



Clingendael

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Between hope and fear

From Russia shock to Hamas shock – The yearning for contemporary protection of the community



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Introduction¹

The Clingendael Foreign Affairs Barometer annually identifies what sources of concern and hope the Dutch population perceives in the international environment. The main findings at the beginning of 2024 are:

- Year on year, Dutch citizens primarily fear threats that directly affect the community: cyber sabotage of critical infrastructure in the Netherlands ranks first once again
- Dutch people fear that the threats they consider most impactful will actually occur within five years
- Migration-related developments and Islamist terrorism rank high on the threat list
- The threat of war is also prominently felt
- There is relatively little attention for other geopolitical developments
- International protectionism and the possible decoupling from China are very low-ranking threats
- EU enlargement to include Ukraine and the Western Balkans offers little hope
- The climate perspective seems to be changing, with hopes primarily being pinned on adaptation to climate change
- Many high-scoring threats are accompanied by corresponding high-scoring developments in the hope rankings: expectations regarding resilience policies are high
- There is less correspondence between perceived threat and potential solutions in the area of migration
- The Dutch population is significantly divided. Hopes and fears with regard to international developments increasingly underlie ideological and political schisms
- The Dutch population is more united in its hopes than in its threat perceptions

Method and research questions

Prior to this survey,² Clingendael performed three similar studies in 2021, 2022 and 2023. Although the potentially threatening and hope-inspiring developments are not completely identical year on year, these four surveys nevertheless enable a number of interesting longitudinal analyses:

- What important constants can be identified in the hierarchies of threats and opportunities among the Dutch population as regards the international environment?
- Do perceivable shocks occur as a result of international crises, in the form of profound changes in the hierarchies (e.g. a “Russia shock” following the large-scale invasion of Ukraine by Russia)?
- What significant changes are apparent throughout the years? Which themes rise in the hierarchies, and which themes fall?
- What other noteworthy developments are there?
- What themes can be identified with regard to which Dutch citizens are confident that the government and society of the Netherlands can become or be made resilient enough to overcome the challenges? And around which threats do Dutch citizens see little in the way of encouraging developments?
- On which developments is the population divided, and where do we see more unity? How do the constituencies of various political parties view the presented developments? And how is that division positioned in relation to the increasingly relevant schism between “Anywheres” (who are less attached to borders and national culture) and “Somewheres” (who are very attached to borders and cultural identity)?

The attitudes of Dutch citizens with regard to potential threats (see Table 1) and potentially hopeful developments (see Table 2) were simultaneously polled using two representative samples. The number of respondents was 3780 for the ranked list of threats, and 3530 for the ranked list of potentially hopeful developments.

1 The authors are very grateful to Jeroen van Lindert and Sasja Meijer of Onderzoeksinstituut Kieskompas for their data collection and treatment, as well as to Peter Haasbroek, Rem Korteweg and René Cuperus for their peer review.

2 The data for this edition of *Between Hope and Fear* were collected in December 2023, i.e. after the general elections of 22 November 2023.

Table 1 Hierarchy of threats

	Development	Impact	Probability (%yes %no)	
1	Cyber sabotage of critical Dutch infrastructure (e.g. energy, payment, drinking water infrastructure)	7.50	56.9	43.1
2	Unwanted foreign interference in migrant communities in the Netherlands	7.30	75.0	25.0
3	An Islamist terrorist attack in the Netherlands	7.29	65.5	34.5
4	Large-scale irregular immigration, with migrants not possessing valid documentation to enter or reside in a country	7.27	72.8	27.2
5	The rise of intolerant religious movements in various countries	7.26	68.5	31.5
6	Lack of socioeconomic security for Dutch citizens (e.g. inability to make ends meet financially) as a result of an international crisis	7.20	62.4	37.6
7	High, unwanted dependence on foreign countries for vital products (e.g. raw materials, energy, chips, medication, weapons)	7.17	69.0	31.0
8	Insufficient military capacity among EU member states to defend European territory	7.14	50.3	49.7
9	Involvement in a war due to a territorial attack against an EU or NATO ally or the Netherlands itself	7.12	34.7	65.3
10	Global overpopulation	7.12	58.8	41.2
11	Undermining of democratic states and the rule of law in the European Union (e.g. due to corruption, erosion of the independence of the judiciary)	7.10	57.7	42.3
12	Physical sabotage of critical Dutch infrastructure (e.g. energy, payment, drinking water infrastructure)	7.07	32.7	67.3
13	Involvement in a nuclear war	7.06	13.9	86.1
14	Use of migration as a weapon by leaders surrounding the EU	6.98	74.3	25.7
15	Growing polarisation and radicalisation due to foreign disinformation campaigns (e.g. around elections in the Netherlands, around the war in Ukraine)	6.95	76.7	23.3
16	Undermining of Dutch society by international organised crime	6.94	60.9	39.1
17	Russia wins the war with Ukraine	6.85	57.2	42.8
18	Large numbers of refugees due to a war near the EU	6.85	79.1	20.9
19	The growing power of big tech companies (e.g. Facebook, TikTok and X)	6.84	71.6	28.4
20	Inflation as a result of an international crisis	6.79	68.0	32.0
21	Unwanted foreign interference in elections in the Netherlands	6.78	51.8	48.2
22	Escalation of the war in the Middle East (through involvement of e.g. Hezbollah, Iran, and/or the US)	6.73	71.0	29.0
23	EU rendered ineffective by internal divisions and differences	6.72	71.9	28.1
24	Erosion of the international legal order (e.g. due to ineffectiveness of the UN Security Council)	6.69	51.1	48.9
25	Damage to our pensions caused by an international crisis	6.67	45.7	54.3

	Development	Impact	Probability (%yes %no)	
26	Growing influence of China and Russia in important third countries (e.g. India, the Gulf states, South Africa, Balkans and Brazil)	6.67	81.8	18.2
27	The rise of hatred towards Jews	6.67	68.7	31.3
28	NATO rendered ineffective by internal divisions and differences	6.66	50.4	49.6
29	Increase of social tensions in the Netherlands due to a foreign conflict (e.g. due to the war between Russia and Ukraine, or the war between Israel and Hamas)	6.61	78.3	21.7
30	Corporate espionage by other countries	6.54	85.2	14.8
31	A military conflict between the USA and China	6.51	19.8	80.2
32	High debts in Europe threaten the stability of the euro	6.46	45.7	54.3
33	A left-wing extremist terrorist attack in the Netherlands	6.46	47.1	52.9
34	Involvement in a war outside EU or NATO territory (e.g. Ukraine or Taiwan)	6.39	52.7	47.3
35	Weakening of the US security guarantee to Europe (e.g. due to political developments in the US or US-China conflict)	6.37	54.4	45.6
36	Increasing international tensions due to ideological conflicts between democratic and autocratic states	6.36	57.6	42.4
37	Insufficient access to natural resources and critical raw materials (e.g. metals for the production of chips and solar cells)	6.35	50.6	49.4
38	A right-wing extremist terrorist attack in the Netherlands	6.28	44.8	55.2
39	The rise of political parties in various countries who discriminate against people based on their religion or race	6.27	65.0	35.0
40	Consequences for Dutch society of climate change (flooding, heat stress, drought, damage to the environment and biodiversity)	6.22	54.2	45.8
41	Disruption of society and economy due to emerging technologies (e.g. artificial intelligence)	6.21	56.7	43.3
42	Large-scale regular migration (e.g. labour migration, family migration, student migration)	6.13	70.3	29.7
43	Major consequences of European court decisions for Dutch policy	6.02	68.8	31.2
44	Europe loses the technological competition between the major powers	6.00	44.6	55.4
45	Replacement of the Dutch population	5.90	39.0	61.0
46	A new severe pandemic	5.82	37.6	62.4
47	The Netherlands exits the European Union	5.69	11.2	88.8
48	The rise of hatred towards Muslims	5.69	66.7	33.3
49	Prosperity decline as a result of increasing protectionism (e.g. due to large-scale Chinese and American state subsidies)	5.62	49.8	50.2
50	Prosperity decline as a result of the scaling down of economic ties with China	4.35	36.2	63.8

The respondents were asked to rate the impact that a large number of events and developments would have on the security and overall prosperity of the Netherlands if these trends were to actually occur (rating on a scale from 0 to 10). They were also asked about the likelihood that these events and trends will occur within the next five years (yes/no). When interpreting the figures, it is important to take into account the position of each event or development in the ranking as well as their average impact scores and their estimated probability of occurrence. In addition to the relative position in the ranking, the average impact scores and probability estimations also offer a great deal of information.³

Migration-related threats and Islamist terrorism

The surveys of the past three years reveal that many citizens feel a need for a clear demarcation and protection of the community. International developments that have an immediate negative impact at the national level have been the greatest source of concern for several years. This includes phenomena such as cyber sabotage, unwanted foreign interference in migrant communities in the Netherlands, large-scale irregular migration, and the undermining of society by international organised crime. At the same time, trends that could counteract some of these threats and help further the demarcation and protection of the community are viewed as hopeful developments. The present survey again confirmed this overall picture.

The results of the past two years primarily centred around protecting the community and *economic threats*. The invasion of Ukraine by Russia in February 2022 caused a shock in the Dutch population's threat perception.

Under the influence of that war and its consequences, the hierarchy of threats among Dutch citizens changed significantly, although – as later surveys showed – several of these changes were temporary. In the 2022 study, the top five threats were all Russia-related. In descending order of threat, these were: high inflation due to an international crisis; a cyber-attack; high, unwanted energy dependence on foreign countries; disinformation campaigns by other states; and increasing tensions between democracies and autocratic states. In 2023, the unwanted dependence on foreign countries for vital products was still considered the largest threat, and the hierarchy of hopes revealed a clear yearning for deglobalisation and de-risking, as revealed for instance in the pronounced hope placed on a return of manufacturing industries to Europe. While that fear and hope are still present, they appear to be less of a priority; it is likely that they were temporarily pushed up the threat and hope hierarchies by the immediate repercussions of the Russia crisis and the gas price crisis, as well as (to a lesser extent) COVID-19 and the unwanted economic dependence on China.

In this edition, by contrast, there is a stronger emphasis on migration-related threats and Islamic terrorism. After the threat of cyber sabotage of critical Dutch infrastructure, which firmly leads the list, irregular migration and various other migration-related developments rank high in the threat hierarchy: “Unwanted foreign interference in migrant communities in the Netherlands” takes second position, and “Large-scale irregular immigration, with migrants not possessing valid documentation to enter or reside in a country” is in position four. Dutch citizens' attitudes in 2024 seem to indicate a certain Hamas shock in reaction to the terrorist attacks against Israel by Hamas on 7 October, as well as the repercussions of the large-scale violence in Israel and Gaza in the form of terrorist attacks in France and other

3 The two samples were identically weighted by a large number of key characteristics such as sex, age, education, political preference and Nielsen region (place of residence). The data of the Statistics Netherlands Golden Standard was used as a benchmark. Both weighted samples are representative for the Dutch population as a whole and are well comparable.

countries.⁴ Whereas the fear of terrorist attacks ranked very low for many years, the threat of an Islamic terrorist attack in the Netherlands now stands at number three, with 66% percent of Dutch citizens believing this will happen within five years. The new item “the rise of intolerant religious movements in various countries” could also be connected with the war between Israel and Hamas. Furthermore, migration was strongly politicised during the recent general elections in the Netherlands, which will also have played a role in the prominence of migration-related items in the threat ranking.

