Ukraine’s civil society is often seen as a driving force behind the country’s remarkable change. There are now well over 20,000 civil society organisations (CSOs) that are active in practically every sector of societal relevance, including in security sector reform. But this has not always been the case. This chapter will explore the development and growth of Ukrainian civil society since the country’s independence in 1991, starting with a definition of ‘civil society’ and which functions CSOs generally fulfil in reform processes. It then concludes with a brief analysis of the difference between national and local NGOs, in particular in terms of their cooperation with international stakeholders.

Concepts and definitions: civil society and the security sector

‘Civil society’ is a broad concept that means many different things to different people. How civil society is understood also depends on the national, regional and (geo)political context. Within the scope of this report, ‘civil society’ is defined as all non-governmental organisations (NGOs), community groups, professional associations, unions, religious groups and other social movements that are organized independently from the state. [2]

The same applies to ‘security sector’. While Ukraine’s security sector comprises a large variety of actors, this research will focus on what the Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance (DCAF) has defined as the ‘narrowest’ definition of the state security sector that includes both the state security providers (such as the police, the armed forces, intelligence) and the actors that provide governance and oversight over the security sector, such as Parliament, the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Ministry of Defence.[3] Non-state actors are part of this narrow definition of the security sector and include academic institutions, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and the media (see Figure 1). This report will particularly focus on the interaction between these state and non-state actors.

Figure 1
Definitions of the security sector (source: DCAF 2015)[4]
Definitions of the security sector (source: DCAF 2015)

Functions of civil society in its relation with the authorities

This report builds on the typology developed by the DCAF. With regard to interaction with the Government, Parliament and armed forces, civil society can manifest itself in a number of functions, such as: awareness raising, advocacy, fact-finding, research and analysis, monitoring and public oversight, and service provision.[5]

An important function that civil society usually plays in countries in democratic transition is monitoring and oversight: by monitoring the use of public funds, overseeing the performance of the government, analyzing the government’s actions and suggesting ways for improvement. If there are indications of alarming developments, civil society can investigate, signal and bring to attention any potential misuse or abuse of the laws, policies and standards.[6]

Civil society actors can facilitate interaction and enhance better understanding between the public and the security sector. They create a channel for communicating the views and expectations of the population concerning security governance, and for suggesting solutions for the improvement of state security provision, management and oversight on the one hand (advocacy function), and inform and educate the population about how security governance works, as well as about the problems and solutions in the security sector on the other hand (awareness-raising function). This in turn enhances public debate on what the security sector should look like and how to tackle challenges and problems, providing decision-makers with constructive solution options and generating demand for greater public involvement in the decisions on the use of available resources, setting standards for service provision and the implementation of the sector reforms.

Civil society is a valuable partner for the government and the state security sector in particular, as it can provide specific skills and complementary knowledge on security and justice topics, community needs and interests (service-provision function). It can also offer an analysis of the interplay between different parts of the security sector – insights that are not easy to generate from within the government system (research and analysis).

Figure 2
Functions of civil society and its interplay with the government structures and the population
Functions of civil society and its interplay with the government structures and the population

In some cases, civil society actors can take over some of the tasks of the government agencies or the authorities can delegate tasks to them, in particular when their capacity is constrained due to ongoing armed conflict. This can include neighbourhood watch programmes and patrols to encourage public participation in law enforcement, emergency response services provided on a volunteer basis, such as the fire services, search and rescue teams, or lifeguards, the provision of legal advice, and medical and social services.[7] In the context of Ukraine, volunteer battalions have even played a key role in defending the country against external aggression, as will be further discussed in Chapter 3. [8]

While this report focuses specifically on the reform of the security sector, it should not be overlooked that both during and after armed conflicts civil society actors also play a key role in humanitarian and reconstruction efforts.[9] The interaction between international, national and local actors in the context of the reconstruction process and its relations with the security sector are not specifically covered by the present report but would be equally worthy of further research.

