central Asia. China and Russia even cooperated in rapidly approving UN Security Council mandates to enable French military intervention in Mali and the Central African Republic. Although the violation of human rights and threat of genocide were major considerations in these cases, economic and other interests also played a role. Moreover, given the nature of the conflicts in Africa and as a broad security provider, the EU seems to be better suited to crisis management, stabilisation and normalisation. The emphasis may therefore shift from NATO interventions to European action (national, EU and/or with other organisations), since the United States is focusing more on Asia.

Both the EU and NATO appear to be becoming more active in the fields of training and assistance. The core question for NATO is of course the training mission in Afghanistan beyond 2014 (Resolute Support). This matter should become clearer in the course of 2014, the political focal point in this regard being the NATO summit in the United Kingdom at the beginning of September 2014. NATO’s training activities, also elsewhere in the world, will focus on the building up of national armed forces and defence organisations. The EU will also continue to carry out training programmes of this kind, most probably for the building up of armies in African countries. In addition, hybrid missions (mainly security sector reform) and civilian missions to develop capabilities in former conflict areas will feature prominently. The possibility of funding civilian missions from the EU budget is an important factor in this regard.

Cooperating with international organisations, principally the UN, and regional partnerships like the African Union and ECOWAS for the purpose of coordinating simultaneous or follow-up operations is becoming more important to both organisations. For the EU, this coordination will primarily concern intervening in a timely manner in rapidly emerging conflicts until a UN force or a force of regional organisations has been sufficiently built up to take over conflict management and stabilisation tasks. It is quite possible that simultaneous operations being conducted alongside each other (EU, UN, regional organisations and lead nation) such as in the case of Mali or the Central African Republic will become more common because of the complexity of conflicts (cross-border aspects, the flaring up of previous crises and so on). There seems to be a trend towards a certain division of tasks according to which African countries contribute the largest contingents (boots on the ground) while the EU provides mainly temporary and additional special capabilities. The ultimate goal will be to ensure that African organisations are sufficiently equipped to carry out peacekeeping missions entirely independently. EU and NATO assistance in the building up of African capabilities is becoming increasingly important. Both organisations will therefore increasingly call on member states to make appropriate personnel, knowledge and expertise available. The rate of progress with respect to the building up of African capabilities will be a key factor in this context. Financial assistance from, among other sources, the EU budget and organisational support will be necessary for an extended period of time until regional organisations in Africa can operate entirely independently. The UN will also remain of great importance to NATO because of the mandate issue and for cooperation on the ground. NATO will have to cooperate with other organisations also when carrying out smaller missions. The UN will frequently be involved.

Courses of action adopted for political and historical reasons, such as preventing the involvement of ‘neocolonial’ European countries, seem to be much less of a factor than they were in the past. Indeed, in Mali and the Central African Republic, the incumbent government requested French intervention. In such situations, Western military intervention does of course mean openly supporting the government in power, since both an intervention force
and a stabilisation force are then a party to the conflict rather than an impartial peacekeeping force. The risk of long-term involvement increases accordingly.

The EU will also develop more activities pertaining to its internal security in the fields of border control, counterterrorism and combating cross-border crime and cyber threats. These activities and threats are being included to an increasing extent in military and civilian Common Security and Defence Policy operations, also in the context of strengthening the EU’s comprehensive approach. Furthermore, these activities will affect the armed forces of EU member states, since they will be deployed to perform security tasks under civilian (EU) leadership more frequently. The importance of civil-military coordination in planning for and deploying capabilities will increase. This aspect is discussed in detail in the study on the relationship between external and internal security that forms part of the Clingendael 2014 Strategic Monitor. The interplay between external and internal security will increasingly affect the organisation of crisis management operations, since such operations must contain the risks and threats of immigration, cross-border crime and terrorism outside Europe. To ensure that these operations are truly effective, interaction between the ministries responsible for internal security (in the Netherlands the Ministry of Security and Justice and the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations) and external security (the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which is also responsible for the Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation portfolio, and Ministry of Defence) needs to be made more structural. A similar development will occur at EU level between the Common Security and Defence Policy and Freedom/Security/Justice actors.

While the EU is slowly shifting towards providing military support for EU activities pertaining to the security of its own territory, NATO will remain responsible for the traditional form of territorial defence. In this context, a return of sorts to NATO exercises of the kind that were held in the past is occurring. These will of course also be used for training with Article 5 operations in mind and the alliance will therefore maintain deployability for large-scale operations. Although the separation between Article 5 and non-Article 5 operations will continue to exist in theory (legal framework and decision-making), it is becoming less clear in practice. Counterterrorism and anti-piracy operations are already in the grey zone between both sets of NATO duties. The further intertwining of external and internal security will enlarge rather than reduce this grey zone.

Conclusion
The expectation is that the EU and NATO will remain important in the future for crisis management operations, especially in complex situations for which other organisations are inadequately equipped in military terms. Although large-scale operations seem to be unlikely at present, they may be necessary in the more distant future. In the short term, however, the emphasis will be on ‘shorter and more limited’: shorter in terms of the duration of operations and more limited in terms of the tasks to be performed, tasks that will more often be specialised ones. In the event of a longer period of deployment, it is likely that, a shift in emphasis from military to hybrid and civilian deployment will occur. In addition, EU and NATO missions and activities aimed at training and building up the capabilities of national or regional partnerships will increase. The EU and NATO appear to be becoming more involved in the expanding grey zone between external and internal security, especially in terms of counter-terrorism, anti-piracy and other operations at sea.
6 Ad hoc coalitions

French troops serving in Operation Serval, a robust, multidimensional peacekeeping force mustered on an ad hoc basis, prepare for departure.

Photograph: US Air Force, Nathanael Callon

Fundamental changes in international politics following the end of the Cold War revived interest in coalition warfare. The frequency of coalition operations has increased, for example. The concept of coalitions is an old one, dating back to the European wars during the 18th and early 19th centuries, including the Napoleonic Wars.116

Previous Clingendael Strategic Monitors identified a strengthening the tendency for cooperation to take shape in the form of ad hoc coalitions of smaller groups of countries that share the same focus and set of priorities, as well as within more light-touch partnerships, also referred to as minilateralism.117

This section discusses ad hoc coalitions that independently carry out military operations, whether or not on the basis of a UN Security Council mandate. Sometimes coalitions carry out military operations under the political umbrella of an international organisation like NATO or the EU. First, therefore, the general characteristics of ad hoc coalitions will briefly be

discussed.\textsuperscript{118} Next, a number of former and current (2013) ad hoc coalitions will be assessed. This section will also provide an analysis of strengths and weaknesses.

**Trends in the recent past**

Although the terms ‘alliance’ and ‘coalition’ are often used interchangeably, there are important differences between the two. First, alliances are more formal in nature than coalitions. The former are based on commitments on the part of states to cooperate. Second, ad hoc coalitions differ in terms of structure and purpose. Whereas alliances are typically established in anticipation of future events, coalitions are formed as a response to a specific crisis that has already manifested itself. Moreover, coalitions are ad hoc by definition and usually temporary. Coalitions may be more lasting, however. An example in this regard is the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) organisation in the Sinai, Egypt, which has been operational since 1983. The motives and interests of countries that contribute to an ad hoc coalition differ. Operation Desert Storm, for example, was launched in response to a major violation of the international legal order. All participating nations supported the operation, which was aimed at restoring Kuwait’s sovereignty. Other motives lay behind the invasion of Iraq. The United States did not hesitate to use financial support to secure the political support of other countries for the invasion, for example. In the case of East Timor, the humanitarian situation and regional stability were important reasons for countries in the region to take part in the mission.

Theoretically, bringing countries together in a group that wishes to achieve certain objectives has three key advantages.\textsuperscript{119} First, doing so can ensure greater political influence and greater legitimacy in the eyes of the international community, especially if the military operation is based on a UN Security Council mandate. Second, risks and costs are in principle shared. Third, the military effort is greater relative to a single country’s unilateral action.