Threat of war

Military leaders claim that the threat of a large-scale international military conflict in Europe has not been this high since the Cold War.⁵ In that connection, we see two high-ranking concerns among Dutch citizens: the insufficiency of the EU’s military capacity (position 8) and involvement in a war due to an attack on an EU member state or a NATO ally (position 9 in the threat hierarchy). These possibilities are seen as significant threats, and not less than 35% of Dutch citizens consider it likely that the Netherlands will be involved in such a war in the coming five years.⁶

Also relatively high in the threat hierarchy are nuclear war (position 13) and a Russian victory in Ukraine (position 17). Nuclear war is a textbook example of a development that is perceived as threatening but unlikely: 14% of Dutch citizens consider it likely that nuclear war will occur within five years. However, the majority – 57% – expect that Russia will win the war with Ukraine in the next five years.

The other war-related developments in the threat hierarchy rank mid-table, occupying positions between 22 and 34 on a list of 50. In declining order of threat, these are: escalation of the war in the Middle East (position 22), the ineffectiveness of NATO (position 28), and involvement in a war outside of the EU and NATO (position 34).

4 See <https://nos.nl/artikel/2494046-tien-mensen-vast-voor-aanslag-franse-docent-regering-zet-7000-militairen-in>

5 <https://nos.nl/artikel/2505275-navo-admiraal-samenleving-moet-het-onverwachte-gaan-verwachten>
<https://time.com/6336897/israel-war-gaza-world-war-iii/>
<https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2024/01/25/why-is-nato-preparing-for-world-war-iii/>

6 In Great Britain, the majority already believes that World War III will break out within five to ten years. See <https://youngov.co.uk/politics/articles/48527-world-war-3-likely-in-next-5-10-years-think-most-britons>

Table 2 Hierarchy of hope

	Development	Impact	Probability (%yes %no)	
1	Better protection against cyberattacks on critical infrastructure (e.g. critical waterworks and payment systems)	7.77	67.3	32.7
2	Enlargement of NATO to include Sweden	7.58	87.5	12.5
3	Reinforcement of modern manufacturing industries in the Netherlands (e.g. chip industry)	7.57	69.4	30.6
4	Better international cooperation to combat international drug crime	7.36	56.0	44.0
5	Adjustment to climate change through targeted investments (e.g. raising dykes, giving rivers more room)	7.31	73.9	26.1
6	Reduction of unwanted dependence on foreign countries for vital products (raw materials, energy, chips, medicines, weapons)	7.30	32.8	67.2
7	More collaboration with origin countries for the return of asylum seekers who have exhausted all rights of appeal in the Netherlands	7.25	35.8	64.2
8	Better protection against physical attacks on critical infrastructure (e.g. energy infrastructure, digital communication cables)	7.24	56.6	43.4
9	The countries of the EU invest more in the safety of the European region in order to reduce their military dependence on the United States	7.22	52.0	48.0
10	Schools devote more attention to recognising fake news and conspiracy theories	7.20	62.5	37.5
11	Reinforcing the resilience of Dutch elections against unwanted foreign interference	7.17	40.1	59.9
12	More transparency in the foreign funding of political parties	7.14	35.6	64.4
13	International agreements to reduce the numbers of nuclear weapons and prevent the spread and use of nuclear weapons	7.12	18.1	81.9
14	Tech companies must satisfy stricter rules (e.g. to protect the privacy of citizens or combat disinformation)	7.04	58.9	41.1
15	Economic rise of countries in the European region due to the relocation of production from China and Russia to the EU and surrounding countries	7.02	38.5	61.5
16	Technological innovations that help combat climate change	6.96	61.3	38.7
17	Reinforcement of NATO's unity and strength	6.83	61.1	38.9
18	International collaboration against tax havens	6.81	28.2	71.8
19	Investments in resilience against corporate espionage	6.78	56.3	43.7
20	World-wide effort to combat illnesses and viruses in order to prevent severe consequences from a new pandemic	6.76	46.6	53.4
21	Limiting immigration	6.65	61.1	38.9
22	Introduction of European legislation in case regimes deliberately send refugees to member states in order to weaken them	6.63	43.6	56.4
23	European countries increase investments in defence	6.54	75.7	24.3
24	Reinforcing the resilience of migrant communities against unwanted foreign interference ("long arm politics")	6.51	25.4	74.6

	Development	Impact	Probability (%yes %no)	
25	Acceleration of the energy transition by means of nuclear energy	6.49	49.8	50.2
26	Circular labour migration to address labour shortages in critical sectors (meaning that migrants return to their country of origin after a period of work)	6.42	47.7	52.3
27	Secret services given more powers to combat terrorism	6.39	69.1	30.9
28	Improvement of the relationship between the United States and China	6.25	28.0	72.0
29	Reinforcement of the transatlantic relationship between Europe and the United States	6.20	48.1	51.9
30	Tighter government control over religious education and “weekend schools”	6.15	48.2	51.8
31	Reinforcement of the relationship between the West and relevant third countries (e.g. India, Gulf states, South Africa, Brazil)	6.12	38.1	61.9
32	Acceleration of the energy transition by means of green energy (e.g. solar and wind energy)	6.12	56.3	43.7
33	More initiatives and programmes to curb global overpopulation	6.12	19.1	80.9
34	Reinforcement of the unity and strength of the EU	6.12	38.3	61.7
35	Less meddling by countries in each other’s internal affairs	6.06	25.2	74.8
36	The European Union shows more respect for the sovereignty of member states	6.05	25.0	75.0
37	Reinforcement of the economy through technological innovation, digitalisation and artificial intelligence	5.92	82.5	17.5
38	Relocation of the handling of asylum requests from the Netherlands to another country outside of Europe (as Italy is planning with Albania)	5.90	37.3	62.7
39	Democratic resistance against the influence of large international organisations such as the World Economic Forum	5.80	25.7	74.3
40	Investing in development cooperation, also in the interest of the Netherlands	5.48	34.2	65.8
41	Attracting labour migrants to address labour shortages in critical sectors	4.89	67.3	32.7
42	Accession of Ukraine to the European Union	4.32	44.6	55.4
43	Accession of the Western Balkans to the European Union (Albania, Montenegro, Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, North Macedonia)	3.35	24.8	75.2

Less attention for other geopolitical developments

Aside from the threat of war as an extreme form of geopolitical dynamics, the Dutch public has less attention for other changes in the international environment. Exceptions are global overpopulation (position 10) and the undermining of democratic states (position 11). Both of these developments are also considered likely by a majority of Dutch citizens.

The other geopolitical developments included in the survey are not considered particularly threatening. This applies to the growing power of big tech companies (position 19), the erosion of the international legal order (position 24), the growing influence of China and Russia (position 26), the weakening of the US security guarantee to Europe (position 35), the struggle between democratic and autocratic regimes (position 36) and Europe losing the technological competition (position 44). Those developments thus occupy positions between 19 and 44 in the ranking hierarchy, meaning that they are perceived as moderately to mildly threatening. It should be noted, however, that several of these threats are considered likely by the vast majority of the population, such as the growing power of big tech companies (position 19, judged likely by 72%) and the growing power of China and Russia (position 26, judged likely by 82%).

Finally, a noteworthy finding is that the consequences of increasing protectionism (position 49) and the decline of prosperity due to the scaling down of economic ties with China (position 50) rank at the bottom of the threat hierarchy. As was the case in our study in 2023, the economic costs of deglobalisation and de-risking are estimated to be very low. The potential impact on Dutch society of these geopolitical shifts also receives very little attention in the social and political debate in the Netherlands. It applies more generally that geopolitical developments and the question of how to deal with them received little to no attention in the recent general elections and were not strongly politicised. This could be one explanation for the lack of attention for the consequences of geopolitical developments;

another possibility is that people feel relatively shielded from the consequences of the above-mentioned geopolitical developments, even though they consider said developments likely to occur.

Similarly to the hierarchy of threats, the majority of the geopolitical developments in the hierarchy of hope is found mid-table. This applies for instance to: international agreements to limit nuclear weapons (position 13); the reinforcement of NATO's unity and strength (position 17); improvement of the relationship between the United States and China (position 28); reinforcement of the transatlantic relationship between Europe and the United States (position 29); and reinforcement of the relationship between the West and relevant third countries, e.g. India, Gulf states, South Africa, and Brazil (position 31).

Most European developments do not inspire much hope

Greater investments in the safety of the European region by the EU nations in order to reduce their military dependence on the US ranks relatively high in the hope hierarchy (position 9), as was also the case in previous years. However, Dutch citizens find little to pin their hopes on in other developments relating to the European Union. The introduction of specific European legislation in the event that migration is implemented as a weapon against member states is still viewed as somewhat hopeful (position 22), but reinforcement of the unity and strength of the EU stands at position 34; a European Union that shows more respect for the sovereignty of member states at position 36; and an enlargement of the Union ranks the very lowest of all, with the accession of Ukraine occupying the penultimate spot (position 42) and accession of the Balkans ranking last (position 43). Ukraine's membership within the coming five years is considered likely by 45%, but just 25% expect the Balkans' accession to occur within that timeframe. Finally, 11% of Dutch citizens expects a 'Nexit' within five years; remarkably, the impact of this development on Dutch security and prosperity is rated very low (position 47).

The climate perspective is changing

In the threat hierarchy, the consequences of climate change for Dutch society are seen as less of a threat. While considered a top three threat four years ago, climate change has since fallen to position 40. This relative diminishment of climate concerns in the threat hierarchy has occurred steadily over the past several years. At the same time, we see a lot of hope invested in adjustments to climate change through targeted investments, which is the fifth most hope-inspiring development, with nearly three quarters of Dutch citizens believing that something will be accomplished in this regard within five years. A relatively large amount of hope also rides on technological innovations that can help combat climate change (position 16, with 61% believing that this could happen within five years). By contrast, acceleration of the energy transition by means of green energy is found to be a lesser source of hope, with this development ranking 32nd, although a majority of 56% respondents believes it could occur within five years. This process – a relative decline in the perceived threat of climate change alongside a relative increase in hope for climate adaptation – was already visible in the *Between hope and fear* survey of 2023, and has crystallised further in the past year. The Dutch public's perception of climate change appears to be changing as part of a more general focus on demarcation and protection of the community: hopes are being pinned on the country's tall (or taller) dykes.

Fears answered by hope

The hopes and fears are, to a certain extent, mirror images of each other. The Netherlands fears international developments that threaten the national and local communities, and at the same time draws hope from trends that could protect those same communities. For example, the threat hierarchy shows that the Dutch public is worried about cyberattacks, while “better protection against cyberattacks on critical infrastructure” tops the list of hopes, with 67% of Dutch citizens believing that this can be realised within five years. Better protection against

physical attacks on critical infrastructure also ranks high in the hope hierarchy (position 8). As a remedy against an excessive dependence on foreign countries for vital products, many Dutch citizens find much hope in the reinforcement of modern manufacturing industries in the Netherlands (position 3) and the reduction of unwanted dependencies on foreign countries with regard to vital products (position 6). The hopes being pinned on these prospective developments are indicative of a continued yearning for economic deglobalisation and de-risking.