The transformation of Ukrainian civil society since 2014

In the last decade before Russia’s full-scale invasion, the Ukrainian state and society have undergone far-reaching transformations. This was caused not only by the Euromaidan protests of 2013-2014, the Russian annexation of Crimea and the eruption of hostilities in the east of the country, but also by Ukraine’s renewed ambition to pursue Euro-Atlantic integration. Civil society has both been at the heart of this change – and has been profoundly changed itself. The Ukrainian public, the Ukrainian authorities and Ukraine’s international partners all rely on elements of civil society as key actors to safeguard and promote the country’s democratic reforms. This section will briefly trace the causes and consequences of this evolution of Ukrainian civil society and the impact on each of the different functions it fulfils as identified above.

Influence of civil society on public trust in the government institutions

Due to its post-communist legacy of state repression followed by two decades of corruption and poor governance, Ukrainian society had a deeply-rooted mistrust of the Government in general and the security sector in particular. The security sector, in turn, traditionally viewed the public more as a potential problem than as a key constituency to listen to and protect.

Euromaidan and its tragic aftermath generated a large-scale citizen mobilisation that later transformed into a sustainable civic awakening.[10] Having missed the opportunity to reform the state after the 2004-2005 Orange Revolution, civil society demanded an active role in the public oversight of state institutions, pressuring for reforms, transparency and accountability. This, in combination with the external security and defence challenges faced by Ukraine’s government and the weakness of state institutions that required urgent assistance from civil society, has substantially increased society’s participation, bringing an end to the post-Soviet legacy of social abstention from public and political affairs and mistrust in public institutions.

The result was greater democratic control, but CSOs found themselves increasingly in a role of de facto opposition to the authorities. During and after Euromaidan, Ukrainian NGOs developed a highly assertive way of articulating demands and publicizing issues of corruption, mismanagement and repression, which exacerbated the public’s negative perception of the State and further eroded its already low trust, which in turn led to a decrease in legitimacy. This is not to say that civil society was the main influencer of public opinion and trust in the State. Adversarial political parties, first-hand experiences of corruption and the ineffectiveness of state institutions were the reasons for low public confidence. For example, in 2015, one year after Euromaidan, only 15.8% of Ukrainians expressed trust towards the Government, while even less than 10% trusted the Ukrainian political parties and only 24% trusted the President. [11]

With the threat of war as a unifying factor, this negative trend has started to change: civil society has gradually realized that simply voicing demands and adopting a critical attitude towards the government is insufficient to build strong and transparent government institutions. Many CSOs now first try to pursue a more constructive dialogue and prefer to build feedback channels. The Government, in turn, has also changed its approach and has become more receptive and responsive to input from civil society. Especially since 2022, an increasing trust in state institutions has been one of the priorities of Ukraine’s government, including in light of external attempts to destabilize the nation. Instead of bringing cases of misuse directly to the media, civil society now increasingly looks for ways to first raise the issue with the relevant government agency and even posits possible solutions. If the Government then responds and resolves the issue, it is then presented in a more positive light by both civil society and the media.[12]

Combined with a general ‘rallying around the flag’ in wartime, this approach has contributed to an increase in trust in Ukraine’s government institutions: in March 2023, 50% of Ukrainians indicated that they trust the Prime Minister and his Government, and the President’s trust rating increased to 83%.[13] The Armed Forces of Ukraine and volunteer organizations are now the two most trusted actors in Ukraine (see figure 2), while the Defence Ministry, civil society organizations, the Security Services of Ukraine (SBU) and local governments also have much higher trust ratings than in 2015 (see figure 2). [14]

Figure 3
Ukrainian public trust in Government Institutions (source: Razumkov 2015, 2023)[15]
Ukrainian public trust in Government Institutions (source: Razumkov 2015, 2023)

