This study has been conducted in accordance with CRU’s political-economy analysis framework, thus focusing on power arrangements. By analysing changes in arrangements of power one can understand why decisions are made, what incentives play a role, how alliances form or break, and what narratives dominate. In turn, such understanding is key to identifying feasible approaches to conflict resolution. Examining shifts in arrangements of power enables the simultaneous exploration of the perspectives of those that govern and those that are being governed, as power is always relational. Doing so requires the use of three lenses: 1) the power networks and relationships between conflict actors; 2) the power practices and exchanges between them; and 3) contextual factors, such as institutions and ideology, that affect the power distribution underlying conflict.[236]

This political-economy analysis is further specified to the informal sector, in order to situate the role of the informal sector in the deeper context of the political settlement, in which the most significant power and state connections are understood. The framework combines traditional conflict analysis with elements from social network and power analysis, and draws on recent research across a range of disciplines, namely new political economy, new institutional economics, and conflict studies. It thus brings to the surface the politics and power dynamics that may facilitate or hamper proposed interventions in conflict-affected situations. In this way it uncovers hidden stakeholders, the practices and exchanges that facilitate the main actors’ relation to power, and the written and unwritten rules and structures that form the silent backdrop of these relations. This identification of arrangements of power helps to identify potential spoilers and entry points for action by showing the structures which might be amenable to change and those which might be used to the policy maker’s advantage.

The report supports conflict-sensitive programming, by recognising that ‘[t]he success of most development efforts, including efforts to strengthen the state and build institutions of public accountability, rises or falls according to the degree to which these efforts are aligned with – or at least do not fundamentally threaten – the interests of powerful national and local actors who are in a position to thwart or co-opt those efforts’.[237] The analysis recognises that ‘many times well-intentioned interventions become ineffective because they reinforce an equilibrium that sustains the outcome the intervention attempted to change. These situations can arise from interventions that do not take into account the existing power balance.’[238]

Research for this report included desk research, and 17 phone interviews (including three female respondents), running between August and November 2020.[239] Desk research included a literature review of academic and grey literature, data from local surveys, government policy documents, supplemented with a variety of news sources. Respondents interviewed for this report represented a range of formal and informal positions, covering governmental and NGO staff, as entrepreneurs and employees of companies in a wide range of sectors, and political actors. The wide range covered allowed the researchers to triangulate information and perspectives through cross-referencing information between different professional backgrounds.

Regardless of the efforts undertaken to cover the breadth and depth of COVID-19’s impacts on the Somali economy and politics, the COVID-imposed travel restrictions prevented any fieldwork being conducted, and may have prevented certain groups of potential interviewees from responding. Additionally, it should be remembered that with the elections looming in Somalia, many respondents were reluctant to discuss topics related to political finance. It should therefore be kept in mind that additional research including fieldwork and further depth on business and political actors might provide further insights. Additionally, it should be noted that the impacts of COVID-19 are not homogenous across the Somali regions. While the dynamics covered in this report are likely to be indicative of dynamics around Mogadishu and Hargeisa, they cannot be expected to hold across other areas (particularly not those under Al Shabaab control). Extrapolations from such dynamics without taking into account the local context may thus obscure important differences.