The worries about security and involvement in a war (position 9, threat hierarchy) are mirrored by the hope placed on the enlargement of NATO to include Sweden (position 2, hope hierarchy) and greater investments by EU member states in the security of the European region (position 9, hope hierarchy). The fear that international organised crime will undermine Dutch society (position 16, threat hierarchy) is mirrored by better international cooperation to combat drug crime (position 4, hope hierarchy). In short, there is a clear correspondence between several developments that are seen as threatening and developments that are seen as hopeful: people see potential solutions to the perceived threats, and in most cases, the majority expects those hopeful developments to occur within the next five years.

No correspondence between hopes and fears

The correspondence between hopes and fears is not perfect, however. For example, just one third of Dutch citizens considers it feasible to reduce unwanted dependence on vital products in the coming five years, even though de-risking is one of their prominent wishes. Similarly, various migration-related developments are seen as threatening, but developments that mitigate those threats are perceived as only marginally hopeful. This state of affairs was already found in the previous *Between hope and fear* study (conducted in 2023), and is reconfirmed by the present study. Unwanted interference in migrant communities is seen as the third most significant

threat, but reinforcing the resilience of those communities against such influences only ranks 24th in the hope hierarchy, and only 25% of Dutch citizens believe that this can be achieved within five years.

The fact that various perspectives for action to address migration rank relatively low in the hierarchy of hope also reflects the Dutch public's division on the desirability of such policies. For example, 61% of Dutch citizens judge the limitation of immigration to be likely within five years, but while some derive hope from this prospect, others do not (resulting in rank 21 in the hope hierarchy).

A strongly divided population

Not all people share the same fears or draw hope from the same developments. While there are threats and hopeful developments that the Dutch public largely agrees on, there are numerous developments on which different social groups have very different opinions. The differences in people's fears and hopes in the international context increasingly underlie the major ideological and political schisms that divide the Dutch population. The time when the Dutch population was only divided along the socioeconomic dimension of left-wing and right-wing is long past, and a new dimension is emerging.

As an initial investigation of this new division, the present study has formulated two questions. Based on the answers to these questions, three groups were identified. *Somewheres* (sometimes referred to as nationalists in the literature) are defined as people who agree with the statements: "Protecting the borders of the Netherlands and Europe is an important duty. Every country should be able to determine who gets in and who gets to stay" and "The Netherlands has its own culture and way of life, and these must be preserved". *Anywheres* (sometimes referred to as cosmopolites in the literature) are people who agree with the statements: "National borders are outdated. Borders should not prevent people from seeking happiness elsewhere" and "National cultures

are not that important or are constantly changing".⁷ In addition to *Somewheres* and *Anywheres*, we also identified an intermediate group, consisting of people who do not choose between the presented statements or who choose the nationalist statement in one instance and the cosmopolitan choice in the other. In the remainder of this document, we describe this group as *Intermediates*. Based on the answers to these two questions, the Dutch population consists of 45% *Somewheres*, 27% *Anywheres* and 28% *Intermediates*. Tables 3 to 8 present the threat and hope rankings of the *Somewheres*, *Anywheres* and *Intermediates*, respectively (see Annex).

Distribution across the threats

In the threat hierarchy of the *Somewheres*, the top five spots are occupied by migration-related developments. In descending order of threat, these are: large-scale irregular migration, unwanted foreign interference in migrant communities, large numbers of refugees due to a war near the EU, an Islamist terrorist attack in the Netherlands, and the rise of intolerant religious movements in various countries. Other migration-related items also rank relatively high in the threat hierarchy, with ranks 7, 8 and 11 going to, respectively: the use of migration as a weapon by leaders surrounding the EU; replacement of the Dutch population; and large-scale regular migration (e.g. labour migration, family migration, student migration). Clearly, *Somewheres* currently perceive migration as the greatest threat to the prosperity and security of Dutch society. By contrast, *Anywheres* find migration and migration-related developments to be far less threatening, although they do see threats in the rise of intolerant religious movements in various countries (position 12 in the threat hierarchy) and an Islamist terrorist attack (position 15). The other developments that relate to migration occupy positions 25 (the use of migration as a weapon) to 49 (replacement of

7 See David Goodhart, *The Road to Somewhere. The New Tribes Shaping British Politics*, 2017.

the Dutch population) of the Anywheres' threat hierarchy.

The top positions in the threat hierarchy according to the Anywheres is less homogenous and more geopolitical than that of the Somewheres. Anywheres fear sabotage of vital infrastructure, both through cyberattack (position 1 in the threat hierarchy) and physical sabotage (position 10). They also fear war: a Russian victory against Ukraine (position 2); involvement in a nuclear war (position 5); and war due to a territorial attack against an EU or NATO ally or the Netherlands itself (position 6). Other perceived threats are global overpopulation (position 4) and a lack of socioeconomic security for Dutch citizens as a result of an international crisis (position 7). We also see concerns among Anywheres that appear to be reactions to threats that they likely associate with nationalism: the rise of political parties in various countries who discriminate against people based on their religion or race (position 3); the undermining of democratic states and the rule of law in the European Union (position 8); and the growing polarisation and radicalisation due to foreign disinformation campaigns (position 9).

Some of the developments that Anywheres consider most threatening are also seen as threats by Somewheres: cyber sabotage of critical Dutch infrastructure (position 6 for Somewheres, position 1 for Anywheres), lack of socioeconomic security (position 12 for Somewheres, position 7 for Anywheres), and involvement in a war due to an attack on an EU or NATO member (position 14 for Somewheres, position 6 for Anywheres). However, it is very clear that these two groups have very different views on what constitutes a threat to the prosperity and security of Dutch society. Developments that cause Somewheres great concern, such as the large numbers of refugees, large-scale migration and replacement of the Dutch population, are not considered to be threats at all by Anywheres, who rank these developments at 43, 47 and 49, respectively, in the threat hierarchy. The inverse does not hold as strongly: developments that Anywheres consider threatening are also seen as threatening or

moderately threatening by Somewheres. Exceptions are the developments that Anywheres deem threatening due to associations with the growing influence of nationalism: growing polarisation and radicalisation (position 9 among Anywheres, position 31 among Somewheres) and the rise of political parties in various countries who discriminate against people based on their religion or race (position 3 among Anywheres, position 47 among Somewheres).

More unity in hope

Despite the significant differences in the fears of Somewheres and Anywheres, their hopes largely focus on the same developments. Reinforcement of modern manufacturing industries in the Netherlands; better protection against cyberattacks; enlargement of NATO to include Sweden; better international cooperation to combat drug crime; and climate adaptation rank in the top ten most hope-inspiring developments of both groups.

Somewheres also desire immigration control and reinforcement of national independence and sovereignty, and see the limitation of immigration as the most hopeful development (first position in the hierarchy of hope). They also find hope in developments that reinforce national sovereignty and independence.

The hope hierarchy of the Anywheres is more internationally oriented. Their twenty top hopes include numerous developments that presuppose international collaboration, as well as the reinforcement of the unity and strength of both the EU and NATO. Furthermore, they see hope in the prospect of schools teaching pupils how to recognise fake news and conspiracy theories (third place in their hope hierarchy) and greater transparency in the foreign funding of political parties (twelfth place).

Breakdown by political party preference

The perceived threats and hopes of citizens are strongly correlated with their preferred political party. The degree to which people's perceptions are coloured by their political views gives reason to believe that the turbulent topography of political parties in the Netherlands in fact conceals fairly stable ideological undercurrents. Tables 9 and 10 give an impression of this party-political division.⁸ In view of the fragmentation of the party-political topography in the Netherlands, caution is advised when reading these tables, as the numbers of respondents affiliated with the smallest parties are not enough to fully guarantee representativeness. However, the tables do paint a picture in broad outlines.

8 Tables 9 and 10 list groups of respondents by political party and the percentage of each group that rated the impact of the various developments 7 or higher on a scale from 0 to 10. The rightmost column notes the rating for the overall population. In Table 9, the threat table, a red or dark red colour shows that the supporters feel threatened or very threatened by a development, while a green or dark green colour indicates that this is less or much less so. In Table 10, the hopes table, a red or dark red colour means that the supporters derive little or very little hope from a development, while a green or dark green colour indicates that they are hopeful or very hopeful about the trend in question.

Table 9 Threatening developments, differentiated according to the respondents' preferred political party

