As quoted in chapter 1 of this Clingendael Report, the BRICS ‘have a strong incentive to be cautious in their approach [to peacekeeping], because disruptions in the global order would harm their own economic growth’. The BRICS are not a consolidated revolutionary force aimed against Western values and interests. At best, the BRICS are (like the EU) a forum aimed at advancing the national interests of its members. The BRICS’ coherence, however, remains hampered by conflicts of economic interests, which are deepened by traditional strategic disagreements.
The global veto power of the BRICS is bound to grow, but their proactive force in global politics will remain negligible.
Most BRICS mainly want to be recognized as equal partners at the highest forums of international decision-making. The global veto power of the BRICS is bound to grow, but their proactive force in global politics will remain negligible. On practical security matters, the BRICS rarely act as a group. This diversity also implies that the BRICS have minimal collective leverage within multilateral forums, and are particularly ineffective on military and security matters. Apart from demanding a larger ‘voice’ in global governance, the BRICS are overall satisfied with the international system’s present functioning and therefore cherish a conservative, rather than revolutionary, vision of the global economy. Still, the EU should not expect these intrinsic divisions to block permanently the development of the BRICS as a strategic actor.
For the time being, the security implications of the BRICS’ mounting confidence and (economic and military) capabilities are rather minor for the EU. The EU’s inadequate toolbox for tackling existing problems and challenges should be of much greater concern to European policy-makers. The EU’s declining economic and political power makes Europe’s vicinity susceptible to the BRICS’ influence (and to Chinese influence in particular). For example, China’s commitment to the principle of non-intervention in the domestic affairs of other countries (including those receiving Chinese aid and investment) will solidify established regimes, whether (more or less) democratic or not. This also includes Europe proper, as the case of the Western Balkans bears out. Even the lure of EU membership seems unable to put a halt to the growing influence of the BRICS in the Western Balkans, allowing Russia and China (as well as the Gulf states) to use their distinctively non-Western societal norms (based on support for authoritarian democracy) to cater to corrupt political elites in the region.
The growing role of China (and, to a lesser extent, Russia) in the MENA region and the Western Balkans owes more to a strategic vacuum left by Western political impotence and strategic neglect than it is the result of careful planning by competing powers. The rise of the BRICS is the geostrategic flipside of the EU’s self-inflicted economic and political crisis (mainly because of its misguided euro ambitions) and its failure to develop effective security and defence policies. The BRICS gain influence in Europe and beyond mainly because the EU lacks the economic resources and political will to offer an attractive alternative. Brussels is engaged in a (admittedly modest and unambitious) strategic rethink on these matters, making the rise of the BRICS a key argument for a more cohesive and integrated EU. Still, the EU has no plan and no policies to go beyond the existing strategic partnerships with all five BRICS members.
One may conclude that the three strategic challenges facing the EU because of the rise of the BRICS (as identified above) remain pertinent, but should not be exaggerated. The BRICS nations clearly use their economic power to reach foreign policy goals, which includes decision-making in international forums. They also develop alternatives to Western initiatives and institutions. Yet political cohesion within the BRICS is brittle, and there are many opportunities for the EU to develop constructive security relationships with the BRICS as a group, as well as with individual players. The EU’s concern about the rise of radical Islam and Jihadism is shared by Russia and China. Russia’s interests and politico–security agenda in the MENA region are conservative, opposing democratization and supporting authoritarian regimes (as long as they are not Sunni, as in Qatar and Saudi Arabia). Although the preferred policies of Russia and China to address this shared strategic challenge may differ, the obvious necessity to work together requires open channels of communication, as well as a chance to avoid the unwelcome rupture dividing ‘the West versus the rest’.
This implies that the EU will have to adopt a conservative approach to the BRICS challenge, one that is accommodating to its rise. Most likely, the opposition of several BRICS countries to the EU’s values and interests will be temporary, since they benefit greatly from globalization and free trade, and most of them are marching upwards on the so-called ‘global value chain’.
China’s ambitious New Silk Road initiative will benefit greatly from stable European economic and political conditions; a new era of superpower competition would not serve Beijing’s interests at all. To some Chinese observers, the EU is a radical, post-modern power, which needs to be balanced by China’s more prudent, conservative approach to world affairs. As Xue Lei has said:
The Chinese approach has been characterized by incrementalism and gradualism, with a marked preference for stability and gradual change in the status quo. At times it has provided a much-needed counterbalance to the radicalism of the Western approach.[81]
All of this suggests that China’s conservative streak is something that the EU (and the West in general) should cherish. Within the BRICS framework, China can manage and could even put a lid on Russia’s rising pugnaciousness. This is clearly in the West’s strategic interest and should be the basis for a more mature EU strategy towards the BRICS group and its individual members.