This more collaborative approach does not mean that the role of the CSOs that were specialised in transparency and government oversight was reduced. On the contrary: many Ukrainian CSOs have now routinely embedded oversight mechanisms in their work and in virtually all sectors there are specialised non-governmental actors that closely monitor the work of government institutions.[16] High-level officials are often ordered to resign as a consequence of public dissatisfaction, as was for example the case with the Minister of Culture Oleksandr Tkachenko in July 2023. It is important to note in this regard that even while monitoring is broadly and firmly embedded in the work of civil society and remains important in order to continue the fight against corruption, civil society actors also increasingly realize and indicate that there is also a need to support the government in its reform efforts. This particularly concerns the provision of expertise and analysis, for which the Government lacks the necessary capacity. These actors are acutely aware that otherwise there is a risk that the Government will fail to meet society’s high expectations not due to bad intentions, but due to a lack of capacity – which in turn could reverse the positive trend of increased trust and co-operation.

In this regard there is one additional development that is worth noting with some concern. Ukraine’s vibrant civil society has been warmly embraced by international donors, who are keen to support it in its role to provide oversight and anti-corruption monitoring. This good intention nonetheless risks inadvertently causing a disbalance in the country’s governance. With international funding, mostly directed at the capacity building of CSOs, and the recent government salary cuts, the incentives for talented civil servants to leave their posts for more favourable employment conditions at NGOs are increasing.[17]

A widespread practice in the last few years for increasing the capacity of the government was to employ a substantial part of the staff on a project basis – with temporary positions usually funded by international donors. This practice enabled government agencies to respond to short-term priorities and tasks, but it did not contribute to an increase of expertise and institutional capacity within the government sector that would be required for the development of long-term strategies and policies. As a result, most government agencies are struggling with a distinct lack of capacity, including in analysis and strategic thinking – which needs to be increased. Think-tank CSOs could in turn contribute with fact-finding and an independent analysis of cross-sectoral issues outside of the reach of government agencies.[18] One example is a joint initiative that Ukraine’s government and civil society are setting up: an international advisory group of experts who will support Ukrainian institutions in responding to the complex requirements demanded by the European Union as part of Ukraine’s EU integration process.

Civil society advocating for reforms & the role of the media

The abovementioned combination of a more open, de-bureaucratized Ukrainian Government that shares the same objective with a more constructive and cooperative civil society has significantly increased society’s trust in the government. This change is still fragile, however: society has strong expectations of an accelerated pace of reforms during and after the war, as well as further integration with the EU and NATO. Both civil society and the government are concerned that any stagnation in the reform progress or a democratic backslide in the aftermath of the war will lead to considerable disappointment in the state structures that may lead to political instability. This concern is further aggravated by a well-founded and widely-held fear that Russian interference and disinformation may exploit such disappointments to further weaken Ukraine.[19] At the same time this fear of Russian meddling in the context of a far-reaching war has a dampening effect on civil participation and the freedom of speech.

Ukraine's pluralistic media landscape has traditionally allowed CSOs to manage the expectations of the population and to influence perceptions concerning society, politics and the government – despite the murky ownership structure of many media outlets. Historically, many media channels in Ukraine were closely affiliated to the major political parties that often used the media to benefit their own visibility; Zelensky’s efforts to address this by targeting specific individuals through a ‘de-oligarchization law’ were criticized by the Venice Commission of the Council of Europe in June 2023, which insisted on a more systemic approach.[20]

In the meantime, the full-scale invasion and martial law have markedly changed the situation. After 24 February 2022, the 9 largest media channels agreed to align their programming in one “United News Telemarathon” (hereinafter: ‘Telemarathon’), aimed at providing the most urgent news and sending out a message of unity for the purpose of winning the war. Criticism of the actions of the Ukrainian government and the President, as well as reporting on common disagreements between the political parties have temporarily become something of a taboo.[21] A similar concept, called “FreeDom”, has been introduced for the Ukrainian media channels catering to the Russian-speaking population in Ukraine. The content of the media programming is determined jointly by the media channels, but the government regulates the general informational framework.