	PVV	GL/ PvdA	WVD	NSC	D66	BBB	CDA	SP	FvD	PvdD	SGP	DENK	Chris- ten- Unie	Volt	Other	Non voters	Total
Cyber sabotage of critical Dutch infrastructure (e.g. energy, payment, drinking water infrastructure)	72.0%	72.8%	75.4%	76.5%	81.8%	74.5%	75.5%	70.7%	74.2%	84.5%	78.5%	80.6%	81.0%	74.5%	70.4%	72.8%	74.6%
An Islamist terrorist attack in the Netherlands	88.2%	56.9%	74.9%	69.3%	59.8%	77.2%	68.6%	69.6%	64.3%	44.4%	81.5%	21.3%	53.2%	68.4%	55.7%	65.7%	69.7%
The rise of intolerant religious movements in various countries	83.2%	65.4%	69.1%	69.0%	71.2%	78.5%	63.1%	66.7%	54.7%	71.2%	47.6%	21.3%	49.2%	50.0%	68.3%	66.7%	69.2%
High, unwanted dependence on foreign countries for vital products (e.g. raw materials, energy, chips, medication, weapons)	73.0%	64.5%	68.0%	70.1%	71.1%	75.4%	61.5%	69.6%	72.3%	71.6%	70.2%	38.7%	76.6%	62.5%	76.7%	67.5%	68.9%
Unwanted foreign interference in migrant communities in the Netherlands	91.8%	51.8%	67.4%	69.1%	48.9%	79.6%	59.6%	66.0%	71.4%	52.9%	75.4%	56.5%	47.6%	40.0%	50.0%	65.0%	68.2%
Global overpopulation	76.0%	66.7%	67.5%	67.4%	66.3%	76.0%	58.3%	76.5%	28.2%	67.6%	30.2%	54.8%	61.9%	71.4%	47.5%	72.0%	68.1%
Insufficient military capacity among EU member states to defend European territory	73.8%	61.4%	71.2%	69.9%	72.9%	69.0%	70.5%	68.0%	36.9%	60.3%	80.0%	57.4%	67.2%	77.8%	44.1%	63.8%	67.7%
Lack of socioeconomic security for Dutch citizens (e.g. inability to make ends meet financially) as a result of an international crisis	80.2%	66.2%	50.9%	65.7%	53.0%	65.7%	46.1%	83.0%	68.2%	71.2%	67.2%	46.8%	55.6%	62.5%	84.5%	74.1%	67.1%
Involvement in a war due to a territorial attack against an EU or NATO ally or the Netherlands itself	67.6%	72.2%	63.1%	58.5%	80.3%	70.3%	65.7%	63.0%	48.5%	79.2%	76.9%	38.7%	72.6%	66.1%	58.3%	70.0%	67.0%
Large-scale irregular immigration, with migrants not possessing valid documentation to enter or reside in a country	93.1%	33.9%	73.1%	68.4%	49.5%	74.3%	68.6%	63.4%	91.4%	47.8%	76.7%	22.6%	46.0%	33.3%	45.8%	65.1%	66.4%
Growing polarisation and radicalisation due to foreign disinformation campaigns (e.g. around elections in the Netherlands, around the war in Ukraine)	59.5%	81.3%	62.6%	64.7%	76.8%	69.9%	67.3%	78.0%	25.0%	84.9%	71.0%	80.3%	71.9%	78.6%	79.3%	56.9%	66.1%
Physical sabotage of critical Dutch infrastructure (e.g. energy, payment, drinking water infrastructure)	63.7%	69.9%	61.5%	64.0%	72.5%	64.1%	63.2%	64.4%	62.0%	71.1%	65.1%	38.7%	73.0%	67.9%	82.0%	68.2%	65.7%
Undermining of democratic states and the rule of law in the European Union (e.g. due to corruption, erosion of the independence of the judiciary)	56.5%	75.1%	59.9%	62.7%	76.8%	64.4%	59.0%	74.0%	56.9%	83.1%	45.3%	80.6%	71.4%	75.0%	71.2%	65.2%	65.0%
Russia wins the war with Ukraine	48.1%	78.3%	76.6%	74.2%	83.1%	68.7%	72.1%	74.0%	6.0%	76.4%	69.4%	2.6%	64.4%	56.4%	42.3%	56.2%	64.1%
Use of migration as a weapon by leaders surrounding the EU	75.6%	56.0%	62.2%	61.7%	61.2%	66.7%	59.4%	68.1%	81.5%	60.7%	69.1%	93.5%	70.4%	60.4%	44.6%	55.9%	63.8%
Undermining of Dutch society by international organised crime	69.5%	54.3%	61.2%	62.6%	68.5%	81.5%	65.3%	66.3%	50.7%	60.3%	72.9%	26.2%	66.7%	75.0%	37.9%	60.7%	62.7%
The growing power of big tech companies (e.g. Facebook, TikTok and X)	59.5%	68.9%	47.9%	59.8%	66.5%	62.1%	54.4%	73.5%	57.1%	75.8%	56.3%	98.4%	54.8%	62.5%	71.2%	67.5%	62.4%
EU rendered ineffective by internal divisions and differences	57.4%	73.8%	63.0%	65.1%	66.7%	52.9%	61.5%	59.4%	34.3%	73.6%	45.2%	74.0%	68.8%	72.2%	51.7%	59.4%	62.1%
Unwanted foreign interference in elections in the Netherlands	68.8%	67.2%	57.5%	57.9%	67.9%	70.3%	52.9%	70.6%	43.3%	73.0%	66.2%	43.5%	65.6%	69.1%	62.1%	54.7%	62.0%
Involvement in a nuclear war	51.8%	79.2%	57.2%	58.1%	79.0%	50.7%	60.2%	60.0%	53.5%	82.2%	64.9%	72.5%	69.8%	67.9%	74.6%	58.1%	61.7%
NATO rendered ineffective by internal divisions and differences	60.3%	66.0%	63.8%	62.7%	66.8%	65.3%	64.9%	57.3%	29.5%	69.7%	68.9%	68.6%	72.1%	59.3%	24.6%	56.3%	61.2%
Growing influence of China and Russia in important third countries (e.g. India, the Gulf states, South Africa, Balkans and Brazil)	58.2%	62.0%	65.3%	68.6%	63.3%	66.7%	72.5%	66.3%	41.8%	69.9%	66.7%	4.8%	57.1%	80.0%	41.7%	57.4%	61.1%
Erosion of the international legal order (e.g. due to ineffectiveness of the UN Security Council)	43.6%	74.0%	57.1%	57.3%	72.8%	61.2%	52.5%	62.1%	16.9%	70.0%	50.8%	96.8%	65.6%	76.9%	62.0%	69.5%	60.5%
Escalation of the war in the Middle East (through involvement of e.g. Hezbollah, Iran, and/or the US)	60.8%	53.0%	57.4%	56.9%	56.9%	67.9%	67.0%	65.3%	37.1%	59.7%	75.0%	43.5%	70.5%	63.0%	27.6%	70.2%	59.8%
Large numbers of refugees due to a war near the EU	88.5%	26.0%	62.6%	62.1%	32.7%	70.3%	57.1%	58.0%	91.7%	30.6%	68.3%	38.7%	39.7%	45.6%	38.3%	61.5%	59.7%
Rise of hatred against Jews	61.9%	58.4%	58.1%	57.1%	53.1%	58.1%	65.4%	68.6%	37.7%	72.3%	87.9%	1.6%	78.1%	66.1%	65.0%	59.9%	59.3%
Inflation as a result of an international crisis	70.5%	56.5%	52.4%	61.2%	47.2%	59.9%	45.5%	67.0%	66.7%	50.0%	58.5%	56.5%	45.8%	71.7%	63.8%	55.6%	58.8%
Increase of social tensions in the Netherlands due to a foreign conflict (e.g. due to the war between Russia and Ukraine, or the war between Israel and Hamas)	68.6%	53.5%	52.2%	57.4%	52.0%	60.4%	64.2%	69.0%	68.6%	49.3%	61.5%	80.6%	53.1%	56.9%	35.0%	53.6%	58.2%
Damage to our pensions caused by an international crisis	74.2%	39.9%	52.0%	58.0%	42.9%	72.5%	44.4%	71.9%	70.0%	44.4%	27.7%	63.3%	35.0%	50.9%	55.0%	57.3%	56.8%

	PVV	GL/ PvdA	VVD	NSC	D66	BBB	CDA	SP	FvD	PvdD	SGP	DENK	Chris- ten- Unie	Volt	Other	Non voters	Total
A left-wing extremist terrorist attack in the Netherlands	76.8%	42.0%	56.6%	55.4%	50.0%	65.5%	58.0%	54.5%	62.7%	38.1%	69.6%	41.3%	54.0%	41.1%	49.2%	47.0%	56.3%
Weakening of the US security guarantee to Europe (e.g. due to political developments in the US or US-China conflict)	51.2%	61.4%	61.6%	57.2%	57.9%	59.7%	66.3%	48.5%	21.2%	64.6%	64.5%	18.0%	49.2%	64.8%	40.8%	57.9%	56.0%
The rise of political parties in various countries who discriminate against people based on their religion or race	20.5%	82.7%	49.6%	51.1%	82.8%	42.4%	56.9%	74.5%	14.3%	85.3%	58.5%	100.0%	76.6%	86.0%	80.0%	63.6%	55.6%
Corporate espionage by other countries	62.3%	49.5%	56.3%	63.0%	50.5%	59.3%	57.3%	64.3%	43.8%	47.8%	65.6%	30.0%	60.7%	68.5%	58.2%	47.8%	55.6%
A military conflict between the United States and China	52.1%	59.0%	55.3%	52.8%	62.9%	53.2%	57.0%	54.5%	48.6%	69.6%	59.0%	54.8%	66.1%	68.5%	55.4%	52.0%	55.2%
A right-wing extremist terrorist attack in the Netherlands	44.6%	72.0%	56.4%	52.9%	67.5%	58.3%	62.7%	70.0%	23.9%	62.2%	54.1%	41.0%	57.1%	74.1%	70.0%	49.2%	55.2%
Consequences for Dutch society of climate change (flooding, heat stress, drought, damage to the environment and biodiversity)	32.2%	85.3%	53.5%	59.5%	83.5%	38.2%	54.5%	71.6%	2.8%	95.6%	28.8%	40.7%	69.8%	78.6%	67.2%	50.4%	54.9%
High debts in Europe threaten the stability of the euro	64.9%	39.1%	49.6%	51.1%	36.6%	54.4%	45.0%	58.9%	70.0%	45.9%	57.1%	96.1%	52.6%	54.7%	64.8%	57.9%	54.1%
Involvement in a war outside EU or NATO territory (e.g. Ukraine or Taiwan)	56.4%	47.2%	48.2%	49.6%	50.8%	58.6%	58.4%	53.0%	58.2%	61.6%	54.7%	41.0%	35.5%	41.1%	30.9%	62.3%	52.9%
Insufficient access to natural resources and critical raw materials (e.g. metals for the production of chips and solar cells)	48.9%	58.0%	53.9%	55.4%	61.7%	62.8%	51.5%	53.5%	38.2%	55.0%	39.7%	38.7%	48.3%	73.2%	64.9%	48.1%	52.9%
Increasing international tensions due to ideological conflicts between democratic and autocratic states	53.1%	57.3%	57.7%	49.7%	60.9%	57.5%	55.2%	55.8%	38.7%	64.8%	42.2%	41.9%	39.0%	64.2%	27.6%	40.5%	51.5%
Large-scale regular migration (e.g. labour migration, family migration, student migration)	84.1%	21.4%	51.8%	61.7%	22.8%	64.6%	52.0%	44.9%	84.8%	29.2%	63.1%	1.6%	18.8%	35.7%	34.5%	44.1%	51.2%
The Netherlands exits the European Union	16.0%	87.0%	62.0%	51.4%	85.6%	35.9%	62.0%	49.0%	0.0%	77.5%	12.3%	38.7%	63.9%	89.1%	60.0%	45.9%	50.5%
Disruption of society and economy due to emerging technologies (e.g. artificial intelligence)	50.5%	48.7%	37.1%	51.6%	45.5%	60.6%	43.4%	44.9%	47.9%	48.5%	66.2%	77.4%	44.3%	57.1%	39.0%	58.5%	50.3%
Replacement of the Dutch population	82.8%	14.3%	49.9%	47.0%	21.7%	70.9%	45.7%	37.3%	94.4%	27.9%	69.0%	0.0%	21.1%	9.1%	38.9%	53.8%	50.2%
Major consequences of European court decisions for Dutch policy	76.7%	18.4%	41.0%	48.3%	11.1%	60.9%	31.5%	43.2%	92.5%	18.8%	65.6%	56.5%	20.0%	9.1%	56.9%	58.7%	48.8%
The rise of hatred against Muslims	28.0%	69.4%	39.7%	42.4%	60.8%	42.5%	50.5%	62.7%	11.6%	68.9%	27.7%	100.0%	47.6%	58.9%	75.0%	50.2%	47.2%
Europe loses the technological competition between the major powers	47.7%	41.7%	47.6%	52.7%	48.7%	53.6%	42.9%	43.3%	55.1%	44.1%	12.3%	29.4%	35.0%	68.5%	64.2%	47.7%	47.1%
A new severe pandemic	36.0%	61.4%	42.3%	44.6%	57.9%	35.2%	45.5%	47.0%	19.7%	64.2%	41.9%	61.3%	55.7%	69.1%	62.9%	49.1%	46.9%
Prosperity decline as a result of increasing protectionism (e.g. due to large-scale Chinese and American state subsidies)	38.7%	30.4%	37.8%	39.4%	29.5%	49.1%	34.4%	45.7%	37.7%	31.4%	34.5%	79.7%	26.3%	50.0%	14.0%	45.4%	38.6%
Prosperity decline as a result of the scaling down of economic ties with China	26.3%	12.2%	17.5%	17.0%	10.6%	21.2%	19.6%	14.9%	25.4%	9.7%	11.1%	2.0%	5.0%	7.4%	45.6%	27.8%	19.7%

Table 10 Hope-inspiring developments, differentiated according to the respondents' preferred political party