Nevertheless, many aspects that characterise a coalition force are the same as those of an alliance, such as problems in terms of integration, interoperability, decision-making and achieving unity of command.\textsuperscript{120} In short, all of these aspects are inherent in multinational peacekeeping operations regardless of the context in which they are carried out. The rules of engagement and caveats (restrictions on operational deployment) are often determined nationally.

The ad hoc nature of coalition operations means that a lead nation is usually in charge. This nation usually makes the largest military contribution and supplies the commander. A lead nation can be described as one that has the will and ability, competence and influence to coordinate the essential elements of political consultation and military leadership required for the planning, preparation and carrying out of a military coalition operation.\textsuperscript{121} Although the commander of an ad hoc coalition normally does not have unity of command, his main focus

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\textsuperscript{118} This first part is based mainly on Kees Homan, ‘De track record van ad-hoc coalities:’ Koeweit, Oost-Timor en Irak’, in *Internationale Spectator*, December 2013, pp. 45-50.


\textsuperscript{121} ‘The Lead Nation Concept in Coalition Operations’, *MIWG Report to the Multinational Interoperability Council*, 20 December 2000, p. 2.
is on unity of effort. The differences between ad hoc coalitions that have taken action in the past decades are clearly shown by the following military operations (see Table 7).

### Table 7  Current ad hoc coalition operations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Mission</th>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Strength</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>North Korea-South Korea</td>
<td>Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission (NNSC)</td>
<td>1953-present</td>
<td>10*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt (Sinai)</td>
<td>Multinational Force and Observers (MFO)</td>
<td>1982-present</td>
<td>1,723**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestine (Hebron)</td>
<td>Temporary International Presence in Hebron (TIPH 2)</td>
<td>1997-present</td>
<td>67*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ivory Coast</td>
<td>Operation Unicorn</td>
<td>2003-present</td>
<td>450*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solomon Islands</td>
<td>Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI)</td>
<td>2003-present</td>
<td>447*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central African Republic</td>
<td>Operation Sangaris</td>
<td>2013-present</td>
<td>2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>Operation Serval</td>
<td>2013-present</td>
<td>1,600</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Data as at 31 December 2012.

a The mission is supported by 535 local staff members.

b The mission is supported by 12 local staff members.

To enable a comparison to be made with other organisations, a list of ad hoc coalition peacekeeping operations classified according to the spectrum of violence (from high to low) is presented below:

### Table 8  Ad hoc peacekeeping operations: list of the most important military and civilian operations classified according to the spectrum of violence (from high to low) and type of mission

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Spectrum of violence</th>
<th>Ad hoc peacekeeping operations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intervention by air</td>
<td>Desert Storm, invasion of Iraq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>campaign (military</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>intervention)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robust peacekeeping</td>
<td>MNF-I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>force on the ground</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+ armed action during</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the operation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robust multidimensional peacekeeping force – initial entry and</td>
<td>Sangaris, Serval, INTERFET, SAPSD, ISAF, Unicorn, MIF-H, ISF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>stabilisation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robust support for</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>humanitarian</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>assistance</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robust support for</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the Protection of</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilians</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-piracy</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peacekeeping force to</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>support humanitarian</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>assistance</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

122 SIPRI Multilateral Peace Operations Database 2014, see footnote 29.
123 The classification of an operation is based on an estimate of the operation’s main focus. Multidimensional operations may also perform tasks that are stated elsewhere in the list. Although traditional peacekeeping operations may also have additional tasks, they were assigned to this category if their main focus is clearly on monitoring a ceasefire.
124 SIPRI Multilateral Peace Operations Database 2014, see footnote 29.
### Spectrum of violence

| Multidimensional peacekeeping force (not robust) | - |
| Police mission | RAMSI |
| Monitoring operation | MFO, NNSC, TIPH2, PMG, IPMT |
| Preventive deployment | - |
| Training of military personnel | CPDTF |
| Rule of law, justice, border management and SSR mission | - |
| Transitional authorities | - |
| Broad civilian mandate | BTT |

The classification of an operation is based on an estimate of the operation's main focus. Operations may also perform additional tasks that are stated elsewhere in the list.

### SWOT analysis

It is very difficult to draw general conclusions based on a variety of ad hoc coalitions. In addition to the ad hoc nature, the mandate (high/low in the spectrum of violence), the duration of the operation (long/short), strength in terms of number of personnel (large-scale operation or otherwise), unforeseen political aspects and the specific context of the operation, for example, also play an important role. Nevertheless, with the necessary caution, the following strengths and weaknesses of ad hoc coalitions may be stated.

#### Strengths

- **Political effectiveness:**
  Rapid decision-making and deployment and clear political leadership from a single capital when there is a lead nation. Although a UN Security Council mandate is desirable, it is not an absolute necessity.

- **Organisational efficiency:**
  The lead nation makes the largest military contribution and in principle determines the mission’s main areas of focus based on the situation in the country concerned, and is more or less effective with national lines of command.

- **Capabilities and operational possibilities (with risks):**
  Depending on the lead nation, such coalitions can rapidly intervene at the highest end of the spectrum. They are also flexible and can tailor the tasks performed to the specific situation.

#### Weaknesses

- **Political effectiveness:**
  Support may be limited by the dominance of national interests. This is not necessarily the case, however, if international political support is generated. Less international legitimacy, for instance when there is no UN Security Council mandate, may result in international opposition, particularly in the theatre of operations.

- **Organisational efficiency:**
  Ad hoc arrangements are required for the inclusion of contributions from other countries and for coordination. Large lead nations are usually prepared in this regard, however.
- **Capabilities and operational possibilities (with risks):**
  Ad hoc coalitions are less able to implement a comprehensive approach, since they are not really formed with continuity in mind (tasks must be taken over by others or transferred to international organisations), and are virtually unable to deal with pre-conflict and post-conflict situations (transfer to other organisations is required).

The SWOT analysis shows that, in contrast to the deployment of a UN peacekeeping force, which takes time to form, ad hoc coalitions are generally able to deploy rapidly in a crisis situation.

**Future trends**

The phenomenon of ad hoc coalitions is likely to increase in importance mainly because of the possibilities of rapid deployment relative to the time required by the UN to deploy. An ad hoc coalition may at times fulfil a bridging function. In other words, an ad hoc coalition may engage in operations until a UN peacekeeping force can be deployed. Particularly countries that view a military operation as being in their interest will be prepared to contribute militarily. Participation in an ad hoc coalition will therefore be determined more by interests than by values. Larger countries in particular have the resources and political will to act as lead nations. In general, a UN Security Council mandate will be sought to ensure legitimacy.
7 A comparison of organisational links for peacekeeping operations

This part of the study deals in greater depth with the question as to which organisational links are the most suitable for future operations, analyses strengths and weaknesses and the opportunities and threats that the different organisations have to deal with, how these relate to each other and what this ‘constellation’ could mean for the allocation of tasks between the different organisations. The study then considers the positions of the four main allies, these being the United States, Germany, France and the United Kingdom, with respect to peacekeeping operations.

Tasks and regional allocation
Table 9 lists the different tasks that have been performed so far by international organisations and partnerships in the context of peacekeeping operations. These tasks are arranged according to the spectrum of violence. Operations at the highest end of the spectrum are listed first. The name of the conducting organisation and the region in which the operation took place is given under each task.