This construction is not without criticism in Ukraine, and some actors are increasingly calling for it to be abolished.[22] The media channels that participate in the Telemarathon are ironically somewhat reluctant to abolish it for financial reasons. Their advertising base and private investments have both shrunk due to the contracting Ukrainian economy and they are only eligible for state funding as long as they keep participating in the Telemarathon.[23] The restriction of media freedom has served its purpose to preserve a sense of a common goal and to deflect the threats of panic and instability due to Russian information warfare. It does, however, pose a significant challenge to the free media environment that civil society needs to function as an intermediary between the government and the population. In addition, the Telemarathon risks being used to filter out political opponents, who receive less air space than the representatives of the ruling political party.[24] For many reasons, including for civil society participation, Ukraine clearly needs to develop a strategy as to when and how to transition back to a more pluralistic media landscape with independent media outlets that are able to secure their own funding.

Institutionalising public participation and strengthening parliamentary oversight

While Ukraine does indeed have a rich history of social mobilisation and protest activism, much of it is ad hoc and there is a distinct lack of institutionalized mechanisms for public participation by civil society.[25] There are specific legislative provisions for civil society to participate, but in practice these are rarely used effectively and civil society tends to find its own ‘shortcuts’ into the governance process.[26] This is especially the case since the war accelerated in 2022. Every government agency has by law a citizens’ consultative board (“hromadska rada”), but in practice they are not used to a large extent. They are often inflexible or cannot meet the demand for expertise or advice. Instead, the ministries and state agencies create ad-hoc consultative groups of professional experts and NGOs that work closely with their government counterparts on strategic analysis and recommendations on most pressing issues.

While this approach of ‘whoever needs to be involved can be involved’ is effective in the current Ukrainian context, it has certain drawbacks. A first problem, which is also admitted by the government, is the lack of a feedback mechanism for civil society on how its analysis and recommendations have been used in policy development. This gives rise to distrust and frustration among CSOs, even if this is probably mostly due to the lack of capacity and time constraints on the government side. A second and related problem is that the process of selecting which CSOs are involved is not structured, which gives the Government an opportunity to select only those CSOs that it feels that it can work with. Other organisations then feel excluded and question how independent the ‘selected’ CSOs really are, especially since some of them were set up by (former) officials. [27]

There is a clear need to further institutionalise this ad-hoc cooperation and to introduce a clear feedback mechanism by the state actors for the benefit of civil society, including with the necessary resources. This would be a way to preserve and ‘lock in’ the effective and constructive cooperation that has emerged between the government and civil society in the context of the Russian aggression.

The same is the case for the interaction between Parliament and civil society. Members of Parliament need to approve a large number of laws on a daily basis and many of them rely on the expertise of the relevant NGOs and think tanks to determine their position on the issue in question. The intensity of communication is high but has no institutionalized basis for a two-way communication channel between Members of Parliament and civil society. Parliament does have specialized commissions where civil society representatives are members thereof, but they do not cover all thematic areas (that are rapidly increasing due to EU and NATO legal requirements). Parliamentary committees also struggle with limited staff capacity and a lack of expertise. One example is the responsibility of the Parliamentary Commission on Foreign Affairs and EU Integration to self-screen Ukrainian legislation according to EU requirements, for which Parliament has neither the sufficient capacity nor the necessary expertise.[28]

These shortcomings together with the prioritisation of the legislative process leaves Parliament with little capacity to execute its oversight function or to cooperate effectively with civil society. The introduction of wartime media freedom restrictions such as the Telemarathon has exacerbated this problem, since it has reduced the media coverage of parliamentary debates. Representatives of the opposition parties complain that they are disproportionally affected and that their work has become much less visible.[29]

There are nonetheless intrinsic competitive characteristics within Ukraine’s Parliament and domestic politics that safeguard the country’s pluralism even in wartime. For example, initial concerns that the absolute majority that the ruling ‘Sluha Narodu’ party obtained in 2021 would lead to a toothless and compliant Parliament were unfounded; in fact, the internal divisions within the party appear to be so strong that the Government was rarely able to obtain a single-party majority for any of its draft laws.[30] To enable a more institutionalised and sustainable form of public participation, it is nonetheless of key importance that even in wartime Parliament finds ways to execute its oversight function and cooperates effectively with CSOs.