	PVV	GL/ PvdA	VVD	NSC	D66	BBB	CDA	SP	FvD	PvdD	SGP	DENK	Chris- ten- Unie	Volt	Other	Non voters	Total
Better protection against cyberattacks on critical infrastructure (e.g. critical waterworks and payment systems)	74.4%	89.8%	84.1%	84.8%	91.3%	72.6%	90.9%	79.2%	53.1%	92.8%	79.0%	60.0%	87.7%	89.1%	79.2%	68.7%	79.9%
Reinforcement of modern manufacturing industries in the Netherlands (e.g. chip industry)	77.0%	77.7%	83.9%	83.5%	84.0%	72.3%	81.8%	72.2%	55.7%	64.7%	55.9%	68.9%	77.4%	80.8%	79.2%	74.9%	77.7%
Enlargement of NATO to include Sweden	72.3%	87.4%	86.9%	81.3%	88.4%	76.5%	90.9%	82.8%	22.2%	73.1%	61.7%	0.0%	78.2%	88.9%	48.9%	59.4%	75.1%
Adaptation to climate change through targeted investments (e.g. raising dykes, giving rivers more room)	71.5%	83.7%	74.9%	79.8%	84.8%	67.2%	81.0%	77.3%	40.9%	85.9%	57.6%	57.8%	89.8%	75.9%	64.8%	59.9%	73.2%
Better international cooperation to combat international drug crime	67.8%	80.9%	79.6%	76.3%	88.0%	72.4%	91.0%	68.0%	42.9%	79.4%	85.5%	57.8%	75.9%	81.5%	63.0%	61.0%	73.0%
Reduction of unwanted dependence on foreign countries for vital products (raw materials, energy, chips, medicines, weapons)	66.0%	73.5%	77.2%	76.7%	77.9%	68.1%	80.8%	69.5%	65.6%	73.5%	78.7%	57.8%	82.1%	77.4%	77.4%	71.0%	72.7%
More collaboration with origin countries for the return of asylum seekers who have exhausted all rights of appeal in the Netherlands	77.9%	63.8%	79.6%	79.3%	74.1%	65.4%	81.0%	67.8%	62.1%	64.7%	83.6%	33.3%	78.0%	71.2%	42.3%	66.0%	71.8%
Schools devote more attention to recognising fake news and conspiracy theories	58.5%	93.8%	79.7%	72.8%	90.2%	66.7%	93.0%	78.0%	12.9%	84.5%	66.1%	53.3%	83.1%	92.5%	72.2%	53.7%	71.6%
Better protection against physical attacks on critical infrastructure (e.g. energy infrastructure, digital communication cables)	66.6%	81.7%	81.8%	77.3%	80.0%	70.7%	80.8%	73.0%	46.7%	77.9%	73.8%	50.0%	82.1%	75.5%	59.6%	54.8%	71.4%
The countries of the EU invest more in the safety of the European region in order to reduce their military dependence on the United States	65.5%	74.7%	77.6%	72.6%	68.7%	68.2%	82.8%	80.9%	44.4%	55.9%	64.5%	71.1%	77.2%	83.3%	57.1%	59.8%	69.3%
Tech companies must satisfy stricter rules (e.g. to protect the privacy of citizens or combat disinformation)	60.1%	87.4%	63.5%	74.9%	86.3%	59.3%	78.8%	77.9%	23.4%	89.9%	62.7%	80.0%	72.1%	83.0%	76.8%	57.5%	68.8%
More transparency in the foreign funding of political parties	56.3%	87.6%	68.0%	66.0%	72.7%	66.9%	76.3%	68.8%	48.3%	83.3%	56.1%	93.3%	78.6%	86.5%	82.4%	58.3%	68.2%
Technological innovations that help combat climate change	49.4%	86.3%	75.4%	72.4%	91.9%	61.1%	82.8%	74.0%	21.5%	88.4%	37.9%	55.6%	87.0%	90.7%	65.5%	56.6%	67.6%
Economic rise of countries in the European region due to the relocation of production from China and Russia to the EU and surrounding countries	59.4%	75.6%	74.8%	67.2%	76.0%	59.9%	69.1%	64.8%	50.0%	75.4%	72.6%	44.4%	75.5%	87.0%	69.1%	62.0%	67.5%
International agreements to reduce the numbers of nuclear weapons and prevent the spread and use of nuclear weapons	56.8%	85.7%	59.3%	64.3%	77.6%	62.0%	78.4%	62.0%	50.8%	89.9%	61.7%	22.2%	68.5%	92.6%	78.2%	69.2%	67.3%
Reinforcing the resilience of Dutch elections against unwanted foreign interference	65.4%	80.2%	70.9%	72.6%	74.0%	57.8%	78.5%	70.7%	54.2%	75.0%	77.8%	26.7%	71.2%	79.6%	66.7%	46.2%	66.6%
World-wide effort to combat illnesses and viruses in order to prevent severe consequences from a new pandemic	50.9%	86.3%	73.3%	66.2%	84.8%	50.7%	80.4%	71.9%	9.5%	79.7%	32.2%	27.3%	67.3%	83.3%	60.7%	61.1%	65.6%
Reinforcement of NATO's unity and strength	50.3%	76.8%	84.1%	70.9%	86.4%	55.4%	88.0%	60.4%	17.7%	56.9%	61.4%	31.4%	71.9%	83.3%	40.0%	47.3%	63.9%
Introduction of European legislation in case regimes deliberately send refugees to member states in order to weaken them	61.2%	60.7%	72.9%	71.2%	68.0%	59.3%	69.9%	58.0%	36.7%	62.3%	57.9%	26.7%	56.5%	71.4%	41.3%	61.4%	63.2%
International collaboration against tax havens	52.8%	88.5%	56.2%	62.9%	70.7%	52.7%	69.3%	78.9%	31.7%	89.6%	47.5%	75.6%	61.0%	86.5%	73.5%	50.0%	62.6%
Reinforcing the resilience of migrant communities against unwanted foreign interference ("long arm politics")	52.6%	71.6%	62.7%	67.0%	72.3%	53.9%	68.0%	63.2%	61.1%	72.6%	68.0%	30.2%	58.5%	80.9%	58.0%	46.7%	60.3%
Limiting immigration	86.2%	14.6%	71.4%	70.7%	18.8%	76.1%	55.8%	36.7%	78.8%	29.2%	76.3%	46.7%	36.8%	18.9%	37.0%	67.5%	59.2%
Circular labour migration to address labour shortages in critical sectors (meaning that migrants return to their country of origin after a period of work)	51.8%	56.2%	70.4%	61.1%	73.5%	53.6%	72.7%	58.1%	41.5%	32.3%	55.0%	77.3%	64.4%	77.4%	38.5%	55.9%	58.9%
Investments in resilience against corporate espionage	52.6%	64.7%	66.6%	67.1%	60.8%	45.3%	66.3%	63.0%	33.3%	41.7%	57.9%	68.6%	63.0%	68.8%	46.8%	52.9%	58.8%
European countries increase investments in defence	61.3%	50.7%	75.2%	67.0%	56.7%	69.7%	79.0%	51.0%	29.0%	33.3%	58.3%	22.2%	77.6%	71.7%	31.5%	46.4%	58.4%
Acceleration of the energy transition by means of nuclear energy	75.5%	29.4%	77.8%	64.2%	55.1%	63.5%	63.9%	31.5%	72.6%	30.9%	75.0%	31.3%	52.9%	63.5%	47.9%	41.9%	57.7%
Reinforcement of the unity and strength of the EU	34.4%	83.3%	63.4%	54.9%	83.7%	39.4%	72.7%	57.9%	9.4%	67.6%	14.8%	0.0%	61.1%	87.0%	46.0%	46.9%	54.7%
Secret services given more powers to combat terrorism	68.0%	37.1%	70.7%	59.7%	45.4%	58.7%	53.7%	31.9%	24.2%	40.6%	73.8%	2.3%	61.0%	41.2%	38.9%	50.9%	54.4%

	PVV	GL/ PvdA	VVD	NSC	D66	BBB	CDA	SP	FvD	PvdD	SGP	DENK	Chris- ten- Unie	Volt	Other	Non voters	Total
Acceleration of the energy transition by means of green energy (e.g. solar and wind energy)	22.3%	92.7%	57.0%	49.9%	88.0%	24.3%	66.3%	65.6%	1.5%	88.4%	23.0%	54.5%	75.4%	88.9%	60.0%	49.9%	53.9%
More initiatives and programmes to curb global overpopulation	50.6%	56.8%	60.8%	53.2%	67.0%	38.9%	49.5%	54.9%	11.7%	61.8%	28.3%	2.3%	27.8%	65.4%	49.0%	51.2%	51.8%
Reinforcement of the relationship between the West and relevant third countries (e.g. India, Gulf states, South Africa, Brazil)	36.3%	71.3%	59.3%	57.5%	55.3%	39.4%	61.2%	50.6%	19.7%	52.3%	41.4%	69.8%	37.7%	75.5%	54.0%	41.1%	51.0%
Improvement of the relationship between the United States and China	44.9%	59.7%	58.6%	54.2%	59.9%	46.8%	62.0%	46.7%	36.8%	49.3%	40.0%	2.2%	32.7%	51.0%	44.4%	49.4%	51.0%
Tighter government control over religious education and "weekend schools"	69.2%	40.3%	61.3%	50.8%	45.6%	50.7%	35.1%	54.9%	33.9%	53.1%	13.8%	0.0%	14.3%	46.2%	37.0%	48.8%	50.9%
Reinforcement of the transatlantic relationship between Europe and the United States	48.6%	52.4%	70.1%	58.8%	52.3%	48.8%	64.6%	35.2%	17.5%	27.7%	49.2%	0.0%	55.4%	52.8%	26.1%	41.1%	50.5%
Reinforcement of the economy through technological innovation, digitalisation and artificial intelligence	41.1%	53.4%	68.1%	51.5%	69.6%	42.5%	62.8%	34.8%	28.6%	32.4%	19.6%	26.7%	46.3%	71.7%	34.5%	38.0%	48.8%
Relocation of the handling of asylum requests from the Netherlands to another country outside of Europe (as Italy is planning with Albania)	75.0%	12.2%	58.7%	63.3%	20.6%	63.0%	42.4%	32.1%	60.9%	24.6%	55.6%	31.4%	16.7%	13.7%	34.0%	44.3%	48.5%
The European Union shows more respect for the sovereignty of member states	58.7%	21.3%	51.9%	55.3%	21.3%	56.4%	47.9%	55.6%	73.0%	15.9%	81.8%	31.4%	48.1%	13.5%	35.8%	54.2%	47.6%
Less meddling by countries in each other's internal affairs	69.2%	18.0%	44.1%	53.7%	17.1%	55.9%	31.6%	40.0%	73.8%	35.9%	80.4%	25.6%	30.9%	17.6%	41.2%	50.6%	46.4%
Investing in development cooperation, also in the interest of the Netherlands	14.2%	82.3%	31.5%	38.8%	73.0%	22.9%	61.9%	58.5%	11.5%	83.6%	49.1%	46.7%	65.0%	80.0%	54.2%	33.0%	42.6%
Democratic resistance against the influence of large international organisations such as the World Economic Forum	54.8%	31.7%	25.1%	46.0%	13.9%	61.1%	17.3%	51.4%	89.2%	56.1%	69.6%	33.3%	32.4%	24.4%	52.2%	36.9%	41.5%
Attracting labour migrants to address labour shortages in critical sectors	15.8%	56.1%	44.1%	26.1%	61.4%	22.0%	41.1%	41.6%	14.1%	38.2%	19.4%	26.7%	27.6%	60.4%	25.5%	23.1%	33.1%
Accession of Ukraine to the European Union	11.7%	55.2%	29.7%	26.2%	39.3%	16.4%	41.0%	31.5%	6.2%	30.3%	22.0%	20.0%	42.6%	66.7%	23.2%	17.4%	27.5%
Accession of the Western Balkans to the European Union (Albania, Montenegro, Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, North Macedonia)	5.7%	33.0%	11.6%	11.3%	24.1%	8.6%	20.7%	16.3%	7.8%	26.6%	3.2%	33.3%	19.2%	30.0%	13.0%	10.0%	14.5%

In the following discussion, we will examine in more detail the perceptions of the supporters of the two biggest parties in the recent national elections, whose party programmes diverge fundamentally on many topics. Looking at the constituencies of PVV and GL/PvdA and the developments that they find threatening and hopeful in the international environment, we find that aside from a number of significant differences, there are also several noteworthy similarities. The percentage of people in these constituencies that perceive the presented developments as threatening does not differ strongly in many cases. This is even more pronounced in the hope hierarchy, where the constituencies of the biggest parties largely concur.