Table 9 List of tasks of international organisations (spectrum of violence, range of tasks and region)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>High in the spectrum of violence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intervention by air campaign (military intervention)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Ad hoc coalition (MENA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- NATO (Europe, MENA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robust peacekeeping force on the ground + armed action during the operation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Ad hoc coalition (MENA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- NATO (South Asia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- UN (Africa)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle of the spectrum of violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robust multidimensional peacekeeping force – initial entry and stabilisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Ad hoc coalition (Africa, Latin America, South Asia, Southeast Asia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- EU (Africa)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- NATO (Europe)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- UN (Africa, Latin America, Southeast Asia) - multidimensional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robust support for humanitarian assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- UN (Africa)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- EU (Africa)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robust support for the Protection of Civilians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- UN (Africa)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-piracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- EU (Africa)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- NATO (Africa)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Low in the spectrum of violence

**Peacekeeping force to support humanitarian assistance**
- UN (Africa, Europe)

**Multidimensional peacekeeping force (not robust)**
- UN (Africa, Europe, Latin America, Southeast Asia)

**Police mission**
- Ad hoc coalition (Oceania)
- EU (Africa, Europe, MENA, South Asia)
- UN (Europe, Latin America, Southeast Asia)

**Monitoring operation**
- Ad hoc coalition (MENA, Oceania, East Asia)
- EU (Europe, Southeast Asia)
- UN (Africa, Central Asia, Europe, Latin America, MENA, South Asia)

**Preventive deployment**
- UN (Europe)

**Training of military personnel**
- Ad hoc coalition (Africa)
- EU (Africa)
- NATO (MENA, South Asia)

**Rule of law, justice, border management and SSR mission**
- EU (Africa, Europe, MENA, South Asia)
- UN (Europe, Latin America, Southeast Asia)

**Transitional authority**
- UN (Europe, Southeast Asia)

**Broad civilian mandate**
- Ad hoc coalition (Oceania)
- EU (Europe)
- UN (Africa, MENA, South Asia)

The classification of an operation is based on an estimate of the operation’s main focus. Operations may also perform additional tasks that are stated elsewhere in the list. For example, although the UN is very active in the field of SSR, it does not have any operations that focus solely on SSR.

Table 9 suggests that a certain allocation of tasks is taking place between the UN, the EU, NATO and ad hoc coalitions. This allocation of tasks has three dimensions: the spectrum of violence (high, middle and low), the range of tasks (military, broad, civilian) and the region.

Although NATO and ad hoc coalitions carry out military operations at the highest end of the spectrum of violence, they only do so in Europe, the MENA region and South Asia (Afghanistan). The UN has the current Force Intervention Brigade in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in Africa.

Somewhat lower in the spectrum of violence, in the upper part of the spectrum’s middle section, different ad hoc coalitions were active in Africa, Latin America, South Asia and Southeast Asia, and the EU carried out an operation in Africa (Artemis). The UN conducted robust initial entry operations in Africa, Latin America and Southeast Asia.

The EU, NATO and the UN are the main actors in the middle section of the spectrum of violence. A clear allocation of tasks in terms of region seems to apply. In this section of the spectrum of violence, NATO focuses only on Europe (the Balkans) and is carrying out an anti-piracy mission off the coast of Africa. In addition to operating in Europe and in an
anti-piracy mission, the EU also operates on the African mainland. The UN remains outside Europe and conducts operations in Africa, Latin America and Southeast Asia. In addition, as regards the middle section of the spectrum of violence, it is striking that the UN adopts a multidimensional approach, whereas the other organisations focus mainly on military aspects.

**Table 10  List of tasks of international organisations (spectrum of violence and region)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Nature of the mission</th>
<th>Spectrum of violence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Middle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>Military</td>
<td>UN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Civilian</td>
<td>UN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Asia</td>
<td>Military</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Civilian</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>Military</td>
<td>EU, NATO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Civilian</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America</td>
<td>Military</td>
<td>Ad hoc, UN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Civilian</td>
<td>UN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MENA</td>
<td>Military</td>
<td>Ad hoc, NATO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Civilian</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Asia</td>
<td>Military</td>
<td>NATO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Civilian</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southeast Asia</td>
<td>Military</td>
<td>Ad hoc, UN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Civilian</td>
<td>UN</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Asia</td>
<td>Military</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Civilian</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oceania</td>
<td>Military</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Civilian</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

At the lower end of the spectrum of violence, NATO is only active in training military personnel. Traditional peace enforcement and monitoring missions were carried out by the EU in Europe and Southeast Asia, by ad hoc coalitions in the MENA region, Oceania and East Asia, and throughout the world by the UN. In this section of the spectrum of violence, the EU also assumes non-military tasks and focuses in this regard mainly on Europe and Africa. The UN is primarily active outside Europe. In addition, the UN operates on the basis of a multidimensional approach, whereas the EU tends to focus on more limited mandates in the fields of rule of law, security sector reform, border monitoring, police missions and training military personnel. Ad hoc coalitions also assume civilian tasks in Oceania and have trained military personnel in Africa.

Although the allocation of tasks referred to above (see Table 10) is based mainly on the past, it is likely to also apply in the future. Of particular relevance to the Netherlands in this context is that NATO and ad hoc coalitions will probably continue to perform military tasks at the higher end of the spectrum of violence in the MENA region and are also capable of doing so in the lower sections of the spectrum. The EU will probably continue to carry out more specialist operations in Africa and the MENA region and will also perform a greater number of multidimensional stabilisation tasks within Europe. The UN will probably continue to conduct
multidimensional operations in sub-Saharan Africa. These operations are mainly located in the middle of the spectrum of violence. In addition, the UN will probably continue to carry out multidimensional and monitoring missions in the MENA region. In the event of rising tensions with Russia, the UN may also be asked to establish a traditional peacekeeping operation at the edges of the European and Russian poles. In this context, although not discussed in this study, it is also possible that the OSCE will play a larger role in peacekeeping operations by carrying out monitoring missions and thereby freezing conflicts in the Russian-EU border area. The OSCE’s monitoring mission to Ukraine is an example in this regard.

Finally, it seems that organisations will increasingly have to cooperate in the future when establishing peacekeeping operations. To the extent that it was ever within their power to do so, the EU, the UN and NATO are becoming less able to resolve complex conflicts on their own. The focus in the future must therefore be on more hybrid organisational forms of peacekeeping operations and more complex constellations of missions like the ones in Mali and the Central African Republic. The following organisational forms are possible:

- **Hybrid missions**: the traditional hybrid operation in which two organisations carry out a mission together (UNAMID, the AU-UN mission in Darfur, for example).
- **Parallel missions**: different operations carried out in the same theatre with different, adjoining and sometimes overlapping mandates (the UN’s MINUSMA, the EU’s EUTM Mali and French troops in Mali, for example).
- **Modular missions**: an operation carried out under the leadership of one organisation in which modules are handled by another organisation or several other organisations (the EU, the OSCE and UNHCR each handled one of the four pillars on which the UN’s UNMIK was based, for example).
- **Follow-up missions/bridging operations**: operations carried out successively by different organisations. Given the allocation of tasks referred to above, different organisations usually handle different phases of an operation (the UN’s UNPROFOR in Bosnia and Herzegovina, for example, was succeeded by NATO’s IFOR and SFOR when peace had been established, and the IFOR and SFOR missions were in turn succeeded by the EUFOR Althea operation when the country had been stabilised). An example of a traditional bridging mission is EUFOR Chad/Central African Republic, which remained active until the UN’s MINURCAT was able to take over the tasks.
- **Support missions/over-the-horizon forces**: an operation conducted by an organisation to support an operation being carried out by a different organisation (the UN’s UNSOM in Somalia is explicitly aimed at supporting the AU’s AMISOM, for example). An over-the-horizon force is not actually deployed in the theatre of operations but is close enough to rapidly deploy as a reserve if necessary (the EUFOR DRC troops in Gabon that had to assist the UN’s MONUC if necessary, for example).

Combinations of the organisational forms listed above are of course possible.

