Until a short time ago, the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) were considered too much of a motley crew to be taken seriously. The only shared feature of these emerging powers seemed to be their criticism of Western institutions and their aspiration to recalibrate the balance of power within today’s global governance frameworks. Although it remains undecided whether the BRICS will develop into a full-fledged, consolidated alliance in global politics, the trend towards intensified cooperation and institutionalization now suggests that this may well be possible. The BRICS have gone a long way from being the simple acronym conceived by a Goldman Sachs economist in 2001, to becoming the serious group of heads of state and government meeting at their 7th summit in the Russian city of Ufa in July 2015.[1]
The BRICS as a Security Challenge
This Clingendael Report examines whether, and if so how, the BRICS are a security challenge to the European Union (EU). Given the comprehensive nature of the EU’s agenda and the ever-widening definition of ‘security’, the report will not only cover traditional (politico–military) aspects of security, but also consider the economic, financial, institutional and normative challenges posed by the rise of the BRICS. Until a few years ago, the discourse around the BRICS was mainly economic; only recently have the BRICS nations manifested themselves as a (still potential and embryonic) ‘security actor’. The first time that the BRICS arrived on the Western strategic radar was in March 2011, when these countries chose to abstain on United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1973, which decided on the international response to Colonel Gaddafi’s merciless actions in Libya. The BRICS sustained their presence as a ‘strategic actor’ during the Syrian civil war, which started in 2011. From the beginning, Russia and China (as permanent members of the UNSC) blocked attempts by Western and Arab states to punish the Assad regime for its brutal repression of the popular uprisings in Syria. Brazil and India, as well as South Africa, de facto supported Russia and China by opposing ‘regime change’. The BRICS declared in a joint statement (in March 2013) that a ‘Syrian-led political process leading to a transition can be achieved only through broad national dialogue that meets the legitimate aspirations of all sections of Syrian society and respect for Syrian independence, territorial integrity and sovereignty’.[2]
Since this episode, the BRICS have met in many different configurations (heads of state and government, ministers, diplomats, parliamentarians and academics), aimed at coordinating policies and strengthening their collective presence in international forums. Most recently, the BRICS flexed their muscles during the crisis over Russia’s annexation of the Crimea (in March 2014) and the on-going civil war in eastern Ukraine. Brazil, India, China and South Africa openly supported the Russian cause by abstaining from the UN General Assembly resolution (no. 68/262) criticizing the Crimea referendum.[3]
With the new drive to establish non-Western economic and financial institutions such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the New Development Bank (NDB), the BRICS have emerged as a global player to be reckoned with. This does not mean that the BRICS all share the same, and perhaps not even similar, strategic interests and visions. Brazil and South Africa are continental powerhouses, mainly interested in the BRICS project to increase South–South trade and to strengthen the role of the so-called ‘Global South’ in world politics; China considers the BRICS project the best way to spread its sovereigntist approach and to extend its own global power under the BRICS’ multilateral guise; Russia clings to the BRICS as a means to mask and delay its own economic and strategic decline; whereas India seeks to acquire the status and influence commensurate with its growing economic weight. One could therefore argue that the BRICS (like the EU) is a forum used for advancing the national interests of its members.[4] Yet one can also expect (akin to the EU) that working within the BRICS will gradually encourage members to streamline their national interests and visions, especially since outside expectations of joint policies and actions apply pressure on members to overcome their differences.
For the time being, the coherence of the BRICS will be hampered by deep fissures in economic interests and traditional strategic conflicts. Yet as the past five years have indicated, the West should not expect these intrinsic divisions to block permanently the development of the BRICS group as a strategic actor.
Scope and Focus of this Report
This Clingendael Report examines the security implications of the BRICS for the EU. Chapter 1 surveys the main security challenges facing the EU in its strategy towards the BRICS. It asks (among other things) whether the BRICS nations can use their growing economic power in support of their foreign policy goals in Europe’s neighbourhood, and whether the very existence of the BRICS (as a group) will change the strategic playing field in Europe’s proximity. Chapter 2 offers a brief analytical overview of the policies and interests of the BRICS in the EU’s neighbourhood, ranging from the Middle East and North Africa (the so-called MENA region), to the Western Balkans and Eastern Europe, including the Caucasus.
The BRICS are gaining influence in Europe and beyond, mainly because the EU lacks the economic resources and political will to offer an attractive alternative.
The report offers one clear and solid conclusion: the BRICS may not be a revolutionary force aimed against the West, but the EU’s flagging economic and political power does make Europe and its vicinity susceptible to the BRICS group’s influence (and the influence of China in particular). The rise of the BRICS is therefore part of the same story as the EU’s unending and self-inflicted economic and political crisis (mainly because of its misguided euro ambitions), and its failure to develop effective security and defence policies. In short, the BRICS are gaining influence in Europe and beyond, mainly because the EU lacks the economic resources and political will to offer an attractive alternative.
A clear illustration presented itself during summer 2015. When the EU found itself in a predicament over what to do with a recalcitrant and economically broke Greece, the BRICS heads of state and government held their 7th summit in Ufa (Russia), inaugurating a New Development Bank and a Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA). The contrast could hardly be sharper: where the EU’s institutions are under pressure, the BRICS are steadily developing their own institutions;[5] where the EU’s mistaken policies are eroding its image, the BRICS offer an ambitious ‘Roadmap to 2025’ as part of China’s gargantuan New Silk Road initiative. [6]
For the time being, the security implications of this shifting balance of global power remain modest for the EU. Still, it should be of serious concern to policy-makers that the EU’s toolbox is proving to be so maladjusted to the problems and challenges at hand. This implies that the EU will have to adopt a conservative approach to the BRICS challenge, one that is accommodating to its rise. In the meantime, the EU’s influence in its direct vicinity will shrink as long as its own economic and political crises endure.