Where differences do exist, these relate to politically significant topics: climate, migration, national sovereignty and the European Union. Among GL/PvdA voters, 85% find the consequences of climate change to be threatening, compared to 32% of the PVV constituency. Migration, on the other hand, is considered far more threatening by PVV voters than GL/PvdA: irregular migration is seen as a threat by 93% of PVV voters and 34% of GL/PvdA voters; large-scale regular migration is threatening to 84% of PVV voters and 21% of GL/PvdA voters; large numbers of refugees register as a threat for 89% of PVV voters and 26% of GL/PvdA voters; replacement of the Dutch population is deemed threatening by 83% of PVV voters and merely 14% of GL/PvdA voters. These are large differences on the subjects of both climate and migration, but what also stands out is the significant percentage of PVV voters (32%) that is concerned about climate change, and the substantial percentage of GL/PvdA voters that (with the exception of replacement of the Dutch population) considers large-scale migration (irregular, regular and refugees) to be threatening (ranging from 21% to 34%).

The constituencies of PVV and GL/PvdA have very different attitudes towards national sovereignty and, to a certain extent, also towards the related issue of the European Union. Many PVV voters (77%) find European

court decisions to be a threat to Dutch policy, which opinion is shared by just 18% of GL/PvdA voters. Of the PVV constituency, a mere 16% see the Netherlands leaving the EU as threatening, compared to 87% in the GL/PvdA constituency. It should be noted, however, that there are also remarkable similarities to be found in these two groups' threat perceptions with regard to Europe, namely with respect to the lack of military capacity on the part of EU member states, the ineffectiveness of the EU due to internal divisions and differences, concerns about the stability of the euro in light of large European debts, and the fact that Europe is losing the technological competition between the major powers.

Looking at the most hopeful developments by constituency, we find that – despite the strong polarisation between PVV and GL/PvdA – their hopes do overlap to a certain extent. The top ten hopes of both constituencies include better defence of critical infrastructure against cyberattacks (deemed hopeful by 90% of the GL/PvdA constituency and 74% of the PVV constituency), as well as the enlargement of NATO to include Sweden (hope-inspiring for 87% of GL/PvdA voters and 72% of PVV voters) and adaptation to climate change through targeted investments (84% of GL/PvdA voters and 72% of PVV voters). All in all, PVV voters are less hopeful than GL/PvdA voters. The average proportion of PVV voters that finds hope in the ten developments rated most hopeful by their own constituency is 75%; the corresponding figure among GL/PvdA voters is 88%.

The developments considered hopeful by the PVV constituency that also appear in the GL/PvdA top ten are ranked 6th, 7th and 8th in the PVV voters' hope hierarchy. The other most hope-inspiring developments from the perspective of PVV voters are: limiting immigration (86% finds hope in this); agreements with third countries to take back rejected asylum seekers (78%); reinforcing modern manufacturing industries in the Netherlands (77%); accelerating the climate transition using nuclear energy (76%); extraterritorial handling of asylum requests (75%); stricter government control over religious education and so-called weekend schools (69%);

and less meddling by countries in each other's internal affairs (69%).

For the GL/PvdA constituency, the hope-inspiring developments shared with the PVV constituency are ranked 3rd, 7th and 9th. The other most hopeful developments are: schools devote more attention to fake news and conspiracy theories (deemed hopeful by 94% of the GL-PvdA constituency); energy transition using green energy (93%); international collaboration against tax havens (89%); more transparency in the foreign funding of political parties (88%); stricter rules for tech companies (87%); a global approach to diseases and viruses (86%); and reinforcing the unity and strength of the EU (83%).

What stands out is that, with two exceptions, the developments seen as most hopeful by GL/PvdA voters are also a source of hope for a majority of PVV voters – 51% to 74%, depending on the development in question. Exceptions are an energy transition using green energy, which is considered hopeful by just 22% of the PVV constituency, and reinforcing the unity and strength of the EU, which only 34% of PVV voters consider a cause for hope.

Four out of the ten most hopeful developments from the perspective of PVV voters are only deemed hopeful by a minority or very small minority of GL/PvdA supporters. Strict government control over religious education and so-called weekend schools is seen as a reason for hope by just 40% of those voters; less meddling by countries in each other's internal affairs inspires hope in just 18%; limiting immigration gives hope to 15%; and extraterritorial handling of asylum, 12%. Looking at the two biggest parties, the PVV shares the hopes of GL/PvdA far more than the other way around.

Clearly, there exists a correlation between perceived threat and hope on the one hand and political preference on the other. The degree to which people feel threatened and see reason for hope colours their political views and preferences, but the latter undoubtedly also have an effect on the magnitude of the

threat and hope that people ascribe to various developments. The degree to which people view threats through an ideological lens is evident from their assessment of the danger posed by various types of terrorism: 88% of PVV voters see a threat in Islamist terrorism, 77% are threatened by left-wing extremist terrorism, and 45% fear right-wing extremist terrorism. Among GL/PvdA voters, on the other hand, 72% see a threat in right-wing extremist terrorism, 57% in Islamist terrorism, and 42% in left-wing extremist terrorism.

Conclusion

At the outset of 2024, hopes and fears in the Netherlands are defined by severe international and national turbulence, which has led to renewed concerns about migration-related developments and Islamist terrorism. However, compared to previous years, what emerges is – broadly speaking – a picture of continuity: the Dutch fear threats that directly affect one's own community. This applies for phenomena such as cyber sabotage of critical Dutch infrastructure, unwanted foreign interference in migrant communities in the Netherlands, large-scale irregular migration and the undermining of Dutch society by international organised crime. At the same time, trends that run counter to these threats and could contribute towards the demarcation and protection of the community are perceived as hopeful developments.

Aside from this continuity, the main findings of Between Hope and Fear 2024 are as follows:

- **Dutch citizens fear that the threats they judge most impactful will indeed occur within five years.** The combination of high perceived impact and likelihood of the top eight developments in the threat hierarchy is concerning: society is dominated by a sense that a daunting number of acute dangers are headed our way.
- **Migration-related threats and Islamist terrorism.** The years 2022 and 2023 were primarily characterised by economic deglobalisation and de-risking, in response to the “Russia shock”. Those fears and hopes are still present, though they appear to

be less of a priority; at the outset of 2024, the focus is primarily on migration-related threats and Islamist terrorism. Irregular migration and various other migration-related developments are ranked very high in the threat hierarchy, while an Islamist terrorist attack is also among the top three fears. The strong politicisation of migration during the general elections and the “ Hamas shock ” of 7 October 2023 likely played a role in these developments.

– **The threat of war is also clearly felt.**

In 2024, war is clearly perceived as a threat. Two concerns relating to this issue rank high: involvement in a war due to a territorial attack against an EU or NATO ally (position 9 in the threat hierarchy) and the inadequate military capacity of the EU (position 8). Also relatively high in the threat hierarchy are nuclear war (position 13, though it is not considered very likely) and a Russian victory in Ukraine (position 17, with a majority of 57% judging this a likely outcome).

– **There is relatively little attention for other geopolitical developments.**

In contrast to the fear of war, other impactful changes in the geopolitical context receive less attention, such as China and Russia’s growing global power; the erosion of the international legal order; the weakening of the American security guarantee to Europe; and the growing power of tech companies. A large number of these developments are deemed likely by the vast majority of the public, however. Dutch citizens display a similarly tepid response to potentially hope-inspiring geopolitical developments, such as an improvement of the transatlantic relationship between Europe and the US, and a reinforcement of the relationship between the West and important third countries such as India, Brazil and South Africa. A possible explanation for this is that geopolitical developments received no attention whatsoever in the general election campaigns. Another possibility is that Dutch citizens see themselves as relatively shielded from these geopolitical developments, even though they consider them likely.

– **International protectionism and potential decoupling from China are rated very low as threats.**

The economic costs of increasing international protectionism and the desired deglobalisation and de-risking are estimated to be very low. Due to the economic consequences of the war between Russia and Ukraine, inflation ranked first in the threat hierarchy. However, there seems to be little awareness that the desired further de-risking and decoupling from China will also have high costs.

– **EU enlargement to include Ukraine and the Western Balkans inspires little hope.**

As in 2023, an enlargement of the EU ranks at the bottom of the hope hierarchy. The Dutch public does not see how the accession of these countries would contribute to the security and overall prosperity of our society. This does not necessarily mean that there are no other arguments (geopolitical or otherwise) for the accession of these countries, but in view of the concrete prospects that the EU (including the Dutch government) is currently offering these countries, the consistently low ranking in the hope hierarchy of EU enlargement is politically significant.

– **The climate perspective appears to be changing.**

Compared to 2021, when climate change still ranked in the top three of the threat hierarchy, the consequences of climate change have dropped significantly in the threat perception of the Dutch public, in spite of all the alarming news regarding the climate. Dutch citizens believe in the positive impact of adaptations to climate change through targeted investments, and believe that major steps will have been taken in this area within five years. Climate mitigation ranks far lower as a hope-inspiring trend, as was also the case in 2023.

– **Correspondence between hopes and fears.**

Many high-scoring threats are mirrored by high-scoring developments in the hope rankings. This applies for cyberattacks on critical infrastructure and better protection against such attacks, and for the fear of excessive dependence on foreign countries

for vital products and a reduction of that dependence, as well as the reinforcement of modern manufacturing industries in the Netherlands. Concerns about security and involvement in a war are complemented by hopes placed on an enlargement of NATO, increased investments by European countries in their security, and better international collaboration against drug crime.

- **Correspondence between perceived threats and potential solutions in the area of migration is not as strong.** The correspondence between hopes and fears is not perfect, however. The developments complementing migration-related threats, in particular, are deemed only moderately hopeful. The limitation of immigration has risen significantly in the hope hierarchy, but the Dutch population remains divided on this issue.
- **Hopes and fears with regard to international developments increasingly underlie ideological and political schisms.** For Somewheres, who consider border controls and cultural preservation to be very important, the five top positions in the threat hierarchy are migration-related, and of the first eleven topics in the hope-hierarchy, eight are migration-related. For Anywheres, who consider national borders to be outdated and view national cultures as less important or changeable, the top threats are far less homogenous in nature, and migration-related developments are less threatening.
- **There is more unity in hope.** The Dutch population is more united in its hopes than in its threat perceptions. Both when broken down by Somewheres versus Anywheres and by political party, we see a population-wide investment of hope in protection against cyberattacks, reinforcement of modern manufacturing industries in the Netherlands, enlargement of NATO to include Sweden, climate adaptation through targeted investments, better international collaboration to combat international drug crime, and reduction of unwanted dependence on foreign countries for vital products.