**Cooperation with regional organisations**

Given that the focus of future peacekeeping operations will be on Africa, the EU, the Netherlands and other actors will have to cooperate with African regional organisations more frequently. The recent past has shown that such cooperation is not without its challenges. An analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of these organisations reveals problems in terms of equipment, level of training and discipline of the military units, the ability of the organisations to operate rapidly in political and other senses and force generation, and also reveals essential shortcomings with respect to certain capabilities (air transport, logistics
and other capabilities). Improvements must also be made with respect to operating in the context of an ‘integrated approach’ to a conflict, if only because the countries that supply the troops do not as yet have enough resources to adequately contribute to the process of reconstruction. There is a clear wish among African countries to deal with the problems on their continent themselves, though with help from outside if necessary.

This means that in addition to individual, independent contributions from Western countries, including the Netherlands, the different hybrid organisational forms pose further challenges in the context of cooperating with and supporting these regional organisations. Cooperation in this context means that other ways of contributing, such as investing in training and education in areas of expertise that are central to peacekeeping missions, must also be considered. These areas must be made a more integral part of the training of units of countries that may be involved in such missions. The Netherlands has already made a modest contribution in this field in the context of the African Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) programme in the cases of, among others, Burundi and Somalia. Given the expectation that the intensity and frequency of these operations will increase, more will have to be invested in this field. Investment may also take the form of supporting SSR more strongly and providing greater support to the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), since, in spite of results that have so far been disappointing, this architecture will be essential to future peacekeeping missions in Africa.

An analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of organisational links for peacekeeping operations

Different organisational forms have both advantages and disadvantages.

In terms of the political effectiveness of operations, ad hoc coalitions can provide rapid decision-making and deployment capabilities, and often operate under clear political leadership. Moreover, a UN Security Council mandate is not an absolute necessity. However, support may be limited by the dominance of national interests and less international legitimacy in the absence of such a mandate.

The UN is the mirror image of ad hoc coalitions. As an organisation, it usually has the most support and legitimacy. Because all UN missions are carried out on the basis of a UN Security Council mandate, decision-making can be slow and operations that infringe national sovereignty are virtually impossible.

While the EU has more in common with the UN, NATO is more similar to ad hoc coalitions. NATO can also operate rapidly without the UN Security Council’s involvement, though action taken in this context is not always seen as legitimate. The EU always operates through the UN Security Council and therefore enjoys more support. The EU requires internal consensus for operations, however, and this consensus is more difficult to achieve. Moreover, both the EU and the UN usually focus on operations that have a civilian component in addition to the military one, whereas NATO and ad hoc coalitions focus more on military operations, certainly when the matter is urgent.

In terms of organisational efficiency, NATO is the only international organisation that has a clear chain of command, permanent headquarters and a standing military organisation. In addition, it can build on experience gained regarding the participation of third countries. ‘Military thinking’ is dominant, however, the use of national areas of responsibility leads to
an inconsistent international approach and the large military bureaucracy makes the organisation unwieldy.

When an ad hoc coalition carries out an operation under the leadership of a lead nation, the national chain of command usually ensures a high degree of effectiveness. Ad hoc arrangements are required when this is not the case, however. The EU also operates on the basis of the lead nation concept and uses the operational headquarters of member states. Because of the separation of intergovernmental military powers from the communitarian non-military ones, organisational relationships, and therefore the comprehensive approach, are made more complicated in terms of planning and implementation at the strategic level in Brussels.

Regarding the UN, there are internal conflicts between the DPA and the DPKO and between the Secretariat and the other funds, organisations and programmes. Although the UN has military planning capability, it is limited, as a result of which the UN is often unable to keep pace with unfolding events. The EU does not have this capability, though it does have its own management unit for civilian operations. The UN’s military command structure is more lean and mean than the EU’s and has an exceptionally high tooth-to-tail ratio. The costs of UN operations are relatively low partly because of the low personnel costs of soldiers from developing countries. In addition, mission commanders ‘in the field’ have many of the decision-making powers, which means that operations are relatively flexible in tactical terms. Even more than the EU, the UN also has instruments that enable it to operate on a long-term basis and organisations that are usually already active in the host country prior to the carrying out of an operation and remain in the country following the end of the operation. The EU and the UN both focus on a comprehensive or integrated approach. Of all organisational forms, however, the UN has the most difficulty with force generation, as a result of which it usually takes a long time to fully deploy an operation.

Depending on the lead nation, ad hoc coalitions generally have the capabilities and operational possibilities required for rapid interventions in all military dimensions from the lowest to the highest end of the spectrum. The focus in this regard is primarily on military aspects, mainly during the conflict phase and the beginning of the post-conflict phase. NATO has the most advanced and large-scale capabilities for such operations, certainly when the United States takes part. Because they lack civilian capabilities, ad hoc coalitions and NATO are not really able to implement the comprehensive approach and are therefore less effective when it comes to the post-conflict phase. In addition, certainly with respect to operations in the higher sections of the spectrum of violence, ad hoc coalitions generally have less staying power, which means that transfer to other organisations is usually necessary. Like the UN, the EU has the capabilities and operational possibilities required to carry out operations in the middle and lower sections of the spectrum. The UN focuses only on the land dimension, whereas the EU also has experience in conducting operations at sea. To a greater extent than the EU, the UN can generate, coordinate and deploy civilian capabilities in addition to military ones. Both organisations, however, have the instruments required to implement a comprehensive and long-term approach in all phases of a conflict. The UN has shown itself to be the organisation par excellence when it comes to maintaining long-term operations and programmes. Both the UN and the EU are less capable of deploying troops rapidly. The EU Battlegroups have so far never been used, for example. Although other organisations lack or have only very limited civilian and police capabilities, both the UN and the EU also struggle to deploy these assets rapidly. Finally, the UN has a number of specific problems. It has difficulty finding the required high-tech capabilities, for example, and terms like – and certainly tasks relating to – ‘intelligence’ remain sensitive. In addition, the UN is less capable of carrying
out operations at the higher end of the spectrum of violence because the variety in military contributions and limited number of permanent partnerships mean that there is less cohesion among the troops. The equipment, training and discipline of some contingents are also substandard.

**Opportunities and threats for the EU, NATO and the UN**

The analysis of strengths and weaknesses set out above may of course change in the future. It is therefore important to also consider opportunities and threats with respect to the EU, NATO and the UN.

**Opportunities and threats for the EU**

- **Political effectiveness:**
  
  Africa is the most likely theatre of operations for the EU and it seems to have sufficient legitimacy in that region. Cooperation between France, the UK and Germany, the large member states, is essential to sound EU decision-making, however. This cooperation may become more difficult if Euroscepticism increases, particularly in the UK. In addition, pronounced French domination may undermine CSDP-operations.

- **Organisational efficiency:**
  
  Although the lead nation concept makes it possible to launch operations relatively rapidly, the comprehensive approach (planning, preparations) must be further developed, institutions like the EEAS and the CPCC must be strengthened and the HR must act forcefully to ensure greater effectiveness and efficiency. Advances in these areas are indeed likely. The greatest limitations arise from the lack of member states that are willing to contribute a substantial number of troops and the insufficient financing of missions under the Athena mechanism.

- **Capabilities and operational possibilities:**
  
  Unless European military capabilities are improved, EU-led operations will remain limited in terms of what is possible. In addition, European military cooperation must be strengthened to make it possible to take action in the higher sections of the spectrum of violence and ensure staying power. The coordination of civilian and military assets in the CSDP with communitarian capabilities will probably improve. The EU Battlegroups continue to provide potential for the rapid deployment of EU capabilities. Improvements could be achieved in terms of interoperability, standardisation and cost savings by devoting more attention to civil-military capabilities (for enablers like reconnaissance, intelligence, transport, medical support, personal protection and so on).