Civil society stepping in to fill gaps in State capacity

Since the start of the full-scale invasion in 2022 the interests of civil society and the Ukrainian Government have become aligned more than ever before. All efforts are directed towards countering Russia’s aggression and restoring the country from the damage caused by Russia’s attacks on the one hand, and obtaining Ukraine’s integration in NATO and the EU on the other. While NATO is viewed by both the public and the Government as a guarantor of Ukraine’s external security, the EU is viewed as a guarantor of internal security, economic prosperity and democratic reforms.

These reform processes and diplomatic lobbying for political, economic and military support combined with the war and reconstruction efforts strain the Government’s resources and create many gaps. Civil society has stepped in to fill these gaps at various levels.

At the international and strategic level, CSOs such as the International Coalition for the Ukrainian Victory or the New Europe Center reinforce Ukraine’s intense global diplomatic efforts to advocate for economic and military support, as well as accelerated integration into the EU and NATO and a global isolation of the Russian Federation. Many of these CSOs were previously or simultaneously engaged in monitoring and oversight, which is sometimes difficult to combine. At the national and tactical level, CSOs support the defence industry and the military, for example through direct purchases of military equipment, crowdfunding, the adaptation of commercially available technology and training the military. And at the local or battlefield level, CSOs and volunteers provide direct medical and logistical support to the military.[31]

Some initiatives that were initially spontaneous volunteer movements have outgrown to become professional drone producers and suppliers of military equipment, others have transformed into training centres. Some of the leaders of the registered voluntary organisations have expressed political ambitions and continue working with their initiatives in the political realm.[32] This experience has created a new generation of professionals with a proactive leadership attitude. These are the types of organisations that have potential if they are supported and team up with other actors to push for security sector reform.

Finally, since 2014 certain groups have organized themselves as volunteer battalions that played an important role in defending the country but also gave cause for concern about their ideology, political agendas and line of command. While some of these groups have indeed displayed militaristic and extreme nationalist tendencies and in the beginning appeared to be operating largely independently from the Government, by now they have been largely integrated into state structures.[33] Some were incorporated into the structures of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MoIA) as part of battalions fighting in East Ukraine, others joined the forces of territorial defence units under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Defence (MoD). The State appears to have largely but not entirely regained the monopoly on the use of force that was temporarily dispersed among a range of (para)military and volunteer formations after 2014.

The importance of localisation

While international attention typically first focuses on larger, institutionalised civil society actors that operate nationwide, local CSOs in Ukraine have proved to be invaluable in providing first response in crisis situations. In Eastern Ukraine, for example, local CSOs have supported internally displaced persons, provided first medical aid to injured civilians and soldiers alike and have delivered basic provisions to cities and villages in need. Because they are based directly at locations that need quick support, local CSOs have the best information about the situation on the ground and are the first to respond to the urgent needs of the population in stabilizing the situation.

Yet, their crucial role is largely underestimated by international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) which prefer to work with a few well-known large Ukrainian NGOs based in Kyiv, as they are better positioned to comply with the bureaucracy of the financial justification of INGOs. When it comes to the allocation of funding, the relations between INGOs and local partners are largely characterized by the low level of trust with emphasis on extensive financial reporting requirements and non-transparent decision-making on the side of international partners. As a result, despite almost 17 billion USD of international funding pledged to Ukraine since February 2022, local Ukrainian NGOs struggle to find sufficient support; many do not have the capacity to apply for international funding as their focus is on providing ad hoc emergency assistance. INGOs, in turn, are struggling to provide flexible, hands-on aid that can generate a long-term impact as they lack the practical experience and knowledge on the ground and are reluctant to cooperate with local civil society.[34] This is increasingly recognized by embassies on the ground that prioritize their support to smaller, regional NGOs.[35]