Annex

Table 3 Hierarchy of threats Somewheres

	Development	Impact
1	Large-scale irregular immigration, with migrants not possessing valid documentation to enter or reside in a country	8.19
2	Unwanted foreign interference in migrant communities in the Netherlands	8.06
3	Large numbers of refugees due to a war near the EU	7.83
4	An Islamist terrorist attack in the Netherlands	7.83
5	The rise of intolerant religious movements in various countries	7.74
6	Cyber sabotage of critical Dutch infrastructure (e.g. energy, payment, drinking water infrastructure)	7.59
7	Use of migration as a weapon by leaders surrounding the EU	7.52
8	Replacement of the Dutch population	7.47
9	High, unwanted dependence on foreign countries for vital products (e.g. raw materials, energy, chips, medication, weapons)	7.40
10	Insufficient military capacity among EU member states to defend European territory	7.36
11	Large-scale regular migration (e.g. labour migration, family migration, student migration)	7.29
12	Lack of socioeconomic security for Dutch citizens (e.g. inability to make ends meet financially) as a result of an international crisis	7.29
13	Undermining of Dutch society by international organised crime	7.23
14	Involvement in a war due to a territorial attack against an EU or NATO ally or the Netherlands itself	7.21
15	Physical sabotage of critical Dutch infrastructure (e.g. energy, payment, drinking water infrastructure)	7.16
16	Global overpopulation	7.14
17	Major consequences of European court decisions for Dutch policy	7.12
18	A left-wing extremist terrorist attack in the Netherlands	7.04
19	Damage to our pensions caused by an international crisis	6.98
20	Inflation as a result of an international crisis	6.96
21	Undermining of democratic states and the rule of law in the European Union (e.g. due to corruption, erosion of the independence of the judiciary)	6.93
22	Involvement in a nuclear war	6.82
23	Escalation of the war in the Middle East (through involvement of e.g. Hezbollah, Iran, and/or the US)	6.77
24	Unwanted foreign interference in elections in the Netherlands	6.72
25	The growing power of big tech companies (e.g. Facebook, TikTok and X)	6.72
26	High debts in Europe threaten the stability of the euro	6.68
27	Corporate espionage by other countries	6.67
28	The rise of hatred towards Jews	6.65
29	Growing influence of China and Russia in important third countries (e.g. India, the Gulf states, South Africa, Balkans and Brazil)	6.64
30	Increase of social tensions in the Netherlands due to a foreign conflict	6.64
31	Growing polarisation and radicalisation due to foreign disinformation campaigns (e.g. around elections in the Netherlands, around the war in Ukraine)	6.60
32	Russia wins the war with Ukraine	6.53
33	A military conflict between the USA and China	6.50

	Development	Impact
34	NATO rendered ineffective by internal divisions and differences	6.42
35	EU rendered ineffective by internal divisions and differences	6.39
36	Disruption of society and economy due to emerging technologies (e.g. artificial intelligence)	6.35
37	Involvement in a war outside EU or NATO territory (e.g. Ukraine or Taiwan)	6.33
38	Insufficient access to natural resources and critical raw materials (e.g. metals for the production of chips and solar cells)	6.32
39	Weakening of the US security guarantee to Europe	6.28
40	Increasing international tensions due to ideological conflicts between democratic and autocratic states	6.20
41	Erosion of the international legal order (e.g. due to ineffectiveness of the UN Security Council)	6.20
42	Europe loses the technological competition between the major powers	6.15
43	A right-wing extremist terrorist attack in the Netherlands	5.78
44	Prosperity decline as a result of increasing protectionism (e.g. due to large-scale Chinese and American state subsidies)	5.55
45	A new severe pandemic	5.44
46	Consequences for Dutch society of climate change (flooding, heat stress, drought, damage to the environment and biodiversity)	5.35
47	The rise of political parties in various countries who discriminate against people based on their religion or race	4.98
48	The Netherlands exits the European Union	4.62
49	The rise of hatred towards Muslims	4.60
50	Prosperity decline as a result of the scaling down of economic ties with China	4.37

Table 4 Hierarchy of hope Somewheres

	Development	Impact
1	Limiting immigration	7.89
2	Reinforcement of modern manufacturing industries in the Netherlands (e.g. chip industry)	7.68
3	Better protection against cyberattacks on critical infrastructure (e.g. critical waterworks and payment systems)	7.58
4	More collaboration with origin countries for the return of asylum seekers who have exhausted all rights of appeal in the Netherlands	7.52
5	Reduction of unwanted dependence on foreign countries for vital products (raw materials, energy, chips, medicines, weapons)	7.41
6	Enlargement of NATO to include Sweden	7.27
7	Better international cooperation to combat international drug crime	7.26
8	Adaptation to climate change through targeted investments (e.g. raising dykes, giving rivers more room)	7.24
9	Better protection against physical attacks on critical infrastructure (e.g. energy infrastructure, digital communication cables)	7.24
10	Reinforcing the resilience of Dutch elections against unwanted foreign interference	7.14
11	Acceleration of the energy transition by means of nuclear energy	7.13
12	The countries of the EU invest more in the safety of the European region in order to reduce their military dependence on the United States	7.06
13	Relocation of the handling of asylum requests from the Netherlands to another country outside of Europe (as Italy is planning with Albania)	7.03

	Development	Impact
14	Economic rise of countries in the European region due to the relocation of production from China and Russia to the EU and surrounding countries	6.99
15	Less meddling by countries in each other's internal affairs	6.96
16	More transparency in the foreign funding of political parties	6.93
17	The European Union shows more respect for the sovereignty of member states	6.87
18	Introduction of European legislation in case regimes deliberately send refugees to member states in order to weaken them	6.78
19	Investments in resilience against corporate espionage	6.75
20	International agreements to reduce the numbers of nuclear weapons and prevent the spread and use of nuclear weapons	6.73
21	Tech companies must satisfy stricter rules (e.g. to protect the privacy of citizens or combat disinformation)	6.72
22	European countries increase investments in defence	6.70
23	Secret services given more powers to combat terrorism	6.69
24	Tighter government control over religious education and "weekend schools"	6.63
25	Reinforcement of NATO's unity and strength	6.60
26	Schools devote more attention to recognising fake news and conspiracy theories	6.58
27	Reinforcing the resilience of migrant communities against unwanted foreign interference ("long arm politics")	6.36
28	Technological innovations that help combat climate change	6.34
29	Reinforcement of the transatlantic relationship between Europe and the United States	6.32
30	International collaboration against tax havens	6.32
31	Circular labour migration to address labour shortages in critical sectors (meaning that migrants return to their country of origin after a period of work)	6.29
32	Democratic resistance against the influence of large international organisations such as the World Economic Forum	6.25
33	World-wide effort to combat illnesses and viruses in order to prevent severe consequences from a new pandemic	6.20
34	More initiatives and programmes to curb global overpopulation	6.08
35	Improvement of the relationship between the United States and China	6.08
36	Reinforcement of the relationship between the West and relevant third countries (e.g. India, Gulf states, South Africa, Brazil)	5.84
37	Reinforcement of the economy through technological innovation, digitalisation and artificial intelligence	5.61
38	Reinforcement of the unity and strength of the EU	5.25
39	Acceleration of the energy transition by means of green energy (e.g. solar and wind energy)	4.94
40	Investing in development cooperation, also in the interest of the Netherlands	4.34
41	Attracting labour migrants to address labour shortages in critical sectors	3.96
42	Accession of Ukraine to the European Union	3.52
43	Accession of the Western Balkans to the European Union (Albania, Montenegro, Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, North Macedonia)	2.53

Table 5 Hierarchy of threats Anywheres

	Development	Impact
1	Cyber sabotage of critical Dutch infrastructure (e.g. energy, payment, drinking water infrastructure)	7.61
2	Russia wins the war with Ukraine	7.32
3	The rise of political parties in various countries who discriminate against people based on their religion or race	7.31
4	Global overpopulation	7.24
5	Involvement in a nuclear war	7.19
6	Involvement in a war due to a territorial attack against an EU or NATO ally or the Netherlands itself	7.18
7	Lack of socioeconomic security for Dutch citizens (e.g. inability to make ends meet financially) as a result of an international crisis	7.17
8	Undermining of democratic states and the rule of law in the European Union (e.g. due to corruption, erosion of the independence of the judiciary)	7.15
9	Growing polarisation and radicalisation due to foreign disinformation campaigns (e.g. around elections in the Netherlands, around the war in Ukraine)	7.13
10	Physical sabotage of critical Dutch infrastructure (e.g. energy, payment, drinking water infrastructure)	7.12
11	Erosion of the international legal order (e.g. due to ineffectiveness of the UN Security Council)	7.07
12	The rise of intolerant religious movements in various countries	7.06
13	The growing power of big tech companies (e.g. Facebook, TikTok and X)	7.03
14	Escalation of the war in the Middle East (through involvement of e.g. Hezbollah, Iran, and/or the US)	7.00
15	An Islamist terrorist attack in the Netherlands	6.98
16	The rise of hatred towards Jews	6.97
17	Insufficient military capacity among EU member states to defend European territory	6.96
18	Undermining of Dutch society by international organised crime	6.92
19	Unwanted foreign interference in elections in the Netherlands	6.90
20	Consequences for Dutch society of climate change (flooding, heat stress, drought, damage to the environment and biodiversity)	6.89
21	High, unwanted dependence on foreign countries for vital products (e.g. raw materials, energy, chips, medication, weapons)	6.88
22	EU rendered ineffective by internal divisions and differences	6.87
23	Growing influence of China and Russia in important third countries (e.g. India, the Gulf states, South Africa, Balkans and Brazil)	6.87
24	A right-wing extremist terrorist attack in the Netherlands	6.85
25	Use of migration as a weapon by leaders surrounding the EU	6.83
26	Unwanted foreign interference in migrant communities in the Netherlands	6.81
27	NATO rendered ineffective by internal divisions and differences	6.75
28	Increasing international tensions due to ideological conflicts between democratic and autocratic states	6.72
29	Increase of social tensions in the Netherlands due to a foreign conflict	6.72
30	A military conflict between the USA and China	6.71
31	Inflation as a result of an international crisis	6.64
32	The rise of hatred towards Muslims	6.63
33	The Netherlands exits the European Union	6.59

	Development	Impact
34	Large-scale irregular immigration, with migrants not possessing valid documentation to enter or reside in a country	6.51
35	Insufficient access to natural resources and critical raw materials (e.g. metals for the production of chips and solar cells)	6.47
36	Involvement in a war outside EU or NATO territory (e.g. Ukraine or Taiwan)	6.46
37	Damage to our pensions caused by an international crisis	6.46
38	Corporate espionage by other countries	6.40
39	Weakening of the US security guarantee to Europe	6.38
40	High debts in Europe threaten the stability of the euro	6.28
41	A new severe pandemic	6.26
42	Disruption of society and economy due to emerging technologies (e.g. artificial intelligence)	6.18
43	Large numbers of refugees due to a war near the EU	6.10
44	A left-wing extremist terrorist attack in the Netherlands	6.00
45	Europe loses the technological competition between the major powers	5.95
46	Prosperity decline as a result of increasing protectionism (e.g. due to large-scale Chinese and American state subsidies)	5.82
47	Large-scale regular migration (e.g. labour migration, family migration, student migration)	5.41
48	Major consequences of European court decisions for Dutch policy	5.30
49	Replacement of the Dutch population	4.75
50	Prosperity decline as a result of the scaling down of economic ties with China	4.36

