This report has sought to provide a clear and all-encompassing overview of Russian objectives and sources of influence in the Western Balkans. Russia’s main objectives in relation to the Western Balkans are threefold. First, the Kremlin seeks to project great power status globally. Second, it seeks to obstruct the Euro-Atlantic integration of the region by advocating against NATO and EU integration and by intensifying instabilities. Third, the Kremlin uses the Balkans, especially the Kosovo issue, as an argument for its foreign policy agenda elsewhere, especially when it comes to defending its perceived dominance over its near abroad. What is striking is that these objectives have more to do with Russia’s general foreign policy stance than with the Western Balkans region as such. In contrast to the early 2010s, the region is not reflected upon in recent Russian strategic foreign policy documents, and is not regularly mentioned by President Putin. Russia has moderate ambitions for building positive relationships with Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Montenegro, which is reflected in the instruments it uses to influence the region. Rather than forging an institutionalised and structural engagement at state level, Russia reverts mainly to nurturing contacts with – and influence through – an array of individual politicians, the Orthodox Church, media and malign proxy groups. Moscow deliberately pursues this approach, informed by its interests and available sources of influence, and it has proven relatively successful.

As can be seen in Figure 7, Russia’s role in the three countries examined is fragmented both within and between the different countries. Russian influence is the most widespread in Serbia, rising to concerning levels in all domains. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, Russian political influence is concentrated in Republika Srpska, although it has a concerning influence on the country at large. In Montenegro, Russia has resorted to malign actions to influence the country, as its support for the country’s pro-Russian political actors has not managed to obstruct Montenegro’s overall pro-Western path.

In spite of its lack of institutionalised and all-encompassing relations with Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Montenegro, Russia maintains an ability to at least delay the Euro-Atlantic integration of those countries, although overall it has not been able to prevent steps in that direction.

Montenegro’s 2017 NATO accession shows that although Russia has reverted to malign actions including a covert coup attempt, cyber-attacks and support for protests through the Orthodox Church, such sources of influence have barely affected Montenegro’s domestic strategic political dynamics.

In Serbia, the picture is more concerning, given that the country’s relations with Russia continue to hinder full rapprochement with the EU, for example when it comes to Serbia’s alignment with the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy. Through energy and other links, but particularly through building ties with political proxies, Russia has been an influencing factor to be reckoned with in Serbia’s development. At the same time, it should be acknowledged that the Kremlin cannot fully dictate the course of events. Only through domestic enabling factors has Russia has managed to retain its influence, meaning that the agency of local politicians is a more important part of the geopolitical puzzle than Russia’s actions themselves.

While the invasion of February 2022 was a major political shock on the European continent at large, Russia’s overall state of relations with, and influence on, Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Montenegro is characterised by continuity rather than disruption. In terms of instruments, strategies and/or objectives, Russia has barely changed course. The shift from Russia being relatively open to the Western integration of the Western Balkans at large to advocating strongly against it actually took place much earlier – against the background of the country’s own fallout with the West throughout the 2000s.

But not everything has remained the same. Since the invasion, it has become harder for Russian officials to visit the region due to sanctions by surrounding EU member states and countries in the region itself, as marked by Lavrov’s failed attempt to visit Belgrade in June 2022. Russian diplomatic and financial resources have also likely been somewhat restrained, and dividing lines between the West and Moscow have become more explicit, even if that has so far not rendered the balancing game of authorities in Serbia and the Republika Srpska impossible. Due to EU sanctions against Russia, joined by Montenegro and partially by BiH, BiH and Serbia are slowly looking to diversify their energy imports, which could diminish dependencies on Russia, and therefore Russian influence. Lastly, the requirement for the three countries, especially Serbia and BiH, to align with such EU sanctions, and as such with the EU’s CFSP at large, has become much more prominent for their EU integration paths. As a result, Serbia’s security relationship with Russia, especially in terms of joint military exercises, has been strained.

Overall, we identify a moderately downward trend in Russian influence in the region, even if Russian influence itself, especially its ability to play a spoiler role, has remained relatively stable. How these trends will develop will depend on the geopolitical context, but even more so on local political developments and the effectiveness of the EU (and its Western partners) to capitalise on their highly institutionalised political relationships with the three countries, underpinned by strong trade links and the geography of the region, which is often described as the ‘inner courtyard’ of the EU. The EU, NATO and their individual member states have a wide array of instruments available to promote EU integration in the region, as well as to counter Russian influence. The extent to which these instruments are adequately employed, particularly in the geopolitical context following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, will be part of a follow-up Clingendael report to be published in autumn 2023. As part of the same research project, analyses of societal and political perceptions of Russia in the three countries will be published in summer 2023 by Clingendael partners the Atlantic Council of Montenegro, the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia and the Atlantic Initiative in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Conclusions

We draw three main conclusions from the analysis put forward in this report.

First, rather than building a sustainable, all-encompassing and meaningful relationship with Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Montenegro, Russia pursues an opportunistic approach dependent on fragmented entry points for influence in each country. Its main objectives are to assert itself as a global power, obstruct Euro-Atlantic integration, and employ tensions and historical events in the region to justify its policies elsewhere.

Second, even if the substance of relations with the three countries is limited and, particularly in BIH and Montenegro, fragmented, Russia has proven itself able to intensify instabilities and societal divides in the three countries and delay their Euro-Atlantic integration paths. At the same time, Russian influence remains dependent on local enablers who make use of intercountry relations for their own interests. Moreover, Russian influence cannot be compared to much stronger and institutionalised relations with both EU and NATO. Russia has not managed to prevent far-reaching cooperation of BiH and Serbia with NATO, nor Montenegro’s 2017 NATO accession.

Third, the Russian invasion of Ukraine has moderately affected but not fully altered Russia’s approach towards Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Montenegro. While the invasion has led to sharper dividing lines between Russia and the West and reduced Russian financial and diplomatic capacities, we observe continuity in terms of Russian strategies and objectives. Russia’s sources of influence in the three countries have been moderately strained, among other causes as a result of BiH and Serbia’s first steps to diversify energy sources and Western pressure to diminish their political and security links with the Russian Federation. For the time being, this has not yet affected Moscow’s ability to act as a spoiler to the Euro-Atlantic integration of the three countries.