**Opportunities and threats for NATO**

- **Political effectiveness:**
  
  If the security situation in the proximity of NATO territory deteriorates, it is likely that the dominance of the US will rapidly return and NATO will again operate more as a unit. Without such a deterioration, differences of opinion on priorities may increase and make decision-making in the NAC more difficult. The attention given to NATO operations and capacity building may decrease as a result of such a situation or if no large-scale operation is carried out.
- Organisational efficiency:
  NATO's bureaucracy could be further reduced. A large military bureaucracy is less efficient in the current security environment and will be less efficient in the future security environment that is expected.

- Capabilities and operational possibilities:
  A strengthening of European capabilities would also benefit NATO. Possibilities for NATO deployment will decrease if these capabilities are not strengthened. The willingness to finance and maintain joint capabilities seems to be decreasing. The current trend appears to be one of deeper cooperation in smaller groups (NORDEFCO, Anglo-French cooperation, Benelux cooperation and the Visegrad Group, for example). Nevertheless, the new comprehensive training and exercise programmes will improve readiness, deployability and interoperability.

Opportunities and threats for the UN
- Political effectiveness:
  When international relations deteriorate, the UN is one of the few organisations that, with the support of the UN Security Council, remains capable of establishing peacekeeping operations. Such operations will be carried out less frequently, however, and will be more like the traditional operations carried out during the Cold War than the current multidimensional operations. At the same time, the UN is threatened by the fact that, on the one hand, Western countries in particular want operations to be more inexpensive and efficient, well below the costs of Western defence structures, while, on the other, standards and results as defined by the West are expected. This situation makes scandals and operational failures more likely. Moreover, the West's reluctance in financial terms, the lack of financial contributions from the Global South and limited troop contributions from Western countries are threatening the solidarity in the international system required for peacekeeping operations. The current troop contributors, mainly countries of the Global South, believe that they are not paid and respected enough, and also that they are criticised too heavily by countries that, as far as they are concerned, have no real idea about realities on the ground. This divide may in time undermine force generation from the Global South.

- Organisational efficiency:
  Despite the already high degree of integration within the UN system, there is still considerable room for improving cooperation between the UN's different funds, programmes and organisations, and between the missions in the field. Considerable room likewise remains for overarching regional strategies. At the same time, however, with approximately 120,000 personnel in the field, the UN is increasingly at risk of being overstretched and continuing budget cuts will also increase the risks of failure. Further cuts will make it necessary for operations to be based on more limited mandates.

- Capabilities and operational possibilities:
  Because the UN has a broad range of instruments and is active in different phases of a conflict, it is at risk of losing sight of the wood for the trees and thereby diluting its effectiveness. The organisation also remains in need of high-tech capabilities (air transport, attack helicopters and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance assets). Until recently, these assets had been deployed by Western nations in Afghanistan but could now be used to meet the UN's need. Much can still be done to improve the quality, discipline, training and equipment of the troops of contributing nations, as well as cooperation
between troop contributors, through current and future training and joint exercise programmes. Projects aimed at giving troop contributors the capabilities required can also be considered.

As part of the Dutch contribution to the ISAF mission, training is being given to Afghan police officers at a base in Kunduz. It is unlikely that large-scale military operations like ISAF will be carried out in the future.

Photograph: Ministry of Defence, Arnoud Schoor

The partners
It goes without saying that the respective positions of the Netherlands’ allies on relevant issues and the military capabilities and willingness of these allies to contribute to operations are key considerations in the context of determining the kind of operations and the conducting organisations to which the Netherlands will contribute in the future. It is unlikely that large-scale military operations like ISAF will be carried out in the coming years, firstly because the wave of spending cuts has reduced capabilities. While Europe's armed forces have become better able to conduct operations far from home because of improved structures, they are not able to sustain such operations on a large scale. This limitation affects the nature and duration of a deployment. A second reason is the loss of public support. The majority of the population in many countries either did not support participation in ISAF or ceased supporting participation in recent years. There is also no majority support in the Netherlands for participation in MINUSMA, the UN's mission in Mali. Although there are undoubtedly several reasons for the drop in public support, the limited success of some military operations as a means of achieving the ultimate political end has probably been an important factor. A third reason is the higher costs of actually conducting an operation. ISAF in particular proved to be a very expensive one. The modification and intensive maintenance of materiel, the use of ammunition and the urgent purchase of special equipment increased costs very substantially. In Uruzgan, for example, the Netherlands spent over three times (EUR 1.6 billion) the amount originally anticipated. The Royal Netherlands Army is still recovering.
The United States is no longer willing to carry out long-term, robust stabilisation operations of the ISAF kind. In military doctrine, the emphasis is now on the Sea Air Battle concept, which is primarily aimed at the destruction of enemy targets without the large-scale use of ground forces. Special forces, on the other hand, are becoming more important in terms of a nation’s own operations and in terms of supporting local armed forces.

France and the United Kingdom are shifting the emphasis to brief interventions, also known as initial entry operations. They are establishing a joint intervention force, the Combined Joint Expeditionary Force, for this purpose. The force should be deployable in 2016. The initial entry model provides for transfer to the UN, the AU or other regional organisations, or indeed to other allies, after the intervention has taken place and a certain degree of military stability has been achieved. Mali is an example of this model. As is the case with respect to the United States, prolonged French and British deployment for large-scale stabilisation operations is less likely.

In Germany, on the other hand, the political willingness to assume greater responsibility in international operations seems to be increasing. If Germany does indeed assume greater responsibility, the emphasis will probably be on robust peacekeeping operations, and it is therefore possible that Germany will act as lead nation in connection with British and/or French interventions. Other European nations could then participate in stabilisation operations of longer duration. The scale would remain limited and there would have to be a comprehensive approach in which civilian and other actors (development assistance, reconstruction) also deploy sufficient resources. It is quite possible that a number of military operations (different organisations, different in nature) will be carried out alongside each other. This is already the case in Mali (UN, EU and national operations being conducted simultaneously).

Conclusion
The previous parts of the study that discussed trends in conflicts and peacekeeping operations, the influence of emerging powers and scenarios for the future of peacekeeping operations provided a consistent picture which showed that the Netherlands will have to focus mainly on multidimensional stabilisation operations in the middle or lower sections at the higher end of the spectrum of violence in the Sahel and the Horn of Africa, and on traditional peacekeeping in the lower sections of the spectrum of violence in the MENA region. Military interventions at the highest end of the spectrum of violence will probably become less frequent. The analysis of the organisational links of relevance to peacekeeping operations and to which the Netherlands can contribute shows that operations of this kind in the regions referred to are carried out mainly by the EU and the UN. Nevertheless, the possibility of a NATO operation in the Middle East cannot be excluded. In view of the Netherlands’ EU membership, a Dutch role at the border between Europe and Russia in a possible monitoring mission would probably be limited to a small number of personnel.
Conclusions and points to note for the Netherlands

To formulate this study’s analysis more in terms of possible implications for Dutch policy with respect to peacekeeping operations, this concluding part first looks more closely at Dutch interests and reasons for taking certain courses of action as set out in the Dutch International Security Strategy (ISS) in the context of contributing to such operations. These Dutch interests provide a framework for more targeted and further analysis.

The consequences of the trends in conflicts, trends in peacekeeping operations and influence of the emerging powers (BRICS) discussed above are then considered in greater depth, after which long-term expectations are set out in more detail based on the four scenarios in Verkenningen: Houvast voor de krijgsmacht van de toekomst ('Explorations: A Frame of Reference for the Armed Forces of the Future', hereinafter referred to as 'Explorations'). This analysis of future peacekeeping operations provides a picture of future theatres of operations and types of missions.

The findings presented in steps below are subsequently used to further identify implications for Dutch policy with respect to peacekeeping operations.

Interests of the Netherlands
In an earlier publication about the armed forces of the future, Clingendael focused on setting priorities in terms of Dutch interests and values. The publication concluded that interests change and can be determined objectively only to a certain extent. A further conclusion was that it is not only about changing priorities, it is also about the interrelatedness of interests and obligations with respect to, for example, international organisations. Determining which interests are priorities is ultimately a matter of political choice.