Table 6 Hierarchy of hope Anywheres

	Development	Impact
1	Better protection against cyberattacks on critical infrastructure (e.g. critical waterworks and payment systems)	7.83
2	Enlargement of NATO to include Sweden	7.79
3	Schools devote more attention to recognising fake news and conspiracy theories	7.50
4	Better international cooperation to combat international drug crime	7.42
5	More transparency in the foreign funding of political parties	7.37
6	International agreements to reduce the numbers of nuclear weapons and prevent the spread and use of nuclear weapons	7.36
7	Adaptation to climate change through targeted investments (e.g. raising dykes, giving rivers more room)	7.35
8	International collaboration against tax havens	7.33
9	Reinforcement of modern manufacturing industries in the Netherlands (e.g. chip industry)	7.28
10	Tech companies must satisfy stricter rules (e.g. to protect the privacy of citizens or combat disinformation)	7.27
11	Better protection against physical attacks on critical infrastructure (e.g. energy infrastructure, digital communication cables)	7.25
12	Reinforcing the resilience of Dutch elections against unwanted foreign interference	7.22
13	The countries of the EU invest more in the safety of the European region in order to reduce their military dependence on the United States	7.17
14	Technological innovations that help combat climate change	7.10
15	Reduction of unwanted dependence on foreign countries for vital products (raw materials, energy, chips, medicines, weapons)	7.07

	Development	Impact
16	World-wide effort to combat illnesses and viruses in order to prevent severe consequences from a new pandemic	7.06
17	Economic rise of countries in the European region due to the relocation of production from China and Russia to the EU and surrounding countries	6.98
18	Reinforcement of NATO's unity and strength	6.89
19	Acceleration of the energy transition by means of green energy (e.g. solar and wind energy)	6.85
20	More collaboration with origin countries for the return of asylum seekers who have exhausted all rights of appeal in the Netherlands	6.78
21	Investments in resilience against corporate espionage	6.74
22	Reinforcement of the unity and strength of the EU	6.74
23	Reinforcing the resilience of migrant communities against unwanted foreign interference ("long arm politics")	6.59
24	Circular labour migration to address labour shortages in critical sectors (meaning that migrants return to their country of origin after a period of work)	6.49
25	Improvement of the relationship between the United States and China	6.43
26	European countries increase investments in defence	6.39
27	Reinforcement of the relationship between the West and relevant third countries (e.g. India, Gulf states, South Africa, Brazil)	6.37
28	Investing in development cooperation, also in the interest of the Netherlands	6.35
29	Introduction of European legislation in case regimes deliberately send refugees to member states in order to weaken them	6.18
30	Reinforcement of the economy through technological innovation, digitalisation and artificial intelligence	6.13
31	Reinforcement of the transatlantic relationship between Europe and the United States	6.12
32	Secret services given more powers to combat terrorism	6.03
33	Attracting labour migrants to address labour shortages in critical sectors	5.85
34	Acceleration of the energy transition by means of nuclear energy	5.78
35	More initiatives and programmes to curb global overpopulation	5.78
36	Tighter government control over religious education and "weekend schools"	5.75
37	Less meddling by countries in each other's internal affairs	5.51
38	Democratic resistance against the influence of large international organisations such as the World Economic Forum	5.49
39	The European Union shows more respect for the sovereignty of member states	5.34
40	Limiting immigration	5.30
41	Accession of Ukraine to the European Union	5.14
42	Relocation of the handling of asylum requests from the Netherlands to another country outside of Europe (as Italy is planning with Albania)	4.67
43	Accession of the Western Balkans to the European Union (Albania, Montenegro, Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, North Macedonia)	4.35

Table 7 Hierarchy of threats *Intermediates*

	Development	Impact
1	Involvement in a nuclear war	7.28
2	Growing polarisation and radicalisation due to foreign disinformation campaigns (e.g. around elections in the Netherlands, around the war in Ukraine)	7.28
3	Undermining of democratic states and the rule of law in the European Union (e.g. due to corruption, erosion of the independence of the judiciary)	7.26
4	Cyber sabotage of critical Dutch infrastructure (e.g. energy, payment, drinking water infrastructure)	7.24
5	The rise of political parties in various countries who discriminate against people based on their religion or race	7.09
6	Lack of socioeconomic security for Dutch citizens (e.g. inability to make ends meet financially) as a result of an international crisis	7.04
7	High, unwanted dependence on foreign countries for vital products (e.g. raw materials, energy, chips, medication, weapons)	7.03
8	Global overpopulation	6.99
9	Erosion of the international legal order (e.g. due to ineffectiveness of the UN Security Council)	6.98
10	EU rendered ineffective by internal divisions and differences	6.98
11	Involvement in a war due to a territorial attack against an EU or NATO ally or the Netherlands itself	6.94
12	Insufficient military capacity among EU member states to defend European territory	6.93
13	Physical sabotage of critical Dutch infrastructure (e.g. energy, payment, drinking water infrastructure)	6.87
14	Russia wins the war with Ukraine	6.86
15	NATO rendered ineffective by internal divisions and differences	6.84
16	Consequences for Dutch society of climate change (flooding, heat stress, drought, damage to the environment and biodiversity)	6.81
17	An Islamist terrorist attack in the Netherlands	6.78
18	The growing power of big tech companies (e.g. Facebook, TikTok and X)	6.76
19	Unwanted foreign interference in elections in the Netherlands	6.72
20	The rise of intolerant religious movements in various countries	6.69
21	Inflation as a result of an international crisis	6.67
22	Unwanted foreign interference in migrant communities in the Netherlands	6.61
23	Large-scale irregular immigration, with migrants not possessing valid documentation to enter or reside in a country	6.55
24	Undermining of Dutch society by international organised crime	6.53
25	Growing influence of China and Russia in important third countries (e.g. India, the Gulf states, South Africa, Balkans and Brazil)	6.46
26	A right-wing extremist terrorist attack in the Netherlands	6.44
27	Increase of social tensions in the Netherlands due to a foreign conflict	6.43
28	The Netherlands exits the European Union	6.42
29	Weakening of the US security guarantee to Europe	6.39
30	Escalation of the war in the Middle East (through involvement of e.g. Hezbollah, Iran, and/or the US)	6.39
31	Corporate espionage by other countries	6.38
32	A military conflict between the USA and China	6.37
33	The rise of hatred towards Jews	6.36
34	Involvement in a war outside EU or NATO territory (e.g. Ukraine or Taiwan)	6.34

	Development	Impact
35	Use of migration as a weapon by leaders surrounding the EU	6.34
36	Damage to our pensions caused by an international crisis	6.33
37	High debts in Europe threaten the stability of the euro	6.29
38	The rise of hatred towards Muslims	6.28
39	Insufficient access to natural resources and critical raw materials (e.g. metals for the production of chips and solar cells)	6.24
40	Increasing international tensions due to ideological conflicts between democratic and autocratic states	6.23
41	Large numbers of refugees due to a war near the EU	6.01
42	Disruption of society and economy due to emerging technologies (e.g. artificial intelligence)	5.99
43	A new severe pandemic	5.98
44	A left-wing extremist terrorist attack in the Netherlands	5.94
45	Europe loses the technological competition between the major powers	5.78
46	Prosperity decline as a result of increasing protectionism (e.g. due to large-scale Chinese and American state subsidies)	5.53
47	Large-scale regular migration (e.g. labour migration, family migration, student migration)	5.08
48	Major consequences of European court decisions for Dutch policy	5.04
49	Replacement of the Dutch population	4.55
50	Prosperity decline as a result of the scaling down of economic ties with China	4.21

Table 8 Hierarchy of hope *Intermediates*

	Development	Impact
1	Better protection against cyberattacks on critical infrastructure (e.g. critical waterworks and payment systems)	8.06
2	Schools devote more attention to recognising fake news and conspiracy theories	7.93
3	Enlargement of NATO to include Sweden	7.90
4	Technological innovations that help combat climate change	7.83
5	Reinforcement of modern manufacturing industries in the Netherlands (e.g. chip industry)	7.72
6	International agreements to reduce the numbers of nuclear weapons and prevent the spread and use of nuclear weapons	7.53
7	The countries of the EU invest more in the safety of the European region in order to reduce their military dependence on the United States	7.52
8	Better international cooperation to combat international drug crime	7.43
9	World-wide effort to combat illnesses and viruses in order to prevent severe consequences from a new pandemic	7.36
10	Adaptation to climate change through targeted investments (e.g. raising dykes, giving rivers more room)	7.35
11	Acceleration of the energy transition by means of green energy (e.g. solar and wind energy)	7.33
12	Tech companies must satisfy stricter rules (e.g. to protect the privacy of citizens or combat disinformation)	7.31
13	Reduction of unwanted dependence on foreign countries for vital products (raw materials, energy, chips, medicines, weapons)	7.31
14	More transparency in the foreign funding of political parties	7.29
15	Better protection against physical attacks on critical infrastructure (e.g. energy infrastructure, digital communication cables)	7.24
16	More collaboration with origin countries for the return of asylum seekers who have exhausted all rights of appeal in the Netherlands	7.24

	Development	Impact
17	Reinforcement of NATO's unity and strength	7.17
18	Reinforcing the resilience of Dutch elections against unwanted foreign interference	7.15
19	International collaboration against tax havens	7.15
20	Economic rise of countries in the European region due to the relocation of production from China and Russia to the EU and surrounding countries	7.10
21	Reinforcement of the unity and strength of the EU	6.96
22	Investments in resilience against corporate espionage	6.82
23	Introduction of European legislation in case regimes deliberately send refugees to member states in order to weaken them	6.79
24	Reinforcing the resilience of migrant communities against unwanted foreign interference ("long arm politics")	6.70
25	Circular labour migration to address labour shortages in critical sectors (meaning that migrants return to their country of origin after a period of work))	6.54
26	European countries increase investments in defence	6.46
27	More initiatives and programmes to curb global overpopulation	6.45
28	Investing in development cooperation, also in the interest of the Netherlands	6.41
29	Reinforcement of the relationship between the West and relevant third countries (e.g. India, Gulf states, South Africa, Brazil)	6.37
30	Improvement of the relationship between the United States and China	6.36
31	Reinforcement of the economy through technological innovation, digitalisation and artificial intelligence	6.22
32	Secret services given more powers to combat terrorism	6.15
33	Acceleration of the energy transition by means of nuclear energy	6.12
34	Reinforcement of the transatlantic relationship between Europe and the United States	6.06
35	Limiting immigration	5.84
36	Tighter government control over religious education and "weekend schools"	5.71
37	Attracting labour migrants to address labour shortages in critical sectors	5.45
38	The European Union shows more respect for the sovereignty of member states	5.39
39	Democratic resistance against the influence of large international organisations such as the World Economic Forum	5.30
40	Relocation of the handling of asylum requests from the Netherlands to another country outside of Europe (as Italy is planning with Albania)	5.16
41	Less meddling by countries in each other's internal affairs	5.02
42	Accession of Ukraine to the European Union	4.87
43	Accession of the Western Balkans to the European Union (Albania, Montenegro, Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, North Macedonia)	3.86

About the Clingendael Institute

Clingendael – the Netherlands Institute of International Relations – is a leading think tank and academy on international affairs. Through our analyses, training and public debate we aim to inspire and equip governments, businesses, and civil society in order to contribute to a secure, sustainable and just world.

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