For how civil society differs in democracies and autocracies, see: Magdalena Kamont, “Civil Society, Democracy and Authoritarianism,” Utblick Magazine, Published December 5, 2021.; Adam Jezard, “Who and What is ‘ Civil Society? ’,” World Economic Forum, Published April 23, 2018.
Geneva Centre for Security Sector GovernanceThe Security Sector: Roles and Responsibilities in Security Provision, Management and Oversight (Geneva: DCAF, 2015:6).
Geneva Centre for Security Sector GovernanceThe Security Sector: Roles and Responsibilities in Security Provision, Management and Oversight (Geneva: DCAF, 2015).
For an excellent overview of the civil society functions and definitions see: DCAF – Geneva Centre for Security Sector GovernanceCivil Society: Roles and Responsibilities in Good Security Sector Governance (Geneva: DCAF, 2019) and Augustin Loada and Ornella ModeranCivil Society Involvement in Security Sector Reform and Governance (Geneva: DCAF, 2015).
Augustin Loada and Ornella Moderan, “Civil Society Involvement in Security Sector Reform and Governance” in Toolkit for Security Sector Reform and Governance in West Africa, ed., Ornella Moderan (Geneva: DCAF, 2015).
DCAF – Geneva Centre for Security Sector GovernanceCivil Society: Roles and Responsibilities in Good Security Sector Governance (Geneva: DCAF, 2019), 7.
More on this in: Rosaria Puglisi, A People’s Army: Civil Society as a Security Actor in Post-Maidan Ukraine (Rome: Istituto Affari Internazionali, July 2015).
Ukrinform, “Vidbudovuvaty Ukrainu Pislia Viiny Planuiut 80% Hromadskykh i Blahodiinykh Orhanizatsii” [80% of Public and Charitable Organizations plan to Rebuild Ukraine After the War], Ukrinform: Multymediina Platforma Inomovlennia Ukrainy, February 21, 2023.
Kateryna Pishchikova and Olesia Ogryzko, Civic Awakening: The Impact of Euromaidan on Ukraine’s Politics and Society (Madrid: FRIDE, July 2014).
Dzherela Truskavtsia, “Dovira Ukraintsiv do 2015 Roku do Instytutiv Vlady Rizko Vpala i Trokhy Zrosla do Bankiv (Opytuvannia)” [By 2015, Ukrainians’ Trust in Government Institutions fell Sharply and Slightly Increased in Banks (Survey)], Dzherela Truskavtsia, Published January 2, 2016.
Clingendael Policy Interview, Kyiv, April 2023.
Razumkov Tsentr, “Otsinka Hromadianamy Sytuatsii v Kraini ta Dii Vlady, Dovira do Sotsialnykh Instytutiv (Liutyi–Berezen 2023r.)” [Citizens’ Assessment of the Situation in the Country and the Actions of the Authorities, Trust in Social Institutions (February–March 2023)], Razumkov Tsentr, Published March 15, 2023.
Dzherela Truskavtsia, “Dovira Ukraintsiv do 2015 Roku do Instytutiv Vlady Rizko Vpala i Trokhy Zrosla do Bankiv (Opytuvannia)” [By 2015, Ukrainians’ Trust in Government Institutions fell Sharply and Slightly Increased in Banks (Survey)], Dzherela Truskavtsia, Published January 2, 2016.