This conclusion can also be drawn on the basis of the ISS, which specifies three strategic interests that play a role when taking action on the international stage is being considered:
1. Defence of national territory and the territory of allies;
2. A properly functioning international legal system;
3. Economic security.

It may be noted that these three interests are becoming increasingly intertwined. The increasing complexity of threats, for example, is making it necessary to devote more attention to cybercrime, piracy, cross-border crime and all forms of terrorism. This situation is very relevant to the setting of priorities because links between threats cannot be ignored and can affect the strategic interests of the Netherlands in different ways.

In the section on policy implications, the ISS states that the Netherlands has worldwide interests but only limited influence. In addition, substantial cuts are being made in defence spending and spending on development cooperation. This means that in addition to having to consider priorities more carefully, cooperation must take place with others when and where possible, preferably within an organised framework. This cooperation is arguably a fourth strategic interest that, although not explicitly mentioned, is important in light of this study on
peacekeeping missions. In other words, it is important for the Netherlands to be a reliable partner and ally.

**Areas of emphasis**

A strategy is required to give further shape to interests and reasons for taking certain courses of action. For this purpose, the ISS provides reference points based on areas of emphasis in Dutch policy:

- Greater European responsibility;
- Focus on unstable regions close to Europe;
- Prevention;
- Disarmament and arms control;
- Integrated approach;
- Cooperation with the private sector.

These areas of emphasis indicate important parameters for Dutch efforts, also in terms of peacekeeping missions. This monitor and the analyses that it includes also show the importance of Europe (the EU as an actor) and the regions close to Europe, especially with respect to the spectrum of conflict. The further destabilisation of regions close to Europe (the Middle East, North Africa, the Horn of Africa and West Africa, including the Sahel region) in recent years means that Europe is facing complex risks and threats. It is becoming more difficult to find an adequate answer to these risks and threats.

Another important parameter for peacekeeping operations is the emphasis on the integrated approach: a mix of diplomatic, military and development instruments that are often strengthened by private sector elements. The added value of this approach has not been limited to the Netherlands. The EU and NATO (comprehensive approach) as well as the UN (integrated missions) recognise the advantages. Nevertheless, bringing different components together effectively involves lessons being learned.

Although the ISS provides important reference points, it also leaves questions unanswered because of shifting priorities and changing circumstances. The crisis in and around Ukraine, for example, is prompting a greater focus on the territory of allies, and the overall focus does indeed seem to be shifting from the Middle East and (North) Africa to the Crimea and the protection of the Baltic states and other eastern NATO allies. Russia's stance and Russian action are of course of great importance in this regard.

**Reasons for taking part in peacekeeping operations**

Decisions to take part in peacekeeping operations are made on the basis of considerations that are context and mission-specific and also take the interests referred to above into account. Reasons given in the past in letters of the Dutch government to the States General (referred to as ‘Article 100 letters’ because of Article 100 of the Dutch Constitution, which provides for the deployment or making available of the Dutch armed forces to enforce or promote the international rule of law), parliamentary debates and public discussion are summarised below.

Security is frequently cited as a reason. Although participation in peacekeeping missions is usually not seen as a direct guarantee of national and territorial security, it has in the past been justified by references to the effects of instability at the EU’s borders on the stability and territorial security of the EU itself and the Netherlands. It is also regularly asserted that promoting international security and stability is necessary because, in a globalised world, events
far from home can affect national security. Challenges referred to in this context include international terrorism. Moreover, if the international legal order collapses, a ‘might is right’ order will apply in which a small country like the Netherlands would be at a disadvantage and vulnerable.

In addition to security, the effects of illegal migration and international organised crime are often cited as problems that, in a globalised world, affect the Netherlands and therefore justify participation in peacekeeping operations. Fighting crime and preventing illegal migration and a major influx of asylum seekers in the context of peacekeeping missions can serve as a kind of forward defence for, among others, the police. This aspect is discussed in detail in the study on the relationship between external and internal security that forms part of the Clingendael Strategic Monitor 2014.

A third consideration relates to the wider interests of the Netherlands. As an international trading nation, maintaining prosperity and economic development in the Netherlands requires the creation of an environment in which the Netherlands can use and further develop its trade relations and economic relations more generally. It may therefore be about ensuring the security of trade and trade routes and access to raw materials. In a more indirect sense, Dutch participation in peacekeeping operations is based on a desire to be seen as an actor that exercises influence on the international stage. Participation in operations can be a source of influence in international forums and a way of securing important positions at the UN, the EU and NATO.

Last but not least, although the Netherlands is a trading nation, moral reasons have always played a role. Article 90 of the Dutch Constitution states that the government shall promote the development of the international legal order. Guaranteeing human rights is very much a part of this duty, also because human rights violations on a large scale can lead to instability. The moral dimension includes promoting development through development cooperation.

**Security environment and trends in peacekeeping operations**

Dutch interests and reasons for taking certain courses of action provide a framework for analysing the security environment and the effects of this environment on possible participation in peacekeeping operations. After all, not every region or trend is of equal importance to the Netherlands. Of particular relevance to the Netherlands is that conflicts in the Sahel, MENA region and the Horn of Africa are becoming increasingly regional in nature, symbolic attacks on urban economic centres are becoming increasingly important in usually asymmetric conflicts and conflicts fragment because of the proliferation of different actors and interests. In the regions referred to, an increasing number of armed groups are seeking to acquire territorial control in order to influence the course of the conflict and thereby increase their economic and political power. At the same time, external influences on conflicts are also becoming greater because of transnational organised crime, Islamic ideology, the interference of neighbouring countries and cross-border sectarian alliances. The result is a growing number of internationalised intrastate conflicts in which there are no organised national parties that can be negotiated with. These conflicts also pose a considerable spillover risk to neighbouring countries. In addition, such conflicts are becoming an increasingly complex security threat that peacekeeping operations are not yet able to fully deal with. Less fragmented and also interstate tensions remain in Europe and large parts of Asia.

The analysis of trends in peacekeeping operations shows that the number of operations has remained fairly stable in recent years and there is no reason to assume that this number
will decrease in the future. Although the total number of personnel deployed will drop sharply because of the phasing out of ISAF, the number of personnel deployed has actually risen since 2012 if ISAF is not taken into account. In 2013, the UN conducted the most missions with, for the first time in years, the highest number of personnel. After many years in which the Middle East and Afghanistan were at the centre of attention, the focus seems to be returning to Africa. This trend will probably continue in the future. Most of the world’s armed conflicts are taking place in Africa. In addition, it is the region in which the permanent members of the UN Security Council have the greatest number of shared interests and therefore the region in which they cooperate best. Moreover, African countries themselves advocate robust operations. The question is what European troop contributors will do after the cessation of operations in Afghanistan. Will they also head to Africa or will they make only limited contributions and leave most of the work to African and South Asian countries? Africa is in any case safer for military personnel there than the Middle East and South Asia, and UN operations are not essentially more dangerous than EU and NATO missions. Ultimately, the relative safety of a mission is determined by its nature and context.

In recent years, peacekeeping missions have been given increasingly broad and robust mandates. Although principles like the Protection of Civilians, the Responsibility to Protect and liberal peace are broadly supported, countries like Russia, China and India tend to be concerned about the infringement of national sovereignty when it comes to implementing them. The BRICS countries therefore take the view that military interventions and more robust mandates for UN operations should not become a matter of course. In addition, the West appears to be becoming less willing to carry out military interventions and to believe less strongly in nation-building. Because of this convergence, major military interventions seem to be less likely in the short to medium term and the robustness of peacekeeping operations will probably not increase much further. Nevertheless, for the time being, the conceptual and normative developments in the field of peacekeeping operations are unlikely to be reversed by the greater influence of the BRICS countries. This group of countries believes in a larger role for regional organisations, however. These countries are also of the opinion that peacekeeping operations may only take place with the UN’s permission. In practice, however, some of them make exceptions when it comes to their own ‘backyards’.

