From its hopeful beginnings as a revolutionary rebellion against the autocratic regime of Colonel Gaddafi, the Libyan civil war has long since joined the ranks of interminable conflicts that resulted from the Arab Uprisings.[1] Telltale signposts for this scenario were present from the beginning, such as the weak institutional basis of the Libyan state under both King Idris I (18 years) and Colonel Gaddafi (42 years), the start of the rebellion in the east of the country, the presence of extremists and the unfinished business of the NATO-intervention based on UN Resolution 1973 (March 2011). Yet, initially, in 2012 and 2013, there were also encouraging indicators of the development of more constructive and peaceful national politics.[2]

By 2018, these indicators had given way to extensive fragmentation of Libya’s political and security landscape to the effect that it has become a mosaic of groups and actors. As with so many conflicts, today the Libyan civil war presents a complex mix of international interference and patronage on the one hand, and highly localised conflict factors on the other. Many of its warring groups cater to local and (inter)national constituencies as well pursuing their own interests in gaining power and riches on the back of the shell of the Libyan state.[3] While on the face of it the present situation is formed by the competing coalitions of the Government of National Accord (GNA), under Prime Minister Al-Serraj in Tripoli and the Libyan National Army (LNA) under General Haftar in Tobruk/Al-Baida, the reality is much more fragmented. It includes: militia rule of Tripoli, which constrains the GNA’s authority to the buildings it operates from;[4] an amorphous Fezzan, which straddles smuggling, crime and cross-border conflict; the use and mobilisation of tribal identities and allegiances throughout much of the country;[5] the persistence of at least two dozen key militias[6] – revolutionary, tribal, Islamist and other – that profit from both the state payroll and illicit revenue; and Salafist armed groups.

This situation has arisen from a mix of foreign intervention, new splits in Libyan society, and state institutions that were historically kept weak to enable personalised regime rule.[7] As to foreign intervention, a number of Western countries such as the UK and US, as well as the UN, support the GNA politically, but do not provide enough practical development and security support to have a positive impact on conflict resolution. Turkey represents about the only exception to this ‘rule’. In contrast, countries like Egypt and the UAE offer much firmer support to the LNA. As to new splits in Libyan society, the division between those with more revolutionary credentials and those with more loyalist credentials has caused significant follow-on conflict in the wake of the original uprising. In terms of weak institutions, Colonel Gaddafi’s personalised, competitive and informal methods of rule have ensured that, in the organisational and regulatory sense, the state is hardly present in Libya.[8] It is rather its symbolic prestige, international relations and, in particular, centralised oil revenue that is being fought over.

The result has been an internationalised civil war of lower intensity than the calamities that have befallen Yemen and Syria. Libya nevertheless matters a great deal because of the bridge it forms between Europe and Africa, its symbolic and practical relevance in the unfinished business of the Arab Uprisings, the conflict’s human suffering and its negative externalities such as illicit trade, extremism and human trafficking. In this context, some of the key factors required to bring about greater stability and security in Libya lie in the diverse interests, patchwork of territorial control and shifting affiliations of the country’s key armed groups, roughly two dozen in number.

This paper looks at security initiatives in Libya between 2011and 2018 in the context of its civil war to identify security sector stabilisation and development lessons for future SSD efforts and programmes. While this is far from the only perspective needed to inform future SSD initiatives that are both feasible and responsible, it can help to avoid past mistakes. Other essential pieces of the analytical puzzle of what makes good SSD possible include: examination of links between the illicit economy and key Libyan armed groups; the power base, relations and composition of armed groups in Cyrenaica (the LNA coalition), Tripolitania (with Misrata as a case on its own) and the Fezzan (including its tribal and ethnic particularities); Salafist influences across Libya; and international support for particular armed groups (especially from Egypt, Turkey, the UAE, Russia and France).

Section 2 offers a brief outline of major developments in the key phases of the Libyan conflict to 2018, highlights the environment each phase created for SSD and, on this basis, identifies four strategic implications for future SSD. Section 3 examines the relevance of these strategic implications in the context of 12 major security initiatives undertaken at the national level between 2011 and 2018. Section 4 subsequently distills a number of operational implications from a short review of global SSD practice that are relevant to the implementation of future SSD initiatives in Libya. Finally, Section 5 offers points of departure for thinking about future SSD in Libya.