Graph based on data from: Dzherela Truskavtsia, “Dovira Ukraintsiv do 2015 Roku do Instytutiv Vlady Rizko Vpala i Trokhy Zrosla do Bankiv (Opytuvannia)” [By 2015, Ukrainians’ Trust in Government Institutions fell Sharply and Slightly Increased in Banks (Survey)].; Razumkov Tsentr, “Otsinka Hromadianamy Sytuatsii v Kraini ta Dii Vlady, Dovira do Sotsialnykh Instytutiv (Liutyi–Berezen 2023r.)” [Citizens’ Assessment of the Situation in the Country and the Actions of the Authorities, Trust in Social Institutions (February–March 2023)].; Liana Novikova, “Dovira do Sotsialnykh Instytutsii ta Hrup” [Trust in Social Institutions and Groups], Kyivskyi Mizhnarodnyi Instytut Sotsiolohii, Published January 15, 2016.
One such example in the security sector is the Independent (Defence) Anti-Corruption Committee (NAKO), set up by Ukrainian civil activists and international experts in 2016 and transformed into a full civil society actor in 2019. A few other examples are DixiGroup in energy policy, EcoAction in environmental and social policy and Cedos in social and housing policy.
Clingendael policy interviews, Kyiv, July 2023.
Clingendael policy interviews, Kyiv, July 2023.
Clingendael Policy Interview, Kyiv, April 2023.
Ihor Burdyha, “Novyi Zakon pro Media: Chy Ochikuvaty Obmezhen Svobody ZMI?” [The New Media Law: Should We Expect Restrictions on Media Freedom?], Deutsche Welle, Published December 12, 2022.
Nataliia Dankova, “Nedoliniinyi Kanal. Shcho Vidbuvaietsia za Lashtunkamy “Yedynykh Novyn”” [Non-linear Channel. What Happens Behind the Scenes of “Edynykh Noviny”], Detektor Media, Published January 23, 2023.
Koalitsiia Reanimatsiinyi Paket Reform, “Monomarafon. Chomu Vlada Prypynyla Movlennia 5 Kanalu, Priamoho ta “Espreso”” [Monomarathon. Why the Authorities Stopped Broadcasting Channel 5, Pryamoy and “Espresso”], Koalitsiia Reanimatsiinyi Paket Reform, Published April 19, 2022.
Clingendael Policy Interview, Kyiv, April 2023.; Aleksander Palikot, “Wartime TV In Ukraine: Much-Needed Unity Or A ‘ Marathon Of Propaganda ’ ?,” RadioFreeEurope RadioLiberty, Published July 23, 2023.
Puglisi, A People’s Army, 5.
Clingendael Policy Interview, Kyiv, April 2023. See also Konstytutsiinyi Sud Ukrainy, “Pravo na Uchast v Upravlinni Derzhavnymy Spravamy” [The Right to Participate in the Management of State Affairs], Konstytutsiinyi Sud Ukrainy, Accessed August 2, 2023.
Clingendael Policy Interview, Kyiv, April 2023.
Clingendael Policy Interview, Kyiv, April 2023.
Clingendael Policy Interview, Kyiv, April 2023.
Tania Matiash, “KVU: De- Fakto v Monobilshosti Lyshe 217 Deputativ” [KVU: Only 217 Deputies have a De Facto Monomajority],, Published January 5, 2022.
Clingendael Policy Interviews, Kyiv, April 2023.; Kateryna Zarembo, “The Resilience and Trauma of Ukraine’s Civil Society,” Carnegie Europe, Published June 1, 2023.
Anna Myroniuk, “Serhiy Prytula : ‘Flawed Political System has not Vanished, it has laid Low Until War ends’,” The Kyiv Independent, Published June 19, 2022.
Puglisi, A People’s Army, 5.
KUNO, “Localisation of Humanitarian Aid in Ukraine,” (roundtable discussion, Cordaid, The Hague, March 28, 2023); “If not now, when?,” Natsionalna Merezha Rozvytku Lokalnoi Filantropii, Accessed August 24, 2023.
Such as the ‘Matra’ programme of the Dutch Embassy in Ukraine, but also for example by the Canadian and Swedish Embassies. Clingendael policy interview, Kyiv, April 2023.