Regarding the international agenda on peacekeeping operations in the medium and long term, it is likely that China in particular will play a more explicit role. In the long term, it is therefore possible that China will staunchly defend the principle that liberal values may not play a formal role in justifying interventions that require the permission of, or a mandate from, the UN Security Council. If this does indeed happen, it is likely that Russia will support China’s position. The positions that the other three BRICS countries will adopt in the normative debate is still unclear. On the one hand, as democracies and like the West and Japan, they support the most important liberal political values and consider democratisation to be a positive process. On the other, they see themselves as leaders or representatives of developing countries and therefore attach great importance to sovereignty and the principle that democratisation processes may not be imposed from the outside.

Peacekeeping operations in the long term: four scenarios
The four scenarios contained in ‘Explorations’ and used in different editions of the Clingendael Strategic Monitor provide good frames of reference to define peacekeeping
expectations in the long term more clearly. Missions are explained in terms of these scenarios in the quadrants below. The following questions are answered in each quadrant:

1. What? What kind of peacekeeping operations predominate?
2. Who? Who conducts peacekeeping operations?
3. Where? Where are peacekeeping operations carried out?
4. How long? What is a peacekeeping operation's time horizon?
5. How? What is the guiding instrument?
6. Why? What are the reasons for carrying out peacekeeping operations?
7. How often? How frequently are peacekeeping operations carried out?

The international system is shifting further away from the multilateral quadrant towards the multipolar quadrant. As a result of this shift, the divide in the field of peacekeeping operations between crises in relation to which there is broad agreement between the great powers about the approach to be taken and those in relation to which such agreement is lacking will probably widen in the coming years. The geopolitical interests of the great powers, which mainly manifest themselves regionally, are decisive in this regard. The BRICS countries are most likely to establish peacekeeping operations in Africa and, to a lesser extent, the Middle East. Such operations in Latin America would probably also not be strongly opposed, since it is in these regions that the great powers share the greatest number of interests. The likelihood is therefore that peacekeeping operations in Africa and Latin America will continue to follow a clear multilateral pattern. By contrast, there is already a multipolar pattern in Asia and Europe. In Asia, the regional powers – India, Russia and China – determine whether peacekeeping operations are established within their respective spheres of influence. These geopolitical considerations make it more difficult to establish peacekeeping operations of a multilateral and multidimensional nature in South Asia, Central Asia and Northeast Asia. Southeast Asia is also becoming more multipolar. Although the MENA region is more diffuse, it is already more multipolar in nature. North Africa seems to be Europe’s ‘backyard’. The Middle East is more of a fault line between poles where operations are only established with the consent of the great powers and, in such cases, operations are mainly limited to monitoring activities. Elsewhere along the fault lines of spheres of influence, the scope is likewise limited to observer missions that are usually carried out by the UN. Not much more than an observer mission would be possible on the fault line between the EU and Russia’s sphere of influence, for example. With respect to Dutch contributions, this means that operations in the Sahel and the Horn of Africa will retain a multidimensional nature and focus mainly on stabilisation in the middle or lower sections at the higher end of the spectrum of violence, whereas more traditional military monitoring operations in the lower sections of the spectrum of violence, to the extent that such operations take place, are likely in the MENA region and even more likely on the fault line between Europe and Russia.

125 Idem.
126 Een wankele wereldorde, see footnote 29.
### Multipolar

- There are mainly two kinds of operations in this quadrant:
  1. a) Monitoring peacekeeping operation
     b) (Military intervention followed by a) Stabilisation operation
  2. a) UN (potentially OSCE)
     b) Regional organisations
  3. a) At the edges or between poles
     b) Within poles or in their “backyard”
  4. Long term
  5. Military leadership
  6. Pole or the security of an ally or allies
  7. Moderate frequency

**Examples:**
- a) UN in UNTSO, UNDOF and UNMOGIP
- b) NATO in Libya and the Balkans, Missions of ECOWAS, CIS and other regional organisations

### Multilateral

- There are mainly two kinds of operations in this quadrant:
  1. a) (Military intervention followed by a) Humanitarian operation
     b) (Military intervention followed by a) Nation-building operation
  2. UN and other organisations
  3. Fragile states
  4. Long term
  5. a) Civilian humanitarian leadership
     b) Civilian development cooperation leadership
  6. Human security
  7. High frequency

**Examples:**
- a) UN in UNOSOM, MINURCAT and UNAMID
- b) UN in UNTAC and ONUMOZ, and NATO and other regional organisations in Kosovo and East Timor

### Fragmentation

- There is mainly one kind of operation in this quadrant:
  1. Military interventions
  2. Unilateral and ad hoc coalitions
  3. Close to the intervening parties
  4. Short term
  5. Military leadership
  6. National or state security interests
  7. Low frequency

**Examples:**
- Ethiopia/Kenya and Somalia

### Network

- There are mainly three kinds of operations in this quadrant:
  1. a) (Military intervention followed by a) Stabilisation operation
     b) (Military intervention followed by a) Humanitarian operation
     c) Police missions
  2. Hybrid operations of the UN, regional organisations and states in cooperation with companies, PMCs, PSCs and NGOs
  3. Regions not connected to the network and regions rich in raw materials
  4. Long-term networking (different organisations)
  5. Network leadership
  6. Human security and economic security interests
  7. High frequency

**Examples:**
- a) NGO operations like Nonviolent Peaceforce in Sri Lanka and Georgia
- b) Anti-piracy off the coast of Somalia
- c) A potential police mission in Ciudad Juarez, Mexico

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**Figure 9  Nature of missions in the different scenario quadrants**

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127 Idem.
Theatres of operations and conducting organisations
Based on the considerations set out above, Dutch participation in peacekeeping operations will most likely occur in the context of multidimensional stabilisation operations in the middle or lower sections at the higher end of the spectrum of violence in the Sahel and the Horn of Africa, and, in the context of traditional peacekeeping, in the lower sections of the spectrum of violence in the MENA region. Military interventions at the highest end of the spectrum of violence will probably become less frequent. The analysis of the organisational links of relevance to peacekeeping operations and to which the Netherlands can contribute shows that operations of this kind in the regions referred to are carried out mainly by the EU and the UN. Moreover, both of these organisations, with the broad range of instruments that they have at their disposal to implement their comprehensive and integrated approaches, are best equipped to deal with complex problems in the likely theatres of operations. Nevertheless, the possibility of a NATO operation in the Middle East cannot be excluded.

Implications for policy
This analysis reveals eight points to note for Dutch policy on peacekeeping operations.

New problems for peacekeeping operations:
The analysis of trends in conflict suggests that problems in the MENA region, the Sahel and the Horn of Africa will probably continue. In addition, the security environment is more complex than previously thought. In the future, peacekeeping missions will increasingly have to operate in decentralised and fragmented conflicts in which transnational influences will increasingly be a factor. They will have to deal with a greater variety of armed groups that include political, terrorist (Islamic) and criminal actors. The traditional, mainly political and military approaches of peacekeeping operations are inadequate in terms of dealing with actors of this kind. Future missions will therefore have to become more customised and flexible in terms of structure and composition than is currently the case, and the nature of each mission will have to be determined on the basis of the specific circumstances of the given conflict.

Point of interest 1: the complex security environments in the MENA region, the Sahel and the Horn of Africa require more customised solutions that are formulated on the basis of the actual problems in terms of the mixture of political, terrorist (Islamic) and criminal actors, transnational influences and the degree of fragmentation.

Future theatres of operations and types of missions:
The analysis of Dutch interests and reasons for taking certain courses of action, the trends in conflicts and peacekeeping operations, the influence of emerging powers and scenarios for the future of peacekeeping operations provide a consistent picture indicating that the Netherlands will have to focus mainly on multidimensional stabilisation operations in the middle or lower sections at the higher end of the spectrum of violence in the Sahel and the Horn of Africa, and on traditional peacekeeping in the lower sections of the spectrum of violence in the MENA region. Military interventions at the highest end of the spectrum of violence will probably become less frequent.

Point of interest 2: the Netherlands will have to focus mainly on multidimensional stabilisation operations in the middle or lower sections at the higher end of the spectrum of violence in the Sahel and the Horn of Africa, and, in the context of traditional peacekeeping, in the lower sections of the spectrum of violence in the MENA region.
Significance for conducting organisations:
The analysis of the organisational links of relevance to peacekeeping operations and to which the Netherlands can contribute shows that multidimensional stabilisation operations in the middle or lower sections at the higher end of the spectrum of violence in the Sahel and the Horn of Africa, and, in the context of traditional peacekeeping, in the lower sections of the spectrum of violence in the MENA region are carried out mainly by the EU and the UN. Nevertheless, the possibility of a NATO operation in the Middle East in which the Netherlands is involved cannot be ruled out. The Netherlands may also be involved in a possible monitoring mission at the border of Europe and Russia.

Greater European responsibility is a political choice that can be given shape in several ways in the context of peacekeeping operations. The Netherlands could opt to take part only in EU operations, for example. However, given the current international allocation of tasks with respect to peacekeeping operations, doing so would drastically limit the Netherlands’ contribution. An alternative would be to establish more EU-UN partnerships in the form of hybrid missions, parallel missions, modular missions, follow-up missions/bridging operations and support missions/over-the-horizon forces. Greater cooperation between individual European states within UN operations, such as the cooperation between the Netherlands, Norway, Finland and Sweden within MINUSMA is also a possibility. Finally, since greater cooperation with the AU and other African regional organisations in different hybrid organisational forms is likely, it is important to devote more attention to African capabilities for peacekeeping operations. Further investing in African training and education for peacekeeping missions, further supporting security sector reform in Africa and further supporting the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) are obvious courses of action.

**Point of interest 3:** future operations in the Sahel, the Horn of Africa and the MENA region to which the Netherlands may contribute will be carried out by the EU and the UN. In the context of greater European responsibility, EU-UN partnerships and greater cooperation between European countries within UN operations could be considered in addition to participating in EU operations.

**Point of interest 4:** strengthening African capabilities in the field of peacekeeping missions will become more relevant in the future.

The Dutch set of instruments:
Because of the fragmentation and proliferation of armed groups, the increasing complexity of conflicts and the international interests involved, the role of intelligence to peacekeeping operations is increasing becoming more important. The fact that conflicts are becoming more internationalised because of illegal trade, Islamic ideology, proxy influences from neighbouring countries and cross-border sectarian links, means that more transnational, usually regional approaches are required. In addition, peacekeeping operations must increasingly deal with fragmented strategic audiences. This places greater pressure on the way in which strategic communication about operations takes place with respect to the local population and authorities and different segments of the international audience. The need for customised solutions will also be a challenge for the Dutch set of instruments. More than was previously the case, peacekeeping operations will have to focus on combating terrorism and crime, as well as promoting economic cooperation, agricultural cooperation and so on in addition to traditional military, diplomatic and development instruments.

This means that the need for a broad set of instruments is greater than ever. The 3D approach that has already been accepted, adopted and applied will have to be broadened and further
developed. In the future, the roles of the Ministries of Security and Justice (police), Interior and Kingdom Relations (intelligence), Infrastructure and the Environment and Economic Affairs will have to be considered more closely in addition to the contributions made by the Ministries of Foreign Affairs (including development cooperation) and Defence. In this context, contributions of, among other parties, the police and intelligence services must be handled and processed mainly on the basis of preventive considerations. In other words, work must be performed according to the British principle of building stability overseas; the root causes of problems must be dealt with before these problems manifest themselves in the Netherlands.

In addition to the aspects referred to above, the Dutch set of instruments that is likely to be required in peacekeeping operations of the future will mainly be based on the needs of the EU and the UN. It must be stressed that these conclusions cannot be applied to the structure of the armed forces as a whole, since the armed forces also have ally-related and national defence tasks in addition to those performed during peacekeeping operations.

Both the EU and the UN need high-tech capabilities and enablers, particularly air transport, medical support and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance assets. Special forces are also eminently suited to be part of the standby rapid reaction units of the EU, the Battlegroups, which, although as yet never deployed, have a lot of potential. Both organisations also need civilian assets (police, rule of law, SSR and so on). Despite improvements like national pools of experts, both organisations still suffer from slow build-up and the limited availability of police personnel and civilian experts. In addition, in terms of its ability to carry out, in exceptional cases, a military intervention at the highest end of the spectrum as part of a peacekeeping operation, the EU lacks capabilities mainly in terms of air power (reconnaissance and intelligence, precision weapons, aerial refuelling and so on). Although the UN does not focus on military interventions, it clearly needs attack helicopters in the context of peacekeeping missions.

Point of interest 5: because of the increasing complexity of the security environments in which operations are carried out, intelligence and a transnational, usually regional approach are becoming more important and pressure on the way in which strategic communication about operations takes place with respect to the different strategic audiences is increasing. More than was previously the case, peacekeeping operations will have to focus on combating terrorism and crime, economic cooperation, agricultural cooperation, cooperation with respect to water and so on in addition to the use of traditional military, diplomatic and development instruments.

Point of interest 6: to deal with the root causes of problems before they become manifest in the Netherlands and to ensure sustained stability, the Ministries of Foreign Affairs (including development cooperation) and Defence must harmonise their policies more strongly with those of, in particular, the Ministries of Security and Justice (police), the Interior and Kingdom Relations (intelligence), Infrastructure and the Environment and Economic Affairs. Peacekeeping missions require a government-wide approach.

Point of interest 7: the Dutch set of instruments that aimed at supporting peacekeeping operations of the future must be based on the needs of the EU and the UN. The focus in this regard must be on high-tech capabilities and enablers, special forces as part of standby rapid reaction units and civilian assets (police, rule of law, SSR and so on).
The importance of the integrated approach:

More than was previously the case, peacekeeping operations will have to be based on a comprehensive approach and focus more on development and combating terrorism and crime. In the context of NATO operations of the recent past in which each country had a national area of responsibility, the Netherlands had its own in-house national 3D approach and developed its own integrated mission plan in Uruzgan. This NATO allocation of tasks led to an inconsistent international approach, however. Moreover, it is less likely that NATO operations of the kind carried out in Afghanistan will occur in the future, though the possibility of an operation taking place in the Middle East, for example, cannot be excluded. For each mission, the EU and the UN, the two other main organisations to which the Netherlands may contribute, develop a comprehensive approach and an integrated approach respectively in an effort to internationally strengthen the integrated capabilities. Both organisations prefer a niche contribution rather than an in-house national 3D approach. The contribution must therefore be of a kind for which there is an international need within the integrated mission plan. In other words, Dutch participation in peacekeeping operations must be based on the contribution made to implementation of the international approach, not on the question as to whether the Netherlands is taking or will be taking 3D action. Applying this ‘need’ criterion will ensure that the Dutch contribution is in keeping with the mission plan and is more than just a short-term countering of effects.

**Point of interest 8:** more than was previously the case, peacekeeping operations will have to be based on a comprehensive approach. The organisations to which the Netherlands is most likely to contribute in the context of peacekeeping operations, however, prefer a niche contribution rather than an in-house national 3D approach. In other words, Dutch participation in peacekeeping operations must be based on the contribution made to implementation of an integrated international mission plan, not on the question as to whether the Netherlands is taking or will be taking 3D action.